The International Emergency Economic Powers January 30, 2024
Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Christopher A. Casey,
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Updated September 1, 2025
(R45618)
Jump to Main Text of Report
Summary
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad
Coordinator
authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national
Analyst in International
emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at
Trade and Finance
the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the
act’act's enactment in 1977s enactment in 1977
have caused some, including its use to impose tariffs on imports from almost all countries in 2025, have caused some Members of Congress and policy analysts to question whether the statute to question whether the statute
’'s oversight provisions s oversight provisions
Dianne E. Rennack
are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President during a
Specialist in Foreign Policy
declared emergency.declared emergency.
Legislation
Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency
power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 power to the President by statute. TWEA was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917
Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney
to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the
U.S. entryentry of the United States into the First into the First
World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a
national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and
international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became the central means
to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block
international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to
deter the hoarding of gold, deter the hoarding of gold,
and limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companieslimit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies
, and impose tariffs. In addition, when a temporary tariff the President had imposed on all imports into the on all imports into the
United StatesUnited States
.
was challenged in federal court, the government argued that TWEA provided legal authority for the President's action.
Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40
years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new
limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and
the NEA required the President to assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency. the NEA required the President to assess annually and extend, if appropriate, an emergency.
However, someSome experts argue experts argue
that thethat renewal process has become renewal process has become
pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national . The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national
emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case, emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark case,
however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional.
Concerned about the termination provisions in the NEA, Congress amended the Congress amended the
statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.
Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA,
Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the
restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents
targeted used IEEPA to target foreign states or their governments. Over the years, foreign states or their governments. Over the years,
however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to
target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and target non-state individuals and groups, such as terrorists, persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, and
certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.
As of January 15, 2024
As of September 1, 2025, Presidents had declared , Presidents had declared
6977 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, national emergencies invoking IEEPA,
3946 of which are ongoing. of which are ongoing.
History shows that nationalNational emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly emergencies invoking IEEPA often last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly
longer—the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of longer—the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of
U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, is in its fifth decade.U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, is in its fifth decade.
IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, until 2023, IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, until 2023,
Congress had never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the Congress had never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the
President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether
IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with CongressIEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress
’'s duty to oversee executive action. s duty to oversee executive action.
Congress may also want to consider IEEPACongress may also want to consider IEEPA
’'s role in implementing s role in implementing
itscongressional influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security
decision-decision making.making.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Origins ............................................................................................................................................. 2
The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) ........................................ 2
The Expansion of TWEA .......................................................................................................... 4
The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities ........................................ 6
The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ............................................................................................................ 8
IEEPA’s Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation ..................................................................... 10
IEEPA’s Statute ....................................................................................................................... 10
Amendments to IEEPA ............................................................................................................ 11
The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA ....................................................... 12
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA ..................................................................... 13
IEEPA Trends .......................................................................................................................... 15
Presidential Emergency Use ............................................................................................. 16
Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval ......................................... 23
Current Uses of IEEPA ........................................................................................................... 25
Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA ......................................................................................... 27
Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA ................................................. 27
Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds
of Sanctions ................................................................................................................... 31
Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA ............................................................................................. 34
Dames & Moore v. Regan ................................................................................................. 34
Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine ............................................................ 36
Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto .......................................................................... 37
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause ..................................................................................... 37
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.............................................................................. 39
First Amendment Challenges ............................................................................................ 42
First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception
under IEEPA .................................................................................................................. 43
Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)................... 48
Issues and Options for Congress ................................................................................................... 50
Delegation of Authority under IEEPA ..................................................................................... 50
Definition of “National Emergency” and “Unusual and Extraordinary Threat” ............... 51
Scope of the Authority ...................................................................................................... 51
Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval ........................................ 53
The NEA, IEEPA, and “Never Ending Emergencies” ...................................................... 53
The Status Quo .................................................................................................................. 54
Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA..................................... 54
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 ................................................................................ 56
Figures
Figure 1. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA ......................................................... 17
Figure 2. Average Length of Emergencies Citing IEEPA .............................................................. 18
Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Ongoing National Emergencies by Year .................................. 19
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Figure 4. National Emergency Act Declarations ........................................................................... 20
Tables
Table 1. Amendments to IEEPA ..................................................................................................... 11
Table A-1. National Emergencies Declared Pursuant to the NEA as of January 15, 2024 ............ 58
Table A-2. Resolutions to Terminate National Emergencies ......................................................... 63
Table A-3. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order ................................................. 66
Appendixes
Appendix A. NEA and IEEPA Use ................................................................................................ 58
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 87
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Introduction
Introduction
The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal
democracies throughout the twentieth democracies throughout the twentieth
centuryand twenty-first centuries. Specifically, the question of how to balance a . Specifically, the question of how to balance a
commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has
been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.been a consistent concern of legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world.
1
1
The U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of The U.S. Constitution is silent on the question of
emergency powerhow to handle emergencies. As such, over the past two . As such, over the past two
centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often centuries, Congress and the President have answered that question in varied and often
ad hoc ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act ways. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act
without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal
civil liability.civil liability.
22 Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently
either to ratify the Presidenteither to ratify the President
’'s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil s actions through legislation or indemnify the President for any civil
liability.liability.
3
3
By the twentieth century, a new pattern By the twentieth century, a new pattern
had begunbegan to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an to emerge. Instead of retroactively judging an
executive’executive's extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing s extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress enacted statutes authorizing
the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers.
4 4 The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via The expanding delegation of emergency powers to executives, and the increase in governing via
emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal emergency power by executives, was a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal
democracies.democracies.
55 As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some As innovation quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some
legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists legislatures felt compelled to delegate to their executives, who traditional political theorists
assumed could operate with greater assumed could operate with greater
“dispatch”"dispatch" than the more deliberate and future-oriented legislatures.6 than the more deliberate and future-oriented
1 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
2 Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of American political institutions. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764), pp. 340-341: “This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […].”
3 Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 36, no. 3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861,” The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from
the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210; Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214.
4 U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of
Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), pp. 40-41.
5 For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social
Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Yale Law
Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Total War
and the Constitution; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
legislatures.6 Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy
modern constitutional orders has been a subject of debate.modern constitutional orders has been a subject of debate.
7
7
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one example of a twentieth-The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one example of a twentieth-
century delegation of emergency authority.century delegation of emergency authority.
88 One of One of
117more than a hundred emergency statutes under the umbrella of emergency statutes under the umbrella of
the National Emergencies Act (NEA),the National Emergencies Act (NEA),
99 IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a
variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in variety of economic transactions during a state of national emergency. Congress enacted IEEPA in
1977 to limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President under the 1977 to limit the emergency economic powers that it had delegated to the President under the
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and
legislative actions subsequent to IEEPAlegislative actions subsequent to IEEPA
’'s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of s enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of
expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm.
1010 Other scholars argue that Other scholars argue that
IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to IEEPA is a useful tool for Presidents to
quickly implement implement
quickly the will of Congress either as directed the will of Congress either as directed
by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.by law or as encouraged by congressional activity.
11
11
Until the late 2010s, there had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or Until the late 2010s, there had been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or
its umbrella statute, the NEA. Presidential actions in the late 2010s and its umbrella statute, the NEA. Presidential actions in the late 2010s and
early 2020s, however, 2020s, have drawn renewed attention to presidential emergency powers under the NEAhave drawn renewed attention to presidential emergency powers under the NEA
, of which IEEPA of which IEEPA
is the most frequently used.is the most frequently used.
Origins
The First World War and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.The First World War (1914-1919) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization.
1212 The The
executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or
without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged
6 Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-341: “[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”
7 For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The
Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3.
8 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (2018) (IEEPA).
9 National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act,
Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.
10 See, e.g., Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p. 1120.
11 See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.”
12 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
without the support of their legislatures. The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-position relative to its allies in Europe. Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-
Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion. Rather than relying on
the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and hoping for a subsequent
congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new
powers to meet the global crisis.powers to meet the global crisis.
13 Between 1916 and13 By the end of 1917, Congress the end of 1917, Congress
had passed 22 passed 22
statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the
war.war.
1414 These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars, These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars,
telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American
economy.economy.
15
15
TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.TWEA was one of those 22 statutes.
1616 It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of
control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United
States and its enemies.States and its enemies.
1717 TWEA defined TWEA defined
“enemy”"enemy" broadly and included broadly and included
“"any individual, any individual,
partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident
within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of within the territory ... of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of
the United States and doing business within such a territory....the United States and doing business within such a territory....
”18 "18 The first four sections of the act The first four sections of the act
granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting granted the President extensive powers to limit trading with, communicating with, or transporting
enemies (or their allies) of the United States.enemies (or their allies) of the United States.
1919 These sections also empowered the President to These sections also empowered the President to
censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or
reinsurance companies.reinsurance companies.
20
It was 20
Section 5(b) of TWEASection 5(b) of TWEA
, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential would form one of the central bases of presidential
emergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, statesemergency economic power in the twentieth century. Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states
:
That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations
as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign foreign
exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of
credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly
within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership
of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person
within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection connection
therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is
completed.21
13 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the
United States, pp. 40-41.
14 J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of
Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.
15 Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 2.
16 For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the Trading with the Enemy Act,” Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018).
17 Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) §2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018) (TWEA).
18 TWEA §2. 19 TWEA §3. 20 TWEA §4. 21 TWEA §5b.
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
completed.21
The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions The statute gave the President expansive control over private international economic transactions
in times of war.in times of war.
2222 While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was
specifically exempted because the U.S. government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien specifically exempted because the U.S. government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien
property in its custody.property in its custody.
23 Indeed, the23 The disposition of property seized under emergency powers disposition of property seized under emergency powers
would become a central tension in the structure of emergency authority over the next century.would become a central tension in the structure of emergency authority over the next century.
The Expansion of TWEA
The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a
challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To address the complexities challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas. To address the complexities
presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to
their executives to a degree that had previously been done only in times of war.their executives to a degree that had previously been done only in times of war.
24 The U.S. 24 Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the
President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic
economic powers.economic powers.
Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public Such a delegation was made politically possible by analogizing economic crises to war. In public
speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be speeches, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be
“"attacked,attacked,
” “" "fought against,fought against,
” “" "mobilized for,mobilized for,
” and “combatted” by “" and "combatted" by "great arm[ies] of people.great arm[ies] of people.
”25"25 The The
economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executiveeconomic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive
’s 's military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to military and economic powers. As the Depression was likened to
“"armed strifearmed strife
”26"26 and declared to and declared to
be be
“"an emergency more serious than waran emergency more serious than war
”27"27 by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine
to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary
economic authority in peacetime.economic authority in peacetime.
28
28
As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt asked Congress
for for
“"broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that
would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.
”29"29 In his first act as President, In his first act as President,
Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions
located in the United States and its territories for four days.located in the United States and its territories for four days.
3030 In his proclamation, Roosevelt In his proclamation, Roosevelt
claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA.
3131 However, However,
because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily
domestic, the Presidentdomestic, the President
’'s authority to issue such an order was dubious.32
Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt's authority to issue such an order was dubious.32
22 TWEA §2. 23 U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International
Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.
24 William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872. 25 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. 56.
26 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933. 27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting). 28 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878. 29 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933. 30 Proclamation 2039 (March 6, 1933). 31 In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” Proclamation 2039. 32 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of (continued...)
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Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt’s actions by passing the Emergency s actions by passing the Emergency
Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation.
3333 The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA
to readto read
During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or
During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit....investigate, regulate, or prohibit....
34
34
This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and
assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war. assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war.
By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate
“"[e]very transaction in [e]very transaction in
foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and
any banking institution outside of the United States.any banking institution outside of the United States.
”35
"35
With AmericaWith America
’'s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to s entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to
grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called
“vesting”"vesting" power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property. power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property.
3636 Now in its most Now in its most
expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing,
to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in
which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest.
37
37
The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed The Second World War ended in 1945. Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed
institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade. institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade.
However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to
emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA emergency powers. Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA
and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war.
3838 Over the next several Over the next several
decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies and assumed expansive authority over
economic transactions in the postwar period.economic transactions in the postwar period.
39
39
During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and
national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool.
Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed” as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.
33 Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United
States, p. 57.
34 TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA. 35 E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), chap. 9.
36 P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838. 37 Ibid. 38 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom
and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).
39 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23, 1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National
Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency
Powers, by L. Elaine Halchin.
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national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool. In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose In 1950, President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea and China.economic sanctions on North Korea and China.
4040 Subsequent Presidents referenced that national Subsequent Presidents referenced that national
emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia.
4141 Truman Truman
likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of
credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s.
42 42 Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls
established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired.
43
43
TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy. Presidents
Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by
President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and
export of gold.export of gold.
4444 In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson explicitly used Truman
’'s 1950 declaration s 1950 declaration
of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U.S. companies
in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the
devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom.
4545 In 1971, after President Nixon In 1971, after President Nixon
suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to
declare a state of emergency and place a 10% declare a state of emergency and place a 10%
ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods supplemental duty on all dutiable goods
entering the United States.entering the United States.
46
46
The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that
postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U.S. international monetary policy relied on
continued states of emergency for their operation.continued states of emergency for their operation.
The Efforts of Congress to Limit Executive Emergency Authorities
By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic By the mid-1970s, following U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic
spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related
abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch. The Senate
formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to
40 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times
of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency
Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.
41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States
Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).
42 E.O. 10348 (April 26, 1952). 43 E.O. 11677 (August 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 (August 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 (July 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 (August 14, 1974); E.O. 11810 (September 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 (November 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 (September 30, 1976).
44 E.O. 10896 (November 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962). 45 E.O. 11387 (January 1, 1968). 46 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey.
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formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.reevaluate delegations of emergency authority to the President.
4747 The special committee issued a The special committee issued a
report surveying the Presidentreport surveying the President
’'s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had s emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had
technically technically
“"been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933
”" and that there were four and that there were four
distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.distinct declarations of national emergency in effect.
4848 The report also noted that the United States The report also noted that the United States
had had
“"on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating
to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which
affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.
”49
"49
In the course of the CommitteeIn the course of the Committee
’'s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted, s investigations, Senator Mathias, a committee co-chair, noted,
“A "A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency
government.government.
”"50 Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee
was was
“"whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present
Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of
emergency.emergency.
”50
"51
Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA. In 1977, during
the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of
the House International Relations Committeethe House International Relations Committee
’'s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described s Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described
TWEA as conferring TWEA as conferring
“"on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could
have used without any restraint by Congress.have used without any restraint by Congress.
”51"52 According to the Department of Justice, TWEA According to the Department of Justice, TWEA
granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency:granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency:
(a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion, (a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion,
currency, and securities;currency, and securities;
(b) Regulatory powers with respect to (b) Regulatory powers with respect to
“"any property in which anyany property in which any
foreign country or a foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest”;
47 The bipartisan special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the
Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of
Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. iii.
48 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President Nixon in 1970 and 1971.
49 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. 50 Qtd. in U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii. 51 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup
before the Committee on International Relations (“House Markup”), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23, 1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President Truman’s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon’s declaration of national emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the Export Administration Act when that act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at 2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” H. Rept. No. 95-459, 7.
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national thereof has any interest";
(c) The power to vest (c) The power to vest
“"any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereofany property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof
”; and
"; and
(d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with (d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with
“"such interest such interest
or propertyor property
”" in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States. in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.
52
53
The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA
“"essentially an unlimited grant of essentially an unlimited grant of
authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and
international economic arena, without congressional review.international economic arena, without congressional review.
”53"54 The criticisms of TWEA centered The criticisms of TWEA centered
on the following:on the following:
(a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or (a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or
the declaration of a national emergency.the declaration of a national emergency.
(b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review, (b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review,
and no way for Congress to terminate it.and no way for Congress to terminate it.
(c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA(c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA
’'s economic powers and the circumstances s economic powers and the circumstances
under which such authority could be used.under which such authority could be used.
(d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances (d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances
in which the national emergency was declared.in which the national emergency was declared.
54
55
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier, In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G. Maier,
a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA:a noted legal scholar, summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President.converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President.
”55 "56
The Enactment of the National Emergencies Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
CongressCongress
’'s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted s reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts. First, Congress enacted
the National Emergencies Act the National Emergencies Act
(NEA) in 1976.in 1976.
5657 The NEA provided for the termination of all The NEA provided for the termination of all
existing existing
declared emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new
restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, includingrestrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including
• Requiring the President to transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the Requiring the President to transmit immediately to Congress a notification of the
declaration of national emergency.declaration of national emergency.
•
Requiring a biannual review whereby Requiring a biannual review whereby
“"each House of Congress shall meet to each House of Congress shall meet to
consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine
whether that emergency shall be terminated.whether that emergency shall be terminated.
”
• "
Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged
concurrent [now joint] resolution.57
52 U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 9. 55 Ibid. 56 P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018).
57 Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider (continued...)
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concurrent [now joint] resolution.58 Second, Congress tackled the more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities Second, Congress tackled the more complicated question of TWEA. Because the authorities
granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use
of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking.
5859 The exclusion of The exclusion of
Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign
assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods.
5960 Similarly, establishing a means to continue Similarly, establishing a means to continue
existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in
“"improving future use rather than improving future use rather than
remedying past abuses.remedying past abuses.
”60
"61
The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports,
including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages.
6162 In In
the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that the resulting legislation, Congress did three things. First, Congress amended TWEA so that
it TWEA was, as originally intended, only applicable was, as originally intended, only applicable
“"during a time of war.during a time of war.
”62"63 Second, Congress expanded Second, Congress expanded
the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to
Section 5(b) of TWEA.Section 5(b) of TWEA.
6364 Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) Act to confer to confer
“"upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national
emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to
procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].
”64
"65
The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summarized the nature of an
“emergency”"emergency" in its in its
“"new approachnew approach
”" to international emergency economic powers: to international emergency economic powers:
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President[G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President
’'s discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to s discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various various
substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by
their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems. A national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no
other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual
how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July 1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) §101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum of September 8, 1978, 45 Federal Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of September 8, 1980, 45 Federal Register 59,549; Memorandum of September 10, 1981, 46 Federal Register 45,321; Memorandum of September 8, 1982, 47 Federal Register 39,797; Memorandum of September 7, 1983, 48 Federal
Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 11, 1984, 49 Federal Register 35,927.
58 U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7. 59 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, International Emergency Economic
Powers Legislation, Report to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 3.
60 U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10. 61 House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of
International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
62 P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // is amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018); House, Trading with the
Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
63 Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”).
64 Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
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state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.65
IEEPA’s Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
IEEPA’s Statute
IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
other purpose. The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs.66
IEEPA's Statute, its Use, and Judicial Interpretation
IEEPA empowers the President to exercise an array of economic powers "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."67 The statute provides that the authorities granted by IEEPA to the President "may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter [i.e., IEEPA] and may not be exercised for any other purpose."68 Each "new threat" for which IEEPA is invoked requires a new declaration.69
IEEPA's Statute
IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit:
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country
or national thereof,or national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and(iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify,nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition,acquisition,
holding,holding,
withholding,withholding,
use,use,
transfer, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign (C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign
country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against
the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest,
when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the
President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the
accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.
66
These powers may be exercised “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”67 Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President “immediately” transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal
Register.68 The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use.69
In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions. Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible
65 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11. 66 50 U.S.C. §1702. 67 50 U.S.C. §1701. 68 50 U.S.C. §1621. 69 50 U.S.C. §1631.
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instance” before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.7070
Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA, subject to the requirements described above. When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President "immediately" transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register.71 The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use to address the emergency.72 The NEA authorizes the President to exercise additional statutory emergency authorities to address a previously declared national emergency, as long as the intent to exercise them is published,73
Requirements for an IEEPA Declaration
In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions. As noted above, IEEPA imposes different requirements if the President seeks to exercise powers with respect to a national emergency that has not expressly been declared by invoking IEEPA. The President may exercise IEEPA authorities only to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of IEEPA. and "not ... for any other purpose."74 Accordingly, IEEPA authorities are available only with respect to a national emergency declared for the purpose of using IEEPA authorities, and that emergency must be declared "with respect to" addressing an unusual and extraordinary threat from abroad. Consequently, the statutory text does not seem to support a President's invocation of IEEPA authorities (by executive order or otherwise) by referring to a preexisting national emergency that had not been declared under IEEPA.75
Presidents have developed a practice of issuing executive orders to either expand or modify the scope of previously declared national emergencies to account for changed circumstances regarding a particular threat.76 In keeping with the limitations IEEPA imposes restricting the use of its authorities to national emergencies declared for that purpose, and requiring a new declaration to address a "new threat,"77 past Presidents appear to have avoided adding IEEPA authorities as an expansion of non-IEEPA emergencies78 or expanding declared IEEPA emergencies to cover distinct new threats.79
President Donald Trump appears to have departed from this trend by issuing three executive orders on February 1, 2025,80 that stated they expanded an earlier national emergency proclaimed with respect to the southern border he declared on January 20, 2025 (January Proclamation) to invoke IEEPA.81 The January Proclamation, which invoked his authority under the NEA, did not invoke IEEPA authorities or describe the threat (i.e., an "invasion") as unusual and extraordinary.82 In each of the February Executive Orders, President Trump noted he had "previously declared a national emergency with respect to the grave threat to the United States posed by the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs into the United States in Proclamation 10886."83 He then announced: "Pursuant to the NEA, I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in that proclamation to cover," among other things, the respective "failure" of Canada, Mexico, and China to take actions to address criminal activities, such as illicit drugs and human trafficking into the United States, including by using IEEPA to impose tariffs.84 The February Executive Orders appear to be contrary to past presidential practice of exercising IEEPA's powers only with respect to a national emergency declared for that purpose, and that new threats (if understood to mean involving distinct geographical areas) require separate declarations of new national emergencies.85
The February Executive Orders also declared, respectively, that the "failure" of Canada, Mexico, and China to act constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."86 Based on those findings, the President announced that he "declare[d] and reiterate[d] a national emergency under the NEA and IEEPA to deal with that threat,"87 leaving some ambiguity with regard to the intent to declare new national emergencies or expand the existing emergency.
The House of Representatives and Senate have treated the February Executive Orders as declaring new national emergencies. On March 6, 2025, the Ranking Member of House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Gregory M. Meeks, introduced two joint resolutions to terminate national emergencies:88 the national emergency declared on February 1, 2025, with respect to Canada;89 and the national emergency declared on February 1, 2025, with respect to Mexico.90 Neither joint resolution claims to terminate the emergency declared on January 20, 2025.91 Additionally, on March 11, 2025, the House of Representatives agreed to a resolution providing, "Each day for the remainder of the first session of the 119th Congress shall not constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 202 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §1622) with respect to a joint resolution terminating a national emergency declared by the President on February 1, 2025."92 Accordingly, sufficient calendar days will not elapse prior to the end of the session to force the automatic discharge of any relevant resolution of termination from the committee of jurisdiction.93 On March 11, 2025, Senator Tim Kaine introduced "a joint resolution to terminate the national emergency declared to impose duties on articles imported from Canada" by the February 1, 2025 Executive Order.94 The Senate approved that resolution on April 2, 2025, and it is pending before the House.95
Consultation and Reporting
Another IEEPA requirement that differs from the NEA is that the IEEPA provides that the President shall consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA.96 Once the President Once the President
declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to
Congress specifyingCongress specifying
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those those
authorities to deal with those circumstances;authorities to deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances;
and
and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such
actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.
71
97
The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in
every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised.
7298 As per the NEA, the As per the NEA, the
emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or
automatically if the President does not publish in the automatically if the President does not publish in the
Federal Register and transmit to Congress a and transmit to Congress a
notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.
73 99
Amendments to IEEPA
Congress has amended IEEPA eight times Congress has amended IEEPA eight times
(Table 1). Five of the eight amendments . Five of the eight amendments
have altered altered
civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute. Other amendments
excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA’protected the exchange of certain informational materials from regulation under IEEPA and expanded IEEPA's scope following the terrorist s scope following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the
Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national
emergency.emergency.
Table 1. Amendments to IEEPA
Date
Action
Date
|
Action
|
December 28, 1977December 28, 1977
IEEPA Enacted (
IEEPA Enacted
(P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625)P.L. 95-223; 91 Stat. 1625)
August 16, 1985*August 16, 1985*
Fol owing
Following the Supreme Court the Supreme Court
’'s holding in s holding in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
, finding so- finding so-
called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress called legislative vetoes unconstitutional, Congress
amendsamended the NEA to change the NEA to change
“concurrent”"concurrent" resolution to resolution to
“joint”"joint" resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448). resolution. (P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 407, 448).
* While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA* While not technically an amendment to IEEPA, IEEPA is tied to the NEA
’'s provisions s provisions
relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies.relating to the declaration and termination of national emergencies.
August 23, 1988August 23, 1988
IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see IEEPA amended to exclude informational materials (Berman Amendment, see
elaboration below).elaboration below).
(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; P.L. 100-418
; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371)
October 6, 1992
|
; 102 Stat. 1107, 1371)
70 50 U.S.C. §1703(a). 71 50 U.S.C. §1703(b). 72 50 U.S.C. §1703(c). 73 50 U.S.C. §1622.
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Date
Action
October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-(Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-
393; 106 Stat. 1729)393; 106 Stat. 1729)
October 6, 1992October 6, 1992
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act. Section 206 of IEEPA amended to decrease civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876)(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993; P.L. 102-396; 106 Stat. 1876)
April 30, 1994April 30, 1994
IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials.IEEPA amended to update the definition of informational materials.
(Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236; 108
Stat. 382)Stat. 382)
September 23, 1996
September 23, 1996
|
IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or IEEPA amended to penalize attempted violations of licenses, orders, regulations or
prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA.prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA.
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725)(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; P.L. 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725)
October 26, 2001October 26, 2001
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below.USA PATRIOT Act Amendments, see elaboration below.
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat. Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001; P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat.
272)272)
March 9, 2006March 9, 2006
Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.Section 206 of IEEPA amended to increase civil and criminal penalties under the act.
(USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat. (USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; P.L. 109-177; 120 Stat.
192)192)
October 16, 2007October 16, 2007
The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206 The International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act amended Section 206
of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added of IEEPA to increase civil and criminal penalties and added
to the prohibitions conspiracy to violate conspiracy to violate
licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil licenses, orders, regulations or prohibitions issued under the authority of IEEPA. Civil
penalties are capped at penalties are capped at
the greater of $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction found to have
violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and violated the law. Criminal penalties now include a fine of up to $1,000,000 and
imprisonment of up to 20 years.imprisonment of up to 20 years.
(International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat. (International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act; P.L. 110-96; 121 Stat.
1011)1011)
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on
United States Code, annotated., annotated.
The Informational Materials Amendments to IEEPA
As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U.S. persons to participate in the exchange of
“"any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of anything of valuetransfer of anything of value
”" with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions. Amendments
in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published
information in a variety of formats.information in a variety of formats.
74100 As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of As amended, the act currently protects the exchange of
“"information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs,
artworks, and news wire feeds,artworks, and news wire feeds,
”" provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national
security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism.
75
74 P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the “Berman Amendments.” For more background, see, “Sleeping with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms,” Perspectives on History (May 2004). 75 Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3).
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101
USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA
Unlike the Trading with the Enemy ActUnlike the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets , IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets
as originally enacted.as originally enacted.
76102 In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress In 2001, at the request of the George W. Bush Administration, Congress
amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT
Act77Act103 to return to the President the authority to vest to return to the President the authority to vest
frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:
[T]he President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been [T]he President may ... when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been
attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign organization, or foreign
country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such
hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President,
in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such
terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and
all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.
78
104
Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt
the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congressthe flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress
At present the PresidentAt present the President
’'s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions s powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions
with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able with terrorist organizations. We need the capacity for more than a freeze. We must be able
to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist to seize. Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition. Terrorist
financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans.financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans.
Consistent with the President’s [issuance of E.O. 1322479] and his statements [of
Consistent with the President's [issuance of E.O. 13224105] and his statements [of September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terroristsSeptember 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists
’ ' assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial assets. Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial
transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts.
80
106
The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as
follows:follows:
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §1702) §1702)
grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with
foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze to the United States. Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze
certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States. A separate law, the Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when
Congress has declared war.Congress has declared war.
Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency
Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Economic
Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under
the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack
76 P.L. 95-223. House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 15 (“This grant of authorities does not include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property.”); Senate, International Emergency Economic
Powers Legislation, p. 5 (“Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions would not be granted.”). 77 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
78 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(C) (2018). 79 E.O. 13224, 66 Federal Register 49,079 (September 24, 2001). 80 Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft).
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the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use
armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national. The proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must
be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing
the expenditure of such proceeds.the expenditure of such proceeds.
Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way
that provision currently is implemented.that provision currently is implemented.
81
107
The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets
within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture within the United States. Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture
procedures.procedures.
82
108
The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20,
2003.2003.
83109 On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W. Bush ordered the blocked
“"property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entitiesproperty of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities
”" to to
be vested be vested
“"in the Department of the Treasury ... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist in the Department of the Treasury ... [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist
in the reconstruction of Iraq.in the reconstruction of Iraq.
”84 However, the"110 The President President
’'s order excluded from confiscation Iraqs order excluded from confiscation Iraq
’s 's diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been
ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit
provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)111 and Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk and Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Insurance
Act85Act (TRIA)112 (which reportedly totaled about $300 million). (which reportedly totaled about $300 million).
86
113
A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families, A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families,
vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be
“"used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,
for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraqfor the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq
’'s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament
of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi
people.people.
”87"114 The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required
member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior
officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was
then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition then administered by the United States. Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.Provisional Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations.
88
115
The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA.
89116 After the After the
power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.90
81 U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 107th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62.
82 See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance companies’ attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets). 83 E.O. 13290, 68 Federal Register 14,307 (March 24, 2003). 84 Ibid.
85 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). 86 See Tom Schoenberg, “Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches,” Legal Times (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest.
87 E.O. 13315, 68 Federal Register 52,315 (September 3, 2003). 88 GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq’s Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for “emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for ministry operations.” Ibid., 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid.
89 P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001). 90 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (2018).
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power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation.117 It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an
“"interest by any person, or interest by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
”91"118 It also added It also added
subsection (c), which providessubsection (c), which provides
In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was
based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information
Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.
92
119
As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and
codify existing practices.codify existing practices.
93 120
IEEPA Trends
Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often
turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy, national turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy, national
security, and economic objectives. While initially enacted to circumscribe presidential emergency security, and economic objectives. While initially enacted to circumscribe presidential emergency
authority,authority,
94121 presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency
since the statutesince the statute
’'s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated, s enactment. The House report on IEEPA stated,
“"emergencies are by their nature emergencies are by their nature
rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems.
”95"122 National emergencies National emergencies
invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment.invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment.
Between 1977 and Between 1977 and
January 15, 2024September 1, 2025, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in , Presidents have invoked IEEPA in
69 new77 declarations of declarations of
national emergency under the NEA.national emergency under the NEA.
96123 On average, these emergencies last On average, these emergencies last
nearlymore than nine years. Most nine years. Most
emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government. emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government.
However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in
response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism,
and malicious cyber-enabled malicious cyber-enabled
activities.97activities, and trade practices.124 The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the
nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority. Originally, IEEPA was used to
target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and
individuals.individuals.
98125 Usually Presidents use IEEPA as an emergency power; however, Congress has Usually Presidents use IEEPA as an emergency power; however, Congress has
directed the President to use IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in directed the President to use IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in
several statutes.several statutes.
99126 Between 1976, when the NEA was enacted, and 2019, Between 1976, when the NEA was enacted, and 2019,
Congress had never affirmatively voted to terminate a national emergency. However, inone joint resolution to terminate a national emergency was introduced.127 In the late-2010s, some the late-2010s, some
Members of Congress began to express concern with the NEA. Between 2019 and Members of Congress began to express concern with the NEA. Between 2019 and
January 15, 2024September 1, 2025, Members of Congress , Members of Congress
have introduced introduced
1523 joint resolutions to terminate a national emergency; 11 joint resolutions to terminate a national
91 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a) (2018). 92 P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (2018). 93 House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, p. 62. 94 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9. 95 Ibid., 11. 96 This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an initial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1.
97 E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020).
98 See “Presidential Emergency Use.” 99 See “Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval.”
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emergency, five of those resolutions involved IEEPA of those resolutions involved IEEPA
(Table A-A-2). Despite this . Despite this
new interest in interest in
terminating national emergencies, no emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated terminating national emergencies, no emergency declared under the NEA has been terminated
without without
Presidentialpresidential assent. assent.
Presidential Emergency Use100
Use128
IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President declares a national IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President declares a national
emergency under the NEA.emergency under the NEA.
129 Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, as had been the Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, as had been the
case with TWEA, IEEPA case with TWEA, IEEPA
has requiredrequires the President to declare a national emergency for each the President to declare a national emergency for each
independent useindependent use
.,130 and permits the exercise of IEEPA powers only in connection with a national emergency declared for the purpose of invoking IEEPA.131 As a result, the number of national emergencies declared under the terms of the As a result, the number of national emergencies declared under the terms of the
NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared NEA has proliferated over the past four decades. Presidents declared
only four national four national
emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPAemergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA
’'s enactment. In s enactment. In
contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 70 of the 79 declarations of national emergency issued under the National Emergencies Act.101 As of January 15, 2024, there were 42 ongoing national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA.102
100 The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not published in the Federal Register by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012).
101 The eight declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March 25, 2022 were all made by presidential proclamation. See Proclamation 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October 14, 1992); Proclamation 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); Proclamation 6907, Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996); Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001); Proclamation 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005); Proclamation 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic (October 23, 2009); Proclamation 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States (February 15, 2019); Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak (March 13, 2020).
102 The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of January 15, 2024 were declared in: Proclamation 6867, Proclamation 7463, Proclamation 10371. All were declared in response to foreign threats. Notably, while IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
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contrast, as of September 1, 2025 Presidents have declared 88 national emergencies under the NEA, 77 of which invoked IEEPA.132 As of September 1, 2025, there were 51 ongoing national emergencies; all but five involve IEEPA.
Figure 1. Declarations and Executive Orders Citing IEEPA
Source: CRS. 2020s current as of CRS. 2020s current as of
January 15, 2024. September 1, 2025.
Note: Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by executive Executive orders include declarations of national emergency that cite IEEPA that were made by executive
order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order.order and any subsequent modifications or amendments to an emergency or such an order.
Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 executive orders citing IEEPA and
declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.declared 1.5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA.
103 133 (Figure 1).
1.)
On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years.
104134 The longest emergency The longest emergency
was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, was also the first. President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979,
declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the
National Emergencies ActNEA and and
invoked IEEPA.invoked IEEPA.
105 Seven135 Eight successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for more
than 40 years. As of than 40 years. As of
January 15, 2024September 1, 2025, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal , that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal
basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shahbasis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah
’'s disputed assets.s disputed assets.
106136 That initial emergency That initial emergency
aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade. The average length
of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years. That average extended to
1112 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and
1516 years for emergencies declared in the years for emergencies declared in the
2000s (Figure 2).107 As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA (Figure 3). Between January 1, 1979, and January 15, 2024, there were on average 15 ongoing national emergencies each year, 14 of which invoked IEEPA.
103 The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued 12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or expand its reach by amending the original language.
104 Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979.
105 E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979). 106 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, 87 Federal Register 68,013 (November 8, 2022). 107 Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared in the 2010s.
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2000s and continues to grow (Figure 3).137
Presidents have terminated emergencies or allowed them to expire. On average Presidents have proclaimed seven emergencies under the NEA per four-year term (six of which invoke IEEPA), and terminated or did not renew an average of three emergencies per four-year term (two of which invoke IEEPA) (Figure 2).138 As a result, Presidents declare an average of four more emergencies under the NEA per term than they terminate or allow to lapse (slightly less than four of which invoke IEEPA). As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA (Figure 4). Between January 1, 1979, and September 1, 2025, there were on average 16 ongoing national emergencies each year, 14 of which invoked IEEPA.
Figure 2. Balance of Emergencies Citing IEEPA by Presidential Term
Source: CRS. Current as of September 1, 2025.
|
Figure 3. Average Length of Emergencies Citing IEEPA
Source: CRS. Current as of September 1, 2025.
Notes: A single emergency was declared in the 1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do not have sufficient data to create an average length that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis.
In most cases, the declared emergencies citing In most cases, the declared emergencies citing
IEEPA have been geographically specific. For IEEPA have been geographically specific. For
Figure 2. Average Length of Emergencies
example, in the first use of IEEPA, President example, in the first use of IEEPA, President
Citing IEEPA
Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that
both declared a national emergency with both declared a national emergency with
respect to the respect to the
“"situation in Iransituation in Iran
”" and and
“"blocked blocked
all property and interests in property of the all property and interests in property of the
Government of Iran.Government of Iran.
”108"139 Five months later, Five months later,
President Carter issued a second order President Carter issued a second order
dramatically expanding the scope of the first dramatically expanding the scope of the first
EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all
goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by
anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.United States.
109140 A further order expanded the A further order expanded the
coverage to block imports to the United States coverage to block imports to the United States
from Iran.from Iran.
110141 Together, these orders touched Together, these orders touched
upon virtually all economic contacts between upon virtually all economic contacts between
any place or legal person subject to the any place or legal person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and the jurisdiction of the United States and the
territory and government of Iran.territory and government of Iran.
111
142
Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA
have followed this pattern of limiting the
Source: CRS. Current as of January 15, 2024.
scope to a specific territory, government, or
Notes: A single emergency was declared in the
its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for
1970s (Iran) and that has lasted 40 years. 2010s do not have sufficient data to create an average length
example, prohibited “have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to a specific territory, government, or its nationals. Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited "imports into the United imports into the United
that would be meaningful for the purposes of analysis.
States of goods and services of Nicaraguan States of goods and services of Nicaraguan
origin”origin" and and
“"exports from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua.exports from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua.
”" The order The order
likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S. likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U.S.
ports.ports.
112143 Executive Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the Executive Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the
“"Government of South Government of South
Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government.”113
108 E.O. 12170. 109 E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.” 110 E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980). 111 Exceptions were made for family remittances. 112 E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985). 113 E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985).
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Figure 3Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government."144
Figure 4. Cumulative Number of Ongoing National Emergencies by Year
Source: CRS. Current as of CRS. Current as of
January 15, 2024. September 1, 2025.
Notes: Orange dashed line indicates national emergencies citing IEEPA. Hashed space indicates all national Orange dashed line indicates national emergencies citing IEEPA. Hashed space indicates all national
emergencies.emergencies.
While the majority of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific, While the majority of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific,
many many
recent emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations.emergencies have lacked explicit geographic limitations.
114145 President George H.W. President George H.W.
Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
115146 Similarly, President George W. Bush Similarly, President George W. Bush
declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by
“"persons who commit, threaten persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorism.to commit, or support terrorism.
”116"147 President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to
the threats of the threats of
“"transnational criminal organizationstransnational criminal organizations
”" and and
“"persons engaging in malicious cyber-persons engaging in malicious cyber-
enabled activities.enabled activities.
”117"148 President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to President Donald Trump declared an emergency to respond to
“"foreign foreign
adversaries”adversaries" who were who were
“"creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and
communications technologies and servicescommunications technologies and services
.”118 " during his first administration,149 and declared an emergency during his second administration to respond to "trading partners" whose "economic policies" he determined were "suppress[ing] domestic wages and consumption."150
Without explicit geographic limitations, these Without explicit geographic limitations, these
orders have included provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific orders have included provisions that are global in scope. These geographically nonspecific
emergencies invoking IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years.119
114 This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979. 115 E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990). 116 E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).
117 E.O. 13581, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011); E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015).
118 E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019). 119 See, E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020). Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the populations of the targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions:
Law and Public Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond political and economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928.
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Figure 4. National Emergency Act Declarations
Source: Federal Register; CRS.
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emergencies invoking IEEPA have increased in frequency over the past 40 years.151
Figure 5. National Emergency Act Declarations
Source: Federal Register; CRS.
|
Examples of Actions Taken in Non-Geographic Emergencies Citing IEEPA - Chemical and biological weapons proliferation
- Measures to restrict the participation by United States persons in weapons proliferation activities
- Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process
- Blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism
- Blocking property of transnational criminal organizations
- Blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities
- Blocking the property of persons involved in serious human rights abuse or corruption
- Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign interference in a United States election
- Limiting investments by U.S. persons in certain national security technologies in countries of concern
|
In addition to the erosion of geographic In addition to the erosion of geographic
limitations, the stated motivations for
Examples of Actions Taken in Non-
declaring national emergencies have expanded
Geographic Emergencies Citing IEEPA
in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for
•
Chemical and biological weapons proliferation
declarations of national emergency citing
•
Measures to restrict the participation by United
IEEPA were short and often referenced either
States persons in weapons proliferation activities
a specific geography or the specific actions of
•
Measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of
limitations, the stated motivations for declaring national emergencies have expanded in scope as well. Initially, stated rationales for declarations of national emergency citing IEEPA were short and often referenced either a specific geography or the specific actions of a government. Presidents found that a government. Presidents found that
mass destruction
circumstances like circumstances like
“"the situation in Iran,the situation in Iran,
”120 or
•
Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who
the “"152 or the "policies and actions of the Government of policies and actions of the Government of
threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process
Nicaragua,”121Nicaragua,"153 constituted constituted
“"unusual and extraordinary threat[s] to the national security unusual and
•
Blocking property and prohibiting transactions
extraordinary threat[s] to the national security
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism
and foreign policy of the United Statesand foreign policy of the United States
”" and and
•
would therefore declare a national
Blocking property of transnational criminal organizations
emergency.122
•
Blocking the property of certain persons engaging
The stated rationales have, however, expanded
in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities
over time in both the length and subject
•
Blocking the property of persons involved in
matter. Presidents have increasingly declared
serious human rights abuse or corruption
national emergencies, in part, to respond to
•
Imposing certain sanctions in the event of foreign
human and civil rights abuses,123 slavery,124
interference in a United States election
denial of religious freedom,125 political
•
Limiting investments by U.S. persons in certain
repression,126 public corruption,127would therefore declare a national emergency.154
The stated rationales have expanded over time in both the length and subject matter. Presidents have increasingly declared national emergencies, in part, to respond to human and civil rights abuses,155 slavery,156 denial of religious freedom,157 political repression,158 public corruption,159 and the and the
national security technologies in countries of concern
undermining of democratic processes.undermining of democratic processes.
128 160 While the first reference to human rights While the first reference to human rights
violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985,violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985,
129161 most most
of such such
references have come in the past references have come in the past
twenty20 years years
. (Table A-3).
A-3).
Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions. Originally, the targets
of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments. The first use of IEEPA targeted
“"Iranian Government Property.Iranian Government Property.
”130"162 Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically
defined regions.defined regions.
131163 Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as political parties, Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as political parties,
120 E.O. 12170. 121 E.O. 12513. 122 Ibid. 123 E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan (November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015).
124 E.O. 13067. 125 E.O. 13067. 126 E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus (June 16, 2006).
127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 E.O. 12532. 130 E.O. 12170. 131 See, e.g., E.O. 12513.
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corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism, suspected corporations, or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism, suspected
narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.narcotics traffickers, or associates of the International Criminal Court.
132
164
The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to
foreign groups or groups or
persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific persons. For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific
“"foreign foreign
persons” and “persons" and "persons determined ... to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf ofpersons determined ... to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of
” " such foreign persons.such foreign persons.
133165 An excerpt is included below: An excerpt is included below:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, orregulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and
notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession
or control of United States persons, of:or control of United States persons, of:
(a)
(a) the the
foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order; listed in the Annex to this order;
(b)
(b) foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:
(i)
(i) to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in
Colombia; orColombia; or
(ii)
(ii) materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for
or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons
designated in or pursuant to this order; anddesignated in or pursuant to this order; and
(c)
(c) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act
for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order.
134
However, in166
In 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target
“"persons persons
who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans.
”"167 While the order was While the order was
similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier
“"foreign.foreign.
”" As such, persons in As such, persons in
the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.the United States, including U.S. citizens, could be targets of the order.
135168 The following is an The following is an
excerpt of the order:excerpt of the order:
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50
Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. U.S.C.
1702(b)(1),1702(b)(1),
(3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may 2000 (title IX, P.L. 106-387), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may
hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in property of:
(i)
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in property of:
(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and
(ii) the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and
132 See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O. 13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978 (prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428, International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in
Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.
133 E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21, 1995).
134 Ibid. Emphasis added. 135 See, e.g., Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003).
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(ii)
persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, because they are found:Secretary of State, because they are found:
(A)
(A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
violence ... violence ...
136
169
Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets.Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets.
137
170
In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA
initially was directed at foreign stateswas directed at foreign states
initially, with targets , with targets
that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s, that were delimited by geography or nationality. Since the 1990s,
however, Presidents have Presidents have
expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of expanded the scope of their declarations to include groups and individual persons, regardless of
nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities.nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities.
Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval
While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of
the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or the context of national emergencies. When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or
directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions.directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions.
In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, for example, Congress directed
the President to exercise the President to exercise
“"all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit [certain transactions].to block and prohibit [certain transactions].
”138"171 Penalties for violations by a person of a measure Penalties for violations by a person of a measure
imposed by the President under the act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.imposed by the President under the act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA.
139
172
This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA This trend has been long-term. Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA
authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by
its former government. That statute providedits former government. That statute provided
The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the
The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International International
Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its
efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges
were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals associated with the Duvalier regime. This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]requirements of section 202 of that Act. [50 USC 1701]
140
173
In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a
national emergency (and none was declared).national emergency (and none was declared).
141
174
Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and
specificity.specificity.
142175 The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in
several recent statutes:
136 E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans (June 26, 2001). Emphasis added.
137 See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006).
138 P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019. 139 Ibid. 140 P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010. 141 Ibid. 142 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat. 2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive (continued...)
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several recent statutes:
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b)
with respect to—with respect to—
...
...
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of
a United States person.a United States person.
...
...
(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b)
and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.subsection (a) of that section.
143
176
Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of
IEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering IranIEEPA in the context of a national emergency. In the Countering Iran
’'s Destabilizing Activities s Destabilizing Activities
Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared,
“"It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382.
”144
Presidents, however,"177
Presidents have also used IEEPA have also used IEEPA
in an effort to preempt or to preempt or
modifyinfluence parallel congressional activity. parallel congressional activity.
On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding
“"that the policies and actions of the that the policies and actions of the
Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy
Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208 (December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144.
143 Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95 (April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18, 2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130 Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions [ ... ].”).
144 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) §104 (22 U.S.C. §9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 Federal Register 38,567 (July 1, 2005).
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Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States,and economy of the United States,
”" declared a national emergency and limited transactions with declared a national emergency and limited transactions with
South Africa.South Africa.
145178 The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting
transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress.
146179 In remarks about In remarks about
the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by
Congress because unspecified provisions Congress because unspecified provisions
“"would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was] would have harmed the very people [the U.S. was]
trying to help.trying to help.
”147"180 Nevertheless, members of the press at the Nevertheless, members of the press at the
time148time181 (and at least one scholar (and at least one scholar
since)since)
149182 noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in noted that the limitations imposed by the executive order and the provisions in
legislation then winding its way through Congress were legislation then winding its way through Congress were
“"substantially similar.substantially similar.
”150 "183
Current Uses of IEEPA
In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the
postwar international sanctions regime.international sanctions regime.
151 184 The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used
IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national
security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved security and foreign policy goals. Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved
blocking transactions and freezing assets.blocking transactions and freezing assets.
Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section
203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. §1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit 203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. §1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit
imports, exports, foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities,
or payments, and may take payments, and may take
other specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing
assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U.S. persons from entering into
transactions related to frozen assets and blocked propertytransactions related to frozen assets and blocked property
, and in some instances denying entry into the United States.
.
Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents havePursuant to Section 203, Presidents have
• , among other things,prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including
“"interfering with or interfering with or
undermining election processes or institutionsundermining election processes or institutions
” [Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, as amended; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note. See also Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018; 83 F.R. 46843.];
• ;"185
prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit
narcotics traffickersnarcotics traffickers
, including foreign drug kingpins; including foreign drug kingpins;
• 186
prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption;engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption;
• 187
prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds;
• 188
prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as
Transnational Criminal Organizations;Transnational Criminal Organizations;
• 189
prohibited transactions with prohibited transactions with
“"those who disrupt the Middle East peace process";190
prohibited transactions related to offensive military overflights of certain regions;191
those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;”
145 E.O. 12532. 146 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986). 147 Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050.
148 See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid., 1050.
149 Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid., ch. 9.
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• prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations; • instituted and maintained maritime restrictions; • prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination
prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979,Administration Act of 1979,
152 and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons
programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea);programs of specific countries (i.e., Iran, North Korea);
• 192
prohibited transactions with those designated as prohibited transactions with those designated as
“"persons who commit, threaten persons who commit, threaten
to commit, or support terrorismto commit, or support terrorism
;”
• ";193
maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying
authority, the Export Administration Act authorityauthority, the Export Administration Act authority
, had lapsed; had lapsed;
• 194
blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructuresengaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures
, including including
election processes or the private sectorelection processes or the private sector
’'s trade secrets;s trade secrets;
• 195
blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as blocked property of, and prohibited transactions with, those designated as
responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption;responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption;
• blocked certain property of, and prohibited transactions with, foreign nationals of
specific countries and those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an extraordinary threat;
• 196
prohibited transactions with those who pose prohibited transactions with those who pose
“"an undue risk of sabotage to or an undue risk of sabotage to or
subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications
technology or services in the United States.”
No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on products imported to the United States in general. However, IEEPA’s similarity to TWEA, coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action could happen.153 In addition, notechnology or services in the United States";197 and
imposed tariffs on imported goods.198No President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily
domestic in effect. Some scholars arguedomestic in effect. Some scholars argue
, however, that the interconnectedness of the global that the interconnectedness of the global
economy means economy means
it would probably be permissiblea President might be able to use IEEPA to take an action that was to use IEEPA to take an action that was
primarily domestic in effect.154
IEEPA vs Section 232 for Imposing Tariffs in Response to a
National Security Threat
While a President could likely use IEEPA to impose additional tariffs on imported goods as President Nixon did under TWEA, no President has done so. Instead, Presidents have turned to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 in cases of purported emergency.155 Section 232 provides that if the Secretary of Commerce “finds that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
152 Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (August 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII(B).
153 President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See also Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Texas Law Review 78 (2000), p. 1190.
154 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.
155 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, §232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §1862(b)–(c)).
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threaten to impair the national security,” then the President may take action to adjust the imports such that they wil no longer impair national security.156 While the use of Section 232 requires findings by the Secretary of Commerce, the restrictions and reporting requirements of the NEA do not apply. For that reason, Section 232 may be an attractive source of presidential authority for imposing additional tariffs for national security purposes. Using this authority, President Donald J. Trump applied additional duties on steel and aluminum in March 2018.157 However, IEEPA is not subject to the same procedural restraints as Section 232. As no investigation is required, IEEPA authorities can be invoked at any time in response to a national emergency based on an “unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” As such, IEEPA may be a source of authority for the President to impose a tariff quickly. On May 30, 2019, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico until “the il egal migration crisis is alleviated through effective actions taken by Mexico.”158 The tariffs were scheduled to be implemented on June 10, 2019, with five percent increases to take effect at the beginning of each subsequent month. On June 7, 2019, President Trump announced that that “The Tariffs scheduled to be implemented by the U.S. [on June 10], against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended.”159 primarily domestic in effect.199
Use of Assets Frozen under IEEPA
The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the
leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors.leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors.
200 The President The President
and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy
goals.goals.
Presidential Use of Foreign Assets Frozen under IEEPA
Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a
resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity, resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity,
or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how or channeling them to a follow-on government. The following are some examples of how
Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues.Presidents have used blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues.
President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing
Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979.
160201 On January 19, On January 19,
1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by 1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by
Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various Algeria under which the hostages were freed and the frozen assets were distributed to various
entities.entities.
161202 Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S. Of the blocked assets, the agreements directed $5.1 billion to repay outstanding U.S.
156 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones; CRS Report R44707, Presidential Authority over Trade: Imposing Tariffs and Duties, by Caitlain Devereaux Lewis.
157 Procl. 9704, 83 Federal Register 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 Federal Register 13,361 (March 15, 2019). CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones.
158 Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/.
159 President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/. 1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.
160 E.O. 12170, 44 Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979). 161 The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter “General Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America (continued...)
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bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in bank loans to Iran, $2.8 billion returned to Iran, $1 billion transferred into a security account in
the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal the Hague to pay other U.S. claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
(IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the (IUSCT), and $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the
Tribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former ShahTribunal. The United States also froze the assets of the former Shah
’'s estate along with those of s estate along with those of
the Shahthe Shah
’'s close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Irans close relatives pending litigation in U.S. courts to ascertain Iran
’'s right to their return. s right to their return.
Iran’Iran's litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.s litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran.
162
203
Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United Presidents have also channeled frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United
States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup dStates continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d
’'état or état or
otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country. For example, after Panamanian
President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega
from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvallefrom his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle
’'s own s own
dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the
legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime.
163 204 As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to As part of these sanctions, the Department of State, in February 1988, advised U.S. banks not to
disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle obtained court orders permitting him access to
those funds.those funds.
164205 In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which
“"blocked blocked
all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States ... all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States ...
or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.or that come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.
”165"206 In In
June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from the June 1988, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations directing most payments from the
U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed U.S. government owed to Panama and all payments owed
“"to Panama from the operation of the to Panama from the operation of the
Panama Canal CommissionPanama Canal Commission
”" to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of to an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.New York.
166207 One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the One escrow account contained funds for the payment of operating expenses of the
Delvalle government.Delvalle government.
167208 After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George After the U.S. invasion of Panama ended in early 1990, President George
H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the H.W. Bush lifted economic sanctions against the
country168country209 and used some of the frozen funds to and used some of the frozen funds to
repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds turned over to the
successor government.successor government.
169
210
The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the The Obama and Trump Administrations took similar actions in response to the
political situation increasing repression of Nicolás Maduro (2013-present) in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015 under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.211 In January 2019, the Trump Administration in Venezuela. President Barack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”). 162 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677, 704 (October 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran’s lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”). 163 GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989). 164 Ibid., 5. 165 E.O. 12635, 53 Federal Register 12,134 (April 8, 1988). 166 GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5. 167 Ibid., 7. 168 E.O. 12,710, 55 Federal Register 13,099 (April 5, 1990). 169 See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”).
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under IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.170 In January 2019, the Trump Administration officially recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan
Guaidó as VenezuelaGuaidó as Venezuela
’'s interim s interim
president171president212 and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan and permitted Guaidó access to the frozen Venezuelan
government assets that were assets that were
“"held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United
States financial institutions.States financial institutions.
”172"213 The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions The Trump Administration also imposed additional sanctions
under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela (Pdvsa),Venezuela (Pdvsa),
173214 which significantly reduced funds available to the which significantly reduced funds available to the
regimegovernment of Nicolas of Nicolas
Maduro.Maduro.
174215 The Biden Administration continued to recognize Guaidó The Biden Administration continued to recognize Guaidó
’'s interim s interim
government175 government216 until its dissolution in December 2022, and until its dissolution in December 2022, and
now recognizes the 2015 then recognized the National Assembly National Assembly
elected in 2014 as the "as the “last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela.”176 The disposition of Venezuelan assets frozen abroad is uncertain, after negotiations between the Maduro government and the opposition to establish a U.N.-administered fund for humanitarian programs supported by these assets has proceeded very slowly since its announcement in November 2022.177 The United States reportedly assured the U.N. that assets in the fund would be shielded from creditors.178 In September 2023, Francisco Palmieri, Chief of Mission of the Venezuelan Affairs Unit at the U.S. Embassy to Columbia, repeated past U.S. offers to provide sanctions relief, which could include unfreezing some assets in the United States, if the Maduro administration allows for the release of political prisoners, allows all opposition candidates to run, and allows international observers to monitor the 2024 elections.179
last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela" even though most of its members are in exile.217
The Biden and Trump Administrations recognize Edmundo González Urrutia, winner of the July 2024 presidential elections, as the "rightful" President of Venezuela.218 Nevertheless, Nicolás Maduro has remained in office and was inaugurated for a third term as president in January 2025.219 González Urrutía, in exile since September 2024, does not have direct access to Venezuela assets in the United States.220 The National Assembly leaders elected in 2015 technically has access to the assets frozen in the United States, but any transactions involving those assets require a license from OFAC.221 The opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly has sought to prevent the sale of one of Venezuela's most valuable assets, CITGO, the U.S. refining arm of PdVSA, for the payment of debts owed and appropriations carried out by the Maduro government; no sale can occur unless OFAC grants a license for it to go forward.222
There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N. There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer Security Council. After the first war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush ordered the transfer
of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U.S. banks to a holding
account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill
“"the rights and obligations of the United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778."223the rights and obligations of the
170 E.O. 13692, 80 Federal Register 12,747 (March 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
171 President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country, White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
172 Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts. 173 E.O. 13857, 84 Federal Register 509 (January 25, 2019); Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil
Company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. Department of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm594.
174 Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.
175 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly and Interim President Guaidó, January 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-interim-president-guaido/.
176 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Venezuela’s Interim Government and the 2015 National Assembly, January 3, 2023, https://www.state.gov/venezuelas-interim-government-and-the-2015-national-assembly/.
177 Geoff Ramsey and Ignacia Ulloa Peters, “Getting Venezuela’s historic humanitarian accord up and running,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, August 11, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/getting-venezuelas-historic-humanitarian-accord-up-and-running/. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
178 Matt Spetalnick, Vivian Sequera and Mayela Armas, “US tells UN it will shield Venezuela humanitarian fund from creditors.” Reuters, May, 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-tells-un-it-will-shield-venezuela-humanitarian-fund-creditors-sources-2023-05-18/.
179 Luz Mely Reyes, “Venezuela 2024: Looking beyond María Corina Machado,” El País, September 6, 2023, https://english.elpais.com/opinion/2023-09-26/venezuela-2024-looking-beyond-maria-corina-machado.html.
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United States under U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 778.”180 The President cited a section The President cited a section
of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),
181224 as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the
action.action.
182225 The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief The President ordered the transferred funds to be used to provide humanitarian relief
and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission,
183226 which was established to which was established to
adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion.
184227 Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and
accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.accumulated interest until the United States vested them in 2003 pursuant to IEEPA.
185
228
In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor
governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released governments. For example, as a condition of releasing sanctions, the United States released
$237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal $237.6 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.Republic of Yugoslavia to the central banks of the successor states in 2003.
186229 In 2002, the United In 2002, the United
States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan States released $217 million in frozen funds that had belonged to the Taliban to the Afghan
Interim Authority.Interim Authority.
187
230
As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United As of the date of this report, the fate of the Afghan Central Bank (DaB) assets held in the United
States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some States at the time of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 remains undecided. Some
victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks victims—including survivors and family members—of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the with judgments against the Taliban have obtained a writ of attachment with respect to the
assets.assets.
188231 The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to The Biden Administration subsequently blocked the funds pursuant to
IEEPA189IEEPA232 and and
filed a statement of filed a statement of
interest190interest233 asking the district court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion) asking the district court for permission to make half ($3.5 billion)
of the assets available for transfer under the OFAC of the assets available for transfer under the OFAC
license191license234 issued on behalf of the people of issued on behalf of the people of
Afghanistan to Afghanistan to
“"to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further to address significant humanitarian and economic concerns and to avoid further
regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United regional instability and other conditions contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United
States.States.
”192"235 The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of The other half of the assets would remain blocked to avail the judgment plaintiffs of
180 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. §317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Federal Register 31,803 (August 2, 1990).
181 22 U.S.C. §287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation. 182 E.O. 12817, 57 Federal Register 48,433 (October 23, 1992). 183 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.
184 S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C. Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).
185 See “USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA.” 186 Foreign Regimes’ Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004).
187 Ibid., 12. 188 Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. September 13, 2021). 189 E.O. 14064, 87 Federal Register 8391 (February 15, 2022). 190 United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. February 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI).
191 OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b-ofac-license.pdf.
192 Ibid., SOI.
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the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their the opportunity to make their case for entitlement to attach them in satisfaction of their
judgments. In the statement of interest, the judgments. In the statement of interest, the
Biden Administration did not take a position with respect to Administration did not take a position with respect to
the plaintiffsthe plaintiffs
’' right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate right to the assets, but set forth some legal considerations that seem to militate
against the judgment plaintiffs.against the judgment plaintiffs.
193236 In February In February
, 2023, the district court denied the plaintiffs 2023, the district court denied the plaintiffs
’ ' motion for post-judgment attachment of the DaB assets, holding that, motion for post-judgment attachment of the DaB assets, holding that,
“"[p]ursuant to the FSIA, [p]ursuant to the FSIA,
TRIA, and the U.S. Constitution, the Taliban—not the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or TRIA, and the U.S. Constitution, the Taliban—not the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or
the Afghan people—must pay for the Talibanthe Afghan people—must pay for the Taliban
’'s liability in the 9/11 Attacks.s liability in the 9/11 Attacks.
”194"237 The court found The court found
that recognizing the DaB as an that recognizing the DaB as an
“"agency or instrumentalityagency or instrumentality
”" of the Taliban would require the court of the Taliban would require the court
to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, and that such authority to recognize to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, and that such authority to recognize
governments is entrusted solely to the President.governments is entrusted solely to the President.
195238 Plaintiffs have appealed to the U.S. Court of Plaintiffs have appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second CircuitAppeals for the Second Circuit
.196
Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds
of Sanctions
The executive branch has traditionally and the case remains pending.239 The court heard oral arguments in October 2024.
Congressionally Mandated Use of Frozen Foreign Assets and Proceeds of Sanctions
Congress appears to have intended that frozen assets may be used to settle a foreign country's debts and claims of U.S. nationals after the national emergency has terminated.240 As described below, Congress has directed frozen assets be used, even during an ongoing national emergency, to pay certain court judgments against foreign states, and has recently enacted a framework for using Russian sovereign assets for reparations to Ukraine.
Compensation for U.S. Victims of Terrorism
The executive branch has historically resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay
U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.U.S. claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question.
197 241 Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been
designated as designated as
“"State Supporters of Terrorism.State Supporters of Terrorism.
”198"242 U.S. nationals who are victims of state- U.S. nationals who are victims of state-
supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages
under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996.
199
243
To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999,
200244 which further amended the FSIA which further amended the FSIA
by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial
transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba),
or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA, Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA,
or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes. Because of the Clinton
Administration’Administration's continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to s continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to
“"waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security,
”" an authority President an authority President
Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law.
201
245
The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment
to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take
other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted Section 2002
193 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss. 194 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 657 F. Supp. 3d 311, 336 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023) (consolidated cases). 195 Ibid., 335. 196 John Does 1 Through 7 v. The Taliban, No. 23-263 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2023). 197 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims). 198 Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria (1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
199 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
200 P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, §117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. §1610(f)(1)(A) (2018). 201 Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October 26, 1998).
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other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders. Congress enacted Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)
202246 to mandate the to mandate the
payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the
FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000.FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000.
The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96.7 million in funds generated from long-
distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants
in in
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S. , the lawsuit based on the 1996 downing of two unarmed U.S.
civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force.
203247 Another payment of more than $7 million was made Another payment of more than $7 million was made
using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her
marriage to a Cuban spy.marriage to a Cuban spy.
204
248
As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress
enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).
205249 Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing
objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy
judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as
follows:follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in
every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim
based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section
1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, United
States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any
agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment
in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory
damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.
206
202 P.L. 106-386, §2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.
203 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages, judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.
204 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).
205 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note. 206 Ibid. The term “blocked asset” is defined in §201(d) of TRIA to mean
(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and
(B) does not include property that—
(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or
(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in March 2023, that the United States, acting pursuant to TRIA, violated the now-defunct Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.T. 900, by permitting judgment creditors, to enforce terrorism judgments against Iran through the attachment of assets of Iranian agencies or instrumentalities who were not participants in the underlying lawsuit. The ICJ found the United States unreasonably ignored those companies’ separate juridical status and deprived Iranian companies of the independent legal personality conferred on them by such status. Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 159 (Mar. 30, 2023), https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/164/164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. The ICJ will decide the amount of damages the United States owes to Iran at a later phase of the case. Ibid., ¶ 231.
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Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority “in the national security interest,” but only with respect to frozen foreign government “property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.” When Congress amended the FSIA in 2008207 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.208 Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.209
Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment creditors.210 To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.211 The fund is replenished through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.212 Three-quarters of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund.213 The Fund sunsets in 2039.
Russia’s 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.214 Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation seeking to seize and repurpose Russian frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine,215 or impose a tax on any earnings.216 Some of the proposals, to the extent that they permit the seizure of assets of aliens with significant ties to or property in the United States, if enacted, may invite legal challenges based on the Fifth Amendment Takings and Due Process
207 P.L. 110-181 §1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 208 28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be synonymous. The provision also overrides the separate juridical status ordinarily accorded to agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states. Ibid. The ICJ determined that this provision violated the Treaty of Amity for the same reason it found TRIA to be “unreasonable.” Certain Iranian Assets, ¶ 159. 209 P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019), both codified at 22 USC §8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress’s Power over Court Decisions: Jurisdiction
Stripping and the Rule of Klein, by Joanna R. Lampe. In Certain Iranian Assets, the ICJ found that Bank Markazi, as Iran’s central bank, was not a “company” entitled to favorable treatment under the Treaty of Amity, and the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the claim based on Peterson. Certain Iranian Assets ¶ 54.
210 See the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, div. O, title IV (2015), 129 Stat. 3007, codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §20144 (2020).
211 Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United
States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
212 34 U.S.C. §20144(e) (2021). 213 Ibid.
214 See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt; CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s War
Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Assistance and Sanctions, by Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF12062, Russia’s War on
Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.
215 From the 117th Cong., see, e.g., H.R. 3838; H.R. 6869; H.R. 6930; H.R. 7015; H.R. 7083; H.R. 7086; S. 3723; S. 3838. From the 118th Cong., see e.g., H.R. 892; H.R. 4175; H.R. 5370; H.R. 5925; H.R. 6491;S. 536; S. 1254; S. 2003; S. 3359.
216 H.R. 6416.
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Clauses.217 Separately, Congress in the Consolidated Appropriates Act, 2023, authorized the Attorney General to “transfer to the Secretary of State the proceeds of any covered forfeited property for use by the Secretary of State to provide assistance to Ukraine to remediate the harms of Russian aggression towards Ukraine.”218 The provision appears to authorize forfeiture of property involved in certain sanctions violations as well as blocked property owned or controlled by a person designated under the specified executive orders pertaining to Russia, which is forfeitable under the identified statutes. There is a proposal to expand that authority to cover additional parties and offenses.219
Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA
250
Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority "in the national security interest," but only with respect to frozen foreign government "property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations." When Congress amended the FSIA in 2008251 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.252 Congress has also crafted legislation on occasion that makes specific assets available to satisfy specific judgments.253
Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment creditors.254 To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (Fund), along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations.255 The Fund is replenished through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism.256 Three-quarters of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the Fund.257 Unless renewed, the Fund sunsets in 2039.258 One bill in the 119th Congress, the American Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act (S. 706 and H.R. 1530), would direct approximately $1.912 billion corresponding to revenue from the Binance Holdings Limited plea agreement259 into the Fund.260 The bill would also amend the funding scheme to increase the portion of proceeds from qualifying civil forfeitures to be deposited into the Fund to 100 percent.261
Russian Central Bank Assets and Oligarch Assets
Russia's 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine has led the executive branch to levy new sanctions against Russia, in addition to sanctions imposed for other reasons.262 On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act.263 The REPO for Ukrainians Act describes Russia as an aggressor state264 and provides authority for the U.S. government to confiscate previously frozen Russian sovereign assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction.265
The REPO for Ukrainians Act also establishes a framework for the transfer of such assets to Ukraine for reconstruction assistance and compensation for damages caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.266 The act further states that it is the sense of Congress that "any effort by the United States to confiscate and repurpose Russian sovereign assets should be undertaken alongside international allies and partners as part of a coordinated, multilateral effort."267 In effect, the act offers the President (and encourages international allies that support Ukraine to embrace) an alternative source of funds to help Ukraine. As of the date of this report, the U.S. government has not seized, transferred, or confiscated any Russian sovereign assets.268
The REPO for Ukrainians Act authorizes the President to seize, confiscate, transfer, liquidate or vest "any Russian aggressor state sovereign assets" subject to U.S. jurisdiction for the purpose of transferring such funds to a Ukraine Support Fund.269 The act describes three permissible uses of the Ukraine Support Fund by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): (1) making contributions to an international body, fund, or mechanism established to administer compensation or provide assistance to Ukraine; (2) supporting Ukraine's "reconstruction, rebuilding, and recovery"; and (3) providing the people of Ukraine with "economic and humanitarian assistance."270 Funds in the Ukraine Support Fund may not be transferred or spent until the President certifies and transmits in writing to appropriate congressional committees a plan "to ensure transparency and accountability" for the use of such funds.271 Authority to use the Ukraine Support Fund expires in five years or 120 days after the President certifies that certain conditions related to the cessation of hostilities and the provision of damages compensation to Ukraine are met, whichever is earlier.272
Separately, Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, authorized the Attorney General to "transfer to the Secretary of State the proceeds of any covered forfeited property for use by the Secretary of State to provide assistance to Ukraine to remediate the harms of Russian aggression towards Ukraine."273 The provision appears to authorize forfeiture of property involved in certain sanctions violations as well as blocked property owned or controlled by a person designated under the specified executive orders pertaining to Russia, which is forfeitable under the identified statutes.274 The provision applies to forfeitures that occurred prior to May 1, 2025.275
International Law Implications of Seizing and Repurposing Frozen Assets
Some observers have debated whether confiscating Russian assets and transferring them to Ukraine as reparations for the invasion would violate international law.276 Proponents of the measure characterize it as a valid countermeasure supported by precedent,277 while others cautioned that confiscation of assets under these circumstances may pose risks to the financial system,278 may not fulfill criteria for a valid countermeasure under international law,279 and is not supported by relevant precedent.280 Historically, reparations have occurred pursuant to an international agreement such as a peace treaty,281 the award of an international court,282 or a UN Security Council resolution.283
In the REPO for Ukrainians Act, a sense of Congress provision expresses that the confiscation and repurposing of Russian sovereign assets, including the assets of agencies and instrumentalities of the Russian Federation,284 is consistent with international law.285 The act also includes a sense of Congress that, because Russia breached the prohibition on aggression under international law, the United States is legally entitled to take countermeasures to induce Russia to comply with its international obligations to cease its military invasion of Ukraine.286
Although not cited in the act, an argument in support of the sense of Congress may be found in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).287 These articles, which are nonbinding, articulate principles that "seek to formulate ... the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful acts."288 Although the articles are not legally binding and do not themselves provide legal authority for taking any action, they are authoritative within the international legal community and may be cited by courts as evidence of international legal principles.289
The articles further describe countermeasures as otherwise internationally wrongful acts (not amounting to the use of armed force or violations of certain other international law norms) taken by an injured state in order to cause the responsible state to cease its wrongful conduct.290 The injured state is entitled to demand cessation of the breach of an international legal obligation, assurances of non-repetition, and reparations.291 Countermeasures are limited to the temporary non-performance of an obligation toward the responsible state and must be reversible insofar as possible.292 ARSIWA contemplate that third states (e.g., the United States) who are not themselves injured may take countermeasures to enforce a breached obligation that is owed to the international community as a whole, in order to "ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State."293 A comment accompanying the articles explains that the status of such an entitlement remains uncertain under international law.294 In addition, a state other than an injured state is entitled to demand cessation of the breach of international law, as well as demand performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured state.295
Judicial Interpretation of IEEPA
A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way
through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and
congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights. congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights.
Most of these challenges have failed, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously Most of these challenges have failed, and the few challenges that succeeded did not seriously
undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions.undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions.
Dames & Moore v. Regan
The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme CourtThe breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court
’'s 1981 s 1981
opinion in opinion in
Dames & Moore v. Regan..
220296 In In
Dames & Moore, petitioners had challenged President , petitioners had challenged President
Carter’Reagan's executive order s executive order
establishingratifying previous executive orders that established regulations to further compliance with the terms of the regulations to further compliance with the terms of the
Algiers Accords, which Algiers Accords, which
the PresidentPresident Carter had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran
.221 Under these agreements,297 and suspending litigation against Iran.298 Under the Algiers Accords, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. , the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S.
courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and courts involving claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and
judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT).Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT).
The President299 President Carter, through executive orders, revoked all licenses , through executive orders, revoked all licenses
that permitted the exercise of that permitted the exercise of
“"any right, power, or privilegeany right, power, or privilege
”" with regard to Iranian funds, with regard to Iranian funds,
nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required
banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held
or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
222
300
Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work Dames & Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work
performed.performed.
223301 The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore and
issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might
217 See sections below “Fifth Amendment Takings Clause” and “Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause”. 218 P.L. 117-328, § 1708, 136. Stat. 5200 (2022). 219 See S. 1905 (proposal to expand §1708 authority to cover forfeitures by additional persons in relation to offenses such as export control violations).
220 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 221 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively “Algiers Accords”). 222 E.O. 12170, 44 Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979); E.O. 12279, 46 Federal Register 7,919 (January 19, 1981). On February 24, 1981 President Reagan ratified the Executive orders that President Carter had signed on January 19, 1981. E.O. 13294, 46 Federal Register 14,111 (1981).
223 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644.
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result,224issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might result,302 but stayed the case pending appeal. but stayed the case pending appeal.
225303 The executive orders and regulations The executive orders and regulations
implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and
the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT.the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT.
In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and In response, Dames & Moore sued the government. The plaintiff claimed that the President and
the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they
adversely affected Dames & Mooreadversely affected Dames & Moore
’'s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the s judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the
prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiffprejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff
’'s ability to continue litigation against the Iranian s ability to continue litigation against the Iranian
banks.banks.
226
304
The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support
for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the
property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in
U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:U.S. courts. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA … directly authorizes the President’
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA … directly authorizes the President's suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor
of Congressof Congress
’' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting
alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, specifically to delegate authority does not,
“"especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and
national security,national security,
”" imply imply
“"congressional disapprovalcongressional disapproval
”" of action taken by the Executive. On of action taken by the Executive. On
the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the Presidentthe contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President
’s 's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent presidential presidential
responsibility.responsibility.
”" At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent
and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort
engaged in by the President.engaged in by the President.
227
305
The Court remarked that CongressThe Court remarked that Congress
’'s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice
of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the
challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.
228306 For support, the Court cited For support, the Court cited
Justice FrankfurterJustice Frankfurter
’'s concurrence in s concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,,
229307 which stated which stated
that that
“"a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on
‘'Executive PowerExecutive Power
’' vested in the vested in the
President by §1 of Art. II.President by §1 of Art. II.
”230"308 Consequently, it may be argued that Congress Consequently, it may be argued that Congress
’'s exclusion of certain s exclusion of certain
express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least
where a court finds sufficient precedent exists.where a court finds sufficient precedent exists.
Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines.Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid., 666. 226 Ibid., 666-67. 227 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted). 228 Ibid., 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
229 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952). 230 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine
Separation of Powers—Non-Delegation Doctrine
Courts have reviewed whether Courts have reviewed whether
CongressIEEPA violated the non-delegation principle of separation of violated the non-delegation principle of separation of
powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new
crimes.crimes.
231309 These challenges have generally failed. These challenges have generally failed.
232310 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are
constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an
“"intelligible principleintelligible principle
” " governing the exercise of the delegated authority.governing the exercise of the delegated authority.
233311 Even if the standards are higher for Even if the standards are higher for
delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient
guidance.guidance.
234312 The court stated The court stated
The IEEPA The IEEPA
“"meaningfully constrains the [Presidentmeaningfully constrains the [President
’'s] discretion,s] discretion,
”" by requiring that by requiring that
“"[t]he [t]he
authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and authorities granted to the President ... may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and
extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.
”" And And
the authorities delegated are defined and limited.the authorities delegated are defined and limited.
235
313
The Second Circuit found it significant that The Second Circuit found it significant that
“"IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which
the President has greater discretion,the President has greater discretion,
”236"314 bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non- bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-
delegation doctrine.delegation doctrine.
Conversely, plaintiffs have had little success challenging IEEPA sanctions where Congress has imposed limitations on the President’s authority. The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the then-existing Iraq travel ban based on the claim that the ban imposed an indirect restriction on the
231 United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate delegation of congressional authority to the executive).
232 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA’s delegation of authority to the President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v. Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No. CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
233 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). 234 Ibid., 216 (“Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA’s delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111 (1991)]”); see also Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 576 (“We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully constrains” the President’s discretion.”); Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding “constraining factors” in IEEPA sufficient to conclude the President’s powers are “explicitly defined and circumscribed”).
235 Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted). See also United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023) (upholding the use of IEEPA to maintain the Export Administration Regulations despite lapse of the Export Administration Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because IEEPA “specifies the steps the President must take before invoking an emergency, including consultation with Congress, and establishes reporting requirements”) The court further held that IEEPA “limits the President’s authority to prohibit certain types of transactions, and prohibits the punishment of unwitting violators.”). Ibid. The court explained that, “[b]ecause these statutory restrictions strike ‘a careful balance between affording the President a degree of authority to address the exigencies of national emergencies and restraining his ability to perpetuate emergency situations indefinitely by creating more opportunities for congressional input,’” it agreed with every Circuit to have considered the issue, and determined “that IEEPA is constitutional.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 577 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2011)).
236 Dhafir, 461 F.3d. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675).
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provision of medical supplies in violation of IEEPA.237
In ongoing litigation regarding tariffs imposed under IEEPA, the Court of International Trade has described the nondelegation doctrine as a "useful tool[] for the court to interpret [IEEPA] so as to avoid constitutional problems."315 The court did not strike down any part of IEEPA but ruled that the statute did not authorize certain "worldwide" tariffs, reasoning that IEEPA cannot allow the President "to impose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable" without "creat[ing] an unconstitutional delegation of power."316 The court's order is currently stayed (paused) pending appeal.317
Conversely, plaintiffs have had little success challenging IEEPA sanctions where Congress has imposed limitations on the President's authority. The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the then-existing Iraq travel ban based on the claim that the ban imposed an indirect restriction on the provision of medical supplies in violation of IEEPA.318 In a case where plaintiffs sought In a case where plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief from the imposition of sanctions by arguing that the Presidentinjunctive relief from the imposition of sanctions by arguing that the President
’'s authority did not s authority did not
extend to imposing sanctions involving medical supplies and humanitarian aid for Iran, the extend to imposing sanctions involving medical supplies and humanitarian aid for Iran, the
district court dismissed the claim in part because the statutory restrictions on such sanctions do district court dismissed the claim in part because the statutory restrictions on such sanctions do
not create a private right of action.not create a private right of action.
238 319
Separation of Powers—Legislative Veto
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA
is an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision statesis an unconstitutional legislative veto. That provision states
The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this
section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution
pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. §1622] and if the pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. §1622] and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to
be exercised under this section.be exercised under this section.
239
In U.S.320
In United States v. Romero-Fernandez, two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive , two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive
order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of
the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional the above provision. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional
legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on
INS v. Chadha,,
240321 in which the in which the
Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch
through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by
presentment of the law to the President.presentment of the law to the President.
241322 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the
defendants’defendants' convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations, convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations,
242323 holding that the legislative veto holding that the legislative veto
provision was severable from the rest of the statute.provision was severable from the rest of the statute.
243 324
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an
uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
Amendment’Amendment's Takings Clause prohibits s Takings Clause prohibits
“"private property [from being] taken for public use, without just compensation."325 The Fifth Amendment'private property [from being] taken for public use,
237 Sacks v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that IEEPA does not burden the President’s powers with respect to humanitarian aid when he acts under the UNPA). IEEPA does not provide authority to regulate “donations ... of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations” would risk certain harms. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(2).
238 Iran Thalassemia Soc’y v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 3:22-CV-1195-HZ, 2022 WL 9888593, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 2022) (declining to enjoin “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran for violating the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA, P.L. 106-387, §1, found at 22 U.S.C. §7202) and the Iran financial sector sanctions provision, found at 22 U.S.C. §8513a(d)(2)), appeal dismissed, No. 22-35850, 2022 WL 18461465 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022).
239 50 U.S.C. §1706(b) (2018). 240 United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). 241 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55. 242 Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 (“Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. §1705(b), and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of §1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is irrelevant to their convictions.”). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution, which does not require the President’s signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution as a response to Chadha. Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by concurrent resolution.
243 Ibid., 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress’s inclusion of a severability clause).
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without just compensation.”244 The Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory s prohibitions apply as well to regulatory
takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes
restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein.
245
326
The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to
regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for
this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments.
246327 The The
Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no
uncompensated taking:uncompensated taking:
This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in
This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing authorizing
blocking orders is blocking orders is
“"to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President....to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President....
” " Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a
“bargaining chip” to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile "bargaining chip" to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. country.
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitionerAccordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner
’'s argument because the practical effect of it s argument because the practical effect of it
is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate
this “bargaining chip” through this "bargaining chip" through attachments,attachments,
garnishments,garnishments,
or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language language
supports such a result.supports such a result.
247
328
Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions
enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under
the Fifth Amendment.the Fifth Amendment.
248329 Even though the plaintiff suffered Even though the plaintiff suffered
“"obvious economic lossobvious economic loss
”" due to the due to the
sanctions regulations, sanctions regulations,
the court found that that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiffthat factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff
’'s claim of a s claim of a
compensable taking.compensable taking.
249330 The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its
finding:finding:
A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great
losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth
of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or
a non-intercourse act, ora non-intercourse act, or
an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? ... [W]as it ever an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? ... [W]as it ever
244 U.S. CONST. Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, Takings Clause: Overview, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-9-1/ALDE_00013280/.
245 See Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as “not involv[ing] physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner’s use of property, … based on the ‘general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking’”) (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)), aff’d, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
246 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that “an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the President may take” pursuant to IEEPA).
247 Ibid., 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The President’s action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.”). 248 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a foreign government “did so against the backdrop of the government’s foreign policy power” and did not have reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (“[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must … take the President’s power into account in structuring their transactions.”); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]hose who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations” (citing Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking because “plaintiff’’s [stock options] were ‘in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA.’”). 249 Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21.
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imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of
law?law?
250
331
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition
of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their
losses.losses.
Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success
challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings.
251332 Many courts have Many courts have
recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a
temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.temporary action that does not vest title in the United States.
252333 This conclusion is apparently so This conclusion is apparently so
even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise.
253334 In In
some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a
Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.Fourth Amendment standard for seizure.
254335 One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under
a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first
obtained a judicial warrant.obtained a judicial warrant.
255 336
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has
been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be been violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
256337 Where one company protested Where one company protested
that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a
district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
257338 A second district court stated that the exigencies A second district court stated that the exigencies
of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have
meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs.
258339 A A
third district court stated that OFACthird district court stated that OFAC
’'s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a s failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a
hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate
its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the
important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist
250 Ibid. (citing Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897). 251 Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) (“Takings claims have often been raised—and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context.”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
252 Ibid. (citing Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.” (citations omitted)), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
253 IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted).
254 KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008).
255 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883. 256 U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V. 257 IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)).
258 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing “the Executive’s need for speed in these matters, and the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records”), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
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financing.259important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist financing.340 That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to
protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.
260
341
In In
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Court of , the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFACAppeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC
’'s use of classified information without s use of classified information without
any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its
failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the
organization’organization's right to procedural due process.s right to procedural due process.
261342 The court applied the balancing test set forth by The court applied the balancing test set forth by
the Supreme Court in its landmark case the Supreme Court in its landmark case
Mathews v. Eldridge262343 to resolve these questions. to resolve these questions.
263 344 Under the Under the
Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received constitutional due process, test, to determine if an individual has received constitutional due process,
courts must weighcourts must weigh
(1) [the person(1) [the person
’'s or entitys or entity
’'s] private property interest,s] private property interest,
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as
well as the value of additional safeguards, andwell as the value of additional safeguards, and
(3) the Government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of
(3) the Government's interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements.additional procedural requirements.
”264
345
While weighing the interests and risks at issue in While weighing the interests and risks at issue in
Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found the , the Ninth Circuit found the
organization’organization's property interest to be significant:s property interest to be significant:
By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity.
All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with
the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties
attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years’ imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is attach even for unwitting violations. Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years' imprisonment, attach for willful violations. For domestic organizations such as AHIF–Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial
relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFACrelief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC
’'s long administrative s long administrative
delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum, delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum, designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation
indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.
265
346
Nevertheless, the court found Nevertheless, the court found
“"the governmentthe government
’'s interest in national security [could not] be s interest in national security [could not] be
understated.understated.
”266"347 In evaluating the government In evaluating the government
’'s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth s interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government
“"take reasonable measures to take reasonable measures to
ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably
designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private partydesigned to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party
’'s interests.s interests.
”267"348 While the While the
Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the
exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively
259 Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002). 260 Ibid.
261 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012). 262 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 263 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979. 264 Ibid. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35). 265 Ibid., 979–80 (internal citations omitted). 266 Ibid., 980. 267 Ibid.
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unconstitutional,268unconstitutional,349 the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case. the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case.
269350 The The
Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not
use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it.
270351 Although Although
the court found that OFACthe court found that OFAC
’'s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information s failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information
at issue was a violation of the organizationat issue was a violation of the organization
’'s due process rights,s due process rights,
271352 the court deemed the error the court deemed the error
harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case.
272
353
In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organizationIn the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization
’'s argument that it had been s argument that it had been
denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
273354 Specifically, the organization asserted Specifically, the organization asserted
that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization, that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization,
leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFACleaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC
’'s unknown suspicions.s unknown suspicions.
274355 Because OFAC had Because OFAC had
provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year
period between the freezing of its assets and its redesignation as a specially designated global period between the freezing of its assets and its redesignation as a specially designated global
terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that OFAC had deprived the organizationterrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that OFAC had deprived the organization
’'s procedural due s procedural due
process rights.process rights.
275356 However, the court found that this error too was harmless. However, the court found that this error too was harmless.
276
357
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that a foreign individual could not
challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds challenge his designation as a specially designated national under IEEPA on due process grounds
because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant because he had not established a sufficient connection with the United States to warrant
constitutional protections.constitutional protections.
277358 The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a The court acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit has not articulated a
specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States specific test for determining whether a foreign national residing outside the United States
maintains the requisite maintains the requisite
“"substantial connectionssubstantial connections
”" to avail himself of due process rights. to avail himself of due process rights.
278359 The The
court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite court held that, irrespective of the proper test, the individual had failed to meet the requisite
constitutional standard because he constitutional standard because he
“"ha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let alone a substantial one."360 The court heldha[d] not established any connection to the United States, let
268 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional” (citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995)).
269 Ibid., 982 “[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared “national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.”). 270 Ibid., 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)). See also Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[G]iven the overriding governmental interest at stake in protecting classified information and the wide berth afforded the executive branch in matters relating to foreign affairs and national security, the Court concludes that OFAC has provided Olenga with sufficient notice of the reasons for his designation to comply with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
271 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 984 (“OFAC’s failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon’s due process rights.”). 272 Ibid., 990. 273 Ibid., 984. 274 Ibid., 984-85. 275 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for the investigation).
276 Ibid. at 990 (“Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC’s ultimate designation determination.”).
277 Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2020) (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Fulmen Co. v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 547 F. Supp. 3d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Because Fulmen’s own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial connections’ necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”).
278 Rakhimov, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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alone a substantial one.”279 The court did, however, hold that the foreign national retained the that the foreign national retained the
right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).right to procedural review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
280 361
First Amendment Challenges
Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations
promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjectspromulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects
’' First Amendment rights to free association, First Amendment rights to free association,
free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.free speech, or religion. Challenges on these grounds have typically failed.
281362 Courts have held Courts have held
that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists.
282363 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the
blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the
organization’organization's freedom of association.s freedom of association.
283364 Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to
hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that typically applies to regulations
implicating political contributions.implicating political contributions.
284
365
With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were
temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that
“"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
”285"366 Accordingly, the district court applied the Accordingly, the district court applied the
following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful. Citing the
Supreme CourtSupreme Court
’'s opinion in s opinion in
United States v. O’'Brien, the court stated that a government , the court stated that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified ifregulation is sufficiently justified if
(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government;(1) it is within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) the (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
279 Ibid. 280 See ibid., *6 (observing that the court must follow “the APA’s [5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)] ‘highly deferential standard,’ meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury’s action ‘only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’”) (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 281 KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (“Courts have uniformly held that OFAC’s blocking and designation authorities do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored.”). Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC blocking action violated plaintiff’s First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of religion, and noting that “nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its views”); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form, including services as a combatant.”). 282 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “where an organization is found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional” under the First Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding “as other courts have,” with respect to a First Amendment right to association claim, that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists” (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
283 Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 (“The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational activity other than financial support.”). 284 Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly intended for charitable purposes).
285 Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), aff'd on
other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
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(4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.essential to the furtherance of that interest.
286
367
The court found the governmentThe court found the government
’'s actions fell within the bounds of this test:s actions fell within the bounds of this test:
First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of
First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order. Second, the Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of preventing terrorist attacks. Third, the governmentpreventing terrorist attacks. Third, the government
’'s action is unrelated to the suppression s action is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists. terrorists.
Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary.287
Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary.368
With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct With respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct
coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found
that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to
strict scrutiny.strict scrutiny.
288369 The court rejected the government The court rejected the government
’'s reliance on the Supreme Courts reliance on the Supreme Court
’'s decision in s decision in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project289370 to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the
organization’organization's right to free speech.s right to free speech.
290371 Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the
First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization
designated as an SDGT.designated as an SDGT.
First Amendment—Informational Materials and Communications Exception
under IEEPA
Although caselaw is sparse, it appears that criminal defendants have had little success asserting a Although caselaw is sparse, it appears that criminal defendants have had little success asserting a
defense that their conduct amounted to conduct under the provision of informational materials or defense that their conduct amounted to conduct under the provision of informational materials or
protected communications exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a protected communications exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a
claim that OFACclaim that OFAC
’'s regulation, which exempts informational materials that were s regulation, which exempts informational materials that were
“"not fully created not fully created
and in existence at the date of the transactionsand in existence at the date of the transactions
”" from the scope of the statutory exception for from the scope of the statutory exception for
informational materials, was ultra vires.informational materials, was ultra vires.
291372 The Third Circuit upheld the defendant The Third Circuit upheld the defendant
’'s conviction s conviction
for violating Iran sanctions regulations by marketing a dynamic chemical engineering software for violating Iran sanctions regulations by marketing a dynamic chemical engineering software
program to various Iranian entities.program to various Iranian entities.
292373 A district court validated an indictment for IEEPA A district court validated an indictment for IEEPA
violations against a defendant who spoke at a conference in the Democratic Peopleviolations against a defendant who spoke at a conference in the Democratic People
’'s Republic of s Republic of
North Korea (DPRK) involving cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.North Korea (DPRK) involving cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.
293374 The court held The court held
that the jury could decide if the speech was part of a long-term conspiracy to persuade and assist that the jury could decide if the speech was part of a long-term conspiracy to persuade and assist
the DPRK in using cryptocurrency services in an effort to avoid U.S. sanctions and launder the DPRK in using cryptocurrency services in an effort to avoid U.S. sanctions and launder
money.money.
294375 Another court upheld regulations that provided that software does not qualify as excepted "information and informational materials" if it is subject to export controls.376 Likewise, Another court upheld regulations that provided that software does not qualify as
286 Ibid. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77). 287 Ibid.
288 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, “[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism”). 289 561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, against First Amendment challenge).
290 Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC’s content-based prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment).
291 United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 583 (3d Cir. 2011). 292 Ibid., 567. 293 United States v. Griffith, 515 F. Supp. 3d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). 294 Ibid., 117.
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excepted “information and informational materials” if it is subject to export controls.295 Likewise, source code was held not entitled to protection insofar as it was used to conduct cryptocurrency source code was held not entitled to protection insofar as it was used to conduct cryptocurrency
transactions.transactions.
296
377
Civil litigants have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down Civil litigants have had some success challenging IEEPA regulations that effectively shut down
communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding communications platforms altogether. On May 15, 2019, President Donald J. Trump, finding
“"that that
the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications
technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversariescontrolled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries
”" constituted an constituted an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked United States, declared a national emergency under the authority of the NEA and invoked
authorities granted by IEEPA.authorities granted by IEEPA.
297
378
A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders A little more than a year later, on August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two executive orders
under that same national emergency to address under that same national emergency to address
“"the spread in the United States of mobile the spread in the United States of mobile
applications developed and owned by companies in [China].applications developed and owned by companies in [China].
”298 "379 The executive orders applied to The executive orders applied to
the video sharing platform the video sharing platform
TikTok299 TikTok380 and the communications platform WeChat, among others,and the communications platform WeChat, among others,
300 381 and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance and prohibited certain transactions, as identified by the Secretary of Commerce, with ByteDance
Ltd., TikTokLtd., TikTok
’'s owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChats owner, and Tencent Holdings Ltd., WeChat
’'s owner.s owner.
301
382
After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and After the Trump Administration issued regulations barring transactions involving the TikTok and
WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat WeChat communications applications (apps) in the United States, users of TikTok and WeChat
challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing challenged the executive orders and the Commerce Department memorandums implementing
them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued them on constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, in two separate cases, litigants argued
that that
the orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated orders and memorandums violated their First Amendment right to free speech and violated
the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.the IEEPA restriction on regulating transactions of informational materials.
302383 TikTok also TikTok also
brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.brought a separate suit to enjoin the restrictions.
303
384
In the first case, In the first case,
Marland v. Trump, plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok, , plaintiffs, users of the video-sharing application TikTok,
challenged the Commerce Departmentchallenged the Commerce Department
’'s memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions s memorandum that identified six prohibited transactions
under E.O. 13942.under E.O. 13942.
304385 The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to- The Commerce TikTok Identification specified that it bans only business-to-
business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among
295 United States v. Alavi, No. CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss superseding indictment).
296 Van Loon v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 1:23-CV-312-RP, 2023 WL 5313091, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023). 297 E.O. 13873 (May 15, 2019), Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
298 E.O. 13942 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the
National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 48,637 (August 11, 2020); E.O. 13943 (August 6, 2020), Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat,
and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications
Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 48,641 (August 11, 2020).
299 E.O. 13942. 300 E.O. 13943. 301 E.O. 13942; E.O. 13943. 302 Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021).
303 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021).
304 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632.
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TikTok users.305business transactions and does not apply to exchanges of business or personal information among TikTok users.386 An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the An earlier Commerce Department memorandum noted that the effect of the
prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to prohibitions, most of which were scheduled to apply on November 12, 2020, would be to
“"significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States,significantly reduce the functionality and usability of the app in the United States,
”" and that and that
“"these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for these prohibitions may ultimately make the application less effective and may be challenging for
U.S.-based TikTok users.U.S.-based TikTok users.
”306
"387
The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth The plaintiffs contended that the Commerce Identification violated the First and Fifth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the APA.
307388 The district court declined to address The district court declined to address
the plaintiffsthe plaintiffs
’' First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their First Amendment challenges and certain other claims, and considered instead their
claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an claim that the Commerce TikTok Identification was an
ultra vires exercise of agency authority exercise of agency authority
under the APA because it violates IEEPAunder the APA because it violates IEEPA
’s “'s "informational materialinformational material
”" exception as well as the exception as well as the
exception for exception for
“"personal communication[s] ... not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value.personal communication[s] ... not involv[ing] a transfer of anything of value.
”308 "389 The court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPAThe court employed a textual interpretation of IEEPA
’'s informational material bar to find that the s informational material bar to find that the
short-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPAshort-format videos exchanged via TikTok clearly fell into IEEPA
’'s nonexhaustive exemplary list s nonexhaustive exemplary list
of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are of informational materials protected from regulation or prohibition because they are
“"analogous analogous
to the to the
‘films,’ ‘artworks,’ ‘'films,' 'artworks,' 'photographs,photographs,
’' and and
‘'news wire feedsnews wire feeds
’' expressly protected under expressly protected under
§1702(b)(3).§1702(b)(3).
”309
"390
The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not The court next determined that the Commerce TikTok Identification, even though it did not
directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect directly ban TikTok users from communicating via TikTok, amounted, at minimum, to an indirect
regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.regulation of such communications by making them impossible to carry out.
310391 The government The government
sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce sought to characterize the burden on TikTok users as merely incidental to the Commerce
Identification’Identification's intended objective of prohibiting TikToks intended objective of prohibiting TikTok
’'s commercial transactions, and that any s commercial transactions, and that any
incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.incidental burden cannot violated IEEPA.
311392 The court, pointing to legislative history of the The court, pointing to legislative history of the
Berman Amendments, rejected the governmentBerman Amendments, rejected the government
’'s contention that the object of the regulation must s contention that the object of the regulation must
itself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPAitself involve transactions of informational material to be in violation of IEEPA
’'s informational s informational
material exception.material exception.
312393 The court observed, The court observed,
“"[t]he Government[t]he Government
’'s suggested reading ignores s suggested reading ignores
Congress’Congress's deliberate insertion of the word s deliberate insertion of the word
‘indirectly’'indirectly' into IEEPA. into IEEPA.
”313"394 While the court accepted While the court accepted
the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so the notion that some burdens on transactions involving informational materials might be so
tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case tangential as to survive review, it declared that this case
“"does not present a line-drawing does not present a line-drawing
problem”problem" between indirect regulation and tangential effects. between indirect regulation and tangential effects.
314
395
In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the In the next case, TikTok and its Beijing-based parent company ByteDance sued to enjoin the
Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary Commerce TikTok Identification prohibitions and were initially granted a nationwide preliminary
injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in injunction on the first of the prohibitions, which involved availability of the video-sharing app in
app stores.app stores.
315396 The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.397 The court The district court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
305 Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the “Commerce TikTok Identification”).
306 Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum). 307 Ibid., 634. 308 Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. §702; 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1) and (3)).
309 Ibid., 636. 310 Ibid., 637 (“[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app’s functionality such that U.S. users will be prevented from exchanging data on the app.”).
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid., 638. 313 Ibid. 314 Ibid., 639. 315 TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020).
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of their claim that the prohibition contravened the informational material exception.316 The court explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational explained that the content users share through TikTok falls into the category of informational
materials because it materials because it
“"appears to be (or to be analogous to) appears to be (or to be analogous to)
‘'publications, films, ... photographs, ... publications, films, ... photographs, ...
artworks, ... and news wire feeds.artworks, ... and news wire feeds.
’”317'"398 Like the court in Like the court in
Marland, the district court in , the district court in
TikTok Inc. rejected the governmentrejected the government
’'s contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business s contention that the prohibition involved only business-to-business
transactions based on the finding that the transactions based on the finding that the
“"purpose and effectpurpose and effect
”" of the prohibition on U.S. users of the prohibition on U.S. users
was was
“"to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the to limit, and ultimately reduce to zero, the number of U.S. users who can comment on the
platform and have their personal data on TikTok.platform and have their personal data on TikTok.
”318"399 The court also found it implausible that The court also found it implausible that
information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials information exchanged on TikTok would fall within a carve-out to the informational materials
exception under the Espionage Act for exception under the Espionage Act for
“"shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets ... with foreign shar[ing] U.S. defense secrets ... with foreign
adversaries.adversaries.
”319
"400
The IEEPA exception also covers The IEEPA exception also covers
“"personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of
anything of value.anything of value.
”320"401 The government in The government in
TikTok argued that, even if personal communications argued that, even if personal communications
shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications shared over TikTok have no economic value to the creators and recipients, such communications
nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.nevertheless have an economic value to the platform as a whole.
321402 The district court rejected this The district court rejected this
argument, stating argument, stating
“"such an expansive reading of the phrase such an expansive reading of the phrase
‘'anything of valueanything of value
’' would write the would write the
personal-communications limitation out of the statute.personal-communications limitation out of the statute.
”322"403 The court reasoned that, The court reasoned that,
“"[a]ll [a]ll
communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone communication service providers—from televisions stations and publishers to cellular phone
carriers—get some value from a usercarriers—get some value from a user
’s ‘'s 'presence onpresence on
’' their platform. their platform.
”323
"404
The third case stems from the Commerce SecretaryThe third case stems from the Commerce Secretary
’'s issuance of s issuance of
“"Identification of Prohibited Identification of Prohibited
Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13943 and Address the Threat Posed by WeChat and
the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and
Services Supply Chain,Services Supply Chain,
”" identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat identifying the prohibited transactions (Commerce WeChat
Identification).Identification).
324405 The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions The Commerce WeChat Identification further clarified that these prohibitions
“"only apply to the parties to business-to-business transactionsonly apply to the parties to business-to-business transactions
”" and did not apply to and did not apply to
“"[t]he [t]he
exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business exchange between or among WeChat mobile application users of personal or business
information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of information using the WeChat mobile application, to include the transferring and receiving of
funds,funds,
”" among other things. among other things.
325406 The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile- The U.S. users of the messaging, social-media, and mobile-
payment app WeChatpayment app WeChat
, sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First sued to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13943 on First
Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception Amendment and Fifth Amendment grounds, as well its compliance with the IEEPA exception
precluding regulation of personal communications.precluding regulation of personal communications.
326407 The government did not contest that the The government did not contest that the
prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of prohibitions would result in shutting down WeChat for users as a platform for the exchange of
information.327
316 Ibid., 80. 317 Ibid., 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3)). 318 Ibid., 81. 319 Ibid., 83. 320 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1). 321 TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83. 322 Ibid. 323 Ibid. 324 U.S. Commerce Department, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-executive-order-13943-and-address-threat.
325 Ibid. 326 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020). 327 Ibid., 926 (referring to plaintiffs’ description of WeChat as “a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S”).
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information.408
Addressing the plaintiffsAddressing the plaintiffs
’' First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs First Amendment challenge, the district court agreed that the plaintiffs
established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed established a strong showing that the WeChat ban unlawfully foreclosed
“"an entire medium of an entire medium of
public expressionpublic expression
”" or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications. or amounted to an unlawful prior restraint of their communications.
328409 The The
court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States court concluded that Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking WeChat users in the United States
do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically, do not have any other viable means of communicating electronically,
“"not only because China not only because China
bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no
options other than WeChat.options other than WeChat.
”329"410 The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could The court suggested, without deciding, that the WeChat ban could
receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.receive heightened First Amendment strict scrutiny if decided on the merits.
330411 With regard to With regard to
intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First
Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on Amendment challenge. An intermediate form of scrutiny is normally reserved for restrictions on
the the
“"time, place, or manner,time, place, or manner,
”" and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it and a time, place, or manner restriction survives such scrutiny if it
“"(1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of (1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of
the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.
”331"412 The court agreed that The court agreed that
the governmentthe government
’'s national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data s national security interest in preventing WeChat (and China) collection of data
from U.S. users is significant, but that the from U.S. users is significant, but that the
“"effective baneffective ban
”" did not advance that interest in a did not advance that interest in a
narrowly tailored way given the narrowly tailored way given the
“"obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat
from government devicesfrom government devices
”" or enhancing data security. or enhancing data security.
332413 The court concluded that The court concluded that
“"[o]n this [o]n this
limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
serve the governmentserve the government
’'s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of
substitute channels for communication.substitute channels for communication.
”333
"414
The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable The court further determined that the immediate shutdown of WeChat would cause irreparable
harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.harm to the plaintiffs by eliminating their platform for communication.
334415 In assessing the balance In assessing the balance
of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),of equities and the public interest (elements that merge where the government is a party),
335416 the the
court found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffscourt found that the balance of equities tipped in plaintiffs
’' favor and the public interest favored favor and the public interest favored
protecting the plaintiffsprotecting the plaintiffs
’' constitutional rights. constitutional rights.
336417 The court framed the government The court framed the government
’'s contention s contention
that an injunction would that an injunction would
“"frustrate and displace the Presidentfrustrate and displace the President
’'s determination of how best to s determination of how best to
address threats to national securityaddress threats to national security
”337"418 as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed as important, but deemed the evidence of the threat posed
specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens specifically by WeChat to be only modest, noting that the wholesale shutdown of WeChat burdens
more speech than necessary to serve the governmentmore speech than necessary to serve the government
’'s national security and foreign policy s national security and foreign policy
interests.interests.
338419 Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce Accordingly, the court entered a preliminary nationwide injunction of the Commerce
WeChat Identification.339
328 Ibid., 927. 329 Ibid. (discounting government’s “argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication”). 330 Ibid., 926-27. In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
331 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)).
332 U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927. 333 Ibid., 928 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 334 Ibid., 929. 335 Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)). 336 Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)). 337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid., 930.
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WeChat Identification.420
All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government All three courts adjudicating these disputes issued preliminary injunctions, and the government
appealed each decision.appealed each decision.
340421 The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while The Biden Administration initially sought to pause the litigation while
it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.it reviewed U.S.-China policy and the effective social media platform bans.
341422 President Biden President Biden
subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the subsequently issued an executive order rescinding the relevant executive orders and the
Commerce DepartmentCommerce Department
’'s implementing memorandums,s implementing memorandums,
342423 making the litigation moot. making the litigation moot.
343424 The The
original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology original underlying executive order related to the information and communications technology
and services supply chain,and services supply chain,
344425 however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive however, remains intact with elaborations set forth in Executive
Order 14034. Consequently, should the Biden Administration decide to institute new restrictions on the platforms, the First Amendment issue and the interpretation of IEEPA’s exception for informational materials and personal communications may arise again in litigation.Order 14034. In April 2024, Congress enacted the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACAA).426 The PAFACAA makes it unlawful for certain entities to "distribute, maintain, or update ... a foreign adversary controlled application" in the United States unless the covered application's owners execute a "qualified divestiture" within a specified timeframe.427
Use of IEEPA to Continue Enforcing the Export Administration Act (EAA)
Until the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,Until the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,
345428 export of dual use goods and export of dual use goods and
services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Actservices was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act
(EAA),346 ,429 which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization. President Reagan was the first President
to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAAto use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA
’'s export controls.s export controls.
347
430
After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444 After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444
in 1983, finding that in 1983, finding that
“"unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods,
technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations
constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security.extraordinary threat to the national security.
”348"431 Although the EAA had been reauthorized for Although the EAA had been reauthorized for
short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the
authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods
of lapse.of lapse.
In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding In the latest iteration, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding
the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—
pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that
“"the provisions for administration of the the provisions for administration of the
[EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export
340 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir. filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020).
341 Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump’s effort to ban WeChat, WASH. POST, February 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/.
342 E.O. 14034 of June 9, 2021, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Federal
Register 31,423 (June11, 2021).
343 Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal at government’s request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at *1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same).
344 E.O. 13873 of May 15, 2019, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
345In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232 to repeal the Export Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections
were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See “
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” section below.
346 P.L. 96-72, §2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§4601-4623 (2018). 347 E.O. 12444, 48 Federal Register 48,215 (October 18, 1983). 348 Ibid.
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[EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect … the export control system heretofore maintained.control system heretofore maintained.
”349"432 Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the
2001 executive order.2001 executive order.
350
433
Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress,
351434 although certain although certain
provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges. The determining factor
appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the
challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction challenged action. In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction
for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly
criminalize such attempts.criminalize such attempts.
352435 The circuit court rejected the defendants The circuit court rejected the defendants
’' argument that the President argument that the President
had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by
“enlarging”"enlarging" the crimes punishable under the crimes punishable under
the regulations.the regulations.
353
436
Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were
rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and
“"could not be repromulgated by executive order could not be repromulgated by executive order
under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President.
”354"437 The district court found that, even The district court found that, even
if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited
by the scope of the statutesby the scope of the statutes
’' substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA
’'s enactment, when no s enactment, when no
conspiracy provision existed in either statute.conspiracy provision existed in either statute.
355
438
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute
permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),Information Act (FOIA),
356439 which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure
by statute, even though the EAA had expired.by statute, even though the EAA had expired.
357440 Referring to legislative history it interpreted as Referring to legislative history it interpreted as
congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of
lapse, the court statedlapse, the court stated
Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAAAlthough the legislative history does not refer to the EAA
’'s confidentiality provision, it s confidentiality provision, it
does evince Congressdoes evince Congress
’'s intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the s intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the
export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of export regulations promulgated under the EAA. Moreover, it is significant for purposes of
determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA’s determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA's export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the Presidentexport regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President
’'s ongoing s ongoing
practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality
protections.protections.
358
441
The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a The D.C. Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a
decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a companydecision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company
’'s violation of the s violation of the
EAA regulations.EAA regulations.
359442 Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce
349 E.O. 13222, 66 Federal Register 44,025 (August 17, 2001). 350 See, e.g., Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Federal Register 39,005 (August 15, 2017).
351 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts uniformly have read [Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.443 The D.C. Circuit, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction:
This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President's order only if the President has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from either the Executive's inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive the executive
order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods of lapse.”). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the EAA because the statute had expired.
352 United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987). 353 Ibid., 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA). 354 United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005). 355 Ibid., 95. 356 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (2018). 357 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 358 Ibid.
359 Micei Int’l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D.C. Circuit.360 The D.C. Circuit, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction:
This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President’s order only if the President has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from either the Executive’s inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of power from Congress. The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to confer jurisdiction in Congress alone. Whether the executive order can provide the basis of our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court.361
Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court according to the default rule under the APA.362
Issues and Options for Congress
Congress may address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; threeorder can provide the basis of our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court under the auspices of IEEPA…. We conclude that the President lacks that power. Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court.444
Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court according to the default rule under the APA.445
Use of IEEPA to Regulate Cryptocurrency
The utility of cryptocurrency for terrorist fundraising and sanctions evasions makes it a prime concern with respect to sanctions enforcement.446 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held in Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury447 that "smart contracts"—applications that self-execute when participants meet some predetermined set of criteria448—are not "property" subject to regulation under IEEPA because they are incapable of being owned,449 even considering the expansive definition of property in the relevant regulations.450 OFAC had designated the automatic crypto-mixer Tornado Cash pursuant to E.O. 13964,451 placing it onto the Specially Designated Nationals List and prohibiting transactions in all property and interests in property belonging to Tornado Cash.452 OFAC designated Tornado Cash due to the mixing protocol's assisting malicious cyber actors, such as a North Korea-linked hacking group, to launder the proceeds of cybercrimes.453
Six users of Tornado Cash brought a lawsuit against OFAC, arguing the designation exceeded its statutory authority by imposing sanctions on self-executing software that does not constitute an interest in property held by a foreign person.454 The district judge issued a summary judgment in favor of OFAC, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity with a property interest in the smart contracts, which it found to be contracts under the regulation.455 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the immutable nature of the contracts require "[a]n agreement between two or more parties," while immutable smart contracts have only one party.456 Tornado Cash, the court observed, does not have control over or own the smart contracts.457 Likewise, the court found, the smart contracts are "less like a 'service' and more like a tool that is used in performing a service."458
The Fifth Circuit suggested Congress consider updating IEEPA to target modern technologies like crypto-mixing software, but stated that until that happens, Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts will not be deemed the "property" of a foreign national or entity, leaving them exempt from blocking under IEEPA.459
Issues and Options for Congress
Congress may address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; four are addressed here. The are addressed here. The
first pertains to first pertains to
the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs. The second pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute, how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute,
the NEA. The the NEA. The
secondthird pertains to the termination of national emergencies invoking IEEPA. The pertains to the termination of national emergencies invoking IEEPA. The
thirdfourth pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Delegation of Authority under IEEPA
The Use of IEEPA to Impose Tariffs
Prior to 2025, no President had used IEEPA to impose tariffs.460 Beginning in February 2025, President Trump cited IEEPA as his authority to impose tariffs on a variety of trading partners to deal with six distinct national emergencies.461 These emergency measures included tariffs on Canada,462 Mexico,463 and China464 to deal with fentanyl trafficking, potential tariffs on countries importing Venezuelan oil,465 tariffs on the imports from most other countries to deal with the "persistent annual United States goods trade deficits,"466 and tariffs on Brazil to deal with "violat[ions of] the free expression rights of United States persons."467
Several Members of Congress have expressed concern with using IEEPA to impose tariffs. Between February 1, 2025, and September 1, 2025, Members of Congress introduced six joint resolutions to terminate national emergencies that had been declared to impose tariffs (Table A-2) and have introduced bills that would restrict the President's authority to impose tariffs using IEEPA.468
Several parties have also filed lawsuits challenging these tariffs.469 In May 2025, the U.S. Court of International Trade found that several of the tariff actions were not authorized under IEEPA, while the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose any tariffs.470 The government has appealed these decisions, respectively, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.471 In August, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. Court of International Trade's opinion, holding that the tariffs imposed on Mexico, Canada, and China with respect to trafficking and on many other trading partners with respect to the U.S. trade balance "exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA's text."472 The Trump Administration appealed the decision and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari with respect to both cases.473
Delegation of Authority under IEEPA
Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of
emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures. Presidents declare
national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades. The limitation of IEEPA to
transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPAtransactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA
’'s domestic application. s domestic application.
However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some
foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—foreign interest. Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—
consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the
emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today.
363474 TWEA came under TWEA came under
criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing criticism because the first national emergency declared pursuant to its authority had been ongoing
for 41 years.for 41 years.
364 In November 2023475 In 2025, the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under , the first emergency declared pursuant to authority under
IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in November 1979, IEEPA, the emergency with Iran declared in November 1979,
enteredis logging its forty- its forty-
fourthsixth year. year.
In general, four criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the NEA and In general, four criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the NEA and
IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the phrases IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress. First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the phrases
“"national emergencynational emergency
”" and and
“"unusual and extraordinary threatunusual and extraordinary threat
”," and Presidents have interpreted and Presidents have interpreted
these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has become less these terms broadly. Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has become less
constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court and constrained in a highly globalized era. Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court and
amendments to the NEA, Congress must have a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority amendments to the NEA, Congress must have a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority
to terminate a national emergency without to terminate a national emergency without
Presidentialpresidential consent. Fourth, the structure of the U.S. consent. Fourth, the structure of the U.S.
360 Ibid., 1151. 361 Ibid., 1153 (internal citations omitted). 362 Ibid., 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. §704 (2009)). 363 See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.” 364 See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” New York Times, October 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency
Powers in the United States, p. v.
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sanctions regime and its reliance on IEEPA has created emergencies that do not end. Despite these sanctions regime and its reliance on IEEPA has created emergencies that do not end. Despite these
criticisms, Congress has never terminated an emergency declaration invoking IEEPA.criticisms, Congress has never terminated an emergency declaration invoking IEEPA.
365476 This This
absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of approval in absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of approval in
some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA thus far. some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA thus far.
Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of Congress.Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of Congress.
Definition of “"National Emergency”" and “"Unusual and Extraordinary Threat”
"
Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a
“"national emergency.national emergency.
”"477 IEEPA conditions its IEEPA conditions its
invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an
“"unusual and extraordinary threat unusual and extraordinary threat
… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.… to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.
”366"478 In the markup of In the markup of
IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the
Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of
IEEPA be IEEPA be
“"based on an unusual and extraordinary threatbased on an unusual and extraordinary threat
”" because such language because such language
“"emphasizes emphasizes
that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.that such powers should be available only in true emergencies.
”367 Because “unusual” and “extraordinary”"479 Because "unusual" and "extraordinary" are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to
conflict with those statutory conditions.conflict with those statutory conditions.
If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of
“"national emergencynational emergency
”" or or
“"unusual and extraordinary unusual and extraordinary
threat,threat,
”" it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort it could do so through statute. Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort
of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under
the First Militia Act of the First Militia Act of
17923681792480 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
369481 Congress could also require some sort of congressional action to make use of IEEPA authority beyond a certain period (See "Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval" below). Alternatively, Alternatively,
Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the
flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch.flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch.
Scope of the Authority
While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase,
“"any any
interest of any foreign country or a national thereofinterest of any foreign country or a national thereof
”" leaves a great deal of room for executive leaves a great deal of room for executive
discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions discretion. The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions
in which a foreign interest is not involved.in which a foreign interest is not involved.
370482 As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, As a result, at least one scholar has concluded,
“"the the
exemption of purely domestic transactions from the Presidentexemption of purely domestic transactions from the President
’'s transaction controls seems to be a s transaction controls seems to be a
limitation without substance.limitation without substance.
”371
"483
Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export
control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its
365 Congress has only successfully terminated via joint resolution one national emergency declared under the NEA. That national emergency, which related to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID 19) pandemic, did not invoke IEEPA. See Table A-2.
366 50 U.S.C. §1701. 367 House Markup, p. 12. 368 Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588. 369 50 U.S.C. §§1803-1805. 370 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n. 49. 371 Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.
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control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its underlying authorization, the Export Administration Actunderlying authorization, the Export Administration Act
(EAA), periodically expired. During , periodically expired. During
those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to
maintain the dual-use export control system.maintain the dual-use export control system.
372484 The current emergency has been ongoing since The current emergency has been ongoing since
2001.2001.
373
485
While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries,
until 2025 it wasit has not been used as a general way not used to impose tariffs. to impose tariffs.
However, as486 As noted above, noted above,
President Nixon used TWEA to imposethe U.S. government cited TWEA after the fact as legal authority for a 10% ad valorem tariff a 10% ad valorem tariff
that President Nixon had imposed on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance
of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Although
the use of TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time,374some legal scholars criticized this use of TWEA,487 the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals upheld President NixonAppeals upheld President Nixon
’s actions375's actions488 and Congress maintained the language that and Congress maintained the language that
President Nixonthe U.S. government relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of relied upon in nearly identical form in the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of
IEEPA.IEEPA.
376 In the 116th, 117th, and 118th489 In the 116th, 117th, 118th, and 119th Congresses, bills were introduced that would limit the Congresses, bills were introduced that would limit the
President’President's authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.s authority to use IEEPA to impose tariffs.
377
490
The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive. Under IEEPA, the President has the
power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by executive order. Such
power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.378
372 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2208, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4801 et seq. to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See “The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” below. 373 Ibid. 374 See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.
375 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA, authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”). 376 TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.”
While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey.
377 E.g., Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 1060 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
378 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759.
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power allows the President to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.491
Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority
that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended.
Amending the NEA to Require Joint Resolutions of Approval
The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that
Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent
resolution. When the resolution. When the
“"legislative vetolegislative veto
”" was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left
Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—
to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA.
379492 To date, no national emergency To date, no national emergency
declared under the NEA has been terminated without declared under the NEA has been terminated without
Presidentialpresidential consent. consent.
Since 2019, Members of Congress have introduced several bills that would amend the NEA to Since 2019, Members of Congress have introduced several bills that would amend the NEA to
place new limits on the exercise of emergency authorities. The most common strategy has been to place new limits on the exercise of emergency authorities. The most common strategy has been to
require a joint resolution of approval. In the require a joint resolution of approval. In the
116th, 117th, and 118th116th, 117th, and 118th Congresses, bills were Congresses, bills were
introduced to require a joint resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain introduced to require a joint resolution of approval for an emergency to extend beyond a certain
number of days.number of days.
380493 The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would have required The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for example, would have required
that Congress pass a joint resolution approving of a national emergency within 30 days.that Congress pass a joint resolution approving of a national emergency within 30 days.
381 494
The NEA, IEEPA, and “"Never Ending Emergencies”
"
Some Members of Congress, scholars, and civil society organizations have criticized the NEA for Some Members of Congress, scholars, and civil society organizations have criticized the NEA for
producing producing
“"never ending emergencies.never ending emergencies.
”382"495 The average length of an emergency declared under the The average length of an emergency declared under the
NEA is more than nine years, with one emergency well into its fifth decade. However, excluding NEA is more than nine years, with one emergency well into its fifth decade. However, excluding
emergencies declared to impose sanctions drops that average to three years. Of the nine emergencies declared to impose sanctions drops that average to three years. Of the nine
emergencies declared under the NEA that do not cite IEEPA, six were terminated or expired after emergencies declared under the NEA that do not cite IEEPA, six were terminated or expired after
fewer than three years. The remaining emergencies relate to Cuba, the September 11, 2001 fewer than three years. The remaining emergencies relate to Cuba, the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, and restrictions on Russian-affiliated vessels put in place after Russiaterrorist attacks, and restrictions on Russian-affiliated vessels put in place after Russia
’'s further s further
invasion of Ukraine in 2022.invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
It is the
The emergencies citing IEEPA emergencies citing IEEPA
that frequently last decades. The reason for this may be frequently last decades. The reason for this may be
structural. Should the President terminate an emergency, the authority to continue freezing assets structural. Should the President terminate an emergency, the authority to continue freezing assets
would, in many cases, also terminate.would, in many cases, also terminate.
383496 Congress could provide non-emergency authority to Congress could provide non-emergency authority to
maintain blocks on transactions and freezes on assets made during a national emergencymaintain blocks on transactions and freezes on assets made during a national emergency
, otherwise. Absent such authority, Presidents will likely consider the continuation of national emergencies to be necessary Presidents will likely consider the continuation of national emergencies to be necessary
to prevent assets frozen under IEEPA from becoming accessible.
379 Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405.
380 E.g., ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 1912 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; National Emergencies Reform Act , H.R. 9041 (Amash), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., December 22, 2020.
381 National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
382 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “Never Ending Emergencies – An Examination of the National Emergencies Act,” 118th Cong., 1st sess., hearing, May 24, 2023; Catherine Padhi, “Emergencies Without End: A Primer on Federal States of Emergency,” Lawfare, December 8, 2017. 383 See “Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA”
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to prevent assets frozen under IEEPA from becoming accessible.
The Status Quo
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G. In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G.
Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA:Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in the sense of
Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit,
by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has
converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President.converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President.
”384
"497
Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Like TWEA
before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the Presidentbefore it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President
’'s use of IEEPA. In several s use of IEEPA. In several
circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA
and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration. Even when Congress has not given
explicit approval, until 2023, no Member of Congress had ever introduced a resolution to explicit approval, until 2023, no Member of Congress had ever introduced a resolution to
terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA.terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA.
385498 The NEA requires that both houses of Congress The NEA requires that both houses of Congress
meet every six months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.meet every six months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency.
386 499 Neither house has ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to Neither house has ever met to do so with respect to an emergency citing IEEPA. In response to
concerns over the scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, concerns over the scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA,
supporters of the status quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed supporters of the status quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed
approval of the statute and its use. approval of the statute and its use.
Indeed, severalSeveral bills proposing a limit on the length of national bills proposing a limit on the length of national
emergencies declared under the NEA explicitly exclude IEEPA.emergencies declared under the NEA explicitly exclude IEEPA.
387 500
Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA
Beginning in the late 2010s, some Members of Congress and civil society organizations began to Beginning in the late 2010s, some Members of Congress and civil society organizations began to
express concern with the NEA and IEEPA. Whereas one resolution to terminate a national express concern with the NEA and IEEPA. Whereas one resolution to terminate a national
emergency declared under the NEA was introduced between 1976 and 2018,emergency declared under the NEA was introduced between 1976 and 2018,
388 15 22 were were
introduced between 2019 and January 15, 2024 (Table A-2).389 In 2019, both houses of Congress
384 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9. 385 Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.
386 50 U.S.C. §1622(b). 387 E.g., Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.
388 In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. While this resolution cited to the NEA, the declaration of national emergency that it sought to terminate (Proclamation 7924, 70 Federal Register 54227) did not.
389 Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, S.J.Res. 54 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 75 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 19, 2019; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 15, 2019, H.J.Res. 85 (Castro), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2020; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 46 (Gosar), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 20, 2021; Relating to a national (continued...)
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introduced between 2019 and September 1, 2025 (Table A-2). In 2019, both houses of Congress passed, for the first time, a resolution to terminate a national emergency.passed, for the first time, a resolution to terminate a national emergency.
390501 President Donald J. President Donald J.
Trump vetoed that resolution and the House did not override the veto.Trump vetoed that resolution and the House did not override the veto.
391502 In 2023, after several In 2023, after several
attempts, Congress voted to terminate the national emergency concerning the Novel Coronavirus attempts, Congress voted to terminate the national emergency concerning the Novel Coronavirus
DiseaseDisease
2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. (COVID-19) outbreak.
392503 President Joe Biden signed the resolution, terminating the President Joe Biden signed the resolution, terminating the
national emergency.national emergency.
393504 In 2023, several Members of Congress introduced five bills seeking to In 2023, several Members of Congress introduced five bills seeking to
terminate, for the first time, national emergencies invoking IEEPA; all five failed to pass the terminate, for the first time, national emergencies invoking IEEPA; all five failed to pass the
House.House.
394505
IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Were Congress to terminate a
IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction regime. Were Congress to terminate a
national emergency invoking IEEPA, sanctions put into place under the authority of that national emergency invoking IEEPA, sanctions put into place under the authority of that
emergency, including the blocking of assets, would emergency, including the blocking of assets, would
terminate395terminate506 unless such sanctions could be unless such sanctions could be
kept in place under a different authority, such as the United Nations Participation Act.396
emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 52 (Gosar), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 16, 2021; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, S.J.Res. 38 (Marshall), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 14, 2022; A joint resolution relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, S.J.Res. 63 (Marshall), 117th Cong., 2nd sess., September 22, 2022; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 2020, H.J.Res. 7 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., January 9, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22, 2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023.
390 In 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019.
391 Ibid. 392 Act of April 10, 2023, P.L. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6. 393 Ibid. 394 Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22, 2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023.
395 50 U.S.C. §1622(a) provides that:
[A]ny powers or authorities exercised by reason of [the terminated] emergency shall cease to be exercised after [the date of termination], except that such termination shall not affect-
(A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date;
(B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or
(C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.
396 United Nations Participation Act, P.L. 79-264, §5, 59 Stat. 620 (1945), codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §287c. The extent to which the UNPA would permit the blocking of property by placing individuals or entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is uncertain. The UNPA gives the President the authority to implement U.N. sanctions and authorizes him to enforce such measures by issuing “such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him,” thereby allowing him to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Ibid. IEEPA authority includes the authority for the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B).
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kept in place under a different authority, such as the United Nations Participation Act.507
IEEPA also contains a savings provision in the event a national emergency invoking IEEPA is IEEPA also contains a savings provision in the event a national emergency invoking IEEPA is
terminated, permitting the President to continue to block property if terminated, permitting the President to continue to block property if
“"the continuation of such the continuation of such
prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country
or its nationals,or its nationals,
”" unless Congress provides otherwise in a resolution terminating the emergency. unless Congress provides otherwise in a resolution terminating the emergency.
397 508 The legislative history suggests that Congress may have considered the continued blocking of The legislative history suggests that Congress may have considered the continued blocking of
assets that could be used for presidential settlements of claims by American citizens against assets that could be used for presidential settlements of claims by American citizens against
foreign countries.foreign countries.
398509 In at least one case, however, the President invoked the savings provision to In at least one case, however, the President invoked the savings provision to
continue to block property pending claims among successor states.continue to block property pending claims among successor states.
399
510
The full scope of the savings provision with regard to the extent of prohibitions that may be The full scope of the savings provision with regard to the extent of prohibitions that may be
maintained following termination is unclear. maintained following termination is unclear.
“"Property in which a foreign country or national Property in which a foreign country or national
thereof has any interestthereof has any interest
”" has been interpreted broadly by the courts, defining has been interpreted broadly by the courts, defining
“interest”"interest" to mean to mean
“"an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.
”400"511 In other words, the sanctioned entity In other words, the sanctioned entity
need not own the property at issue in order to have an interest in it.need not own the property at issue in order to have an interest in it.
401512 The reference in the savings The reference in the savings
provision to provision to
“"that property [deemed] necessary [for purpose of resolving] claims involving such property [deemed] necessary [for purpose of resolving] claims involving such
country or its nationalscountry or its nationals
”402"513 arguably refers only to blocked property owned by the sanctioned arguably refers only to blocked property owned by the sanctioned
entity liable for claims. Under this interpretation, the full range of prohibitions under the relevant entity liable for claims. Under this interpretation, the full range of prohibitions under the relevant
sanctions regulations could no longer be enforced in the event the underlying national emergency sanctions regulations could no longer be enforced in the event the underlying national emergency
is terminated, even if outstanding claims exist.is terminated, even if outstanding claims exist.
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018
In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).
403514 The legislation repealed the The legislation repealed the
expired Export Administration Act of 1979,expired Export Administration Act of 1979,
404515 the regulations of which had been continued by the regulations of which had been continued by
reference to IEEPA since 2001.reference to IEEPA since 2001.
405516 ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export
Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export Administration Regulations. Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export
Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018;
406 517 instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to
implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.407
397 50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1). 398 S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 6 (1977) (noting that “blocked assets may continue to be blocked by the President despite termination of a state of emergency, the National Emergencies Act notwithstanding, unless Congress specifies otherwise” and that “[n]othing in this act is intended by the committee to interfere with the authority of the President to continue blocking assets which are presently blocked, or to impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries”).
399 E.O. 13304, Termination of Emergencies With Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, 68 Federal Register 32315 (May 29, 2003).
400 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
401 See Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that covered “interest” need not be a legal interest “in the way that a trustee is legal owner of the corpus even if someone else enjoys the beneficial interest”).
402 50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1) (emphasis added). 403 Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232. 404 Ibid. §1766(a). 405 E.O. 13222. 406 ECRA §1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.
407 ECRA §1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”).
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implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed.518 Going forward, Congress may revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the Going forward, Congress may revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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Appendix A.
Appendix A.
NEA and IEEPA Use
Table A-1. National Emergencies Declared Pursuant to the NEA as of January 15,
2024
September 1, 2025
*Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA *Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA
but that did not invoke IEEPA.that did not invoke IEEPA.
Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
1
Blocking Iranian Government Property
11/14/1979
Ongoing
12170
2
Sanctions Against Iran
4/17/1980
4/17/1981
12211
Expired
3
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Date of Declaration
|
Date of Termination
|
Originating E.O./Procl.
|
Revoking E.O./Procl.
|
1
|
Blocking Iranian Government Property
|
11/14/1979
|
Ongoing
|
12170
|
2
|
Sanctions Against Iran
|
04/17/1980
|
04/17/1981
|
12211
|
Expired
|
3
|
Continuation of Export Control Regulations
|
10/14/1983
|
12/20/1983
|
12444
|
12451
|
4
|
Continuation of Export Control Regulations
10/14/1983
12/20/1983
12444
12451
4
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
3/30/1984
7/12/1985
12470
12525
5
Regulations
03/30/1984
|
07/12/1985
|
12470
|
12525
|
5
|
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving NicaraguaTransactions Involving Nicaragua
5/1/1985
3/13/1990
12513
12707
6
05/1/1985
|
03/13/1990
|
12513
|
12707
|
6
|
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other
Transactions Involving South AfricaTransactions Involving South Africa
9/9/1985
7/10/1991
12532
12769
7
09/9/1985
|
07/10/1991
|
12532
|
12769
|
7
|
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions
Involving LibyaInvolving Libya
1/7/1986
9/20/2004
12543
13357
8
01/7/1986
|
09/20/2004
|
12543
|
13357
|
8
|
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Prohibiting Certain Transactions With
Respect to PanamaRespect to Panama
4/8/1988
4/5/1990
12635
12710
9
04/8/1988
|
04/5/1990
|
12635
|
12710
|
9
|
Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with IraqProhibiting Transactions with Iraq
8/2/1990
7/29/2004
12722
13350
10
08/2/1990
|
07/29/2004
|
12722
|
13350
|
10
|
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
9/30/1990
9/30/1993
12730
12867
Regulations
09/30/1990
|
09/30/1993
|
12730
|
12867
|
11
|
Chemical and Biological Weapons Chemical and Biological Weapons
Proliferation
11
Proliferation
11/16/1990
11/11/1994
12735
12938
11/16/1990
11/11/1994
|
12735
|
12938
|
12
|
Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Prohibiting Certain Transactions with
12
Respect to HaitiRespect to Haiti
10/4/1991
|
10/14/1994
|
12775
|
12932
|
13
|
Blocking "10/4/1991
10/14/1994
12775
12932
Blocking “Yugoslav Government" Property Yugoslav Government" Property
13
and Property of the Governments of Serbia and Property of the Governments of Serbia
and Montenegroand Montenegro
5
05/30/1992/30/1992
5
05/28/2003/28/2003
12808
13304
12808
|
13304
|
14
|
To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March
3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area 3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area
14
in Response to the National Emergency in Response to the National Emergency
Caused by Hurricane Caused by Hurricane
Andrewa
Andrewa
10/14/1992
|
03/06/1993
|
6491
|
6534
|
15
|
10/14/1992
3/6/1993
6491
6534
Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving
UNITA
09/26/1993
|
05/06/2003
|
12865
|
24857
|
16
|
15
UNITA
9/26/1993
5/6/2003
12865
24857
Measures To Restrict The Participation By Measures To Restrict The Participation By
16
United States Persons In Weapons United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation ActivitiesProliferation Activities
9
09/30/1993/30/1993
9/29/1994
12868
12930
09/29/1994
|
12868
|
12930
|
17
|
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
06/30/1994
|
08/19/1994
|
12923
|
12924
|
18
|
Continuation of Export Control Regulations
|
08/19/1994
|
04/04/2001
|
12924
|
13206
|
19
|
17
Regulations
6/30/1994
8/19/1994
12923
12924
Continuation of Export Control
18
Regulations
8/19/1994
4/4/2001
12924
13206
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Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
Measures To Restrict The Participation By
19
Measures To Restrict The Participation By United States Persons In Weapons United States Persons In Weapons
Proliferation ActivitiesProliferation Activities
9/29/1994
09/29/1994
|
11/14/1994
|
12930
|
12938
|
20
|
11/14/1994
12930
12938
20
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Destruction
11/14/1994
|
Ongoing
|
12938
|
21
|
11/14/1994
Ongoing
12938
Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists
21
Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East
Peace ProcessPeace Process
1/23/1995
09/09/2019
12947
12947
01/23/1995
|
09/09/2019
|
12947
|
12947
|
22
|
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Prohibiting Certain Transactions With
22
Respect to the Development of Iranian Respect to the Development of Iranian
Petroleum ResourcesPetroleum Resources
3/15/1995
Ongoing
12957
03/15/1995
|
Ongoing
|
12957
|
23
|
Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Blocking Assets and Prohibiting
23
Transactions With Significant Narcotics Transactions With Significant Narcotics
Traffickers
Traffickers
10/21/1995
|
Ongoing
|
12978
|
24
|
10/21/1995
Ongoing
12978
24
Regulation of the Anchorage and Regulation of the Anchorage and
Movement of Vessels with Respect to CubaMovement of Vessels with Respect to Cuba
3/1/1996
Ongoing
6867
03/01/1996
|
Ongoing
|
6867
|
25
|
Declaration of a State of Emergency and Declaration of a State of Emergency and
25
Release of Feed Grain from the Disaster Release of Feed Grain from the Disaster
Reserve
7/1/1996
07/01/1997
6907
Expired
26
Reserve
07/01/1996
|
07/01/1997
|
6907
|
Expired
|
26
|
Prohibiting New Investment in BurmaProhibiting New Investment in Burma
5/20/1997
10/7/2016
13047
13742
27
05/20/1997
|
10/7/2016
|
13047
|
13742
|
27
|
Blocking Sudanese Government Property Blocking Sudanese Government Property
and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudanand Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan
11/3/199711/3/1997
Ongoing
13067
Ongoing
|
13067
|
28
|
Blocking Property of the Governments of Blocking Property of the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia,
28
and the Republic of Montenegro, and and the Republic of Montenegro, and
Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic
of Serbia in Response to the Situation in of Serbia in Response to the Situation in
Kosovo
6/9/1998
5/28/2003
13088
13304
29
Kosovo
06/09/1998
|
5/28/2003
|
13088
|
13304
|
29
|
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With the TalibanTransactions With the Taliban
7/4/1999
7/2/2002
13129
13268
07/04/1999
|
7/2/2002
|
13129
|
13268
|
30
|
Blocking Property of the Government of Blocking Property of the Government of
the Russian Federation Relating to the the Russian Federation Relating to the
30
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear WeaponsExtracted From Nuclear Weapons
6/21/2000
6/21/2012
13159
Expired
31
06/21/2000
|
6/21/2012
|
13159
|
Expired
|
31
|
Prohibiting the Importation of Rough Prohibiting the Importation of Rough
Diamonds From Sierra LeoneDiamonds From Sierra Leone
1/18/2001
1/15/2004
13194
13324
01/18/2001
|
1/15/2004
|
13194
|
13324
|
32
|
Blocking Property of Persons Who Blocking Property of Persons Who
32
Threaten International Stabilization Efforts Threaten International Stabilization Efforts
in the Western Balkansin the Western Balkans
6/26/2001
Ongoing
13219
06/26/2001
|
Ongoing
|
13219
|
33
|
Continuation of Export Control Continuation of Export Control
Regulations
08/17/2001
|
Ongoing
|
13222
|
34
|
33
Regulations
8/17/2001
Ongoing
13222
34
Declaration of National Emergency by Declaration of National Emergency by
Reason of Certain Terrorist AttacksReason of Certain Terrorist Attacks
9/14/2001
Ongoing
7463
35
09/14/2001
|
Ongoing
|
7463
|
35
|
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Transactions With Persons Who Commit,
9/23/2001
Ongoing
13224
Congressional Research Service
59
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining
36
Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe
3/6/2003
Ongoing
13288
Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism
09/23/2001
|
Ongoing
|
13224
|
36
|
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe
|
03/06/2003
|
03/04/2024
|
13288
|
14118
|
37
|
Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq
37
and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq
Has an InterestHas an Interest
5
05/22/2003/22/2003
Ongoing
13303
Ongoing
|
13303
|
38
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Blocking Property of Certain Persons and
38
Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to
Syria
5/11/2004
Ongoing
13338
Syria
05/11/2004
|
06/03/2025
|
13338
|
14312
|
39
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Blocking Property of Certain Persons and
39
Prohibiting the Importation of Certain Prohibiting the Importation of Certain
Goods From LiberiaGoods From Liberia
7/22/20047/22/2004
11/12/201511/12/2015
13348
13710
13348
|
13710
|
40
|
To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of
Title 40, United States Code, Within a Title 40, United States Code, Within a
40
Limited Geographic Area in Response to Limited Geographic Area in Response to
the National Emergency Caused by the National Emergency Caused by
Hurricane Hurricane
Katrinab
9/8/2005
11/3/2005
7924
7959
Katrinab
09/08/2005
|
11/03/2005
|
7924
|
7959
|
41
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
41
Contributing to the Conflict in Cote Contributing to the Conflict in Cote
d'Ivoire
2/7/2006
9/14/2016
13396
13739
d'Ivoire
02/07/2006
|
09/14/2016
|
13396
|
13739
|
42
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
42
Undermining Democratic Processes or Undermining Democratic Processes or
Institutions in BelarusInstitutions in Belarus
6/16/2006
Ongoing
13405
06/16/2006
|
Ongoing
|
13405
|
43
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
43
Contributing to the Conflict in the Contributing to the Conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the CongoDemocratic Republic of the Congo
10/27/2006
Ongoing
13413
10/27/2006
|
Ongoing
|
13413
|
44
|
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Blocking Property of Persons Undermining
44
the Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its the Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its
Democratic Processes and InstitutionsDemocratic Processes and Institutions
8/1/2007
Ongoing
13441
08/1/2007
|
Ongoing
|
13441
|
45
|
Continuing Certain Restrictions With Continuing Certain Restrictions With
45
Respect to North Korea and North Respect to North Korea and North
Korean NationalsKorean Nationals
6/26/2008
Ongoing
13466
06/26/2008
|
Ongoing
|
13466
|
46
|
Declaration of a National Emergency With Declaration of a National Emergency With
46
Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza
Pandemic
Pandemic
10/23/200910/23/2009
10/22/2010
8443
Expired
47
10/22/2010
|
8443
|
Expired
|
47
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Conflict in SomaliaContributing to the Conflict in Somalia
4/12/2010
Ongoing
13536
48
04/12/2010
|
Ongoing
|
13536
|
48
|
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Related to LibyaTransactions Related to Libya
2/25/2011
Ongoing
13566
Blocking Property of Transnational
49
Criminal Organizations
7/24/2011
Ongoing
13581
50
02/25/2011
|
Ongoing
|
13566
|
49
|
Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations
|
07/24/2011
|
Ongoing
|
13581
|
50
|
Blocking Property of Persons Threatening Blocking Property of Persons Threatening
the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yementhe Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen
5
05/16/2012/16/2012
Ongoing
13611
Congressional Research Service
60
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
Ongoing
|
13611
|
51
|
Blocking Property of the Government of Blocking Property of the Government of
the Russian Federation Relating to the the Russian Federation Relating to the
51
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted From Nuclear WeaponsExtracted From Nuclear Weapons
6/25/2012
5/26/2015
13617
13695
52
06/25/2012
|
5/26/2015
|
13617
|
13695
|
52
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in UkraineContributing to the Situation in Ukraine
3/6/2014
Ongoing
13660
53
03/06/2014
|
Ongoing
|
13660
|
53
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Blocking Property of Certain Persons With
Respect to South SudanRespect to South Sudan
4/3/2014
Ongoing
13664
04/03/2014
|
Ongoing
|
13664
|
54
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
54
Contributing to the Conflict in the Central Contributing to the Conflict in the Central
African RepublicAfrican Republic
5
05/12/2014/12/2014
Ongoing
13667
Ongoing
|
13667
|
55
|
Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
55
Certain Persons Contributing to the Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in VenezuelaSituation in Venezuela
3/8/2015
Ongoing
13692
03/08/2015
|
Ongoing
|
13692
|
56
|
Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Blocking the Property of Certain Persons
56
Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-
Enabled ActivitiesEnabled Activities
4/1/2015
Ongoing
13694
57
04/01/2015
|
Ongoing
|
13694
|
57
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in BurundiContributing to the Situation in Burundi
11/22/201511/22/2015
11/18/2021
13712
14059
11/18/2021
|
13712
|
14059
|
58
|
Blocking the Property of Persons Involved Blocking the Property of Persons Involved
58
in Serious Human Rights Abuse or in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption
12/20/2017
Ongoing
13818
Corruption
12/20/2017
|
Ongoing
|
13818
|
59
|
Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of
59
Foreign Interference in a United States Foreign Interference in a United States
Election
9Election
09/12/2018/12/2018
Ongoing
13848
60
Ongoing
|
13848
|
60
|
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in NicaraguaContributing to the Situation in Nicaragua
11/27/2018
|
Ongoing
|
13851
|
61
|
11/27/2018
Ongoing
13851
Declaring a National Emergency Declaring a National Emergency
61
Concerning the Southern Border of the Concerning the Southern Border of the
United StatesUnited States
2/15/2019
1/20/2021
9844
10142
02/15/2019
|
01/20/2021
|
9844
|
10142
|
62
|
Securing the Information and Securing the Information and
62
Communications Technology and Services Communications Technology and Services
Supply ChainSupply Chain
5/15/2019
Ongoing
13873
05/15/2019
|
Ongoing
|
13873
|
63
|
Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
63
Certain Persons Contributing to the Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in MaliSituation in Mali
07/26/201907/26/2019
Ongoing
13882
Ongoing
|
13882
|
64
|
Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of
64
Certain Persons Contributing to the Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in SyriaSituation in Syria
10/17/2019
Ongoing
13894
10/17/2019
|
Ongoing
|
13894
|
65
|
Declaring a National Emergency Declaring a National Emergency
65
Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Outbreak(COVID-19) Outbreak
03/13/2020
Ongoing
9994
66
03/13/2020
|
04/10/2023
|
9994
|
P.L. 118-3
|
66
|
Securing the United States Bulk-Power Securing the United States Bulk-Power
System
System
05/01/202005/01/2020
05/01/2021
|
13920
|
Expired
|
67
|
05/01/2021
13920
Expired
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Blocking Property of Certain Persons
67
Associated With the International Criminal Associated With the International Criminal
Court
Court
06/11/202006/11/2020
04/01/202104/01/2021
13928
14022
Congressional Research Service
61
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Title of E.O. or Procl. Declaring National
Date of
Date of
Originating
Revoking
Emergency Pursuant to NEA
Declaration
Revocation
E.O./Procl.
E.O./Procl.
68
Hong Kong Normalization
07/14/2020
Ongoing
13936
69
Critical Minerals
09/30/2020
09/30/2021
13953
Expired
70
13928
|
14022
|
68
|
Hong Kong Normalization
|
07/14/2020
|
Ongoing
|
13936
|
69
|
Critical Minerals
|
09/30/2020
|
09/30/2021
|
13953
|
Expired
|
70
|
Investments that Finance Chinese Military Investments that Finance Chinese Military
Companies
Companies
11/12/2020
|
Ongoing
|
13959
|
71
|
11/12/2020
Ongoing
13959
71
Blocking Property With Respect to the Blocking Property With Respect to the
Situation in BurmaSituation in Burma
02/10/2021
Ongoing
14014
02/10/2021
|
Ongoing
|
14014
|
72
|
Blocking Property With Respect to Blocking Property With Respect to
72
Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the
Russian FederationRussian Federation
04/15/2021
|
Ongoing
|
14024
|
73
|
04/15/2021
Ongoing
14024
Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons
73
With Respect to the Humanitarian and With Respect to the Humanitarian and
Human Rights Crisis in EthiopiaHuman Rights Crisis in Ethiopia
09/17/2021
Ongoing
14046
74
09/17/2021
|
Ongoing
|
14046
|
74
|
Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons
Involved in the Global Involved in the Global
Il icitIllicit Drug Trade Drug Trade
12/15/2021
Ongoing
14059
12/15/2021
|
Ongoing
|
14059
|
75
|
Protecting Certain Property of Da Protecting Certain Property of Da
75
Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the
People of AfghanistanPeople of Afghanistan
02/11/202202/11/2022
Ongoing
14064
Ongoing
|
14064
|
76
|
Declaration of National Emergency and Declaration of National Emergency and
Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating
76
to the Regulation of the Anchorage and to the Regulation of the Anchorage and
Movement of Russian-Affiliated Vessels to Movement of Russian-Affiliated Vessels to
United States PortsUnited States Ports
04/21/2022
Ongoing
10371
04/21/2022
|
Ongoing
|
10371
|
77
|
Declaration of Emergency and Declaration of Emergency and
77
Authorization for Temporary Extensions of Authorization for Temporary Extensions of
Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar
Cells and Modules From Southeast Cells and Modules From Southeast
Asiac
06/06/2022
Ongoing
10414
Asiac
06/06/2022
|
06/05/2023
|
10414
|
Expired
|
78
|
Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and
78
Wrongful yWrongfully Detained United States Detained United States
Nationals HomeNationals Home
07/19/202207/19/2022
Ongoing
14078
Ongoing
|
14078
|
79
|
Addressing United States Investments in Addressing United States Investments in
79
Certain National Security Technologies and Certain National Security Technologies and
Products in Countries of ConcernProducts in Countries of Concern
08/09/2023
|
Ongoing
|
14105
|
80
|
Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank
|
02/01/2024
|
Ongoing
|
14115
|
81
|
Declaring a National Energy Emergency
|
01/20/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14156
|
82
|
Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists
|
01/20/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14157
|
83
|
Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States
|
01/20/2025
|
Ongoing
|
10886
|
84
|
Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border
|
02/01/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14193
|
85
|
Imposing Duties To Address The Situation At Our Southern Border
|
02/01/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14194
|
86
|
Imposing Duties To Address The Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain In The People's Republic Of China
|
02/01/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14195
|
87
|
Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court
|
02/06/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14203
|
88
|
Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits
|
04/02/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14257
|
89
|
Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil
|
07/30/2025
|
Ongoing
|
14323
|
08/09/2023
Ongoing
14105
Source: CRS, as of CRS, as of
January 15, 2024. September 1, 2025.
Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. This table Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA. This table
tracks emergencies that have been declared and their ultimate disposition. It does not include expansions or tracks emergencies that have been declared and their ultimate disposition. It does not include expansions or
amendments to those emergencies. For example, Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency amendments to those emergencies. For example, Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency
with respect to specified harmful activities of the Russian Federation in April of 2021, has been the basis of with respect to specified harmful activities of the Russian Federation in April of 2021, has been the basis of
certain actions taken under IEEPA against the Russian Federation since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. See, certain actions taken under IEEPA against the Russian Federation since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. See,
e.g., E.O.for example, Executive Order 14065 of February 21, 2022, 14065 of February 21, 2022,
“"Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
of Ukraine,of Ukraine,
”" 87 87
Federal Register 10293, February 23, 2022; 10293, February 23, 2022;
E.O.Executive Order 14066 of March 8, 2022, 14066 of March 8, 2022,
“"Prohibiting Certain Prohibiting Certain
Imports and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Imports and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,
”" 87 87
Federal Register 13625, March 10, 2022; 13625, March 10, 2022;
E.O.Executive Order 14068 of March 14068 of March
11, 2022, 11, 2022,
“"Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian
Federation Aggression,Federation Aggression,
”" 87 87
Federal Register 14381, March 15, 2022. 14381, March 15, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
62
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
a.
a. Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase Although the President did not explicitly use that phrase
“"declare a national emergency,declare a national emergency,
”" the Davis-Bacon the Davis-Bacon
actAct, as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the , as amended at the date of the proclamation, and as noted in the proclamation, provided for the
suspension of the actsuspension of the act
’'s provisions s provisions
“"in the event of a national emergency.in the event of a national emergency.
”
b. "
b. Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon Similar to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon
actAct in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The in 1992, this proclamation was somewhat anomalous. The
proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending proclamation did not cite to the NEA when declaring a national emergency for the purposes of suspending
the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA. the act. However, the revoking proclamation did cite the NEA.
Moreover, Rep. George Rep. George
Mil erMiller (CA) (CA)
introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res. introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the NEA. H.J.Res.
69 (Mil er), 109th Cong., 1st69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. sess., September 8, 2005.
c.
c. On June 6, 2022, President Biden declared an On June 6, 2022, President Biden declared an
“"an emergency to exist with respect to the threats to the an emergency to exist with respect to the threats to the
availability of sufficient electricity generation capacity to meet expected customer demand.availability of sufficient electricity generation capacity to meet expected customer demand.
”" Although the Although the
President did not cite the NEA, the statute he invoked may fall under the NEA. U.S. Congress, Senate President did not cite the NEA, the statute he invoked may fall under the NEA. U.S. Congress, Senate
Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions
of Federal Law Now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National of Federal Law Now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National
Emergency, committee print, Emergency, committee print,
93rd93rd Cong., Cong.,
1st1st sess., September 1973 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), pp. xi, sess., September 1973 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), pp. xi,
32, 243; U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and 32, 243; U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations, National Emergencies Act, hearing on H.R. 3884Governmental Relations, National Emergencies Act, hearing on H.R. 3884
, 94th, 94th Cong., Cong.,
1st1st sess., March 6, 18, sess., March 6, 18,
19, and April 9, 1975 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), p. 117: 19, and April 9, 1975 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), p. 117:
“"American importers have relied extensively American importers have relied extensively
on the practice of warehousing merchandise in Customs bonded warehouses for periods in excess of the on the practice of warehousing merchandise in Customs bonded warehouses for periods in excess of the
initial statutory periods afforded by sections 491, 557, and 550 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Such extensions initial statutory periods afforded by sections 491, 557, and 550 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Such extensions
have been made possible by Customs regulations authorized by Proclamation 2048 which President Truman have been made possible by Customs regulations authorized by Proclamation 2048 which President Truman
Issued under the authority of section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (10 U.S.C. §1318), an emergency statute. Issued under the authority of section 318 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (10 U.S.C. §1318), an emergency statute.
Due to the extensive reliance on these Customs regulations in the past, a statutory replacement for the Due to the extensive reliance on these Customs regulations in the past, a statutory replacement for the
existing authority conferred on this Department by Proclamation 2948 existing authority conferred on this Department by Proclamation 2948
wil will be recommended.be recommended.
”" Although Although
the letter was written in 1974 in response to the letter was written in 1974 in response to
other bil sa previous version of the NEA, it was included in hearings on H.R. 3884, which , it was included in hearings on H.R. 3884, which
was the was the
bil bill that ultimately became the NEA. Commerce argued in subsequent regulations that the agency that ultimately became the NEA. Commerce argued in subsequent regulations that the agency
“"[did] not agree that Proclamation 10414 fails to conform with the requirements of the [NEA]." [did] not agree that Proclamation 10414 fails to conform with the requirements of the [NEA]."
International Trade Administration, International Trade Administration,
“"Procedures Covering Suspension of Liquidation, Duties and Estimated Procedures Covering Suspension of Liquidation, Duties and Estimated
Duties in Accord With Presidential Proclamation 10414,Duties in Accord With Presidential Proclamation 10414,
”" 87 87
Federal Register 56868, September 16, 2022. 56868, September 16, 2022.
Table A-2. Resolutions to Terminate National Emergencies
Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
H.J.Res. 69
109
Proclamation 7924
Introduced
Other
1976 – September 1, 2025
Resolution
|
Cong.
|
Targeted Declaration of National Emergency
|
Disposition of Resolution
|
IEEPA or Other
|
H.J.Res. 69
|
109
|
Proclamation 7924 of September 8, of September 8,
2005, 2005,
“"To Suspend To Suspend
Subchapter IV of Subchapter IV of
Chapter 31 of Title Chapter 31 of Title
40, United States 40, United States
Code, Within a Code, Within a
Limited Limited
Geographic Area Geographic Area
in Response to the in Response to the
National National
Emergency Caused Emergency Caused
by Hurricane Katrina”
H.J.Res. 46
116
Proclamation 9844
Failed to pass over veto Other
by Hurricane Katrina"
Introduced
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 46
|
116
|
Proclamation 9844 of February 15, of February 15,
2019, 2019,
“"Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Southern Border Southern Border
of the United of the United
States.”
Congressional Research Service
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Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
S.J.Res. 10
116
Proclamation 9844
Introduced
Other
States."
Failed to pass over veto
|
Other
|
S.J.Res. 10
|
116
|
Proclamation 9844 of February 15, of February 15,
2019, 2019,
“"Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Southern Border Southern Border
of the United of the United
States.”
S.J.Res. 54
116
States."
Introduced
|
Other
|
S.J.Res. 54
|
116
|
Proclamation 9844 Proclamation 9844
Failed to pass over veto Other
of February 15, of February 15,
2019, 2019,
“"Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Southern Border Southern Border
of the United of the United
States.”
H.J.Res. 75
116
Proclamation 9844
Introduced
Other
States."
Failed to pass over veto
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 75
|
116
|
Proclamation 9844 of February 15, of February 15,
2019, 2019,
“"Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Southern Border Southern Border
of the United of the United
States.”
H.J.Res. 85
116
Proclamation 9844
Introduced
Other
States."
Introduced
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 85
|
116
|
Proclamation 9844 of February 15, of February 15,
2019, 2019,
“"Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Southern Border Southern Border
of the United of the United
States.States.
”
H.J.Res. 46
117
Proclamation 9994
Introduced
Other
"
Introduced
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 46
|
117
|
Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.”
Congressional Research Service
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Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
H.J.Res. 52
117
Proclamation 9994
Introduced
Other
19) Outbreak."
Introduced
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 52
|
117
|
Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.19) Outbreak.
”
S.J.Res. 38
117
Proclamation 9994
Passed Senate
Other
"
Introduced
|
Other
|
S.J.Res. 38
|
117
|
Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.”
S.J.Res. 63
117
Proclamation 9994
Passed Senate
Other
19) Outbreak."
Passed Senate
|
Other
|
S.J.Res. 63
|
117
|
Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.19) Outbreak.
”
H.J.Res. 7
118
Proclamation 9994
Became Law
Other
"
Passed Senate
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 7
|
118
|
Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "of March 13, 2020, “Declaring a Declaring a
National National
Emergency Emergency
Concerning the Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak.19) Outbreak.
”
H.J.Res. 68
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
"
Became Law
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 68
|
118
|
Executive Order 13413 of October 13413 of October
27, 2006, 27, 2006,
“"Blocking Blocking
Property of Property of
Certain Persons Certain Persons
Contributing to Contributing to
the Conflict in the the Conflict in the
Democratic Democratic
Republic of the Republic of the
Congo.”
Congressional Research Service
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Targeted
Declaration of
National
Disposition of
Resolution
Cong.
Emergency
Resolution
IEEPA or Other
H.J.Res. 70
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
Congo."
Failed House
|
IEEPA
|
H.J.Res. 70
|
118
|
Executive Order 13566 of February 13566 of February
25, 2011, 25, 2011,
“"Blocking Blocking
Property and Property and
Prohibiting Certain Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Transactions
Related to Libya.”
H.J.Res. 71
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
Related to Libya."
Failed House
|
IEEPA
|
H.J.Res. 71
|
118
|
Executive Order 13303 of May 22, 13303 of May 22,
2003, 2003,
“"Protecting Protecting
the Development the Development
Fund for Iraq and Fund for Iraq and
Certain Other Certain Other
Property in Which Property in Which
Iraq Has an Iraq Has an
Interest.Interest.
”
H.J.Res. 74
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
"
Failed House
|
IEEPA
|
H.J.Res. 74
|
118
|
Executive Order 13611 of May 16, 13611 of May 16,
2012, 2012,
“"Blocking Blocking
Property of Property of
Persons Persons
Threatening the Threatening the
Peace, Security, or Peace, Security, or
Stability of Stability of
Yemen.”
H.J.Res. 79
118
Executive Order
Failed House
IEEPA
13338 of May 11, 2004, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria.”
Source: CRS as of January 15, 2024. Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA.
Table A-3. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order
In chronological order, from first use (1979) to January 15, 2024
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)
12170
Iran (hostage taking)
Declares national
Emergency requires annual
(November 14. 1979; 44
emergency; blocks Iran
renewal; other parts
FR 65729)
government property
Yemen."
Failed House
|
IEEPA
|
H.J.Res. 79
|
118
|
Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria."
|
Failed House
|
IEEPA
|
S.J.Res. 10
|
119
|
Executive Order 14156 of January 20, 2025, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency."
|
Failed Senate
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 72
|
119
|
Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border."
|
Introduced
|
IEEPA
|
H.J.Res. 73
|
119
|
Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border."
|
Introduced
|
IEEPA
|
S.J.Res. 37
|
119
|
Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border."
|
Passed Senate
|
IEEPA
|
H.J.Res. 91
|
119
|
Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits."
|
Introduced
|
IEEPA
|
S.J.Res. 49
|
119
|
Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits."
|
Failed Senate
|
IEEPA
|
S.J.Res. 71
|
119
|
Executive Order 14156 of January 20, 2025, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency."
|
Introduced
|
Other
|
H.J.Res. 117
|
119
|
Executive Order 14323 of July 30, 3035 "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil."
|
Introduced
|
IEEPA
|
Source: CRS.
Notes: Greyed lines indicate emergencies declared pursuant to the NEA that did not invoke IEEPA.
Table A-3. IEEPA National Emergency Use by Executive Order
In chronological order, from first use (1979) to September 1, 2025
Executive Order
|
Country or Issue of Concern
|
Sanction/Remedy
|
Current Status
|
Administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)
|
12170
(November 14. 1979; 44 Federal Register 65729)
|
Iran (hostage taking)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Iran government property
|
Emergency requires annual renewal; other parts revoked and replaced, E.O. revoked and replaced, E.O.
13599 (2012)13599 (2012)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12205
12205
(April. 7, 1980; 45 Federal Register 24099)
|
Iran (hostage taking)Iran (hostage taking)
Prohibits certain Prohibits certain
transactions
Revoked in part by E.O. Revoked in part by E.O.
(April. 7, 1980; 45 FR
transactions
12282 (1981)
24099)
12211
12282 (1981)
12211
(April 17, 1980; 45 Federal Register 26685)
|
Iran (hostage taking)Iran (hostage taking)
Prohibits transactions
Prohibits transactions
|
Revoked in part by E.O. Revoked in part by E.O.
(April 17, 1980; 45 FR
12282 (1981)
26685)
12276
Iran (hostage taking—
Establishes escrow
12282 (1981)
12276
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7913)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Establishes escrow accounts
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12277
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7915)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Transfers Iran government funds
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12278
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7917)
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
accounts
(1981)
7913)
12277
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government funds
(1981)
7915)
12278
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
Transfers Iran government assets overseas
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12279
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7917)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Transfers Iran government assets held in U.S. banks
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12280
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7921)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Transfers Iran government financial assets held by non-banks
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12281
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7923)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Transfers other Iran government assets
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12282
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7925)
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government assets
(1981)
7917)
overseas
12279
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government assets held in
(1981)
7917)
U.S. banks
12280
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government financial
(1981)
7921)
assets held by non-banks
12281
Iran (hostage taking—
Transfers other Iran
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
government assets
(1981)
7923)
12282
Iran (hostage taking—
Revokes prohibitions
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
against transactions
(1981)
7925)
involving Iran
12283
Iran (hostage taking—
Non-prosecution of
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
claims of Iran hostages
(1981)
7927)
12284
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
Revokes prohibitions against transactions involving Iran
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12283
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7927)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Non-prosecution of claims of Iran hostages
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12284
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7929)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Restricts transfer of property of the Shah
|
Ratified by E.O. 12294 (1981)
|
12285
(January 19, 1981; 46 Federal Register 7931)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution
|
Iran (hostage taking—
Restricts transfer of
Ratified by E.O. 12294
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution)
property of the Shah
(1981)
7929)
12285
Iran (hostage taking—
Establishes Commission
Revoked by E.O. 12379
(January 19, 1981; 46 FR
resolution
on Hostage
(1982)
7931)
Compensation
Administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
12294
Iran (hostage taking—
Suspends claims and
Amended by E.O. 12379
(February 24, 1981; 46 FR resolution)
litigation against Iran
(1982)
14111)
12444
Expiration of Export
Continues Export
Revoked by E.O. 12451
(October 14, 1983; 48 FR
Administration Act of
Administration
(1983) (EAA
48215)
1979 (EAA)
Regulations (EAR)
reauthorized)
Congressional Research Service
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12470
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Establishes Commission on Hostage Compensation
Revoked by E.O. 12379 (1982)
|
Administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
|
12294
(February 24, 1981; 46 Federal Register 14111)
|
Iran (hostage taking—resolution)
|
Suspends claims and litigation against Iran
|
Amended by E.O. 12379 (1982)
|
12444
(October 14, 1983; 48 Federal Register 48215)
|
Expiration of Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA)
|
Continues Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
|
Revoked by E.O. 12451 (1983) (EAA reauthorized)
|
12470
(March 30, 1984; 49 Federal Register 13099)
|
Expiration of EAA
|
Continues EAR
|
Revoked by E.O. 12525 (1985) (EAA reauthorized)
|
12513
(May 1, 1985; 50 Federal Register 18629)
|
Nicaragua (civil war)
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits Revoked by E.O. 12525
(March 30, 1984; 49 FR
(1985) (EAA
13099)
reauthorized)
12513
Nicaragua (civil war)
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12707
(May 1, 1985; 50 FR
emergency; prohibits
(1990)
18629)
imports, exports, air imports, exports, air
traffic, use of U.S. portstraffic, use of U.S. ports
12532
South Africa (apartheid,
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12769
(September 9, 1985; 50
to meet requirements of
emergency; prohibits
(1991)
FR 36861)
U.N. Security Council
loans to government,
(UNSC) Resolution)
Revoked by E.O. 12707
(1990)
|
12532
(September 9, 1985; 50 Federal Register 36861)
|
South Africa (apartheid, to meet requirements of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution)
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits loans to government, crime control exports, crime control exports,
nuclear-related exports, nuclear-related exports,
military-related imports; military-related imports;
supports Sul ivan Principles
12535
South Africa (apartheid,
Prohibits import of
Revoked by E.O. 12769
(October 1, 1985; 50 FR
to meet requirements of
krugerrands
(1991)
40325)
UNSC Resolution)
12543
Libya (terrorism, regional
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13357
(January 1, 1986; 51 FR
unrest)
emergency; prohibits
(2004)
875)
supports Sullivan Principles
Revoked by E.O. 12769 (1991)
|
12535
(October 1, 1985; 50 Federal Register 40325)
|
South Africa (apartheid, to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Prohibits import of krugerrands
|
Revoked by E.O. 12769 (1991)
|
12543
(January 1, 1986; 51 Federal Register 875)
|
Libya (terrorism, regional unrest)
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits most imports and most imports and
exports, transactions exports, transactions
relating to transportation relating to transportation
to/from Libya, to/from Libya,
performance of contract performance of contract
obligations in support of obligations in support of
Libyan projects, bank Libyan projects, bank
loans, financial loans, financial
transactions related to transactions related to
travel to Libyatravel to Libya
12544
Libya (terrorism, regional
Blocks Libyan
Revoked by E.O. 13357
(January 8, 1986; 51 FR
unrest)
Government assets in
(2004)
1235)
United States
12635
Panama (finding
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12710
(April 8, 1988; 53 FR
government of Noriega
emergency; blocks
(1990)
12134)
and Palma a threat)
Panama assets in United States
Administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)
12722
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13350
(August 2, 1990; 55 FR
to meet requirements of
emergency; blocks Iraq
(2004)
31803)
UNSC Resolution)
Revoked by E.O. 13357 (2004)
|
12544
(January 8, 1986; 51 Federal Register 1235)
|
Libya (terrorism, regional unrest)
|
Blocks Libyan Government assets in United States
|
Revoked by E.O. 13357 (2004)
|
12635
(April 8, 1988; 53 Federal Register 12134)
|
Panama (finding government of Noriega and Palma a threat)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Panama assets in United States
|
Revoked by E.O. 12710 (1990)
|
Administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)
|
12722
(August 2, 1990; 55 Federal Register 31803)
|
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait; to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Iraq Government assets in Government assets in
U.S.; prohibits most U.S.; prohibits most
export and import; export and import;
restricts transactions restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits loans
12723
Kuwait (after Iraq’s
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12725
(August 2, 1990; 55 FR
invasion; to meet
emergency; blocks Kuwait (1990)
31805)
requirements of UNSC
Government assets in
Resolution)
U.S.
Congressional Research Service
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12724
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait;
Blocks Iraq Government
Revoked by E.O. 13350
(August 9, 1990; 55 FR
to meet requirements of
assets in U.S.; prohibits
(2004)
33089)
UNSC Resolution)
related to travel; prohibits loans
Revoked by E.O. 13350 (2004)
|
12723
(August 2, 1990; 55 Federal Register 31805)
|
Kuwait (after Iraq's invasion; to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Kuwait Government assets in U.S.
|
Revoked by E.O. 12725 (1990)
|
12724
(August 9, 1990; 55 Federal Register 33089)
|
Iraq (invasion of Kuwait; to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Blocks Iraq Government assets in U.S.; prohibits most export and import; most export and import;
restricts transactions restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits loans
12725
Kuwait (after Iraq’s
Blocks Kuwait
Revoked by E.O. 12771
(August 9, 1990; 55 FR
invasion, to meet
Government assets in
(1991)
33091)
requirements of UNSC
related to travel; prohibits loans
Revoked by E.O. 13350 (2004)
|
12725
(August 9, 1990; 55 Federal Register 33091)
|
Kuwait (after Iraq's invasion, to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Blocks Kuwait Government assets in U.S.; prohibits most U.S.; prohibits most
Resolution)
export and import; export and import;
restricts transactions restricts transactions
related to travel; prohibits loans
12730
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked by E.O. 12867
(September 30, 1990; 55
(1993)
FR 40373)
12735
Chemical and biological
Declares national
Revoked and replaced by
(November 16, 1990; 55
weapons proliferation
emergency; prohibits
E.O. 12938 (1994)
FR 48587)
transactions
12775
Haiti (military coup)
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(October 4, 1991; 56 FR
emergency; blocks Haiti
(1994)
50641)
related to travel; prohibits loans
Revoked by E.O. 12771 (1991)
|
12730
(September 30, 1990; 55 Federal Register 40373)
|
Expiration of EAA
|
Continues EAR
|
Revoked by E.O. 12867 (1993)
|
12735
(November 16, 1990; 55 Federal Register 48587)
|
Chemical and biological weapons proliferation
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits transactions
|
Revoked and replaced by E.O. 12938 (1994)
|
12775
(October 4, 1991; 56 Federal Register 50641)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Haiti Government assets in Government assets in
U.S.; prohibits transactions
12779
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks Haiti Government
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(October 28, 1991; 56 FR
assets in U.S.; prohibits
(1994)
55975)
export and import, transactions
12801
Libya (to meet
Bars overflight, takeoff
Revoked by E.O. 13357
(April 15, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC
and landing planes
(2004)
14319)
Resolution)
traveling to/from Libya
12808
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(May 30, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional
emergency; blocks
(2003)
23299)
conflict; to meet
Yugoslav Government
requirements of UNSC
assets in United States
Resolution)
12810
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 5, 1992; 57 FR
Montenegro) (regional
Government assets in
(2003)
24347)
conflict; to meet
U.S.; prohibits import and
requirements of UNSC
export, transactions
Resolution)
related to travel, air traffic, loans, completing contracts, sports participation, tech/cultural exchanges
12817
Iraq (postwar; to meet
Blocks assets
Revoked by E.O. 13350
October 21, 1992; 57 FR
requirements of UNSC
(2004)
48433)
Resolution)
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Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12831
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Prohibits transshipment
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(January 15, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional
(2003)
5253)
conflict)
Administration of President William Clinton (1993-2001)
12846
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Tightens sanctions,
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(April 25, 1993; 58 FR
Montenegro) (regional
especial y those relating
(2003)
25771)
conflict; to meet
to maritime restrictions
requirements of UNSC Resolution)
12853
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of regime;
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 30, 1993; 58 FR
prohibits export of
(1994)
35843)
U.S.; prohibits transactions
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12779
(October 28, 1991; 56 Federal Register 55975)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Blocks Haiti Government assets in U.S.; prohibits export and import, transactions
|
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12801
(April 15, 1992; 57 Federal Register 14319)
|
Libya (to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Bars overflight, takeoff and landing planes traveling to/from Libya
|
Revoked by E.O. 13357 (2004)
|
12808
(May 30, 1992; 57 Federal Register 23299)
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Yugoslav Government property
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
12810
(June 5, 1992; 57 Federal Register 24347)
|
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
|
Blocks Yugoslav Government property; prohibits imports, exports, and dealings; prohibits transactions related to transportation; prohibits landing, departure, and overfly air rights; prohibits performance of certain contracts, prohibits commitments or transfers of funds or other financial or economic resources; prohibits transactions related to sports participation; prohibits transactions related to scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
12817
October 21, 1992; 57 Federal Register 48433)
|
Iraq (postwar; to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Blocks assets
|
Revoked by E.O. 13350 (2004)
|
12831
(January 15, 1993; 58 Federal Register 5253)
|
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
|
Prohibits transactions related to the transshipment of commodities and certain vessels
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
Administration of President William Clinton (1993-2001)
|
12846
(April 25, 1993; 58 Federal Register 25771)
|
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
|
Blocks property; detains pending investigation vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft, and cargo; prohibits non-naval U.S. vessels from entering the territorial waters of Yugoslavia; prohibits dealings related to the import, export, or transshipment through U.N. protected areas in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
12853
(June 30, 1993; 58 Federal Register 35843)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Blocks assets of regime; prohibits export of petroleum, arms, and petroleum, arms, and
related materielrelated materiel
12865
UNITA (Angola) (to meet
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13298
(September 26, 1993; 58
requirements of UNSC
emergency; prohibits sales (2003)
FR 51005)
Resolution)
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12865
(September 26, 1993; 58 Federal Register 51005)
|
UNITA (Angola) (to meet requirements of UNSC Resolution)
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits sales to UNITA and UNITA-controlled regions
|
Revoked by E.O. 13298 (2003)
|
12868
(September 30, 1993; 58 Federal Register 51749)
|
Weapons proliferation
|
Declares national emergency; controls to UNITA and UNITA-control ed regions
12868
Weapons proliferation
Declares national
Revoked and replaced by
(September 30, 1993; 58
emergency; controls
E.O. 12930 (1994)
FR 51749)
exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controlswith controls
12872
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of those
Revoked by E.O. 12932
Revoked and replaced by E.O. 12930 (1994)
|
12872
(October 18, 1993; 58 Federal Register 54029)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Blocks assets of those impeding democratization process
|
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12914
(May 7, 1994; 59 Federal Register 24339)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Blocks assets of military and participants in 1991 overthrow; prohibits air traffic
|
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12917
(May 21, 1994; 59 Federal Register 26925)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Prohibits imports
|
(October 18, 1993; 58 FR
impeding democratization
(1994)
54029)
process
12914
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of military
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 7, 1994; 59 FR
and participants in 1991
(1994)
24339)
overthrow; prohibits air traffic
12917
Haiti (military coup)
Prohibits imports
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(May 21, 1994; 59 FR
(1994)
26925)
12920
Haiti (military coup)
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
12920
(June 10, 1994; 59 Federal Register 30501)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Prohibits certain financial transactions, exports
|
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12922
(June 21, 1994; 59 Federal Register 32645)
|
Haiti (military coup)
|
Blocks assets of certain individuals
|
Revoked by E.O. 12932 (1994)
|
12923
(June 30, 1994; 59 Federal Register 34551)
|
Expiration of EAA
|
Continues EAR
|
Prohibits certain financial
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 10, 1994; 59 FR
transactions, exports
(1994)
30501)
12922
Haiti (military coup)
Blocks assets of certain
Revoked by E.O. 12932
(June 21, 1994; 59 FR
individuals
(1994)
32645)
12923
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked and replaced by
(June 30, 1994; 59 FR
E.O. 12924 (1994)
34551)
12924
Expiration of EAA
Continues EAR
Revoked and replaced by E.O. 12924 (1994)
12924
(August 19, 1994; 59 Federal Register 34551)
|
Expiration of EAA
|
Continues EAR
|
Revoked by E.O. 13206 (2001); previously Revoked by E.O. 13206
(August 19, 1994; 59 FR
(2001); previously
34551)
amended by E.O. 12981 amended by E.O. 12981
(1995)(1995)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
12930
Proliferation of weapons
Declares national
Revoked and replaced by
(September 29, 1994; 59
of mass destruction
emergency; controls
E.O. 12938 (1994)
FR 50475)
12930
(September 29, 1994; 59 Federal Register 50475)
|
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
|
Declares national emergency; controls exports; prohibits exports; prohibits
transactions with those transactions with those
found not in compliance found not in compliance
with controlswith controls
12934
Bosnian Serb-control ed
Blocks assets; prohibits
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(October 25, 1994; 59 FR
areas of Bosnia and
export, maritime access
(2003)
54117)
Herzegovina (to meet
to certain ports
requirements of UNSC resolution)
12938
Proliferation of weapons
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 19, 1994; 59
of mass destruction
emergency; controls
amended by E.O. 13094
FR 59099)
exports; prohibits
Revoked and replaced by E.O. 12938 (1994)
|
12934
(October 25, 1994; 59 Federal Register 54117)
|
Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina (to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Blocks assets; prohibits exports, maritime access to certain ports
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
12938
(November 19, 1994; 59 Federal Register 59099)
|
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
|
Declares national emergency; controls exports; prohibits transactions with those found not in compliance with controls
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13094 (1998); E.O. 13128 (1998); E.O. 13128
transactions with those
(1999); E.O. 13382 (2005)(1999); E.O. 13382 (2005)
found not in compliance with controls
12947
Terrorists who disrupt
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13886
(January 23, 1995; 60 FR
Middle East peace process emergency; blocks assets;
(2019)
5079)
prohibits transactions
12957
Iran (weapons
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 15, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation)
emergency; prohibits
other parts revoked and
14615)
investment in oil
restated in E.O. 12959
development
(1995)
12959
Iran (weapons
Prohibits investment in oil
12947
(January 23, 1995; 60 Federal Register 5079)
|
Terrorists who disrupt Middle East peace process
|
Declares national emergency; blocks assets; prohibits transactions
|
Revoked by E.O. 13886 (2019)
|
12957
(March 15, 1995; 60 Federal Register 14615)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation)
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits investment in oil development
|
Requires annual renewal; other parts revoked and restated in E.O. 12959 (1995)
|
12959
(May 6, 1995; 60 Federal Register 24757)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation)
|
Prohibits investment in oil development
|
Revoked in part by E.O. 13059 (1997)
|
12978
(October 21, 1995; 60 Federal Register 54579)
|
Significant narcotics traffickers (initially Colombia)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks assets; prohibits transactions
|
Requires annual renewal; technical amendments in E.O. 13286 (2003)
|
12981
(December 5, 1995; 60 Federal Register 62981; 50 U.S.C. 4603 note)
|
EAA
|
Amends the administration of export controls.
|
Amended by E.O. 13020 (1996); E.O. 13206 (1996); E.O. 13117 (1999)
|
13020
(October 12, 1996; 61 Federal Register Revoked in part by E.O.
(May 6, 1995; 60 FR
proliferation)
development
13059 (1997)
24757)
12978
Significant narcotics
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(October 21, 1995; 60 FR
traffickers (initially
emergency; blocks assets;
technical amendments in
54579)
Colombia)
prohibits transactions
E.O. 13286 (2003)
12981
EAA
Amends the
Amended by E.O. 13020
(December 5, 1995; 60
administration of export
(1996); E.O. 13206
FR 62981; 50 U.S.C. 4603
controls.
(1996); E.O. 13117 (1999)
note)
13020
EAA
Further amends the
Amended by E.O. 13026
(October 12, 1996; 61 FR
administration of export
(1996)
54079; 50 U.S.C. 4603
controls.
note)
13026
EAA
54079; 50 U.S.C. 4603 note)
EAA
|
Further amends the administration of export controls.
|
Amended by E.O. 13026 (1996)
|
13026
(November 15, 1996; 61 Federal Register 58767; 50 U.S.C. 4603 note)
|
EAA
|
Further amends the administration of export controls. Adds rules for encryption products.
|
Exempted from authorities of E.O. 13206 (2001)
|
13047
(May 22, 1997; 62 Federal Register 28301)
|
Burma (military government; to Further amends the
Exempted from
(November 15, 1996; 61
administration of export
authorities of E.O. 13206
FR 58767; 50 U.S.C. 4603
controls. Adds rules for
(2001)
note)
encryption products.
13047
Burma (military
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13742
(May 22, 1997; 62 FR
government; to
emergency; blocks new
(2016)
28301)
implement Sec. 570 of implement Sec. 570 of
P.L. 104-208)
Declares national emergency; blocks new investment
|
Revoked by E.O. 13742 (2016)
|
13059
(August 19, 1997; 62 Federal Register 44531)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation, terrorism, regional stability)
|
Blocks imports, exports
|
Expands applicability of P.L. investment 104-208)
13059
Iran (weapons
Blocks imports, exports
Expands applicability of
(August 19, 1997; 62 FR
proliferation, terrorism,
E.O. 12957 (1995), E.O.
44531)
regional stability)
E.O. 12957 (1995), E.O. 12959 (1995)12959 (1995)
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Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13067
Sudan (conflict)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 3, 1997; 62
emergency; blocks Sudan
revoked in part by E.O.
FR 59989)
Government assets;
13761 (2017)
prohibits exports, imports, other transactions
13069 (December 12,
UNITA (Angola) (war)
Prohibits certain
13067
(November 3, 1997; 62 Federal Register 59989)
|
Sudan (conflict)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Sudan Government assets; prohibits exports, imports, other transactions
|
Requires annual renewal; revoked in part by E.O. 13761 (2017)
|
13069 (December 12, 1997; 62 Federal Register 65989)
|
UNITA (Angola) (war)
|
Prohibits certain transaction
|
Revoked by E.O. 13298 (2003)
|
13088
(June 9, 1998; 63 Federal Register 32109)
|
Revoked by E.O. 13298
1997; 62 FR 65989)
transaction
(2003)
13088
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(June 9, 1998; 63 FR
Montenegro) (war)
emergency; blocks
(2003); previously
32109)
Yugoslav Government
amended by E.O. 13121
assets; prohibits
(1999) and E.O. 13192
transactions
(2001)
13094
Proliferation of weapons
Prohibits some
Amends E.O. 12938
(July 28, 1998; 63 FR
of mass destruction
transactions, assistance,
(1994)
40803)
imports
13098
UNITA (Angola) (war; to
Blocks UNITA assets in
Revoked by E.O. 13298
(August 18, 1998; 63 FR
meet requirements of
U.S.; prohibits imports
(2003)
44771)
UNSC resolution)
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosovo
Declares national emergency; blocks property of the Yugoslav, Serbia, and Montenegrin Government assets; prohibits transactions, including trade financing
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
13094
(July 28, 1998; 63 Federal Register 40803)
|
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
|
Prohibits some transactions, assistance, imports
|
Amends E.O. 12938 (1994)
|
13098
(August 18, 1998; 63 Federal Register 44771)
|
UNITA (Angola) (war; to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Blocks UNITA assets in U.S.; prohibits imports from and exports to from and exports to
UNITA-UNITA-
control edcontrolled or or
influences industriesinfluences industries
13099
Terrorists who disrupt
Adds Usama bin Laden
Amends E.O. 12947
(August 20, 1998; 63 FR
the Middle East peace
and others to the
(1995); see above
45167)
process
terrorist list
13121
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Blocks Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(April 30, 1999; 64 FR
Montenegro) (war)
Government assets;
(2003)
24021)
prohibits transactions
13128
Proliferation of weapons
Implements the Chemical
Related to E.O. 12938
(June 25, 1999; 64 FR
of mass destruction
Weapons Convention and (1994); see above
34704)
Revoked by E.O. 13298 (2003)
|
13099
(August 20, 1998; 63 Federal Register 45167)
|
Terrorists who disrupt the Middle East peace process
|
Adds Usama bin Laden and others to the terrorist list
|
Amends E.O. 12947 (1995); see above
|
13121
(April 30, 1999; 64 Federal Register 24021)
|
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosovo
|
Blocks Yugoslav Government assets; prohibits exports, imports, transactions or dealings in goods, software, technology, or services
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
13128
(June 25, 1999; 64 Federal Register 34704)
|
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
|
Implements the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons the Chemical Weapons
Convention Convention
Implementation Act.
13129
Taliban (terrorism)
Declares national
National emergency
(July 4, 1999; 64 FR
emergency; blocks
terminated by E.O. 13268
36759)
property
Implementation Act.
Related to E.O. 12938 (1994); see above
|
13129
(July 4, 1999; 64 Federal Register 36759)
|
Taliban (terrorism)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
National emergency terminated by E.O. 13268 (2002); see, however, (2002); see, however,
E.O. 13224 (2001)E.O. 13224 (2001)
E.O. 13159
Russia for misuse of highly Declares national
Superseded by E.O.
E.O. 13159
(June 21, 2000; 65(June 21, 2000; 65
FR
enriched uranium
emergency; blocks
13617 (2012)
39279)
extractions
property
13192
Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Substantially expands
Revoked by E.O. 13304
(January 17, 2001; 66 FR
Montenegro) (war)
sanctions in E.O. 13088
(2003)
7379)
(1998) to apply to humanitarian crisis in Kosovo
13194
Sierra Leone (diamond
Federal Register 39279)
Russia for misuse of highly enriched uranium extractions
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Superseded by E.O. 13617 (2012)
|
13192
(January 17, 2001; 66 Federal Register 7379)
|
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
|
Blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
13194
(January 18, 2001; 66 Federal Register 7389)
|
Sierra Leone (diamond trade)
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits diamond imports
|
Revoked by E.O. 13324 (2004); previously Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13324
(January 18, 2001; 66 FR
trade)
emergency; prohibits
(2004); previously
7389)
diamond imports
amended by E.O. 13312 amended by E.O. 13312
(2003)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President George W. Bush (2001-2009)
13213
Sierra Leone (diamond
Expands prohibitions on
Revoked by E.O. 13324
(May 22, 2001; 66 FR
trade)
diamond trade
2004); previously
28829)
(2003)
Administration of President George W. Bush (2001-2009)
|
13213
(May 22, 2001; 66 Federal Register 28829)
|
Sierra Leone (diamond trade)
|
Expands prohibitions on diamond trade
|
Revoked by E.O. 13324 2004); previously amended by E.O. 13312 amended by E.O. 13312
(2003)(2003)
13219
Western Balkans
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(June 26, 2001; 66 FR
(destabilization postwar)
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13304
34775)
property
(2003); see also E.O. 14033 (2021)
13222
Expiration of EAA
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(August 17, 2001; 66 FR
emergency with the
amended by E.O. 13637
44025)
expiration of the Export
(2013)
13219
(June 26, 2001; 66 Federal Register 34775)
|
Western Balkans
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13304 (2003); see also E.O. 13304 (2003), E.O. 14033 (2021), and E.O. 14140 (2025)
|
13222
(August 17, 2001; 66 Federal Register 44025)
|
Expiration of EAA
|
Declares national emergency with the expiration of the Export Administration Act of Administration Act of
1979 (EAA). Continues 1979 (EAA). Continues
Export Administration Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) and Regulations (EAR) and
three remaining statutory three remaining statutory
provisions in the EAA provisions in the EAA
relating to weapons proliferation
13224
Terrorism
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(September 23, 2001; 66
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13268
FR 49079
property; prohibits
relating to weapons proliferation
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13637 (2013)
|
13224
(September 23, 2001; 66 Federal Register 49079)
|
Terrorism
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property; prohibits transactions
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13268 (2002), E.O. 13284 (2002), E.O. 13284
transactions
(2003), E.O. 13372 (2003), E.O. 13372
(2005), and E.O. 13886 (2005), and E.O. 13886
(2019)(2019)
13268
Taliban and Terrorism
Terminates E.O. 13129
Expanded by E.O. 13372
13268
(July 2, 2002; 67 Federal Register 44751)
|
Taliban and Terrorism
|
Terminates E.O. 13129 (1999); adds "Taliban" and others to restricted list (2001)
|
Expanded by E.O. 13372 (2005); amended E.O. 13224 (2001)
|
13288
(March 6, 2003; 68 Federal Register 11457)
|
Zimbabwe
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property; prohibits transactions
|
Revoked by E.O. 14118 (2024)
|
13290
March 20, 2003; 68 Federal Register (July 2, 2002; 67 FR
(1999); adds “Taliban”
(2005); amended E.O.
44751)
and others to restricted
13224 (2001)
list (2001)
13288
Zimbabwe (undermining
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 6, 2003; 68 FR
democratic processes)
emergency; blocks
superseded in part by
11457)
property
E.O. 13391 (2005)
13290
Iraq (war)
Authorizes the
Amended by E.O. 13350
March 20, 2003; 68 FR
confiscation and vesting of (2004)
14307; 50 U.S.C. 1702
property
note)
13298
UNITA (Angola)
Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders
(May 6, 2003; 68 FR
emergency and related
24857)
authorities
13303
Iraq (war)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(May 22, 2003; 68 FR
emergency; Protects
amends E.O. 13290
31931)
certain property
14307; 50 U.S.C. 1702 note)
Iraq (war)
|
Authorizes the confiscation and vesting of property
|
Amended by E.O. 13350 (2004)
|
13298
(May 6, 2003; 68 Federal Register 24857)
|
UNITA (Angola)
|
Terminates earlier emergency and related authorities
|
Revokes earlier orders
|
13303
(May 22, 2003; 68 Federal Register 31931)
|
Iraq (war)
|
Declares national emergency; Protects certain property
|
Requires annual renewal; amends E.O. 13290 (2003); amended by E.O. (2003); amended by E.O.
13364 (2004); expanded 13364 (2004); expanded
on by E.O. 13315 (2003), on by E.O. 13315 (2003),
E.O. 13350 (2004), E.O. E.O. 13350 (2004), E.O.
13438 (2007), and E.O. 13438 (2007), and E.O.
13668 (2014)13668 (2014)
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13304
Yugoslavia (regional war)
Terminates earlier
Revokes and modifies
(May 28, 2003; 68 FR
emergency
earlier orders
32315)
13310
Burma (military
Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 28, 2003; 68 FR
government)
(2016)
44853)
13312
Sierra Leone and Liberia
13304
(May 28, 2003; 68 Federal Register 32315)
|
Yugoslavia and Western Balkans
|
Terminates earlier emergencies; blocks property
|
Terminates national emergencies declared in and revokes E.O. 12808 (1992) and E.O. 13088 (1998); revokes E.O. 12810 (1992), E.O. 12831 (1993), E.O. 12846 (1993), E.O. 12934 (1994), E.O. 13121 (1999), and E.O. 13192 (2001); expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13219 (2001); replaces and supersedes Annex to E.O. 13219 (2001); amends E.O. 13219 (2001); see also E.O. 14033 (2021) and E.O. 14140 (2025)
|
13310
(July 28, 2003; 68 Federal Register 44853)
|
Burma (military government)
|
Blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 13742 (2016)
|
13312
(July 3, 2003; 68 Federal Register 45151))
|
Sierra Leone and Liberia (conflict)
|
Implements the Clean Diamond Trade Act
|
Revoked by E.O. 13324 (2004)
|
13315
(August 28, 2003; 68 Federal Register 52315)
|
Iraq (former regime)
|
Blocks property
|
Implements the Clean
Revoked by E.O. 13324
(July 3, 2003; 68 FR
(conflict)
Diamond Trade Act
(2004)
45151))
13315
Iraq (former regime)
Blocks property
Superseded by E.O.
(August 28, 2003; 68 FR
13350 (2004)
52315)
13324
Superseded by E.O. 13350 (2004)
13324
(January 15, 2004; 69 Federal Register 2823)
|
Sierra Leone and Liberia (conflict)
|
Sierra Leone and Liberia
Terminates earlier Terminates earlier
emergency
Revokes E.O. 13194
(January 15, 2004; 69 FR
(conflict)
emergency
(2001) and E.O. 13213
2823)
(2001)
13338
Syria (civil conflict)
Revokes E.O. 13194 (2001) and E.O. 13213 (2001)
13338
(May 11, 2004; 69 Federal Register 26751)
|
Syria (civil conflict)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property of those who export certain goods to Syria
|
Revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13348
(July 22, 2004; 69 Federal Register 44885)
|
Liberia (corruption, to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property; prohibits imports
|
Revoked by E.O. 13710 (2015)
|
13350
(July 29, 2004; 69 Federal Register 46055)
|
Iraq (postwar)
|
Ends emergency from 1990 Kuwait invasion
|
Revokes several earlier E.O.
|
13357
(September 20, 2004; 69 Federal Register 56665)
|
Libya (terrorism)
|
Terminates earlier emergency
|
Revokes earlier orders
|
13364
(November 29, 2004; 69 Federal Register 70177)
|
Iraq (postwar)
|
Amends transaction controls and regulations on the Development fund for Iraq
|
Amends E.O. 13303 (2003)
|
13372
(February 16, 2005; 70 Federal Register 8499)
|
Terrorism
|
Clarifies use of sanctions
|
Amends E.O. 12947 (1995), E.O. 13224 (2001)
|
13382
(June 28, 2005; 70 Federal Register 38567)
|
Weapons proliferation
|
Expands earlier orders; blocks property
|
Amends E.O. 12938 (1994) and 13094 (1998)
|
13391
(November 22, 2005; 70 Federal Register 71201)
|
Zimbabwe
|
Blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 14118 (2024)
|
13396
(February. 7, 2006; 71 Federal Register 7389)
|
Cote d'Ivoire (conflict)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 13739 (2016)
|
13399
(April 25, 2006; 71 Federal Register 25059)
|
Syria (civil war)
|
Blocks additional property
|
Revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13400
(April 26, 2006; 71 Federal Register 25483)
|
Sudan (Darfur)
|
Blocks additional property
|
Expands E.O. 13067 (1997)
|
13405
(June 16, 2006; 71 Federal Register 35485)
|
Belarus (undermining democracy)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13412
(October 13, 2006; 71 Federal Register 61369)
|
Sudan (Darfur, regional stability)
|
Expands E.O. 13067 (1997); blocks property and transactions
|
Revoked by E.O. 13761 (2017)
|
13413
(October 27, 2006; 71 Federal Register 64105)
|
Democratic Republic of the Congo (regional stability)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13671 (2014)
|
13438
(July 17, 2007; 72 Federal Register 39719)
|
Those who threaten stabilization efforts in Iraq
|
Blocks additional property
|
Expands E.O. 13303 (2003)
|
13441
(August 1, 2007; 72 Federal Register 43499)
|
Those who threaten the sovereignty of Lebanon (primarily Syria)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13448
October 18, 2007; 72 Federal Register 60223)
|
Burma (military government)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property and transactions
|
Revoked by E.O. 13742 (2016)
|
13460
(February 13, 2008; 73 Federal Register 8991)
|
Syria (civil conflict)
|
Blocks property of those who support certain activities in Syria
|
Revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13464
April 30, 2008; 72 Federal Register 24491)
|
Burma (military government)
|
Blocks property and transactions
|
Revoked by E.O. 13742 (2016)
|
13466
(June 26, 2008; 73 Federal Register 36787)
|
North Korea (weapons proliferation, to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property and transactions
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 13551 (2010), E.O. 13570 (2011), E.O. 13687 (2015), E.O. 13722 (2016), and E.O. 13810 (2017)
|
13469
(July 25, 2008; 73 Federal Register 43841)
|
Zimbabwe
|
Blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 14118 (2024)
|
Administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017)
|
13536
(April 12, 2010; 75 Federal Register 19869)
|
Somalia (conflict, high seas piracy)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13620 (2012)
|
13551
(August 30, 2010; 75 Federal Register 53837)
|
North Korea (weapons proliferation, to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Blocks property
|
Expands E.O. 13466 (2008)
|
13553
(Sept, 28, 2010; 75 Federal Register 60567)
|
Iran (human rights)
|
Blocks property including that of Iranian officials
|
Expands E.O. 12957 (1995)
|
13566
(February 25, 2011; 76 Federal Register 11315)
|
Libya (stability)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property and transactions
|
Requires annual renewal; expanded by E.O. 13726 (2016)
|
13570
(April 18, 2011; 76 Federal Register 22291)
|
North Korea (weapons proliferation, to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Blocks transactions
|
Expands E.O. 13466 (2008), 13551 (2010); expanded by E.O. 13687 (2015)
|
13572
(April 29, 2011; 76 Federal Register 24787)
|
Syria (human rights)
|
Blocks property of human rights violators
|
Revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13573
(May 18, 2011; 76 Federal Register 29143)
|
Syria (war)
|
Blocks property of senior government officials
|
Revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13574
(May 23, 2011; 76 Federal Register 30505)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation)
|
Implements new sanctions in Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
|
Revoked by E.O. 13716 (2016)
|
13581
(July 24, 2011; 76 Federal Register 44757)
|
Transnational Criminal Organizations
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13863 (2019)
|
13582
(August 17, 2011; 76 Federal Register 52209)
|
Syria (war)
|
Blocks property of Government of Syria and transactions, new investment, importation of petroleum and related products
|
Revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13590
(November 20, 2011; 76 Federal Register 72609)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation)
|
Prohibits transactions related to Iran's energy and petrochemical sectors
|
Revoked by E.O. 13716 (2016)
|
13599
(February 5, 2012; 77 Federal Register 6659)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation)
|
Blocks property of government and financial institutions
|
Expands E.O. 12957 (1995)
|
13606
(April 22, 2012; 77 Federal Register 24571)
|
Iran and Syria (human rights)
|
Blocks property and denies visas
|
Expands E.O. 12957 (1995) and E.O. 13894 (2019); previously, it had drawn on the national emergency declared in E.O. 13338 (2004), but that order was revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13608
(May 1, 2012; 77 Federal Register 26409)
|
Iran and Syria (sanctions evasion)
|
Blocks transactions and denies visas
|
Expands E.O. 12938 (1994), 12957 (1995), and 13224 (2001); previously, it had also drawn on the national emergency declared in E.O. 13338 (2004), but that order was revoked by E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13611
(May 16, 2012; 77 Federal Register 29533)
|
Yemen (stability)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13617
(June 25, 2012; 77 Federal Register 38459)
|
Russia (misuse of highly enriched uranium extractions
|
Blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 13695 (2015)
|
13619
(July 11, 2012; 77 Federal Register 41243)
|
Declares national
Requires annual renewal.
(May 11, 2004; 69 FR
emergency; blocks
Modified by E.O. 13460
26751)
property of those who
(2008). See also E.O.
export certain goods to
13399 (2006), E.O. 13572
Syria
(2011), E.O. 13573 (2011), E.O. 13582 (2011), E.O. 13606 (2012), and E.O. 13608 (2012)
13348
Liberia (corruption, to
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13710
(July 22, 2004; 69 FR
meet requirements of
emergency; blocks
(2015)
44885)
UNSC resolution)
property; prohibits imports
13350
Iraq (postwar)
Ends emergency from
Revokes several earlier
(July 29, 2004; 69 FR
1990 Kuwait invasion
E.O.
46055)
13357
Libya (terrorism)
Terminates earlier
Revokes earlier orders
(September 20, 2004; 69
emergency
FR 56665)
13364
Iraq (postwar)
Amends transaction
Amends E.O. 13303
(November 29, 2004; 69
controls and regulations
(2003)
FR 70177)
on the Development fund for Iraq
13372
Terrorism
Clarifies use of sanctions
Amends E.O. 12947
(February 16, 2005; 70 FR
(1995), E.O. 13224 (2001)
8499)
13382
Weapons proliferation
Expands earlier orders;
Amends E.O. 12938
(June 28, 2005; 70 FR
blocks property
(1994) and 13094 (1998)
38567)
13391
Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property
Amends and supersedes
(November 22, 2005; 70
democratic processes)
part of E.O. 13288 (2003)
FR 71201)
Congressional Research Service
74
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13396
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 13739
(February. 7, 2006; 71 FR
emergency; blocks
(2016)
7389)
property
13399
Syria (civil war)
Blocks additional property Expands E.O. 13338
(April 25, 2006; 71 FR
(2004)
25059)
13400
Sudan (Darfur)
Blocks additional property Expands E.O. 13067
(April 26, 2006; 71 FR
(1997)
25483)
13405
Belarus (undermining
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(June 16, 2006; 71 FR
democracy)
emergency; blocks
35485)
property
13412
Sudan (Darfur, regional
Expands E.O. 13067
Revoked by E.O. 13761
(October 13, 2006; 71 FR
stability)
(1997); blocks property
(2017)
61369)
and transactions
13413
Democratic Republic of
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(October 27, 2006; 71 FR
the Congo (regional
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13671
64105)
stability)
property
(2014)
13438
Those who threaten
Blocks additional property Expands E.O. 13303
(July 17, 2007; 72 FR
stabilization efforts in Iraq
(2003)
39719)
13441
Those who threaten the
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(August 1, 2007; 72 FR
sovereignty of Lebanon
emergency; blocks
43499)
(primarily Syria)
property
13448
Burma (military
Declares national
Burma (military government)
Blocks property
|
Revoked by E.O. 13742 Revoked by E.O. 13742
October 18, 2007; 72 FR
government)
emergency; blocks
(2016)
60223)
property and transactions
13460
Syria (civil conflict)
Blocks property of those
Amends E.O. 13338
(February 13, 2008; 73 FR
who support certain
(2004)
8991)
activities in Syria
13464
Burma (military
Blocks property and
Revoked by E.O. 13742
April 30, 2008; 72 FR
government)
transactions
(2016)
24491)
13466
North Korea (weapons
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(June 26, 2008; 73 FR
proliferation, to meet
emergency; blocks
see also E.O. 13551
36787)
requirements of UNSC
property and transactions
(2010), E.O. 13570
resolution)
(2011), E.O. 13687 (2015), E.O. 13722 (2016), and E.O. 13810 (2017)
13469
Zimbabwe (undermining
Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13288
(July 25, 2008; 73 FR
democracy)
(2003) and 13391 (2005)
43841)
Congressional Research Service
75
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
Administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017)
13536
Somalia (conflict, high seas Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(April 12, 2010; 75 FR
piracy)
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13620
19869)
property
(2012)
13551
North Korea (weapons
Blocks property
Expands national
(August 30, 2010; 75 FR
proliferation, to meet
emergency declared in
53837)
requirements of UNSC
E.O. 13466 (2008)
resolution)
13553
Iran (human rights)
Blocks property including
Expands E.O. 12957
(Sept, 28, 2010; 75 FR
that of Iranian officials
(1995)
60567)
13566
Libya (stability)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(February 25, 2011; 76 FR
emergency; blocks
expanded by E.O. 13726
11315)
property and transactions
(2016)
13570
(2016)
13620
July 20, 2012; 77 Federal Register 43483)
|
Somalia (conflict)
|
Expands targets to include misappropriations, corruption, impeding humanitarian aid
|
Amends E.O. 13536 (2010)
|
13622
(July 30, 2012; 77 Federal Register 45897)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation)
|
Additional sanctions
|
Revoked by E.O. 13716 (2016)
|
13628
(October 9, 2012; 77 Federal Register 62139)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation, human rights, sanctions evasion)
|
Implements Iran Threat Reduction Act
|
Revoked by E.O. 13846 (2018); previously amended by E.O. 13716 (2016)
|
13637
(March 8, 2013; 78 Federal Register 16131)
|
EAA
|
Delegates export authorities, coordinates responsibilities; amends E.O. 13222
|
Amends E.O. 13222 (2001)
|
13645
(June 3, 2013; 78 Federal Register 33945)
|
Iran (weapons proliferation, human rights)
|
Implements Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
|
Revoked by E.O. 13716 (2016)
|
13651
(August 6, 2013; 78 Federal Register 48793)
|
Burma
|
Prohibits import of jadeite and rubies
|
Revoked by E.O. 13742 (2016)
|
13660
(March 6, 2014; 79 Federal Register 13493)
|
Ukraine (stability)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal; expanded on by E.O. 13661 (2014); E.O. 13662 (2014); with additional actions in E.O. 13685 (2014); E.O. 13849 (2018); and E.O. 14065 (2022)
|
13661
(March 16, 2014; 79 Federal Register 15535)
|
Russia (destabilization of Ukraine)
|
Blocks property
|
Expands E.O. 13660 (2014)
|
13662
(March 20, 2014; 79 Federal Register 16169)
|
Russia (destabilization of Ukraine)
|
Blocks property
|
Expands E.O. 13660 (2014)
|
13664
(April 3, 2014; 79 Federal Register 19283)
|
South Sudan (conflict)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13667
(May 12, 2014; 79 Federal Register 28387)
|
Central African Republic (conflict)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13668
(May 27, 2014; 79 Federal Register 31019)
|
Iraq (postwar)
|
Ends immunities granted to the Development Fund for Iraq
|
Expands E.O. 13303 (2003)
|
13671
(July 8, 2014; 79 Federal Register 39949)
|
Democratic Republic of the Congo (regional stability)
|
Additional sanctions
|
Expands E.O. 13413 (2006)
|
13685
(December 19, 2014; 79 Federal Register 77357)
|
Ukraine (destabilizing activities in Crimea)
|
Blocks property and transactions
|
Expands E.O. 13660 (2014)
|
13687
(January 2, 2015; 80 Federal Register 819)
|
North Korea (weapons proliferation, to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Additional sanctions including on DPRK government officials and members of the Workers' Party of Korea
|
Expands E.O. 13466 (2008), 13551 (2010), 13570 (2011)
|
13692
(March 8, 2015; 80 Federal Register 12747)
|
Venezuela
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property; suspends U.S. entry
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), E.O. 13884 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13694
(April 1, 2015; 80 Federal Register 18077)
|
Malicious cyber-enabled activities
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property; suspends U.S. entry
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 13757 (2016), E.O. 13984 (2021), E.O. 14144 (2025), and E.O. 14306 (2025)
|
13695
(May 26, 2015; 80 Federal Register 30331)
|
Russia's misuse of highly enriched uranium extractions
|
Terminates emergency
|
Revokes E.O. 13617 (2012)
|
13710
(November 12, 2015; 80 Federal Register 71679)
|
Liberia (corrupt government)
|
Terminates emergency
|
Revokes E.O. 13348 (2004)
|
13712
(November 22, 2015; 80 Federal Register 73633)
|
Burundi (stability)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Terminated by E.O. 14054 (2021)
|
13716
(January 16, 2016; 81 Federal Register 3693; 22 U.S.C. 8801 note)
|
Iran (nuclear weapons)
|
Implements U.S. obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
|
Revoked by E.O. 13846 (2018). Had revoked and modified earlier orders
|
13722
(March 15, 2016; 81 Federal Register 14943)
|
North Korea (weapons proliferation, to meet requirements of UNSC resolution)
|
Blocks property of North Korea government and central party; prohibits transactions
|
Expands E.O. 13466 (2008)
|
13726
(April 19, 2016; 81 Federal Register 23559)
|
Libya (stability)
|
Additional sanctions
|
Expands E.O. 13566 (2011)
|
13739
(Sept, 14, 2016; 81 Federal Register 63673)
|
Cote d'Ivoire (conflict)
|
Terminates emergency
|
Revokes E.O. 13396 (2006)
|
13742
(October 7, 2016; 81 Federal Register 70593)
|
Burma
|
Terminates emergency
|
Revokes E.O. 13047 (1997), 13310 (2003), 13448 (2007), 13464 (2008), 13619 (2012), 13651 (2013)
|
13757
(December 28, 2016; 82 Federal Register 1)
|
Malicious cyber-enabled activities
|
Blocks property
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13694 (2015); see also E.O. 13984 (2021), E.O. 14144 (2025), and E.O. 14306 (2025)
|
13761
(January 13, 2017; 82 Federal Register 5331)
|
Sudan (war, human rights)
|
Recognizes "positive actions" by the Government of Sudan by removing some sanctions
|
Revokes in part E.O. 13067 (1997), in whole E.O. 13412 (2006); amended by E.O. 13804 (2017)
|
Administration of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021)
|
13804
(July 11, 2017; 82 Federal Register 32611)
|
Sudan (war, human rights)
|
Extends deadlines in E.O. 13761 (2017)
|
Modifies E.O. 13761 (2017)
|
13808
(August 24, 2017; 82 Federal Register 41155)
|
Venezuela
|
Prohibits transactions, financing, and other dealings related to certain Venezuelan debt, bonds, dividend payments or distributions, as well as the purchase of certain Venezuelan securities
|
Expands on national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), E.O. 13884 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13810
(Sept, 20, 2017; 82 Federal Register 44705)
|
North Korea (weapons proliferation, human rights)
|
Additional sanctions
|
Expands actions based on national emergency declared in E.O. 13466 (2008)
|
13818
(December 20, 2017; 82 Federal Register 60839)
|
Global Magnitsky (human rights, corruption)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13827
(March 19, 2018; 83 Federal Register 12469)
|
Venezuela
|
Prohibits transactions, financing, and other dealings in digital currency, coin, or token issued by or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela
|
Expands on national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), E.O. 13884 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13835
(May 21, 2018; 83 Federal Register 24001)
|
Venezuela
|
Prohibits transactions, financing, and other dealings related to Venezuelan debt, as well as the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral of equity in which the Venezuelan Government holds at least a 50% stake
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), E.O. 13884 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13846
(August 6, 2018; 83 Federal Register 38939)
|
Iran
|
Reimposes sanctions lifted for U.S. meeting its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA)
|
Revokes E.O. 13716 (2016); expands actions based on national emergency declared in E.O. 12957 (1995)
|
13848
(September 12, 2018; 83 Federal Register 46843)
|
Foreign interference in U.S. elections
Declares national emergency; establishes framework to assess possible interference by foreign persons or governments in any U.S. election; blocks property and interests in property of those designated for being complicit in interfering in an election
|
Requires annual renewal; complements actions taken under E.O. 13694 (2015), as amended
|
13849
(September 21, 2018; 83 Federal Register 48195; 22 U.S.C. 9521 note)
Implements Russia-related sanctions adopted in the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §§9501 et seq.)
|
Limits U.S. bank loans, prohibits foreign exchange, blocks property, prohibits Export-Import Bank programs, limits the issuing of specific licenses, requires "no" votes in the international financial institutions where a loan would benefit a person otherwise subject to sanctions, limits access to the U.S. banking system, prohibits procurement contracts with the USG, denies entry into the United States
|
Expands actions based on national emergencies declared in E.O. 13660 (2014) and related EO, and E.O. 13694 (2015), as amended
|
13850
(November 1, 2018; 83 Federal Register 55243)
|
Venezuela
|
Blocks property; suspends U.S. entry
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), E.O. 13884 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13851
(November 27, 2018; 83 Federal Register 61505)
|
Nicaragua
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Nicaragua; prohibits import, export, new investment, facilitation of transaction by a foreign person
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 14088 (2022)
|
13857
(January 25, 2019; 84 Federal Register 509)
|
Venezuela
|
Redefines "the government of Venezuela"
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850, E.O. 13884 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13863
(March 15, 2019; 84 Federal Register 10255)
|
Transnational Criminal Organizations
|
Defines "significant transnational criminal organization"
|
Expands and amends E.O. 13581 (2011)
|
13871
(May 8, 2019; 84 Federal Register 20761)
|
Iran
|
Prohibits transactions related to Iran's iron, steel, aluminum, or copper sectors
|
Expands actions based on national emergency declared in E.O.12957 (1995)
|
13873
(May 15, 2019, 84 Federal Register 22689)
|
Information and communications technology and services supply chain
|
Declares national emergency; prohibits unduly risky transactions involving information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by foreign adversaries
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 14034 (2021) and E.O. 14117 (2024)
|
13876
(June 24, 2019; 84 Federal Register 30573)
|
Iran
|
Prohibits transactions related to U.S.-based assets of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Supreme Leader's Office (SLO), and anyone appointed to a state position in Iran
|
Expands actions based on national emergency declared in E.O. 12957 (1995)
|
13882
(July 26, 2019; 84 Federal Register 37055)
|
Mali (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, human rights abuses, hostage-taking, and attacks against civilians and international security forces in Mali)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13883
(August 1, 2019; 84 Federal Register 38113; 22 U.S.C. 5605 note)
|
Chemical and biological weapons proliferation or use; currently could be used against Syria, North Korea, and Russia, based on determinations made under Sec. 307 of P.L. 102-182 (22 U.S.C. §5605)
|
Requires the U.S. to oppose international financial institutions' programs to the targeted state; prohibits U.S. banks from providing loans or credits to the targeted government
|
Expands actions based on E.O. 12938 (1994); implements sanctions requirements of Sec. 307, P.L. 102-182; and amends Exec. Order 12851 (1993) to include CBW-related determinations
|
13884
(August 5, 2019; 84 Federal Register 38843)
|
Venezuela
|
Blocks property of the government of Venezuela in the United States
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), and E.O. 14245 (2025)
|
13886
(September 9, 2019; 84 Federal Register 48041)
|
Terrorism
|
Consolidates and enhances "sanctions to combat acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism by foreign terrorists"
|
Revokes E.O. 12947 (1995); amends E.O. 13224 (2001)
|
13894
(October 14, 2019; 84 Federal Register 55851)
|
Syria
|
Declares a national emergency; blocks property and suspends U.S. entry
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 14142 (2025) and E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
13902
(January 10, 2020; 85 Federal Register 2003)
|
Iran
|
Blocks property and prohibits transactions related to Iran's construction, mining, manufacturing, or textiles sectors, or any other sector to be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
|
Expands actions based on E.O. 12957 (1995)
|
13920
(May 1, 2020; 85 Federal Register 26595; 50 U.S.C. 1621 note)
|
U.S. Bulk-Power System
|
Declares a national emergency relating to bulk-power system equipment
|
Suspended by E.O. 13990 (2021; 42 U.S.C. 4321 note)
|
13928
(June 11, 2020; 85 Federal Register 36139)
|
International Criminal Court
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property and U.S. entry
|
Revoked by E.O. 14022 (2021), which was in turn revoked by E.O. 14148 (2025)
|
13936
(July 14, 2020; 85 Federal Register 43413; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note)
|
Hong Kong (China's "normalization")
|
Declares national emergency related to China's crackdown, resulting in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) losing its political and economic autonomy
|
Requires annual renewal
|
13942
(August 6, 2020; 85 Federal Register 48637)
|
Information and communications technology and services supply chain; TikTok and ByteDance
|
Prohibits transactions with TikTok and ByteDance
|
Revoked by E.O. 14034 (2021)
|
13943
(August 6, 2020; 85 Federal Register 48641)
|
Information and communications technology and services supply chain; WeChat
|
Prohibits transactions with WeChat
|
Revoked by E.O. 14034 (2021)
|
13949
(September 21, 2020; 85 Federal Register 60043)
|
Iran (regional stability)
|
Targets Iran's conventional arms trade for its destabilizing impact in the region
|
Expands actions based on E.O. 12957 (1995)
|
13953
(September 30, 2020; 85 Federal Register 62539; U.S.C. 1601 note)
|
Threat to domestic supply chain from reliance on critical minerals from foreign adversaries
|
Declares national emergency; requires whole-of-government assessment of U.S. critical materials
|
Requires annual renewal, but has been neither renewed nor revoked since its issuance. Builds on earlier non-emergency actions based primarily on Defense Production Act of 1950 (see also, however, E.O. 14017 (2021), not codified, which requires similar review without revoking the 2020 order.
|
13959
(November 12, 2020; 85 Federal Register 73185)
|
China
|
Declares national emergency; restricts trade, transactions, and investment in securities of "Communist Chinese military companies"
|
Requires annual renewal; amended by E.O. 13974 (2021); the remaining authorities are superseded in large part by E.O. 14032 (2021)
|
13971
(January 5, 2021; 86 Federal Register 1249)
|
Information and communications technology and services supply chain; Chinese connected software applications
|
Prohibits transactions with several China-origin software applications
|
Revoked by E.O. 14034 (2021)
|
13974
(January 13, 2021; 86 Federal Register 4875)
|
China
|
Clarifies definitions related to restrictions on transactions with China military entities initiated in E.O. 13959; establishes wind-down period for divestment
|
Revoked by E.O. 14032 (2021)
|
13984
(January 19, 2021; 86 Federal Register 6837)
|
Malicious cyber-enabled activities
|
Requires the Secretary of Commerce to investigate and identify foreign users of U.S. infrastructure as a service (IaaS), mainly software and storage services
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13694 (2015); see also E.O. 13757 (2016), E.O. 14144 (2025), and E.O. 14306 (2025)
|
Administration of President Joseph R. Biden (2021-2024)
|
14014
(February 10 2021; 86 Federal Register 9429)
|
Burma (antidemocratic or other destabilizing activities)
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property of and transactions
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14022
(April 1, 2021; 86 Federal Register 17895)
|
International Criminal Court
|
Terminated national emergency declared in E.O. 13928 (2020); ends sanctions
|
Revoked by E.O. 14148 (2025)
|
14024
(April 15, 2021; 86 Federal Register 20249)
|
Russia (harmful activities)
|
North Korea (weapons
Blocks transactions
Expands E.O. 13466
(April 18, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation, to meet
(2008), 13551 (2010);
22291)
requirements of UNSC
expanded by E.O. 13687
resolution)
(2015)
13572
Syria (human rights)
Blocks property of human Expands E.O. 13338
(April 29, 2011; 76 FR
rights violators
(2004), 13399 (2006), and
24787)
13460 (2008)
13573
Syria (war)
Blocks property of senior
Expands E.O. 13338
(May 18, 2011; 76 FR
government officials
(2004), 13399 (2006),
29143)
13460 (2008), and 13572 (2011); amended by E.O. 13582 (2011)
13574
Iran (weapons
Implements new sanctions Revoked by E.O. 13716
(May 23, 2011; 76 FR
proliferation)
in Iran Sanctions Act of
(2016)
30505)
1996
13581
Transnational Criminal
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(July 24, 2011; 76 FR
Organizations
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13863
44757)
property
(2019)
13582
Syria (war)
Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 13338
(August 17, 2011; 76 FR
Government of Syria and
(2004), 13399 (2006),
52209)
transactions, new
13460 (2008), 13572
investment, importation
(2011), and E.O. 13573
of petroleum and related
(2011)
products
13590
Iran (weapons
Prohibits transactions
Revoked by E.O. 13716
(November 20, 2011; 76
proliferation)
related to Iran’s energy
(2016)
FR 72609)
and petrochemical sectors
13599
Iran (weapons
Blocks property of
Expands E.O. 12957
(February 5, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation)
government and financial
(1995)
6659)
institutions
13606
Iran and Syria (human
Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 12957
(April 22, 2012; 77 FR
rights)
denies visas
(1995) and 13338 (2004)
24571)
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13608
Iran and Syria (sanctions
Blocks transactions and
Expands E.O. 12938
(May 1, 2012; 77 FR
evasion)
denies visas
(1994), 12957 (1995),
26409)
13224 (2001), and 13338 (2004)
13611
Yemen (stability)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(May 16, 2012; 77 FR
emergency; blocks
29533)
property
13617
Russia (misuse of highly
Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13695
(June 25, 2012; 77 FR
enriched uranium
(2015)
38459)
extractions
13619
Burma (military
Blocks property
Revoked by E.O. 13742
(July 11, 2012; 77 FR
government)
(2016)
41243)
13620
Somalia (conflict)
Expands targets to include Amends E.O. 13536
July 20, 2012; 77 FR
misappropriations,
(2010)
43483)
corruption, impeding humanitarian aid
13622
Iran (weapons
Additional sanctions
Revoked by E.O. 13716
(July 30, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation)
(2016)
45897)
13628
Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Threat
Revoked by E.O. 13846
(October 9, 2012; 77 FR
proliferation, human
Reduction Act
(2018); previously
62139)
rights, sanctions evasion)
amended by E.O. 13716 (2016)
13637
EAA
Delegates export
Amends E.O. 13222
(March 8, 2013; 78 FR
authorities, coordinates
(2001)
16131)
responsibilities; amends E.O. 13222
13645
Iran (weapons
Implements Iran Freedom
Revoked by E.O. 13716
(June 3, 2013; 78 FR
proliferation, human
and Counter-Proliferation
(2016)
33945)
rights)
Act of 2012
13651
Burma
Prohibits import of jadeite Revoked by E.O. 13742
(August 6, 2013; 78 FR
and rubies
(2016)
48793)
13660
Ukraine (stability)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 6, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks
expanded on by E.O.
13493)
property
13661 (2014); E.O. 13662 (2014); with additional actions in E.O. 13685 (2014); E.O. 13849 (2018); and E.O. 14065 (2022)
13661
Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660
(March 16, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine)
(2014)
15535)
13662
Russia (destabilization of
Blocks property
Expands E.O. 13660
(March 20, 2014; 79 FR
Ukraine)
(2014)
16169)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13664
South Sudan (conflict)
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(April 3, 2014; 79 FR
emergency; blocks
19283)
property
13667
Central African Republic
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(May 12, 2014; 79 FR
(conflict)
emergency; blocks
28387)
property
13668
Iraq (postwar)
Ends immunities granted
Expands E.O. 13303
(May 27, 2014; 79 FR
to the Development Fund
(2003)
31019)
for Iraq
13671
Democratic Republic of
Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13413
(July 8, 2014; 79 FR
the Congo (regional
(2006)
39949)
stability)
13685
Ukraine (destabilizing
Blocks property and
Expands E.O. 13660
(December 19, 2014; 79
activities in Crimea)
transactions
(2014)
FR 77357)
13687
North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13466
(January 2, 2015; 80 FR
proliferation, to meet
including on DPRK
(2008), 13551 (2010),
819)
requirements of UNSC
government officials and
13570 (2011)
resolution)
members of the Workers’ Party of Korea
13692
Venezuela (corruption,
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(March 8, 2015; 80 FR
stability)
emergency; blocks
expanded on in E.O.
12747)
property and deny visas
13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), and E.O. 13884 (2019)
13694
Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(April 1, 2015; 80 FR
Activities
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 13757
18077)
property
(2016), E.O. 13984 (2021)
13695
Russia’s misuse of highly
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13617
(May 26, 2015; 80 FR
enriched uranium
(2012)
30331)
extractions
13710
Liberia (corrupt
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13348
(November 12, 2015; 80
government)
(2004)
FR 71679)
13712
Burundi (stability)
Declares national
Terminated by E.O.
(November 22, 2015; 80
emergency; blocks
14054 (2021)
FR 73633)
property
13716
Iran (nuclear weapons)
Implements U.S.
Revoked by E.O. 13846
(January 16, 2016; 81 FR
obligations under the Joint (2018). Had revoked and
3693; 22 U.S.C. 8801
Comprehensive Plan of
modified earlier orders
note)
Action
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13722
North Korea (weapons
Blocks property of North
Expands E.O. 13466
(March 15, 2016; 81 FR
proliferation, to meet
Korea government and
(2008)
14943)
requirements of UNSC
central party; prohibits
resolution)
transactions
13726
Libya (stability)
Additional sanctions
Expands E.O. 13566
(April 19, 2016; 81 FR
(2011)
23559)
13739
Cote d’Ivoire (conflict)
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13396
(Sept, 14, 2016; 81 FR
(2006)
63673)
13742
Burma
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13047
(October 7, 2016; 81 FR
(1997), 13310 (2003),
70593)
13448 (2007), 13464 (2008), 13619 (2012), 13651 (2013)
13757
Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Additional sanctions
Modifies E.O. 13694
(December 28, 2016)
Activities
(2015)
13761
Sudan (war, human rights) Recognizes “positive
Revokes in part E.O.
(January 13, 2017; 82 FR
actions” by the
13067 (1997), in whole
5331)
Government of Sudan by
E.O. 13412 (2006);
removing some sanctions
amended by E.O. 13804 (2017)
Administration of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021)
13804
Sudan (war, human rights) Extends deadlines in E.O.
Modifies E.O. 13761
(July 11, 2017; 82 FR
13761 (2017)
(2017)
32611)
13808
Venezuela (human rights,
Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on
(August 24, 2017; 82 FR
democracy, corruption)
national emergency
41155)
declared in E.O. 13692 (2015)
13810
North Korea (weapons
Additional sanctions
Expands actions based on
(Sept, 20, 2017; 82 FR
proliferation, human
national emergency
44705)
rights)
declared in E.O. 13466 (2008)
13818
Global Magnitsky (human
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(December 20, 2017; 82
rights, corruption)
emergency; blocks
FR 60839)
property
13827
Venezuela (sanctions
Prohibits transactions,
Expands actions based on
(March 19, 2018; 83 FR
evasion)
financing, trade in digital
national emergency
12469)
currency issued by or on
declared in E.O. 13692
behalf of the Government
(2015); amended by E.O.
of Venezuela
13857 (2019)
13835
Venezuela (economic
Prohibits U.S. persons
Expands actions based on
(May 21, 2018; 83 FR
mismanagement, public
from purchasing debt
national emergency
24001)
corruption, undermining
owed the Government of
declared in E.O. 13692
democratic order,
Venezuela or trading in
(2015); amended by E.O.
humanitarian and public
equity in which the
13857 (2019)
health crisis)
Government holds at least a 50% stake
Congressional Research Service
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13846
Iran
Reimposes sanctions lifted Revokes E.O. 13716
(August 6, 2018; 83 FR
for U.S. meeting its
(2016); expands actions
38939)
obligations under the Joint based on national Comprehensive Plan of
emergency declared in
Action of July 14, 2015
E.O. 12957 (1995)
(JCPOA)
13848
Foreign interference in
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(September 12, 2018; 83
U.S. elections
emergency; establishes
complements actions
FR 46843)
framework to assess
taken under E.O. 13694
possible interference by
(2015), as amended
foreign persons or governments in any U.S. election; blocks property and interests in property of those designated for being complicit in interfering in an election
13849
Implements Russia-related Limits U.S. bank loans,
Expands actions based on
(September 21, 2018; 83
sanctions adopted in the
prohibits foreign
national emergencies
FR 48195; 22 U.S.C. 9521
Countering Russian
exchange, blocks
declared in E.O. 13660
note)
Influence in Europe and
property, prohibits
(2014) and related EO,
Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title
Export-Import Bank
and E.O. 13694 (2015), as
II, P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C.
programs, limits the
amended
9501 et seq.)
issuing of specific licenses, requires “no” votes in the international financial institutions where a loan would benefit a person otherwise subject to sanctions, limits access to the U.S. banking system, prohibits procurement contracts with the USG, denies entry into the United States
13851
Nicaragua
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 27, 2018; 83
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 14088
FR 61505)
property of certain
(2022)
persons contributing to the situation in Nicaragua; prohibits import, export, new investment, facilitation of transaction by a foreign person
13857
Venezuela
Taking additional steps to
Expands actions based on
(January 25, 2019; 84 FR
address the national
national emergency
509)
emergency with respect
declared in E.O. 13692
to Venezuela; redefines
(2015); modifies E.O.s
“the government of
13692, 13808, 13827,
Venezuela”
13850
13863
Transnational Criminal
Defines “significant
Expands and amends E.O.
(March 15, 2019; 84 F.R.
Organizations
transnational criminal
13581 (2011)
10255)
organization”
Congressional Research Service
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The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use
Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13871
Iran
Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on
(May 8, 2019; 84 FR
related to Iran’s iron,
national emergency
20761)
steel, aluminum, or
declared in E.O.12957
copper sectors
(1995)
13873
Information and
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(May 15, 2019, 84 FR
communications
emergency; prohibits
see also E.O. 14034
22689)
technology and services
unduly risky transactions
(2021)
supply chain
involving information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by foreign adversaries
13876
Iran
Prohibits transactions
Expands actions based on
(June 24, 2019; 84 FR
related to U.S.-based
national emergency
30573)
assets of the Supreme
declared in E.O. 12957
Leader of the Islamic
(1995)
Republic of Iran, Supreme Leader’s Office (SLO), and anyone appointed to a state position in Iran
13882
Mali (terrorism, narcotics
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(July 26, 2019; 84 FR
trafficking, trafficking in
emergency; blocks
37055)
persons, human rights
property
abuses, hostage-taking, and attacks against civilians and international security forces in Mali)
13883
Chemical and biological
Requires the U.S. to
Expands actions based on
(August 1, 2019; 84 FR
weapons proliferation or
oppose international
E.O. 12938 (1994);
38113; 22 U.S.C. 5605
use; currently could be
financial institutions’
implements sanctions
note)
used against Syria, North
programs to the targeted
requirements of Sec. 307,
Korea, and Russia, based
state; prohibits U.S. banks
P.L. 102-182; and amends
on determinations made
from providing loans or
Exec. Order 12851 (1993)
under Sec. 307 of P.L.
credits to the targeted
to include CBW-related
102-182 (22 U.S.C. 5605) government
determinations
13884
Venezuela
Blocks property of the
Expands actions based on
(August 5, 2019; 84 FR
government of Venezuela
E.O. 13692 (2015)
38843)
in the United States
13886
Terrorism
Consolidates and
Revokes E.O. 12947
(September 9, 2019; 84
enhances “sanctions to
(1995); amends E.O.
FR 48041)
combat acts of terrorism
13224 (2001)
and threats of terrorism by foreign terrorists”
Congressional Research Service
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13894
Turkey’s incursion into
Declares a national
Requires annual renewal
(October 14, 2019; 84 FR
Syria
emergency relating to
55851)
Turkey’s military invasion of northeast Syria; blocks property and suspends entry into the United States of “certain persons contributing to the situation in Syria”
13902
Iran
Blocks property and
Expands actions based on
(January 10, 2020; 85 FR
prohibits transactions
E.O. 12957 (1995)
2003)
related to Iran’s construction, mining, manufacturing, or textiles sectors, or any other sector to be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
13920
U.S. Bulk-Power System
Declares a national
Suspended by E.O. 13990
(May 1, 2020; 85 FR
emergency relating to
(2021; 42 U.S.C. 4321
26595; 50 U.S.C. 1621
bulk-power system
note)
note)
equipment
13928
International Criminal
Declares national
Revoked by E.O. 14022
(June 11, 2020; 85 FR
Court (ICC)
emergency related to the
(2021)
36139)
ICC’s intention to “investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any United States personnel without the consent of the United States”; blocks property and entry into the United States of any person found to be engaged in or facilitating ICC investigations
13936
Hong Kong (China’s
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(July 14, 2020; 85 FR
“normalization”)
emergency related to
43413; 22 U.S.C. 5701
China’s crackdown,
note)
resulting in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) losing its political and economic autonomy
13942
Information &
Expands emergency
Revoked by E.O. 14034
(August 6, 2020; 85 FR
Communications
stated in EO 13873
(2021)
48637)
Technology; Services
(2019) to restrict
Supply Chain
transactions with TikTok and ByteDance—Chinese tech entities
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
13943
Information &
Expands emergency
Revoked by E.O. 14034
(August 6, 2020; 85 FR
Communications
stated in E.O. 13873
(2021)
48641)
Technology; Services
(2019) to restrict
Supply Chain
transactions with WeChat—Chinese tech entity
13949
Iran (regional stability)
Targets Iran’s
Expands actions based on
(September 21, 2020; 85
conventional arms trade
E.O. 12957 (1995)
FR 60043)
for its destabilizing impact in the region
13953
Threat to domestic supply Declares national
Requires annual renewal,
(September 30, 2020; 85
chain from reliance on
emergency; requires
but has been neither
FR 62539; U.S.C. 1601
critical minerals from
whole-of-government
renewed nor revoked
note)
foreign adversaries
assessment of U.S. critical
since its issuance. Builds
materials
on earlier non-emergency actions based primarily on Defense Production Act of 1950 (see also, however, E.O. 14017 (2021), not codified, which requires similar review without revoking the 2020 order.
13959
China
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(November 12, 2020; 85
emergency; restricts
amended by E.O. 13974
FR 73185)
trade, transactions, and
(2021); the remaining
investment in securities of authorities are “Communist Chinese
superseded in large part
military companies”
by E.O. 14032 (2021)
13971
China
Expands national
Revoked by E.O. 14034
(January 5, 2021; 86 FR
emergency declared in
(2021)
1249)
E.O. 13873 (2019) to prohibit transactions with several China-origin software applications
13974
China
Clarifies definitions
Revoked by E.O. 14032
(January 13, 2021; 86 FR
related to restrictions on
(2021)
4875)
transactions with China military entities initiated in E.O. 13959; establishes wind-down period for divestment
13984
Cyber-enabled activities
Builds on emergency
Expands on and amends
(January 19, 2021; 86 FR
declared in E.O. 13694
authorities stated in E.O.
6837)
(2015) to require
13694 (2015)
Secretary of Commerce to investigate and identify foreign users of U.S. infrastructure as a services (IaaS), mainly software and storage services
Administration of President Joseph R. Biden (2021-)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
14014
Burma (antidemocratic or
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(February 10 2021; 86 FR
other destabilizing
emergency; blocks
9429)
activities)
property of and transactions
14022
International Criminal
Revokes national
Revokes E.O. 13928
(April 1, 2021; 86 FR
Court
emergency; ends travel
(2020)
17895)
and asset restrictions leveled against ICC staff
14024
Russia (election
Declares national
Requires annual renewal;
(April 15, 2021; 86 FR
interference, malicious
emergency; blocks
amended by E.O. 14114
20249)
cyber attacks, corruption;
property
(2023)
or extraterritorial pursuit
of Russia’s adversaries)
14032
China
Prohibits U.S. persons
Amends national
(June 3, 2021; 86 FR
from trading or investing
emergency authority
30145)
in securities of those
declared in E.O. 13959
operating in or on behalf
(2020)
of China’s defense and related materiel sector or the surveillance technology sector
14033
Western Balkans (regional Expands national
Amends national
(June 8, 2021; 86 FR
destabilization,
emergency declared in
emergency authority
31079)
antidemocratic activities,
E.O. 13219 (2001); blocks
declared in E.O. 13219
human rights violations,
property
(2001)
corruption)
14034
Sensitive data—
Initiates new whole-of-
Expands on national
(June 9, 2021; 86 FR
protection from foreign
government review of
emergency declared in
31423)
adversaries
U.S. sensitive dates and
E.O. 13873 (2020)
foreign adversaries who interfere with sensitive data and related technology
14038
Belarus (activities related
Blocks property of any
Expands on national
(August 9, 2021; 86 FR
to threatening the peace,
leader or official
emergency declared in
43905)
human rights violations,
E.O. 13405 (2006)
corruption, election fraud, sanctions evasion)
14039
Russia (gas pipelines)
Targets any foreign
Expands on national
(August 20, 2021; 86 FR
person identified under
emergency declared in
47205)
Sec. 7503(a)(1)(B) of P.L.
E.O. 14024 (2021)
116-92) for financial activities related to Russian gas pipeline to serve western Europe (Nord Stream 2)
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
14046
Ethiopia (threats to
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(September 17, 2021; 86
stability, corruption,
emergency; authorizes
FR 52389)
disruption of delivery of
blocking of property,
humanitarian services,
investments, use of U.S.
violence against civilians)
financial instruments, transactions in foreign exchange
14054
Burundi (civil strife,
Terminates emergency
Revokes E.O. 13712
(November 18, 2021; 86
human rights, stability)
(2015)
FR 66149)
14059
Global il icit drug trade
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(December 15, 2021; 86
emergency; authorizes
FR 71549)
blocking of property, prohibits use of most U.S.
financial instruments, denies entry into the United States to any foreign person engaged in il icit drug production and trade
14064
Afghanistan
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(February 11, 2022; 87 FR
emergency; blocks Taliban
8391)
(as government of Afghanistan) access to
U.S.-based assets of Afghanistan’s central bank
14065
Ukraine/Russia
Blocks investment in and
Expands national
(February 21, 2022; 87 FR
trade with Donetsk and
emergency in E.O. 13660
10293)
Luhansk regions of
(2014)
Ukraine
(2022)
14066
Ukraine/Russia
Prohibits some imports
Expands national
(March 8, 2022; 87 FR
from and energy-sector
emergency in E.O. 14024
13625)
investments in Russia
(2021)
14068
Ukraine/Russia
Prohibits additional
Expands national
(March 11, 2022; 87 FR
imports, exports of luxury emergency in E.O. 14024
14381)
goods, and investment in
(2021); amended by E.O.
Russia; amendments add
14114 (2023)
restrictions on trade in seafood, diamonds, alcohol
14071
Russia
Prohibits a U.S. person
Expands national
(April 6, 2022; 87 F.R.
from engaging in new
emergency in E.O. 14024
20999)
investment, export,
(2021)
reexport, sales and services, or facilitation of a foreign person’s transaction
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Country or Issue of
Executive Order
Concern
Sanction/Remedy
Current Status
14088
Nicaragua
Prohibits import, export,
Amends national
(October 24, 2022; 87
new investment, and
emergency in E.O. 13851
F.R. 64685)
facilitation of a foreign
(2018)
person’s transactions
14097
Global il icit drug trade
Authorizes the Secretary
Expands authorities to
(April 27, 2023; 88 F.R.
of Defense and Secretary
address national
26471; 10 U.S.C. 12302
of Homeland Security to
emergency in E.O. 14059
note)
order to active duty
(2021)
members of the Ready Reserve to address international drug trafficking
14098
Sudan (threats to the
Authorizes blocking of
Expands national
(May 4, 2023; 88 F.R.
peace, security, or
property of any foreign
emergency in E.O. 13067
29529)
stability of Sudan,
person
(1997)
including obstructing democratic processes, censorship, corruption, human rights abuses, targeting women, children, U.N. activities
14105
Sensitive technologies
Declares national
Requires annual renewal
(August 9, 2023; 88 F.R.
emergency; requires
54867)
identifying “countries of concern” and related “notifiable transactions” associated with “covered national security technologies and products”
14114
Russia (harmful activities)
Targets foreign financial
Expands and amends
(December 22, 2023; 88
institutions operating in
national emergency in
F.R. 89271)
Russia’s economy
E.O. 14024 (2021)
Sources: CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Federal Register, various dates. Note: Unless otherwise noted in left-hand column, the declarations of national emergency are codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. §1701. Some Executive Orders are codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. §4603, a provision in the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) that was repealed by the Export Control Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-232). Those authorities continue in force to the extent they might apply to the remaining three provision of the 1979 Act, related to weapons proliferation, or remaining designations or other executive actions taken under foreign policy or national security provisions in the 1979 Act.
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Author Information
Christopher A. Casey, Coordinator
Jennifer K. Elsea
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Legislative Attorney
Dianne E. Rennack
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, who developed the graphics for this report, and our dear friend Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, who was an original contributor to this report.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R45618 · VERSION 12 · UPDATED
87 Declares national emergency; blocks property
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 14039 (2021), E.O. 14066 (2022), E.O. 14068 (2022), E.O. 14071 (2022), E.O. 14114 (2023), and E.O. 14329 (2025)
|
14032
(June 3, 2021; 86 Federal Register 30145)
|
China
|
Prohibits U.S. persons from trading or investing in securities of those operating in or on behalf of China's defense and related materiel sector or the surveillance technology sector
|
Amends national emergency authority declared in E.O. 13959 (2020)
|
14033
(June 8, 2021; 86 Federal Register 31079)
|
Western Balkans
|
Blocks property; suspends U.S. entry
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13219 (2001); see also E.O. 13304 (2003) and E.O. 14140 (2025)
|
14034
(June 9, 2021; 86 Federal Register 31423)
|
Sensitive data—protection from foreign adversaries
|
Revokes several orders; initiates whole-of-government review of U.S. sensitive data and foreign adversaries
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13873 (2019); revokes E.O. 13942 (2020), E.O. 13943 (2020), and E.O. 13971 (2021); see also E.O. 14117 (2024)
|
14038
(August 9, 2021; 86 Federal Register 43905)
|
Belarus (activities related to threatening the peace, human rights violations, corruption, election fraud, sanctions evasion)
|
Blocks property of any leader or official
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13405 (2006)
|
14039
(August 20, 2021; 86 Federal Register 47205)
|
Russia (harmful activities)
|
Targets any foreign person identified under Sec. 7503(a)(1)(B) of P.L. 116-92) for financial activities related to Russian gas pipeline to serve western Europe (Nord Stream 2)
|
Expands actions based on national emergency declared in E.O. 14024 (2021); see also E.O. 14066 (2022), E.O. 14068 (2022), E.O. 14071 (2022), E.O. 14114 (2023), and E.O. 14329 (2025)
|
14046
(September 17, 2021; 86 Federal Register 52389)
|
Ethiopia (threats to stability, corruption, disruption of delivery of humanitarian services, violence against civilians)
|
Declares national emergency; authorizes blocking of property, investments, use of U.S. financial instruments, transactions in foreign exchange
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14054
(November 18, 2021; 86 Federal Register 66149)
|
Burundi (civil strife, human rights, stability)
|
Terminates emergency
|
Revokes E.O. 13712 (2015)
|
14059
(December 15, 2021; 86 Federal Register 71549)
Global illicit drug trade
|
Declares national emergency; authorizes blocking of property, prohibits use of most U.S. financial instruments, denies entry into the United States to any foreign person engaged in illicit drug production and trade
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14064
(February 11, 2022; 87 Federal Register 8391)
Afghanistan
|
Declares national emergency; blocks Taliban (as government of Afghanistan) access to U.S.-based assets of Afghanistan's central bank
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14065
(February 21, 2022; 87 Federal Register 10293)
(2022)
|
Ukraine/Russia
|
Blocks investment in and trade with Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine
|
Expands national emergency in E.O. 13660 (2014)
|
14066
(March 8, 2022; 87 Federal Register 13625)
Russia (harmful activities)
|
Prohibits some imports from and energy-sector investments in Russia
|
Expands actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14024 (2021); see also E.O. 14039 (2021), E.O. 14068 (2022), E.O. 14071 (2022), E.O. 14114 (2023), and E.O. 14329 (2025)
|
14068
(March 11, 2022; 87 Federal Register 14381)
Russia (harmful activities)
|
Prohibits additional imports, exports of luxury goods, and investment in Russia; amendments add restrictions on trade in seafood, diamonds, alcohol
|
Expands actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14024 (2021); see also E.O. 14029 (2021), E.O. 14066 (2022), E.O. 14071 (2022), E.O. 14114(2023), and E.O. 14329 (2025)
|
14071
(April 6, 2022; 87 Federal Register 20999)
|
Russia (harmful activities)
|
Prohibits a U.S. person from engaging in new investment, export, reexport, sales and services, or facilitation of a foreign person's transaction
|
Expands actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14024 (2021); see also E.O. 14039 (2021), E.O. 14066 (2022), E.O. 14068 (2022), E.O. 14114 (2023), and E.O. 14329 (2025)
|
14088
(October 24, 2022; 87 Federal Register 64685)
|
Nicaragua
|
Prohibits import, export, new investment, and facilitation of a foreign person's transactions
|
Amends national emergency in E.O. 13851 (2018)
|
14097
(April 27, 2023; 88 Federal Register 26471; 10 U.S.C. 12302 note)
|
Global illicit drug trade
|
Authorizes the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security to order to active duty members of the Ready Reserve to address international drug trafficking
|
Expands authorities to address national emergency in E.O. 14059 (2021)
|
14098
(May 4, 2023; 88 Federal Register 29529)
|
Sudan (threats to the peace, security, or stability of Sudan, including obstructing democratic processes, censorship, corruption, human rights abuses, targeting women, children, U.N. activities)
|
Authorizes blocking of property of any foreign person
|
Expands national emergency in E.O. 13067 (1997)
|
14105
(August 9, 2023; 88 Federal Register 54867)
|
Sensitive technologies
|
Declares national emergency; requires identifying "countries of concern" and related "notifiable transactions" associated with "covered national security technologies and products"
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14110
(October 30, 2023; 88 Federal Register 75191)
|
Artificial intelligence development and use
|
Expanded national emergency declared in E.O. 13694 (2015); directed the Secretary of Commerce to propose regulations related to the use of U.S IaaS products by foreign malicious cyber actors; authorized the Secretary of Commerce to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA
|
Revoked by E.O. 14148 (2025)
|
14114
(December 22, 2023; 88 Federal Register 89271)
|
Russia (harmful activities)
|
Targets foreign financial institutions operating in Russia's economy
|
Expands actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14024 (2021); see also E.O. 14039 (2021), E.O. 14066 (2022), E.O. 14068 (2022), E.O. 14071 (2022), E.O. 14114 (2023), and E.O. 14329 (2025)
|
14115
(February 1, 2024; 89 Federal Register 7605)
|
West Bank
|
Declared national emergency; blocked property; suspended U.S. entry
|
Revoked by E.O. 14148 (2025)
|
14117
(February 28, 2024; 89 Federal Register 15421)
|
Sensitive data—preventing access by countries of concern
|
Authorizes the Attorney General to prohibit or restrict transactions that would enable countries of concern from accessing bulk sensitive personal data or U.S. government-related data
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13873 (2019); see also E.O. 14034 (2021)
|
14118
(March 4, 2024; 89 Federal Register 15945)
|
Zimbabwe
|
Terminates national emergency and ends sanctions
|
Terminates national emergency declared in and revokes E.O. 13288 (2003); revokes E.O. 13391 (2005) and E.O. 13469 (2008)
|
14140
(January 8, 2025; 90 Federal Register 2589)
|
Western Balkans
|
Blocks property
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13219 (2001); amends E.O. 14033 (2021); see also E.O. 13304 (2003)
|
14142
(January 15, 2025; 90 Federal Register 6709)
|
Syria
|
Blocks property; suspends U.S. entry
|
Expands national emergency declared in and amends E.O. 13894 (2019); see also E.O. 14312 (2025)
|
14144
(January 16, 2025; 90 Federal Register 6755)
|
Malicious cyber-enabled activities—cybersecurity
|
Blocks property
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13694 (2015); see also E.O. 13757 (2016), E.O. 13984 (2021), and E.O. 14306 (2025)
|
Administration of President Donald J. Trump (2025-2029)
|
14148
(January 20, 2025; 90 Federal Register 8237)
Prior executive orders—rescissions
|
Revokes prior termination of sanctions related to the International Criminal Court, revokes order related to the development and use of artificial intelligence, and revokes order imposing sanctions related to the West Bank
|
Revokes E.O. 14022 (2021), E.O. 14110 (2023), and E.O. 14115 (2024)
|
14157
(January 20, 2025; 90 Federal Register 8439)
|
Cartels and other transnational organizations
|
Declares national emergency; directs the Secretary of State to make a recommendation regarding the designation of any cartel of transnational organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and/or a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 13224, as amended
|
14193
(February 1, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9113)
|
Drug trafficking and northern border
|
Declares national emergency; imposes tariffs on Canada
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 14197 (2025), E.O. 14226 (2025), E.O. 14231 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14325 (2025)
|
14194
(February 1, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9117)
|
Drug trafficking and southern border
|
Declares national emergency; imposes tariffs on Mexico
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 14198 (2025), E.O. 14227 (2025), E.O. 14232 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), and E.O. 14324 (2025)
|
14195
(February 1, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9121)
|
Synthetic opioids and China
|
Declares national emergency; imposes tariffs on China
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 14200 (2025), E.O. 14228 (2025), E.O. 14256 (2025), E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (2025), E.O. 14298 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14197
(February 3, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9183)
|
Drug trafficking and northern border
|
Pauses the imposition of tariffs on Canada
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14193 (2025); see also E.O. 14226 (2025), E.O. 14231 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14325 (2025)
|
14198
(February 3, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9185)
|
Drug trafficking and southern border
|
Temporarily pauses planned tariffs on Mexico
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. E.O. 14194 (2025); see also E.O. 14227 (2025), E.O. 14232 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), and E.O. 14324 (2025)
|
14200
(February 5, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9277)
|
Synthetic opioids and China
|
Authorizes duty-free de minimis treatment for certain products from China
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14195 (2025); see also E.O. 14228 (2025), E.O. 14256 (2025), E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (2025), E.O. 14298 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025, and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14203
(February 6, 2025; 90 Federal Register 9369)
|
International Criminal Court
|
Declares national emergency; blocks property
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14226
(March 2, 2025; 90 Federal Register 11369)
|
Drug trafficking and northern border
|
Authorizes duty-free de minimis treatment for certain products from Canada
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14193 (2025); see also E.O. 14197 (2025); E.O. 14321 (2025); E.O. 14289 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14325 (2025)
|
14227
(March 2, 2025; 90 Federal Register 11371)
|
Drug trafficking and southern border
|
Authorizes duty-free de minimis treatment for certain products from Mexico
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. E.O. 14194 (2025); see also E.O. 14198 (2025), E.O. 14232 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), and E.O. 14324 (2025)
|
14228
(March 3, 2025; 90 Federal Register 11463)
|
Synthetic opioids and China
|
Increases the rate of tariffs on China
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14195 (2025); see also E.O. 14200 (2025), E.O. 14256 (2025), E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (20250, E.O. 14298 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14231
(March 6, 2025; 90 Federal Register 11785)
|
Drug trafficking and northern border
|
Modifies tariffs on Canada
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14193 (2025); see also E.O. 14197 (2025), E.O. 14226 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14325 (2025)
|
14232
(March 6, 2025; 90 Federal Register 11787)
|
Drug trafficking and southern border
|
Modifies tariffs on Mexico
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14194 (2025); see also E.O. 14198 (2025), E.O. 14227 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), and E.O. 14324 (2025)
|
14245
(March 24, 2025; 90 Federal Register 13829
|
Venezuela
|
Authorizes the imposition of tariffs on goods imported into the United States from any country that imports Venezuelan oil
|
Expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13692 (2015); see also E.O. 13808 (2017), E.O. 13827 (2018), E.O. 13835 (2018), E.O. 13850 (2018), E.O. 13857 (2019), and E.O. 13884 (2019)
|
14256
(April 2, 2025; 90 Federal Register 14899)
|
Synthetic opioids and China
|
Imposes tariffs on China, including with respect to goods otherwise eligible for de minimis treatment
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14195 (2025); see also E.O. 14200 (2025), E.O. 14228 (2025), E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (2025), E.O. 14298 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14257
(April 2, 2025; 90 Federal Register 15041)
|
U.S. trade deficit—reciprocal tariffs
|
Declares national emergency; imposes tariffs at various rates specified in the order
|
Requires annual renewal; see also E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (2025), E.O. 14298 (2025), E.O. 14309 (2025), E.O. 14316 (2025), E.O. 14324 (2025); E.O. 14326 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14259
(April 8, 2025; 90 Federal Register 15509)
|
U.S. trade deficit—amendments with respect to China
|
Modifies tariffs with respect to China
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025); modifies provisions in E.O. 14256 (2025); see also E.O. 14266 (2025), E.O. 14298 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14266
(April 9, 2025; 90 Federal Register 15625)
|
U.S. trade deficit—modifications to reflect trading partner retaliation and alignment
|
Modifies tariffs with respect to China and other trading partners
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025); modifies provisions in E.O. 14256 (2025); see also E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14298 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14289
(April 29, 2025; 90 Federal Register 18907)
|
Tariffs on imported articles—addressing applicability
|
Clarifies applicability of certain tariffs
|
Clarifies actions based on national emergencies in E.O. 14193 (2025) and E.O. 14194 (2025); see also E.O. 14197 (2025), E.O. 14198 (2025), E.O. 14226 (2025), E.O. 14227 (2025), E.O. 14231 (2025), E.O. 14232 (2025), E.O. 14257 (2025), and E.O. 14324 (2025)
|
14298
(May 12, 2025; 90 Federal Register 21831)
|
U.S. trade deficit—modifications with respect to China
|
Modifies tariffs with respect to China
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025); modifies provisions in E.O. 14256 (2025); see also E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (2025), and E.O. 14334 (2025)
|
14306
(June 6, 2025; 90 Federal Register 24723)
|
Malicious cyber-enabled activities—cybersecurity
|
Directs officials to take additional actions to strengthen U.S. cybersecurity; limits the scope of certain sanctionable targets to foreign persons in E.O. 13694 (2015)
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 13694 (2015); see also E.O. 13757 (2016), E.O. 13984 (2021), and E.O. 14144 (2025)
|
14309
(June 16, 2025; 90 Federal Register 26419)
|
U.S. trade deficit—U.S.-U.K. Economic Prosperity Deal
|
Modifies tariffs with respect to the United Kingdom on automobiles, auto parts, aerospace, and aluminum and steel articles and their derivatives
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025) and certain proclamations
|
14312
(June 30, 2025; 90 Federal Register 92395)
|
Syria
|
Ends certain sanctions; blocks property
|
Terminates national emergency declared in and revokes E.O. 13338 (2004); also revokes E.O. 13399 (2006), E.O. 13460 (2008), E.O. 13572 (2011), E.O. 13573 (2011), and E.O. 13582 (2011); expands national emergency declared in E.O. 13894 (2019); see also E.O. 14142 (2025)
|
14316 (July 7, 2025; 90 Federal Register 30823)
|
U.S. trade deficit—modifications to reciprocal tariffs
|
Continues modified tariffs with respect to certain trading partners—extends expiration of modified duties in E.O. 14266 (2025) until August 1, 2025
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025); see also E.O. 14266 (2025)
|
14323 (July 30, 2025; 90 Federal Register 37739)
|
Brazil
|
Declares national emergency; imposes certain tariffs on certain products from Brazil
|
Requires annual renewal
|
14324 (July 30, 2025; 90 Federal Register 37775)
|
Duty-free de minimis treatment—Drug trafficking and northern border; Drug trafficking and southern border; Synthetic opioids and China; U.S. trade deficit
|
Suspends duty-free de minimis treatment
|
Modifies actions based on national emergencies in E.O. 14193 (2025), E.O. 14194 (2025), E.O. 14195 (2025), and E.O. 14257 (2025)
|
14325 (July 31, 2025; 90 Federal Register 37957)
|
Drug trafficking and northern border—modifications with respect to Canada
|
Modifies tariffs with respect to Canada
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14193 (2025); see also E.O. 14197 (2025), E.O. 14226 (2025), E.O. 14231 (2025), E.O. 14289 (2025), and E.O. 14324 (2025)
|
14326 (July 31, 2025; 90 Federal Register 37963)
|
U.S. trade deficit—modifications to reciprocal tariffs
|
Modifies tariffs with respect to the European Union and other trading partners
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025)
|
14329 (August 6, 2025; 90 Federal Register 38701)
|
Russia (harmful activities)
|
Imposes certain tariffs on India
|
Expands actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14024 (2021); see also E.O. 14039 (2021), E.O. 14066 (2022), E.O. 14068 (2022), E.O. 14071 (2022), and E.O. 14114 (2023)
|
14334 (August 11, 2025; 90 Federal Register 39305)
|
U.S. trade deficit—modifications to reciprocal tariffs with respect to China
|
Continues modified tariffs with respect to China—extends expiration of modified duties in E.O. 14298 (2025) until November 10, 2025
|
Modifies actions based on national emergency in E.O. 14257 (2025); see also E.O. 14259 (2025), E.O. 14266 (2025), and E.O. 14298 (2025)
|
Sources: CRS, based on National Archives: Executive Orders Disposition Tables; The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara; and Federal Register, various dates.
Notes: Unless otherwise noted in left-hand column, the declarations of national emergency are codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. §1701.
Some Executive Orders are codified as notes to 50 U.S.C. §4603, a provision in the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) that was repealed by the Export Control Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-232). Those authorities continue in force to the extent they might apply to the remaining three provision of the 1979 Act, related to weapons proliferation, or remaining designations or other executive actions taken under foreign policy or national security provisions in the 1979 Act.
Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, developed the graphics for this report. Ian Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, and Dianne Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy, were contributors to the original version of this report.
Footnotes
1.
|
Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
|
2.
|
See, for example, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764), pp. 340-341: "This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […]."
|
3.
|
Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism," Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-1398; John Fabian Witt, "A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism," Law and History Review 36, no. 3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, "Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861," The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210; Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the country "does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that risk." Thomas Jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford, Federal Edition (New York: Putnam, 1905), p. 11:146, qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214.
|
4.
|
U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), pp. 40-41.
|
5.
|
For scholarship on this general trend, see, for example, William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, "The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s," Yale Law Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism"; Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Total War and the Constitution; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship.
|
6.
|
Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, for example, Carl Schmitt, "The Plight of European Jurisprudence," tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-341: "[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe."
|
7.
|
For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, for example, Sanford Levinson, "Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency," Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that states of emergency can be a standard feature of modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele, "Small Emergencies," Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3.
|
8.
|
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (2018) (IEEPA).
|
9.
|
National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea (2020).
|
10.
|
See, for example, Patrick A. Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; "The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power," Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p. 1120.
|
11.
|
See, for example, Scheppele, "Small Emergencies," pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show "that emergencies have been brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process."
|
12.
|
See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
|
13.
|
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, pp. 40-41.
|
14.
|
J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.
|
15.
|
Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 2.
|
16.
|
For an overview of TWEA's development, see Benjamin A. Coates, "The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the Trading with the Enemy Act," Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018).
|
17.
|
Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) §2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018) (TWEA).
|
18.
|
TWEA §2.
|
19.
|
TWEA §3.
|
20.
|
TWEA §4.
|
21.
|
TWEA §5b.
|
22.
|
TWEA §2.
|
23.
|
U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.
|
24.
|
William E. Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency," Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872.
|
25.
|
See, for example, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 56.
|
26.
|
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933.
|
27.
|
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
|
28.
|
Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency," p. 1878.
|
29.
|
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1933.
|
30.
|
Proclamation 2039 of March 6, 1933, "Bank Holiday, March 6-9, 1933, Inclusive," 48 Stat. 1689.
|
31.
|
In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the "Trading with the Enemy Act," but instead chose to use the more-opaque "Act of October 6, 1917." Proclamation 2039.
|
32.
|
President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover's Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of Hoover's presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover "should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed" as there was only a "shoe string" on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.
|
33.
|
Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after 38 minutes of debate. The Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 57.
|
34.
|
TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA.
|
35.
|
E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), chap. 9.
|
36.
|
P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838.
|
37.
|
Ibid.
|
38.
|
Scheuerman, "The Economic State of Emergency," p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).
|
39.
|
Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23, 1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2019); CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency Powers, by Elizabeth M. Webster (2021).
|
40.
|
Proclamation 2914 of December 16, 1950, "Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, 15 Federal Register 9029, December 19, 1950. This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.
|
41.
|
U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).
|
42.
|
Executive Order 10348 of April 26, 1952, "Continuing in Force Orders and Regulations Relating to Blocked Property," 17 Federal Register 3769, April 29, 1952.
|
43.
|
Executive Order 11677 of August 1, 1972, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 37 Federal Register 15483, August 3, 1972; Executive Order 11683 of August 29, 1972, "Revoking Executive Order No. 11677 of August 1, 1972, and Continuing in Effect Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, Relating to the Administration of Export Controls," 37 Federal Register 17813, September 1, 1972; Executive Order 11796 of July 30, 1974, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 39 Federal Register 27891, August 2, 1974; Executive Order 11798 of August 14, 1974, "Revoking Executive Order No. 11796 of July 30, 1974, and Continuing in Effect Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, Relating to the Administration of Export Controls," 39 Federal Register 29567, August 16, 11974; Executive Order 11810 of September 30, 1974, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 39 Federal Register 35567, October 2, 1974; Executive Order 11818 of November 5, 1974, "Revoking Executive Order No. 11810 of September 30, 1974, and Continuing in Effect Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, Relating to the Administration of Export Control," 39 Federal Register 39429, November 7, 1974; Executive Order 11940 of September 30, 1976, "Continuing the Regulation of Exports," 41 Federal Register 43707, October 4, 1976.
|
44.
|
Executive Order 10896 of November 29, 1960, "Amendment of Executive Order No. 6260 of August 28, 1933," 25 Federal Register 12281, December 1, 1960; Executive Order 11037 of July 20, 1962, "Amendment of Section 12 of Executive Order No. 6260 of August 28, 1933, as Amended," 27 Federal Register 6967, July 24, 1962.
|
45.
|
Executive Order 11387 of January 1, 1968, "Governing Certain Capital Transfers Abroad," 33 Federal Register 47, January 3, 1968.
|
46.
|
Proclamation 4074 of August 15, 1971, "Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of Payments Purposes," 36 Federal Register 15724, August 17, 1971, reprinted in 85 Stat. 926. Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the "Trading with the Enemy Act" to impose a tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (NEA), and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey (2025).
|
47.
|
The bipartisan special committee was called the "Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency," and was charged with conducting "a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950." U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. iii.
|
48.
|
U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were those proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President Nixon in 1970 and 1971.
|
49.
|
U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.
|
50.
|
Qtd. in U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii.
|
51.
|
Ibid.
|
52.
|
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup before the Committee on International Relations ("House Markup"), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23, 1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President Truman's declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon's declaration of national emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the Export Administration Act when that act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at 2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report concluded, TWEA "has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review." H. Rept. No. 95-459, 7.
|
53.
|
U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
|
54.
|
Ibid.
|
55.
|
Ibid., 9.
|
56.
|
Ibid.
|
57.
|
P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.
|
58.
|
Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that "were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July 1, 1977," including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) §101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, for example, Memorandum of September 8, 1978, "Determination Extending the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act," 45 Federal Register 40449, September 12, 1978; Memorandum of September 12, 1979, "Memorandum From the President on Embargo Regulations Under the Trading With the Enemy Act," 44 Federal Register 53153, September 13, 1979; Presidential Determination of September 8, 1980, "Determination Concerning the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act," 45 Federal Register 59549, September 10, 1980.
|
59.
|
U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7.
|
60.
|
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, Report to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 3.
|
61.
|
U.S. Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10.
|
62.
|
House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
|
63.
|
P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) ("Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // is amended by striking out "or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President" in the text preceding subparagraph (A)."); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
|
64.
|
Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 ("Title III of the bill makes a series of conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.").
|
65.
|
Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.
|
66.
|
House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11.
|
67.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701.
|
68.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701(b).
|
69.
|
Ibid.
|
70.
|
50 U.S.C. §1702.
|
71.
|
50 U.S.C. §1621.
|
72.
|
50 U.S.C. §1631.
|
73.
|
50 U.S.C. §1631 (stating the President may list intended authorities "either in the declaration of a national emergency, or by one or more contemporaneous or subsequent Executive orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress").
|
74.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701(b).
|
75.
|
IEEPA authorities are broad, but not unlimited. See, for example, Micei Int'l v. Dep't of Com., 613 F.3d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court."); TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92, 112 (D.D.C. 2020) (enjoining enforcement of regulation as exceeding authority conferred by IEEPA because provisions "likely constitute indirect regulations of 'personal communication[s]' or the exchange of 'information or informational materials'" in violation of §1702(b)).
|
76.
|
See, for example, Executive Order 13566 of February 25, 2011, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya," 76 Federal Register 11315, March 2, 2011 (addressing threat to the national security and U.S. policy after finding that "Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, his government, and close associates have taken extreme measures against the people of Libya, including by using weapons of war, mercenaries, and wanton violence against unarmed civilians"); expanded by Executive Order 13726 of April 19, 2016, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Persons Contributing to the Situation in Libya," 81 Federal Register 23559, April 21, 2016 (changing scope of the national emergency after Qadhafi was deposed to cover "ongoing violence in Libya, including attacks by armed groups against Libyan state facilities, foreign missions in Libya, and critical infrastructure, as well as human rights abuses, [and] violations of the [U.N.] arms embargo"); Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria," 69 Federal Register 26751, May 13, 2004 (declaring national emergency to deal with threat posed by "the actions of the Government of Syria in supporting terrorism, continuing its occupation of Lebanon, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and undermining United States and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq"), modified in scope by Executive Order 13399 of April 25, 2006, "Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria," 71 Federal Register 25059, April 28, 2006 (modifying scope of the national emergency to assist in the investigation of the "assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, and the deaths of 22 others, and other bombings or assassination attempts in Lebanon since October 1, 2004, that are related to Hariri's assassination or that implicate the Government of Syria or its officers or agents"), expanded by Executive Order 13572 of April 29, 2011, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria," 76 Federal Register 24787, March 3, 2011 (expanding scope of the national emergency to cover "the Government of Syria's human rights abuses, including those related to the repression of the people of Syria").
|
77.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701(b).
|
78.
|
See Table A-3. While IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," 66 Federal Register 49079, September 25, 2001.
79.
|
President Jimmy Carter declared a new national emergency to address a threat emanating from countries neighboring Iran in the same executive order in which he modified an existing national emergency. Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, "Sanctions Against Iran," 45 Federal Register 26685, April 21, 1980 (issued "in order to take steps additional to those set forth" in Executive Order 12170, but declaring a new national emergency with respect to "added unusual and extraordinary threat … created by subsequent events in Iran and neighboring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan").
|
80.
|
Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border," 90 Federal Register 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China," 90 Federal Register 9121, February 7, 2025.
|
81.
|
Proclamation 10886 of January 20, 2025, "Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States," 90 Federal Register 8327, January 29, 2025. The President declared in the Proclamation that "a national emergency exists at the southern border of the United States." Ibid.
|
82.
|
Ibid. (describing threat to U.S. sovereignty that is geographically specific to the southern border caused by "cartels, criminal gangs, known terrorists, human traffickers, smugglers, unvetted military-age males from foreign adversaries, and illicit narcotics" as a "grave threat to our Nation" and an "imminent threat"). The Proclamation asserted the intent to authorize military mobilization under 10 U.S.C. §12302 and to authorize the diversion of military construction funds for not- previously authorized construction projects to support use of the Armed Forces. For information about the use of this authority, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11278, Diverting Military Construction Funds During a National Emergency: Legal Framework, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2025).
|
83.
|
Executive Order 14193 [Canada]; Executive Order 14194 [Mexico]; Executive Order 14195 [China].
|
84.
|
Ibid.
|
85.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701(b). The plain language of the statute appears to preclude the President from relying on IEEPA to "expand" a previously declared national emergency to address a separate threat and appears to preclude the President invoking IEEPA authorities by referring to a preexisting national emergency that was not declared under IEEPA.
|
86.
|
Executive Order 14193 [Canada]; Executive Order 14194 [Mexico]; Executive Order 14195 [China].
|
87.
|
Ibid.
|
88.
|
H.J.Res. 72; H.J.Res. 73.
|
89.
|
H.J.Res. 72.
|
90.
|
H.J.Res. 73.
|
91.
|
H.J.Res. 72; H.J.Res. 73.
|
92.
|
H.Res. 211 §4.
|
93.
|
50 U.S.C. §1622(c).
|
94.
|
S.J.Res. 37.
|
95.
|
Ibid.
|
96.
|
50 U.S.C. §1703(a).
|
97.
|
50 U.S.C. §1703(b).
|
98.
|
50 U.S.C. §1703(c).
|
99.
|
50 U.S.C. §1622. For information regarding the expedited procedures for terminating a national emergency, see CRS Report R46567, National Emergencies Act: Expedited Procedures in the House and Senate, by Michael Greene (2025).
|
100.
|
P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988); P.L. 103-236 (April 30, 1994). The amendments were introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and are occasionally referred to as the "Berman Amendments." For more background, see, "Sleeping with the Enemy? OFAC Rules and First Amendment Freedoms," Perspectives on History (May 2004).
|
101.
|
Codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3).
|
102.
|
P.L. 95-223. House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 15 ("This grant of authorities does not include the following authorities … : (1) the power to vest … property."); Senate, International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, p. 5 ("Authority to vest property, seize records and regulate purely domestic economic transactions would not be granted.").
|
103.
|
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
|
104.
|
P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 272, 277, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(C) (2018).
|
105.
|
Executive Order 13224.
|
106.
|
Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess., serial no. 39 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 7 (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft).
|
107.
|
U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, 107th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 107-236 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), p. 62.
|
108.
|
See United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2015) (insurance companies' attempt to intercede in civil forfeiture action involving Al Qaeda assets).
|
109.
|
Executive Order 13290 of March 20, 2003, "Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property," 68 Federal Register 14307, March 24, 2003.
|
110.
|
Ibid.
|
111.
|
28 U.S.C. §1605A.
|
112.
|
P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
|
113.
|
See Tom Schoenberg, "Fights Loom for Iraqi Riches," Legal Times (March 31, 2003). Judgment creditors were paid about $140 million from the vested assets to cover the unsatisfied portions of judgments and interest.
|
114.
|
E.O. 13315, 68 Federal Register 52,315 (September 3, 2003).
|
115.
|
GAO-04-579T Recovering Iraq's Assets (March 18, 2004). As of March 2004, according to GAO, the CPA had spent $1.67 billion of the $1.9 billion for "emergency needs, including salaries for civil servants and pensions, and for ministry operations." Ibid., 7. The CPA was also authorized to use the more than $900 million in assets seized by the U.S. military in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Ibid.
|
116.
|
P.L. 107-56 §106, 115 Stat. 277 (2001).
|
117.
|
P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (2018).
|
118.
|
P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(a) (2018).
|
119.
|
P.L. 107-56 §106, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (2018).
|
120.
|
House, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 2975, p. 62.
|
121.
|
House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9.
|
122.
|
Ibid., 11.
|
123.
|
This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an initial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1.
124.
|
For example, Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017; Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, "Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election," 83 Federal Register 46843, September 114, 2018; Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019; Executive Order 13920 of May 1, 2020, "Securing the United States Bulk-Power System," 85 Federal Register 26595, May 4, 2020; Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits," 90 Federal Register 15041, April 7, 2025.
|
125.
|
See "Presidential Emergency Use."
|
126.
|
See "Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval."
|
127.
|
H.J.Res 69, 109th Cong. Congress did not vote on the joint resolution because the President terminated the emergency before a vote was required to be held. Proclamation 7959 of November 3, 2005, 70 Federal Register 67899 (November 8, 2005).
|
128.
|
The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not published in the Federal Register by the emergency's anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of emergencies. See, for example, Executive Order 13159 of June 21, 2000, "Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons," 65 Federal Register 39279, June 26, 2000; Executive Order 13617 of June 25, 2012, "Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons," 77 Federal Register 38459, June 27, 2012.
|
129.
|
See Figure 4.
130.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701(b) ("Any exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.").
|
131.
|
Ibid. ("The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.").
|
132.
|
Declarations of emergency under the NEA that do not invoke IEEPA have all made by presidential proclamation. See, for example, Proclamation 6491 of October 14, 1992, "To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki," 57 Federal Register 47553, October 16, 1992; Proclamation 6867 of March 1, 1996, "Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels," 61 Federal Register 8843, March 5, 1996; Proclamation 6907 of July 1, 1996, "Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve," 61 Federal Register 35083, July 5, 1996; Proclamation 7463 of September 14, 2001, "Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks," 66 Federal Register 48199, September 18, 2001; Proclamation 7924 of September 8, 2005, "To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina," 70 Federal Register 54227, September 13, 2005; Proclamation 8443 of October 23, 2009, "Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic," 74 Federal Register 55439, October 28, 2009; Proclamation 9844 of February 15, 2019, "Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States," 84 Federal Register 4949, February 20, 2019; Proclamation 9994 of March 13, 2020, "Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak," 85 Federal Register 15337, March 18, 2020.
|
133.
|
The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued 12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or expand its reach by amending the original language.
|
134.
|
Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979.
|
135.
|
Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, "Blocking Iranian Government Property," 44 Federal Register 65729, November 15, 1979.
|
136.
|
Notice of November 8, 2022, "Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran," 87 Federal Register 68013, November 10, 2022.
|
137.
|
Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared in the 2010s.
|
138.
|
Rounded to the nearest whole emergency. Includes the partial term for President Trump as of September 1, 2025.
|
139.
|
Executive Order 12170.
|
140.
|
Executive Order 12205 of April 7, 1980, "Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran," 45 Federal Register 24099, April 9, 1980. The order exempted "food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering."
|
141.
|
Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, "Further Prohibitions on Transactions With Iran," 45 Federal Register 26685, April 21, 1980.
|
142.
|
Exceptions were made for family remittances.
|
143.
|
Executive Order 12513 of May 1, 1985, "Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua," 50 Federal Register 18629, May 2, 1985.
|
144.
|
Executive Order 12532 of September 9, 1985, "Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa," 50 Federal Register 36861, September 10, 1985.
|
145.
|
This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979.
|
146.
|
Executive Order 12735 of November 16, 1990, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," 55 Federal Register 48587, November 20, 1990.
|
147.
|
Executive Order 13224.
|
148.
|
Executive Order 13581 of July 24, 2011, "Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations," 76 Federal Register 44757, July 27, 2011; Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015.
|
149.
|
Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019.
|
150.
|
Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Federal Register 15041," April 7, 2025.
|
151.
|
See, for example, Executive Order 13694; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017; Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, "Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election," 83 Federal Register 46843, September 14, 2018; Executive Order 13873; Executive Order 13920 of May 1, 2020, "Securing the United States Bulk-Power System," 85 Federal Register 26595, May 4, 2020; Executive Order 13928 of June 11, 2020, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court," 85 Federal Register 36139, June 15, 2020. Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the populations of the targeted states. See, for example, Daniel W. Drezner, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice," International Studies Review 13 (2011), p. 13; Thomas Weiss, et al. eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Matthew Craven, "Humanitarianism and the Search for Smarter Sanctions," European Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (2002). Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond political and economic elites. See, for example, Executive Order 13928.
|
152.
|
Executive Order 12170.
|
153.
|
Executive Order 12513.
|
154.
|
Ibid.
|
155.
|
Executive Order 12532; Executive Order 13396 of February 7, 2006, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire," 71 Federal Register 7389, February 10, 2006; Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, "Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan," 62 Federal Register 59989, November 5, 1997; Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela," 80 Federal Register 12747, March 11, 2015.
|
156.
|
Executive Order 13067.
|
157.
|
Ibid.
|
158.
|
Executive Order 13405 of June 16, 2006, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus," 71 Federal Register 35485, June 20, 2006.
|
159.
|
Ibid.
|
160.
|
Ibid.
|
161.
|
Executive Order 12532.
|
162.
|
Executive Order 12170.
|
163.
|
See, for example, Executive Order 12513.
|
164.
|
See, for example, Executive Order 12865 of September 26, 1993, "Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving UNITA," 58 Federal Register 51005, September 29, 1993 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the second-largest political party in Angola); Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban," 64 Federal Register 36759, July 7, 1999 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); Executive Order 13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); Executive Order 12978 (prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); Executive Order 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court); Executive Order 14203 of February 6, 2025, "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court," 90 Federal Register 9369, February 12, 2025 (same).
|
165.
|
Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995, "Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers," 60 Federal Register 54579, October 24, 1995.
|
166.
|
Ibid. Emphasis added.
|
167.
|
Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, "Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans," 66 Federal Register 34777, June 26, 2001.
|
168.
|
See, for example, Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003).
|
169.
|
Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, "Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans," 66 Federal Register 34777, June 29, 2001, emphasis added.
|
170.
|
See, for example, Executive Order 13224; Executive Order 13396.
|
171.
|
Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019.
|
172.
|
Ibid.
|
173.
|
Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986, P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010.
|
174.
|
Ibid.
|
175.
|
See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat. 2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998), 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010), 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81 (December 31, 2011), 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012), 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208 (December 14, 2012), 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018), 132 Stat. 4144.
|
176.
|
Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95 (April 3, 2014), 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014), 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016), 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18, 2016), 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017), 130 Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national emergency. See, for example, Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272, §103, 132 Stat. 4144, 4148 ("(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions [ ... ].").
|
177.
|
CAATSA §104, codified at 22 U.S.C. §9403; Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005, "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters," 70 Federal Register 38567, July 1, 2005.
|
178.
|
Executive Order 12532.
|
179.
|
H.R. 1460 (99th Cong.); See also Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986), 100 Stat. 1086.
|
180.
|
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050.
|
181.
|
See, for example, questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid., 1050.
|
182.
|
Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201.
|
183.
|
Ibid.
|
184.
|
Ibid., ch. 9.
|
185.
|
For example, Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016, "Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 82 Federal Register 1, January 3, 2017; See also Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018, "Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election," 83 Federal Register 46843, September 14, 2018.
|
186.
|
For example, Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995, "Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers," 60 Federal Register 54579, October 24, 1995.
|
187.
|
For example, Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017.
|
188.
|
For example, Executive Order 13194 of January 18, 2001, "Prohibiting the Importation of Rough Diamonds From Sierra Leone," 66 Federal Register 7389, January 23, 2001.
|
189.
|
For example, Executive Order 13581 of July 24, 2011, "Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations," 76 Federal Register 44757, July 27, 2011.
|
190.
|
For example, Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, "Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," 60 Federal Register 5079, January 25, 1995.
|
191.
|
For example, Executive Order 13400 of April 26, 2006, "Blocking Property of Persons in Connection With the Conflict in Sudan's Darfur Region," 71 Federal Register 25483, April 26, 2006.
|
192.
|
For example, Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," 59 Federal Register 59099, November 16, 1994.
|
193.
|
For example, Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism," 66 Federal Register 49079, September 25, 2001.
|
194.
|
For example, Executive Order 12923 of June 30, 1994, "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," 59 Federal Register 34551, July 5, 1994.
|
195.
|
For example, Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015.
|
196.
|
For example, Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, "Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption," 82 Federal Register 60839, December 26, 2017.
|
197.
|
For example, Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019.
|
198.
|
For example, Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025.
|
199.
|
"The International Emergency Economic Powers Act," p. 1111; Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," pp. 757-758.
|
200.
|
For example, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981) (explaining that "[blocking] orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a 'bargaining chip' to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country").
|
201.
|
Executive Order 12170.
|
202.
|
The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter "General Declaration"], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 [hereinafter "Algiers Accords"].
|
203.
|
Sean D. Murphy, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law," American Journal of International Law 94 (October 2000), p. 704 (explaining that "[a]ll of Iran's lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah's assets] were eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens").
|
204.
|
GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989).
|
205.
|
Ibid., 5.
|
206.
|
Executive Order 12635 of April 8, 1988, "Prohibition on the Use of Federal Funds for the Acquisition of Certain Real Property in the District of Columbia," 53 Federal Register 12134, April 8, 1988.
|
207.
|
GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5.
|
208.
|
Ibid., 7.
|
209.
|
Executive Order 12710 of April 5, 1990, "Termination of Emergency With Respect to Panama," 55 Federal Register 13099, April 6, 1990.
|
210.
|
See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded "that the net amount still due Panama, after 'offsets, was about $200 million").
|
211.
|
Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela," 80 Federal Register 12747, March 11, 2015. For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke (2025).
|
212.
|
President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People's Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country, White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-supports-venezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke (2022).
213.
|
Trump Supports the Venezuelan People's Efforts.
|
214.
|
Executive Order 13857 of January 25, 2019, "Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Venezuela," 84 Federal Register 509, January 30, 2019; Treasury Sanctions Venezuela's State-Owned Oil Company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. Department of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm594.
|
215.
|
Marianna Parraga, "Venezuela's oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions," Reuters, June 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-us-sanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.
|
216.
|
Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela's 2015 National Assembly and Interim President Guaidó, January 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-and-interim-president-guaido/.
217.
|
Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Venezuela's Interim Government and the 2015 National Assembly, January 3, 2023, https://www.state.gov/venezuelas-interim-government-and-the-2015-national-assembly/.
218.
|
U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Rubio's Call with the Rightful President of Venezuela González Urrutia and Venezuelan Democratic Opposition Leader Machado," January 22, 2025.
|
219.
|
CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
|
220.
|
CRS electronic correspondence with State Department, July 7, 2025.
|
221.
|
Ibid.
|
222.
|
Marianna Parraga, "Is Venezuela About to Lose Citgo, its Most Prized Foreign Asset," Reuters, July 7, 2025.
|
223.
|
Executive Order 12817 of October 21, 1992, "Transfer of Certain Iraqi Government Assets Held by Domestic Banks," 57 Federal Register 48433, October 23, 1992. President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant to IEEPA in response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," 55 Federal Register 31803, August 3, 1990.
|
224.
|
22 U.S.C. §287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions by "investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation.
|
225.
|
Executive Order 12817.
|
226.
|
See Ronald J. Bettauer, "Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective," The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.
|
227.
|
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, ¶16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that "Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait"; U.N. Security Council Resolution 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C. Res. 687); U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 (August 15, 1991) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 712 (September 19, 1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); U.N. Security Council Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).
|
228.
|
See "USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA."
|
229.
|
Foreign Regimes' Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004).
|
230.
|
Ibid., 12.
|
231.
|
Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. September 13, 2021).
|
232.
|
Executive Order 14064 of February 11, 2022, "Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan," 87 Federal Register 8391, February 15, 2022.
|
233.
|
United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. February 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI).
|
234.
|
OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-b-ofac-license.pdf.
|
235.
|
Ibid., SOI.
|
236.
|
CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss (2023).
|
237.
|
In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 657 F. Supp. 3d 311, 336 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023) (consolidated cases).
|
238.
|
Ibid., 335.
|
239.
|
John Does 1 Through 7 v. The Taliban, No. 23-263 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2023).
|
240.
|
50 U.S.C. §1706(a) (authorizing the President to continue to block assets after the termination of a national emergency if he "determines that the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals").
|
241.
|
Claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries have historically been paid from liquidated frozen assets or payments from the foreign country pursuant to international settlement agreements. See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims) (outlining source of funding for claims programs.) Presidents have in the past objected to congressional efforts to put frozen foreign assets directly under the control of courts and private litigants, and exercised waivers to avoid making frozen assets subject to enforcement to satisfy judgments. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 125 (D.D.C. 2009) ("In terms of United States foreign policy and national security objectives, one of the perverse outcomes of Congress' legislative victories over the Executive Branch [recounted in Part A of the court's opinion] is that what limited resources might have served as a bargaining chip that the President could have used in dealings with Iran are now subject to depletion as a result of the TRIA."). The court when on to describe "[t]hese frozen assets, once at the disposal of the President in his management of foreign policy crises under the IEEPA and other authorities, [as being] now largely subject to the jurisdiction of the Article III courts to be divided up among what few plaintiffs first lay claim to them in satisfaction of judgments under [the terrorism exception to the FSIA]"). Ibid. For a description of executive branch objections to making frozen assets available to litigants and the exercise of presidential waivers to preclude the eventuality, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2008).
|
242.
|
Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria (1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://perma.cc/RVE8-W28E.
|
243.
|
The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2008).
|
244.
|
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, §117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. §1610(f)(1)(A) (2018).
|
245.
|
Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2088 (October 26, 1998).
|
246.
|
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386, §2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to "vest and liquidate up to and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]" to pay the compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.
|
247.
|
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages, judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.
|
248.
|
Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).
|
249.
|
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note.
|
250.
|
Ibid. The term "blocked asset" is defined in §201(d) of TRIA to mean
(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and
(B) does not include property that—
(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or
(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in March 2023, that the United States, acting pursuant to TRIA, violated the now-defunct Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.T. 900, by permitting judgment creditors, to enforce terrorism judgments against Iran through the attachment of assets of Iranian agencies or instrumentalities who were not participants in the underlying lawsuit. The ICJ found the United States unreasonably ignored those companies' separate juridical status and deprived Iranian companies of the independent legal personality conferred on them by such status. Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 159 (Mar. 30, 2023), https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/164/164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. The ICJ will decide the amount of damages the United States owes to Iran at a later phase of the case. Ibid., ¶ 231.
|
251.
|
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181 §1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
|
252.
|
28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether "regulated" property and "blocked asset" are meant to be synonymous. The provision also overrides the separate juridical status ordinarily accorded to agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states. Ibid. The ICJ determined that this provision violated the Treaty of Amity for the same reason it found TRIA to be "unreasonable." Certain Iranian Assets, ¶ 159.
|
253.
|
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019), both codified at 22 USC §8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress's Power over Court Decisions: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of Klein, by Joanna R. Lampe (2024). In Certain Iranian Assets, the ICJ found that Bank Markazi, as Iran's central bank, was not a "company" entitled to favorable treatment under the Treaty of Amity, and the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the claim based on Peterson. Certain Iranian Assets ¶ 54.
|
254.
|
See Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, div. O, title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-113, §404 (2015), 129 Stat. 3007, codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §20144 (2020).
|
255.
|
Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2023).
|
256.
|
34 U.S.C. §20144(e) (2021).
|
257.
|
34 U.S.C. §20144(e).
|
258.
|
34 U.S.C. §20144(e)(6).
|
259.
|
United States v. Zhao, No. 2:23–CR–00178 (W.D. Wash. filed Nov. 14, 2023). Binance pleaded guilty to resolve DOJ's investigation into "violations related to the Bank Secrecy Act... failure to register as a money transmitting business, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ... " See DOJ, Binance and CEO Plead Guilty to Federal Charges in $4B Resolution, November 21, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/binance-and-ceo-plead-guilty-federal-charges-4b-resolution.
|
260.
|
S. 706, §2(a)(2).
|
261.
|
Ibid. §3(a)(3).
|
262.
|
See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia Before 2022, coordinated by Cory Welt (2022); CRS Insight IN11869, Russia's War Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Assistance and Sanctions, by Cory Welt (2023); CRS In Focus IF12062, Russia's War on Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson (2023).
|
263.
|
Division F of P.L. 118-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §9521 note).
|
264.
|
Ibid. §§2(1)(A), 101(b).
|
265.
|
If the President determines that "Belarus has engaged in an act of war against Ukraine related to Russia's ongoing February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine," the authorities applicable to Russia in the REPO for Ukrainians Act can apply to Belarus as well. See ibid. §2(1) (defining "Russian aggressor state").
|
266.
|
Ibid. §104(f).
|
267.
|
Ibid. §102(9).
|
268.
|
The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued instructions for U.S. financial institutions to report holdings of covered assets. Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Notice of Reporting Instructions Under the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act," 89 Federal Register 60568, July 26, 2024.
|
269.
|
REPO for Ukrainians Act §104(b).
|
270.
|
Ibid. §104(f).
|
271.
|
Ibid. §104(g).
|
272.
|
Ibid. §104(l).
|
273.
|
P.L. 117-328, §1708, 136. Stat. 5200 (2022).
|
274.
|
Ibid. §1708(c)(2) (defining "covered forfeited property" to mean property forfeited under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–987 or 1963 "by a person subject to sanctions and designated by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of State, or which property was involved in an act in violation of sanctions enacted pursuant to Executive Order 14024, and as expanded by Executive Order 14066 of March 8, 2022, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14039 of August 20, 2021, and Executive Order 14068 of March 11, 2022").
|
275.
|
Ibid. §1708(d).
|
276.
|
For example, Elisabeth Braw, "Freeze—Don't Seize—Russian Assets," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2023; Christopher Caldwell, "Everyone Wants to Seize Russia's Money. It's a Terrible Idea," New York Times, April 9, 2024; Timothy Ash, "The Economic Case for Seizing Russia's Frozen Assets to Support Ukraine," Project Syndicate, June 12, 2024.
|
277.
|
Laurence H. Tribe, et al., The Legal, Practical, and Moral Case for Transferring Russian Sovereign Assets to Ukraine, Renew Democracy Initiative, September 17, 2023, pp. 154-157, https://rdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2023.09.17-MPP-Report.pdf.
|
278.
|
For example, Elisabeth Braw, "Freeze—Don't Seize—Russian Assets," Foreign Policy, January 13, 2023; Christopher Caldwell, "Everyone Wants to Seize Russia's Money. It's a Terrible Idea," New York Times, April 9, 2024; Timothy Ash, "The Economic Case for Seizing Russia's Frozen Assets to Support Ukraine," Project Syndicate, June 12, 2024.
|
279.
|
For example, Scott R. Anderson and Chimène Keitner, The Legal Challenges Presented by Seizing Frozen Russian Assets, Lawfare, May 26, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/legal-challenges-presented-seizing-frozen-russian-assets.
|
280.
|
Ibid.
|
281.
|
For example, Treaty of Peace with Japan, September 8, 1951, 46 U.N.T.S. 1832; Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, 41 U.N.T.S. 643; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, February 10, 1947, 41 U.N.T.S. 644; Treaty of Peace with Romania, February 10, 1947, 42 U.N.T.S. 645; Treaty of Peace with Italy, February 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 747.
|
282.
|
See U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, art. 36 cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (December 12, 2001) (ARSIWA) ("It is … well established that an international court or tribunal which has jurisdiction with respect to a claim of State responsibility has, as an aspect of that jurisdiction, the power to award compensation for damage suffered.") (citation omitted).
|
283.
|
U.N. Security Council Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992) (creating UN Compensation Commission to allocate reparations due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait).
|
284.
|
REPO for Ukrainians Act §2(6) (defining "Russian sovereign asset" to include Russian Central Bank and other funds, as well as "any other funds or other property that are owned by the Government of the Russian Federation, including by any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of that government"). The authority to confiscate such assets excludes property protected by certain diplomatic treaties. Ibid. §104(j).
|
285.
|
Ibid. §102(7).
|
286.
|
Ibid. §101(a)(7) ("The Russian Federation bears international legal responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and, under international law, must cease its internationally wrongful acts. Because of this breach of the prohibition on aggression under international law, the United States is legally entitled to take counter measures that are proportionate and aimed at inducing the Russian Federation to comply with its international obligations.").
|
287.
|
ARSIWA at cmt.
|
288.
|
Ibid. at comment. 1.
|
289.
|
See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶¶51-52 (Sept. 25).
|
290.
|
ARSIWA arts. 22, 49, 50.
|
291.
|
Ibid. art. 48(2).
|
292.
|
Ibid. art. 49.
|
293.
|
Ibid. art. 54.
|
294.
|
Ibid. art. 54, cmt 6. The comment states that "the current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States. At present, there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States ... to take countermeasures in the collective interest.... [C]hapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of international law."
|
295.
|
Ibid. art. 48(2)(a)-(b).
|
296.
|
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
|
297.
|
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments Made by Iran and the United States and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (collectively "Algiers Accords").
|
298.
|
Executive Order 12294 of February 24, 1981, "Suspension of Litigation Against Iran," 46 Federal Register 14111, February 26, 1981.
|
299.
|
Algiers Accords.
|
300.
|
Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, "Blocking Iranian Government Property," 44 Federal Register 65729, November 15, 1979; Executive Order 12279 of January 19, 1981, "Direction to Transfer Iranian Government Assets Held by Domestic Banks," 46 Federal Register 7917, January 23, 1981.
|
301.
|
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 644.
|
302.
|
Ibid.
|
303.
|
Ibid., 666.
|
304.
|
Ibid., 666-67.
|
305.
|
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
|
306.
|
Ibid., 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
|
307.
|
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).
|
308.
|
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
|
309.
|
United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal of whether IEEPA constitutes an appropriate delegation of congressional authority to the executive).
|
310.
|
United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding IEEPA's delegation of authority to the President); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App'x 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (same); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir.1993) (same); see also United States v. Nazemzadeh, No. 11 CR 5726 L, 2014 WL 310460, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2014); United States v. Vaghari, No. CRIM.A. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2009); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 05–C–580, 2007 WL 1051767, at *20–21 (E.D. Wis. March 31, 2007), aff'd, 559 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05–CR–0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. January 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829–30 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
|
311.
|
Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
|
312.
|
Ibid., 216 ("Even if a heightened standard should apply to delegations concerning criminal offenses, the IEEPA's delegation is subject to constraints similar to those found sufficient in [Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111 (1991)]"); see also Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 576 ("We too conclude that IEEPA "meaningfully constrains" the President's discretion."); Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d at 1092–94 (holding "constraining factors" in IEEPA sufficient to conclude the President's powers are "explicitly defined and circumscribed").
|
313.
|
Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 216-17 (internal citations omitted). See also United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023) (upholding the use of IEEPA to maintain the Export Administration Regulations despite lapse of the Export Administration Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because IEEPA "specifies the steps the President must take before invoking an emergency, including consultation with Congress, and establishes reporting requirements") The court further held that IEEPA "limits the President's authority to prohibit certain types of transactions, and prohibits the punishment of unwitting violators."). Ibid. The court explained that, "[b]ecause these statutory restrictions strike 'a careful balance between affording the President a degree of authority to address the exigencies of national emergencies and restraining his ability to perpetuate emergency situations indefinitely by creating more opportunities for congressional input,'" it agreed with every Circuit to have considered the issue, and determined "that IEEPA is constitutional." Ibid. (citing United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 577 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092–94 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App'x 249, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2011)).
|
314.
|
Dhafir, 461 F.3d. at 217 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675).
|
315.
|
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-00066, Slip Op. 25-66 at 28 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 28, 2025); cf. CRS Report R45153, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends, by Valerie C. Brannon (2023) (discussing use of constitutional-avoidance canon to interpret statutes).
|
316.
|
V.O.S. Selections, Slip Op. 25-66 at 30.
|
317.
|
See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
|
318.
|
Sacks v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that IEEPA does not burden the President's powers with respect to humanitarian aid when he acts under the UNPA). IEEPA does not provide authority to regulate "donations ... of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations" would risk certain harms. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(2).
|
319.
|
Iran Thalassemia Soc'y v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 3:22-CV-1195-HZ, 2022 WL 9888593, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 2022) (declining to enjoin "maximum pressure" sanctions against Iran for violating the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA, P.L. 106-387, §1, found at 22 U.S.C. §7202) and the Iran financial sector sanctions provision, found at 22 U.S.C. §8513a(d)(2)), appeal dismissed, No. 22-35850, 2022 WL 18461465 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022).
|
320.
|
50 U.S.C. §1706(b) (2018).
|
321.
|
United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
|
322.
|
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55.
|
323.
|
Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d at 197 ("Because [defendants] were charged and convicted under 50 U.S.C. §1705(b), and this section is not affected by the unconstitutionality of §1706(b), the constitutionality of the legislative veto is irrelevant to their convictions."). Although the original NEA authorized termination through a concurrent resolution, which does not require the President's signature, Congress amended the provision in 1985 to require a joint resolution as a response to Chadha. Notwithstanding this amendment, Section 207 of IEEPA continues to refer to termination by concurrent resolution.
|
324.
|
Ibid., 196 (finding that the balance of IEEPA is capable of functioning independently and noting Congress's inclusion of a severability clause).
|
325.
|
U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, "Takings Clause: Overview," Constitution Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-9-1/ALDE_00013280/.
326.
|
See Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20 (2001) (describing a regulatory taking as "not involv[ing] physical invasion or seizure of property [but rather] concern[ing] action that affects an owner's use of property, … based on the 'general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking'") (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)), aff'd, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
|
327.
|
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673 n. 6. (noting that "an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the President may take" pursuant to IEEPA).
|
328.
|
Ibid., 673–674; see also Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat. Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The President's action in nullifying the attachments did not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.").
|
329.
|
767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (landlord leasing office space to a foreign government "did so against the backdrop of the government's foreign policy power" and did not have reasonable investment-backed expectation that its contract would be fulfilled); Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) ("[T]hose who trade with foreign governments must … take the President's power into account in structuring their transactions."); Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[T]hose who enter into employment contracts overseas do so in light of one salient fact of economic life: that their ability to perform and compel performance is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations" (citing Chang v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1987)); Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21 (holding there was no taking because "plaintiff's [stock options] were 'in every sense subordinate to the President's power under the IEEPA.'").
330.
|
Paradissiotis, 49 Fed. Cl. at 21.
|
331.
|
Ibid. (quoting Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870), quoted in Chang, 859 F.2d at 897).
|
332.
|
Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill.) ("Takings claims have often been raised—and consistently rejected—in the IEEPA context."), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
|
333.
|
Ibid. (citing Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir.1981); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[T]he case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
|
334.
|
IPT Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. 92 CIV. 5542 (JFK), 1994 WL 613371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the blocking of assets is not a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government, the company IPT did not become a government-owned enterprise, and any proceeds from a sale of the business or its assets will still vest in its owners, who may claim such assets when the blocking order is lifted).
|
335.
|
KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1263 (D. Or. 2008).
|
336.
|
KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
|
337.
|
U.S. Constitution, Amdt. V.
|
338.
|
IPT Co., 1994 WL 613371, at *6 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976)).
|
339.
|
Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04 (emphasizing "the Executive's need for speed in these matters, and the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of records"), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
|
340.
|
Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (D.D.C. 2002).
|
341.
|
Ibid.
|
342.
|
686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012).
|
343.
|
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
|
344.
|
Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979.
|
345.
|
Ibid. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
|
346.
|
Ibid., 979–80 (internal citations omitted).
|
347.
|
Ibid., 980.
|
348.
|
Ibid.
|
349.
|
Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 981 (stating the use of classified information "should be presumptively unconstitutional" (citing Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995)).
|
350.
|
Ibid., 982 "[T]the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared "national emergency," qualifies as sufficiently "extraordinary" to overcome the presumption.").
|
351.
|
Ibid., 981 (citing Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Al–Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008)). See also Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (D.D.C. 2020) ("[G]iven the overriding governmental interest at stake in protecting classified information and the wide berth afforded the executive branch in matters relating to foreign affairs and national security, the Court concludes that OFAC has provided Olenga with sufficient notice of the reasons for his designation to comply with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
|
352.
|
Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 984 ("OFAC's failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF–Oregon's due process rights.").
|
353.
|
Ibid., 990.
|
354.
|
Ibid., 984.
|
355.
|
Ibid., 984-85.
|
356.
|
Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 987 (holding that, at a minimum, OFAC must provide a timely statement of reasons for the investigation).
|
357.
|
Ibid. at 990 ("Even if [the organization] had enjoyed better access to classified information and constitutionally adequate notice, we are confident that it would not have changed OFAC's ultimate designation determination.").
|
358.
|
Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2020) (citing People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Fulmen Co. v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 547 F. Supp. 3d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2020) ("Because Fulmen's own pleadings demonstrate no property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the 'substantial connections' necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.").
|
359.
|
Rakhimov, 2020 WL 1911561 at *5 (citing Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 32 Cty. Sovereignty Comm. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
|
360.
|
Ibid.
|
361.
|
See ibid., *6 (observing that the court must follow "the APA's [5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)] 'highly deferential standard,' meaning that [it] may set aside Treasury's action 'only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law'") (quoting Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
|
362.
|
KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 889 ("Courts have uniformly held that OFAC's blocking and designation authorities do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and that its restrictions are narrowly tailored."); Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting claims that OFAC blocking action violated plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of religion, and noting that "nothing in the IEEPA or the executive order prohibits [the plaintiff] from expressing its views"); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 570 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("The First Amendment's guarantee of associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with resources or material support in any form, including services as a combatant.").
|
363.
|
Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that "where an organization is found to have supported terrorism, government actions to suspend that support are not unconstitutional" under the First Amendment); Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 166 (holding "as other courts have," with respect to a First Amendment right to association claim, that "there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terrorists" (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
|
364.
|
Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 736 ("The blocking was not based on, nor does it prohibit, associational activity other than financial support.").
|
365.
|
Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting cases that concluded that intermediate scrutiny applies to a designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and blocking order affecting funds purportedly intended for charitable purposes).
|
366.
|
Glob. Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)), aff'd on other grounds, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
|
367.
|
Ibid. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77).
|
368.
|
Ibid.
|
369.
|
Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 997 (holding strict scrutiny applies and that, "[a]ccordingly, the prohibition survives only if it is narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest of preventing terrorism").
|
370.
|
561 U.S. 1, 38 (2010) (upholding the prohibition on material support of terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, against First Amendment challenge).
|
371.
|
Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001 (holding that under the prevailing fact circumstances, OFAC's content-based prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment).
|
372.
|
United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 583 (3d Cir. 2011).
|
373.
|
Ibid., 567.
|
374.
|
United States v. Griffith, 515 F. Supp. 3d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
|
375.
|
Ibid., 117.
|
376.
|
United States v. Alavi, No. CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss superseding indictment).
|
377.
|
Van Loon v. Dep't of Treasury, No. 1:23-CV-312-RP, 2023 WL 5313091, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023).
|
378.
|
Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22689, May 17, 2019.
|
379.
|
Executive Order 13942 of August 6, 2020, "Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 85 Federal Register 48637, August 11, 2020; Executive Order 13943 of August 6, 2020, "Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 85 Federal Register 48641, August 11, 2020.
|
380.
|
Executive Order 13942.
|
381.
|
Executive Order 13943.
|
382.
|
Executive Order 13942; Executive Order 13943.
|
383.
|
Marland v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 4692706 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021).
|
384.
|
TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021).
|
385.
|
Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632.
|
386.
|
Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat Posed by TikTok and the National Emergency with Respect to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 85 Federal Register 60,061 (September 24, 2020) (the "Commerce TikTok Identification").
|
387.
|
Marland, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting September 17 Commerce Department memorandum).
|
388.
|
Ibid., 634.
|
389.
|
Ibid. (citing 5 U.S.C. §702; 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1) and (3)).
|
390.
|
Ibid., 636.
|
391.
|
Ibid., 637 ("[T]he effect of the Identification will be to undermine the app's functionality such that U.S. users will be prevented from exchanging data on the app.").
|
392.
|
Ibid.
|
393.
|
Ibid., 638.
|
394.
|
Ibid.
|
395.
|
Ibid., 639.
|
396.
|
TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020).
|
397.
|
Ibid., 80.
|
398.
|
Ibid., 82 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3)).
|
399.
|
Ibid., 81.
|
400.
|
Ibid., 83.
|
401.
|
50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1).
|
402.
|
TikTok, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 83.
|
403.
|
Ibid.
|
404.
|
Ibid.
|
405.
|
U.S. Commerce Department, https://www.commerce.gov/files/identification-prohibited-transactions-implement-executive-order-13943-and-address-threat.
|
406.
|
Ibid.
|
407.
|
U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
|
408.
|
Ibid., 926 (referring to plaintiffs' description of WeChat as "a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S").
|
409.
|
Ibid., 927.
|
410.
|
Ibid. (discounting government's "argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication").
|
411.
|
Ibid., 926-27. In order to justify a prior restraint, the government must demonstrate that the restraint is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. 571 (1979); Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
|
412.
|
U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v. Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)).
|
413.
|
U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927.
|
414.
|
Ibid., 928 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
|
415.
|
Ibid., 929.
|
416.
|
Ibid. (citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018)).
|
417.
|
Ibid. (citing Am. Beverage Ass'n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019)).
|
418.
|
Ibid.
|
419.
|
Ibid.
|
420.
|
Ibid., 930.
|
421.
|
Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. filed November11, 2020); TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5381 (D.C. Cir. filed December 29, 2020); U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908 (9th Cir. filed October 2, 2020).
|
422.
|
Jeanne Whalen, Biden asks for pause in Trump's effort to ban WeChat, Wash. Post, February 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/11/wechat-trump-biden-pause/.
423.
|
Executive Order 14034 of June 9, 2021, "Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries," 86 Federal Register 31,423 (June11, 2021).
|
424.
|
Marland v. Trump, No. 20-3322, 2021 WL 5346749, at *1 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal pursuant to agreement between parties); TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-5381, 2021 WL 3082803, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021) (dismissing appeal at government's request); WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, No. 20-16908, 2021 WL 4692706, at *1 (9th Cir. August 9, 2021) (same).
|
425.
|
Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 Federal Register 22,689 (May 17, 2019).
|
426.
|
P.L. 118-50. After the deadline to divest had passed and the Supreme Court upheld PAFACAA, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57 (2025) (per curiam), President Trump suspended enforcement for 75 days. Executive Order 14166, "Application of Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act to Tiktok," 90 Federal Register 8611, January 20, 2025. For more information, see CRS Report R48023, TikTok: Frequently Asked Questions and Issues for Congress, by Michael D. Sutherland, Peter J. Benson, and Clare Y. Cho (2025). In June 2025, President Trump extended the enforcement delay until September 17, 2025. Executive Order 14310, "Further Extending the TikTok Enforcement Delay," 90 Federal Register 26913, June 24, 2025.
|
427.
|
P.L. 118-50, div. H, §2.
|
428.
|
In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232, to repeal the Export Administration Act of 1979 and provide new statutory authority for the continuation of Export Administration Regulations (EAR). However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See "
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018" section below.
429.
|
P.L. 96-72, §2, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§4601-4623 (2018).
|
430.
|
Executive Order 12444 of October 14, 1983, "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," 48 Federal Register 48215, October 18, 1983.
|
431.
|
Ibid.
|
432.
|
Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," 66 Federal Register 44025, August 22, 2001.
|
433.
|
See, for example, Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 82 Federal Register 39005 (August 15, 2017).
|
434.
|
Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Courts uniformly have read [the executive order preserving the EAA regulations under IEEPA] to mean that the statute remained in full effect during the periods of lapse."). In this case, Sudan challenged its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to a provision of the EAA because the statute had expired.
|
435.
|
United States v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1987).
|
436.
|
Ibid., 1113-14 (emphasizing the foreign affairs connection served by the EAA).
|
437.
|
United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).
|
438.
|
Ibid., 95.
|
439.
|
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (2018).
|
440.
|
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
|
441.
|
Ibid.
|
442.
|
Micei Int'l v. Dep't of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
|
443.
|
Ibid., 1151.
|
444.
|
Ibid., 1153 (internal citations omitted).
|
445.
|
Ibid., 1152 (citing 5 U.S.C. §704 (2009)).
|
446.
|
For information about illicit uses of cryptocurrency, see CRS Report R47425, Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues, by Paul Tierno (2023); CRS In Focus IF12537, Terrorist Financing: Hamas and Cryptocurrency Fundraising, by Liana W. Rosen, Paul Tierno, and Rena S. Miller (2024).
|
447.
|
122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024).
|
448.
|
CRS In Focus IF12405, Introduction to Cryptocurrency, by Paul Tierno (2025).
|
449.
|
Ibid., 565.
|
450.
|
According to 31 C.F.R. § 510.323
The terms property and property interest include money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts, debts, indebtedness, obligations, notes, guarantees, debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, any other financial instruments, bankers acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership, or indebtedness, letters of credit and any documents relating to any rights or obligations thereunder, powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors' sales agreements, land contracts, leaseholds, ground rents, real estate and any other interest therein, options, negotiable instruments, trade acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, services of any nature whatsoever, contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent.
Ibid., footnote 53.
|
451.
|
Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2, 2015.
|
452.
|
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, "U.S. Treasury Sanctions Notorious Virtual Currency Mixer Tornado Cash," press release, August 8, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916.
|
453.
|
Van Loon, 122 F.4th at 553.
|
454.
|
Ibid. at 553–54.
|
455.
|
Van Loon v. Dep't of Treasury, 688 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468 (W.D. Tex. 2023) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the smart contracts are immutable and not subject to being owned because OFAC's definition of property encompasses "contracts of any nature whatsoever"), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Van Loon v. Dep't of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024).
|
456.
|
Van Loon, 122 F.4th at 568.
|
457.
|
Ibid.
|
458.
|
Ibid., 570.
|
459.
|
Ibid., 554.
|
460.
|
In 2019, President Trump suggested that he would use IEEPA to impose a tariff on Mexico but ultimately decided not to. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190531004403/https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/; President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://perma.cc/Q2DZ-5EK4. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190608032208/https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.
461.
|
Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border," 90 Federal Register 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China," 90 Federal Register 9121, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14245 of March 24, 2025, "Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil," 90 Federal Register 13829, March 27, 2025; Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits," 90 Federal Register 15041, April 7, 2025; Executive Order 14323 of July 30, 2025, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil," 90 Federal Register 37739, August 5, 2025. See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11281, Legal Authority for the President to Impose Tariffs Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
|
462.
|
Executive Order 14193.
|
463.
|
Executive Order 14194.
|
464.
|
Executive Order 14195.
|
465.
|
Executive Order 14245.
|
466.
|
Executive Order 14257.
|
467.
|
Executive Order 14323.
|
468.
|
See, for example, S. 151 (119th Cong.); H.R. 407 (119th Cong.).
|
469.
|
See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
|
470.
|
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-00066, Slip Op. 25-66 at 48-49 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 28, 2025); Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-01248, Memorandum Op. at 27 (D.D.C. May 29, 2025). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
|
471.
|
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, Nos. 2025-1812, -1813, Order (Fed. Cir. June 10, 2025) (en banc consideration granted); Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-5202, Order (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2025) (scheduling oral argument for Sept. 30, 2025). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
|
472.
|
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, Nos. 2025-1812, 2025-1813, 2025 LX 386998, at *47-48 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) ("We affirm the CIT's holding that the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA's text. We also affirm the CIT's grant of declaratory relief that the orders are "invalid as contrary to law. We vacate the CIT's grant of a permanent injunction universally enjoining the enforcement of the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs and remand for the CIT to reevaluate the propriety of granting injunctive relief and the proper scope of such relief, after considering all four eBay factors and the Supreme Court's holding in CASA." Internal citations omitted)
|
473.
|
Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., No. 25-250, 2025 LX 313715, at *1 (Sep. 9, 2025).
474.
|
See, for example, Jason Luong, "Forcing Constraint"; Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism."
|
475.
|
See, for example, "After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending," New York Times, October 13, 1974; "Senate Votes to Conclude 4 National Emergencies," New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.
|
476.
|
Congress has only successfully terminated via joint resolution one national emergency declared under the NEA. That national emergency, which related to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID 19) pandemic, did not invoke IEEPA.
|
477.
|
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea (2019).
|
478.
|
50 U.S.C. §1701.
|
479.
|
House Markup, p. 12.
|
480.
|
Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a district judge confirm that an insurrection "too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings" existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court "to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and reasonable man." Qtd. in Witt, "A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism," p. 588.
|
481.
|
50 U.S.C. §§1803-1805.
|
482.
|
"The International Emergency Economic Powers Act," Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n. 49.
|
483.
|
Ibid.; See also Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," pp. 757-758.
|
484.
|
In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2208, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4801 et seq. to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See "The Export Control Reform Act of 2018" below.
|
485.
|
Ibid.
|
486.
|
Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border," 90 Federal Register 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border," 90 Federal Register 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025, "Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China," 90 Federal Register 9121, February 7, 2025.
|
487.
|
See, for example, the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.
|
488.
|
United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ("Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA, authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] 'regulate importation,' by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.").
|
489.
|
TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest."
While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a 5% tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (NEA), and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey (2025).
490.
|
For example, Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 1060 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
|
491.
|
Thronson, "Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime," p. 759.
|
492.
|
Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President's veto, to terminate an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405. See also Rachel Jessica Wolff, "Whose Constitutional Authority Is It Anyway? Nondelegation, the National Emergencies Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act," Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 21 (2023), p. 628.
|
493.
|
For example, ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 1912 (Lee), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2023; Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; National Emergencies Reform Act , H.R. 9041 (Amash), 116th Cong., 2nd sess., December 22, 2020.
|
494.
|
National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.
|
495.
|
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, "Never Ending Emergencies – An Examination of the National Emergencies Act," 118th Cong., 1st sess., hearing, May 24, 2023; Catherine Padhi, "Emergencies Without End: A Primer on Federal States of Emergency," Lawfare, December 8, 2017.
|
496.
|
See "Implications of Terminating National Emergencies Invoking IEEPA"
|
497.
|
House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9.
|
498.
|
Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.
|
499.
|
50 U.S.C. §1622(b).
|
500.
|
For example, Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764 (Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.
|
501.
|
In 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019.
|
502.
|
Ibid.
|
503.
|
Act of April 10, 2023, P.L. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6.
|
504.
|
Ibid.
|
505.
|
Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on October 27, 2006, H.J.Res. 68 (Boebert), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on February 25, 2011, H.J.Res. 70 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 22, 2003, H.J.Res. 71 (Crane), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 16, 2012, H.J.Res. 74 (Gosar), 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2023; Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on May 11, 2004, H.J.Res. 79 (Gaetz), 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 6, 2023.
|
506.
|
50 U.S.C. §1622(a) provides that:
[A]ny powers or authorities exercised by reason of [the terminated] emergency shall cease to be exercised after [the date of termination], except that such termination shall not affect-
(A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date;
(B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or
(C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.
|
507.
|
United Nations Participation Act, P.L. 79-264, §5, 59 Stat. 620 (1945), codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §287c. The extent to which the UNPA would permit the blocking of property by placing individuals or entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is uncertain. The UNPA gives the President the authority to implement U.N. sanctions and authorizes him to enforce such measures by issuing "such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him," thereby allowing him to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Ibid. IEEPA authority includes the authority for the President to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B).
|
508.
|
50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1).
|
509.
|
S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 6 (1977) (noting that "blocked assets may continue to be blocked by the President despite termination of a state of emergency, the National Emergencies Act notwithstanding, unless Congress specifies otherwise" and that "[n]othing in this act is intended by the committee to interfere with the authority of the President to continue blocking assets which are presently blocked, or to impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries").
|
510.
|
Executive Order 13304 of May 28, 2003, "Termination of Emergencies With Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001," 68 Federal Register 32315, May 29, 2003.
|
511.
|
See, for example, Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
|
512.
|
See Glob. Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that covered "interest" need not be a legal interest "in the way that a trustee is legal owner of the corpus even if someone else enjoys the beneficial interest").
|
513.
|
50 U.S.C. §1706(a)(1) (emphasis added).
|
514.
|
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), P.L. 115-232.
|
515.
|
Ibid. §1766(a).
|
516.
|
Executive Order 13222.
|
517.
|
ECRA §1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.
|
518.
|
ECRA §1766(b) ("The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).").
|