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On September 11, 2019, the United States and 11 other Western Hemisphere nationscountries invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) to facilitate a regional response to the crisis in Venezuela. Foreign ministers fromAs a first step, on September 23, the countries that have ratified the treaty ("states parties") are to convene in the coming weeks to discuss a range of options that could include the suspension of diplomatic and consular relations, the imposition of economic sanctions, or the use of armed forceagreed to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the government of Nicolás Maduro. They also pledged to meet again within two months to discuss additional measures. Congress may closely track the deliberations, given their potential implications for U.S. policy.
The Rio Treaty, which was signed in 1947 and entered into force in 1948, is a collective security pact among 19 of the 35 countries of the Western Hemisphere. The United States ratified the treaty in 1947 after the U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent. Article 3 of the Rio Treatytreaty asserts than "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all American States," and it calls on each party to the treaty to assist in collective self-defense. Article 6 of the treaty, which was invoked in this case, empowers states parties to collectively respond to any other "situation that might endanger the peace" of the region.
The treaty establishes a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as the principal forum through which states parties are to address collective security threats. Any treaty signatory may request such a meeting but must secure the votes of an absolute majority of parties to the treaty within the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). TheOn September 11, 2019, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay supported thea resolution calling a Meeting of Consultation to address the crisis in Venezuela. The interim Venezuelan government of Juan Guaidó, which is recognized by the OAS and rejoined the Rio Treaty in August 2019, also backed the resolution. Five other nationscountries (Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay) abstained from the vote; the Bahamas was absent.
As noted above, Article 8 of the treaty authorizes states parties to engage in a variety of collective measures, such as breaking diplomatic and consular relations, restricting economic relations, and using armed force. A Meeting of Consultation may adopt such measures with a two-thirds vote (i.e., 13 of 19 states parties). Decisions are binding on all states parties, with the exception of the use of armed force.
States parties havePrior to this year, states parties had applied provisions of the Rio Treaty 20 times. They have never called for the use of force but have adopted other significant measures on several occasions:
The most recent invocation of the treaty—the first since 1982— occurred following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. The 24th Meeting of Consultation recognized the attacks against the United States as an attack on the entire region and committed to using all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish any individuals involved.
U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo argues that collective action under the Rio Treaty is necessary because the political and economic crisis in Venezuela is having an "increasingly destabilizing influence" on the region. He notes that more than 4 million people have left Venezuela, straining neighboring countries' resources. Secretary Pompeo also asserts that "recent bellicose moves by the Venezuelan military to deploy along the border with Colombia as well as the presence of illegal armed groups and terrorist organizations in Venezuelan territory demonstrate that Nicolás Maduro not only poses a threat to the Venezuelan people, his actions threaten the peace and security of Venezuela's neighbors."
The United States could push regional allies to harmonize their policies with those of the United States by imposing targeted sanctions against officials in the Maduro government or broader economic sanctions against Venezuela. A Meeting of Consultation offers a possible venue to advance such measures, since most parties to the Rio Treaty have supported other multilateral efforts to exert pressure against Maduro. For example, 14 states parties voted in favor of a January 2019 OAS resolution that refused to recognize the legitimacy of Maduro's second term; called for new presidential elections; and urged all member states to adopt diplomatic, political, economic, and financial measures to facilitate the prompt restoration of the democratic order in Venezuela. Few states parties have imposed sanctions thus far, however, suggesting many U.S. allies remain reluctant to enact such measures.
It appears unlikely that the Meeting of Consultation would authorize the use of armed force against the Maduro government. A majority of states parties, wary of U.S. threats, have rejected "any threat or course of action that involves military intervention." Attitudes could shift, however, if the Venezuelan military or other armed groups were to attack Colombia.
Following a discussion closed to the public, 16 of the 19 states parties approved a resolution to
The resolution could provide an external legal framework to implement targeted sanctions for states parties that lack domestic legal mechanisms for imposing such measures. The United States has already sanctioned more than 200 individuals and entities tied to Venezuela, but some analysts argue that coordinated sanctions may be more effective and increase pressure on Maduro and those around him to facilitate a political transition.
The states parties plan to meet again within two months to consider additional measures. The governments of Uruguay, which opposed the September 23 resolution, and Trinidad and Tobago, which abstained, have warned that sanctions could be the first step toward armed intervention. That appears unlikely at this time because a majority of states parties have rejected the use of force. Nevertheless, some analysts are concerned that non-state armed groups operating along the Colombia-Venezuela border could precipitate a conflict with the potential to escalate quickly.