shipbuilding industrial base. This report focuses on the FFG(X) program. A related Navy shipbuilding program, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, is covered in a separate CRS report.¹ Other CRS detail in CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Other CRS reports discuss the strategic context within which the FFG(X) program and other Navy acquisition programs may be considered.²

Background

Navy'1 Background Navy’s Force of Small Surface Combatants (SSCs)

SSC Definition

In discussing its force-level goals and 30-year shipbuilding plans, the Navy organizes its surface combatants into large surface combatants (LSCs), meaning the Navy'’s cruisers and destroyers, and small surface combatants (SSCs), meaning the Navy'’s frigates, Littoral Combat ShipsLCSs, mine warfare ships, and patrol craft.³2 SSCs are smaller, less capable in some respects, and individually less expensive to procure, operate, and support than LSCs.

SSC Force-Level Goal

SSCs can operate in conjunction with LSCs and other Navy ships, particularly in higher-threat operating environments, or independently, particularly in lower-threat operating environments. In December 2016, the Navy released a goal to achieve and maintain a Navy of 355 ships, including 52 SSCs, of which 32 are to be LCSs and 20 are to be FFG(X)s. Although patrol craft are SSCs, they do not count toward the 52-ship SSC force-level goal, because patrol craft are not considered battle force ships, which are the kind of ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy and the Navy'’s force-level goal.⁴

SSC Force at End of FY2018

3 At the end of FY2018, the Navy'’s force of SSCs was projected to totaltotaled 27 battle force ships, including the following:

• 0 frigates;
• 0 frigates, 16 LCSs;, and and
• 11 mine warfare ships.

Under the Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, the SSC force is to grow to 52 ships (34 LCSs and 18 FFG[X]s) in FY2034, reach a peak of 62 ships (30 LCSs, 20 FFG[X]s, and 12 SSCs of a future design) in FY2040, and then decline to 50 ships (20 FFG[X]s and 30 SSCs of a future design) in FY2049. 1 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie. 2 See, for example, CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 3 For additional discussion of battle force ships, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 1 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress U.S. Navy Frigates in General U.S. Navy Frigates in General

In contrast to cruisers and destroyers, which are designed to operate in higher-threat areas, frigates are generally intended to operate more in lower-threat areas. U.S. Navy frigates perform many of the same peacetime and wartime missions as U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers, but since frigates are intended to do so in lower-threat areas, they are equipped with fewer weapons, less-capable radars and other systems, and less engineering redundancy and survivability than cruisers and destroyers.⁵

4 The most recent class of frigates operated by the Navy was the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class ( (Figure 1). A total of 51 FFG-7 class ships were procured between FY1973 and FY1984. The ships entered service between 1977 and 1989, and were decommissioned between 1994 and 2015.

Figure 1. Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) Class Frigate

Source: Photograph accompanying Dave Werner, "“Fighting Forward: Last Oliver Perry Class Frigate Deployment," ” Navy Live, January 5, 2015, accessed September 21, 2017, at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2015/01/05/ fighting-forward-last-oliver-perry-class-frigate-deployment/.

. In their final configuration, FFG-7s were about 455 feet long and had full load displacements of roughly 3,900 tons to 4,100 tons. (By comparison, the Navy'’s Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] class destroyers are about 510 feet long and have full load displacements of roughly 9,300 tons.) Following their decommissioning, a number of FFG-7 class ships, like certain other decommissioned U.S. Navy ships, have been transferred to the navies of U.S. allied and partner countries.

4 Compared to cruisers and destroyers, frigates can be a more cost-effective way to perform missions that do not require the use of a higher-cost cruiser or destroyer. In the past, the Navy’s combined force of higher-capability, higher-cost cruisers and destroyers and lower-capability, lower-cost frigates has been referred to as an example of a so-called highlow force mix. High-low mixes have been used by the Navy and the other military services in recent decades as a means of balancing desires for individual platform capability against desires for platform numbers in a context of varied missions and finite resources. Peacetime missions performed by frigates can include, among other things, engagement with allied and partner navies, maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Intended wartime operations of frigates include escorting (i.e., protecting) military supply and transport ships and civilian cargo ships that are moving through potentially dangerous waters. In support of intended wartime operations, frigates are designed to conduct anti-air warfare (AAW—aka air defense) operations, anti-surface warfare (ASuW) operations (meaning operations against enemy surface ships and craft), and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations. U.S. Navy frigates are designed to operate in larger Navy formations or as solitary ships. Operations as solitary ships can include the peacetime operations mentioned above. Congressional Research Service 2 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress decommissioned U.S. Navy ships, have been transferred to the navies of U.S. allied and partner countries. FFG(X) Program FFG(X) Program

Meaning of Designation FFG(X)

In the program designation FFG(X), FF means frigate,⁶5 G means guided-missile ship (indicating a ship equipped with an area-defense AAW system),⁷6 and (X) indicates that the specific design of the ship has not yet been determined. FFG(X) thus means a guided-missile frigate whose specific design has not yet been determined.⁸

Program Quantity

The Navy notionally 7 Procurement Quantity The Navy wants to procure a notional total of 20 FFG(X)s, which in combination with the Navy'’s planned total of 32 LCSs would meet the Navy'’s 52-ship SSC force-level goal. A total of 35 (rather than 32) LCSs have been procured through FY2019, but Navy officials have stated that the Navy nevertheless wants to procure 20 FFG(X)s. The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Analysis (FSA) that the Navy conducted in 2016. The Navy conducts a new or updated FSA every few years, and it is currently conducting a new FSA that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have stated that this new FSA will likely not reduce the required number of small surface combatants, and might increase it. Navy officials have also suggested that the Navy in coming years may shift to a new fleet architecture that will include, among other things, a larger proportion of small surface combatants. Procurement Schedule The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the next 18 at a rate of two per year in FY2021-FY2029, and the 20th in FY2030. Under the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission, the first FFG(X) is scheduled to be delivered in July 2026, 72 months after the contract award date of July 2020. 5 The designation FF, with two Fs, means frigate in the same way that the designation DD, with two Ds, means destroyer. FF is sometimes translated less accurately as fast frigate. FFs, however, are not particularly fast by the standards of U.S. Navy combatants—their maximum sustained speed, for example, is generally lower than that of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. In addition, there is no such thing in the U.S. Navy as a slow frigate. 6 Some U.S. Navy surface combatants are equipped with a point-defense AAW system, meaning a short-range AAW system that is designed to protect the ship itself. Other U.S. Navy surface combatants are equipped with an areadefense AAW system, meaning a longer-range AAW system that is designed to protect no only the ship itself, but other ships in the area as well. U.S. Navy surface combatants equipped with an area-defense AAW system are referred to as guided-missile ships and have a “G” in their designation. 7 When the ship’s design has been determined, the program’s designation might be changed to the FFG-62 program, since FFG-61 was the final ship in the FFG-7 program. It is also possible, however, that the Navy could choose a different designation for the program at that point. Based on Navy decisions involving the Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarine and the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer, other possibilities might include FFG-1000, FFG2000, or FFG-2100. (A designation of FFG-21, however, might cause confusion, as FFG-21 was used for Flatley, an FFG-7 class ship.) A designation of FFG-62 would be consistent with traditional Navy practices for ship class designations. Congressional Research Service 3 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress s 52-ship SSC force-level goal.

Procurement Schedule

Ship Capabilities and Design

Ship Capabilities and Design As mentioned above, the (X) in the program designation FFG(X) means that the design of the ship has not yet been determined. In general, the Navy envisages the FFG(X) as follows:

•      The ship is to be a multimission small surface combatant capable of conducting anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and electromagnetic warfare (EMW) operations.
• Compared to an FF concept that emerged under a February 2014 restructuring of the LCS program, the FFG(X) is to have increased AAW and EMW capability, and enhanced survivability.
• The ship'’s area-defense AAW system is to be capable of local area AAW, meaning a form of area-defense AAW that extends to a lesser range than the area-defenseareadefense AAW that can be provided by the Navy'’s cruisers and destroyers.
• The ship is to be capable of operating in both blue water (i.e., mid-ocean) and littoral (i.e., near-shore) areas.
• The ship is to be capable of operating either independently (when that is appropriate for its assigned mission) or as part of larger Navy formations.

Given the above, the FFG(X) design will likely be larger in terms of displacement, more heavily armed, and more expensive to procure than either the LCS or thean FF concept that emerged from the February 2014 LCS program restructuring. Figure 2 shows a January 2019 Navy briefing slide summarizing the FFG(X)’s planned capabilities. For additional information on the FFG(X)’s planned capabilities, see the Appendix.8 Dual Crewing To help maximize the time that each ship spends at sea, the Navy reportedly is considering operating FFG(X)s with dual crews—an approach, commonly called blue-gold crewing, that the Navy uses for operating its ballistic missile submarines and LCSs.9 8 RFI: FFG(X) - US Navy Guided Missile Frigate Replacement Program, accessed August 11, 2017, at https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=d089cf61f254538605cdec5438955b8e& _cview=0. 9 See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Planning for Its New Frigate to Be a Workhorse,” Defense News, January 30, 2018. Congressional Research Service 4 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress the February 2014 LCS program restructuring.

Figure 2 shows a January 2019 Navy briefing slide summarizing the FFG(X)'s planned capabilities.

Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on FFG(X) Capabilities Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on FFG(X) Capabilities Presented at Surface Navy Association National Symposium, January 2019

Source: Presentation by Dr. Reagan Campbell, "“FFG(X) Update, National Symposium—Surface Navy Association,"” January 15, 2019, briefing slide 3, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), January 22, 2019. Procurement Cost 2019.

Dual Crewing

Unit Procurement Cost

The Navy wants the follow-on ships in the FFG(X) program (i.e., ships 2 through 20) to have an average unit procurement cost of $800 million to $950 million each in constant 2018 dollars.¹¹ The Navy reportedly believes that the ship's cost can be held closer to the $800 million figure.¹² By way of comparison, the LCS that the Navy requested for FY2019 had an estimated average unit procurement cost of about $646 million (not including the cost of its embarked mission package), and the three DDG-51 class destroyers that the Navy has requested for FY2019 have an estimated average unit procurement cost of about $1,764 million each.

On July 10, 2017, the Navy released a Request for Information (RFI) to industry to solicit information for better understanding potential trade-offs between cost and capability in the FFG(X) design.¹³ On July 25, the Navy continued that effort by holding an industry day event. On July 28, the Navy posted its briefing slides for that event; some of those slides are reprinted in the Appendix.¹⁴ Responses to the RFI were due by August 24, 2017. The Navy states that it "received a very robust response to the FFG(X) RFI inclusive of [i.e., including] domestic and foreign ship designs and material vendor solutions."¹⁵ The Navy folded information gained through that RFI into its determination of the target unit procurement cost for the FFG(X).

The Navy has not yet established a target unit procurement cost for the lead ship in the program. As shown in Table 1 below, however, the Navy's FY2019 budget submission programs $1,228.2 million (i.e., about $1.2 billion) in procurement funding for FY2020, the year that the first FFG(X) is to be procured. The lead ship in the program will be considerably more expensive than the follow-on ships in the program, because the lead ship's procurement cost will incorporate most or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to attach most or all of the DD/NRE costs for a 10 See Sam LaGrone, “NAVSEA: New Navy Frigate Could Cost $950M Per Hull,” USNI News, January 9, 2018; Richard Abott, “Navy Confirms New Frigate Nearly $1 Billion Each, 4-6 Concept Awards By Spring,” Defense Daily, January 10, 2018: 1; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform Testbed,” Breaking Defense, January 12, 2018; Lee Hudson, “Navy to Downselect to One Vendor for Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the Navy, January 15, 2018; Richard Abott, “Navy Aims For $800 Million Future Frigate Cost, Leveraging Modularity and Commonality,” Defense Daily, January 17, 2018: 3. The $800 million figure is the objective cost target; the $950 million figure is threshold cost target. Regarding the $950 million figure, the Navy states that The average follow threshold cost for FFG(X) has been established at $950 million (CY18$). The Navy expects that the full and open competition will provide significant downward cost pressure incentivizing industry to balance cost and capability to provide the Navy with a best value solution. FFG(X) cost estimates will be reevaluated during the Conceptual Design phase to ensure the program stays within the Navy’s desired budget while achieving the desired warfighting capabilities. Lead ship unit costs will be validated at the time the Component Cost Position is 10 Congressional Research Service 5 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress The Navy reportedly believes that the ship’s cost can be held closer to the $800 million figure.11 By way of comparison, the Navy estimates the average unit procurement cost of the three LCSs procured in FY2019 at $523.7 million (not including the cost of each ship’s embarked mission package), and the average unit procurement cost of the three DDG-51 class destroyers that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020 at $1,821.0 million. As shown in Table 1, the Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,281.2 million for the procurement of the first FFG(X). The lead ship in the program will be considerably more expensive than the follow-on ships in the program, because the lead ship’s procurement cost incorporates most or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to attach most or all of the DD/NRE costs for a new ship class to the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.) As shown in Table 1, the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission shows that subsequent ships in the class are estimated by the Navy to cost roughly $900 million each in then-year dollars over the next few years. The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of 20 FFG(X)s at $20,470.1 million (i.e., about $20.5 billion) in then-year dollars, or an average of about $1,023.5 million each. Since the figure of $20,470.1 million is a then-year dollar figure, it incorporates estimated annual inflation for FFG(X)s to be procured out to FY2030. new ship class to the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.)

Acquisition Strategy

The Navy'Parent-Design Approach The Navy’s desire to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020 does not allow enough time to develop a completely new design (i.e., a clean-sheet design) for the FFG(X). (Using a clean-sheet design might defer the procurement of the first ship to about FY2023FY2024.) Consequently, the Navy intends to build the FFG(X) to a modified version of an existing ship design—an approach called the parent-design approach. The parent design could be a U.S. ship design or a foreign ship design.¹⁶

12 Using the parent-design approach can reduce design time, design cost, and technicalcost, schedule, and cost technical risk in building the ship. The Coast Guard and the Navy are currently using the parent-designparentdesign approach for the Coast Guard'’s polar security cutter (i.e., polar icebreaker) program.¹⁷ The parent-design approach has also been used in the past for other Navy and Coast Guard ships, including Navy mine warfare ships¹⁸ and the Coast Guard'13 The established in 3rd QTR FY19 prior to the Navy awarding the Detail Design and Construction contract. (Navy information paper dated November 7, 2017, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS and CBO on November 8, 2017.) The Navy wants the average basic construction cost (BCC) of ships 2 through 20 in the program to be $495 million per ship in constant 2018 dollars. BCC excludes costs for government furnished combat or weapon systems and change orders. (Source: Navy briefing slides for FFG(X) Industry Day, November 17, 2017, slide 11 of 16, entitled “Key Framing Assumptions.”) 11 See, for example, Justin Katz, “FFG(X) Follow-On Ships Likely yo Cost Near $800M, Down from $950M Threshold,” Inside the Navy, January 21, 2019; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Squeezing Costs Out of GG(X) Program as Requirements Solidify,” USNI News, January 22, 2019; David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s New, More Lethal Frigate Is Coming into Focus,” Defense News, January 28, 2019. 12 For articles about reported potential parent designs for the FFG(X), see, for example, Chuck Hill, “OPC Derived Frigate? Designed for the Royal Navy, Proposed for USN,” Chuck Hill’s CG [Coast Guard] Blog, September 15, 2017; David B. Larter, “BAE Joins Race for New US Frigate with Its Type 26 Vessel,” Defense News, September 14, 2017; “BMT Venator-110 Frigate Scale Model at DSEI 2017,” Navy Recognition, September 13, 2017; David B. Larter, “As the Service Looks to Fill Capabilities Gaps, the US Navy Eyes Foreign Designs,” Defense News, September 1, 2017; Lee Hudson, “HII May Offer National Security Cutter for Navy Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the Navy, August 7, 2017; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Beyond LCS: Navy Looks To Foreign Frigates, National Security Cutter,” Breaking Defense, May 11, 2017. 13 For more on the polar security cutter program, including the parent-design approach, see CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald Congressional Research Service 6 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress parent-design approach has also been used in the past for other Navy and Coast Guard ships, including Navy mine warfare ships14 and the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs).15 s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs).¹⁹

No New Technologies or Systems

As an additional measure for reducing technicalcost, schedule, and costtechnical risk in the FFG(X) program, the Navy envisages developing no new technologies or systems for the FFG(X)—the ship is to use systems and technologies that already exist or are already being developed for use in other programs.

Number of Builders Given the currently envisaged procurement rate of two ships per year, the Navy’s baseline plan for the FFG(X) program envisages using a single builder to build the ships.²⁰16 Consistent with U.S. law,²¹17 the ship is to be built in a U.S. shipyard, even if it is based on a foreign design. Using a foreign design might thus involve cooperation or a teaming arrangement between a U.S. builder and a foreign developer of the parent design. The Navy has not, however, ruled out the option of building the ships at two or three shipyards. At a December 12, 2018, hearing on Navy readiness before two subcommittees (the Seapower subcommittee and the Readiness and Management Support subcommittee, meeting jointly) of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:

SENATOR ANGUS KING (continuing):

Talking about industrial base and acquisition, the frigate, which we'’re talking about, there are 5 yards competing, there are going to be 20 ships. As I understand it, the intention now is to award all 20 ships to the winner, it'’s a winner take all among the five. In terms of industrial base and also just spreading the work, getting the—getting the work done faster, talk to me about the possibility of splitting that award between at least two yards if not three.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RICHARD SPENCER:

You bring up an interesting concept. There'’s two things going on here that need to be weighed out. One, yes, we do have to be attentive to our industrial base and the ability to keep hands busy and trained. Two, one thing we also have to look at, though, is the balancing of the flow of new ships into the fleet because what we want to avoid is a spike because that spike will come down and bite us again when they all go through regular maintenance cycles and every one comes due within two or three years or four years. It gets very crowded. It's not off the table because we've not awarded anything yet, but we will—we will look at how best we can balance with how we get resourced and, if we have O'Rourke 14 The Navy’s Osprey (MCM-51) class mine warfare ships are an enlarged version of the Italian Lerici-class mine warfare ships. 15 The FRC design is based on a Dutch patrol boat design, the Damen Stan Patrol Boat 4708. 16 See, for example, Lee Hudson, “Navy to Downselect to One Vendor for Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the Navy, January 15, 2018. 17 10 U.S.C. 7309 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains these provisos: “ ... Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign facilities for the construction of major components of such vessel: Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards.... ” Congressional Research Service 7 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress gets very crowded. It’s not off the table because we’ve not awarded anything yet, but we will—we will look at how best we can balance with how we get resourced and, if we have the resources to bring expedition, granted, we will do that.18 Competing Industry Teams At least five industry teams are reportedly competing for the FFG(X) program. Two of these teams are offering designs for the FFG(X) that are modified versions of the two Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) designs that the Navy has procured in prior years. The other three industry teams are offering designs for the FFG(X) that are based on other existing ship designs. One of these three other industry teams is proposing to build its design at one of the LCS shipyards. the resources to bring expedition, granted, we will do that.²²

The Navy intends to conduct a full and open competition to select the builder of the FFG(X), including proposals based on either U.S. or foreign parent designs. On February 16, 2018, the Navy awarded five FFG(X) conceptual design contracts with a value of $15.0 million each to

•   Austal USA of Mobile, AL;
• Huntington Ingalls Industry/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS;    MS;
• Lockheed Martin of Baltimore, MD;
• Fincantieri/Marinette Marine (F/MM) of Marinette, WI; and
• General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW), of Bath, ME.19 Being a recipient of a conceptual design contract is not a requirement for competing for the subsequent Detailed Design and Construction (DD&C) contract for the program. The Navy plans to announce the outcome of the FFG(X) competition—the winner of the DD&C contract—in July 2020. A February 16, 2018, press report states the following: The Navy would not confirm how many groups bid for the [FFG(X)] work. At least one U.S.-German team that was not selected for a [conceptual] design contract, Atlas USA and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, told USNI News they had submitted for the [DD&C] General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW), of Bath, ME.²³

competition.... During last month'’s Surface Navy Association [annual symposium], several shipbuilders outlined their designs for the FFG(X) competition.

Austal USA Shipyard: Austal USA in Mobile, Ala.

Parent Design: Independence-class [i.e., LCS-2 class] Littoral Combat Ship

One of the two Littoral Combat Ship builders, Austal USA has pitched an upgunned variant of the Independence-class LCS as both a foreign military sales offering and as the answer to the Navy'’s upgunned small surface combatant and then frigate programs. Based on the 3,000-ton aluminum trimaran design, the hull boasts a large flight deck and space for up to 16 Mk-41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells.

18 Source: Transcript of hearing posted at CQ.com. Department of Defense, Contracts, Press Operations, Release No: CR-032-18, February 16, 2018 (i.e., the DOD contracts award page for February 16, 2018). See also Ben Werner, “Navy Exercises Options For Additional Future Frigate Design Work,” USNI News, July 31, 2018; Rich Abott, “Navy Awards Mods To FFG(X) Design Contracts,” Defense Daily, August 1, 2018; Kris Osborn, “The Navy Is Moving Fast to Build a New Frigate. Here Is What We Know,” National Interest, August 1, 2018. 19 Congressional Research Service 8 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Fincantieri Marine Group Fincantieri Marine Group

Shipyard: Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisc.

Parent Design: Fincantieri Italian FREMM

As part of the stipulations of the FFG(X) programs, a contractor can offer just one design in the competition as a prime contractor but may also support a second bid as a subcontractor. Fincantieri elected to offer its 6,700-ton Italian Fregata europea multi-missionemultimissione (FREMM) design for construction in its Wisconsin Marinette Marine shipyard, as well as partner with Lockheed Martin on its Freedom-class pitch as a subcontractor. The Italian FREMM design features a 16-cell VLS as well as space for deck-launched anti-ship missiles.

General Dynamics Bath Iron Works

Shipyard: Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine

Parent Design: Navantia Álvaro de Bazán-class F100 Frigate

The 6,000-ton air defense guided-missile frigates fitted with the Aegis Combat System have been in service for the Spanish Armada since 2002 and are the basis of the Australian Hobart-class air defense destroyers and the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates. The Navantia partnership with Bath is built on a previous partnership from the turn of the century. The F100 frigates were a product of a teaming agreement between BIW, Lockheed Martin and Navantia predecessor Izar as part of the Advanced Frigate Consortium from 2000.

Huntington Ingalls Industries

Shipyard: Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Miss.

Parent Design: Unknown

Out of the competitors involved in the competition, HII was the only company that did not present a model or a rendering of its FFG(X) at the Surface Navy Association symposium in January. A spokeswoman for the company declined to elaborate on the offering when contacted by USNI News on Friday. In the past, HII has presented a naval version of its Legend-class National Security Cutter design as a model at trade shows labeled as a "Patrol Frigate."

“Patrol Frigate.” Lockheed Martin Shipyard: Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisc.

Parent Design: Freedom-class [i.e., LCS-1 class] Littoral Combat Ship

Of the two LCS builders, Lockheed Martin is the first to have secured a foreign military sale with its design. The company'’s FFG(X) bid will have much in common with its offering for the Royal Saudi Navy'’s 4,000-ton multi-mission surface combatant. The new Saudi ships will be built around an eight-cell Mk-41 vertical launch system and a 4D air search radar. Lockheed has pitched several other variants of the hull that include more VLS cells.

" “We are proud of our 15-year partnership with the U.S. Navy on the Freedom-variant Littoral Combat Ship and look forward to extending it to FFG(X),"” said Joe DePietro, Lockheed Martin vice president of small combatants and ship systems in a Friday evening statement.

" Congressional Research Service 9 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress “Our frigate design offers an affordable, low-risk answer to meeting the Navy'’s goals of a larger and more capable fleet.”20 larger and more capable fleet."²⁴

Block Buy Contracting As a means of reducing their procurement cost, the Navy envisages using one or more fixed-price block buy contracts to procure the ships.²⁶

Program Funding

21 Program Funding Table 1 shows funding for the FFG(X) program under the Navy's FY2019’s FY2020 budget submission.

Issues for Congress

FY2019 Funding Request

Analytical Basis for Capability Gaps/Mission Needs

Analytical Basis for Addressing Capability Gaps/Mission Needs with an FFG

Growth Margin

Another potential oversight issue for Congress whether the Navy has chosen the appropriate amount of growth margin to whether the Navy has accurately priced that work. Cost, Capabilities, and Growth Margin Another issue for Congress is whether the Navy has appropriately defined the cost, capabilities, and growth margin of the FFG(X). Analytical Basis for Desired Ship Capabilities One aspect of this issue is whether the Navy has an adequately rigorous analytical basis for its identification of the capability gaps or mission needs to be met by the FFG(X), and for its Sam LaGrone and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Picks Five Contenders for Next Generation Frigate FFG(X) Program,” USNI News, February 16, 2018. See also David B. Larter, “Navy Awards Design Contracts for Future Frigate,” Defense News, February 16, 2018; Lee Hudson, “Navy Awards Five Conceptual Design Contracts for Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the Navy, February 19, 2018. 21 For more on block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz. 20 Congressional Research Service 10 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress decision to meet those capability gaps or mission needs through the procurement of a FFG with the capabilities outlined earlier in this CRS report. The question of whether the Navy has an adequately rigorous analytical basis for these things was discussed in greater detail in earlier editions of this CRS report.22 Balance Between Cost and Capabilities Another potential aspect of this issue is whether the Navy has arrived at a realistic balance between its desired capabilities for the FFG(X) and the its estimated procurement cost for the ship. An imbalance between these two could lead to an increased risk of cost growth in the program. The Navy could argue that a key aim of the five FFG(X) conceptual design contracts and other preliminary Navy interactions with industry was to help the Navy arrive at a realistic balance by informing the Navy’s understanding of potential capability-cost tradeoffs in the FFG(X) design. Number of VLS Tubes Another potential aspect of this issue concerns the planned number of Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile tubes on the FFG(X). The VLS is the FFG(X)’s principal (though not only) means of storing and launching missiles. As shown in Figure 2 (see the box in the upper-left corner labeled “AW,” meaning air warfare), the FFG(X) is to be equipped with 32 Mark 41 VLS tubes. (The Mark 41 is the Navy’s standard VLS design.) Supporters of requiring the FFG(X) to be equipped with a larger number of VLS tubes, such as 48, might argue that the FFG(X) is to be roughly half as expensive to procure as the DDG-51 destroyer, and might therefore be more appropriately equipped with 48 VLS tubes, which is onehalf the number on recent DDG-51s. They might also argue that in a context of renewed great power competition with potential adversaries such as China, which is steadily improving its naval capabilities,23 it might be prudent to equip the FFG(X)s with 48 rather than 32 VLS tubes, and that doing so might only marginally increase the unit procurement cost of the FFG(X). Supporters of requiring the FFG(X) to have no more than 32 VLS tubes might argue that the analyses indicating a need for 32 already took improving adversary capabilities (as well as other U.S. Navy capabilities) into account. They might also argue that the FFG(X), in addition to having 32 VLS tubes, is also to have a separate, 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) missile launcher (see again the “AW” box in the upper-left corner of Figure 2), and that increasing the number of VLS tubes from 32 to 48 would increase the procurement cost of a ship that is intended to be an affordable supplement to the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers. Potential oversight questions for Congress might be: What would be the estimated increase in unit procurement cost of the FFG(X) of increasing the number of VLS tubes from 32 to 48? What would be the estimated increase in unit procurement cost of equipping the FFG(X) with 32 VLS tubes but designing the ship so that the number could easily be increased to 48 at some point later in the ship’s life? 22 See, for example, the version of this report dated February 4, 2019. For more on China’s naval modernization effort, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 23 Congressional Research Service 11 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Growth Margin Another potential aspect of this issue is whether, beyond the specific question of the number of VLS tubes, the Navy more generally has chosen the appropriate amount of growth margin to incorporate into the FFG(X) design. As shown in the Appendixincorporate into the FFG(X) design. As shown in the Appendix, the Navy wants the FFG(X) design to have a growth margin (also called service life allowance) of 5%, meaning an ability to accommodate upgrades and other changes that might be made to the ship'’s design over the course of its service life that could require up to 5% more space, weight, electrical power, or equipment cooling capacity. As shown in the AppendixAppendix, the Navy also wants the FFG(X) design to have an additional growth margin (above the 5% factor) for accommodating a future directed energy system (i.e., a laser or high-power microwave device) or an active electronic attack system (i.e., electronic warfare system).

Supporters could argue that a 5% growth margin is traditional for a ship like a frigate, that the FFG(X)'’s 5% growth margin is supplemented by the additional growth margin for a directed energy system or active electronic attack system, and that requiring a larger growth margin could make the FFG(X) design larger and more expensive to procure.

Skeptics might argue that a larger growth margin (such as 10%—a figure used in designing cruisers and destroyers) would provide more of a hedge against the possibility of greater-than-anticipatedthananticipated improvements in the capabilities of potential adversaries such as China,³³ that a limited growth margin was a concern in the FFG-7 design,³⁴24 and that increasing the FFG(X) growth margin from 5% to 10% would have only a limited impact on the FFG(X)'’s procurement cost.

Parent-Design Approach

Another A potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy's proposed acquisition strategy for the program, including the Navy's intent to use a parent-design approach for the question for Congress might be: What would be the estimated increase in unit procurement cost of the FFG(X) of increasing the ship’s growth margin from 5% to 10%? Parent-Design Approach Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the parent-design approach for the program. One alternative would be to use a clean-sheet design approach, under which procurement of the FFG(X) would begin about FY2023FY2024 and procurement of LCSs might be extended through about 2022.

2023. As mentioned earlier, using the parent-design approach can reduce design time, design cost, and technical, schedule, and cost risk in building the ship. A clean-sheet design approach, on the other hand, might result in a design that more closely matches the Navy'’s desired capabilities for the FFG(X), which might make the design more cost-effective for the Navy over the long run. It might also provide more work for the U.S. ship design and engineering industrial base.

Another possible alternative would be to consider frigate designs that have been developed, but for which there are not yet any completed ships. This approach might make possible consideration of designs, such as (to cite just one possible example) the UK'’s new Type 26 frigate design, production of which was in its early stages in 2018. Compared to a clean-sheet design approach, using a developed-but-not-yet-built design would offer a reduction in design time and cost, but might not offer as much reduction in technical, schedule, and cost risk in building the ship as would be offered by use of an already-built design. 24 See, for example, See U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Jerome H. Stolarow, Director, Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division, before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee on The Navy’s FFG-7 Class Frigate Shipbuilding Program, and Other Ship Program Issues, January 3, 1979, pp. 9-11. Congressional Research Service 12 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risk Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns cost, schedule, and technical risk in the FFG(X) program. The Navy can argue that the program’s cost, schedule, and technical risk has been reduced by use of the parent-design approach and the decision to use only systems and technologies that already exist or are already being developed for use in other programs, rather than new technologies that need to be developed. Skeptics, while acknowledging that point, might argue that lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs inherently pose cost, schedule, and technical risk, because they serve as the prototypes for their programs, and that, as detailed by CBO25 and GAO,26 lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in many cases have turned out to be more expensive to build than the Navy had estimated. An April 2018 report from the Government Accountability Office on the status of various Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs states the following about the FFG(X) program: Current Status In May 2017, the Navy shifted away from its plan for a new frigate derived from minor modifications to an LCS design and now plans to select a new frigate design and shipbuilder through a full and open competition that is not limited to LCS derivatives. The program intends to leverage the proposed capabilities of the original frigate program and ship as would be offered by use of an already-built design.

Navy's Plan for Shifting Procurement from LCS to FFG(X)

Technical Risk

expand upon them to create a more lethal and survivable ship. In fiscal year 2018, the FFG(X) program plans to focus on system specifications development and approval, acquisition program documentation needs, test strategy development, and combat management system integration. The program released a request for conceptual design proposals in November 2017 and plans to award multiple contracts in 2018 in an effort to reduce risk by maturing industry designs to meet FFG(X) capability needs.

Consistent with statute and knowledge-based practices, the Navy has scheduled a preliminary design review prior to a development start decision in February 2020. To support the development start decision, the program expects to complete an independent cost estimate, affordability and should-cost analyses, and an independent technical risk assessment. Although the number of planned frigates remains uncertain due to previous Secretary of Defense direction to cap the combined total of LCS and frigates at 40 ships, the program plans to award what the Navy refers to as a "“block buy"” contract for FFG(X) detail design and construction in September 2020. This block buy contract, which the Navy plans to award to a single shipbuilder, is intended to achieve more favorable pricing, but as planned, would require the Navy to commit to more than 1 year'’s worth of procurement in a single contract. If the Navy requests congressional authorization during 2019 for the planned fiscal year 2020 block buy, the Navy will lack key knowledge, such as an independent cost estimate, to support its request.

Program Office Comments

We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The program stated that conceptual design allows the Navy to mature multiple designs and better understand cost and capability drivers across design options before a detail design See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2018, p. 25, including Figure 10. 26 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 8. 25 Congressional Research Service 13 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress and construction award, as well as inform final specifications that will achieve a best value solution.27 Procurement of LCSs in FY2020 as Hedge against FFG(X) Delay Another potential issue for Congress is whether any additional LCSs should be procured in FY2020 as a hedge against potential delays in the FFG(X) program. Supporters might argue that, as detailed by GAO,28 lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in many cases encounter schedule delays, some quite lengthy, and that procuring additional LCSs in FY2020 could hedge against that risk at reasonable cost by taking advantage of hot LCS production lines. Skeptics might argue that the Navy does not have a requirement for any additional LCSs, and that funding the procurement of additional LCSs in FY2020 could reduce FY2020 funding available for other Navy or DOD programs, with an uncertain impact on net Navy or DOD capabilities. Potential Industrial-Base Impacts of Shifting Procurement from LCSs to FFG(X)s Another issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base impacts of the Navy’s plan to shift procurement of small surface combatants from LCSs to FFG(X)s starting in FY2020, particularly in terms of future workloads and employment levels at the two LCS shipyards, if one or both of these yards are not involved in building FFG(X)s. If a design proposed for construction at one of the LCS shipyards is chosen as the winner of the FFG(X) competition, then other things held equal (e.g., without the addition of new work other than building LCSs), workloads and employment levels at the other LCS shipyard (the one not chosen for the FFG(X) program), as well as supplier firms associated with that other LCS shipyard, would decline over time as the other LCS shipyard’s backlog of prior-year-funded LCSs is completed and not replaced with new FFG(X) work. If no design proposed for construction at an LCS shipyard is chosen as the FFG(X)—that is, if the winner of the FFG(X) competition is a design to be built at a shipyard other than the two LCS shipyards—then other things held equal, employment levels at both LCS shipyards and their supplier firms would decline over time as their backlogs of prior-year-funded LCSs are completed and not replaced with FFG(X) work.29 As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s current baseline plan for the FFG(X) program is to build FFG(X)s at a single shipyard. One possible alternative to this baseline plan would be to build FFG(X)s at two or three shipyards, including one or both of the LCS shipyards. This alternative is discussed further in the following section. Another possible alternative would be would be to shift Navy shipbuilding work at one of the LCS yards (if the other wins the FFG(X) competition) or at both of the LCS yards (if neither wins the FFG(X) competition) to the production of sections of larger Navy ships (such as DDG-51 destroyers or amphibious ships) that undergo final assembly at other shipyards. Under this option, in other words, one or both of the LCS yards would 27 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to Sustaining Recent Positive Trends, GAO-18-360SP, p. 115. 28 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 9. 29 For additional discussion, see, for example, Roxana Tiron, “Shipyards Locked in ‘Existential’ Duel for Navy’s New Frigate,” Bloomberg, February 20, 2019; Paul McLeary, “Saudis Save Wisconsin Shipbuilder: Fills Gap Between LCS & Frigates At Marinette,” Breaking Defense, January 17, 2019. Congressional Research Service 14 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress function as feeder yards supporting the production of larger Navy ships that undergo final assembly at other shipyards. This option might help maintain workloads and employment levels at one or both of the LCS yards, and might alleviate capacity constraints at other shipyards, permitting certain parts of the Navy’s 355-ship force-level objective to be achieved sooner. The concept of feeder yards in naval shipbuilding was examined at length in a 2011 RAND report.30 Number of FFG(X) Builders Another issue for Congress whether to build FFG(X)s at a single shipyard, as the Navy’s baseline plan calls for, or at two or three shipyards. As mentioned earlier, one possible alternative to the Navy’s current baseline plan for building FFG(X)s at a single shipyard would be to build them at two or three yards, including potentially one or both of the LCS shipyards. The Navy’s FFG-7 class frigates, which were procured at annual rates of as high as eight ships per year, were built at three shipyards.31 Supporters of building FFG(X)s at two or three yards might argue that it could  boost FFG(X) production from the currently planned two ships per year to four or more ships per year, substantially accelerating the date for attaining the Navy’s small surface combatant force-level goal;  permit the Navy to use competition (either competition for quantity at the margin, or competition for profit [i.e., Profit Related to Offers, or PRO, bidding])32 to 30 Laurence Smallman et al., Shared Modular Build of Warships, How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2011 (report TR-852), 81 pp. The Navy in recent years has made some use of the concept:  All Virginia-class attack submarines have been produced jointly by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat division (GD/EB) and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), with each yard in effect acting as a feeder yard for Virginia-class boats that undergo final assembly at the other yard.  Certain components of the Navy’s three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers were produced by HII’s Ingalls Shipyard (HII/Ingalls) and then transported to GD’s Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW), the primary builder and final assembly yard for the ships.  San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships were built at the Ingalls shipyard at Pascagoula, MS, and the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, LA. These shipyards were owned by Northrop and later by HII. To alleviate capacity constraints at Ingalls and Avondale caused by damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Northrop subcontracted the construction of portions of LPDs 20 through 24 (i.e., the fourth through eighth ships in the class) to other shipyards on the Gulf Coast and East Coast, including shipyards not owned by Northrop. For more on the Virginia-class joint production arrangement, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Regarding the LPD17 program, see Laurence Smallman et al., Shared Modular Build of Warships, How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2011 (report TR-852), pp. 45-48. See also David Paganie, “Signal International positions to capture the Gulf,” Offshore, June 1, 2006; Peter Frost, “Labor Market, Schedule Forces Outsourcing of Work,” Newport News Daily Press, April 1, 2008; Holbrook Mohr, “Northrop Gets LPD Help From General Dynamics,” NavyTimes.com, April 1, 2008; and Geoff Fein, “Northrop Grumman Awards Bath Iron Works Construction Work On LPD-24,” Defense Daily, April 2, 2008. 31 The 51 FFG-7s were procured from FY1973 through FY1984 in annual quantities of 1, 0, 3, 6, 8, 8, 8, 5, 6, 3, 2, and 1. The three FFG-7 builders were GD/BIW, Todd Shipyards/San Pedro, CA, and Todd Shipyards/Seattle, WA. The two Todd shipyards last built Navy ships in the latter 1980s. (See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020, March 2019, p. 16.) Todd/San Pedro closed at the end of the 1980s. Todd/Seattle was purchased by and now forms part of Vigor Shipyards, a firm with multiple facilities in the Puget Sound area and in Portland, OR. Vigor’s work for the Navy in recent years has centered on the overhaul and repair of existing Navy ships, although it also builds ships for other customers. 32 For more on PRO bidding, see Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the House Armed Services Committee on Case Studies in DOD Acquisition: Finding What Works, June 24, 2014, p. 7. Congressional Research Service 15 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress  help restrain FFG(X) prices and ensure production quality and on-time deliveries; and perhaps complicate adversary defense planning by presenting potential adversaries with multiple FFG(X) designs, each with its own specific operating characteristics. Opponents of this plan might argue that it could    weaken the current FFG(X) competition by offering the winner a smaller prospective number of FFG(X)s and perhaps also essentially guaranteeing the LCSs yard that they will build some number of FFG(X)s; substantially increase annual FFG(X) procurement funding requirements so as to procure four or more FFG(X)s per year rather than two per year, which in a situation of finite DOD funding could require offsetting reductions in other Navy or DOD programs; and reduce production economies of scale in the FFG(X) program by dividing FFG(X) among two or three designs, and increase downstream Navy FFG(X) operation and support (O&S) costs by requiring the Navy to maintain two or three FFG(X) logistics support systems. Potential Impact on Requirements for Cruisers and Destroyers Another potential oversight issue for Congress is whether the FFG(X) program has any implications for required numbers or capabilities of U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. The Navy’s goal to achieve and maintain a force of 104 cruisers and destroyers and 52 small surface combatants was determined in 2016, and may reflect an earlier plan to procure FFs, rather than the current plan to procure more-capable FFG(X)s. If so, a question might arise as to whether the current plan to procure FFG(X)s would permit a reduction in the required number of cruisers and destroyers, or in the required capabilities of those cruisers and destroyers. As mentioned earlier, Navy officials have stated that the new Force Structure Assessment (FSA) being conducted by the Navy may shift the Navy to a new fleet architecture that will include, among other thing, a larger proportion of small surface combatants—and, by implication, a smaller proportion of large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers). A September 7, 2018, press report stated the following: Ahead of the Navy's next force-structure assessment [FSA], the service aims to “pull together something” quicker to help inform the fiscal year 2020 budget request, according to the Navy's top requirements officer…. [Vice Adm. William Merz, deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems,] said Sept. 5 he'll be paying attention to the mix of large and small surface combatants. “A lot of that will depend on our perception of what is this next frigate really going to look like,” he said, referring to the future frigate, FFG(X). “How much capability and modernization are we actually going to be able to do to that ship? That could influence how much of another kind of ship we need.”33 A January 15, 2019, press report states: Justin Katz, “Ahead of FSA, Navu Will Send Quicl Look to Congress to Inform FY-20 Budget,” Inside the Navy, September 7, 2018. 33 Congressional Research Service 16 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress The Navy plans to spend this year taking the first few steps into a markedly different future, which, if it comes to pass, will upend how the fleet has fought since the Cold War. And it all starts with something that might seem counterintuitive: It’s looking to get smaller. “Today, I have a requirement for 104 large surface combatants in the force structure assessment; [and] I have [a requirement for] 52 small surface combatants,” said Surface Warfare Director Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall. “That’s a little upside down. Should I push out here and have more small platforms? I think the future fleet architecture study has intimated ‘yes,’ and our war gaming shows there is value in that.”34 An April 8, 2019, press report states that Navy discussions about the future surface fleet include the upcoming construction and fielding of the [FFG(X)] frigate, which [Vice Admiral Bill Merz, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems] said is surpassing expectations already in terms of the lethality that industry can put into a small combatant. “The FSA may actually help us on, how many (destroyers) do we really need to modernize, because I think the FSA is going to give a lot of credit to the frigate—if I had a crystal ball and had to predict what the FSA was going to do, it’s going to probably recommend more small surface combatants, meaning the frigate … and then how much fewer large surface combatants can we mix?” Merz said. An issue the Navy has to work through is balancing a need to have enough ships and be capable enough today, while also making decisions that will help the Navy get out of the top-heavy surface fleet and into a better balance as soon as is feasible. “You may see the evolution over time where frigates start replacing destroyers, the Large Surface Combatant [a future cruiser/destroyer-type ship] starts replacing destroyers, and in the end, as the destroyers blend away you’re going to get this healthier mix of small and large surface combatants,” he said—though the new FSA may shed more light on what that balance will look like and when it could be achieved.35 Legislative Activity for FY2020 Summary of Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 funding request for the LCS program. Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2020 FFG(X) Program Funding Request Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth. Authorization Request Research and development Procurement (Procurement quantity) HASC SASC Appropriation Conf. HAC SAC Conf. 59.0 1,281.2 (1) David B. Larter, “US Navy Moves Toward Unleashing Killer Robot Shps on the World’s Oceans,” Defense News, January 15, 2019. 35 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Sees No Easy Answer to Balance Future Surface Fleet,” USNI News, April 8, 2019. Ellipse as in original. 34 Congressional Research Service 17 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2020 Navy budget submission, committee and conference reports, and explanatory statements on the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act and the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act. Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement. Research and development funding is located in PE (Program Element) 0603599N, Frigate Development, which is line 54 in the FY2020 Navy research and development account. Congressional Research Service 18 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix. Navy Briefing Slides from July 25, 2017, FFG(X) Industry Day Event This appendix reprints some of the briefing slides that the Navy presented at its July 25, 2017, industry day event on the FFG(X) program, which was held in association with the Request for Information (RFI) that the Navy issued on July 25, 2017, to solicit information for better understanding potential trade-offs between cost and capability in the FFG(X) design. The reprinted slides begin on the next page. Congressional Research Service 19 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Slides from Navy FFG(X) Industry Day Briefing Congressional Research Service 20 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 21 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 22 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 23 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Source: Slides from briefing posted on July 28, 2017, at RFI: FFG(X) - US Navy Guided Missile Frigate Replacement Program, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id= d089cf61f254538605cdec5438955b8e&_cview=0, accessed August 11, 2017. Author Information Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs Congressional Research Service 24 Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Congressional Research Service R44972 · VERSION 23 · UPDATED 25 better understand cost and capability drivers across design options before a detail design and construction award, as well as inform final specifications that will achieve a best value solution.³⁹

Potential Impact on Requirements for Cruisers and Destroyers

Legislative Activity for FY2019

Summary of Congressional Action on FY2019 Funding Request

Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's FY2019 funding request for the LCS program.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019/John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/S. 2987/P.L. 115-232)

House

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-676 of May 15, 2018) on H.R. 5515, recommended the funding levels for the FFG(X) program shown in the HASC column of Table 2.

Senate

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 115-262 of June 5, 2018) on S. 2987, recommended the funding levels for the FFG(X) program shown in the SASC column of Table 2.

Conference

The conference report (H.Rept. 115-874 of July 25, 2018) on H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018 recommended the funding levels for the FFG(X) program shown in the authorization conference column of Table 2.

FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 6157/S. 3159 /Division A of H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245)

House

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-769 of June 20, 2018) on H.R. 6157, recommended the funding levels for the FFG(X) program shown in the HAC column of Table 2. The recommended reduction of $2.0 million is for "Testing delays." (Page 248)

Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 115-290 of June 28, 2018) on S. 3159, recommended the funding levels for the FFG(X) program shown in the SAC column of Table 2.

Conference

The joint explanatory statement for H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245 specified the funding levels shown in the appropriations conference column of Table 2. The reduction of $2.0 million is for "Testing and engineering delays." (PDF page 276 of 559)

Appendix. Navy Briefing Slides from July 25, 2017, FFG(X) Industry Day Event