U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An
August 30, 2022
November 7, 2023 An Overview
TomasTomás F. Husted,
Overview. Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. foreign assistance for sub- Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. foreign assistance for sub-
Coordinator
Saharan Africa (“Africa”), which Saharan Africa (“Africa”), which typically receives about a quarter of all U.S. foreign assistanceis often the largest regional recipient of U.S. aid each year. In
Analyst in African Affairs Analyst in African Affairs
(including humanitarian assistance) annually. Annualthe past decade, State Department- and U.S. Agency for State Department- and U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID)-administered assistance to Africa increased more than five-
Alexis Arieff
fold in the 2000s, largely due to increases in global health spending to help combat HIV/AIDS.
Specialist in African Affairs
Over the past decade, funding levels have fluctuated between $6.5 and $7.5 billion annually. This

does not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs, such as humanitarian
assistance, or funds provided through multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations and the
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
World Bank. Other federal entities also administer programs in African countries, including the
Specialist in African Affairs
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, U.S. Development Finance Corporation, and

the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture.
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Objectives and Delivery. Unless noted, this report focuses on State Department- and USAID-

administered funds. Over the past decade, approximately 70% of U.S. assistance for Africa has
sought to address health challenges, primarily HIV/AIDS. Other assistance has aimed to foster

agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security; improve
education access and social service delivery; and strengthen democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG). Much of this
funding is provided under multi-country initiatives focused largely or wholly on Africa, including theInternational Development (USAID)- administered assistance allocated for Africa has generally fluctuated around $8 billion annually Alexis Arieff (in inflation-adjusted dollars). Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and South Specialist in African Affairs Africa were in the top 10 recipients of nonemergency State Department- and USAID-managed aid allocations globally in FY2022. African countries receive other U.S. assistance via funding managed by other U.S. agencies, allocated from global accounts or programs (e.g., humanitarian Lauren Ploch Blanchard aid), or furnished through contributions to multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations. Specialist in African Affairs Objectives and Delivery. Around 70% of annual (non-humanitarian) State Department and Nicolas Cook USAID-administered aid for Africa supports health programs; HIV/AIDS assistance is by far the Specialist in African Affairs largest category of U.S. aid for the region. Other funding aims to foster agricultural productivity and economic growth; bolster security; promote democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG); and improve access to quality education and social services. The U.S. government provides a large share of U.S. aid for Africa through multi-country initiatives focused largely or entirely on the region, such as the U.S. President’s Emergency President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative, Feed the Future, Prosper Africa, and Power Africa. Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative, Feed the Future, Prosper Africa, and Power Africa.
Government-to-government aid comprises a small share of U.S. aid for Africa: U.S.-based contractors and nongovernmental organizations, as well as multilateral actors (such as U.N. agencies), implement most U.S. aid programs in the region. The Biden Administration. The Biden Administration has The Biden Administration has articulated priorities for U.S. engagement with Africa that are
broadly consistent with those of its predecessors. Stated objectives include advancing global health; enhancing peace and
security; promoting mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democracy; and building
resilience to address challenges related to health, climate change, food security, and other areas. In its FY2023 Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)maintained longstanding U.S. assistance priorities in Africa (e.g., global health, agricultural productivity, and DRG) while increasing support for climate change adaptation, among other shifts in emphasis. Administration officials pledged new health, food security, governance, technology, and youth exchange initiatives at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS) in December 2022; implementation of many Summit outcomes will hinge on congressional support, including foreign aid appropriations. In its FY2024 budget request, the Administration proposed $ budget request, the Administration proposed $7.778.00 billion in billion in
assistance assistance specifically for Africa, up from $7.for Africa, up from $7.65 billion in FY2021 actual nonemergency allocations. Health95 billion in FY2022, including allocations of supplemental appropriations. Broadly consistent with funding trends over the past decade, health programs programs
comprise comprise roughly 75approximately 73% of % of the FY2024the FY2023 proposal proposal for Africa, economic growth assistance , economic growth assistance 1214%, DRG programs 5%, peace and security assistance %, peace and security assistance 6%, DRG
programs 4%, and 5%, and education and social service funding education and social service funding 4%. Top recipients would include 3%. Nigeria ($Nigeria ($610622 million), million), Tanzania
($565Mozambique ($564 million), million), Mozambique ($558Tanzania ($560 million), Uganda ($ million), Uganda ($549559 million), and Kenya ($ million), and Kenya ($525512 million) million).
would be the top recipients of U.S. non-humanitarian aid for the region. Issues for Congress. The The 117th118th Congress is considering the Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for Africa as it request for Africa as it
debates debates FY2023 appropriations. Congress will evaluate the FY2023 request for Africa in the context of other demands on
U.S. attention and resources—including for security, economic, and humanitarian aid for Ukraine and ongoing efforts to
combat COVID-19FY2024 appropriations. Members of Congress have expressed interest in monitoring ALS deliverables. More broadly, policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the . More broadly, policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the funding levels, focus,impact and and
effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Some Members have questioned whether current assistance for Africa is
sufficient and appropriately balanced between sectors given the broad scope of U.S. interests in the region. Congressional
debate also has focused on the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with undemocratic governments in the region, and
on the possible unintended consequences associated with U.S. foreign assistance, among other considerations. That
effectiveness of U.S. assistance for Africa, as well as the appropriate level and balance of such funding. Members also have considered how best to approach U.S. engagement with authoritarian governments in the region, the possible unintended consequences of U.S. foreign assistance, and the ways that U.S. assistance could help promote U.S. influence vis-à-vis China, Russia, and other global competitors. That comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made available in public budget comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made available in public budget
documents may complicate congressional oversight, inhibit efforts to assess impact, and obscure policy dilemmas. Congress documents may complicate congressional oversight, inhibit efforts to assess impact, and obscure policy dilemmas. Congress
may continue to assess whether may continue to assess whether the executive branch executive branch departments and agencies provideprovides sufficient programmatic, funding, and sufficient programmatic, funding, and
impactperformance evaluation information to Congress to enable effective oversight and timely responses to evaluation information to Congress to enable effective oversight and timely responses to identified challenges. challenges.
Congress has shaped U.S. assistance for Africa through Congress has shaped U.S. assistance for Africa through authorizing legislation and annual appropriations annual appropriations legislationmeasures directing allocations for certain directing allocations for certain
activities and countries. Congress has also enacted appropriations provisions and other legislation prohibiting or imposing activities and countries. Congress has also enacted appropriations provisions and other legislation prohibiting or imposing
conditions on aid to specific countries in Africa, and on certain kinds of assistance, on various grounds (e.g., related to conditions on aid to specific countries in Africa, and on certain kinds of assistance, on various grounds (e.g., related to
trafficking in persons, child soldiers, terrorism, military coups, and religious freedom). trafficking in persons, child soldiers, terrorism, military coups, and religious freedom). Security assistance has been a focus
of congressional scrutiny: Congress has restricted certain kinds of support for foreign security forces implicated in human
rights abuses, and the 117th Congress has acted to enhance congressional oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Historic Trends and Key Rationales ..........Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery ...................................................................................... 1
Recent Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery Health .......................................................................... 3
Health Assistance .............................................................. 2 Economic Growth ........................................................ 3
Economic Growth Assistance............................................................. 4 Peace and Security ....................................... 5
Peace and Security Assistance................................................................................................... 7
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) ............................................................. 10.. 9
Education and Social Services ................................................................................................ 10
Selected Global Assistance for Africa ..........Funding from Regional and Global Programs .................................................................................. 11
Humanitarian Assistance .......................................................................................................... 11
Health Assistance .................................................................................................................... 12
Peace and Security Assistance................................................................................................. 12
Other U.S. Department and Agency Assistance Departments and Agencies .......................................................................................... 13
The Department of Defense (DOD) ........................................................................................ 13
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) ............................................................................ 13
The Peace Corps14 U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) ................................................ 14 African Development Foundation (USADF) .......................................................................... 14
African Development Foundation (USADF)15 The Peace Corps .......................................................................... 14
The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request ..................................................................... 14
The FY2023 SFOPS Budget Request for Africa 15 International Financial Institution Assistance ......................................................................... 15 The Biden Administration and the FY2024 Request 15
Outlook and Issues for Congress ..................................................................... 15 The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS): Assistance Commitments ...................................... 16 The FY2024 Aid Budget Request for Africa ........................................................................... 17 Outlook and Issues for Congress .............................. 17

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance for Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts .................... 2
Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element ........................ 4
Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and
Element......................................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 4. Peace and Security 20 Figures Figure 1. U.S. Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and
Element, Select State Department and USAID Accounts ..................... 2 Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2022 ........................................................................... 3 Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2022 ......................................... 8
Figure 5. DRG............... 5 Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element FY2022 ....................................................... 108
Figure 6. Education and Social Services5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program
Area and Element .......FY2022............................................................................ 10 Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2022 ..................................... 11
Figure 7. The FY2023The FY2024 Health Assistance Request for Africa, by AccountProgram Area ................................................................. 15 18 Tables Table 1. The FY2024 State Department and USAID Request for Africa, by Account .................. 19

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 2124

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Introduction
This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. foreign assistance funding and programming
assistance for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) to inform Congress as it authorizes, appropriates funds for, and for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) to inform Congress as it authorizes, appropriates funds for, and
oversees such engagement. This report focuses primarily on funds and programs administered by
the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and includes
more limited discussion of select assistance managed by other U.S. departments and agenciesoversees such programming. A . A
separate separate CRS report, CRS Report R45428, report, CRS Report R45428, Sub-Saharan Africa: Key IssuesOverview and U.S.
Engagement, discusses U.S., discusses U.S.-Africa policy policy toward andand U.S. commercial and military engagement in engagement in Africathe region. This report focuses primarily on funds administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and.
Scope and Definitions
Unless otherwise indicated, this report discusses State Department- and USAID-administered assistance allocated allocated
specifically for African countries and regional specifically for African countries and regional programs. It includes more-limited discussion of funding provided through global accounts and programs, which is not reportedprograms. It does not comprehensively discuss funding allocated for
African countries via global accounts and programs that are not allocated by country or region in annual State by country or region in annual State
Department Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs), which provide information on the planned allocation of
appropriated assistance.1 Unless otherwise noted, figures (CBJs), and of funding managed by other U.S. departments and agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and Department of Defense (DOD).1 It does not address U.S. assistance channeled through international financial institutions and other multilateral bodies (e.g., U.N. agencies). Unless otherwise noted, figures in this report refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in
the given fiscal year (hereinafter, “allocations”).2 given fiscal year (hereinafter, “allocations”).2
Historic Trends and Key Rationales
Africa has received a growing share of annual U.S. foreign assistance over the past two decades,
accounting for 36% ofFunding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery In the past decade, Africa has regularly received 35%-40% of annual non-humanitarian State Department- and USAID-administered State Department- and USAID-administered fundingassistance allocated on a regional basis.3 U.S. assistance for Africa allocated for specific
regions in FY2021 (latest available), up from 31% in 2011 and 10% in 2001.3 U.S. assistance for
the region grew markedly during the 2000s (se grew markedly during the 2000s (see Figure 1), as Congress appropriated substantial , as Congress appropriated substantial
funds funds toin support support of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the Bush
George W. Bush Administration launched in 2003 with bipartisan support in Congress.Administration launched in 2003 with bipartisan support in Congress.4 As discussed below, As discussed below,
assistance to combataid to address HIV/AIDS remains by far the HIV/AIDS remains by far the largestleading category of U.S. category of U.S. assistanceaid for Africa. for Africa.
Other developmentDevelopment and security aid for Africa also increased during the 2000s, albeit to a lesser extent. and security aid for Africa also increased during the 2000s, albeit to a lesser extent.
Annual U.S. aid allocations for Africa have since remained generally level, typicallyU.S. assistance for Africa was comparatively flat over the past decade, generally fluctuating fluctuating
between $7.between $7.67 billion and $8.3 billion in billion and $8.3 billion in annual inflation-adjusted dollarsinflation-adjusted dollars.4

1 from FY2012 to FY2022.5 In the past decade, health assistance has typically comprised approximately 70% of annual State Department- and USAID-administered aid allocations for Africa; HIV/AIDS-related funding alone often accounts for around half of all U.S. aid for the region each fiscal year.6 Economic growth assistance, led by agricultural development aid, generally has comprised the second-largest focus area of U.S. assistance for Africa in the past decade, followed by peace and security, education and social services, and democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance. 1 The CBJ provides information on the planned allocation of appropriated assistance. See CRS In Focus IF11515, See CRS In Focus IF11515, U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution, by Nick M. Brown.
. 2 “Actual” allocations reflect a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer 2 “Actual” allocations reflect a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer
or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities. or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities.
3 CRS calculations based on 3 CRS calculations based on actual allocation data provided in Country/Account Summaries (“Spigots”) in State Department allocation data provided in Country/Account Summaries (“Spigots”) in State Department
CBJs for FY2003, FY2013, and FY2023CBJs for FY2014-FY2024. Calculations do not include . Calculations do not include funding for the Peace Corps, humanitarian
assistance, or funding categorized as “Other.”
4P.L. 480 Title II (Food for Peace) assistance. 4 See CRS In Focus IF12463, PEPFAR Extension Act of 2018: Expiring Authorities. 5 CRS calculation based on allocations for CRS calculation based on allocations for FY2011-FY2021FY2012-FY2022, drawn from State Department CBJs for , drawn from State Department CBJs for FY2013-FY2023FY2014-FY2024; ;
constant FY2022 dollars based on deflators from Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables, FY2022. constant FY2022 dollars based on deflators from Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables, FY2022.
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6 Figures in this paragraph reflect CRS calculations based on State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024. Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 6 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

Figure 1. U.S. Assistance for Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts

Source: CRS graphic, based on State Department CRS graphic, based on State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for (CBJs) for FY2003-FY2023FY2002-FY2024. .
Notes: CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs; CSH=Child Survival and Health Programs; DA=Development CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs; CSH=Child Survival and Health Programs; DA=Development
Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs;
IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping
Operations. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs. Operations. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs.
These figures do not include funds administered through global accounts or programs, such as
humanitarian assistance. They also exclude funds administered by other U.S. federal entities, such
as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S.
contributions to international financial institutions and other multilateral bodies, such as the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and United Nations (U.N.) agencies.
Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and appropriate balance of
U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Proponents contend that foreign assistance helps African
countries address pressing challenges (e.g., development and humanitarian needs) while
advancing U.S. national interests, such as by bolstering U.S. economic relations abroad and
promoting U.S. influence vis-à-vis that of global competitors such as China and Russia.5 Some
also contend that U.S. assistance reflects U.S. values of charity and global leadership.6
Critics have alleged that foreign aid may create market distortions or dependencies, or have other
unintended consequences, such as prolonging conflicts or strengthening undemocratic regimes.7
Some African commentators have criticized the nature of donor-recipient relationships, describing
them as shaped primarily by donor prerogatives rather than by the needs and demands of recipient
countries, or as benefitting international implementers over local authorities and organizations.8

5 Stephen A. O’Connell, “What the U.S. Gains From its Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa,” EconoFact, January
31, 2017.
6 For more on the rationales and objectives of U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An
Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown.
7 For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, A
Plan to Reform U.S. Security Assistance, Center for American Progress, 2021; and Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid
is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).
8 See, e.g., testimony by Degan Ali and Ali Mohamed in House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Shifting the Power:
Advancing Locally-Led Development and Partner Diversification in U.S. Development Programs,” hearing, 117th
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More broadly, some Members and others have called for a reorientation of U.S. engagement in
Africa to deemphasize U.S. assistance relative to U.S. commercial engagement, calling for “trade,
not aid” to promote development in the region.9 Other considerations related to U.S. assistance
for Africa and issues for Congress are discussed below (see “Outlook and Issues for Congress”).
Recent Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery
Since FY2017, health assistance has constituted approximately three-quarters of annual U.S.
assistance for Africa; HIV/AIDS-related funding alone typically accounts for around half of all
State Department- and USAID-administered assistance for the region in a given fiscal year.10
Agriculture and other economic programs generally have comprised the second-largest focus area
of U.S. assistance for Africa, accounting for around 9% of average annual allocations since
FY2017, followed by peace and security programs (7%), education and social services funding
(4%) and democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance (4%).11
U.S. assistance for Africa totaled $7.65 billion in FY2021 allocations, including supplemental
global health security funds provided in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA, P.L. 117-
2) but excluding emergency assistance appropriated for Sudan under Title IX of P.L. 116-260 as
well as humanitarian assistance.12 Broadly consistent with past years, health programs comprised
roughly 78% of FY2021 assistance, followed by funds to promote economic growth, advance
peace and security, enhance education and other social service delivery, and strengthen
democracy, human rights, and governance.
Health Assistance
Congress funds U.S. health assistance for Africa primarily through appropriations to the Global
Health Programs account, which is administered partly by the State Department (GHP-State) and
partly by USAID (GHP-USAID). Health assistance to improve access to water and sanitation,
however, is generally funded under the Development Assistance (DA) account.

Cong., 1st Sess., September 23, 2021; U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief
Coordinator Mark Lowcock, “What’s Wrong with the Humanitarian Aid System and How to Fix It,” remarks at Center
for Global Development, April 2021.
9 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Karen Bass in House Foreign Affairs Committee roundtable, “Roundtable:
Celebrating African Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Leadership,” May 25, 2021; Adva Saldinger, “Q&A: US
Representative Ted Yoho on his foreign aid philosophy,” Devex, February 24, 2017.
10 CRS calculations based on FY2017-FY2021 data provided by USAID, May 2022. In FY2017, the State Department
revised the Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (SPSD) framework under which U.S. foreign assistance is
categorized by program area and activity, complicating assessments of longer-term sectoral funding trends.
11 CRS calculations based on data provided by USAID, May 2022. Figures reflect averages from FY2017-FY2021.
12 State Department, CBJ for FY2023. Specifically, this includes $367 million in global health security in development
(GHSD) assistance provided in ARPA to enable comparison with the Biden Administration’s FY2023 request, which—
in a departure from past budget requests—disaggregates most GHSD funding by country. It excludes $700 million in
emergency funding for Sudan appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Title IX of P.L. 116-260).
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3Health Congress funds U.S. health assistance for Africa primarily through appropriations to the Global Health Programs accounts, which includes a State Department (GHP-State) and a USAID (GHP-USAID) appropriation. Assistance to improve access to water and sanitation is generally funded under the Development Assistance (DA) account. Other federal entities, notably the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), manage additional health programs in Africa, including for infectious disease preparedness, surveillance, and response (see “Other U.S. Departments and Agencies”). HIV/AIDS. As noted above, most U.S. health assistance for Africa supports HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention (see Figure 2), provided under the State Department-led, interagency President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Congress first authorized appropriations in support of PEPFAR in the “Leadership Act” of 2003 (P.L. 108-25) and has since enacted several bills reauthorizing or reshaping global HIV/AIDS assistance—most recently the PEPFAR Extension Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-305), which extended several provisions through September 30, 2023. Congress is considering whether, and with what possible changes, to reauthorize funding for PEPFAR.7 GHP-State is the main account for HIV/AIDS assistance for Africa, though additional assistance is provided via GHP-USAID and CDC-managed funding appropriated in Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS) appropriations. Malaria. Programs to prevent and treat malaria, a life-threatening but usually curable disease caused by parasites transmitted through bites of infected mosquitoes, typically constitute the second-largest category of U.S. health assistance for the region. The U.S. President's Malaria 7 See CRS Video WVB00632, International HIV/AIDS Assistance: What next for PEPFAR? Congressional Research Service 2 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Initiative (PMI), a USAID-led initiative launched in 2005, is the main channel for U.S. malaria-related assistance for Africa. In April 2023, the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator announced the expansion of PMI to three new countries—Burundi, Gambia, and Togo—bringing the total number of African PMI focus countries to 27, out of 30 focus countries globally

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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element

Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.
HIV/AIDS. Most U.S. health assistance for Africa supports HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
efforts under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—a State Department-
led, interagency effort that Congress first authorized during the George W. Bush Administration
and reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-305.13 GHP-State is the primary vehicle for HIV/AIDS
assistance for Africa, though USAID partly manages such funding, and USAID administers some
additional HIV/AIDS assistance via GHP-USAID. Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa,
Uganda, and Zambia were the top recipients of HIV/AIDS assistance allocations in FY2021.
Malaria. Programs to prevent and treat malaria typically constitute the second-largest category of
U.S. health assistance for the region.14 Such funding is largely provided through the USAID-led
President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), which focused on 24 African “focus countries” (out of 27
worldwide) as of July 2022. Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which . Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which
together account for roughly 40% of annual malaria cases globallyaccounted for around 45% of global malaria deaths in 2021, regularly rank as the leading , regularly rank as the leading
recipients of U.S. counter-malaria assistance in Africa.recipients of U.S. counter-malaria assistance in Africa.15
Maternal and Child Health, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health. African countries
have made strides in maternal and child health in recent decades, yet stark challenges persist; as a
region, Africa accounts for an estimated two-thirds of global maternal deaths and has the world’s
highest neonatal and under-five mortality rates.16 U.S. maternal and child health programs aim to
8 Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2022 State Department and USAID Source: Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2024. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding. Maternal and Child Health and Family Planning and Reproductive Health. Maternal and child health programs, primarily administered by USAID, aim to improve maternal, newborn, and improve maternal, newborn, and early childhood care. Family planning and reproductive health programs, for their part, support access to contraception and efforts to curb child marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and gender-based violence, among other issues.9 Other Health Assistance. Other U.S. health assistance for Africa seeks to boost access to improved water and sanitation facilities, strengthen infectious disease preparedness and response 8 World Health Organization (WHO), World Health Statistics 2023: Monitoring Health for the SDGs, 2023. 9 CRS Report R46215, U.S. Bilateral International Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programs: Background and Selected Issues. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 8 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview (categorized under “global health security in development”), control tuberculosis, and improve nutrition. As discussed in further detail below, the United States provides additional health aid for Africa through global programs not accounted for in regional allocation data; via other U.S. federal entities and agencies, such as the CDC; and through early childhood care. Family planning and reproductive health

13 See CRS In Focus IF11018, Global Trends in HIV/AIDS, by Sara M. Tharakan, and CRS In Focus IF10797,
PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
14 See CRS In Focus IF11146, Global Trends: Malaria, by Sara M. Tharakan.
15 Malaria burden figures from World Health Organization (WHO), World Malaria Report 2021, 2021.
16 WHO, U.N. Children’s Fund, U.N. Population Fund, World Bank, and U.N. Population Division, Trends in Maternal
Mortality, 2000 to 2017, 2019; U.N. Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, Levels & Trends in Child
Mortality: Report 2021, 2021.
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programs, meanwhile, support access to contraception, along with efforts to end child marriage,
female genital mutilation/cutting, gender-based violence, and other reproductive health issues.17
Global Health Security. U.S. health assistance for Africa includes some funding for pandemic
preparedness and response activities, though most such assistance is channeled through global
accounts and programs or administered by other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it also has
included aid to help African countries counter the disease and its effects (see Text Box).
COVID-19-Related Assistance for Africa
As of March 31, 2022 (latest data available), USAID-administered support for COVID-19 responses in Africa
totaled over $1.8 bil ion, most of which was special y appropriated by Congress and represents an addition to
regular annual foreign aid appropriations.18 USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) administered a
majority ($1.3 bil ion) of such funding, with smaller amounts managed by the Bureau for Africa ($353 mil ion) and
Bureau for Global Health ($231 mil ion). Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of U.S. COVID-19-related
assistance in Africa by, with at least $366 mil ion in U.S. obligations as of March 2022, fol owed by South Sudan
($182 mil ion), Sudan ($163 mil ion), and Nigeria ($104 mil ion).
Other Assistance. Other U.S. health assistance for Africa, most administered by USAID, seeks to
enhance access to improved water and sanitation facilities, improve nutrition, and combat
tuberculosis. As discussed below (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”), the United States
provides additional health funding for Africa through global programs as well as through
contributions to multilateral health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, contributions to multilateral health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund). Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund).
Economic Growth Assistance
As noted above, economicEconomic growth growth programsassistance typically typically comprisecomprises the second-largest the second-largest focus areasector of of
U.S. assistance for Africa. Congress funds such assistance primarily through the DA account,
though some programs are funded via the Economic Support Fund (ESF).19

17 See CRS Report R46215, U.S. Bilateral International Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programs:
Background and Selected Issues. On differences between maternal and child health programs and family planning and
reproductive health programs, see State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and
Definitions,” April 19, 2016.
18 Figures in this text box refer to obligated funds provided in the 2020 Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123), the 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act (P.L. 116-136), the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2), and prior year funding. Figures do not include
USAID support for GAVI COVAX, the multilateral vaccine initiative. USAID, “COVID-19 – Sub-Saharan Africa
(Fact Sheet #4, FY2022),” March 31, 2022.
19 The State Department and USAID jointly administer ESF funding; USAID manages DA.
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5U.S. aid for Africa each year. Led by funding for agricultural development, economic growth assistance may also support entrepreneurship training, trade and investment capacity-building, and climate change adaptation, among other activities (see Figure 3). Congress provides economic growth aid primarily under the DA account, though some is provided via the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. Congressional Research Service 4

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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and
ElementFY2022 State Department and USAID

Source: CRS graphicGraphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for . Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023FY2024. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding. .
Agricultural Development. Support for agricultural development Support for agricultural development typicallyusually constitutes the largest constitutes the largest
category of U.S. economic growth category of U.S. economic growth assistanceaid for Africa. for Africa. Such programs seekPrograms aim to improve to improve
agricultural productivity by strengthening value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and access agricultural productivity by strengthening value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and access
to markets, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Feed to markets, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Feed
the Future (FTF), a USAID-ledthe Future (FTF), a USAID-led, interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration that aims to to
reduce food insecurityreduce food insecurity and enhance market-based economic growth, is the main channel for U.S. , is the main channel for U.S.
agricultural assistance for Africa; as of agricultural assistance for Africa; as of July 2022, there were eight African FTF focus countries,
out of 12 globally.20September 2023, 16 FTF partner countries were in Africa, out of 20 globally.10 The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195 The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195), reauthorized through , reauthorized through
2023 in P.L. 115-266) endorsed an approach to U.S. food security assistance similar to FTF.
2028 as part of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263, Sec. 5588 of Title LV, Subtitle G), established a legislative framework for FTF. 10 African FTF focus countries are DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 20 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Trade and Investment. Prosper Africa, a USAID-led, multiagency initiative launched by the Prosper Africa, a USAID-led, multiagency initiative launched by the
Trump Administration in 2019, is the Trump Administration in 2019, is the primarymain vehicle for U.S. trade and investment vehicle for U.S. trade and investment assistanceaid for for
Africa. It Africa. It aims to increase two-way U.S.-Africa trade and investmentaims to spur U.S. and African market-led economic growth by substantially increasing
two-way U.S.-African trade and investment ties, foster business environment reforms in Africa, , foster business environment reforms in Africa,
and counter the economic influence of China and other U.S. counter the economic influence of China and other U.S. global competitors.21
A range of U.S. assistance programs support trade capacity-building (TCB) efforts that aim to
boost African countries’ ability to trade with other countries and with the United States—the latter
notably under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended),

20 African FTF focus countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. FTF supports
other countries under “aligned” and regional programs
21 Prosper Africa primarily seeks to harmonize and provide a single point of access to the services and programs of 17
U.S. agencies and departments with trade and investment promotion and economic development mandates. See CRS In
Focus IF11384, The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative, by Nicolas Cook and Brock R. Williams.
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which provides duty-free treatment for U.S. imports from eligible African countries.22 Over the
last two decades, much of this activity has been channeled through two (formerly three) USAID-
administered sub-regional trade and investment hubs, located in West and Southern Africa.
Climate Change and Environment. The State Department classifiescompetitors, and harmonize the services and programs of 17 U.S. federal departments and agencies with trade and investment promotion and economic development mandates.11 These entities generally use their own resources to carry out initiative work; USAID manages some funding to support its coordination activities and selected initiative-related work by USAID missions in Africa. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended), a cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy, established a nonreciprocal U.S. trade preference program that provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain exports from eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa.12 It also directed the President to provide trade capacity-building (TCB) assistance to the region, aimed at bolstering African countries’ ability to trade with other countries and with the United States. In the last two decades, much of this activity was channeled through USAID-administered sub-regional trade and investment hubs located in Southern, East, and West Africa. Only the West Africa hub—located in Nigeria—remains in operation as of September 2023.13 Climate Change and Energy. The State Department and USAID classify a range of U.S. assistance a range of U.S. assistance
to mitigate and address the impacts of climate change under the umbrella of economic to mitigate and address the impacts of climate change under the umbrella of economic growth
assistance, though not all of this assistance is directly related to economic growth.23 Under the
Obama Administration, the United States sharply increased such funding, including for Africa;
the Trump Administration took steps to largely end such assistance globally.
The Biden Administration has placed a high priority on responding to climate change globally
and, as discussed below, has sought to increasegrowth aid.14 During the Biden Administration, a large portion of climate change-related climate change-related assistance for Africa (see
“The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request”). During the Biden Administration, the
largest allocation of climate change-related assistance has been foraid for Africa has supported Power Africa, a USAID-led Power Africa, a USAID-led
electrification effort launched by the Obama Administration that provides technical assistanceelectrification effort launched by the Obama Administration that provides technical assistance and
advice, grants, loans, financial risk mitigation, and other , grants, loans, financial risk mitigation, and other assistance to support increasedsupport to increase access to access to
power, including renewable energy.power, including renewable energy.24 Facilitating individual power15 Power Africa continues to support some fossil fuel-related investments and projects. Facilitating private sector power generation projects is a core focus of the projects is a core focus of the
initiative, which aims to create 30,000 megawatts of initiative, which aims to create 30,000 megawatts of new power generation capacity and power generation capacity and establish
60 million new connections in Africa by 2030.60 million new connections in Africa by 2030.25 Expanding energy access in the region is a
standing U.S. policy goal under the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121).
U.S. economic growth assistance also funds “environment”16 Congress established a framework for Power Africa under the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121). Other climate change aid includes support for adaptation, or resilience to the impacts of climate shocks, for which the Biden Administration has requested a large increase in funding in FY2023 and FY2024 (see “The FY2024 Aid Budget Request for Africa”). “Sustainable landscapes” programs entail efforts to promote sustainable land use and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Environment. U.S. economic growth aid also funds environment programs, activities related to natural programs, activities related to natural
resources that are not directly focused on climate change (e.g., resources that are not directly focused on climate change (e.g., conservation and countering
wildlife crimewildlife or biodiversity conservation). Funding for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE)). Funding for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE), administered through USAID’s Central Africa Regional Mission, is usually
is typically the largest allocation the largest allocation of environment aid for Africaof annual environment assistance. Implemented by USAID and . Implemented by USAID and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servicethe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (per congressional directives), , CARPE promotes conservation CARPE promotes conservation
and sustainable and sustainable resource use in Central Africa’sland use in the Congo Basin. Congo Basin.26 Congress has supported efforts to Congress has supported efforts to
curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime in Africa.curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime in Africa.27
Other Economic Growth Efforts. Other U.S. trade and investment assistance programs in Africa
seek to aid economic policy reform and analysis, microenterprise lending and support, other
private sector strengthening activity, and infrastructure development.
Peace and Security Assistance
U.S. peace and security assistance for Africa principally refers to State Department-administered
security assistance programs, which are authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code. Some such
programs are implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD), some by other federal entities

22 Among other activities, TCB assistance aims to help improve countries’ ability to negotiate and implement trade
agreements, as well as customs procedures and processes, legal and regulatory structures for trade-related issues (e.g.
intellectual property rights and labor and environmental protections), overall commercial environments, and
infrastructure. See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), by Brock R. Williams, and
CRS Report R47197, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief, by
Nicolas Cook, Brock R. Williams, and Rileigh K. Greutert.
2317 11 CRS In Focus IF11384, The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative. In the 117th Congress, H.R. 6455 would have codified Prosper Africa, among other provisions. 12 CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 13 See the USAID West Africa Trade and Investment Hub’s webpage at https://westafricatradehub.com/. 14 State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions.” State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions.”
2415 The Trump Administration The Trump Administration, which ended most climate change-related aid, categorized Power Africa funding under a separate program classification, “Modern categorized Power Africa funding under a separate program classification, “Modern
Energy Services,” which does not specifically refer to climate change. Energy Services,” which does not specifically refer to climate change.
2516 For more on Power Africa, see USAID, “Power Africa,” available at https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica. For more on Power Africa, see USAID, “Power Africa,” available at https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica.
26 For more information, see CARPE, “About,” at https://carpe.umd.edu/content/development-objectives.
2717 See CRS Insight See CRS Insight IN11227IN12171, , Foreign Assistance for International Conservation, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and CRS In
Focus IF11923, Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Africa: An Overview, coordinated by Katarina C. O'Regan. .
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link to page 16 link to page 11 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Other Economic Growth Assistance. Other U.S. economic growth programs support economic policy reform and analysis, access to credit, other private sector strengthening, and infrastructure development. As discussed below, the Biden Administration also has requested funding to promote information and communications technology (ICT) access in Africa under a new Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) initiative, announced at the 2022 ALS. Peace and Security U.S. peace and security assistance for Africa includes State Department-administered aid to build the capacity of African military and police forces, along with programsU.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

(such as the Department of Justice), and others by private contractors.28 Congress appropriates
such assistance primarily via five accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International
Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE),
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO). U.S. peace and security assistance also includes more limited funding for
programs that aim to prevent, mitigate, and to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts. (DOD administers additional security cooperation programs with its own funds; see “Other U.S. Departments and Agencies.”) State Department-administered security assistance, authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code, is primarily funded via five accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The Department of Defense (DOD), other federal entities, and private contractors implement some of these programs. Conflict prevention and mitigation programs are typically funded via DA and ESF. As discussed below, many countries receive additional peace and security assistance via global programs. Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities. Funds for military training, equipment, and professionalization regularly constitute the largest category of annual peace and security aid for Africa (see Figure 4). The PKO account is the largest vehicle of U.S. security aid for Africa; despite its name, PKO supports a range of programs, most of which are unrelated to peacekeeping (see Text Box). For over a decade, Somalia has received the largest annual allocation of PKO funding for Africa, in support of an African Union (AU) stabilization operation and a U.N. presence that aids the AU mission.18resolve conflicts, typically funded through DA and
ESF. As discussed below, many countries receive additional U.S. peace and security assistance
through global programs, and DOD administers security cooperation programs from DOD funds,
complicating efforts to assess the extent of U.S. security assistance for any particular country.
Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and
Element

Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.
Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities. Security force capacity-building and
military professionalization constitute the largest category of annual peace and security assistance
for Africa. As a region, Africa receives a tiny share of global FMF funding, which supports grant-
based transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment and related training. Instead, most military
assistance for Africa is provided through the PKO account, regularly the largest channel for Title
22 security assistance for the region—including for programs unrelated to peacekeeping per se
(see Text Box). For over a decade, more than half of annual PKO funding for Africa has typically
been allocated for Somalia, in support of an African Union (AU) stabilization and peace support
operation in the country and a U.N. presence that aids the AU mission.29 Most other PKO funding Most other PKO funding
for Africa is generally requested for Africa is generally requested and allocated for regional programs under the State Department’s Africa Regional allocation. The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account PKO is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries, accounting for between half and three-quarters of annual Title 22 assistance al ocated for Africa in the past decade.19 Despite its name, PKO supports not only capacity-building for peacekeepers, but also counterterrorism, maritime security, and security sector reform. This entails funding for a range of regional security programs, including the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program, Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI), Africa Regional Counterterrorism (ARCT) program, and Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC), which aims to address malign foreign influence. PKO funds also support two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, focused on North and West Africa). In addition, the PKO-funded Global Peace Operations Initiative trains and equips militaries that provide or plan to provide U.N. peacekeeping troops, many of which are in Africa. Public budget materials do not disaggregate allocations for these programs by country. A separate Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.20 18 From FY2009-FY2021, successive Administrations requested funding for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS, formerly known as the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM, after the name of the AU mission) via the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account, but Congress appropriated funds through PKO. Since FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested funding for UNSOS under PKO. 19 CRS calculation based on State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024. 20 See CRS In Focus IF10597, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping. Congressional Research Service 7 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2022 State Department and USAID Source: Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding. Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities assistance also includes IMET, which is allocated for nearly all African countries, and supports professionalization, military exchanges, and English instruction, often in the United States. Africa receives a small share of global FMF funding, which supports grant-based transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment and training. In the past five years, among African countries, only Djibouti—which hosts the sole enduring U.S. military base in Africa—has received country-specific allocations of FMF, though additional FMF funding has been channeled for the region through global and regional programs. Counterterrorism. PKO is a leadand allocated for regional programs under the State

28 See CRS Report R45091, U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding
Trends, coordinated by Susan B. Epstein.
29 Prior to the Biden Administration, successive Administrations had requested funding for the U.N. Support Office in
Somalia (UNSOS, formerly known as the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM) via the State Department’s Contributions
to International Peacekeeping Activities account, but Congress had appropriated such funds through PKO. In its budget
requests to date, the Biden Administration has requested funding to support UNSOS under PKO, instead of CIPA.
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Department’s Africa Regional allocation. In the past five years, the State Department also has
allocated PKO funding specifically for the Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, and South
Sudan in support of military professionalization and security sector reform.
U.S. assistance to strengthen military partnerships and capabilities also encompasses the IMET
program, which supports professionalization, military exchanges, and English language
instruction, generally in the United States. A majority of African countries participate in IMET.30
The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account
PKO is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries, accounting
for between half and three-quarters of annual Title 22 assistance al ocated specifically for Africa over the past
decade.31 Despite its name, PKO supports not only peacekeeping capacity-building, but also counterterrorism,
maritime security, and security sector reform activities. A separate account, Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.32
In addition to funding for Somalia, PKO funding whol y or partly funds a range of regional security programs,
including the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program, Africa Military Education Program
(AMEP), Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI), Africa Regional Counterterrorism (ARCT) program, and a
nascent Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program, focused on addressing malign foreign influence. PKO
funding also supports two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Partnership for Regional East
Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT, in East Africa) and Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP,
focused on North and West Africa). Public budget documents do not disaggregate allocations for such programs
by country. PKO funding for TSCTP is managed centrally, rather than regionally, and is discussed in greater detail
below (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”).
Counterterrorism. PKO also is the main funding vehicle for State Department-administered
assistance to build the capacity of vehicle for State Department-administered aid to build African African security forces’ counterterrorism capacities, alongside NADR, which is primarily focused on strengthening non-military security institutions such as law enforcement agencies, gendarmes, national guard corps, and border security entities. Additional assistance focused on countering Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 16 link to page 14 link to page 13 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview security forces to disrupt and respond to terrorist
threats. Other security assistance accounts, including NADR and FMF, also fund counterterrorism
activities, while assistance focused on countering violent extremist ideology and recruitment violent extremist ideology and recruitment
among vulnerable populations is funded through is funded through the ESF and DAESF and DA accounts. Somalia and Kenya have been top . Somalia and Kenya have been top
country recipients of Title 22 counterterrorism assistance, though most such funding is allocated country recipients of Title 22 counterterrorism assistance, though most such funding is allocated
tovia regional programs. DOD provides additional counterterrorism training and equipment for African countries (see “Other U.S. Departments and Agencies”) regional programs. Additional counterterrorism assistance for Africa is provided via global
accounts and programs (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”). .
Other Peace and Security Assistance. The State Department also administers programs to build The State Department also administers programs to build
the capacitythe capacity and professionalism of law enforcement bodies and other justice sector institutions of law enforcement bodies and other justice sector institutions and personnel, , funded funded
primarily under INCLE. USAID, for its part, administers programs aimed at increasing citizens’
primarily under the INCLE account and often implemented by the Justice Department. USAID administers other programs to increase access to justice, primarily funded through the DA account. access to justice, primarily funded through the DA account.
U.S. assistance also funds U.S. assistance also funds State Department-administered efforts to destroy excess or obsolete small arms and light weapons, efforts to destroy excess or obsolete small arms and light weapons,
ammunition, and unexploded ordnance, and improve management of weapons stockpiles. The
State Department administers such programs, which are funded principally under NADR, in
countries previously affected by violence that face challenges related to stockpile management
and landmine removal (e.g., Angola), and those currently afflicted by conflict (e.g., Somalia).33

30 Forty African countries received IMET allocations in FY2021.
31 CRS calculation based on State Department CBJs for FY2012-FY2023. Calculation does not account for centrally
managed assistance.
32 See CRS In Focus IF10597, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping, by Luisa Blanchfield.
33 State Department, “U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction in Africa: Stabilizing Conflict-Affected Areas and
Setting the Stage for Development,” April 4, 2022.
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Conflict mitigation and stabilization programs, most funded under the DA and ESF accounts, aim
to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflicts through support for early warning systems,
peace and reconciliation initiatives, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration effortsammunition, and unexploded ordnance, and improve stockpile management. Conflict mitigation and stabilization aid aims to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts through support for early warning systems, reconciliation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Most such aid is funded under DA or ESF, or under global programs such as aid authorized under the Global Fragility Act (“Funding from Regional and Global Programs”). .
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG)
U.S. DRG programs in Africa seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government U.S. DRG programs in Africa seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government
accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen respect for human rights and the rule of lawaccountability and responsiveness, and strengthen respect for human rights and the rule of law.
(see Figure 5). Activities include efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media, enhance the capacity Activities include efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media, enhance the capacity
and effectiveness of state institutions, combat corruption, promote legal reform and justice sector and effectiveness of state institutions, combat corruption, promote legal reform and justice sector
operations and independence, and foster participatory political systems characterized by credible operations and independence, and foster participatory political systems characterized by credible
elections and other democratic processes. The DA and, to a lesser extent, ESF accounts are the elections and other democratic processes. The DA and, to a lesser extent, ESF accounts are the
main vehicles for such assistancemain vehicles for such assistance, though some in Africa, with additional funding to help strengthen law enforcement and funding to help strengthen law enforcement and
justice sector authoritiesjustice sector authorities is provided via INCLE.
Figure 5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element

Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.
provided via INCLE. In cumulative terms, over the past five years, Somalia, Nigeria, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Kenya Somalia, Nigeria, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Kenya rank amonghave ranked as the top recipients of U.S. the top recipients of U.S.
DRG assistance in AfricaDRG assistance in Africa over the past five years. Regional . Regionally allocated DRG assistance for Africa supports DRG assistance for Africa supports
the Africa Regional Democracy Fund, the Africa Regional Democracy Fund, a regional program primarily funded via ESF that funded via ESF, which supports supports
programs across DRG focus areas to strengthen democratic institutionsprograms across DRG focus areas to strengthen democratic institutions in the region. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 14 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Figure 5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2022 State Department and USAID Source: Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding. .
Education and Social Services
DA is the primary funding vehicle for U.S. education and social service assistance for Africa. DA is the primary funding vehicle for U.S. education and social service assistance for Africa.
U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs constitute the majority of U.S. education U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs constitute the majority of U.S. education
and social service support for Africaand social service support for Africa. Most such (see Figure 6).21 Most funding is allocated toward basic education funding is allocated toward basic education
programs, of which DRC has been the programs, of which DRC has been the leadingtop recipient since FY2017 recipient since FY2017;. Malawi is regularly the top Malawi has been the
leading bilateral recipient of U.S. higher education assistance in Africa over the same period, as
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Congress has directed allocations of higher education funding for Malawi in successive SFOPS
appropriations (most recently, Section 7042(f) of P.L. 117-103).
Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program
Area and Element

Source: CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.
U.S. higher education programs also include funding for recipient of U.S. higher education assistance in Africa; Congress has included provisos in successive SFOPS appropriations (most recently, Section 7042[f] of P.L. 117-328, Division K) directing that funds be made available for higher education and professional development in Malawi. The Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development (READ) Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-56) articulated U.S. policy for education assistance, required a strategy for administering basic education assistance, and established performance evaluation mechanisms. 21 See CRS Report R44676, Foreign Assistance and the Education Sector: Programs and Priorities. Congressional Research Service 10 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview U.S. higher education programs include the Young African Leaders Initiative the Young African Leaders Initiative
(YALI), which provides training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships to (YALI), which provides training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships to
emerging African business, science, and civic leaders. Regional funding for YALI supports four emerging African business, science, and civic leaders. Regional funding for YALI supports four
Africa Regional Leadership Centers, based in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South AfricaAfrica Regional Leadership Centers, based in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa, which
provide training and professional development for participants. (. The Mandela Washington The Mandela Washington
Fellowship program, which brings YALI fellows to the United States to study at U.S. colleges and Fellowship program, which brings YALI fellows to the United States to study at U.S. colleges and
universities, is administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural universities, is administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs and is not accounted for in regional budget allocations.Affairs and is not accounted for in regional budget allocations.)
Selected Global Assistance for Africa
As noted above, topline regional assistance data do not account for U.S. assistance allocated for
African countries via global accounts and programs—funds that are not disaggregated by region
or country in public budget documents Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2022 Source: Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2024. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding. Funding from Regional and Global Programs As noted above, regional assistance allocation data do not account for U.S. assistance provided for African countries via global programs. This notably includes humanitarian assistance, which is . This notably includes humanitarian assistance, which is
appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to needs and U.S. policy priorities, as appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to needs and U.S. policy priorities, as
well as a range of well as a range of global health and peace and security programs through which African countries health and peace and security programs through which African countries
receive considerable funding in addition to regional and country-specific allocations. receive considerable funding in addition to regional and country-specific allocations.
Humanitarian Assistance
As a region, Africa generally receives a large share of annual U.S. humanitarian assistanceAs a region, Africa generally receives a large share of annual U.S. humanitarian assistance funds,
which are administered under various authorities and accounts, including USAID-administered
International Disaster Assistance (IDA),. This includes State Department- State Department-administeredmanaged Migration and Refugee Migration and Refugee
Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), and USAID-Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), and USAID-
administered Food for Peace (FFP) assistance authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Actadministered International Disaster
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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

Assistance (IDA) and Food for Peace (FFP) aid—the latter authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480, known as “P.L. 480”) and appropriated in (P.L. 83-480, known as “P.L. 480”) and appropriated in the Agriculture appropriations bill.34 IDA,agriculture appropriations.22
MRA, ERMA, MRA, ERMA, IDA, and FFP assistance and FFP assistance for Africa totaled $4.0 billion in FY2021 obligations,
accounting for nearly 60obligations for African countries totaled $6.53 billion in FY2022, accounting for around 52% of the global total.% of the global total.3523 Ethiopia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Somalia, Sudan, and DRCand
Nigeria were the top African recipient countries of such assistance in FY2021 obligations.36
Health Assistance
The United States channels additional health assistance for Africa through global programs. This
includes considerable funding (most via GHP-State) to support were the top African recipients of U.S. humanitarian aid obligations in FY2022.24 Health Assistance Health assistance for Africa provided under global programs includes funding (mostly provided under GHP-State) to support the State Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD), which oversees PEPFAR. The Biden Administration launched GHSD in 2023, merging the Office of International Health and Biodefense and the functions of the Coordinator for Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security with the Office of the U.S. Global the Office of the U.S. Global
AIDS CoordinatorAIDS Coordinator, which oversees PEPFAR, and . The bureau intends to coordinate the State Department’s “work on strengthening global health security to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS.”25 Global health assistance that benefits Africa also includes funding for replenishments of the Global Fund to Fight replenishments of the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund), AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund), both of which target a majority of their
health assistance toward Africa.37 a multilateral initiative that has historically directed a large share of its aid toward Africa.26 Other global health assistance Other global health assistance benefittingfor Africa includes GHP- Africa includes GHP-
USAID International Partnerships funding supporting contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, USAID International Partnerships funding supporting contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,
andan international organization that works to improve access to vaccines in poor countries; a large share of Gavi’s work is focused on Africa. It also comprises a range of U.S. special-focus health programs that operate a range of U.S. special-focus health programs that operate, in large part, in Africa (e.g., aimed
at eradicating neglected tropical diseases and addressing multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in Africa and other regions (e.g., to eradicate neglected tropical diseases). As ). As
noted above, U.S. assistance to support African countries’ responses to COVID-19 has been
channeled partly through country-specific programs and partly through U.S. contributions to
multilateral initiatives, such as COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX).38
noted above, the CDC administers substantial additional pandemic preparedness and global health security aid programs in Africa. Peace and Security Assistance
Many African countries receive U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs. Many African countries receive U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs. This
As noted above (see “The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account” text box, above), this includes PKO funding includes PKO funding provided underfor the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), a
program that builds the capacity of partner security forces to participate in international
peacekeeping deployments. It also includes PKO fundingwhich aims to strengthen partner security forces’ peacekeeping capacities, and for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP)Partnership (TSCTP).39, a sub-regional counterterrorism program.27 The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)
manages PKO funding for GPOI and TSCTPmanages PKO funding for GPOI and TSCTP. The State Department Bureau for Counterterrorism,
meanwhile,, while its Bureau for Counterterrorism manages the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), a NADR-funded program manages the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), a NADR-funded program
to strengthen civilianto build the counterterrorism capacities counterterrorism capacities. CTPF programming in Africa has focused on
the Sahel, East Africa, and the Lake Chad Basin region.
of non-military security forces (e.g., police). Other assistance Other assistance helpsseeks to help African countries prevent, mitigate, and transition out of conflict. This African countries prevent, mitigate, and transition out of conflict. This
includes most funding provided pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division includes most funding provided pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division
J, P.L. 116-94), which authorized aid for preventing conflict and promoting stability through two J, P.L. 116-94), which authorized aid for preventing conflict and promoting stability through two
global funds: the State Department-funds: the State Department-administeredmanaged Prevention and Stabilization Fund and 22 Prevention and Stabilization Fund and the USAID-
managed Complex Crises Fund. The Biden Administration has selected part of coastal West
Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo) and Mozambique as two of five global
GFA focus areas. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provides short-term aid focused

34 USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to
transition transition away from emergency food assistancefrom emergency food assistance to agricultural development. See CRS Report R45422, . See CRS Report R45422, U.S. International
Food Assistance: An OverviewOverview, by Alyssa R. Casey and Emily M. Morgenstern and CRS Report R45879, and CRS Report R45879, International
Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs, by Emily M. Morgenstern.
35. 23 CRS calculation based on CRS calculation based on FY2021FY2022 obligations data from ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed June obligations data from ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed June 14, 2022.
36 Ibid.
37 Global Fund, “Global Fund Overview.”
38 See CRS Report R46633, COVID-19 Vaccines: Global Health Issues, coordinated by Sara M. Tharakan.
3929, 2023. 24 Ibid. 25 State Department, “Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy.” 26 For disbursement data by country and region, see Global Fund Data Explorer, https://data.theglobalfund.org/. 27 Successive Administrations have requested non-PKO funding for TSCTP—including DA, ESF, INCLE, and NADR Successive Administrations have requested non-PKO funding for TSCTP—including DA, ESF, INCLE, and NADR
funding—on a regional or bilateral basis, while requesting PKO funds under the State Department’s Bureau of Military funding—on a regional or bilateral basis, while requesting PKO funds under the State Department’s Bureau of Military
Affairs allocation. See Supplementary Tables in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications. Affairs allocation. See Supplementary Tables in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications.
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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

on averting conflict, fostering reconciliation, and supporting recoveries, funded via the TI
account; as of July 2022, OTI had programs in coastal West Africa, Ethiopia, Niger, and Sudan.
Other U.S. Department and Agency Assistancethe USAID-managed Complex Crises Fund (CCF).28 The Biden Administration has selected part of coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo) and Mozambique as two of five GFA focus areas. Separately, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provides short-term aid focused on averting conflict, supporting reconciliation and recovery, and encouraging political transitions. As of October 2023, OTI had programs in coastal West Africa (Ghana, Benin, and Togo), Ethiopia, and Sudan.29 Other U.S. Departments and Agencies
While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign assistance to
aid for Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region. Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region.
For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security,
and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and in some and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and in some
cases cases help implement State Department- and USAID-administered programs in the region.implement State Department- and USAID-administered programs in the region.
Other U.S. federal departments and agencies that administer assistance for Africa include:
The Department of Defense (DOD)
As noted above, DOD implements some State Department-administered security assistance in As noted above, DOD implements some State Department-administered security assistance in
AfricaAfrica. DOD also is and is also authorized, under Title 10 of the authorized, under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, to use DOD appropriations to , to use DOD appropriations to
fund and conduct security cooperation activities with foreign partner militaries and internal fund and conduct security cooperation activities with foreign partner militaries and internal
security entities.security entities.4030 Most Title 10 assistance for Africa Most Title 10 assistance for Africa has beenis provided under DOD’s “global provided under DOD’s “global
train and equip” train and equip” authority, 10 U.S.C. §333 (“Section 333”).31 Section 333 authorizes DOD—subject to “joint” planning, coordination, and concurrence from the Secretary of State—authority, first established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified
and expanded this authority under 10 U.S.C. §333 (“Section 333”), consolidating various
capacity-building authorities that it had granted DOD on a temporary or otherwise limited basis.
Section 333 authorizes DOD to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal
security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug
trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military
intelligence.
intelligence. Other DOD security cooperation programs in Africa include the State Partnership Program (SPP), in which U.S. state National Guards partner with foreign militaries for capacity-building, training, and other military-to-military engagements. As of mid-2023, there were 16 SPP partnerships in Africa.32 In the past decade, Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa on a temporary basis, under global or under global or
Africaregion-specific authorities (e.g., to -specific authorities (e.g., to helpbolster the counterterrorism capacity of African countries deploying troops to Somalia, or to help a Ugandan-led regional force combat the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in combat the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in
Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017).Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017).41 Comprehensive regional- or country-level Comprehensive regional- or country-level
funding data for DOD funding data for DOD security cooperation programs are not publicly available, although funding data are reported to committees of jurisdiction pursuant to legislative reporting and notification requirements. 28 The CCF account supports USAID responses to emerging crises, with projects aimed at addressing the root causes of instability. Previously funded through Defense appropriations (as authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Section 1207, P.L. 109-163), today USAID administers CCF under Section 509(b) of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title V of Division J of P.L. 116-94). See CRS Report R40482, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts. 29 USAID Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, “Where We Work,” accessed September 27, 2023. 30security cooperation programs are not publicly available.
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
The MCC, which Congress authorized in 2004 (Title VI of Division D, P.L. 108-199), supports
economic growth programs in developing countries that meet a range of governance and
development benchmarks.42 The MCC funds two types programs: five-year, large-scale
investments known as “compacts” that are designed to address key “constraints to growth”
identified during the project design phase, and smaller, shorter-term “threshold programs,” that
aim to help countries address reforms necessary for them to become compact-eligible.
As of July 2022, the MCC was implementing six programs in Africa—compacts in Benin, Côte
d’Ivoire, Niger, and Senegal, and threshold programs in Gambia and Togo—jointly valued at

40 DOD uses the term “security assistance” to denote Title 22 (State Department-administered) programs, including DOD uses the term “security assistance” to denote Title 22 (State Department-administered) programs, including
those implemented by DOD, and the term “security cooperation” to denote activities authorized under Title 10. those implemented by DOD, and the term “security cooperation” to denote activities authorized under Title 10. See
CRS In CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation. 31 This authority was first established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified and expanded this authority under 10 U.S.C. §333 (“Section 333”), consolidating various capacity-building authorities it had granted DOD on a temporary or limited basis. 32 National Guard, “State Partnership Program,” accessed October 27, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) The MCC, which Congress established in 2004 (Title VI of Division D, P.L. 108-199), supports economic growth programs in developing countries that meet a range of governance and development benchmarks.33 The MCC funds two types of programs: large, five-year investments (typically amounting to several hundred million dollars) known as “compacts” that aim to address key “constraints to growth” identified during the project design phase, and smaller, shorter-term “threshold programs,” that aim to help countries advance reforms to become compact-eligible. As of September 2023, the MCC had active compacts in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal and threshold programs in Gambia and Togo, a total MCC commitment of $1.15 billion.34 The MCC has signed compacts with Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique valued at an additional $1.15 billion and approved a $60 million threshold program for Kenya. It also has selected Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia as eligible to develop compacts, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal as eligible for regional (cross-border) compacts, and Mauritania as eligible to develop a threshold program. The MCC has suspended or terminated engagementFocus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia.
41 CRS Report R42094, The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response, by Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
and Tomás F. Husted.
42 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.
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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

$1.97 billion.43 A $316 million compact in Ghana closed in June 2022, while a $300 million
compact for Lesotho was signed in May 2022; in March 2022, Kenya won approval to implement
a threshold program.44 Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zambia also were developing
compact proposals as of July 2022.The MCC has suspended or terminated compacts with some
African governments for failing to meet MCC eligibility criteria. In late 2021, the MCC
discontinued the development of a proposed threshold program for Ethiopia amid that country’s
civil conflict, and with some governments due to failure to meet governance or other criteria. Most recently, in 2023, the MCC suspended aid for Niger after a military takeover, pausing activity on an existing $442.6 million compact and preparatory work for a concurrent cross-border compact with Benin.35 The MCC had previously announced that it would “significantly reduce” funding for Benin under announced that it would “significantly reduce” funding for Benin under a
plannedthat joint compact joint compact with Niger due to concerns over democratic backsliding under Benin’s due to concerns over democratic backsliding under Benin’s
current government.current government.4536 In 2022, the MCC paused and later terminated Burkina Faso’s eligibility for MCC engagement due to a military coup, and in 2021, it discontinued development of a threshold program for Ethiopia amid the country’s civil war.37 U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)38 DFC provides developing countries with loans, loan guarantees and insurance, direct equity, and technical assistance aimed at fostering economic development and advancing U.S. economic interests and foreign policy aims. In general, DFC must prioritize projects in low-income and lower-middle-income countries to help foster economic development, with some exceptions for upper-middle-income countries when presidentially determined U.S. economic or foreign policy interests are at stake. Africa has been a leading recipient of DFC financing, historically second only to Latin America.39 During the 2022 ALS, DFC reported that its active commitments across Africa totaled more than $11 billion.40 Top investment categories in Africa include finance and insurance, energy, and natural resources.41 DFC participates in several aid initiatives in Africa, 33 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues. 34 This includes an addition of $12 million to the MCC compact for Côte d’Ivoire to accommodate a one-year extension due to COVID-19-related delays. CRS calculation based on compact and threshold program data in MCC, “Where We Work,” accessed September 27, 2023, available at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work. 35 MCC, “MCC Board Suspends Assistance to Niger, Approves FY2024 Selection Criteria and Methodology Report,” September 13, 2023. 36 MCC, “MCC’s Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance,” December 15, 2021. 37 MCC, “MCC Board Approves Agency’s First Regional Grant Program,” September 28, 2022; and “MCC’s Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance,” December 15, 2021. 38 CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance Shayerah I. Akhtar and Analyst in Foreign Assistance Nick Brown authored this section. See CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 39 This trend dates back to DRC’s predecessor agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). 40 DFC, “At U.S.-Africa Business Forum DFC Announces Active Commitments in Africa Top $11 Billion,” December 14, 2022. 41 CRS analysis of DFC’s active projects database. Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview including Power Africa and Prosper Africa, and has launched its own Africa-focused programs, such as the ICT-focused Connect Africa and the 2X Africa Women’s Investment Initiative.42 In 2022, the MCC suspended the development of a proposed compact with
Burkina Faso due to a military coup.46
The Peace Corps
Peace Corps volunteers lead locally oriented programs focused on agriculture, economic
development, youth engagement, health, and education.47 As of FY2020, 45% of Peace Corps
volunteers were serving in sub-Saharan Africa—by far the largest share of any region.48 The
Peace Corps is gradually returning volunteers to pre-pandemic levels. Conflicts and other crises
in Africa have in some cases led the Peace Corps to suspend programming over concern for
volunteer safety, with recent conflict-related suspensions in Mali (in 2015) and Burkina Faso
(2017) and suspensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during a 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak.
African Development Foundation (USADF)
The USADF is a federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation, established by Congress The USADF is a federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation, established by Congress
under the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533)under the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533), that . The USADF provides provides
targeted grants worth up to $250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic targeted grants worth up to $250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic
growth projects. The Foundation focuses on women- and youth-led entrepreneurship, agriculture growth projects. The Foundation focuses on women- and youth-led entrepreneurship, agriculture
and food security, and off-grid electricity projects, and also plays a role in selected multi-agency and food security, and off-grid electricity projects, and also plays a role in selected multi-agency
initiatives (e.g., Power Africa and YALI).
The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request
The Department of State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy for Africa, released in February 2022,
identifies four priorities for U.S. engagement in Africa: advancing peace and security; increasing
“mutually beneficial” economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democratic
governance and respect for human rights; and building resilience to address challenges in health,
climate change, food security, and other areas.49 These goals are consistent with those articulated

43 See MCC, “Where We Work,” at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work.
44 In 2019, the MCC cancelled a $190 million worth of funds under Ghana’s compact over concern with the Ghanaian
government’s termination of a private energy utility contract, reducing the compact’s total value from $498 million. On
the recent approvals, see MCC, “MCC Board Approves Grants for Lesotho, Kenya to Drive Sustainable, Inclusive
Economic Growth,” April 1, 2022.
45 MCC, “MCC’s Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance,” December 15, 2021.
46 The MCC previously suspended a compact with Tanzania in 2016 due to a government crackdown on the political
opposition, and curtailed implementation of a compact in Mali in 2012 due to a military coup.
47 See CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.
48 Peace Corps, Agency Financial Report: FY2020, 2020.
49 State Department and USAID, Joint Regional Strategy for Africa, 2022. During his first visit to Africa as Secretary
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by previous Administrations. At the same time, the Biden Administration has proposed higher
levels of annual foreign assistance for Africa than did the Trump Administration, and the Biden
Administration’s proposed assistance to help African countries respond to the impacts of climate
change (discussed below) represents a departure from the approach of its predecessor.
The FY2023 SFOPS Budget Request for Africa
The Biden Administration requested $7.77 billion for Africa for FY2023, a 1.5% increase from
FY2021 actual allocations. Noteworthy changes from FY2021 allocations include proposed
decreases for HIV/AIDS, global health security, water and sanitation, and environment programs;
increases for agriculture, trade and investment, and DRG programs; and a surge in funding for
activities related to climate change.
Figure 7. The FY2023 Request for Africa, by Account
$ thousands

Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2023.
Health. At $5.80 billion, health assistance comprises 75% of the FY2023 budget request for
Africa. This would represent a decrease of $262 million (4%) from FY2021 allocations, largely
driven by proposed declines in funding for global health security, water and sanitation, and
HIV/AIDS programming. Several other health activities would see funding increases (see Text
Box below). Support for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment would constitute two-thirds of
FY2023 health assistance for Africa, and nearly half of all U.S. assistance for the region.
Broadly consistent with past years, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia would
be the leading recipients of U.S. health assistance in Africa.50 The largest proportional increase in
funding would be for USAID’s West Africa Regional Mission, which would see a surge in

of State, in 2021, Secretary Blinken emphasized shared efforts to advance global health (including by combating
COVID-19), respond to climate change, and foster inclusive economic growth, strengthen democracy, and advance
security. Secretary Blinken, “The United States and Africa: Building a 21st Century Partnership,” November 19, 2021.
50 The request proposes $550 million in health assistance for Nigeria, $537 million for Tanzania, $498 million for
Mozambique, $492 million for Uganda, and $466 million for Zambia.
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HIV/AIDS-related funding.
Health Assistance for Africa: FY2023
Economic Growth (including Climate
Request vs. FY2021 Actual
Change). Economic growth assistance
HIV/AIDS: $3.83 bil ion (-$63 mil ion from FY2021 actual)
would see a 50% upswing from FY2021
Malaria: $692 mil ion (+$10 mil ion)
Maternal/Child Health: $371 mil ion (+$14 mil ion)
allocations, with $936 million requested
Family Planning/Reproductive Health: $368 mil ion
for FY2023.51 Aid for agriculture, the
(+$25 mil ion)
largest focus area of U.S. economic growth
Global Health Security: $193 mil ion (-$174 mil ion)
funding for Africa, would see a $65 million
Water Supply/Sanitation: $132 mil ion (-$87 mil ion)
increase from FY2021 (see Text Box).
Tuberculosis: $115 mil ion (+$13 mil ion)
Nutrition: $102 mil ion (level with FY2021 actual)
Trade and investment assistance would
Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2023
also increase, to $134 million, including
$100 million for Prosper Africa and $27
million requested separately for USAID’s East Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa regional
operating units. The request proposes $20 million for USAID’s Africa Regional Bureau (AFR)
for “Digital Africa,” intended to “foster the growth of an inclusive and resilient African digital
ecosystem led by African communities and built on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure
Internet.”52
The FY2023 request also proposes
Economic Growth Assistance for Africa: FY2023
a $174 million increase for climate
Request vs. FY2021 Actual
change programs focused on
Selected Program Areas
adaptation, clean energy, and
Agriculture: $440 mil ion (+$65 mil ion)
“sustainable landscapes” activities,
Trade/Investment (incl. Prosper Africa): $134 mil ion (+$98
which support ecosystem
mil ion)
preservation and climate change-
Environment: $92 mil ion (-$40 mil ion)
related carbon storage. Most
Climate Change-Related Assistance
climate change-related aid would
Adaptation: $84 mil ion (+$76 mil ion)
be channeled through USAID’s
Clean Energy (incl. Power Africa): $114 mil ion (+$57 mil ion)
Sustainable Landscapes: $51 mil ion (+41 mil ion)
AFR Bureau, including a proposed
$100 million for Power Africa—
Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2023.
continuing the Biden
Administration’s trend of classifying Power Africa funding as “Clean Energy” assistance, as
opposed to the Trump Administration’s classification of such assistance under “Modern Energy
Services,” for which no funding is requested. Funding for environment-related activities not
directly focused on climate change (e.g., conservation and countering wildlife crime) would see a
$46 million decrease, to $92 million.
Security Assistance. The FY2023 request proposes $461 million for peace and security programs
in Africa, a $19 million (4%) increase relative to FY2021 allocations. Changes from FY2021
would include increases for strengthening military partnerships and capabilities (+$23 million)
and counterterrorism (+$11 million), and decreases for citizen security and law enforcement (-$9
million) and transnational threats (-$5 million). The PKO account would continue to be the
primary vehicle for U.S. security assistance for Africa, with $303 million requested. Around 70%
($233 million) of the PKO request for Africa would be allocated for Somalia. The PKO request

51 FY2021 allocation figures in this paragraph do not include Food for Peace (FFP) Title II assistance.
52 State Department, CBJ for FY2023, p. 226.
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also includes $3 million to support a “modest” Countering Strategic Competitors program
“targeted against influence by strategic competitors in Sub-Saharan Africa.”53
DRG. DRG funding for Africa would increase by $59 million (26%) relative to FY2021, to $285
million. Good governance programming, which aims to enhance the effectiveness of government
institutions and combat corruption, among other objectives, would see the largest absolute
increase in funding. The request also proposes increases for activities to strengthen civil society,
promote human rights, and support independent media. DRC, Kenya, Somalia, Liberia, and
Sudan would be the top recipients of U.S. DRG funding in Africa.
Education and Social Services. Total education and social services funding for Africa would see
a $16 million (5%) decrease in FY2023, to $282 million. DRC, Liberia, Malawi, and Senegal
would be the largest recipients of basic education assistance in Africa, the largest category of U.S.
education assistance for the region. The initiatives (e.g., Power Africa and YALI). The Peace Corps Peace Corps Volunteers lead local programs in education, agriculture, community development, youth engagement, health, and the environment.43 As of FY2022, the Peace Corps was active in 24 African countries, and almost 45% of Peace Corps Volunteers were serving in Africa, the largest share of any region.44 International Financial Institution Assistance The United States provides substantial additional funds for African countries via contributions to international financial institutions.45 These include replenishments, appropriated by Congress and administered by the U.S. Treasury Department, for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank. The United States plays a role in approving investments and projects by these institutions. The Biden Administration and the FY2024 Request The Biden Administration has maintained longstanding U.S. assistance priorities in Africa (e.g., global health, agricultural productivity, and DRG) while increasing support for climate change adaptation and mitigation, among other shifts in emphasis. U.S. assistance for Africa totaled $7.95 billion in FY2022 allocations, excluding humanitarian aid but including $337 million in supplemental economic aid provided in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).46 Health assistance comprised roughly 70% of FY2022 allocations for Africa, followed by assistance to promote economic growth and respond to food insecurity. Consistent with past years, assistance for peace and security, social services (including education), and DRG programs made up the balance. FY2023 allocation data were not publicly available as of September 2023. 42 OPIC launched Connect Africa in 2018. See DFC, “DFC to Launch Regional Team Based in Africa,” July 14, 2020. 43 See CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues. 44 Peace Corps, Agency Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2022, 2022. 45 See CRS In Focus IF11902, International Financial Institutions: FY2024 Budget Request; CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress; CRS In Focus IF11361, The World Bank; and CRS In Focus IF10676, The International Monetary Fund. 46 For supplemental assistance allocations, see State Department, CBJ for FY2024 Supplementary Tables, p. 12. Congressional Research Service 15 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS): Assistance Commitments In December 2022, President Joe Biden hosted senior delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union (AU) for a three-day U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS). During the Summit, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan asserted that the Administration would work with Congress to “commit $55 billion to Africa over the next three years.”47 The Administration has released few details on the composition of the $55 billion figure, which appears to comprise a mix of past, requested, and prospective resources for sub-Saharan and North Africa administered by a range of U.S. departments and agencies.48 Aid commitments made at the 2022 ALS include: • Food security and health workforce aid. Among the largest financial pledges made at the ALS were President Biden’s commitments to provide “an additional $2 billion” to address food insecurity in Africa,49 and to invest $4 billion in Africa’s health workforce by 2025 under a State Department- and USAID-led Global Health Worker Initiative.50 • Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA). President Biden formally announced DTA, an initiative to “expand digital access and literacy and strengthen digital enabling environments” in Africa. A White House fact sheet stated the Administration’s intention to “invest over $350 million and facilitate over $450 million in financing” for DTA.51 • African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT). The Administration unveiled ADAPT, a new initiative to “provide rapid, flexible support and assistance to governments and civil society during vulnerable yet critical political transitions.”52 A White House fact sheet pledged to “invest $75 million for this initiative to counter democratic backsliding in partnership with regional bodies, governments, and civil society in support of durable political transitions.” • YALI. Vice President Kamala Harris announced the “next phase” of YALI, entailing a commitment of “$100 million [...to] expand networking for alumni and connect them with social impact and business investors.”53 The Administration named retired Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit 47 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” December 12, 2022. 48 In a fact sheet on Summit pledges, the State Department outlines commitments by the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Agriculture; USAID; MCC; USADF; DFC; and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, among others. See State Department, “2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Overview,” last updated September 5, 2023. 49 White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Closing Session on Promoting Food Security and Food Systems Resilience,” December 15, 2022. An accompanying White House fact sheet set out a pledge of “$2.5 billion in emergency aid and medium to long-term food security assistance”; White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.- Africa Partnership to Promote Food Security and Resilient Food Systems,” December 15, 2022. 50 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Health Cooperation,” December 13, 2022. 51 White House, “Fact Sheet: New Initiative on Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA),” December 14, 2022. The Administration requested $20 million for DTA (then referred to as “Digital Africa”) in its FY2023 budget request. 52 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Promoting Peace, Security, and Democratic Governance,” December 15, 2022. 53 White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit African and Diaspora Young Leaders Forum,” December 13, 2022. See also the YALI website at https://yali.state.gov/. Congressional Research Service 16 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Implementation to oversee ALS outcomes.54 To date, the Administration has not comprehensively detailed what Summit goals have been met, or how much of the $55 billion total pledge has been allocated to which programs or activities. The FY2024 budget request for the State Department and USAID proposes new or increased funding for several aid initiatives pledged during the Summit, but at a total level far below the $55 billion commitment—which, as noted above, appears to include a wide range of past and planned aid and other resources for sub-Saharan as well as North Africa, administered by various U.S. departments and agencies.55 Several Members have expressed interest in continuing to monitor Summit outcomes.56 The FY2024 Aid Budget Request for Africa The Administration requested $8.00 billion for Africa for FY2024, 0.6% more than FY2022 allocations in current (non-inflation-adjusted) dollars, and 7.3% less than FY2022 in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars. Health. Health assistance comprises 73% of the FY2024 request for Africa, Health Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. at $5.82 billion (see Figure 7). FY2022 Actual Allocations Broadly consistent with past funding HIV/AIDS: $3.80 bil ion (-$19 mil ion from FY2022) trends, HIV/AIDS-related assistance Malaria: $692 mil ion (+$5 mil ion) Maternal/Child Health: $390 mil ion (+4 mil ion) constitutes around 65% of the health Family Planning/Reprod. Health: $392 mil ion (+$51 mil ion) request and nearly half of all State Global Health Security: $204 mil ion (+$44 mil ion) Department- and USAID-managed Water Supply and Sanitation: $117 mil ion (-$103 mil ion) funding proposed for the region. Tuberculosis: $120 mil ion (-$7 mil ion) Malaria would continue to be the Nutrition: $113 mil ion (+$6 mil ion) second-largest health program area in Africa. Global health security and family planning and reproductive health would see increases compared to FY2022 allocations, alongside a large proposed cut for water and sanitation aid. 54 White House, “Statement: Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation,” December 15, 2022. 55 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year FY2024, 2023 (hereafter, CBJ for FY2024). Congressional consideration of FY2024 appropriations was ongoing as of October 2023. 56 See, e.g., remarks by Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member James Risch and SFRC Africa Subcommittee Ranking Member Tim Scott in SFRC, Review of the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of State, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 2023; and letter from then-HFAC Chair Gregory Meeks to President Biden, December 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 10 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Figure 7.The FY2024 Health Assistance Request for Africa, by Program Area $ thousands, current U.S. dollars Source: CRS graphic, based on data in State Department, CBJ for FY2024. Economic Growth. Economic growth assistance for Africa would increase by nearly 40% from FY2022 allocations, to $1.08 billion under the request. Agriculture and food security aid, channeled primarily via FTF, would increase to $487 million and remain the largest category of U.S. economic growth assistance for Africa. Economic Growth Aid for Africa: FY2024 Trade and investment aid would more than Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations double, to $135 million, including $100 Agriculture: $487 mil ion (+$76 mil ion) million for Prosper Africa. The request also Trade/Investment: $135 mil ion (+$75 mil ion) includes $50 million for USAID’s Digital Environment: $97 mil ion (-$50 mil ion) Transformation with Africa (DTA), ICT Services: $40 mil ion (+$40 mil ion) announced at the 2022 ALS. Environment Private Sector Productivity: $18 mil ion (+$17 mil ion) assistance would see the largest drop of any Workforce Development: $10 mil ion (-$1 mil ion) economic growth category from FY2022, Modern Energy Services: $800,000 (-$9 mil ion) of 34%, while climate change-related aid— Climate Change-Related Assistance for adaptation, clean energy, and Adaptation: $119 mil ion (+$69 mil ion) Clean Energy: $125 mil ion (+$60 mil ion) sustainable landscapes—would increase by Sustainable Landscapes: $54 mil ion (+29 mil ion) 112%. The FY2024 request includes $100 million for Power Africa. Peace and Security. The FY2024 request proposes $423 million for State Department- and USAID-administered peace and security programs in Africa, 5% less than FY2022 allocations, with decreases proposed for several program areas. As in past years, Somalia would be the single largest destination for U.S. peace and security assistance, with $219 million proposed.57 57 State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, p. 416. The Biden Administration has again requested funding for the U.S. contribution to UNSOS under PKO, rather than CIPA (see footnote 18). Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview PKO would continue to be the leading vehicle for State Department- and USAID-administered security assistance for Africa, with $261 million requested, not including globally managed programs.58 The regional PKO request includes $3 million to support a “modest” Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program, “which is targeted against strategic competitors, including but not limited to, PRC and Russian influence in Peace and Security Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. Sub-Saharan Africa and FY2022 Actual Allocations intended to address the Strengthening Mil. Partnerships/Capabilities: $287 mil ion (-$3 mil ion) highest needs for strategic Counter-Terrorism: $53 mil ion (+$8 mil ion) competition in Africa.”59 Citizen Security/Law Enforcement: $27 mil ion (-$14 mil ion) Djibouti is once again the Weapons Security/Explosive Remnants of War: $22 mil ion (-$5 mil ion) only African country for Conflict Mitigation/Stabilization: $22 mil ion (-$3 mil ion) Transnational Threats/Crime: $7 mil ion (-$7 mil ion) which FMF is requested, Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction: $2 mil ion (-$1 mil ion) with $6 million proposed, Counter-Narcotics: $1 mil ion (near flat-line) level with FY2022 Trafficking in Persons: $0.5 mil ion (-$1 mil ion) allocations. DRG. DRG aid would see the largest proportional increase of any sector, with $436 million proposed, 61% more than FY2022 allocations. The request would boost funding across all DRG activity areas. Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, DRC, and Kenya would be the leading country recipients of DRG assistance. As part of the $436 million proposal, DRG Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 in line with ALS pledges, the Actual Allocations DRG request includes $25 million Good Governance: $138 mil ion (+$60 mil ion) for the African Democratic and Civil Society: $119 mil ion (+$40 mil ion) Political Transitions (ADAPT) Rule of Law: $79 mil ion (+$45 mil ion) initiative to support political Pol. Competition/Consensus Building: $40 mil ion (+$17 mil ion) transitions in countries yet to be Media and Free Flow of Information: $26 mil ion (+$2 mil ion) publicly identified. Human Rights: $24 mil ion (+$2 mil ion) Education and Social Services. Total education and social services funding for Africa would see a $45 million decrease, to $234 million. Broadly consistent with past years, DRC, Mali, Senegal, Ghana, and Malawi would be the top recipients of basic education assistance in Africa. The higher education request includes $20 million in USAID higher education request includes $20 million in USAID
Africa Regional funding for YALI, a $10 million increase from FY2021 allocations.54
Outlook and Issues for Congress
The 117th Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for Africa
as it debates FY2023 appropriations. Heavily weighted toward health programs, with the balance
dedicated to longstanding economic development and security priorities, the FY2023 request for
Africa closely resembles, in level and scope, recent-year allocations for the region—though it
would expand regional climate change-related assistance considerably and provide funding for an
emergent “Digital Africa” program, among other proposals.
In June 2022, the House Appropriations Committee released its FY2023 SFOPS appropriations
bill (H.R. 8282) and accompanying report (H.Rept. 117-401). As reported to the House, among
other provisions, that bill would allocate $100 million for Power Africa (equal to the request) and
$80 million for Prosper Africa ($100 million proposed). Somalia would receive $233.2 million in
PKO funding (level with the request), while $59 million in PKO would be allocated for regional
programs (roughly $7 million above the proposal). As in past years, the bill would also impose
directives, conditions, and reporting requirements on assistance to several African countries.
Globally, report language recommends $6.7 billion for HIV/AIDS programming, including $2.0
billion to support the Seventh Replenishment of the Global Fund.55
Global developments may shape Congress’s assessment of needs, priorities, and budgetary
decision-making related to U.S. assistance for Africa. Russia’s invasion of UkraineAfrica Regional funding for YALI.60 Table 1. The FY2024 State Department and USAID Request for Africa, by Account $ thousands Education Economic and Social Peace and Account DRG Growth Services Health Security TOTAL DA 376,329 1,079,895 231,956 117,198 30,454 1,835,832 ESF 41,300 6,600 2,000 - 7,700 57,600 58 These include TSCTP ($33 million in PKO requested) and GPOI ($71 million in PKO requested), both included in the request for the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. 59 State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, p. 417. According to the request, “dedicated PKO – complemented by global Countering PRC Influence Fund FMF – will enable the flexibility to choose the best account for the project in the year of appropriation given the different advantages and authorities of PKO and FMF.” 60 The request includes an additional $26 million for YALI via the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Education Economic and Social Peace and Account DRG Growth Services Health Security TOTAL FMF - - - - 6,000 6,000 GHP – State - - - 3,579,600 - 3,579,600 GHP –USAID - - - 2,127,000 - 2,127,000 IMET - - - - 20,805 20,805 INCLE 18,634 - - - 33,266 51,900 NADR - - - - 63,850 63,850 PKO - - - - 260,558 260,558 TOTAL 436,263 1,086,495 233,956 5,823,798 422,633 8,003,145 Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, “Operating Unit by Objective, Program Area, and Account” tables, pp. 455-484. Outlook and Issues for Congress Assistance for Africa is one among several considerations for Congress in the context of the FY2024 SFOPS appropriations process. Heavily weighted toward health programs, with the balance dedicated mostly to longstanding economic development and security priorities, the Biden Administration’s FY2024 aid budget request for Africa resembles, in level and scope, recent-year allocations for the region, although it would also make several changes. For example, funding for DRG programs and most economic growth assistance (including climate change aid) would increase relative to FY2022 allocations, while funds for water and sanitation and environment programs would decline. The request also includes funding for several ALS commitments, including $40 million for the Administration’s digital connectivity initiative, DTA, and $25 million for ADAPT, which aims to support political transitions in the region. Global and regional developments are likely to continue to shape Congress’s approach to U.S. assistance for Africa. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza war, for instance, have generated, for instance,
has generated new demands on U.S. engagement and resources in Europe, even as an
accompanying surge in global food and fuel prices has worsened food insecurity across Africa.56
As Congress sets its priorities for FY2023 assistance for Africa and continues to oversee U.S.
programming in the region, Members may consider various issues, such as demands on U.S. engagement in other regions. Global competition with Russia and China has also become a justification and focus for some aid programs in Africa. Members may continue to consider whether—and with what (if any) changes—to reauthorize PEPFAR, the leading vehicle for U.S. aid for Africa in the past two decades. The 118th Congress also may help determine the future of AGOA (P.L. 106-200, as amended), which is to expire in September 2025; though not an aid program per se, AGOA directs the executive branch to conduct certain trade and investment assistance programming in Africa. Within the region, the expansion of Islamist insurgent threats in several countries and a string of military coups have prompted increased congressional scrutiny of U.S. security cooperation and counterterrorism programs. As Congress sets its priorities for FY2024 assistance for Africa and continues to oversee U.S. programming in the region, Members may also consider a range of broader issues, including: :
Scale and Balance. Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is suitably balanced Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is suitably balanced
among programmatic sectors given the scope of U.S. priorities among programmatic sectors given the scope of U.S. priorities and interests in the region. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa—for example, the Biden Administration’s Africa Strategy cites “open societies,” “democratic and security dividends,” and environmental and climate adaptation objectives as top priorities—even as U.S. assistance for the region remains largely weighted Congressional Research Service 20 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview toward health programs. Some Members and executive branch officials have advocated additional funding for other U.S. priorities, such as such as promoting democracy, in the region and commensurate

53 State Department, CBJ for FY2023, p. 410.
54 The request includes an additional $20 million for YALI via the State Department Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs.
55 See Global Fund, “Seventh Replenishment,” at https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/seventh-replenishment/.
56 CRS Insight IN11919, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for Global Food Prices and Food Security, by
Rhoda Margesson et al.
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with U.S. interests. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development,
governance, and security objectives in Africa, yet U.S. assistance for the region remains largely
weighted toward health programs. Some Members have called for a greater allocation of U.S.
assistance to be dedicated to other stated U.S. priorities, such as fostering economic fostering economic growth, supporting education, or strengthening security.61growth,
expanding U.S.-Africa commercial ties, and mitigating conflict.57 Others have defended the Others have defended the
relative relative allocation of funding for health programs vis-à-vis other U.S. assistance for Africa, arguing, for example, that U.S. health assistance has been particularly effective or appreciated in the region.62 More broadly, some Members and advocates have called for a reorientation of U.S. engagement in Africa to deemphasize assistance in favor of a greater emphasis on trade and investment to promote development in Africa.63 Geostrategic Competition and U.S. Influence. Amid mounting U.S. policymaker concern regarding China’s and Russia’s activities in Africa, some in Congress have questioned whether U.S. assistance is adequately targeted to promote U.S. influence vis-à-vis global competitors. Among other issues, some Members have voiced concern that African leaders and publics may view China’s engagement more positively than that of the United States, due in part to China’s record of investment in high-profile infrastructure projects in the region.64 In turn, some Members have advocated for increased U.S. support for infrastructure development in the region.65 Some Members have simultaneously probed the extent to which U.S. assistance is effectively addressing Russian “malign influence” in Africa, including the role of Russian private military companies in the region.66 As it considers the FY2024 request, Congress might, for instance, consider what role U.S. aid might play in geostrategic competition in Africa, as well as assess the status and focus of the ongoing Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program in the region. Transparency and Oversight. Definitive accounts of U.S. aid allocated for specific African countries, or for particular programs in the region, are seldom made public and in some cases may not be readily available to Congress upon request. As Administration budget documents and congressional appropriations bills do not fully disaggregate funding by country or region, allocation data in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications may understate (in some cases, substantially) the amount of assistance allocated for Africa, or for a given African country. Obligation and disbursement data captured in the public ForeignAssistance.gov database may provide a more granular view into actual funding flows for particular countries and activities, but may not capture all global and regional program funding. Such data also are not disaggregated by year of appropriation, which may obscure policy changes or choices. 61 See, e.g., remarks by then-Representative Karenallocation of funding for health programs vis-à-vis other U.S. assistance for Africa.58
Transparency and Oversight. While this report provides approximate funding figures based
largely on publicly available allocation data, comprehensive estimates of U.S. assistance for
Africa and amounts dedicated to specific focus areas are difficult to determine. Because annual
executive branch budget documents and congressional appropriations measures do not fully
disaggregate funding by region or country, topline bilateral assistance figures for specific
countries may understate (in some cases, substantially) the amount of assistance allocated for a
given country once global and regional funding is considered.
Gaps in region- and country-level assistance data may partly reflect efforts to maintain flexibility
in U.S. assistance programs, as in the case of humanitarian aid, which is appropriated to global
accounts for subsequent allocation according to need and U.S. policy priorities. At the same time,
Congress has not imposed rigorous country allocation reporting requirements evenly across U.S.
foreign assistance programs. For instance, while DOD “global train and equip” assistance is
subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that capture information on
country and security force unit recipient and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous
reporting requirement governing State Department-administered security assistance.59
The 117th Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. foreign assistance for Africa, notably
security assistance. Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) expanded the notification
and reporting requirements associated with PKO assistance, for example. The Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103), in addition to
providing statutory authority for TSCTP, established congressional notification requirements on
funding allocations and mandated regular reporting on progress in meeting TSCTP objectives and
resolving past management deficiencies.
Restrictions on U.S. Assistance. Several African countries are (or previously have been) subject
to restrictions on U.S. assistance pursuant to provisions in annual appropriations measures or
other laws that Congress has enacted prohibiting or placing conditions on such aid on human
rights and other grounds. Statutes establishing such conditions often accord the executive branch
the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive such restrictions. Congress may
continue to debate the effectiveness of such restrictions as it oversees and assesses executive
branch implementation. Related laws and considerations include:
 Section 7008 in SFOPS appropriations legislation (most recently, P.L. 117-103),
which restricts certain U.S. assistance following a coup d’état.60 As of June 2022,

57 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Bass in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Bass in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and
Global Human Rights, Global Human Rights, FY2022 Budget and U.S.-Africa Relations, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 2021., hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 2021.
58 See, e.g., remarks by Senator In late 2022 testimony before HFAC, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee stated that “there's a lot of money earmarked for health [programming in Africa]. Also, education. I think we would benefit from more resources in the democracy area that would help us address the issues of [democratic] backsliding” in the region. See remarks by Assistant Secretary Phee in HFAC, “Assessing the Biden Administration's U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., November 17, 2022. 62 See, e.g., remarks by Senator Mike Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy,
FY2023 Budget Request for Africa, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022. , hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022.
59 On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff,
CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, U.S.
Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019.
60 CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L.
Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser; CRS Insight IN11854, “An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress, by
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Section 7008 was in effect with regard to Burkina Faso (due to a coup in 2022),
Guinea (2021), Mali (2020), and Sudan (1989). In contrast to most legislative
restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, Section 7008 does not grant the executive
branch the authority to waive such restrictions, which go into effect once the
executive branch determines that a coup has taken place.
 The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), which provides
a list of escalating punitive actions (potentially including restrictions on U.S.
assistance) for “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs), whose governments
engage in or tolerate “particularly severe” religious freedom violations.61 In the
most recent CPC determinations, issued in late 2021, Secretary of State Antony
Blinken re-designated Eritrea as a CPC and upheld existing sanctions on the
country, while de-listing Nigeria. Some Members of Congress criticized
Nigeria’s removal from the CPC list.62
 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as
amended) and related legislation, which restrict “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-
related assistance” for governments that the State Department determines do not
meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons and are not
making significant efforts to do so.63 In its 2021 Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
report, the State Department designated Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and
South Sudan for potential sanction pursuant to the TVPA; in late 2021, citing the
U.S. national interest, President Biden partially waived associated restrictions on
U.S. assistance in FY2022 for all four countries, with varying justifications.64
 The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as
amended) and related legislation, which restrict certain U.S. security assistance
for countries in which governmental security forces or government-backed armed
groups have recruited or used child soldiers.65 In its 2021 TIP report, the
Secretary of State designated DRC, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan
pursuant to the CSPA. In October 2021, President Biden fully waived associated
restrictions on U.S. security assistance in FY2022 for Nigeria, and partly waived
them for DRC, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan.66
Some countries have been subject to other legal restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, such as
those imposed on governments that support international terrorism or are in external debt arrears.
Congress has also included provisions in annual SFOPS appropriations measures restricting or
placing conditions on certain assistance to specific African countries. In FY2022, these include
conditions on IMET assistance for the countries of Africa’s Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC,

Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch Blanchard.
61 CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy, by Michael A. Weber.
62 See letter from Senators Marco Rubio, Josh Hawley, James Lankford, Kevin Cramer, Mike Braun, Jim Inhofe, and
Tom Cotton to Secretary Blinken, December 13, 2021; see also Representative Chris Smith, “Biden’s retreat from the
noble and necessary fight to protect victims of religious persecution in Nigeria,” November 23, 2021.
63 CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and
Methodology, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan, and Liana W. Rosen.
64 White House, “Memorandum on the Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments
Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” December 21, 2021.
65 CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions, by Michael A. Weber.
66 White House, “Presidential Determination and Certification With Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of
2008,” 86 Federal Register 57525, October 18, 2021.
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Rwanda, Republic of Congo, and Uganda) and restrictions on certain kinds of assistance for the
central governments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.67
The so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered
security assistance to individual units or members of foreign security forces credibly implicated
in a “gross violation of human rights,” subject to certain exceptions.68 The 63 See, e.g., Office of Senator Dick Durbin, “Durbin, Boozman, Inhofe, Booker, Cardin Introduce Bipartisan Bill To Increase U.S. Exports To Africa,” press release accompanying introduction of S. 1022 (117th Cong.), March 25, 2021. 64 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Michael McCaul in HFAC, “The State of American Influence in 2023: Great Power Competition and Persistent Crises in an Era of Budget Constraints,” 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 2023; and remarks by Senator Robert Menendez in SFRC, “Review of the FY2024 United States Agency for International Development Budget,” 118th Cong., 1st sess., April 26, 2023. 65 See, e.g., remarks by Senator Chris Van Hollen in SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, “FY2023 Budget Request for Africa,” hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022. 66 See, e.g., remarks by Senator Rounds in SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, FY2023 Budget Request..., and remarks by Representative John James in HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Examining the Fiscal Year 2024 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request for Africa, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 22, 2023. Congressional Research Service 21 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Gaps in region- and country-level allocation data may partly reflect the preservation of flexibility in U.S. assistance programs, as in the case of humanitarian aid. At the same time, Congress has not imposed country allocation reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign assistance programs. For instance, while DOD “global train and equip” assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that capture information on country and security force unit recipients and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement comprehensively governing State Department-administered security assistance.67 Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa. Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) imposed new notification and reporting requirements associated with PKO assistance, for example.68 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103), in addition to establishing TSCTP in statute, instituted new congressional notification and reporting requirements on funding allocated under the program. Restrictions on U.S. Assistance. U.S. assistance to certain African countries is subject to legal restrictions pursuant to provisions in appropriations measures or other laws. Some provisions are country-specific, while others prohibit or condition various types of aid to any country that fails to meet certain conditions relating to governance, human rights, and other issues. Statutes establishing such conditions often accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive accompanying restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the effectiveness of such restrictions as it oversees and assesses executive branch implementation. Related laws and considerations include: • Section 7042 (“Africa”) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division K of P.L. 117-328), which prohibits appropriated funds from being provided to the governments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, with certain exceptions. In addition, Section 7042 places conditions on certain types of IMET programming for governments in Africa’s Great Lakes region. • Section 7008 in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation (most recently, Division K of P.L. 117-328), which restricts certain U.S. assistance following a coup d’état.69 As of September 2023, Section 7008 was in effect with regard to Burkina Faso (due to a coup in 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020), and Sudan (1989). Congress granted authority to the executive branch to waive Section 7008 restrictions for the first time in FY2023, subject to congressional consultation and notification. Some Members continue to debate the impact and effectiveness of Section 7008, including the level of flexibility it provides to the executive branch regarding the application of restriction. • The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended), which sets out a list of punitive actions, including aid restrictions, to be imposed on “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs) whose governments engage in or tolerate “particularly severe” religious freedom violations.70 Such punitive measures are subject to a waiver or referral to existing sanctions on the country. Most recently, in 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated 67 On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019. 68 Congress modified these requirements under Section 5594 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263). 69 See CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations and CRS Insight IN11854, “An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress. 70 CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy. Congressional Research Service 22 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview Eritrea as a CPC—referring the country to existing sanctions—and placed CAR on the Special Watch List. Some Members have criticized the Biden Administration’s decision not to list Nigeria as a CPC.71 • The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance” and certain other engagement for governments that the State Department determines do not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons, subject to a waiver.72 In its 2023 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department designated Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan as Tier 3 (worst-performing). President Biden partly waived associated assistance restrictions for all six countries.73 • The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict certain security assistance for countries in which state security forces or state-backed militia have recruited or used child soldiers.74 In its 2023 TIP report, the State Department listed CAR, DRC, Eritrea, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, and South Sudan per the CSPA. President Biden partly waived associated restrictions for CAR, DRC, and Somalia.75 The so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict individual units or members of foreign security forces who have been credibly implicated in a “gross violation of human rights” from receiving most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance, subject to certain exceptions.76 The executive branch does executive branch does
not regularly publicize information on which unitsnot regularly publicize information on which units or individuals have been prohibited from receiving U.S. have been prohibited from receiving U.S.
assistance pursuant to these laws. assistance pursuant to these laws.
Country Ownership. Most U.S. Most U.S. assistanceaid for Africa is implemented by nongovernment or multilateral actors—such as for Africa is provided through multilateral or
nongovernment actors—such as U.N. agencies, U.S. and international humanitarian humanitarian
organizations, and civil society groups—rather than through African governments. (Exceptions
include U.S. security assistance for African security forces and some healthcare capacity-building
programs.)organizations, non-profit groups, private contractors, and U.N. agencies—rather than by African governments. Congress may thus debate the extent to which Congress may thus debate the extent to which U.S. aid enablesU.S. assistance enables partner African African
governments to take the lead in addressing their country’s governments to take the lead in addressing their country’s socioeconomic development, security, development, security,
and governance challenges. and governance challenges. In some cases, providing assistanceProviding aid through nongovernment actors through nongovernment actors
may enable the may enable the provisiondelivery of assistance in contexts where a government of assistance in contexts where a government ismay be unable or unwilling to unable or unwilling to
meet the needs of its populationprovide services, and may , and may also help the United States better help the United States better control and oversee the oversee the
use of funds. Congress may debateuse of funds in countries where there may be a risk of diversion by the government. It may be debated, however, whether this mode of delivery adequately equips , however, whether this mode of delivery adequately equips
recipient partner-country authorities to take responsibility for service provision, country authorities to take responsibility for service provision, as well asand whether it may whether it may
limit U.S. influence limit U.S. influence with recipient country governments as opposed to budget supportor leverage with governments in recipient countries. Members . Members
also may consider the merits and status of the Biden Administration’s also may consider the merits and status of the Biden Administration’s statedenhanced emphasis on emphasis on
increasing the share of U.S. increasing the share of U.S. assistanceaid that is implemented by local partners (e.g., that is implemented by local partners (e.g., partner
governments and local civil society organizations) as opposed to international actors.69African-led organizations) as opposed to U.S.- and other internationally based actors.77
Possible Unintended Consequences. Some MembersAnalysts and advocates have raised concerns over potential have raised concerns over potential
unintended consequences of U.S. unintended consequences of U.S. foreign assistanceaid for African countries. For instance, some for African countries. For instance, some
lawmakers have questioned whether providing security assistance to African critics of foreign 71 In the 118th Congress, H.Res. 82 would call for Nigeria to be re-designated as a CPC, among other provisions. 72 CRS In Focus IF10587, Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction. 73 White House, “Memorandum on Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” September 29, 2023. 74 CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions. 75 White House, “Presidential Determination and Certification With Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008,” 88 Federal Register 66671, September 27, 2023. 76 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber. 77 Speech by USAID Administrator Samantha Power, November 4, 2021, available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/nov-4-2021-administrator-samantha-power-new-vision-global-development. Congressional Research Service 23 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview assistance generally allege that such aid may create market distortions or dependencies.78 Other commentators have argued that U.S. aid may legitimize or strengthen authoritarian regimes in the region. According to one observer, for example, PEPFAR spending in countries with autocratic governments “reduces pressure on the recipient states to deliver services, thereby creating opportunities for them to shift funds to projects that serve elite interests.”79 In a response to this critique, former U.S. health officials argued that PEPFAR has had positive impacts on governance in Africa, in addition to the success it has achieved in the fight against HIV/AIDS.80 Some lawmakers have questioned whether providing security aid to governments with governments with
poor human rights records poor human rights records (e.g., Cameroon and Uganda) may strengthen abusive militaries and may strengthen abusive militaries and
contribute to poor governance.contribute to poor governance.70 81 Amid a wave of military coups in Africa since 2020, some led by Amid a wave of military coups in Africa since 2020, some led by
personnel who previously took part in U.S. training programs, some Members personnel who previously took part in U.S. training programs, some Members also have questioned have questioned to
what extent U.S. security assistancewhether U.S. training may have empowered coup leaders, or how U.S. may have empowered coup leaders, or how U.S. security
assistance could be adjusted in light of such events.assistance could be adjusted in light of such events.71 82 Proponents of U.S. security assistance may Proponents of U.S. security assistance may
contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and related contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and related
training—training—work to enhance security sector governance and civil-enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus improve human rights practices by partner militaries.83 Members continue to debate the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with military regimes and other undemocratic governments in Africa.84 Author Information Tomás F. Husted, Coordinator Lauren Ploch Blanchard Analyst in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs Alexis Arieff Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs 78 For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009). 79 Jon Temin, “Fight AIDS in Africa, Not Democracy,” American Purpose, June 22, 2022. 80 Deborah L. Birx and William R. Steiger, “Fighting AIDS in Africa Does Help Democracy,” American Purpose, July 25, 2022. 81military relations, and may thus

67 Most recently, Section 7042(a) and Section 7042(i)-(j) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, Title VII.
68 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber.
69 Remarks by USAID Administrator Samantha Power at Georgetown University, November 4, 2021, available at
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/nov-4-2021-administrator-samantha-power-new-vision-global-
development.
70 See, e.g. letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Karen Bass, and Sara Jacobs to Secretary See, e.g. letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Karen Bass, and Sara Jacobs to Secretary of State Antony Blinken Blinken
and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pertaining to Cameroon, March 9, 2022; letter from Senators Cory Booker and and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pertaining to Cameroon, March 9, 2022; letter from Senators Cory Booker and
James Risch to Secretary of State Blinken pertaining to Uganda, March 4, 2021. James Risch to Secretary of State Blinken pertaining to Uganda, March 4, 2021.
7182 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Sara Jacobs in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International See, e.g., remarks by Representative Sara Jacobs in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International
Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Social Impact, “Improving the United States’ Ability Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Social Impact, “Improving the United States’ Ability
to Prevent and Stabilize Conflict: Global Fragility Act Implementation,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 11, 2022, remarks to Prevent and Stabilize Conflict: Global Fragility Act Implementation,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 11, 2022, remarks
by Senator Chris Van Hollen in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and by Senator Chris Van Hollen in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and
Assistance,” 117th Cont., 2nd sess., March 10, 2022; and remarks by Senator Mike Rounds in Assistance,” 117th Cont., 2nd sess., March 10, 2022; and remarks by Senator Mike Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations
CommitteeSFRC, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response,” hearing, 117th Cong., , “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response,” hearing, 117th Cong.,
2nd Sess., July 12, 2022.
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U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

improve human rights practices by partner militaries.72 Members continue to debate the
appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with military regimes in Africa.73

Author Information

Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs


Alexis Arieff
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs


2nd Sess., July 12, 2022. 83 For one evaluation of U.S. security assistance in Africa, see Stephen Watts et al. Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present, 2018. 84 See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel.” Congressional Research Service 24 U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
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than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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72 For one evaluation of U.S. security assistance in Africa, see Stephen Watts et al. Building Security in Africa: An
Evaluation of U.S. security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present, 2018.
73 See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel."
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