Qatar: Issues for the 118th Congress
March 10June 21, 2023 , 2023
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich monarchy
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich monarchy
, strategically located near the center of the strategically located near the center of the
Persian Gulf. Defense and diplomatic cooperation anchor close-U.S. Qatari relations: Qatar hosts Persian Gulf. Defense and diplomatic cooperation anchor close-U.S. Qatari relations: Qatar hosts
Christopher M. Blanchard
thousands of U.S. troops, allows U.S. military use of Qatari facilities, and consults with U.S.
thousands of U.S. troops, allows U.S. military use of Qatari facilities, and consults with U.S.
Specialist in Middle
Specialist in Middle
officials on engagements with third parties in the Middle East region and beyond. In January
officials on engagements with third parties in the Middle East region and beyond. In January
Eastern Affairs
Eastern Affairs
2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani reaffirmed the
2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani reaffirmed the
multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden Administration
multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden Administration
designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally. designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally.
Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG):
Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG):
LNG revenues have fueled change in Qatar and enabled Qatar’s active foreign policies. Qatar’s fewer than 300,000 citizens LNG revenues have fueled change in Qatar and enabled Qatar’s active foreign policies. Qatar’s fewer than 300,000 citizens
enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as with other Gulf states, a large expatriate population is enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as with other Gulf states, a large expatriate population is
critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth; critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth;
transformed the global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks; engaged in complex and transformed the global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks; engaged in complex and
at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and pursued a course of limited domestic political at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and pursued a course of limited domestic political
liberalization. liberalization.
While Qatar supports many U.S. priorities, its leaders’ pursuit of Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented
While Qatar supports many U.S. priorities, its leaders’ pursuit of Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented
both opportunities and challenges. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand military, security, diplomatic, and both opportunities and challenges. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand military, security, diplomatic, and
economic cooperation with Qatar. Issues of immediate priority for the United States include shaping Qatari choices economic cooperation with Qatar. Issues of immediate priority for the United States include shaping Qatari choices
with regard to about energy production and exports, sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation, encouraging stability energy production and exports, sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation, encouraging stability
in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Arab states, and leveraging in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Arab states, and leveraging
Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and with neighboring Iran. Qatar has not joined Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and with neighboring Iran. Qatar has not joined
the Abraham Accords between some Arab states and Israel but has instead conditioned normalization of relations with Israel the Abraham Accords between some Arab states and Israel but has instead conditioned normalization of relations with Israel
on substantial progress toward resolving Israel-Palestinian disputes. on substantial progress toward resolving Israel-Palestinian disputes.
In terms of its approach to Russia and China, Qatar voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations,
In terms of its approach to Russia and China, Qatar voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations,
stated its “respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,” and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful stated its “respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,” and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful
resolution to the conflict in accordance with international law. Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China (PRC) leader Xi resolution to the conflict in accordance with international law. Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China (PRC) leader Xi
Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December 2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December 2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China
Summit. PRC state-owned firms have provided infrastructure and construction services for some major projects in Qatar. Summit. PRC state-owned firms have provided infrastructure and construction services for some major projects in Qatar.
Qatar exports oil products and LNG to China. Qatar exports oil products and LNG to China.
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar, marking a shift in Qatar’s
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar, marking a shift in Qatar’s
defense planning toward the use of advanced U.S. attack and transport helicopters and other weapons systems, including defense planning toward the use of advanced U.S. attack and transport helicopters and other weapons systems, including
items for air defense and missile defense. Qatar is investing in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs, items for air defense and missile defense. Qatar is investing in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs,
with planned Qatar-funded development projects at Al Udeid Air Base valued at $8.4 billion through 2033. with planned Qatar-funded development projects at Al Udeid Air Base valued at $8.4 billion through 2033.
Qatar and the United States have not negotiated a Free Trade Agreement, but Qatar has used a Trade and Investment
Qatar and the United States have not negotiated a Free Trade Agreement, but Qatar has used a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) to undertake large investments in the United States. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of Framework Agreement (TIFA) to undertake large investments in the United States. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of
aerospace equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products. aerospace equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products.
Qatar’s constitution provides for elections to a consultative
Qatar’s constitution provides for elections to a consultative
Shura Council. The government limits freedom of assembly, Council. The government limits freedom of assembly,
expression, religion, the press, and association. Labor and migrants rights concerns have long drawn public and official expression, religion, the press, and association. Labor and migrants rights concerns have long drawn public and official
attention as Qatar has implemented large-scale infrastructure projects including in preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA attention as Qatar has implemented large-scale infrastructure projects including in preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA
soccer World Cup. The U.S. State Department notes reports of human rights violations in Qatar and credits Qatar with taking soccer World Cup. The U.S. State Department notes reports of human rights violations in Qatar and credits Qatar with taking
some steps to improve human rights and labor conditions. some steps to improve human rights and labor conditions.
In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar remains relatively limited with the exception of appropriations and
In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar remains relatively limited with the exception of appropriations and
authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional review of proposed foreign military sales. authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional review of proposed foreign military sales.
Foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while Qatar’s resources, Foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while Qatar’s resources,
sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional interest in Qatar’s energy and investment policies sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional interest in Qatar’s energy and investment policies
and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties. In the 117th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties. In the 117th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic
Relationships was active. Members of Congress and congressional staff frequently visit Qatar to attend conferences, consult Relationships was active. Members of Congress and congressional staff frequently visit Qatar to attend conferences, consult
with U.S. civilian and military personnel, and to conduct oversight of U.S. regional policy and U.S. military operations. with U.S. civilian and military personnel, and to conduct oversight of U.S. regional policy and U.S. military operations.
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Qatar: Issues for the 118th Congress
Contents
Overview and Bilateral Relations .................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Relations .............................................................................. 3
Arms Sales .......................................................................................................................... 4
Al Udeid Air Base and Military Construction .................................................................... 4
Counterterrorism Cooperation ............................................................................................ 5
U.S. Security Assistance ..................................................................................................... 6
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations ................................................................................................ 6
Congress and Qatar ................................................................................................................... 7
Qatari Politics and Government ...................................................................................................... 7
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 8
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 9
Labor Issues and Trafficking in Persons ............................................................................. 9
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 10
Qatar’s Foreign Policy .................................................................................................................... 11 10
Qatar and Russia’s War against Ukraine .................................................................................. 11
Qatar and China....................................................................................................................... 12
Qatar and Afghanistan ............................................................................................................. 12
Qatar and its Neighbors ........................................................................................................... 13
Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues ............................................................................................ 16
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance ............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure, 2015 ................................. 16
Tables
Table
Table A-1. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022 ........................................................ 19
Appendixes
Appendix. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022 .................................................... 19
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20
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Qatar: Issues for the 118th Congress
Overview and Bilateral Relations
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich monarchy, strategically located near the center of the The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich monarchy, strategically located near the center of the
Persian Gulf (seePersian Gulf (see
Figure 1); its natural resources and active foreign policy give it global ; its natural resources and active foreign policy give it global
influence. Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major influence. Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major
exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).1 From 2000 to 2021, Qatar’s GDP increased tenfold exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).1 From 2000 to 2021, Qatar’s GDP increased tenfold
from $17 billion to an estimated $179 billion. The country’s population, including expatriates, from $17 billion to an estimated $179 billion. The country’s population, including expatriates,
more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2022, growing to over 2.7 million in 2022.2 Its fewer more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2022, growing to over 2.7 million in 2022.2 Its fewer
than 300,000 citizens enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as with than 300,000 citizens enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as with
other Gulf states, a large expatriate population is critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the other Gulf states, a large expatriate population is critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the
mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth; transformed the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth; transformed the
global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks; engaged in global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks; engaged in
complex and at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and complex and at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and
introduced constitutional changes to formalize succession and limited consultative governance. introduced constitutional changes to formalize succession and limited consultative governance.
International attention focuses on Qatar’s roles as an energy exporter and diplomatic catalyst. International attention focuses on Qatar’s roles as an energy exporter and diplomatic catalyst.
U.S. officials recognized Qatar’s independence in September 1971 and established diplomatic
U.S. officials recognized Qatar’s independence in September 1971 and established diplomatic
relations in 1972. Since the 1990s, successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand relations in 1972. Since the 1990s, successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand
military, security, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with Qatar. Qatari leaders’ pursuit of military, security, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with Qatar. Qatari leaders’ pursuit of
Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented both opportunities and challenges over Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented both opportunities and challenges over
time. Past U.S. Administrations have scrutinized Qatari policy with regard to some armed time. Past U.S. Administrations have scrutinized Qatari policy with regard to some armed
conflicts and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa region and some Qataris’ conflicts and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa region and some Qataris’
relationships with Islamist groups: at present Qatar supports many U.S. priorities and U.S. relationships with Islamist groups: at present Qatar supports many U.S. priorities and U.S.
officials welcome Qatar’s partnership (see below). officials welcome Qatar’s partnership (see below).
Issues of immediate priority for the U.S. government include shaping Qatari choices
Issues of immediate priority for the U.S. government include shaping Qatari choices
with regard to energy about energy production and exports, sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation, production and exports, sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation,
encouraging stability in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation encouraging stability in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and other Arab states, and leveraging Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with the Council (GCC) and other Arab states, and leveraging Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with the
Taliban government in Afghanistan and with neighboring Iran. Qatar has not joined the Abraham Taliban government in Afghanistan and with neighboring Iran. Qatar has not joined the Abraham
Accords that some other Arab states have signed with Israel since 2020, but has instead Accords that some other Arab states have signed with Israel since 2020, but has instead
conditioned normalization of relations with Israel on substantial progress toward resolving conditioned normalization of relations with Israel on substantial progress toward resolving
Israel-Palestinian disputes. Israel-Palestinian disputes.
In January 2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
In January 2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
reaffirmed the multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden reaffirmed the multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden
Administration designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Administration designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Ally. A Biden Administration official said that the designation “reflects U.S. commitment to the Ally. A Biden Administration official said that the designation “reflects U.S. commitment to the
strategic partnership and the role that we envision for Qatar in the region.”3 strategic partnership and the role that we envision for Qatar in the region.”3
Qatar hosts U.S. military forces under the terms of a defense cooperation agreement, including
Qatar hosts U.S. military forces under the terms of a defense cooperation agreement, including
the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S.-Qatar security ties have the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S.-Qatar security ties have
1 In 2015, Qatar National Bank estimated that at then-prevailing production rates, Qatar’s gas reserves could last 138 1 In 2015, Qatar National Bank estimated that at then-prevailing production rates, Qatar’s gas reserves could last 138
years. Sergio Chapa, “U.S. Holds World’s Top LNG Exporter Spot on European Energy Crisis,” years. Sergio Chapa, “U.S. Holds World’s Top LNG Exporter Spot on European Energy Crisis,”
Bloomberg, February , February
1, 2022; and, Agence France Presse, “Qatar vast gas reserves ‘to last 138 years’: report,” June 21, 2015. 1, 2022; and, Agence France Presse, “Qatar vast gas reserves ‘to last 138 years’: report,” June 21, 2015.
2 Based on figures available from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
2 Based on figures available from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision,” accessed February 2023. Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision,” accessed February 2023.
3 U.S. Department of State, Special Online Briefing with Major General Matthew McFarlane, Commander, Combined 3 U.S. Department of State, Special Online Briefing with Major General Matthew McFarlane, Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, and Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, February 28, Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, and Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, February 28,
2023. 2023.
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deepened since the mid-1990s, and in May 2022, CENTCOM commander General Erik Kurilla
deepened since the mid-1990s, and in May 2022, CENTCOM commander General Erik Kurilla
described U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation as “a critically important strategic partnership.”4 described U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation as “a critically important strategic partnership.”4
Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance
Area
11,586 sq. km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)
11,586 sq. km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)
People
Population: ~2.7 mil ion, of which nearly ~90% are expatriates ~2.7 mil ion, of which nearly ~90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 65.2%; Christian 13.7%; Hindu 15.9%; 3.8% Buddhist; and 1% other. Figures Muslim 65.2%; Christian 13.7%; Hindu 15.9%; 3.8% Buddhist; and 1% other. Figures
include expatriates. (2020 est.) include expatriates. (2020 est.)
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $249 bil ion on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis (2021 est.) $249 bil ion on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis (2021 est.)
GDP per capita: $92,900 on PPP basis $92,900 on PPP basis
Inflation: 2.3% (2021) 2.3% (2021)
GDP Growth Rate: 1.59% (2021) : 1.59% (2021)
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: ~900,000 barrels per day (2022) ~900,000 barrels per day (2022)
Gas (LNG) Exports: 127.9 bil ion cubic meters per year (2021) : 127.9 bil ion cubic meters per year (2021)
Sources: Graphic created by CRS using data from Department of State and Esri. At-a-glance information from Graphic created by CRS using data from Department of State and Esri. At-a-glance information from
CIA World Factbook (March 2023), U.N. Population Division (March 2023), International Monetary Fund, and CIA World Factbook (March 2023), U.N. Population Division (March 2023), International Monetary Fund, and
Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) Annual Statistics Bul etin (October 2022). Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) Annual Statistics Bul etin (October 2022).
On several occasions, U.S. officials have acknowledged Qatar’s role in supporting U.S.
On several occasions, U.S. officials have acknowledged Qatar’s role in supporting U.S.
diplomatic efforts globally. In July 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised Qatar for its diplomatic efforts globally. In July 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised Qatar for its
role in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, assisting the United States with Afghanistan, and role in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, assisting the United States with Afghanistan, and
holding indirect talks with Iran.5 In January 2023, Blinken again acknowledged Qatar for
4 U.S. CENTCOM, “CENTCOM Commander meets with Qatar Armed Forces Chief of Staff,” May 174 U.S. CENTCOM, “CENTCOM Commander meets with Qatar Armed Forces Chief of Staff,” May 17
, 2022. 5 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Al-Thani,” July 3, 2022. , 2022.
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holding indirect talks with Iran.5 In January 2023, Blinken again acknowledged Qatar for diplomatically engaging on Ukraine, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.6diplomatically engaging on Ukraine, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.6 In May 2023, Secretary Blinken thanked Qatar’s Prime Minister for Qatar’s “important efforts to de-escalate violence” between Israel and Palestinian groups in Gaza and “reiterated his appreciation for Qatar’s continued assistance on Afghanistan.”7
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Relations
In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar engaged in a years-long diplomatic dispute In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar engaged in a years-long diplomatic dispute
regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.
78 The The
dispute froze then-planned economic and military cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on dispute froze then-planned economic and military cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on
arms sales to Qatar (§566(d), P.L. 100-461) that lasted until the months leading up to the 1991 arms sales to Qatar (§566(d), P.L. 100-461) that lasted until the months leading up to the 1991
Persian Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory and agreed Persian Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory and agreed
to destroy the missiles in question.to destroy the missiles in question.
89
Deep U.S. defense and security relations with Qatar did not begin until after the 1991 war. In
Deep U.S. defense and security relations with Qatar did not begin until after the 1991 war. In
January 1991, Qatari armored forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi January 1991, Qatari armored forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi
Arabian town of Kafji, on the coastal road leading south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Arabian town of Kafji, on the coastal road leading south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich
Eastern Province.Eastern Province.
910
In June 1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a
In June 1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a
period of close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present. In June 1995, period of close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present. In June 1995,
Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father and became Emir. The United States promptly Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father and became Emir. The United States promptly
recognized Shaykh Hamad’s assumption of power, and welcomed his decision to subsequently recognized Shaykh Hamad’s assumption of power, and welcomed his decision to subsequently
expand U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation. Shaykh Hamad faced a counter-coup attempt in 1996.expand U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation. Shaykh Hamad faced a counter-coup attempt in 1996.
With its small territory and narrow citizen population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on
With its small territory and narrow citizen population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on
external cooperation and support for its security. With 16,500 personnel, Qatar’s armed forces are external cooperation and support for its security. With 16,500 personnel, Qatar’s armed forces are
the second smallest in the Middle East.the second smallest in the Middle East.
1011 Since 2013, the government has imposed mandatory Since 2013, the government has imposed mandatory
short-term (3-4 month) military training and service for Qatari males. short-term (3-4 month) military training and service for Qatari males.
Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded since 2001 to include cooperative defense exercises,
Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded since 2001 to include cooperative defense exercises,
equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. Qatar hosts the forward headquarters for equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. Qatar hosts the forward headquarters for
U.S. Central Command. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited U.S. Central Command. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited
Doha, met with Emir Tamim, and signed a 10-year bilateral defense cooperation agreement. The Doha, met with Emir Tamim, and signed a 10-year bilateral defense cooperation agreement. The
5 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Al-Thani,” July 3, 2022.
6 In January 2023, Qatar had proposed hosting Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi and
6 In January 2023, Qatar had proposed hosting Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi and
Rwandan President Paul Kagame for talks over ongoing conflict in eastern Congo, but the talks did not materialize. Rwandan President Paul Kagame for talks over ongoing conflict in eastern Congo, but the talks did not materialize.
U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Al Thani,” January 21, 2023. Al Thani,” January 21, 2023.
7
7
U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Al Thani,” May 13, 2023.
8 Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to
Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand
For Return of Illicit Stingers,” For Return of Illicit Stingers,”
New York Times, June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn Into Gulf Dispute—Stray , June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn Into Gulf Dispute—Stray
Stingers Tied To Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,” Stingers Tied To Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,”
Washington Post, October 6, 1988. , October 6, 1988.
89 The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1991 (§568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Act of 1991 (§568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment No. 144) that Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment No. 144) that
repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national interest to repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national interest to
reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the Middle East.” reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the Middle East.”
910 Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,” Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,”
United Press International, January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright, , January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright,
“Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,” “Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,”
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 3, 1991. , February 3, 1991.
1011 Bahrain’s armed forces are the smallest. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Bahrain’s armed forces are the smallest. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance
2022. .
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text of the agreement is classified.
text of the agreement is classified.
1112 Qatar is a member of the Combined Maritime Forces Qatar is a member of the Combined Maritime Forces
coalition, which operates Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 (maritime security and counter-coalition, which operates Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 (maritime security and counter-
terrorism), CTF 151 (counter piracy), CTF 152 (Gulf security and cooperation), and CTF 153 terrorism), CTF 151 (counter piracy), CTF 152 (Gulf security and cooperation), and CTF 153
(Red Sea security). The Qatari military and the West Virginia National Guard cooperate under the (Red Sea security). The Qatari military and the West Virginia National Guard cooperate under the
U.S. National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program. U.S. National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program.
Qatar’s 2022 designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally qualifies Qatar to purchase certain U.S.
Qatar’s 2022 designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally qualifies Qatar to purchase certain U.S.
arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the
United States, for which it would not otherwise be eligible. United States, for which it would not otherwise be eligible.
Over the past several years, the number of U.S. military personnel who are deployed at the
Over the past several years, the number of U.S. military personnel who are deployed at the
various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid Air Base (see below), has ranged from about 8,000 various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid Air Base (see below), has ranged from about 8,000
to more than 10,000.to more than 10,000.
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Arms Sales
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar,
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar,
marking a shift in Qatar’s defense planning toward the use of advanced U.S. attack and transport marking a shift in Qatar’s defense planning toward the use of advanced U.S. attack and transport
helicopters and other weapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see helicopters and other weapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see
Table A-1 in the1 in Appendix below)). France previously had provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s . France previously had provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s
arms inventory. Qatar collaborates with Italy and Turkey in support of its naval development arms inventory. Qatar collaborates with Italy and Turkey in support of its naval development
efforts.efforts.
13 14 Qatar’s purchase of U.S. weapons systems, including U.S. air and missile defense Qatar’s purchase of U.S. weapons systems, including U.S. air and missile defense
systems, corresponds to increased interest in such systems from some other governments in the systems, corresponds to increased interest in such systems from some other governments in the
region, ostensibly to defend against and respond to potential attacks from Iran. In 2021, the U.S. region, ostensibly to defend against and respond to potential attacks from Iran. In 2021, the U.S.
Department of State reported Department of State reported
Qatar has over $26 billion in active government-to-government cases under the Foreign Military
Qatar has over $26 billion in active government-to-government cases under the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) system making Qatar the United States’ third largest FMS partner in the world. Sales (FMS) system making Qatar the United States’ third largest FMS partner in the world.
Recent and significant FMS sales focused on integrated air and missile defense and include the Recent and significant FMS sales focused on integrated air and missile defense and include the
PATRIOT long-range air missile system, the National Advanced Surface PATRIOT long-range air missile system, the National Advanced Surface
to Air Missile System, and the AN/FPS-132 Early Warning Radar; F-15QA fighter aircraft - to Air Missile System, and the AN/FPS-132 Early Warning Radar; F-15QA fighter aircraft—the most advanced F-15 in the most advanced F-15 in
production; and AH-64E Apache attack helicopters. Each of these programs includes facility production; and AH-64E Apache attack helicopters. Each of these programs includes facility
construction and extended munitions, logistics, and training support.construction and extended munitions, logistics, and training support.
1415
Al Udeid Air Base and Military Construction
Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha during the
Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha during the
1990s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also awarded over $100 million in Military 1990s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also awarded over $100 million in Military
Construction Air Force (MCAF) contracts for the initial construction of U.S. storage, housing, Construction Air Force (MCAF) contracts for the initial construction of U.S. storage, housing,
11
12 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021. In addition to this U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021. In addition to this
agreement, as of 2021, the United States and Qatar had the following agreements for defense cooperation: 2012 agreement, as of 2021, the United States and Qatar had the following agreements for defense cooperation: 2012
General Security of Military Information Agreement, 2013 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, 2013 Basic General Security of Military Information Agreement, 2013 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, 2013 Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, 2016 Communications Interoperability and Security Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, 2016 Communications Interoperability and Security
Memorandum of Agreement, and 2020 Maritime Implementing Agreement. Memorandum of Agreement, and 2020 Maritime Implementing Agreement.
1213 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Qatar,” February 2023, available at U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Qatar,” February 2023, available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/qatar; U.S. Department of State, “Coordinator for https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/qatar; U.S. Department of State, “Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales Travels to Qatar,” August 12, 2020; and Department of Defense, “U.S. Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales Travels to Qatar,” August 12, 2020; and Department of Defense, “U.S.
and Qatar Sign MOU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” and Qatar Sign MOU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,”
January 14, 2019. January 14, 2019.
1314 Agnes Helou, “Qatari navy’s new amphibious ship to help fulfil nation’s ‘unique’ needs,” Breaking Defense, Agnes Helou, “Qatari navy’s new amphibious ship to help fulfil nation’s ‘unique’ needs,” Breaking Defense,
February 2, 2023. February 2, 2023.
1415 U.S. Department of State, Qatar Integrated Country Strategy, July 2022. U.S. Department of State, Qatar Integrated Country Strategy, July 2022.
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service, command, and communication facilities. Qatar’s financing and construction of the
service, command, and communication facilities. Qatar’s financing and construction of the
runways and most of the facilities at Al Udeid and its granting of permission for the construction runways and most of the facilities at Al Udeid and its granting of permission for the construction
of U.S.-funded facilities facilitated gradually deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces. of U.S.-funded facilities facilitated gradually deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces.
In April 2003, the U.S. military moved its Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East
In April 2003, the U.S. military moved its Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East
from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid. Al Udeid then served as a logistics, from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid. Al Udeid then served as a logistics,
command, and basing hub for U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the U.S. command, and basing hub for U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR.Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR.
1516
Qatar has invested more than $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since
Qatar has invested more than $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since
2003, expanding and enhancing the facility in conjunction with U.S. military construction 2003, expanding and enhancing the facility in conjunction with U.S. military construction
funding.funding.
1617 From FY2003 to FY2011, Congress appropriated and authorized more than $457 From FY2003 to FY2011, Congress appropriated and authorized more than $457
million for U.S. military construction activities in Qatar.million for U.S. military construction activities in Qatar.
1718
Qatar plans further investment in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs.
Qatar plans further investment in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs.
Planned Planned
development projects under the Qatar Development of Al Udeid programAl Udeid development projects are valued at $8.4 billion with construction plans through are valued at $8.4 billion with construction plans through
2033 set to adapt base facilities from an expeditionary to an enduring nature and to enable them 2033 set to adapt base facilities from an expeditionary to an enduring nature and to enable them
to house more than 15,000 personnel and support additional fighter, transport, and helicopter to house more than 15,000 personnel and support additional fighter, transport, and helicopter
aircraft.aircraft.
18 19
Nearby Camp As Sayliyah housed significant U.S. military equipment pre-positioning and
Nearby Camp As Sayliyah housed significant U.S. military equipment pre-positioning and
command facilities for the CENTCOM area of operations prior to its closure and a repositioning command facilities for the CENTCOM area of operations prior to its closure and a repositioning
of U.S. equipment in mid-2021.of U.S. equipment in mid-2021.
1920 Facilities at As Sayliyah serve as the main operations center for Facilities at As Sayliyah serve as the main operations center for
U.S. resettlement efforts in Qatar for evacuees from Afghanistan. U.S. resettlement efforts in Qatar for evacuees from Afghanistan.
As of December 2022, thousandsThousands of Afghans of Afghans
remained remain in Qatar awaiting onward travel. in Qatar awaiting onward travel. In October 2022, press reports said Qatar planned to suspend additional flights from Afghanistan under the program until the completion of the December 2022 FIFA World Cup; flights reportedly resumed in January 2023.20 A U.S.-Qatar bilateral agreement provides terms for the hosting in Qatar of evacuees from A U.S.-Qatar bilateral agreement provides terms for the hosting in Qatar of evacuees from
Afghanistan under U.S. auspices.21Afghanistan under U.S. auspices.21
Counterterrorism Cooperation
U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including
U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including
reported past support by members of the royal family, have been considered over time alongside reported past support by members of the royal family, have been considered over time alongside
Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S.
military forces.22 U.S. officials have described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as military forces.22 U.S. officials have described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as
15significant, and the State Department report on terrorism for 2021 states that “Qatar has made
16 Rebecca Grant, “The Short, Strange Life of PSAB,” Rebecca Grant, “The Short, Strange Life of PSAB,”
Air and Space Forces, July 1, 2012 , July 1, 2012
1617 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021.
1718 Specific legislative text available from CRS. Specific legislative text available from CRS.
1819 U.S. CENTCOM response to CRS Inquiry, January 2023. U.S. CENTCOM response to CRS Inquiry, January 2023.
1920 Staff Sgt. Neil W. McCabe, “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar after three decades supporting readiness, resilience,” U.S. Staff Sgt. Neil W. McCabe, “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar after three decades supporting readiness, resilience,” U.S.
Army 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, June 24, 2021Army 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, June 24, 2021
.
20 Dan De Luce, Julia Ainsley, and Courtney Kube, “Qatar plans to suspend evacuation flights for U.S.-bound Afghan refugees while it hosts World Cup, sources say,” NBC News, October 22, 2022; and, Kylie Atwood, “US rolls out tool for Afghans in US to reunify with family members,” CNN, January 12, 2023. .
21 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs,
21 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs,
Qatar (22-919) – —Protocol Amending the Temporary Relocation
Transit Agreement of November 12, 2021, September 19, 2022; and, , September 19, 2022; and,
Qatar (21-1112) – —Temporary Relocation Transit
Agreement, November 12, 2021. November 12, 2021.
22 In 2022, media reports described a lawsuit involving allegations of terrorist financing by Qatar Charity and Qatar
22 In 2022, media reports described a lawsuit involving allegations of terrorist financing by Qatar Charity and Qatar
National Bank, and a reported investigation of similar allegations concerning the Emir’s half-brother. See Alan National Bank, and a reported investigation of similar allegations concerning the Emir’s half-brother. See Alan
Suderman, “Qatar, key US ally, faces new accusations of terror funding,” May 13, 2022; and, Sotloff et al v. Qatar Suderman, “Qatar, key US ally, faces new accusations of terror funding,” May 13, 2022; and, Sotloff et al v. Qatar
Charity et al, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, May 12, 2022. According to the 9/11 Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, Qatari royal family member and later Interior Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani provided support to Al Qaeda figures, including the suspected mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. See also, James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz, “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
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significant, and the State Department report on terrorism for 2021 states that “Qatar has made strides in addressing state-sourced internal support for educational and religious content strides in addressing state-sourced internal support for educational and religious content
espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples can still be espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples can still be
found in textbooks and disseminated through satellite television and other media.”23 found in textbooks and disseminated through satellite television and other media.”23
Qatar uses its own funds to pay for participation of Qatari personnel in the U.S. State
Qatar uses its own funds to pay for participation of Qatari personnel in the U.S. State
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program, including training that was Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program, including training that was
pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host the 2022 International Federation of Association Football pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host the 2022 International Federation of Association Football
(FIFA) soccer World Cup. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reached cooperative (FIFA) soccer World Cup. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reached cooperative
security agreements with Qatar related to the World Cup, and in July 2022 signed memoranda on security agreements with Qatar related to the World Cup, and in July 2022 signed memoranda on
border and cyber security cooperation.24 border and cyber security cooperation.24
U.S. Security Assistance
The Administration of President George W. Bush requested $10,000 in International Military
The Administration of President George W. Bush requested $10,000 in International Military
Education and Training (IMET) assistance funds for Qatar in FY2010, and requested an Education and Training (IMET) assistance funds for Qatar in FY2010, and requested an
additional $10,000 for FY2011 but did not allocate funds for Qatar during that fiscal year. The additional $10,000 for FY2011 but did not allocate funds for Qatar during that fiscal year. The
nominal IMET assistance had the administrative effect of making Qatar eligible to purchase other nominal IMET assistance had the administrative effect of making Qatar eligible to purchase other
U.S. military training at the reduced cost level available only to IMET recipients.25 The Obama, U.S. military training at the reduced cost level available only to IMET recipients.25 The Obama,
Trump, and Biden Administrations have not requested IMET assistance for Qatar, though Qatari Trump, and Biden Administrations have not requested IMET assistance for Qatar, though Qatari
personnel continue to participate in IMET and other U.S. training programs. personnel continue to participate in IMET and other U.S. training programs.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
Qatar and the United States have not negotiated a Free Trade Agreement, but Qatar has used a Qatar and the United States have not negotiated a Free Trade Agreement, but Qatar has used a
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to undertake large investments in the United Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to undertake large investments in the United
States. The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” the Qatar States. The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” the Qatar
Investment Authority’s (Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund) commitment of $45 billion in future Investment Authority’s (Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund) commitment of $45 billion in future
investments in U.S. companies and real estate. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aerospace investments in U.S. companies and real estate. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aerospace
equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products. Total bilateral trade in equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products. Total bilateral trade in
2022 was valued at $6.5 billion.26 Qatar Petroleum has jointly developed LNG export 2022 was valued at $6.5 billion.26 Qatar Petroleum has jointly developed LNG export
infrastructure at the Golden Pass facility in Texas with ExxonMobil.27 infrastructure at the Golden Pass facility in Texas with ExxonMobil.27
Charity et al, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, May 12, 2022. According to the 9/11 Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, Qatari royal family member and later Interior Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani provided support to Al Qaeda figures, including the suspected mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. See also, James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz, “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways (QA), has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft and in January 2022 announced that it would purchase up to 50 cargo aircraft and up to 50 737 Max passenger aircraft from Boeing.28 Qatar Airways and Airbus in 2023 announced they had reached a settlement of their dispute over paint on QA-purchased Airbus aircraft.29 In the past, some U.S. airlines challenged Qatar Airways’ benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement based on
23 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Qatar,” February 2023, available at 23 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Qatar,” February 2023, available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/qatar. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/qatar.
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS to Expand Security Cooperation with Qatar and the United Arab
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS to Expand Security Cooperation with Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates,” July 12, 2022. Emirates,” July 12, 2022.
25 The Senate version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2467, 112th Congress) would have 25 The Senate version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2467, 112th Congress) would have
amended existing law to make Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia eligible for such reduced amended existing law to make Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia eligible for such reduced
cost purchases without having to receive IMET. §1204 of S. 2467 would have amended Section 546(b) of the Foreign cost purchases without having to receive IMET. §1204 of S. 2467 would have amended Section 546(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2347e(b)). Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2347e(b)).
26 U.S. Census Bureau data via U.S. International Trade Administration, TradeStatsExpress, February 2023.
26 U.S. Census Bureau data via U.S. International Trade Administration, TradeStatsExpress, February 2023.
27 ExxonMobil, “QatarEnergy and ExxonMobil to independently market Golden Pass LNG,” October 27, 2022; and, at 27 ExxonMobil, “QatarEnergy and ExxonMobil to independently market Golden Pass LNG,” October 27, 2022; and, at
https://www.goldenpasslng.com/about/about-golden-pass. https://www.goldenpasslng.com/about/about-golden-pass.
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Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways (QA), has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft and in January 2022 announced that it would purchase up to 50 cargo aircraft and up to 50 737 Max passenger aircraft from Boeing.28 Qatar Airways and Airbus in 2023 announced they had reached a settlement of their dispute over paint on QA-purchased Airbus aircraft.29 In the past, some U.S. airlines challenged Qatar Airways’ benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement based on 28 “Boeing lands huge airplane order from Qatar Airways.” Associated Press, January 31, 2022. 29 Airbus, “Qatar Airways and Airbus reach amicable settlement in legal dispute,” February 1, 2023.
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the Qatari government’s support for QA aircraft purchases.30 The United States and Qatar reached the Qatari government’s support for QA aircraft purchases.30 The United States and Qatar reached
a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar Airways to a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar Airways to
financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick up financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick up
passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. European officials reached an open skies passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. European officials reached an open skies
agreement with Qatar in 2021, but not all European Union member states have ratified it.31 agreement with Qatar in 2021, but not all European Union member states have ratified it.31
Several prominent U.S. universities have established satellite faculty campuses in Doha at Qatar’s
Several prominent U.S. universities have established satellite faculty campuses in Doha at Qatar’s
Education City, where Qatari, American, and other students pursue undergraduate and graduate Education City, where Qatari, American, and other students pursue undergraduate and graduate
coursework across a broad range of subjects: Carnegie Mellon, Virginia Commonwealth coursework across a broad range of subjects: Carnegie Mellon, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Georgetown University, Texas A&M, Weill Cornell Medicine, and Northwestern University, Georgetown University, Texas A&M, Weill Cornell Medicine, and Northwestern
University. University.
Congress and Qatar
In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar remains relatively limited with the exception of In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar remains relatively limited with the exception of
appropriations and authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional appropriations and authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional
review of proposed foreign military sales to the Qatari military. Congressional foreign affairs, review of proposed foreign military sales to the Qatari military. Congressional foreign affairs,
defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while
Qatar’s resources, sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional Qatar’s resources, sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional
interest in Qatar’s energy and investment policies and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties. interest in Qatar’s energy and investment policies and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties.
In the 117th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic Relationships was
In the 117th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic Relationships was
active. The Senate in 2022 adopted S.Res. 390, expressing appreciation for Qatar’s “pivotal role active. The Senate in 2022 adopted S.Res. 390, expressing appreciation for Qatar’s “pivotal role
and support of Operation Allies Refuge; and ... support to temporarily house thousands of and support of Operation Allies Refuge; and ... support to temporarily house thousands of
evacuees [from Afghanistan] until they are cleared for follow-on movement.” In 2022, Congress evacuees [from Afghanistan] until they are cleared for follow-on movement.” In 2022, Congress
designated U.S. veterans who served on active duty in Qatar and several other countries on or designated U.S. veterans who served on active duty in Qatar and several other countries on or
after August 2, 1990, as “covered veterans” under the Honoring our Promise to Address after August 2, 1990, as “covered veterans” under the Honoring our Promise to Address
Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-168), which expands health care eligibility Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-168), which expands health care eligibility
for veterans subject to toxic exposure. The FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 117-for veterans subject to toxic exposure. The FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 117-
81 did not include a provision from the House-passed version of the bill (Section 1251 of H.R. 81 did not include a provision from the House-passed version of the bill (Section 1251 of H.R.
4350) on U.S.-Qatar relations, but the joint explanatory statement accompanying the bill repeated 4350) on U.S.-Qatar relations, but the joint explanatory statement accompanying the bill repeated
that provision’s operative statement that “the United States should continue to strengthen the that provision’s operative statement that “the United States should continue to strengthen the
relationship between the United States and Qatar, including through security and economic relationship between the United States and Qatar, including through security and economic
cooperation.” cooperation.”
Qatari Politics and Government
Qatar declared its independence from the United Kingdom on September 3, 1971.32 It is a Qatar declared its independence from the United Kingdom on September 3, 1971.32 It is a
constitutional monarchy governed by the Al Thani family; in an April 2003 referendum, Qatari constitutional monarchy governed by the Al Thani family; in an April 2003 referendum, Qatari
28 “Boeing lands huge airplane order from Qatar Airways.” Associated Press, January 31, 2022. 29 Airbus, “Qatar Airways and Airbus reach amicable settlement in legal dispute,” February 1, 2023. 30 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016. 31 European Commission, “Aviation: EU and Qatar sign landmark aviation agreement,” October 18, 2021. 32 Treaties signed in 1868 and 1916 between the Al Thani family and the United Kingdom recognized the Al Thani
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voters approved a new constitution that outlined plans to elect some members of the consultative National Assembly (Majlis al Shura) and recognized women’s right to vote and run for national office. The Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (age 42), began his rule in June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since its independence.33 Al Thani family members lead voters approved a new constitution that outlined plans to elect some members of the consultative National Assembly (Majlis al Shura) and recognized women’s right to vote and run for national office. The Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (age 42), began his rule in June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since its independence.33 Al Thani family members lead
30 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016. 31 European Commission, “Aviation: EU and Qatar sign landmark aviation agreement,” October 18, 2021. 32 Treaties signed in 1868 and 1916 between the Al Thani family and the United Kingdom recognized the Al Thani family’s authority in Qatar but placed mutually agreed restrictions on Qatari sovereignty from 1868 through 1971. 33 The former emir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, raised Qatar’s global profile and influence after replacing his own (continued...)
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several government ministries and hold board seats on important state and private companies; the several government ministries and hold board seats on important state and private companies; the
ruling family retains ultimate political authority but its relationships with other leading families ruling family retains ultimate political authority but its relationships with other leading families
appear cooperative. In March 2023, Emir Tamim bin Hamad announced a cabinet reshuffle and appear cooperative. In March 2023, Emir Tamim bin Hamad announced a cabinet reshuffle and
named Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani as Prime Minister: Sheikh Mohammed has named Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani as Prime Minister: Sheikh Mohammed has
served as Qatar’s Foreign Minister since 2016.34 served as Qatar’s Foreign Minister since 2016.34
Qatari authorities delayed the holding of national elections envisioned in the 2003 constitution
Qatari authorities delayed the holding of national elections envisioned in the 2003 constitution
until October 2021, when Qatari voters selected 30 members for the 45-seat National Assembly. until October 2021, when Qatari voters selected 30 members for the 45-seat National Assembly.
The onset of political unrest in other regional countries from 2011 onward, the 2013 transition The onset of political unrest in other regional countries from 2011 onward, the 2013 transition
from former emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to his son Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and from former emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to his son Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and
the 2017-2021 confrontation between Qatar and some neighboring states may have contributed to the 2017-2021 confrontation between Qatar and some neighboring states may have contributed to
Qatari decisions to delay the election. Turnout in the 2021 election exceeded 63% of eligible Qatari decisions to delay the election. Turnout in the 2021 election exceeded 63% of eligible
voters. Citizens categorized as naturalized, including members of the numerous Al Murra tribe, voters. Citizens categorized as naturalized, including members of the numerous Al Murra tribe,
were ineligible to stand as candidates or vote, leading to some protests and arrests in the run up to were ineligible to stand as candidates or vote, leading to some protests and arrests in the run up to
the election.35 Qatari officials argued that procedural remedies were available to challenge the election.35 Qatari officials argued that procedural remedies were available to challenge
election-related complaints and that the new Shura Council could review “any amendments to the election-related complaints and that the new Shura Council could review “any amendments to the
laws governing the elections process.”36 None of the female candidates who stood for office were laws governing the elections process.”36 None of the female candidates who stood for office were
elected, but the Emir appointed two women among the 15 additional members whose elected, but the Emir appointed two women among the 15 additional members whose
appointments he controls in accordance with the constitution. Qatar last held Central Municipal appointments he controls in accordance with the constitution. Qatar last held Central Municipal
Council elections in 2019. Qatar convicted four protestors on related charges in May 2022, Council elections in 2019. Qatar convicted four protestors on related charges in May 2022,
sentencing two individuals to life terms.37 sentencing two individuals to life terms.37
Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Emir appoints all judges.
Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Emir appoints all judges.
Human Rights
The The
20212022 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar cites U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar cites
credible
credible
reports of: restrictions on free expression, including the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental
family’s authority in Qatar but placed mutually agreed restrictions on Qatari sovereignty from 1868 through 1971. 33 The former emir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, raised Qatar’s global profile and influence after replacing his own reports of: serious restrictions on free expression, including the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement, access to justice, and vulnerability to abuses, including forced labor; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully in free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation, including a complete prohibition on political parties; lack of investigation and accountability for gender-based violence; existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct; and prohibitions on independent trade unions.38
father in a palace coup in 1995. Qatar’s constitution reflects the previously contested principle that successors to the father in a palace coup in 1995. Qatar’s constitution reflects the previously contested principle that successors to the
throne will follow the hereditary line of Shaykh Hamad’s male offspring (Article 8). throne will follow the hereditary line of Shaykh Hamad’s male offspring (Article 8).
34 Andrew Mills, “Qatar
34 Andrew Mills, “Qatar
'’s emir names top diplomat as premier, reappoints energy and finance ministers,” Reuters, s emir names top diplomat as premier, reappoints energy and finance ministers,” Reuters,
March 7, 2023. March 7, 2023.
35 Some members of the Al Murra tribe have contested the leadership of Emir Tamim bin Hamad and his father, and
35 Some members of the Al Murra tribe have contested the leadership of Emir Tamim bin Hamad and his father, and
Qatari authorities have stripped some members of the tribe of their Qatari nationality in related disputes. In 2017, some Qatari authorities have stripped some members of the tribe of their Qatari nationality in related disputes. In 2017, some
Al Murra tribal figures supported Saudi efforts to isolate Qatar. Human Rights Watch, “The Shura Council Elections,” Al Murra tribal figures supported Saudi efforts to isolate Qatar. Human Rights Watch, “The Shura Council Elections,”
September 9, 2021; and Reuters, “QatarSeptember 9, 2021; and Reuters, “Qatar
'’s new electoral law stirs up tribal sensitivities,” August 12, 2021. For more s new electoral law stirs up tribal sensitivities,” August 12, 2021. For more
background see Jill Crystal, “Tribes and Patronage Networks in Qatar” in Uzi Rabi (ed.), background see Jill Crystal, “Tribes and Patronage Networks in Qatar” in Uzi Rabi (ed.),
Tribes and States in a
Changing Middle East, Oxford University Press, June 2016, pp. 37–56. , Oxford University Press, June 2016, pp. 37–56.
36 Qatar Government Communications Office statement in response to HRW report regarding “The Shura Council
36 Qatar Government Communications Office statement in response to HRW report regarding “The Shura Council
Elections,” September 9, 2021. Elections,” September 9, 2021.
37 Reuters, “Qatar jails four election protesters, including three for life,” May 13, 2022. 37 Reuters, “Qatar jails four election protesters, including three for life,” May 13, 2022.
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organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully in free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation, including prohibitions on political parties; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct; and prohibitions on independent trade unions.3838 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2023.
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A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of human rights abuses
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of human rights abuses
and appears to operate independently. It is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by and appears to operate independently. It is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by
the Emir’s mother, Shaykha Moza bint Nasser Al Missned. The non-governmental organization the Emir’s mother, Shaykha Moza bint Nasser Al Missned. The non-governmental organization
Freedom House classifies Qatar as “not free.”39 Freedom House classifies Qatar as “not free.”39
The European Parliament (EP) in December 2022 suspended consideration of Qatar-related
The European Parliament (EP) in December 2022 suspended consideration of Qatar-related
legislation pending resolution of allegations of corruption involving Qatari nationals, the NHRC, legislation pending resolution of allegations of corruption involving Qatari nationals, the NHRC,
and some EP Members.40 and some EP Members.40
Women’s Rights
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and work in the government and private sector. Qatar’s
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and work in the government and private sector. Qatar’s
constitution recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office. According to the State constitution recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office. According to the State
Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, despite the constitutional Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, despite the constitutional
assertion of equality.41 The application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage, assertion of equality.41 The application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage,
divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, contributes to this gender inequality, as divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, contributes to this gender inequality, as
does a lack of laws against domestic violence.42 Guardianship laws require young women to does a lack of laws against domestic violence.42 Guardianship laws require young women to
obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone, as well as “to marry, obtain a obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone, as well as “to marry, obtain a
government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and obtain some government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and obtain some
reproductive health care.”43 In the labor market, as of 2021, women (citizens and expatriates) reproductive health care.”43 In the labor market, as of 2021, women (citizens and expatriates)
constituteconstituted nearly 57% of the workforce.44 The World Economic Forum’s 2022 Global Gender nearly 57% of the workforce.44 The World Economic Forum’s 2022 Global Gender
Gap Report ranked Qatar 137 out of 146 countries assessed and found that Qatar was one of five Gap Report ranked Qatar 137 out of 146 countries assessed and found that Qatar was one of five
countries where health and survival outcomes demonstrate a 5% or more gap between men and countries where health and survival outcomes demonstrate a 5% or more gap between men and
women, but also praised Qatari women’s educational attainment.45 Qatar is a member of the women, but also praised Qatari women’s educational attainment.45 Qatar is a member of the
executive board of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of executive board of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women (UN Women). Women (UN Women).
Labor Issues and Trafficking in Persons
Domestic and international observers and officials have raised labor and migrants’ rights
Domestic and international observers and officials have raised labor and migrants’ rights
concerns for decades as Qatar has implemented large-scale infrastructure projects, including in concerns for decades as Qatar has implemented large-scale infrastructure projects, including in
preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA soccer World Cup. Press analysis citing government data preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA soccer World Cup. Press analysis citing government data
38 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, April 2022. from labor source countries reported in 2021 that thousands of foreign workers had died while employed in Qatar since 2011, but cited statistics that were not categorized “by occupation or place of work.”46 Amnesty International has said some labor conditions have amounted to the equivalent of “forced labor;” Qatari officials have highlighted labor law changes, acknowledged some shortcomings,
39 Freedom House, 39 Freedom House,
Freedom in the World, 2022. .
40 Joshua Posaner, Mari Eccles and Hanne Cokelaere, “EU Parliament to stop work on Qatar airline, visa laws,” 40 Joshua Posaner, Mari Eccles and Hanne Cokelaere, “EU Parliament to stop work on Qatar airline, visa laws,”
Politico, December 15, 2022; and, Eddy Wax and Ana Fota , “How Qatar used a secret deal to bind itself to the EU , December 15, 2022; and, Eddy Wax and Ana Fota , “How Qatar used a secret deal to bind itself to the EU
Parliament,” Parliament,”
Politico, February 17, 2023., February 17, 2023.
41 U.S. Department of State,
41 U.S. Department of State,
20212022 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, ,
April 2022March 2023. .
42 For more information and sources, see CRS Report R46423, 42 For more information and sources, see CRS Report R46423,
Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for
Congress, by Zoe Danon and Shannon L. Smith. , by Zoe Danon and Shannon L. Smith.
43 Human Rights Watch,
43 Human Rights Watch,
Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules, March 29, 2021. March 29, 2021.
44 World Bank, Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled International Labor 44 World Bank, Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled International Labor
Organization estimate)Organization estimate)
– —Qatar, December 2022. Qatar, December 2022.
45 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2022, Table 1.1, July 13, 2022.
45 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2022, Table 1.1, July 13, 2022.
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from labor source countries reported in 2021 that thousands of foreign workers had died while employed in Qatar since 2011, but cited statistics that were not categorized “by occupation or place of work.”46 Amnesty International has said some labor conditions have amounted to the equivalent of “forced labor;” Qatari officials have highlighted labor law changes, acknowledged some shortcomings, 46 “Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since World Cup awarded,” The Guardian, February 23, 2021.
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and rejected some foreign criticism.47 Qatari officials emphasize their and rejected some foreign criticism.47 Qatari officials emphasize their
commitment to ending abusive and exploitative labor practices and have established minimum commitment to ending abusive and exploitative labor practices and have established minimum
wage rules and banned some components of the wage rules and banned some components of the
kafala [migrant labor sponsorship] system. [migrant labor sponsorship] system.
Official enforcement reportedly has remained uneven and some reports suggest continuing abuses Official enforcement reportedly has remained uneven and some reports suggest continuing abuses
by private employers, including firms that supported World Cup-related projects.48 by private employers, including firms that supported World Cup-related projects.48
According to the State Department’s 2021 human rights report, “the government made efforts to
According to the State Department’s 2021 human rights report, “the government made efforts to
prevent and eliminate forced labor but did not in all cases effectively enforce the law; the prevent and eliminate forced labor but did not in all cases effectively enforce the law; the
kafala system left migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation.” The State Department’s 2022 Trafficking system left migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation.” The State Department’s 2022 Trafficking
in Persons report classifies Qatar as a Tier 2 country and describes several announced and in Persons report classifies Qatar as a Tier 2 country and describes several announced and
implemented reforms to Qatar’s sponsorship system. The report notes, “the government did not implemented reforms to Qatar’s sponsorship system. The report notes, “the government did not
meet the minimum standards in several key areas,” but observes that authorities “prosecuted a meet the minimum standards in several key areas,” but observes that authorities “prosecuted a
variety of cases exhibiting trafficking indicators under the labor laws, residency laws, or penal variety of cases exhibiting trafficking indicators under the labor laws, residency laws, or penal
code.”49 In November 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued a report code.”49 In November 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued a report
describing “significant progress” in Qatar’s efforts to reform its labor system and noting describing “significant progress” in Qatar’s efforts to reform its labor system and noting
“universal recognition that the work is not complete.”50 “universal recognition that the work is not complete.”50
Religious Freedom
Qatar’s constitution guarantees the freedom to practice religious rites in accordance with “the
Qatar’s constitution guarantees the freedom to practice religious rites in accordance with “the
maintenance of public order and morality.” Islam is the state religion and maintenance of public order and morality.” Islam is the state religion and
sharia is “a main is “a main
source” of legislation. Most citizens are Sunni Muslims, and some citizens are Shia Muslims. source” of legislation. Most citizens are Sunni Muslims, and some citizens are Shia Muslims.
Non-Muslims comprise most of Qatar’s non-citizen expatriate population, including Hindus, Non-Muslims comprise most of Qatar’s non-citizen expatriate population, including Hindus,
Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Copts, Orthodox Christians, Baha’i, and others. Expatriate non-Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Copts, Orthodox Christians, Baha’i, and others. Expatriate non-
Muslim religious groups must register with the government. The law prohibits public worship or Muslim religious groups must register with the government. The law prohibits public worship or
proselytization by non-Muslims. The State Department’s proselytization by non-Muslims. The State Department’s
2022 report on religious freedom report on religious freedom
conditions in Qatar during conditions in Qatar during
20212022 reported that Qatar reported that Qatar
continued to host the headquarters of the
continued to host the headquarters of the
International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), a group widely viewed in the press and IUMS, a group widely viewed in the press and academia as being affiliated with the Muslimacademia as being affiliated with the Muslim
Brotherhood, a Sunni Brotherhood, a Sunni transnational organization that promotes political Islam.transnational organization that promotes political Islam.
Although IUMS stated it was an independent association of scholars, observers said its Although IUMS stated it was an independent association of scholars, observers said its close close
relationship with the government helped it to serve as an instrument of the country’s soft relationship with the government helped it to serve as an instrument of the country’s soft
power.51
46 “Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since World Cup awarded,” The Guardian, February 23, 2021. power.51
The report states that “members of the government-allied International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) publicly framed homosexuality as an affront to Islam.”
Qatar’s Foreign Policy Qatar’s multidirectional foreign policy, financial resources, and unique international relationships have raised its global diplomatic profile since the early 2000s, and appears to lead other governments to view Qatari initiatives variously as useful or vexing depending on their discrete perspectives and interests. Qatar’s 2011 deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led
47 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Security guards subjected to forced labour,” April 7, 2022; Reuters, “Qatar minister 47 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Security guards subjected to forced labour,” April 7, 2022; Reuters, “Qatar minister
slams hypocrisy of people calling for World Cup boycott,” November 4, 2022. slams hypocrisy of people calling for World Cup boycott,” November 4, 2022.
48 Migrant Rights, “Job mobility in Qatar is still a mirage despite reforms; domestic workers most affected,” October 5,
48 Migrant Rights, “Job mobility in Qatar is still a mirage despite reforms; domestic workers most affected,” October 5,
2021; and, Pramod Acharya, “Months before World Cup, workers forced to return home early and with pending dues,” 2021; and, Pramod Acharya, “Months before World Cup, workers forced to return home early and with pending dues,”
Migrant Rights, September 4, 2022. Migrant Rights, September 4, 2022.
49 U.S. Department of State,
49 U.S. Department of State,
2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Qatar, July 2022. , July 2022.
50 ILO, 50 ILO,
Labour reforms in the State of Qatar: Coming together around a shared vision, November 3, 2022. , November 3, 2022.
51 U.S. State Department, 51 U.S. State Department,
20212022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Qatar, Report on International Religious Freedom: Qatar,
June 2, 2022May 15, 2023. .
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Qatar’s Foreign Policy
Qatar’s multidirectional foreign policy, financial resources, and unique international relationships have raised its global diplomatic profile since the early 2000s, and appears to lead other governments to view Qatari initiatives variously as useful or vexing depending on their discrete perspectives and interests. Qatar’s 2011 deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led operations in Libya signaled a new assertiveness, as did reported Qatari support for armed operations in Libya signaled a new assertiveness, as did reported Qatari support for armed
elements of the Syrian opposition during the height of Syria’s civil war. Some of Qatar’s elements of the Syrian opposition during the height of Syria’s civil war. Some of Qatar’s
positions have drawn U.S. attention and have been scrutinized by some of Qatar’s Arab positions have drawn U.S. attention and have been scrutinized by some of Qatar’s Arab
neighbors, including its contacts with the government of Iran and groups such as Lebanon’s neighbors, including its contacts with the government of Iran and groups such as Lebanon’s
Hezbollah, the Palestinian group Hamas, various other Islamist groups (including members of the Hezbollah, the Palestinian group Hamas, various other Islamist groups (including members of the
Muslim Brotherhood movement), and Afghanistan’s now-ruling Taliban. Muslim Brotherhood movement), and Afghanistan’s now-ruling Taliban.
Qatar and Russia’s War against Ukraine
In response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Qatar has stated its “respect for Ukraine’s In response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Qatar has stated its “respect for Ukraine’s
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders” sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders”
and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with international and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with international
law.52 Qatar also has provided $5 million to support humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees and law.52 Qatar also has provided $5 million to support humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees and
displaced persons and in December 2022 participated in a Ukraine solidarity conference displaced persons and in December 2022 participated in a Ukraine solidarity conference
organized by the government of France.53 Qatar’s diplomatic statements on the Russia-Ukraine organized by the government of France.53 Qatar’s diplomatic statements on the Russia-Ukraine
war and related humanitarian crises outline the Qatari government’s “full readiness to contribute war and related humanitarian crises outline the Qatari government’s “full readiness to contribute
to any international and regional effort aimed at alleviating the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and is in to any international and regional effort aimed at alleviating the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and is in
line with its position supporting peaceful solutions through dialogue and mediation.”54 line with its position supporting peaceful solutions through dialogue and mediation.”54
Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited Moscow in March 2022 to offer mediation, and, in October
Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited Moscow in March 2022 to offer mediation, and, in October
2022, the Emir spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by telephone and separately 2022, the Emir spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by telephone and separately
met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazakhstan during a meeting of the Shanghai met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazakhstan during a meeting of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).55 Qatar has signed a memorandum of understanding to become Cooperation Organization (SCO).55 Qatar has signed a memorandum of understanding to become
a SCO Dialogue Partner, as have Egypt and Saudi Arabia.56 a SCO Dialogue Partner, as have Egypt and Saudi Arabia.56
Qatar has voted in favor of U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of
Qatar has voted in favor of U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, but abstained, along with other GCC members, in the April 2022 vote on expelling Ukraine, but abstained, along with other GCC members, in the April 2022 vote on expelling
Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. Qatar has had close energy related ties to fellow Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. Qatar has had close energy related ties to fellow
natural gas exporter Russia, and has considered closer security cooperation with Russia at times natural gas exporter Russia, and has considered closer security cooperation with Russia at times
in the past.57 in the past.57
Qatar has committed to maintaining (and expanding as possible) its supplies of natural gas to Europe during the crisis. However, Qatari officials have said they will not divert to Europe gas already contracted for delivery to Asia, emphasizing that, “Qatar is absolutely committed to the sanctity of contracts.”58 Entities purchasing Qatari gas may have discretion to divert gas to Europe, which Qatari officials have not said they oppose. Qatari energy officials have stressed that no combination of major gas exporters can supply enough natural gas to Europe, on short
52 Qatar “calls for a ceasefire and the start of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, based on its keenness on the 52 Qatar “calls for a ceasefire and the start of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, based on its keenness on the
Charter of the United Nations and the well-established principles of the international law, its obligations stipulated in Charter of the United Nations and the well-established principles of the international law, its obligations stipulated in
the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and its commitment to the sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity of states.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in Humanitarian Meeting of Senior and territorial integrity of states.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in Humanitarian Meeting of Senior
Officials on Ukraine,” September 27, 2022. Officials on Ukraine,” September 27, 2022.
53 Qatar Information Office, “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Affirms Qatar
53 Qatar Information Office, “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Affirms Qatar
'’s Support for s Support for
UNHRC in Facing Global Challenges,” February 28, 2022; and, UNHRC in Facing Global Challenges,” February 28, 2022; and,
Gulf Times, “Ukraine, “Ukraine
'’s envoy hails Qatars envoy hails Qatar
'’s s
humanitarian support,” August 18, 2022. humanitarian support,” August 18, 2022.
54 Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in 54 Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in
'‘Solidarity with Ukrainian PeopleSolidarity with Ukrainian People
'’ Conference in Paris,” December 13, Conference in Paris,” December 13,
2022. 2022.
55 “Foreign Minister meets Russian Foreign Minister.”
55 “Foreign Minister meets Russian Foreign Minister.”
The Peninsula, March 14, 2022. , March 14, 2022.
56 Abhishek G Bhaya, “SCO to induct Egypt and Saudi Arabia as dialogue partners,” 56 Abhishek G Bhaya, “SCO to induct Egypt and Saudi Arabia as dialogue partners,”
CGTN, July 15, 2021. , July 15, 2021.
57 57
Al Jazeera, “Qatar FM: Doha buying S-400s ‘not anyone’s business,’” March 4, 2019. , “Qatar FM: Doha buying S-400s ‘not anyone’s business,’” March 4, 2019.
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Qatar has committed to maintaining (and expanding as possible) its supplies of natural gas to Europe during the crisis. However, Qatari officials have said they will not divert to Europe gas already contracted for delivery to Asia, emphasizing that, “Qatar is absolutely committed to the sanctity of contracts.”58 Entities purchasing Qatari gas may have discretion to divert gas to Europe, which Qatari officials have not said they oppose. Qatari energy officials have stressed that no combination of major gas exporters can supply enough natural gas to Europe, on short 58 QatarEnergy CEO Saad Al Kaabi quoted in Andrew Mills, “QatarEnergy expanding in LNG, won't divert supplies to Europe,” Reuters, October 18, 2022.
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notice, to completely compensate for a shutoff of gas supplies from Russia. Qatar’s Minister of notice, to completely compensate for a shutoff of gas supplies from Russia. Qatar’s Minister of
Energy warned in October 2022 that while European gas storage may prove sufficient through Energy warned in October 2022 that while European gas storage may prove sufficient through
early 2023, European countries may face significant challenges after that in replenishing stocks early 2023, European countries may face significant challenges after that in replenishing stocks
and providing gas for current use until more global supplies come online.59and providing gas for current use until more global supplies come online.59
Qatar has announced Qatar has announced
plans to expand its gas output and exports in coming years and has discussed new long-term plans to expand its gas output and exports in coming years and has discussed new long-term
purchase agreements with European customers.60 (See purchase agreements with European customers.60 (See
“Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues”
belowbelow.) In January 2023, Qatar announced it would replace a Russian firm in a joint natural gas .) In January 2023, Qatar announced it would replace a Russian firm in a joint natural gas
exploration venture in Lebanese waters in partnership with ENI of Italy and TotalEnergies of exploration venture in Lebanese waters in partnership with ENI of Italy and TotalEnergies of
France.61 France.61
Qatari officials at times have observed that multilateral financial sanctions could motivate some
Qatari officials at times have observed that multilateral financial sanctions could motivate some
energy producers to develop alternative, non-U.S. dollar-based means of marketing oil and gas energy producers to develop alternative, non-U.S. dollar-based means of marketing oil and gas
exports.62 exports.62
Qatar and China
Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China leader Xi Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China leader Xi Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December
2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China Summit. PRC firm 2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China Summit. PRC firm
China Railway Construction Corporation partnered with Qatari firms to build the Lusail stadium China Railway Construction Corporation partnered with Qatari firms to build the Lusail stadium
that hosted the 2022 World Cup final. China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) played a that hosted the 2022 World Cup final. China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) played a
central role in Qatar’s Hamad Port and Emiri Naval Base construction projects.63 In 2015, Qatar central role in Qatar’s Hamad Port and Emiri Naval Base construction projects.63 In 2015, Qatar
launched the first launched the first
renminbi clearing hub in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region, clearing hub in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region,
primarily to settle payments in China’s currency for exports of oil and gas.64 Oil, natural gas, and primarily to settle payments in China’s currency for exports of oil and gas.64 Oil, natural gas, and
petroleum products comprise most of Qatar’s exports to China. In November 2022, China’s petroleum products comprise most of Qatar’s exports to China. In November 2022, China’s
Sinopec and QatarEnergy agreed to a 27-year LNG supply deal. Sinopec and QatarEnergy agreed to a 27-year LNG supply deal.
Press reports suggest that China China
National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and Qatar-Energy National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and Qatar-Energy
may soon signsigned a similar a similar
3027-year deal-year deal
in June 2023.65 .65
Qatar and Afghanistan
Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, Qatari diplomats in Kabul helped Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, Qatari diplomats in Kabul helped
U.S. evacuation efforts, including by escorting small groups of Americans into the Kabul U.S. evacuation efforts, including by escorting small groups of Americans into the Kabul
58 QatarEnergy CEO Saad Al Kaabi quoted in Andrew Mills, “QatarEnergy expanding in LNG, won't divert supplies to Europe,” Reuters, October 18, 2022. airport.66 Since the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, 2021, Qatar Airways charter flights have evacuated additional U.S. and other nationals. President Biden and senior U.S. officials have thanked Qatar for its help in U.S. relocation efforts and for Qatar’s ongoing engagement in talks with the Taliban on issues of mutual concern to Qatar and the United States. U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats transferred to Embassy Doha, where they operate an Afghan Affairs Unit. The Biden Administration sought $41.9 million in FY2023 State Department funding to support the
59 Andrew England, “Europe at risk of ‘much worse’ energy crisis next year, warns Qatar,”
59 Andrew England, “Europe at risk of ‘much worse’ energy crisis next year, warns Qatar,”
Financial Times, October , October
18, 2022. 18, 2022.
60 “Germany agrees gas deal with Qatar to help end dependency on Russia.”
60 “Germany agrees gas deal with Qatar to help end dependency on Russia.”
The Guardian, March 20 2022. , March 20 2022.
61 Bassem Mroue, “Qatar boosts influence in Lebanon amid multiple crises,” Associated Press, February 4, 2023. 61 Bassem Mroue, “Qatar boosts influence in Lebanon amid multiple crises,” Associated Press, February 4, 2023.
62 “Ukraine-Russia crisis is driving countries to explore new ways of pricing oil, Qatar says,” 62 “Ukraine-Russia crisis is driving countries to explore new ways of pricing oil, Qatar says,”
CNC, March 26, 2022. , March 26, 2022.
63 Qatar New Port Project at http://www.npp.com.qa/Construction.html. 63 Qatar New Port Project at http://www.npp.com.qa/Construction.html.
64 SWIFT, “The United Arab Emirates and Qatar drive RMB adoption in the Middle East,” press release, January 28, 64 SWIFT, “The United Arab Emirates and Qatar drive RMB adoption in the Middle East,” press release, January 28,
2016. 2016.
65
65
Chen Aizhu and Marwa Rashad, “Exclusive: China's CNPC set to seal mega Qatari LNG deal –sourcesAndrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “Qatar strikes second big LNG supply deal with China,” Reuters, June 20, 2023. 66 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,” Washington Post, August 22, 2021.
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,” Reuters, February 13, 2023.
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airport.66 Since the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, 2021, Qatar Airways charter flights have evacuated additional U.S. and other nationals. President Biden and senior U.S. officials have thanked Qatar for its help in U.S. relocation efforts and for Qatar’s ongoing engagement in talks with the Taliban on issues of mutual concern to Qatar and the United States. U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats transferred to Embassy Doha, where they operate an Afghan Affairs Unit. The Biden Administration sought $41.9 million in FY2023 State Department funding to support the Protecting Power Arrangement (PPA) between Qatar and the United States to protect certain U.S. Protecting Power Arrangement (PPA) between Qatar and the United States to protect certain U.S.
interests in Afghanistan. interests in Afghanistan.
Qatar has maintained contact with Taliban officials and in January 2023,
Qatar has maintained contact with Taliban officials and in January 2023,
Qatar’s Foreign Minister Foreign Minister (and then-Deputy Prime Minister) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani described Taliban actions to impose limits on the education and employment of girls and women described Taliban actions to impose limits on the education and employment of girls and women
as “very disappointing.”67 as “very disappointing.”67 In May 2023, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed reportedly travelled to Kandahar, Afghanistan for a direct meeting with Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada.
As noted above, Qatar and the United States have a bilateral agreement regarding Qatar’s hosting
As noted above, Qatar and the United States have a bilateral agreement regarding Qatar’s hosting
of Afghan nationals for a limited period to complete their vetting and processing for onward of Afghan nationals for a limited period to complete their vetting and processing for onward
migration.68 Qatar’s Camp As Sayliyah, a former pre-positioning site for U.S. military equipment, migration.68 Qatar’s Camp As Sayliyah, a former pre-positioning site for U.S. military equipment,
has served as the main operations center in Qatar for U.S. resettlement efforts of evacuees from has served as the main operations center in Qatar for U.S. resettlement efforts of evacuees from
Afghanistan. Afghanistan.
Qatar and its Neighbors
Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab States
The United States has encouraged intra-Arab rapprochement following a period from 2017 The United States has encouraged intra-Arab rapprochement following a period from 2017
through 2020 in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt worked to through 2020 in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt worked to
isolate Qatar diplomatically and economically in the hopes of changing Qatari officials’ policies isolate Qatar diplomatically and economically in the hopes of changing Qatari officials’ policies
toward sensitive regional political issues.69 By 2019, having realized few benefits from the toward sensitive regional political issues.69 By 2019, having realized few benefits from the
blockade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE apparently began to look for a resolution—an outcome blockade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE apparently began to look for a resolution—an outcome
urged by the Trump Administration.70 At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, on urged by the Trump Administration.70 At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, on
January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced that they would restore January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced that they would restore
diplomatic relations with Qatar, though Qatar did not commit to meeting any of their demands. diplomatic relations with Qatar, though Qatar did not commit to meeting any of their demands.
Following the Al Ula summit, Qatar reengaged with its former antagonists, and Emir Tamim
Following the Al Ula summit, Qatar reengaged with its former antagonists, and Emir Tamim
visited Egypt in June 2022 and participated in the GCC+3 Summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, visited Egypt in June 2022 and participated in the GCC+3 Summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
where he met with President Biden. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi visited Doha in where he met with President Biden. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi visited Doha in
September 2022. September 2022.
Qatari authorities reportedly requested that several Egyptian nationals affiliated with Islamist groups relocate from Qatar in June 2023. Qatar joined other Gulf states in announcing billions of dollars of planned Qatar joined other Gulf states in announcing billions of dollars of planned
66 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,” Washington Post, August 22, 2021. investments in Egypt in 2022, as the Egyptian government sought Gulf-state financial support in exchange for Egyptian state assets, including Egyptian government-held stakes in several companies. In February 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted officials from Qatar and Bahrain to launch talks to resolve a series of outstanding issues between Qatar and Bahrain. Emir Tamim visited Saudi Arabia for the April 2023 Arab League summit, but reportedly departed before Syrian President Bashar al Asad spoke following his government’s reinstatement by the League.
67 Reuters, “Davos 2023: Qatar says engagement with Taliban needed despite
67 Reuters, “Davos 2023: Qatar says engagement with Taliban needed despite
'disappointing'‘disappointing’ actions,” January 17, actions,” January 17,
2023. 2023.
68 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs,
68 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs,
Qatar (22-919) – —Protocol Amending the Temporary Relocation
Transit Agreement of November 12, 2021, September 19, 2022; and, , September 19, 2022; and,
Qatar (21-1112) – —Temporary Relocation Transit
Agreement, November 12, 2021. November 12, 2021.
69 In June 2017, those countries cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari
69 In June 2017, those countries cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari
nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The group initially demanded that, as a condition for nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The group initially demanded that, as a condition for
ending the boycott, Qatar close the Al Jazeera satellite network, sever relations with Muslim Brotherhood ending the boycott, Qatar close the Al Jazeera satellite network, sever relations with Muslim Brotherhood
organizations, downgrade relations with Iran, and end the deployment of Turkish military personnel in Qatar. See “List organizations, downgrade relations with Iran, and end the deployment of Turkish military personnel in Qatar. See “List
of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated Press, June 23, 2017. of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated Press, June 23, 2017.
70 “US Secretary of State in Qatar urges end to Gulf diplomatic rift,”
70 “US Secretary of State in Qatar urges end to Gulf diplomatic rift,”
Deutsche Welle, January 13, 2019. , January 13, 2019.
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investments in Egypt in 2022, as the Egyptian government sought Gulf-state financial support in exchange for Egyptian state assets, including Egyptian government-held stakes in several companies. In February 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted officials from Qatar and Bahrain to launch talks to resolve a series of outstanding issues between Qatar and Bahrain.
Iran
Iran
Qatari leaders have pursued dialogue with Iran, while cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran Qatari leaders have pursued dialogue with Iran, while cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran
strategically. Qatar hosted Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in February 2022, and the two sides signed strategically. Qatar hosted Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in February 2022, and the two sides signed
several agreements.71 Qatar turned to Iran to help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing several agreements.71 Qatar turned to Iran to help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing
Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying Iranian airspace, a privilege for which Qatar Airways paid Iran Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying Iranian airspace, a privilege for which Qatar Airways paid Iran
over $130 million per year in overflight fees.72 Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. over $130 million per year in overflight fees.72 Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S.
withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, instead stating that efforts withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, instead stating that efforts
to “denuclearize” the region should not lead to “escalation.”73 Qatar and Iran exchanged mutual visits to “denuclearize” the region should not lead to “escalation.”73 Qatar and Iran exchanged mutual visits
of high-ranking officials in 2019 in an initiative reported as seeking to de-escalate U.S.-Iran of high-ranking officials in 2019 in an initiative reported as seeking to de-escalate U.S.-Iran
tensions,74 and Qatar has encouraged dialogue between the GCC countries and Iran to lower Gulf tensions,74 and Qatar has encouraged dialogue between the GCC countries and Iran to lower Gulf
tensions.75 Qatar and Iran share the large North Field natural gas reserve in the Persian Gulf. tensions.75 Qatar and Iran share the large North Field natural gas reserve in the Persian Gulf.
Qatar has supported Biden Administration efforts to restore full Iranian and U.S. adherence to the
Qatar has supported Biden Administration efforts to restore full Iranian and U.S. adherence to the
JCPOA; the Emir visited Iran in May 2022, and in June hosted U.S. negotiators for indirect talks. In JCPOA; the Emir visited Iran in May 2022, and in June hosted U.S. negotiators for indirect talks. In
January 2023, Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited Iran and is reported to have said he shared a message January 2023, Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited Iran and is reported to have said he shared a message
from the U.S. government “about a topic related to the [2015 nuclear] agreement that may not be from the U.S. government “about a topic related to the [2015 nuclear] agreement that may not be
directly linked to it.”76 In February 2023, NBC News reported that Qatari officials have served as directly linked to it.”76 In February 2023, NBC News reported that Qatari officials have served as
intermediaries in U.S.-Iran talks about possible prisoner exchanges.77intermediaries in U.S.-Iran talks about possible prisoner exchanges.77
Iran’s Foreign Minister visited Doha in June 2023.
Israel and the Palestinians
Qatar has had high-level contacts with Israel since the mid-1990s, and has allowed some small-Qatar has had high-level contacts with Israel since the mid-1990s, and has allowed some small-
scale direct Israel-Qatar trade and visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes, doctors, and scale direct Israel-Qatar trade and visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes, doctors, and
other Israelis, in spite of abiding policy differences.78 Emir Tamim and other Qatari officials have other Israelis, in spite of abiding policy differences.78 Emir Tamim and other Qatari officials have
accused Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and express support for Palestinian efforts to accused Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and express support for Palestinian efforts to
establish a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.79 Qatari officials say they have ruled out establish a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.79 Qatari officials say they have ruled out
joining other Arab states in normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords until there is substantial progress toward resolving the Israel-Palestinian dispute.80
71 Anna L. Jacobs, 71 Anna L. Jacobs,
Qatar and Iran Expand Ties Amid Broader Gulf De-escalation, Arab Gulf States Institute in , Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington, March 11, 2022. Washington, March 11, 2022.
72 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,”
72 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,”
Fox News, July 14, 2020. , July 14, 2020.
73 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018. 73 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.
74 The Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis, 74 The Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis,
Fox News, May 16, 2019. , May 16, 2019.
75 Erin Cunningham, “Qatar urges dialogue between Persian Gulf states,” 75 Erin Cunningham, “Qatar urges dialogue between Persian Gulf states,”
Washington Post, January 19, 2021. , January 19, 2021.
76 Amwaj Media, “Qatar carries US ‘message’ to Tehran as IAEA chief set to visit Iran,” January 31, 2023. 76 Amwaj Media, “Qatar carries US ‘message’ to Tehran as IAEA chief set to visit Iran,” January 31, 2023.
77 Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams, “The U.S. and Iran are holding indirect talks on a possible prisoner exchange, 77 Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams, “The U.S. and Iran are holding indirect talks on a possible prisoner exchange,
with the help of the U.K. and Qatar, sources say,” NBC News, February 15, 2023. with the help of the U.K. and Qatar, sources say,” NBC News, February 15, 2023.
78 Uzi Rabi, “Qatar
78 Uzi Rabi, “Qatar
'’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,”
Middle East Journal, vol. 63, no. 3 , vol. 63, no. 3
(Summer, 2009), pp. 443-459; and, Guy Azriel, “Qatar-Israel talks fail over Israeli demand to go public,” (Summer, 2009), pp. 443-459; and, Guy Azriel, “Qatar-Israel talks fail over Israeli demand to go public,”
i24 News, ,
August 31, 2022. August 31, 2022.
79 See, for example, “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,”
79 See, for example, “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,”
The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. In March 2023, Qatar’s , September 29, 2015. In March 2023, Qatar’s
permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva stated Qatar’s position “supporting the Palestinian people permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva stated Qatar’s position “supporting the Palestinian people
and their just cause until they reclaim all their legitimate rights, and establish full sovereignty as independent state and their just cause until they reclaim all their legitimate rights, and establish full sovereignty as independent state
based on the borders of 1967 with East Jerusalem as the capital.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “The State of Qatar based on the borders of 1967 with East Jerusalem as the capital.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “The State of Qatar
Reiterates Position of Supporting Palestine,” March 3, 2023. Reiterates Position of Supporting Palestine,” March 3, 2023.
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joining other Arab states in normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords until there is substantial progress toward resolving the Israel-Palestinian dispute.80 80 “Interview: Qatar’s FM rules out normalization with Israel, Syria.” Axios, February 2, 2022.
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Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.-
Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.-
designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari
officials asserted in 2017 that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian officials asserted in 2017 that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian
peace.81 Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its peace.81 Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its
political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, relocated there in 2020.82 As of January 2023, Haniyeh political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, relocated there in 2020.82 As of January 2023, Haniyeh
continued to host official meetings in Doha.83 Qatar’s main engagement with the Palestinians continued to host official meetings in Doha.83 Qatar’s main engagement with the Palestinians
appears to come through the substantial financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza, which appears to come through the substantial financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza, which
Israeli officials have supported as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.84 Aid Israeli officials have supported as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.84 Aid
efforts are provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official efforts are provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official
Mohammad al Emadi, who serves informally as an envoy to Israel. Mohammad al Emadi, who serves informally as an envoy to Israel.
Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021,
Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021,
efforts that were reportedly facilitated, in part, by additional Qatari pledges of aid to Gaza.85 efforts that were reportedly facilitated, in part, by additional Qatari pledges of aid to Gaza.85
Before the conflict, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about Before the conflict, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about
the potential for its diversion, Qatar agreed to arrangements in late 2021 to provide money the potential for its diversion, Qatar agreed to arrangements in late 2021 to provide money
transfers for needy families through the United Nations, and send fuel from Egypt into Gaza so it transfers for needy families through the United Nations, and send fuel from Egypt into Gaza so it
can be sold to pay for civil servants’ salaries.86 can be sold to pay for civil servants’ salaries.86
In August 2022, Qatar supported Egyptian efforts to broker a ceasefire between Israel and
In August 2022, Qatar supported Egyptian efforts to broker a ceasefire between Israel and
Palestine Islamic Jihad (another U.S.-designated terrorist group) militants in Gaza, while Palestine Islamic Jihad (another U.S.-designated terrorist group) militants in Gaza, while
expressing “strong condemnation and denunciation” of Israeli settlers’ actions at the Al Aqsa expressing “strong condemnation and denunciation” of Israeli settlers’ actions at the Al Aqsa
mosque in Jerusalem.87 In December 2022, the Qatari government expressed “its strong mosque in Jerusalem.87 In December 2022, the Qatari government expressed “its strong
condemnation and denunciation of the Israeli government’s plans for settlement expansion, its condemnation and denunciation of the Israeli government’s plans for settlement expansion, its
continued attempts to Judaize Al Quds [Jerusalem] and Al Aqsa mosque, considering them a continued attempts to Judaize Al Quds [Jerusalem] and Al Aqsa mosque, considering them a
severe violation of the UN Charter, international law principles, related UN resolutions, and a severe violation of the UN Charter, international law principles, related UN resolutions, and a
blatant assault on the rights of the brotherly Palestinian people.”88 The Qatari government made blatant assault on the rights of the brotherly Palestinian people.”88 The Qatari government made
a similar similar
statementstatements in February in February
and May 2023 in response to announced Israeli settlement plans 2023 in response to announced Israeli settlement plans
and the visit of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to the Al Aqsa mosque area in Jerusalem. Qatar has and called called
on international actors “to compel Israel to stop its settlement policy in the occupied Palestinian on international actors “to compel Israel to stop its settlement policy in the occupied Palestinian
territories.”89
80 “Interview: Qatar's FM rules out normalization with Israel, Syria.” Axios, February 2, 2022. territories.”89 Qatar and Egypt again helped broker a ceasefire following May 2023 fighting between Gaza-based groups and Israel. In June 2023, delays were reported in Qatari financial transfers of assistance to Gaza-based households.90
81 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June 81 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June
12, 2017. 12, 2017.
82 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar
82 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar
– —report,” report,”
Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020. , February 2, 2020.
83 Ma’an News Agency, “"Haniyeh meets Wensland and a number of his aides in Doha,” January 12, 2023. 83 Ma’an News Agency, “"Haniyeh meets Wensland and a number of his aides in Doha,” January 12, 2023.
84 Neville Teller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?” 84 Neville Teller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?”
The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019. , September 19, 2019.
85 “Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure,” 85 “Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure,”
Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021. , May 19, 2021.
86 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” 86 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,”
Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021; Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza , September 12, 2021; Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza
economy,” economy,”
Al-Monitor, November 23, 2021. , November 23, 2021.
87 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@MofaQatar_EN), “Qatar Strongly Condemns Settlers Storming Al-Aqsa 87 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@MofaQatar_EN), “Qatar Strongly Condemns Settlers Storming Al-Aqsa
Mosque,” Twitter, August 7, 2022, 5:34 AM. Mosque,” Twitter, August 7, 2022, 5:34 AM.
88 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media and Communication Department, “Qatar Condemns Israeli Government88 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media and Communication Department, “Qatar Condemns Israeli Government
'’s s
Plans on Developing Settlements,” December 30, 2022. Plans on Developing Settlements,” December 30, 2022.
89 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media and Communication Department, “Qatar condemns in the strongest terms 89 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media and Communication Department, “Qatar condemns in the strongest terms
the occupation government’s vote to legalize settlement outposts,” February 13, 2023. the occupation government’s vote to legalize settlement outposts,” February 13, 2023.
90 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Delay in cashing Qatari aid slows Gaza economy,” Al Monitor, June 7, 2023.
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Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues
Qatar’s active diplomacy is at least in part a result of its considerable financial resources and Qatar’s active diplomacy is at least in part a result of its considerable financial resources and
economic influence. In June 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Qatar’s economic influence. In June 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Qatar’s
response to the economic pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic, noted non-hydrocarbon growth response to the economic pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic, noted non-hydrocarbon growth
in Qatar’s economy, and projected that the planned large-scale expansion of natural gas in Qatar’s economy, and projected that the planned large-scale expansion of natural gas
production and exports from Qatar’s North Field production and exports from Qatar’s North Field
(Figure 2) would support state finances over the would support state finances over the
medium term.medium term.
9091 The IMF describes the North Field project as “the largest single LNG expansion The IMF describes the North Field project as “the largest single LNG expansion
ever” and expects the project to “further increase Qatar’s reliance on fossil fuel.”ever” and expects the project to “further increase Qatar’s reliance on fossil fuel.”
9192 According to According to
the IMF, non-oil and gas revenues provide only roughly 20% of the government’s revenue.the IMF, non-oil and gas revenues provide only roughly 20% of the government’s revenue.
9293 Qatar does not have a value added tax (VAT). Qatar does not have a value added tax (VAT).
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure, 2015
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief, October 2015. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief, October 2015.
New challenges have accompanied Qatar’s economic success in areas such as social cohesion;
New challenges have accompanied Qatar’s economic success in areas such as social cohesion;
education; labor; preservation of local traditions; national infrastructure; and energy, water, and education; labor; preservation of local traditions; national infrastructure; and energy, water, and
food supplies. To respond to these challenges, Qatari authorities have pursued a series of national food supplies. To respond to these challenges, Qatari authorities have pursued a series of national
development strategies based on a comprehensive national vision document that seeks balanced, development strategies based on a comprehensive national vision document that seeks balanced,
90
91 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Qatar Article IV Consultation and Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Qatar Article IV Consultation and Staff Report, IMF Country Report No.
22/175, June 2022. 22/175, June 2022.
9192 Ibid. Ibid.
9293 Ibid. Ibid.
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sustainable growth by the year 2030.
sustainable growth by the year 2030.
9394 Emir Tamim bin Hamad chaired the implementation Emir Tamim bin Hamad chaired the implementation
oversight body for the oversight body for the
Qatar National Vision 2030 project in his former role as heir apparent. The project in his former role as heir apparent. The
national development strategy for 2018 through 2022 set targets for economic infrastructure national development strategy for 2018 through 2022 set targets for economic infrastructure
development and diversification, natural resource protection and use, performance management, development and diversification, natural resource protection and use, performance management,
and international partnership informed by Qatar’s experiences in implementing its first national and international partnership informed by Qatar’s experiences in implementing its first national
development strategy from 2011 to 2016.development strategy from 2011 to 2016.
9495 Qatar’s isolation by neighboring Saudi Arabia, Qatar’s isolation by neighboring Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates from 2017 through 2020 may contribute to Qatar’s pursuit Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates from 2017 through 2020 may contribute to Qatar’s pursuit
of greater self-sufficiency in some areas, and of extra-regional economic partnerships. of greater self-sufficiency in some areas, and of extra-regional economic partnerships.
Preparations for the 2022 World Cup and preservation of Qatari culture were core elements of the Preparations for the 2022 World Cup and preservation of Qatari culture were core elements of the
2018-2022 strategy. 2018-2022 strategy.
With proven oil reserves of 25.2 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf
With proven oil reserves of 25.2 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf
producers. QatarEnergy, the state-owned oil and natural gas company, increased crude oil output producers. QatarEnergy, the state-owned oil and natural gas company, increased crude oil output
from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to approximately 1.3 million b/d in November 2022.from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to approximately 1.3 million b/d in November 2022.
9596 Qatar withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as of Qatar withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as of
January 2019.January 2019.
9697 Qatar also withdrew from the 25-member OPEC+ group in 2019. Qatar has not Qatar also withdrew from the 25-member OPEC+ group in 2019. Qatar has not
coordinated its production decisions with OPEC or OPEC+ since, as Qatari officials have coordinated its production decisions with OPEC or OPEC+ since, as Qatari officials have
prioritized LNG development and criticized both OPEC and OPEC+ as primarily reflecting the prioritized LNG development and criticized both OPEC and OPEC+ as primarily reflecting the
influence of larger producers.influence of larger producers.
9798 Leading importers of Qatari oil include Japan, Taiwan, South Leading importers of Qatari oil include Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, and Singapore. Korea, and Singapore.
Qatar has the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world, an estimated 23.86 trillion cubic
Qatar has the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world, an estimated 23.86 trillion cubic
meters (tcm).meters (tcm).
9899 Qatar borrowed internationally and invited foreign investment in order to expand Qatar borrowed internationally and invited foreign investment in order to expand
gas extraction and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export facilities in the late 1990s gas extraction and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export facilities in the late 1990s
and early 2000s.and early 2000s.
99100 The Export-Import Bank of the United States provided more than $1 billion in The Export-Import Bank of the United States provided more than $1 billion in
loan guarantees to support the early development of Qatar’s gas production facilities in loan guarantees to support the early development of Qatar’s gas production facilities in
cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks, and export credit cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks, and export credit
agencies.agencies.
100101 Qatar expanded annual natural gas production from 29.6 billion cubic meters in 2002 Qatar expanded annual natural gas production from 29.6 billion cubic meters in 2002
93
94 According to Qatari authorities, Qatar’s According to Qatari authorities, Qatar’s
National Vision 2030 initiative “aims at transforming Qatar into an advanced initiative “aims at transforming Qatar into an advanced
country capable of sustaining its own development and ensuring high living standards for its people for generations to country capable of sustaining its own development and ensuring high living standards for its people for generations to
come by seeking to develop a diversified economy coupled with diminishing dependence on hydrocarbons, where come by seeking to develop a diversified economy coupled with diminishing dependence on hydrocarbons, where
investment is moving towards a knowledge-based economy and the private sector is growing in importance....investment is moving towards a knowledge-based economy and the private sector is growing in importance....
The QNV The QNV
2030 identifies five main challenges: modernization and preservation of traditions; balance between the needs of this 2030 identifies five main challenges: modernization and preservation of traditions; balance between the needs of this
generation and those of future generations; managed growth and uncontrolled expansion; the size and quality of the generation and those of future generations; managed growth and uncontrolled expansion; the size and quality of the
expatriate labor force and the selected path of development; and economic growth, social development and expatriate labor force and the selected path of development; and economic growth, social development and
environmental management.” For more information, see the Qatar Government Communications Office at environmental management.” For more information, see the Qatar Government Communications Office at
https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/, and Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority website at https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/, and Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority website at
https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/qnv1/Pages/default.aspx.https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/qnv1/Pages/default.aspx.
94
95 For Qatar’s National Development Strategy documents see https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx. For Qatar’s National Development Strategy documents see https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx.
9596 U.S. International Trade Administration, U.S. International Trade Administration,
Qatar - —Country Commercial Guide, November 2022. , November 2022.
9697 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Opinion: Why Is Qatar Leaving OPEC?” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Opinion: Why Is Qatar Leaving OPEC?”
New York Times, December 10, 2018; and , December 10, 2018; and
Verity Ratcliffe and Simone Foxman, “Qatar Says Rejoining OPEC Would Not Fit With Its Strategy,” Verity Ratcliffe and Simone Foxman, “Qatar Says Rejoining OPEC Would Not Fit With Its Strategy,”
Bloomberg, ,
October 11, 2021. October 11, 2021.
9798 In 2020, Qatari Minister of State for Energy Affairs Saad bin Sherida Al Kaabi said, “The big players make the In 2020, Qatari Minister of State for Energy Affairs Saad bin Sherida Al Kaabi said, “The big players make the
decisions in OPEC. We didn't see a place for us there because we are a gas producer, and we are really growing in gas.” decisions in OPEC. We didn't see a place for us there because we are a gas producer, and we are really growing in gas.”
S&P Global, “INTERVIEW: Qatar thrives outside OPEC as minister warns over market flood legacy,” April 20, 2020. S&P Global, “INTERVIEW: Qatar thrives outside OPEC as minister warns over market flood legacy,” April 20, 2020.
9899 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2021 estimate. Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2021 estimate. Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002,
when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field. when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field.
99100 See Kohei Hashirnoto, Jareer Elass and Stacy Eller, “Liquefied Natural Gas from Qatar: The Qatargas Project,” See Kohei Hashirnoto, Jareer Elass and Stacy Eller, “Liquefied Natural Gas from Qatar: The Qatargas Project,”
Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and Rice University James A. Baker III Institute Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and Rice University James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy, December 2004. for Public Policy, December 2004.
100101 See Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build See Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build
(continued...)
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to 167 billion cubic meters in 2019, and since 2020 has been the world’s top exporter of LNG
to 167 billion cubic meters in 2019, and since 2020 has been the world’s top exporter of LNG
alongside the United States.alongside the United States.
101102 South Korea, Japan, and China were the top importers of Qatari South Korea, Japan, and China were the top importers of Qatari
LNG by volume in 2021.LNG by volume in 2021.
102103 Qatar is a member of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and Qatar is a member of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and
hosts the GECF headquarters. hosts the GECF headquarters.
Following a pause in development of gas production and LNG export infrastructure in the 2010s,
Following a pause in development of gas production and LNG export infrastructure in the 2010s,
Qatari authorities embarked in 2020 on a further expansion of North Field operations and LNG Qatari authorities embarked in 2020 on a further expansion of North Field operations and LNG
facilities under a $30-$50 billion initiative that seeks to expand LNG export capacity by 60% to facilities under a $30-$50 billion initiative that seeks to expand LNG export capacity by 60% to
126 million tons per year by 2027. Qatar in 2021 raised $12.5 billion for this expansion through a 126 million tons per year by 2027. Qatar in 2021 raised $12.5 billion for this expansion through a
series of international bonds.series of international bonds.
103104 The North Field-East expansion project includes four LNG trains The North Field-East expansion project includes four LNG trains
and the North Field-South expansion project includes two LNG trains.and the North Field-South expansion project includes two LNG trains.
104105 U.S. companies, U.S. companies,
particularly ExxonMobil, have long been partners in Qatar’s LNG operations: Qatari officials particularly ExxonMobil, have long been partners in Qatar’s LNG operations: Qatari officials
chose ExxonMobil to participate in the North Field-East project along with ConocoPhillips. chose ExxonMobil to participate in the North Field-East project along with ConocoPhillips.
In addition to its domestic expansion, QatarEnergy is increasing its presence globally, including
In addition to its domestic expansion, QatarEnergy is increasing its presence globally, including
through marketing, liquefaction, regasification, and shipping.through marketing, liquefaction, regasification, and shipping.
105106
Outlook
Qatari-U.S. security cooperation appears likely to continue to anchor the bilateral relationship, Qatari-U.S. security cooperation appears likely to continue to anchor the bilateral relationship,
with U.S. officials paying close attention to Qatar’s energy exports and its multidirectional with U.S. officials paying close attention to Qatar’s energy exports and its multidirectional
foreign policy. Congress may continue to conduct oversight of the U.S. militaryforeign policy. Congress may continue to conduct oversight of the U.S. military
'’s presence and s presence and
programs in Qatar and may monitor Qatari foreign and domestic policies, especially programs in Qatar and may monitor Qatari foreign and domestic policies, especially
with regard to concerning Russia’s war on Ukraine, China, Iran, Afghanistan, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and human Russia’s war on Ukraine, China, Iran, Afghanistan, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and human
rights. Qatari officials may continue to seek defense, economic, and diplomatic coordination with rights. Qatari officials may continue to seek defense, economic, and diplomatic coordination with
the United States while pursuing Qatar’s discrete interests and priorities. the United States while pursuing Qatar’s discrete interests and priorities.
LNG Plant in Qatar,” November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances LNG Plant in Qatar,” November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances
QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural Gas Complex, December 15, 2005. QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural Gas Complex, December 15, 2005.
101102 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2022. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2022.
102103 S&P Global Commodity Insights, “Infographic: Where do Qatar’s LNG exports go?” April 12, 2022. S&P Global Commodity Insights, “Infographic: Where do Qatar’s LNG exports go?” April 12, 2022.
103104 Yousef Saba, “Qatar Petroleum grabs $12.5 bln in emerging market bonds record,” Reuters, June 30, 2021. Yousef Saba, “Qatar Petroleum grabs $12.5 bln in emerging market bonds record,” Reuters, June 30, 2021.
104105 Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “QatarEnergy signs deal with TotalEnergies for North Field South expansion,” Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “QatarEnergy signs deal with TotalEnergies for North Field South expansion,”
Reuters, September 24, 2022. Reuters, September 24, 2022.
105106 Rafiq Latta, “QatarEnergy 2.0: The New LNG Industry Hegemon,” Energy Intelligence Group, February 28, 2023. Rafiq Latta, “QatarEnergy 2.0: The New LNG Industry Hegemon,” Energy Intelligence Group, February 28, 2023.
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Appendix. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales
2012-2022
Table A-1. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022
Estimated
Items
Cost
Notification Date
($,Cost
Items
($ mil ion) mil ion)
Notification Date
UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters
$1,112
$1,112
June 13, 2012
June 13, 2012
MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters
MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters
$2,500
$2,500
June 26, 2012
June 26, 2012
AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles
AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles
$3,000
$3,000
July 12, 2012
July 12, 2012
HELLFIRE Missiles
HELLFIRE Missiles
$137
$137
July 12, 2012
July 12, 2012
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
$6,500
$6,500
November 5, 2012
November 5, 2012
PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles
PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles
$9,900
$9,900
November 7, 2012
November 7, 2012
M142 High Mobility Artil ery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army
M142 High Mobility Artil ery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army
$406
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1 Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1
$406
December 24, 2012 December 24, 2012
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets
Javelin Guided Missiles
Javelin Guided Missiles
$122
$122
March 28, 2013
March 28, 2013
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems
$110
$110
May 15, 2013
May 15, 2013
C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support
C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support
$35
$35
June 27, 2013
June 27, 2013
A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar
A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar
$1,100
$1,100
July 29, 2013
July 29, 2013
RIM-116C and RIM-116C-2 Rol ing Airframe Missiles
RIM-116C and RIM-116C-2 Rol ing Airframe Missiles
$260
$260
April 21, 2016
April 21, 2016
Javelin Guided Missiles
Javelin Guided Missiles
$20
$20
May 24, 2016
May 24, 2016
Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats
Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats
$124
$124
August 23, 2016
August 23, 2016
Logistics Support Services and Equipment Continuation
Logistics Support Services and Equipment Continuation
$700
$700
December 8, 2016
December 8, 2016
Spare C-17 Engines
Spare C-17 Engines
$81
$81
December 8, 2016
December 8, 2016
F-15QA multirole fighter aircraft
F-15QA multirole fighter aircraft
$1,100
$1,100
November 1, 2017
November 1, 2017
Upgrade of Qatar Air Operations Center
Upgrade of Qatar Air Operations Center
$197
$197
March 7, 2018
March 7, 2018
Advanced Precision Kil Weapon Systems (APKWS) II Guidance
Advanced Precision Kil Weapon Systems (APKWS) II Guidance
$300
$300
April 9, 2018
April 9, 2018
Sections
Sections
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) for National
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) for National
$215
November 27, 2018
Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS)
$215
November 27, 2018
AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters and related equipment AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters and related equipment
$3,000
$3,000
May 9, 2019
May 9, 2019
AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)
AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)
systems for Head of State Aircraft
$86
$86
September 24, 2019
September 24, 2019
systems for Head of State Aircraft
Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Smal Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated
Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Smal Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated
Defeat System (FS-LIDS)
$1,000
$1,000
November 29, 2022
November 29, 2022
Defeat System (FS-LIDS)
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Does not reflect Direct Commercial Sales approved by U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Does not reflect Direct Commercial Sales approved by
U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State.
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Author Information
Christopher M. Blanchard Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
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