Contents

• Overview
• Domestic Issues
• Leadership and Succession
• Administrative Changes, Lower Oil Prices, and Fiscal Priorities
• Gender Issues, Minority Relations, and Human Rights
Economic Reform, Fiscal Priorities, and Administrative Changes
• Human Rights, Gender Issues, and Minority Relations
• Human Rights Concerns
• Women's Rights Issues
• Minority Relations and Security
• Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation
• The Islamic State's Campaign Againstagainst the Kingdom
• Terrorist Financing and Material Support: Concerns and Responses
• U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia
• Arms Sales and, Security Assistance, and Training
• Arms Sales
• Support to Saudi Military Operations in Yemen
• Assistance to the Saudi Ministry of Interior
• U.S.-Saudi Trade
• Energy Issues
• Global Energy Trends and Saudi Policy
• Potential U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
• Saudi Energy Consumption and Nuclear Plans
• U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia
• Congressional Views, Legislation, and Administration Perspectives
• Saudi Views on Fuel Cycle Technologies
• Saudi Foreign Policy
• Iran, Iraq, and Syria
• Conflict in Yemen
• Qatar and Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Tensions
• Israeli-Palestinian Affairs
Security Training
• Proposed Foreign Military Sales Draw Congressional Scrutiny
• Developments in the 115^th Congress
• U.S. Support to the Saudi Ministry of Interior
• Consensus and Contention in the Middle East
• Saudi Arabia and Iran
• Tensions Escalate in 2016 and 2017
• Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Plans
• Confrontation with Qatar
• Saudi Military Campaigns and Policy in Yemen
• Implications for U.S.-Saudi Relations
• Syria
• Iraq
• Egypt
• The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
• U.S.-Saudi Trade and Energy Issues
• Outlook

Summary

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932, wields significant global influence through its administration of the birthplace of the Islamic faith and by virtue of its large oil reserves. Close U.S.-Saudi official relations have survived a series of challenges since the 1940s. In recent years, shared concerns over Sunni Islamist extremist terrorism and Iranian government policies have provided some renewed logic for continued strategic cooperation. Political upheaval and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa have created new challenges, and the Trump Administration is seekinghas sought to strengthen U.S. ties to Saudi leaders as the kingdom implements a series of new domestic and foreign policy initiatives.

Successive U.S. Administrations have referred to the Saudi government as an important partner, and U.S. arms sales and related security cooperation programs have continued with congressional oversight and amid some congressional opposition. The Trump Administration, like its recent predecessors, praises Saudi government counterterrorism efforts. Since 2009, the executive branch has notified Congress of proposed foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia of major defense articles and services with a potential aggregate value of more than $136nearly $139 billion. The United States and Saudi Arabia concluded formal arms sale agreements worth more than $65 billion, from FY2009 through FY2016. Since Since March 2015, the U.S.-trained Saudi military has used U.S.-origin weaponry, U.S. logistical assistance, and shared intelligence in support of military operations in Yemen. Some in Congress express concern about Saudi use of U.S.-origin weaponry and question Saudi commitment to combating extremism. Legislation beforeLegislation has been proposed in the 115^th Congress would place conditions onto condition or disapprove of some proposed U.S. weapons sales or otherwise limit the use of funds for some U.S. involvement in YemenU.S. weapons sales and condition or direct the President to end U.S. support to Saudi operations without specific authorization (H.J.Res. 102, H.J.Res. 104, S.J.Res. 40, S.J.Res. 42, H.R. 2810). U.S. officials praise Saudi counterterrorism efforts, including action against the Islamic State.

S.J.Res. 54, S.J.Res. 55).

In parallel to close security ties, official U.S. concerns aboutreports describe restrictions on human rights and religious freedom in the kingdom have in part reflected deeper concerns for the kingdom's stability. Saudi activists advance limited economic and political reform demands, continuing. Some Saudi activists advocate for limited economic and political reforms, continuing decades-long trends that have seen Saudi liberals, moderates, and conservatives pressadvance different visions for domestic change for decades. While some limited protests . Saudi leaders in 2018 reversed a long-standing ban on women's right to drive, amid some arrests of women's rights advocates and critics of social liberalization. While some limited protests and arrests have occurred since unrest swept the wider region in 2011, clashes involving Saudi security forces have not spread beyond certain predominantly Shia areas of the oil-rich Eastern Province. The Obama Administration endorsed Saudi citizens' rights to free assembly and free expression. Saudi leaders reject foreign interference in the country's internal affairs.

The death of King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz in January 2015 brought to a close his long chapter of national leadership. His half-brother King Salman bin Abd al Aziz assumed the throne and has moved to assert his authority at home and pursue Saudi prerogatives abroad. Succession arrangements have attracted particular attention in recent years, as senior leaders in the royal family have passed away or faced reported health issues. A Since assuming the throne in 2015, King Salman bin Abd al Aziz (age 82) has made a series of appointments and reassignments since 2015 hasthat have altered the responsibilities and relative power of leading members of the next generation of the Al Saud family, who are the grandsons of the kingdom's founder. The king's son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has emerged as a(age 33), is the central figure in Saudi policymaking, having. He has asserted control over national security forces, proposedsidelined potential rivals, proposed and begun implementing bold economic and social changes, and arrested prominent figures accused of corruption, including some fellow royal family members.

Shared security challenges have long defined U.S.-Saudi relations, and questions about Saudi domestic and foreign policy may become more pertinent as Saudi leadership changes unfold and as regional conflicts and competition continue. Saudi leaders' assertiveness in confronting perceived threats and the effects of their sharpening tensions with Iran could affect U.S. security interests, including with regard to Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Ambitious plans for the transformation of the kingdom's economy seek to provide opportunity for young Saudis and bolster nonoil sources of revenues for the state. Abroad, the kingdom pursues a multidirectional policy and has aggressively confronted perceived threats.

Saudi decisionmaking long appeared to be risk-averse and rooted in rulers' concerns for maintaining consensus among different constituencies, including factions of the royal family, business elites, and conservative religious figures. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's assertive and more centralized leadership has challenged this model of governance. The change is leading Saudis and outsiders alike to reexamine their assumptions about the kingdom's future.

Congress may examine these developments when considering the scope, terms, and merits of ongoing U.S.-Saudi partnership, proposed arms sales and nuclear cooperation, and security commitments.

---

Overview

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States, its stability, and its future trajectory are subjects of continuing congressional interest. In particular, Saudi leadership transitions, lowertrends in global oil prices, related Saudi budget pressures and reform plans, aggressive transnational terrorist threats, more assertive Saudi foreign policypolicies, and Saudi-Iranian tensions have fueled recent congressional discussions. U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and U.S. concern for the continuing global availability of Saudi energy supplies continue to anchor official bilateral relations as they have for decades. In this context, the Trump Administration's efforts to reinvigorate U.S.-Saudi relations have drawn increased public attention and have generated debate, as had. Previously, the Obama Administration's differences had differed with Saudi leaders over Iran, the Iranian nuclear program, and the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Amid some continuing differences on these issues, bilateral ties have been bolstered by new arms sale proposals, extensions of security force training arrangements, enhanced counterterrorismdefined since 2017 by arms sale proposals, Yemen-related security cooperation, and shared concerns about Iran, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). From late 2012 through late 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of proposed Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia with a potential value of more than $45 billion. President Donald Trump and Saudi officials announced agreement on some of these sales and others during the President's May 2017 trip to the kingdom, as part of a package that may potentially be worth more than $110 billion. This package of previously discussed and newly proposed defense sales is intended to address Saudi needs for maritime and coastal security improvements, air force training and support, cybersecurity and communications upgrades, missile and air defenses, and enhanced border security and counterterrorism capabilities (see "Arms Sales and, Security Assistance, and Training" below and Appendix B).

King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud (age 82) succeeded his late half-brother King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz following the latter's death in January 2015. King Salman later announced dramatic changes to succession arrangements left in place by King Abdullah, surprising observers of the kingdom's politics. King Salman first replaced his half-brother Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abd al Aziz with their nephew, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abd al Aziz, who was then- Interior Minister and counterterrorism chief. The king then named his own son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abd al Aziz, then- 29, as Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister. Later, in In June 2017, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was relieved of his positions and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, now 32, (age 33) was elevated further to the position of Crown Prince, placing him in line to succeed his father (see Figure 1, Figure 2, and "Leadership and Succession" below). Both princes are members of the generation of grandsons of the kingdom's late founder, King Abd al Aziz bin Abd al Rahman Al Saud (aka Ibn Saud). The succession changes and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's efforts to assert his role as the shaper of the kingdom's national security and economic policies have resulted in an apparent consolidation of authority under one individual and sub-branch of the family that is unprecedented in the kingdom since its founding under the late Ibn Saud.

Shifts in Saudi foreign policy toward a more assertive posture—typified by the kingdom's military operations in neighboring Yemen and its insistence on the departure of President Bashar al Asad in Syriaa series of regional moves intended to counteract Iranian initiatives—have accompanied the post-2015 leadership changes. Saudi leaders launched military operations in Yemen following the early 2015 ouster of Yemen's transitional government by the Zaydi Shia Ansar Allah (aka Houthi) movement and backers of the late former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (see "Saudi Military Campaigns and PolicyConflict in Yemen" below). A U.S.-facilitated, Saudi-led coalition air campaign has conducted strikes across the country since late March 2015 aimed at reversing gains made by Houthi-Saleh forces and compelling them to negotiate with U.N.-recognized transition leaders.

Concerns about Yemeni civilian deaths in Saudi airstrikes, the operation's contribution to deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and gains by Al Qaeda and Islamic State supporters have led some Members of Congress and U.S. officials to urge all parties to seek a prompt settlement. President Obama maintained U.S. logistical support for Saudi operations in Yemen but decided in 2016 to reduce U.S. personnel support and limit certain U.S. arms transfers. President Trump has chosen to proceed with precision guided munition technology sales that the Obama Administration deferred, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has renewed calls for a political settlement backed by military support to Yemen's internationally recognized government, coupled with a joint Saudi and Emirati ground campaign aimed at reversing Houthi gains and compelling them to negotiate with U.N.-recognized transition leaders.

2017) and General Organization for Statistics.

Concerns about Yemeni civilian deaths in Saudi airstrikes, the operation's contribution to grave humanitarian conditions, and gains by Al Qaeda and Islamic State supporters have led some Members of Congress and U.S. officials to urge all parties to seek a prompt settlement. President Obama maintained U.S. logistical support for Saudi operations in Yemen but decided in 2016 to reduce U.S. personnel support and limit certain U.S. arms transfers. President Trump has chosen to proceed with precision guided munition technology sales that the Obama Administration deferred. In September 2018, the Trump Administration certified conditions set by Congress on Saudi actions in Yemen and renewed calls for a political solution. A U.S. State Department travel advisory issued in April 2018 warns that "rebel groups operating in Yemen have fired long-range missiles into Saudi Arabia, specifically targeting populated areas and civilian infrastructure" and that "rebel forces in Yemen fire artillery at Saudi border towns and launch cross-border attacks against Saudi military personnel."¹

U.S. support to the kingdom's operations in Yemen and Saudi use of U.S.-origin weaponry has drawn new attention to congressionally reviewed arms sales and questions of authorization. In the 114^th Congress, some Members scrutinized proposed sales of thousands of guided air-to-ground munitions and tanks to Saudi Arabia in the context of concerns about the Saudi military's conduct in Yemen. In September 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to further consider a joint resolution of disapproval on the proposed tank sale. In the 115^th Congress, S.J.Res. 40 would require the Trump Administration to provide a detailed briefing and make certifications regarding Saudi civilian protection measures, the flow of humanitarian goods to Yemen, and Saudi counterterrorism efforts prior to the transfer of any air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia. In (see Appendix D below). In the 115^th Congress, legislation has been enacted that prohibits the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that are not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained (Section 1290 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 115-232, Appendix D).² The provision is subject to an Administration national security waiver. A similar measure would place conditions on the transfer of any air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia (S.J.Res. 40), and, in June 2017, the Senate narrowly voted to reject a motion to further consider a joint resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res. 42) on proposed sales of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabiathe kingdom. The House and Senate also have considered resolutions (H.Con.Res. 81 and S.J.Res. 54) that would direct the President to end U.S. military support for Saudi operations in Yemen unless Congress specifically authorizes the continuation of such support.

Inside the kingdom, arrests of Islamic State (IS) supporters have continued since 2014, as Islamic State affiliates have claimed responsibility for a series of deadly attacks against Saudi security forces and members of the kingdom's Shia minority across the country (see "The Islamic State's Campaign Againstagainst the Kingdom" below). A U.S. State Department travel warning issued in March 2017 notes that Saudi authoritiesSaudi authorities report having disrupted planned IS attacks on government targets in 2017 and counted 34 terrorist attacks in 2016, including an attempted IS-claimed suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah. It warns that "terrorist groups, including ISIS and its affiliates, have targeted both Saudi and Western government interests" and notes that "violence in Yemen has spilled over into Saudi Arabia on a number of occasions."¹ Saudi leaders and their IS adversaries have reiterated their hostility toward each other since late 2015, with Saudi leaders proposing new transnational counterterrorism cooperation and IS leaders redeclaring war against the royal family, condemning official Saudi clerics, and urging attacks inside the kingdom.

The Obama Administration, like its predecessors, engaged the Saudi government as a strategic partner to promote regional security and global economic stability. Nevertheless, a degree of discord between the Obama Administration and Saudi leaders became apparent, driven in part by differences of opinion over Iran, Syria, and Yemen, among other issues. In January 2017, President Trump and King Salman spoke via telephone, reaffirming bilateral ties and discussing a range of proposals for further strengthening relations, particularly in terms of counterterrorism, regional stability, and economic and energy cooperation. At the conclusion of President Trump's May 2017 visit, the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to "a new Strategic Partnership for the 21^st Century in the interest of both countries by formally announcing a Joint Strategic Vision."²

(see "Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation"). The current U.S. State Department travel advisory for Saudi Arabia warns that "terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks" and that "terrorists may attack with little or no warning."

Since 2011, significant shifts in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East have focused international attention on Saudi domestic policy issues and reinvigorated social and political debates among Saudis. These shifts (see "Domestic Issues" below). These regional shifts, coupled with ongoing economic, social, and political changes in the kingdom, may make sensitive issues such as political reform, unemployment, education, human rights, corruption, religious freedom, and extremism more prominent in U.S.-Saudi relations than in the past. U.S. policy initiatives have long sought to help Saudi leaders address economic and security challenges in ways consistent with U.S. interests, and recent. Recent joint U.S.-Saudi diplomatic efforts to strengthen economic, educational, and interpersonal ties have focused on improving opportunities for the kingdom's young population. Tens of thousands of Saudi students continue to pursue higher education in the United States, although numbers have declined in response to Saudi government funding changes.

Some nongovernment observers have called for a reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations amid the kingdom's ongoing military campaign in Yemen and.³ They cite concern about human rights conditions in the kingdom, as well as resurgent questions about the relationship between Saudi-backed religious proselytizationreligious proselytization by some Saudis and the appeal of violent Islamist extremism. While U.S. officials have called publicly for the kingdom to seek a negotiated settlement in Yemen, allow peaceful expressions of dissent at home, and contribute to efforts against extremism abroad, the history of U.S.-Saudi relations suggests that anyhelp fight extremism abroad. Any more strident official U.S. criticisms of the kingdom's policies maytraditionally remain subjects of private U.S. diplomatic engagement rather than public officialofficial public discussion.

Saudi concerns about U.S. leadership and policies in the Middle East grew during the Administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, in parallel to U.S. concerns about Saudi priorities and choices. In particular, Saudi leaders at times have signaled their displeasure with U.S. policy approaches to Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Saudi officials opposealso opposed the changes to U.S. sovereign immunity law that were made by the 114^th Congress through the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (S. 2040, P.L. 114-222, aka JASTA) and have sought their amendment or repeal.³4

Saudi official public responses to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran were initially relatively neutral, emphasizing elements of an agreement with Iran that Saudi Arabia would support rather than expressing Saudi endorsement of the JCPOA as negotiated and agreed. King Salman eventually endorsed the JCPOA during his September 2015 visit to Washington, DC. President Trump and the king discussed "the importance of rigorously enforcing" the agreement and "addressing Iran's destabilizing regional activities" in January 2017.⁴ The May 2017 joint statement released following President Trump's visit to the kingdom similarly condemns Iranian "malign interference in the internal affairs of other states" and says the JCPOA "needs to be re-examined in some of its clauses.", but later called for the agreement to be reexamined and welcomed President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the agreement. Saudi officials have engaged in civil nuclear cooperation talks with the United States and other countries since 2017 (see "Potential U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation").

Policy differences and specific current disagreements notwithstanding, officials in both countriesU.S. and Saudi officials have long favored continuity over dramatic strategic shifts in the face of controversy, despite some Saudis' and Americans' calls for fundamental changes to the bilateral relationship. The Trump Administration, like its predecessors, engages the Saudi government as a strategic partner to promote regional security and global economic stability. The Saudi government appears to view the United States as an important security partner. At the end of President Trump's May 2017 visit, the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to "a new Strategic Partnership for the 21^st Century in the interest of both countries by formally announcing a Joint Strategic Vision."⁵ With a new generation of Saudi leaders assuming prominent positions in the kingdom and chaotic conditions persisting in the Middle East region, some change in U.S.-Saudi relations may prove inevitable. The Trump Administration has thus far signaled its willingness to partnerpartnered with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on their domestic policy initiatives and their approaches to Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The success or failure of these initiatives may have considerable significance for the bilateral relationship and consequences for international security for years to come.

Domestic Issues

Saudi Arabia is a monarchy governed in accordance with a 1992 Basic Law, and its legal system is largely rooted in the Hanbali school of Sunni Islamic law as interpreted and applied by state-appointed religious judges.⁵ Political decisionmaking in the kingdom continues to reflect6 An appointed, 150-member national Shura Council provides limited oversight and advisory input on some government decisions, and municipal councils with both appointed and elected members serve as fora for public input into local governance. Political decisionmaking in the kingdom long reflected a process of consensus-building among a closed elite presided over by senior members of the ruling Al Saud family. An appointed, 150-member national Shura Council provides limited oversight and advisory input on some government decisions, and municipal councils with both appointed and elected members serve as fora for public input into local governanceIn recent years, decisionmaking appears to have become more centralized under the authority of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with the apparent blessing of the king. Members of the conservative Salafist Sunni religious establishment shapehave long shaped government decisionmaking on social and legal issues, and younger members of the ruling family and prominent nonroyals have played a more publicly visible role in policy initiatives in recent years.. Some representatives of this community have endorsed swift and dramatic changes to some social policies since 2015, while others have been imprisoned for alleged foreign ties and possibly for opposing change. The Crown Prince has presided over efforts ostensibly designed to root out corruption among elites, including prominent businessmen and members of the royal family. These efforts may also have the effect of contributing to the centralization of power. Rumored discontent among other royal family members has not manifested in demonstrable public efforts to resist or undermine the Crown Prince's agenda.⁷ At present, the balances of power, interests, and influence among the rising generation of leaders in the royal family are relatively opaque and appear to be evolving, subject to much international speculation.

.

Over time, Saudi leaders have sought to manage increasingly vocal and public demands from the country's relatively young population for improved economic opportunities, limited political participation, and improved social conditions. Efforts to do so have been balanced with the royal family's commitments to protect the kingdom's conservative Islamic traditions and address a host of regional and domestic security threats. Security forces monitor and tightly limit political and social activism in a domestic security environment that has been defined since the mid-1990s by persistent terrorist threats and to a lesser extent since 2011 by anxiety about potential unrest and economic stagnation. Relations between some members of the Shia minority population (~10%-15%) and the government remain tense, amid periodic localized confrontations between security forces, demonstrators, and armed youth in the oil-rich Eastern Province. Efforts to improve sectarian relations are complicated by anti-Shia terrorism, official discrimination, and official Saudi concerns about perceived Iranian efforts to destabilize the kingdom by agitating Saudi Shia.

High prices in international oil markets amplified the earning power of the kingdom's oil exportsoil export earnings for most of the period from 2005 to 2014, generating significant fiscal surpluses and leaving the country with sizeable foreign reserves and low levels of official debt. Nevertheless, afterAfter 2011, the government launched large social spending programs to improve housing and infrastructure, raise public sector wages, expand education, and ease the burdens of unemployment. This spending has created some new fiscal burdens as, and state oil revenues have decreased more than nonoil revenues have grown. As of 2017grew from 2014 through 2017. At present, Saudi leaders are now simultaneously managing ambitious and politically sensitive fiscal consolidation and economic transformation initiatives, with U.S. encouragement.

Leadership and Succession

By all accounts, King Salman and other Saudi leaders are likely to continue to face complex questions about political consent, economic performance, and social reform as they push ahead with newambitious economic and social initiatives, and as power is transferred from the sons of the kingdom's founder, King Abd al Aziz bin Abd al Rahman al Saud (aka Ibn Saud), to his grandsons. The willingness and ability of the monarchy's leaders to successfully manage their relationships with each other and with competing domestic interest groups is among the factors most likely tothat will determine the country's future stability. Succession questions and intrafamily politics may have direct implications for regional stability and for U.S. national security interests.

Most sources suggest that the Al Saud family has managed a recent series of leadership transition decisions without a paralyzing degree of disruptive internal dissent, and formal. Formal announcements of major changes in succession have stated that a preponderance of members of an Allegiance Council made up of senior family members has considered and endorsed transition decisions taken since its establishment during the late King Abdullah's reign. This includes key transition decisions made prior to and in the wake of King Abdullah's death in January 2015, and in conjunction with succession changes announced in April 2015 and June 2017 (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 below).⁶

Figure 1. Saudi Leadership and Succession Changes, 2015 Changes Effective January and April 2015

Source: [author name scrubbed], CRS. Official photos adapted from Saudi Arabian government sources.

Figure 2. Saudi Leadership and Succession Changes, 2017 Changes Effective June 2017

Source: [author name scrubbed], CRS. Official photos adapted from Saudi Arabian government sources.

As noted above, decisions taken in 2015 saw King Salman assume the throne and place King Salman first placed two members of the next generation of the Al Saud family in line to rule. This generation—grandsons of the kingdom's founder—is more numerous and has even more complex intrafamily ties than those of its predecessors, making answers to current and future questions of governance and succession less certain. In recent years press reports and think-tank analyses have explored theThere exists potential for competition among members of this generation, as positions of influence in government have been distributed and redistributed among them.

Changes undertaken in 2015 (Figure 1) elevated Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and the king's son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to the line of succession at the expense of senior members of their fathers' generation. Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who became Crown Prince, retained his duties as Minister of Interior and assumed leadership of a newly created Council for Political and Security Affairs. Then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman became Defense Minister and the head of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs.

In June 2017 (Figure 2), Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was replaced as Crown Prince by Mohammed bin Salman and relieved of his position as Minister of Interior. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's elevation puts him next in line for the throne, with some observers speculating. Given his age, he could rule for decades upon succession. In conjunction with the change, which was approved by the Allegiance Council, the kingdom's Basic Law was amended to prohibit kings from the generation of the grandsons of the founder from choosing successors from the same maternal line of the Al Saud family. This amendment presumably was agreed to in order to assuage concern among members of the family about the further consolidation of power among the branch of the family from which King Salman and the new Crown Prince hail.⁷ Some members of the royal family reportedly have objected to some changes under the leadership of King Salman and his son, the Crown Prince, in a series of intrafamily letters reported since 2015 and during meetings of the Allegiance Council.⁸

Some individuals expected King Salman and his appointed successors to reverse some liberal initiatives launched under King Abdullah's tenure in an attempt to shore up domestic support for his succession changes and a more independent and active Saudi foreign policy.⁹ In practice, King Salman's administration has taken a mixed approach. Human rights advocates have criticized a trend toward increased implementation of death sentences against convicted prisoners since early 2015, although Saudi officials contend that judicial due process has been consistently observed in all cases. Municipal elections were held as planned in December 2015 and included participation by Saudi women candidates and voters for the first time, in accordance with reforms announced by the late King Abdullah (see "Gender Issues, Minority Relations, and Human Rights" below). In 2016, the Saudi government moved to curtail the powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (the kingdom's "religious police"), prohibiting them from independently arresting persons suspected of crimes.

8

Figure 1. Saudi Leadership and Succession Changes, 2015

Changes Effective January and April 2015

Source: CRS. Official photos adapted from Saudi Arabian government sources.

Notes: Succession changes in April 2015 reversed a key decision taken by King Abdullah before his death—King Abdullah had named his half-brother Prince Muqrin as Deputy Crown Prince in March 2014, and Prince Muqrin briefly served as Crown Prince after King Abdullah's death. In April 2015, Saudi authorities stated that Prince Muqrin stepped down as Crown Prince at his own choosing and credited then-new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef with selecting King Salman's son Mohammed bin Salman to serve as Deputy Crown Prince, with the approval of a majority of the Allegiance Council.

Figure 2. Saudi Leadership and Succession Changes, 2017

Changes Effective June 2017

Source: CRS. Official photos adapted from Saudi Arabian government sources.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is asserting a public national leadership role on a range of topics, generating considerable international speculation about the potential for reported rivalry or competition to harden between him and other family members. Such potential exists, and has precedent in the family's recent past, but intrafamily dynamics historically have remained largely shielded from public view until disputes have deepened to the point that consensus breaks down.

To date there has been no clear public confirmation that leading members of the royal family have reverted to the level of overt tension and competition that characterized intrafamily relations in the mid-20^th century.¹⁰9 Nevertheless, some international observers have expressed concern and uncertainty about Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's November 2017 decision to detain and investigate 11some royal family members on corruption charges and remove the late King Abdullah's son, Prince Miteb bin Abdullah, from his position as Minister of the National Guard.

The moves appear10 These moves appeared to signal the end ofa stark end to the consensus-based approach that reportedly hashad prevailed among senior royal family members for decades, and, when considered in parallel with the Crown Prince's bold social and economic reform agendas, could invite both acceptance and opposition from different components of society and leadership circles. On November 7, State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said, "We continue to encourage Saudi authorities to pursue the prosecution of people they believe to have been corrupt officials, we expect them to do it in a fair and transparent manner."

Administrative Changes, Lower Oil Prices, and Fiscal Priorities

In public statements since early 2015, Saudi leaders have highlighted continuing regional security threats and domestic economic challenges and have sought to project an image of assertive engagement in implementing diplomatic, economic, and security policies. Upon taking power, King Salman reshuffled leaders of several ministries with responsibility for government programs in areas where domestic popular demands are high, in addition to abolishing several state councils and replacing them with the overarching security and economic councils described above. Further cabinet changes since have been made in areas where performance has lagged or the king has sought to launch new initiatives.

Close observers of Saudi domestic policy described the leadership and structural changes as indications of the king's desire to reinvigorate government policy approaches to pressing issues, with some observers attributing some of the changes to the king's desire to provide and secure a leadership role for his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Crown Prince has outlined an ambitious program of economic reforms since late 2015, and he is widely considered a key shaper of his father's decisions.¹¹ He has been the public face of the kingdom's ambitious Vision 2030 and National Transformation Plan agendas, which seek to transform Saudi Arabia's economy and reduce its dependence on oil revenue.¹²

Saudi policy changes also are being driven by the reversal of the kingdom's prevailing fiscal position—from one of repeated surpluses to one of actual and projected deficits—rooted in drastic reductions in global market prices for crude oil. Lower oil prices have prevailed since mid-2014, while Saudi oil production levels remained roughly constant through mid-2016.¹³ From 2011 to 2015, the kingdom approved a series of record-high annual budgets and launched major additional spending programs to meet economic and social demands. Some feared that if these demands were left unmet, they could fuel stronger calls from citizens for political change.

Expenditure consistently exceeded budgeted levels from 2006 through 2015, and by late 2014, approximately one-half of Saudi government expenditures supported "salaries, wages, and allowances."¹⁴ Expenditure rose a further 13% beyond planned levels in 2015, with the majority being attributed to salary increases, social security and retirement benefits, and other royal decrees announced by King Salman upon his accession to the throne.¹⁵ Overall revenues declined, but nonoil revenues increased nearly 30%.

The Saudi Ministry of Finance stated in December 2015 that, over the next five years, the government planned on, inter alia, "embracing a set of policies and procedures designed to achieve wide structural reforms in the national economy and reduce its dependence on oil," and "reviewing government support, including revision of energy, water, and electricity prices gradually."¹⁶ These goals are paired with a fiscal consolidation plan that seeks to balance the kingdom's budget by 2020. The 2016 budget projected a fiscal deficit of nearly $90 billion and was announced in conjunction with a series of planned budgeting and expenditure reforms.¹⁷ The actual 2016 deficit was closer to $79 billion, and is expected to decline further to ~$53 billion in 2017, with improvements stemming from reduced expenditure and higher expected oil prices. To finance the 2015-2017 deficits, Saudi officials have drawn more than $100 billion from state reserves and issued more than $30 billion in new domestic and international bonds to meet revenue needs.¹⁸

Saudi officials continue to review and revise state support to consumers and industry in the form of energy and utility subsidies, with some changes having already come into effect. Reviews of public land holdings are underway and the kingdom has announced plans to implement a value-added tax (VAT) system by 2018. In May 2016, the kingdom also announced the reorganization and consolidation of several important economic ministries in a bid to streamline operations, reduce costs, and support the implementation of planned reforms. Cuts to public sector salaries and bonuses were implemented in late 2016, but reversed in 2017 in response to improved fiscal performance.

The IMF has commended announced Saudi reform plans in the Vision 2030 and National Transformation Plan initiatives, which in part reflect long-standing IMF recommendations that Saudi officials implement structural reforms to encourage private sector growth and improve employment opportunities for young Saudis.¹⁹ Historically, Saudi policymakers have sought to accomplish these types of reforms while managing concerns for security, social stability, and cultural and religious values. In May 2017, IMF officials stated their view that the kingdom's leaders have "scope for more gradual implementation" of planned changes in order to allow citizens to adapt and preserve fiscal resources to respond to unanticipated needs.²⁰

U.S. Support in Educating the Next Generation of Saudis The kingdom's investments in the education sector are an acknowledgement of the challenges related to preparing the large Saudi youth population (~45% under 25 years of age) to compete and prosper in coming decades. It also is possible that a more educated and economically engaged youth population could make new social and/or political reform demands. In this regard, joint efforts to expand the number of Saudi students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities since the mid-2000s may have cumulative economic, social, and political effects on Saudi society in future decades. The number of Saudi students pursuing higher education in the United States increased ten-fold from 2000 to 2015, but declined by 14% to more than 52,000 Saudi students in the United States during the 2016/2017 academic year.21 In 2016, the kingdom announced plans to reduce funding for some overseas students, and the number of Saudi students enrolled in some U.S. universities has declined as scholarship program requirements have changed.22

Gender Issues, Minority Relations, and Human Rights

Many gender-rights issues in Saudi Arabia remain subject to domestic debate and international scrutiny. Saudi women face restrictions on travel and employment, and male guardianship rules and practices continue to restrict their social and personal autonomy. In April 2017, King Salman ordered government agencies to review guardianship rules that restrict women's access to government services and to remove those that lack a basis in Islamic law, as interpreted by the kingdom's judicial establishment.²³ While in the past, Saudi officials regularly detained, fined, or arrested individuals associated with protests by advocates for Saudi women's right to drive automobiles and travel freely, in September 2017 the government directed ministries to prepare regulations that will recognize women's rights to drive.²⁴ The late King Abdullah recognized women's right to vote and stand as candidates in 2015 municipal council elections and expanded the size of the national Shura Council to include 30 women. These moves, while controversial in the kingdom, have been seen by some outsiders as signs that managed, limited political and social reforms involving gender issues are possible.

The most recent (2016) U.S. State Department report on human rights in Saudi Arabia notes "women continued to face significant discrimination under law and custom, and many remained uninformed about their rights."²⁵ The report states that, despite conditions in which "gender discrimination excluded women from many aspects of public life ... women slowly but increasingly participated in political life, albeit with significantly less status than men." The third nationwide municipal council elections were held in December 2015, and expanded the elected membership to two-thirds, lowered the voter registration age to 18 from 21, and were the first in which Saudi women could vote and stand as candidates. Female candidates won 21 of the 2,106 seats and 17 were appointed to seats.²⁶

IS terrorist attacks against Shia minority communities, low-level unrest in some Shia communities in the oil-rich Eastern Province (see Ash Sharqiyah in Table 1 above), and small protests by students and families of Sunni security and political detainees have created strains on public order and overall stability. Saudi authorities continue to pursue a list of young Shia individuals wanted in connection with ongoing protests and clashes with security forces in the Eastern Province. These clashes intensified in the wake of the January 2016 execution of outspoken Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr, with arson attacks targeting public buildings in some Shia-populated areas and shooting attacks having killed and injured Saudi security personnel. Nimr had been charged with incitement to treason and alleged involvement with individuals responsible for attacks on security forces.²⁷

In line with the firm approach evident in Nimr's October . Taken in conjunction with the Crown Prince's bold social, economic, and foreign policy agendas, these steps may meet with different responses from various family members and components of Saudi society. Economic Reform, Fiscal Priorities, and Administrative Changes As of 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman presides over the kingdom's national economic transformation initiatives, and, under his father's auspices, he has directed changes to the leadership of security and administrative bodies across the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 initiative, National Transformation Plan, and Fiscal Balance Plan (Figure 3) seek to reshape the economy and reduce government and social dependence on oil revenue.¹¹ Authorities have introduced some taxes, reduced energy subsidies, and taken other fiscal measures to improve the kingdom's state finances, tailoring implementation and in some cases offering temporary financial support to citizens to ease burdens at the household level.

The IMF has commended the reform goals articulated in Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan, which in part reflect long-standing IMF recommendations for structural reforms to encourage private sector growth and improve employment opportunities for young Saudis.¹² Historically, Saudi policymakers have faced challenges in balancing these types of reforms with concerns for the preservation of security, social stability, and cultural and religious values.

In May 2017, IMF officials stated their view that the kingdom's leaders have "scope for more gradual implementation" of planned changes in order to allow citizens to adapt and preserve fiscal resources to respond to unanticipated needs.¹³ In August 2018, the IMF judged that Saudi leaders "have made good progress in implementing their reform program," and emphasized their view that the kingdom should maintain the current pace of implementation and avoid the temptation of expansionary government spending, despite increases in oil prices since 2017.¹⁴ The Saudi government's fiscal consolidation plans (Figure 3) seek to balance the kingdom's budget by 2023, an adjustment from earlier plans to achieve balance by 2020.

Figure 3. Saudi Arabian Government Fiscal Projections

Fiscal Balance Program Update 2018

Source: Saudi Arabian government, Vision 2030: Fiscal Balance Program, 2018.

Note: The Saudi riyal is pegged to the U.S. dollar at a rate of 1 USD to 3.75 SAR.

The kingdom's fiscal position reversed from one of repeated surpluses from 2005 through 2013 to one of actual and projected deficits in 2014. This change was rooted in lower global market prices for crude oil and major Saudi spending initiatives introduced to meet domestic economic and social demands. From 2011 to 2015, the kingdom approved a series of record-high annual budgets and expanded financial support for citizens, possibly due to government concerns that a failure to meet popular economic needs could lead to demands for political change.

When oil prices turned sharply lower between mid-2014 and mid-2017, Saudi officials turned to borrowing and deficit spending of accumulated reserves while reducing oil production levels in a bid to support global market price increases. From 2014 through 2017, Saudi officials drew more than $235 billion from state reserves and national government debt increased from 5.8% of GDP to 17.2%, as new domestic and international bonds were issued to help meet revenue needs.¹⁵ Higher oil prices since mid-2017 have eased the kingdom's immediate fiscal burden, though IMF staff recommend that the kingdom plan for a range of oil revenue scenarios and maintain fiscal discipline.¹⁶

According to the IMF, Saudi officials plan to continue public stimulus spending, coupled with administrative and legal changes to encourage private sector and nonoil sources of economic growth and government revenue. They continue to review and revise state support to consumers and industry in the form of energy and utility subsidies, with some changes having already come into effect. Reviews of public land holdings are ongoing, and the kingdom has implemented a value-added tax (VAT) system. Officials also have reorganized and consolidated several important economic ministries in a bid to streamline operations, reduce costs, and support the implementation of planned reforms. Cuts to public sector salaries and bonuses were implemented in late 2016, but reversed in 2017 in response to improved fiscal performance.

Human Rights, Gender Issues, and Minority Relations Human Rights Concerns

According to the U.S. State Department's 2017 report on human rights in Saudi Arabia, Saudi law provides that "the State shall protect human rights in accordance with Islamic sharia."¹⁹ Saudi law does not provide for freedom of assembly, expression, religion, the press, or association; rather, the government strictly limits each of these. The kingdom remains an absolute monarchy, and its citizens do not choose their government through election. Political parties are prohibited, as are any groups deemed to be in opposition to the government. A Specialized Criminal Court presides over trials of suspects in terrorism cases, including cases involving individuals accused of violating restrictions on political activity and public expression contained in counterterrorism and cybercrimes laws adopted since 2008. A government Human Rights Commission (HRC) is responsible for monitoring human rights conditions, fielding complaints, referring cases of violations for criminal investigation, and interacting with foreign entities on issues of human rights concern.

While Saudi authorities have created new space for some social and entertainment activities in recent years, they also have moved to further restrict the activities of groups and individuals advocating for political change and campaigning on behalf of individuals detained for political or security reasons, including advocates for the rights of terrorism suspects. Some young Saudis who have produced social media videos criticizing the government and socioeconomic conditions in the kingdom also have reportedly been arrested. In September 2018 Saudi prosecutors announced plans to prosecute for cybercrime individuals who produce or distribute content that "mocks, provokes or disrupts public order, religious values and public morals."²⁰

King Salman, like the late King Abdullah, has moved to restrict and redefine some of the responsibilities and powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), often referred to by non-Saudis as "religious police," in response to some public concerns. A government-endorsed entity, the CPVPV assumed a prominent public role in enforcing standards of religious observance and gender segregation norms for decades. In April 2016, the government formally stripped the CPVPV of certain arrest powers, required its personnel to meet certain educational standards, and instructed them to improve their treatment of citizens. The commission remains in operation, in cooperation with security forces, and its role in society, while less visible, remains a subject of debate.²¹ Periodic incidents involving CPVPV personnel and the government's moves to embrace certain types of entertainment and social gatherings shape related discussion and debate among Saudi citizens and public figures.

Critics of the kingdom's record on human issues have highlighted the fact that since the 1990s, authorities have periodically detained, fined, or arrested individuals associated with protests or public advocacy campaigns. This includes some advocates for Saudi women's rights that the government has recently moved to recognize, such as rights to drive automobiles, travel freely, or to enjoy fewer guardianship-related legal restrictions (see "Women's Rights Issues" below). Since 2016, Saudi officials have more frequently described their motives for detentions and investigations in gender-related and other human rights cases as being based on concerns about activists' relations with foreign third parties. Saudi authorities broadly reject most international calls for specific action on human rights-related cases, which they perceive to be attempts to subvert Saudi sovereignty or undermine the kingdom's judicial procedures.

Arrests and public punishments of human rights advocates have attracted increased international attention to contentious social and human rights issues in recent years, and, in February 2017, Human Rights Watch issued a report reviewing what it described as a "stepped up" campaign against activists. ²² Cases discussed in international media include the following:

• In March 2013, Saudi authorities convicted two prominent human rights activists and advocates for detainee rights, Mohammed al Qahtani and Abdullah al Hamid, on a range of charges, including "breaking allegiance" to the king.²³
• In January 2015, Saudi blogger Raif Badawi began receiving public flogging punishments following his conviction for "insulting Islam," a charge levied in response to Badawi's establishment of a website critical of certain Saudi religious figures and practices.²⁴
• Badawi's sister Samar also is a human rights advocate—Saudi authorities questioned her in January 2016 and released her, reportedly calling her back for questioning in February 2017, and then detaining her in July 2018.²⁵

The Badawis' cases have complicated Saudi Arabia's bilateral relationships with Canada and some European governments pressing for their release. In August 2018, Saudi Arabia expelled Canada's ambassador to the kingdom and recalled its ambassador from Ottawa after the Canadian embassy called for the release of Raif and Samar Badawi and other jailed activists.²⁶ Saudi authorities further suspended plans to invest in Canada and recalled Saudi students.

The Saudi government particularly objected to Canada's call for the "immediate release" of detained individuals, describing it as "blatant interference in the kingdom's domestic affairs, against basic international norms and all international protocols" and a "major, unacceptable affront to the kingdom's laws and judicial process, as well as a violation of the kingdom's sovereignty."²⁷ U.S. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert called on Canada and Saudi Arabia to resolve their dispute diplomatically and encouraged the Saudi government "to address and respect due process and also publicize information on some of its legal cases."²⁸

In parallel, press reports and human rights advocates have noted the detention of several religious figures who are presumed to be critical of the government and recent social reforms, and, in some cases, who are accused by Saudi authorities of linkages with the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁹ This includes prominent conservative religious figures such as Salman al Awda, Safar al Hawali, Ali al Omari, Nasir al Umar, Awad al Qarni, and Abd al Aziz al Fawzan. Several have been harsh critics of U.S. policy in the past, and some, like Awda and Hawali, were associated with the Islamist "awakening" (sahwa) movement of the 1990s.

Saudi prosecutors have announced their intention to seek the death penalty against some of the detainees for their involvement with the International Union of Muslim Scholars, which the kingdom considers a terrorist organization because of its ties to neighboring Qatar (see "Qatar and Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Tensions" below). Public backlash in the kingdom and beyond could be considerable in light of the transnational media visibility that several of the accused have long enjoyed and their large, global social media followings.³⁰

Women's Rights Issues

Many women's rights issues in Saudi Arabia remain subject to domestic debate and international scrutiny. Saudi women face restrictions on travel and employment, and male guardianship rules and practices continue to restrict women's social and personal autonomy.³¹ The most recent (2017) U.S. State Department report on human rights in Saudi Arabia notes that "women continued to face significant discrimination under law and custom, and many remained uninformed about their rights."³² The report states that, despite conditions in which "gender discrimination excluded women from many aspects of public life ... women slowly but increasingly participated in political life, albeit at a disadvantage."

The late King Abdullah recognized women's right to vote and stand as candidates in 2015 municipal council elections and expanded the size of the national Shura Council to include 30 women. The third nationwide municipal council elections were held in December 2015, and expanded the elected membership to two-thirds, lowered the voter registration age to 18 from 21, and were the first in which Saudi women could vote and stand as candidates. Female candidates won 21 of the 2,106 seats, and 17 were appointed to seats.³³

In April 2017, King Salman ordered government agencies to review guardianship rules that restrict women's access to government services and to remove those that lack a basis in Islamic law, as interpreted by the kingdom's judicial establishment.³⁴ The guardianship rules remain under review. In September 2017, the government directed ministries to prepare regulations to recognize women's rights to drive, and in June 2018, Saudi women began driving with state approval. These moves, while controversial in the kingdom, have been seen by some outsiders as signs that managed, limited political and social reforms involving gender issues are possible. The implemented and proposed changes nevertheless have been accompanied by the detention of some of their most prominent female proponents.³⁵ Saudi authorities allege the detainees have inappropriate ties to foreign entities.

Minority Relations and Security Saudi Arabia's Shia Muslim minority communities have historically faced discrimination and periodic violence, although outreach by government authorities and attempts at integration and inclusion have improved intercommunal relations in some instances.³⁶ Since 2014, IS terrorist attacks against Shia minority communities, low-level unrest in some Shia communities in the oil-rich Eastern Province (see Ash Sharqiyah in Table 1 above), and small protests by students and families of Sunni security and political detainees have created strains on order and stability.

Saudi authorities continue to pursue a list of young Shia individuals wanted in connection with ongoing protests and clashes with security forces in the Eastern Province. These clashes intensified in the wake of the 2016 execution of outspoken Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr, with arson attacks targeting public buildings in some Shia-populated areas and shooting attacks having killed and injured Saudi security personnel. Nimr had been charged with incitement to treason and alleged involvement with individuals responsible for attacks on security forces.³⁷

In line with the firm approach evident in Nimr's 2014 death sentence, Saudi courts have handed down lengthy jail terms and travel bans for Shia protestors and activists accused of participating in protests and attacking security force personnel over the last several years. Islamic State-linked anti-Shia terrorist attacks (see below) and continuing views among some Saudi Shia of the state as being discriminatory and encouraging of anti-Shia extremism contribute to tensions.

2014 death sentence, Saudi courts have handed down lengthy jail terms and travel bans for Shia protestors and activists accused of participating in protests and attacking security force personnel over the last several years. Islamic State-linked anti-Shia terrorist attacks (see below) and continuing views among some Saudi Shia of the state as being discriminatory and encouraging of anti-Shia extremism contribute to tensions. In May 2017, Saudi security forces traded fire with armed individuals in Nimr's home village of Al Awamiya, and one Saudi soldier was killed. Explosions and gunfire have periodically killed and injured Saudi security officers in nearby Qatif in June and July 2017.

While Saudi authorities have created new space for some social and entertainment activities, they also have moved to further restrict the activities of groups and individuals advocating for political change and campaigning on behalf of individuals detained for political or security reasons, including advocates for the rights of terrorism suspects. In March 2013, Saudi authorities convicted two prominent human rights activists and advocates for detainee rights, Mohammed al Qahtani and Abdullah al Hamid, on a range of charges, including "breaking allegiance" to the king.²⁸ Some young Saudis who have produced social media videos criticizing the government and socioeconomic conditions in the kingdom also have reportedly been arrested. In February 2017, Human Rights Watch issued a report reviewing what it described as a "stepped up" campaign against activists.²⁹

Some prominent arrests and public punishments have attracted attention to contentious social and human rights issues since 2015. In January 2015, Saudi blogger Raif Badawi began receiving public flogging punishments following his conviction for "insulting Islam," a charge levied in response to Badawi's establishment of a website critical of certain Saudi religious figures and practices. Badawi was sentenced in May 2014 to 1,000 lashes (to be administered in 20 sessions of 50 lashes) and 10 years in prison. After the first session, his subsequent punishments were delayed for medical reasons.³⁰ The case has complicated Saudi Arabia's bilateral relationships with Canada and some European governments pressing for Badawi's release. Badawi's sister Samar also is a human rights advocate—Saudi authorities questioned her in January 2016 and released her, reportedly calling her back for questioning in February 2017.³¹ Her former husband is a prominent human rights activist and lawyer who also was jailed in 2014 on a range of charges related to his advocacy.³²

At the same time, King Salman, like the late King Abdullah, has moved to restrict and redefine some of the responsibilities and powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), often referred to by non-Saudis as "religious police," in response to public concerns. In April 2016, the government formally stripped the CPVPV of certain arrest powers, required its personnel to meet certain educational standards, and instructed them to improve their treatment of citizens. The commission remains in operation, in cooperation with security forces, and its role in society remains a subject of debate. Periodic incidents involving CPVPV personnel and the government's moves to embrace certain types of entertainment and social gatherings shape related discussion and debate among Saudi liberals and conservatives.

Saudi Arabia has been designated since 2004 as a country of particular concern under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292, as amended) for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Most recently, on October 31, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerryand around Awamiyah and Qatif since mid-2017. Saudi security operations and clashes with armed locals resulted in the destruction of areas of Al Awamiya in August 2017, and government-sponsored reconstruction efforts are now underway.³⁸ U.S. travel advisories warn U.S. citizens to avoid these areas of the Eastern Province because of related tensions and the potential for renewed violence.

International Religious Freedom: Country of Particular Concern Designation

Saudi Arabia has been designated since 2004 as a country of particular concern under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292, as amended) for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Saudi law does not provide freedom of religion. The country's official religion is Islam, and the Quran and Sunna (traditions) of the Prophet Mohammed serve as the country's foundational legal sources. In November 2017, authorities revised the counterterrorism law to criminalize "the promotion of atheistic ideologies in any form," "any attempt to cast doubt on the fundamentals of Islam," publications that "contradict the provisions of Islamic law," and other acts deemed contrary to sharia, including non-Islamic public worship, public display of non-Islamic religious symbols, conversion by a Muslim to another religion, and proselytizing by a non-Muslim.³⁹ On January 3, 2018, the State Department renewed this designation and deemed the waiver of accompanying sanctions as required in the important national interest of the United States pursuant to Section 407 of the act. As of November 2017, the Trump Administration had not yet updated the 2016 list of Countries of Particular Concern pursuant to the act.

Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation

The Saudi Arabian government states that it views Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda affiliates, the Islamic State (aka ISIS/ISIL or the Arabic acronym Da'esh), other Salafist-jihadist groups, and their supporters as direct threats to Saudi national security. In February 2017, the State DepartmentThe U.S. government has described the Saudi government as "a strong partner in regional security and counterterrorism efforts."³³ The U.S. government,"⁴⁰ and has reported that the Saudi government has taken increased action since 2014 to prevent Saudis from travelling abroad in support of extremist groups or otherwise supporting armed extremists. At the March 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Saudi Arabia pledged $10 million to support the creation of a center focused on preventing nuclear terrorism at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria.

The aggressive expansion of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq and in Syria and the group's attacks inside Saudi Arabia raised Saudis' level of concern about the group, and may be leading the Saudi government to seek stronger partnerships with the United States, select Syrian opposition forces, Iraqi Sunnis, and select regional countries. Saudi leaders also seek regional and U.S. support for their efforts to confront what they describe as Iranian efforts to destabilize Yemen through support for the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement (see "Saudi Military Campaigns and Policy in Yemen" below).

Amid the Islamic State's rise, Saudi and U.S. officials have stated that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen and led by Saudi nationals, also poses a continuing terrorist threat to the kingdom. Following the January 2016 execution In 2016, the Saudi Ministry of Interior reported that there were "2,093 Saudis fighting with terrorist organizations in conflict zones, including ISIS, with more than 70 percent of them in Syria."⁴¹ Saudi and U.S. officials agree that the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—based in Yemen and led by Saudi nationals—pose continuing terrorist threats to the kingdom. From 2014 through 2017, the aggressive expansion of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq and in Syria and the group's attacks inside Saudi Arabia created alarm in the kingdom. Following the January 2016 execution by the Saudi government of dozens of convicted AQAP suspects, including some prominent ideologues, Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri released a statement condemning the Saudi governmentKingdom and calling for revenge. Some observers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed concern about the apparent strengthening of AQAP during the course of the ongoing conflict in Yemen.

In December 2015, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman announced that the kingdom would lead a 34-nation coalition of predominantly Muslim countries to confront and defeat terrorist threats.³⁴ After an initial period of clarification and refinement, the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism initiative reportedly has attracted the support of 41 countries with a coalition force to be commanded by former Pakistan army chief General Raheel Sharif.³⁵ Questions about the arrangement's purpose, resources, forces, and limits remain to be fully answered. In May 2017, participants announced they had identified "a reserve force of 34,000 troops to support operations against terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria when needed."³⁶ Some Saudi officials appear to want the coalition to confront terrorist threats and threats posed by nonstate actors to member countries, while some coalition members, notably Pakistan, appear to want to proscribe clearer boundaries on coalition activities, in part to avoid antagonizing Iran.³⁷

The Islamic State's Campaign Against42

Persistent terrorist threats appear to be one factor that has led the Saudi government to seek stronger partnerships with the United States. Since 2017, Saudi officials have announced plans to contribute to stabilization efforts in Syria and have reengaged with Iraqi leaders in line with U.S. preferences.⁴³ Saudi leaders also seek support from their regional neighbors and from the United States to confront what they describe as efforts by Iran and their Hezbollah allies to destabilize Yemen through support for the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement (see "Conflict in Yemen" below).

The Islamic State's Campaign against the Kingdom

Since 2014, IS supporters have claimed responsibility for several attacks inside the kingdom, including attacks on security officers and Shia civilians.³⁸44 Claims for the attacks have come on behalf of members of IS-affiliated "provinces" or (wilayah) named for the central Najd region and the western Hijaz region of the Arabian Peninsula.³⁹45 In June 2015, an IS-affiliated Saudi suicide bomber blew himself up in a Kuwaiti mosque, killing more than two dozen people and wounding hundreds.⁴⁰46 On January 29, 2016, attackers struck a Shia mosque in Al Ahsa, killing two people and wounding seven others. An IS-claimed attack in April 2016 west of Riyadh killed a senior Saudi police official, and in July 2016, a series of three IS-linked suicide bombings targeted the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah, the Prophet's Mosque in Medina, and a Shia mosque in the Eastern Province. Saudi officials have arrested more than 1,600 suspected IS supporters (including more than 400 in July 2015) and claim to have foiled several planned attacks.⁴¹ In December 2016, the Saudi Ministry of Interior reported that there were "2,093 Saudis fighting with terrorist organizations in conflict zones, including ISIS, with more than 70 percent of them in Syria."⁴²

47

The Islamic State arguably poses a unique political threat to Saudi Arabia in addition to the tangible security threats that its supporters have demonstrated through the recent attacks. IS leaders claim to have established a caliphate to which all pious Sunni Muslims owe allegiance, and they directly challenge the legitimacy of the Al Saud family, who have long described themselves as the custodians of Islam's holiest sites and rulers of a state uniquely built on and devoted to the propagation of Salafist interpretations of Sunni Islam. In May 2015, IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 48 The Saudi government's use of state-backed clerics to denounce the Islamic State signals Saudi rulers' antipathy toward the group, but IS figures dismiss these clerics as apostates and "palace scholars." IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi has aggressively challenged Saudi leaders' credentials as defenders of Islam and implementers of Salafist Sunni principles, calling them "the slaves of the Crusaders and allies of the Jews" and accusing them of abandoning Sunni Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqis, and others.⁴³

In a series of videos released in mid-December 2015, Islamic State-controlled "provinces" launched a coordinated media campaign condemning the Al Saud family as apostate tyrants, promising attacks in the kingdom, and encouraging IS supporters to rise up and overthrow the Saudi government. The videos promised to free prisoners held in Saudi jails and condemned the Al Saud for protecting Shia in the kingdom and for cooperating with the United States and others in military operations targeting Muslims. Themes, terms, threats, and promises were largely consistent among the December 2015 videos, which were released by most of the self-declared IS "provinces" in Iraq and Syria as well as "provinces" in Yemen, Libya, and Egypt.

IS critiques of the Al Saud may have resonance among some Saudis who disagree with the government's policies or those49 Islamic State propaganda also has included features claiming to justify the assassination of several prominent Saudi clerics and exhorting its followers to do so.⁵⁰ In August 2018, IS leader Al Baghdadi challenged supporters in the Arabian Peninsula to rise up, reject the influence of Saudi state-aligned scholars, and resist what he described as Saudi leaders' plans to Westernize the kingdom "in a systematic campaign" to make believers "into infidels."⁵¹

Some analysts have examined the similarities and differences between the kingdom's official "Wahhabist" brand of Sunni Islam and the ideology espoused by the Islamic State.⁵² IS ideologues draw on the writings of Mohammed Ibn Abd al Wahhab and other clerics who have played a historic role in Saudi Arabia's official religious establishment, but pro-IS ideologues differ from official Saudi clerics in their hostility toward the Al Saud family and on other matters.

IS critiques of the Al Saud and state-aligned religious scholars may have resonance among some Saudis who disagree with the government's policies or some who have volunteered to fight in conflicts involving other Muslims over the last three decades.⁵³ who have volunteered to fight in conflicts involving other Muslims over the last three decades. Saudi leaders argue that it is the Islamic State that lacks legitimacy, and some Saudi observers compare the group's ideology to that of other violent, deviant groups from the past and present.⁴⁴ The Saudi government's use of state-backed clerics to denounce the Islamic State signals Saudi rulers' antipathy toward the group, but IS figures mock these clerics as apostates and "palace scholars."

The January 2016 edition of the Islamic State's English-language magazine Dabiq contained a feature claiming to justify the assassination of several prominent Saudi clerics, exhorting its followers to do so. Some analysts have examined the similarities and differences between the kingdom's official "Wahhabist" brand of Sunni Islam and the ideology espoused by the Islamic State. IS ideologues draw on the writings of Mohammed Ibn Abd al Wahhab and other clerics who have played a historic role in Saudi Arabia's official religious establishment, but pro-IS ideologues differ from official Saudi clerics in their hostility toward the Al Saud family and on other matters.⁴⁵

54

Terrorist Financing and Material Support: Concerns and Responses

According to U.S. government reports, financial support for terrorism from Saudi individuals remains a threat to the kingdom and the international community, even though the Saudi government has "affirmedreaffirmed its commitment to countering terrorist financing in the Kingdom and sought to further establish itself as a leader in disrupting terrorist finance within the Gulf region."⁴⁶ The U.S. government the Gulf region."⁵⁵ Official U.S. views of Saudi counterterrorism policy have evolved since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (see Appendix C), and the U.S. government now credits its Saudi counterparts with taking terrorism threats seriously and praises Saudi cooperation in several cooperative initiatives, including Saudi Arabia's leadership alongside Italy and the United States in the multilateral Counter-ISIL Finance Group.

. Saudi Arabia cochairs the Counter-ISIS Finance Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS alongside Italy and the United States.

Overall, according to the State Department's 20162017 Country Reports on Terrorism entry on Saudi Arabia,

Despite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism within the Kingdom, some individuals and entities in Saudi Arabia probably continued to serve as sources of financial support for terrorist groups. While the Kingdom has maintained strict supervision of the banking sector, tightened the regulation of the charitable sector, and stiffened penalties for financing terrorism, some funds are allegedly collected in secret and illicitly transferred out of the country in cash, sometimes by pilgrims performing Hajj and Umrahunder the cover of religious pilgrimages. To address this issue, the MOISaudi government continued efforts to counter bulk cash smuggling in 2016. Regional turmoil and the sophisticated use of social media have enabled charities outside of Saudi Arabia with ties to violent extremiststerrorists to solicit contributions from Saudi donors, but the government has demonstrated a willingnessworked to pursue and disrupt such funding streams.⁴⁷

56

Saudi authorities have forbidden Saudi citizens from travelling to Syria to fight and have taken steps to limit the flow of privately raised funds from Saudis to armed Sunni groups and charitable organizations in Syria. In January 2014, the kingdom issued a decree setting prison sentences for Saudis found to have travelled abroad to fight with extremist groups, including tougher sentences for any members of the military found to have done so. The decree was followed by the release in March 2014 of new counterterrorism regulations under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior outlawing support for terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State as well as organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁸57 The regulations drew scrutiny and criticism from human rights advocates concerned about further restrictions of civil liberties.

In August 2014, Saudi Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al Aziz bin Abdullah bin Mohammed al Al Shaykh declared "the ideas of extremism ... and terrorism" to be the "first enemies of Muslims," and stated that all efforts to combat Al Qaeda and the Islamic State were required and allowed because those groups "consider Muslims to be infidels."⁴⁹58 The statement, coupled with state crackdowns on clerics deviating from the government's antiterrorism messaging, appears to signal the kingdom's desire to undercut claims by the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their followers that support for the groups and their violent attacks is religiously legitimate. During President Trump's May 2017 visit to Riyadh, photos from the inauguration of the Saudis' new Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology attracted significant international attention. In conjunction with the government's expanded efforts to dissuade Saudi citizens from supporting the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Saudi security entities continue to arrest cells suspected of plotting attacks, recruiting, or fundraising for some terrorist groups.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia

U.S. training and security support to Saudi Arabia remains overwhelmingly Saudi funded via Foreign Military Sales and other contracts, reflecting Saudi ability to pay for costly programs (and limiting opportunities for Congress to affect cooperation through appropriations legislation). Saudi Arabia receives roughly $10,000 per year in International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This nominal amount makes Saudi Arabia eligible for a discount on training that it purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program.⁵⁹

The Bush Administration requested limited IMET funding for Saudi Arabia from FY2003 through FY2009, and the Obama Administration similarly requested annually that Congress appropriate a small amount of IMET assistance. Successive Administrations have argued that the discount supports continued Saudi participation in U.S. training programs, which in turn supports the maintenance of important military-to-military relationships and improves Saudi capabilities. President Trump's FY2018 budget request sought $10,000 in IMET for Saudi Arabia, but for FY2019 did not specifically request the funds (without explanation). The Senate Appropriations Committee report on the FY2019 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill (S. 3108, S.Rept. 115-282) recommends that $10,000 in IMET assistance be provided for Saudi Arabia.

In some past years, Congress enacted prohibitions on IMET and other foreign assistance to the kingdom in annual appropriations legislation, subject to waiver provisions. The

Saudi Arabia and Inquiries into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 The report of the congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, released in December 2002, brought attention to the alleged role of Saudi Arabia in supporting terrorism.50 In the 900-page report, a chapter on alleged foreign support for the September 11 hijackers was redacted virtually in its entirety—Part Four of the report, often referred to as "the 28 pages" (actually 29)—because executive branch officials determined at the time that its public release was contrary to U.S. national security interests. The congressional Joint Inquiry's report stated that the committee had "made no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues [alleged foreign support for the hijackers] that was found contained in FBI and CIA documents. It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of such alleged support to the hijackers." U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies subsequently investigated information in the redacted portion of the report further. Some information reportedly remains under investigation. In the years since, speculation and periodic media reporting focused on the degree to which the redacted pages may have addressed the question of whether or not there was some degree of official Saudi complicity in the September 11 attacks. For years, some people who claimed to have read the formerly classified sections of the report said it addressed some Saudi nationals' links with individuals involved in the attacks.51 In 2003, the Saudi government appealed to U.S. authorities to publish the redacted pages so as to enable Saudi Arabia to rebut related allegations.52 On April 19, 2016, President Barack Obama stated that he had asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to review the redacted pages of the congressional Joint Inquiry's report for potential release.53 On July 15, 2016, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a declassified version of Part Four of the congressional Joint Inquiry as well as two declassified pages from the executive summary of the September 2005 Joint FBI-CIA Intelligence Report Assessing the Nature and Extent of Saudi Government Support of Terrorism.54 The latter report focused in part on investigating information discussed in the 2002 Joint Inquiry and was originally submitted as required by the classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004. The "28 pages" of the congressional Joint Inquiry released in 2016 address a number of reports that individual Saudi nationals had contact with and may have provided assistance to some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. Specifically, the pages discuss information that suggested that "While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of those individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry's review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of it which has yet be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups." (emphasis added) As noted above, the pages discuss allegations and not investigatory conclusions of law enforcement or intelligence officials. The declassified pages from the September 2005 FBI-CIA report state that, "There is no evidence that either the Saudi government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere." The executive summary of the joint FBI-CIA report further states that "there is evidence that official Saudi entities, [redacted portion], and associated nongovernmental organizations provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity. The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida." The 2004 final report of the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (aka "The 9/11 Commission") states that the commission "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda]."55 The report also states that Saudi Arabia "was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities," and indicates that "charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship" may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda. In July 2016, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir argued that the pages' release exonerated the Saudi government with regard to allegations that it supported or had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks, saying that "when the appropriate agencies, the 9/11 Commission and the FBI and CIA investigated those leads and came out with their conclusions they said that 'there's no there there.'"56 The Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, has consistently responded to news reports about the so-called 28 pages content by citing some of the findings of later investigations and noting the dismissal of lawsuits against the kingdom.57 See also CRS In Focus IF10438, Finding #20 and the Case of the "28 Pages," by [author name scrubbed].

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia

The Obama Administration annually requested that Congress appropriate a small amount of International Military Education and Training assistance funding for Saudi Arabia (approximately $10,000) in its annual budget requests. This nominal amount makes Saudi Arabia eligible for a substantial discount on the millions of dollars of training it purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program.⁵⁸ The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request included this nominal amount and noted that the program and the related discounts result in increased Saudi participation in U.S. training, opportunities to promote purchases of U.S. weaponry, and improved Saudi capabilities. President Trump's FY2018 budget request seeks $10,000 in IMET for Saudi Arabia.

In some past years, Congress enacted prohibitions on IMET and other foreign assistance to the kingdom in annual appropriations legislation, subject to waiver provisions, and the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations subsequently issued national security waivers enabling the assistance to continue. George W. Bush and Obama Administrations subsequently issued national security waivers enabling the assistance to continue.⁶⁰ Saudi officials were privately critical of the congressional prohibitions and appear to prefer to avoid contentious public debate over U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and security cooperation. The overwhelmingly Saudi-funded nature of U.S. training reflects Saudi Arabia's ability to pay for the costly programs. Congress would have more opportunity to exert influence over U.S.-funded programs and to potentially apply pressure, if appropriated funds were involved.

In JuneIn 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee narrowly rejected a proposed committee amendment to the Senate version of the FY2017 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (S. 3117) that sought to condition the provision of FY2017 IMET assistance to Saudi Arabia on certification of Yemen- and terrorism -related criteria.

61

Arms Sales and Security Training

, Security Assistance, and Training Arms Sales

Saudi Arabia's armed forces have relied on U.S. arms sales, training, and service support for decades. Congress has broadly supported U.S. arms sales to the kingdom, while seeking to maintain Israel's qualitative military advantageedge (QME) over potential Arab adversaries and expressing concern about the merits or terms of individual sales cases in some instances. Some Members of Congress hashave at times expressed concern about the potential for U.S. arms sales to contribute to or help drive arms races in the Gulf region and broader Middle East, but at present congressional consensus appears and about Saudi use of U.S. origin weaponry in Yemen. At present, congressional majorities appear to back continued sales to U.S. partners in the Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia, as a means of improving interoperability, reducing the need for U.S. deployments, deterring Iran, and supporting U.S. industry.

The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG) oversee U.S. defense cooperation with the kingdom and have been active under special bilateral agreements and funded by Saudi purchases since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. Saudi military and national -guard forces have, until recently, been under the leadership of two different members of the royal family, and it is unclear what if any effect recent leadership changes may have on patterns of U.S. weapons acquisition and training among these forces.

62 Since 2009, a series of high-value U.S. proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been announced, including the 2010 announcement that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) would reconstitute and expand its main fighter forces with advanced U.S. F-15 aircraft (see Table B-1.) In May 2017, President Trump signaled a continuation and deepening of bilateral defense cooperation, announcing completed and proposed defense sales during his visit to Riyadh with a potential value of more than $110 billion (textbox). The sales include cases that the Obama Administration had proposed and notified to Congress under the Obama Administration, sales, cases developed under the Obama Administration on which Congress hashad been preliminarily consulted, as well asand new sales that remain under development. Ongoing and proposed sale cases are set to considerably improve Saudi military capabilities, and appear to be seen by leaders in both countriesleaders in both countries appear to view them as symbolic commitments to cooperation during a period of regional turmoil and leadership change.

Proposed Foreign Military Sales Draw Congressional Scrutiny

President Trump's announcements come amid a period of more intense scrutiny of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia among some Members of Congress, driven in part by reports of civilian casualties and deteriorating humanitarian conditions resulting from Saudi military operations in Yemen. Congress reviews proposed foreign military and commercial arms sales pursuant to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act.⁶⁰ When the Obama Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification. After the formal notification in November 2015,⁶¹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments.⁶²

No related joint resolutions of disapproval of this proposed sale were introduced during the 30-calendar-day consideration period outlined in the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2776), but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern. Then, in April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia (S.J.Res. 32 and H.J.Res. 90). Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs (FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 2943) or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia (Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 5293).

The Senate did not consider the PGM amendment submitted in conjunction with its consideration of the FY2017 NDAA, but the House narrowly defeated the Saudi cluster munitions prohibition amendment in a June 2016 House floor vote.⁶³ Saudi use of U.S. cluster munitions in Yemen has been reported, and unnamed U.S. officials have indicated that the Obama Administration placed a hold on further cluster munitions transfers.⁶⁴

In August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia, and some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.⁶⁵ In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). U.S. tanks form the core of the Royal Saudi Land Forces fleet, and a series of contracts concluded since 2006 has seen Saudi M1 series tanks first sold to the kingdom in the 1990s upgraded to the M1A2S standard.⁶⁶ On September 21, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).⁶⁷

In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sana'a that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration announced that it was initiating a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia. In December 2016, press reports cited Obama Administration officials as stating that a planned commercial sale of precision guided munitions technology, including more than 16,000 air-to-ground munitions kits, would not proceed and that U.S. intelligence sharing would be further limited in favor of enhanced training for the Saudi Air Force.⁶⁸

Developments in the 115^th Congress

Legislation seeking to place conditions on future transfers or sales of precision guided munitions technology was modified and reintroduced in the 115^th Congress (S.J.Res. 40 and H.J.Res. 104) and would condition the sale or transfer of munitions on a presidential certification that

(1) The Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners are taking all feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, which includes minimizing harm to civilians, discriminating between civilian objects and military objectives, and exercising proportional use of force in the course of military actions it pursues for the purpose of legitimate self-defense as described in section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2754).

(2) The Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners are making demonstrable efforts to facilitate the flow of critical humanitarian aid and commercial goods, including commercial fuel and commodities not subject to sanction or prohibition under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015).

(3) The Government of Saudi Arabia is taking effective measures to target designated foreign terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as part of its military operations in Yemen.

On May 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to the kingdom, President Trump notified Congress that he intends to proceed with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.⁶⁹ The proposed sales would include equipment and services related to joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), Paveway laser-guided munitions kits, and programmable bomb fuzes. Pursuant to Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, the executive branch may proceed with a proposed direct commercial sale case 30 days after formally notifying Congress. Legislation in the House (H.J.Res. 102) and Senate (S.J.Res. 42) would disapprove of the three proposed sales. On June 13, the Senate voted to reject a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 (47-53, Record Vote 143).

As noted above, a separate previously notified foreign military sale of air-to-ground munitions from November 2015 also remains subject to a 30-day preshipment notification requirement, as requested by the chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Critics of the proposed sales argued that Saudi airstrikes in Yemen using U.S. munitions and weapons platforms violate international humanitarian law and that further U.S. sales of identical or related items risk facilitating further such airstrikes or otherwise indelibly associating the United States with Saudi conduct. Proponents of the sales argued that in order to improve Saudi military operations and targeting, the United States should provide more advanced U.S. technology and expand training and intelligence support to the Saudi air force. Proponents further argued that U.S.-Saudi collaboration on other issues—including efforts against the Islamic State—might be strengthened if the United States maintains and expands its support for the Saudi military.

The conference report on the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-404) requires the Administration to submit reports on U.S. strategy in Yemen, Saudi policy in Yemen, and U.S. support to Saudi and coalition military operations. The conferees did not adopt two House-engrossed provisions that would have prohibited the use of funds authorized by the act for the deployment of U.S. military personnel to participate in Yemen's civil war (H.Amdt. 194) or to conduct military operations in Yemen with the exception of activities carried out in full compliance with the Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40), the provision of humanitarian assistance, the defense of United States Armed Forces, and support for freedom of navigation operations (H.Amdt. 196).

U.S. Support to the Saudi Ministry of Interior

U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and internal security cooperation has expanded since 2008, when a bilateral technical cooperation agreement was signed establishing a U.S.-interagency critical infrastructure protection advisory mission to the kingdom. Modeled loosely on embedded advisory and technology transfer programs of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, the Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) is a Saudi-funded, U.S.-staffed senior advisory mission that provides embedded U.S. advisors to key security, industrial, energy, maritime, and cybersecurity offices within the Saudi government "focused on the protection of critical infrastructure and the Saudi public."⁷⁰ According to the State Department, "Through the OPM-MOI program, U.S. agencies are helping Saudi Arabia improve its ability to thwart terrorists before they act and to defend against terrorist attacks if they occur."⁷¹ In parallel to these advisory efforts, the United States Military Training Mission also oversees a Saudi-funded Training and Advisory Group supporting the Ministry of Interior's Facilities Security Force (FSF-TAG), which protects key infrastructure locations. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as of September 2015, the U.S. government had reached sales agreements worth $215 million in support of Saudi Ministry of Interior programs since FY2009.⁷² It is unclear what changes, if any, to ongoing cooperation programs may result from 2017 changes of leadership within the Ministry of Interior.

Consensus and Contention in the Middle East

Close U.S.-Saudi security cooperation continues in parallel with work to overcome U.S.-Saudi differences of opinion on some regional security threats and over some preferred responses. The latter years of President Obama's Administration were characterized by reports of tension between U.S. and Saudi leaders on key issues, most notably the conflict in Syria, Iran's nuclear program, and U.S. policy toward Egypt. Many of those issues—in addition to political-military developments in Yemen and campaigns against the Islamic State and other violent extremists—remain prominent on the U.S.-Saudi policy agenda and were identified as issues of interest during President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom.

President Trump and King Salman bin Abd al Aziz agreed to a "Strategic Partnership for the 21^st Century" during the President's May 2017 trip to Riyadh. King Salman and President Obama had previously formed such a partnership in September 2015. President Trump and King Salman further agreed to a "Joint Strategic Vision for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America" and announced plans for a "Strategic Joint Consultative Group" that is intended to meet "at least once a year, alternating between the two countries" to review bilateral cooperation. It remains to be seen if the Trump Administration's stated desire to repair and deepen relations with the kingdom will result in more aligned and cooperative joint efforts on issues of common concern. In response to a missile attack on Saudi Arabia from Yemen on November 4, 2017, the White House released a statement saying, inter alia, "We condemn the Iranian regime's activities and stand with Saudi Arabia and all our Gulf partners against the Iranian regime's aggression and blatant violations of international law."

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Iran's regional policies and nuclear program are the focal point for many of Saudi Arabia's current security concerns and thus are a key issue for Saudi-U.S. cooperation and debate. Statements by Saudi leaders suggest that they see Iran's policies as part of an expansionist, sectarian agenda aimed at empowering Shia Muslims in the Middle East at the expense of Sunnis. Iranian leaders attribute similarly sectarian motives to their Saudi counterparts and remain critical of GCC cooperation with the United States. Saudi leaders are particularly critical of Iranian support for the government of Bashar al Asad in Syria, where Saudi Arabia supports anti-Asad groups and favored U.S. military intervention in response to chemical weapons use attributed to pro-Asad forces in August 2013. Iranian support for Houthi forces in Yemen is also a subject of great concern to the kingdom. Saudi officials also may fear that any U.S.-Iranian engagement could undermine the basis for close Saudi-U.S. relations and empower Iran to be more assertive in the Gulf region and the broader Middle East. Saudi-Iranian differences over Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and U.S. policy debates over solutions to conflicts there may be critical in this regard.

Saudi officials' initial skepticism about agreements associated with U.S. and other P5+1 members' negotiation with Iran over its nuclear program eventually evolved into relatively positive public statements about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement in July 2015 (see textbox below). At the same time, some nonofficial but prominent Saudis have suggested that the kingdom could seek nuclear "parity" with Iran or pursue other unspecified options as the JCPOA agreement is implemented. With limits on arms sales to Iran in place at least until 2020, expanded U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation and arms transfers should further improve Saudi Arabia's conventional military advantage and ability to meet potential unconventional threats from Iran or Iranian proxies.

Overall, Saudi leaders continue to emphasize their broader concerns about Iranian regional policies, and Saudi official statements suggest the kingdom remains committed to actively confronting Iranian initiatives in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries.

Tensions Escalate in 2016 and 2017

Saudi Arabia severed its diplomatic relations, air connections, and trade ties with Iran in January 2016 in the wake of violent attacks and vandalism against the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, Iran. The incidents in Iran occurred after Saudi Arabia executed an outspoken Shia cleric named Nimr al Nimr alongside dozens of Al Qaeda members: all had been convicted of treason and/or terrorism charges. The execution, diplomatic facility incidents, and resulting diplomatic fallout sent Saudi-Iran relations plummeting to levels of confrontation and acrimony not seen since the late 1980s. Tensions continued to build in 2017, as Saudi officials condemned reported Iranian support for Houthi forces in Yemen and accused Iran of seeking to destabilize Lebanon through its support for Hezbollah.

Some observers argue that while Saudi displeasure with the diplomatic facility incidents and missile attacks from Yemen is understandable, its decision to execute Nimr and subsequent attempts to isolate Iran diplomatically in part reflect the kingdom's own "angst and perhaps even paranoia."⁷³ Some speculate that the Saudi actions and handling of broader disputes with Iran might be rooted in fear that the ongoing implementation of the JCPOA and the outcome of conflict in Iraq and Syria will result in the empowerment of Iranian rivals whom Saudi decisionmakers see as bent on regional domination and diminishing Saudi influence. Others have speculated that Saudi leaders worried these developments could open the door to more fundamental rapprochement between Iran and others, especially the United States. U.S. officials downplay the prospects for such a change, and some Members of Congress vocally oppose the idea.

Saudi officials justify steps to isolate Iran as a legitimate response not only to the diplomatic facility incidents but also to what they describe as a broad and long-running pattern of Iranian intrigue aimed at destabilizing regional rivals. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir continually highlights what he describes as Iranian efforts at "subversion and interference in Arab countries, including inside Saudi Arabia and in neighboring countries."⁷⁴ Iranian military and intelligence intervention in Syria and close Iranian ties to Shia armed groups in Lebanon and Iraq appear to demonstrate that not all Saudi fears of Iranian security initiatives in predominantly Arab countries are unfounded, even if Iranian officials deny that their actions are part of a campaign against Saudi Arabia, Sunnis, or Arabs generally.

Saudi officials have denied that their policies are intended to be escalatory and they have publicly stated their hope that the row with Iran will not disrupt multilateral negotiations concerning the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman said in a widely read January 4, 2016, interview in The Economist magazine that anyone pushing for direct war between Iran and Saudi Arabia "is somebody who is not in their right mind. Because a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the beginning of a major catastrophe in the region, and it will reflect very strongly on the rest of the world. For sure we will not allow any such thing." Asked if he considered Iran to be Saudi Arabia's biggest enemy, he said "we hope not." Representatives of both governments publicly accuse each other of supporting terrorism, but leading diplomats also hold out the prospect of improved relations in exchange for an end to behavior by the other that they see as problematic.

Short of outright war between the two regional contenders, their apparent proxy wars may intensify. Such intensification could complicate the Administration's desired outcomes for crises in places like Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, and could affect stated U.S. national security objectives across the Middle East. The November 2017 resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh, his subsequent extended stay in the kingdom, his departure to France, and the reversal of his resignation raised widespread questions about Saudi Arabia's role in the events. Recent Saudi decisions to further restrict access to Yemen also have highlighted these concerns.

Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Plans

Many observers have speculated about how Saudi Arabian leaders might respond to any post-JCPOA strengthening of Iran over time or to any perceived failings by Iran or the United States to live up to their mutual commitments under the agreement. Specifically, analysts continue to debate whether the kingdom might seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, a nuclear threshold status, or a formal U.S. defense guarantee if Iran moves toward creating a nuclear weapon or retains the capability to do so without what Saudi officials see as sufficient constraints or warning.

It is also unclear whether a Saudi movement toward nuclear "parity" with Iran—specifically the adoption of energy policies that seek to match Iranian domestic nuclear fuel production capabilities—would take place, how practical such an option is, and what the effect of such a policy would be on U.S.-Saudi relations. Limits on the supply of certain nuclear technology could hinder Saudi efforts in this regard, although close relations with Pakistan could conceivably provide the basis for the transfer of some relevant technology. Experts differ over how feasible or likely such transfers may be.

Some Saudis have advocated for nuclear ambiguity while seeking to counter expectations that the kingdom would or could seek nuclear weaponry or enrichment technology from Pakistan or other sources. In a recent interview, Saudi Arabia's former Ambassador to the United States and long-time director of intelligence Prince Turki al Faisal bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud said

In a speech I gave 4 years ago in the kingdom and subsequently reiterated, I said that should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) must look at all the available options to meet the potential threat that will come from Iran–including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

I don't think we should close the door to ourselves before we see what is going to happen with Iran. And if that means that we go to develop nuclear weapons, then that is a choice that will have to be made by the GCC leadership, as I recommend, to meet that challenge. But there isn't going to be any buying of Pakistani or whatever source of weapons in that field. No country will sell, first of all.

Secondly, you can't simply just buy it off the shelf and say, "OK, I'm going to bring this nuclear weapon." Where are you going to put it? Who's going to deal with it? Who's going to handle it? Who's going to protect it, etc.? You need a whole complex infrastructure to service nuclear weapons. So it's not just simply buying from Pakistan. And that's never been considered an option in the kingdom, despite what American and European reporters have said or written.⁷⁸

Saudi officials at the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA CARE) have announced plans to develop as many as 16 nuclear power plants by 2040 in order to reduce the domestic consumption of oil and natural gas for electricity production. In March 2015, an Argentine-Saudi state joint venture was established to produce nuclear technology for the kingdom's nuclear energy program. Later that month, King Salman and South Korean President Park Geun-hye also signed bilateral agreements on "mutual nuclear co-operation for peaceful uses," which included a memorandum of understanding on the construction of two small South Korean SMART reactors to power Saudi water desalination plants.

In June 2015, KA CARE officials signed an agreement with Rosatom (Russia's state-run nuclear company) to provide a basis for future Saudi-Russian nuclear energy cooperation, including in areas relating to nuclear power and fuel management. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia and China signed a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation in the possible future construction of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom. A follow-on agreement for a joint feasibility study for HTGR construction in Saudi Arabia was signed in March 2017, and in May 2017 KA CARE Vice President Walid bin Hussein Abu al Faraj visited China with Saudi experts to begin related implementation planning.⁷⁹ In November 2017, Reuters reported that a consortium of U.S. companies may seek to bid on an eventual Saudi tender for reactor construction.⁸⁰

It remains unclear whether Saudi Arabia would accept so-called "gold standard"⁸¹ restrictions on any domestic nuclear fuel production in order to enter into a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. U.S.-Saudi nuclear technology or energy cooperation has not been addressed in recent joint statements issued during head of state visits. In October 2017, KA CARE director Hashim bin Abdullah Yamani said, "Regarding the production of uranium in the kingdom, this is a program which is our first step towards self-sufficiency in producing nuclear fuel. We utilize the uranium ore that has been proven to be economically efficient."⁸²

Saudi Arabia has had an IAEA Safeguards Agreement in force since 2009. It has not agreed to an Additional Protocol to that Safeguards Agreement. According to Yamani, "The IAEA also has been requested to conduct an integrated review of our nuclear infrastructure during the second quarter of 2018." Isolating Saudi Arabia economically in the event that its nuclear program becomes a matter of proliferation concern would likely prove difficult for concerned parties given the kingdom's central role in the world's oil market, its vast wealth, and its global investment posture.

Confrontation with Qatar

Saudi-Qatari disputes have periodically flared over the last 20-plus years in the wake of a 1992 border clash and the 1995 palace coup in Qatar that saw Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani replace his Saudi-aligned father as emir.⁸³ A 1996 countercoup attempt reportedly had Saudi backing, and Saudi Arabia has since taken issue with the pro-Islamist and independent foreign policy pursued by Emir Hamad and his son, the current Emir, Tamim bin Hamad. Saudi leaders also have opposed Qatar's maintenance of ties to Iran, with which Qatar shares lucrative natural gas reserves.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both sought to shape the outcome of regional uprisings since 2011, in some cases using their own military forces, such as in Libya and Yemen. In Syria, Qatar has joined other GCC states in assisting groups opposed to President Bashar Al Asad, but the Syrian groups Qatar has helped have been accused of having ties to Al Qaeda. In March 2014, these and related differences—including over the 2013 military overthrow of an elected Muslim Brotherhood-linked President of Egypt—widened to the point where Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha. The Ambassadors returned in November 2014 in exchange for mutual pledges not to interfere in each other's affairs, but the underlying policy differences remained.

Emir Tamim bin Hamad participated in the May 2017 U.S.-Gulf summit and met with President Donald Trump, but there were indications of Qatari-Saudi discord prior to and during the summit. On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia abruptly severed diplomatic relations with Qatar, closed the land border between the two countries, closed its air space and waters to Qatari vessels, prohibited Saudi nationals from visiting or transiting Qatar, and gave Qatari nationals 14 days to leave the kingdom. The moves followed a period of escalation in official Saudi-Qatari confrontation marked by mutual recriminations and accusations. Saudi Arabia accuses Qatar's government of supporting terrorism, interfering in the internal affairs of fellow Arab states, and facilitating Iranian efforts to destabilize Saudi Arabia and its neighbors.⁸⁴ Qatar rejects the charges and views Saudi Arabia as seeking to violate Qatari sovereignty and impose its will on the country's leaders and population.⁸⁵

Qatar has rejected some demands presented by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain, but has sought to resolve the confrontation through negotiation. Saudi authorities have kept their isolation measures in place. Both sides of the dispute have sought to influence the United States to support their position.

The United States maintains close defense cooperation, including arms sales, with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar and continues to operate from military bases in Qatar. U.S. officials have called for reconciliation and have offered to facilitate dialogue among the parties. Limitations imposed on travel and transit to Qatar by Saudi Arabia could impact U.S. nationals and businesses, and U.S. nationals and businesses operating in the kingdom may face pressure to limit or curtail their contacts with Qatar as the dispute continues.

Saudi Military Campaigns and Policy in Yemen

Saudi Arabia has long exercised a strong role in Yemen, seeking to mitigate potential threats to the kingdom through liaison relationships and security interventions. Saudi officials expressed increasing concern about developments in Yemen over the course of 2014, as the Saudi and GCC-backed transition process stalled and an alliance of northern Yemen-based insurgents and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh grew more aggressive in their attempts to coerce transitional President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi.⁸⁶

Some analysts have viewed Saudi support for President Hadi and the transition since 2011 as a hedge against potential threats to Saudi interests posed by a broad range of Yemeni political forces and armed movements. These include the ousted Saleh and his disgruntled supporters; the northern Yemen-based Zaydi Shia Ansar Allah movement (Partisans of God, aka Houthi movement);⁸⁷ the tribal and Sunni Islamist supporters of the Islah (Reform) movement; and armed Salafi-jihadists like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁸ Saudi air, ground, and border forces fought Houthi militia members in 2009 in a campaign that ejected Houthi fighters who had crossed the Saudi border, but failed to defeat the movement or end the potential threat it posed to Saudi interests in Yemen.

In mid-2014, pro-Saleh and Houthi forces took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, and, in late September 2014, they continued military operations in contravention of an agreed power-sharing arrangement with the Hadi government. In response, Saudi Arabia's then-Foreign Minister, the late Prince Saud al Faisal, warned the U.N. General Assembly that the conflict in Yemen would "undoubtedly escalate and threaten the security and stability at the regional and international levels," and "could even reach a stage of no return regardless of the efforts and resources used to avoid such a situation."⁸⁹ In October 2014, the U.S. State Department encouraged Yemenis to implement the September agreement peacefully and called for an inclusive resumption of the transition.⁹⁰

Houthi forces' unwillingness to withdraw from the capital and unilateral moves by Houthi leaders and Saleh supporters to circumvent Hadi's authority precipitated a crisis that culminated in the outbreak of renewed conflict and Hadi's resignation and de facto house arrest in January 2015. Houthi leaders announced a new governance plan in February 2015 and in March launched an offensive against pro-Hadi forces in central and southern Yemen, prompting the Saudi Foreign Minister to decry "the serious escalation in Yemen—carried out by an Al Houthi militia coup against constitutional legitimacy."⁹¹

Days later, as Houthi forces advanced on the southern city of Aden, Saudi Arabia and members of a coalition launched air strikes in response to a specific request from President Hadi "to provide instant support by all necessary means, including military intervention to protect Yemen and its people from continuous Houthi aggression and deter the expected attack to occur at any hour on the city of Aden and the rest of the southern regions, and to help Yemen in the face of Al Qaeda and ISIL."⁹² In August 2015, Saudi ground forces participated in military operations that resulted in the seizure of the southern port city of Aden, alongside forces from the United Arab Emirates. Saudi, Emirati, and other coalition forces have since suffered dozens of casualties during ground operations in Yemen.

In the period since, Houthi fighters have launched attacks on Saudi border areas that have killed Saudi civilians and security personnel, and Saudi military operations have continued to strike Houthi and pro-Saleh positions across Yemen. Saudi forces have intercepted missile attacks from Yemen on several occasions, including a missile attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh in November 2017.

As the military campaign has continued, reports of civilian casualties and displacement; food, medicine, and water shortages; advances by AQAP forces; Islamic State attacks; and persistence by the Houthis and their pro-Saleh allies have fueled some international criticism of Saudi policy.⁹³ Ansar Allah leader Abd al Malik Al Houthi has lashed out at the Saudi-led operation as "aggression" against Yemenis and has sought to shift blame to the United States, alleging

The Americans determine targeting of every child, residential compound, house, home, shop, market, or mosque targeted in this country. They determined for the Saudi regime the targets to hit. Then, they supervised and ran the striking operation. Therefore, the Saudi regime is a soldier and servant of the Americans.⁹⁴

Saudi officials have blamed their adversaries for reported civilian deaths and for deteriorating humanitarian conditions. In May 2017, Saudi Foreign Minister Al Jubeir accused Houthi-Saleh forces of conspiring to restrict flows of humanitarian goods to areas under their control and of profiting off the illicit diversion and sale of such goods. Saudi officials also underscore their view of the Houthis as a hostile minority movement that benefits from Iranian security support. The United States and other partner governments have seized a number of arms shipments off Yemen's coast that are suspected of having originated in Iran.⁹⁵

In April 2016, the United Nations helped broker a cessation of hostilities to facilitate intra-Yemeni negotiations in Kuwait, marking its third attempt at brokering an end to the conflict since the March 2015 Saudi intervention. Sporadic fighting continued during summer 2016 talks, though the Saudi-led coalition largely refrained from conducting airstrikes in Sana'a. The Hadi government and the Houthi-Saleh alliance were reportedly close to agreement, but differed over settlement sequencing in an atmosphere of persistent mutual mistrust. The Hadi government preferred incremental confidence-building measures through which Houthi-Saleh forces would withdraw from cities and disarm in accordance with Resolution 2216 (April 2015). The Houthi-Saleh alliance refused to depart Sana'a and sought a comprehensive settlement to legitimize their control over northern Yemen and to secure Hadi's resignation.

In August 2016, the parties suspended the Kuwait talks and the war intensified. The Obama Administration called "on all parties to cease hostilities immediately," except for defensive operations.⁹⁶ In late August, Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Saudi Arabia, where he proposed a new peace initiative calling for the Houthis to withdraw from the capital, while having their heavy weapons and ballistic missiles transferred to a third party. The proposal did not gain traction, and subsequent U.S.-Saudi differences over the conduct of Saudi military operations overshadowed continuing efforts to broker an end to the ongoing fighting.

By spring 2017, U.N. officials were warning of dire humanitarian consequences of continued fighting and reported that "all parties to the conflict are arbitrarily denying sustained humanitarian access and are politicizing aid."⁹⁷ In the wake of the November 2017 missile attack on Riyadh, Saudi forces imposed a full closure of air and sea access to Yemen. U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock responded by warning that total restrictions on aid deliveries could produce "the largest famine the world has seen for many decades, with millions of victims."⁹⁸ Saudi officials later announced their intention to open access to the ports of Aden, Mokha, and Mukalla, while maintaining restrictions on air access to Sanaa and access to Hodeidah and other ports controlled by Houthi-Saleh forces.

The Trump Administration has stated that it "supports the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, to renew the cessation of hostilities and bring the parties back to the table for negotiations." The Administration also has stated that, "While the conflict continues, the parties must allow sustained access, both for humanitarian aid and for the commercial import of food, medicine, fuel and other basic supplies. These essential goods must be able to arrive through all of the ports of Yemen, and they must be able to move within Yemen."⁹⁹

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stated that "our emphasis is on finding a political solution" in Yemen, while adding that U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia would continue because the Houthi-Saleh forces "have to know that they will never prevail militarily."¹⁰⁰ Following their May 2017 meeting, President Trump and King Salman "stressed the need to work to resolve the crisis in Yemen," and President Trump "commended the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for providing humanitarian and relief aid to the Yemeni people."¹⁰¹ On October 10, U.N. Secretary General Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed told the Security Council, "the parties have to commit to ending all hostilities and start discussions for a comprehensive peace agreement."

As noted above, the Trump Administration has announced its intention to proceed with the proposed sale of precision guided munitions technologies that were deferred by the Obama Administration and also has announced plans to offer a more robust training and capacity building program with the Saudi air force to include enhanced training on targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict. A U.S. Central Command Air Force spokesperson reported in February 2017 that U.S. military refueling missions for Saudi-coalition operations over Yemen increased by 50% in 2016 relative to 2015 and are ongoing.¹⁰²

Implications for U.S.-Saudi Relations

Saudi Arabia's military intervention in neighboring Yemen has placed the United States in a difficult position. On the one hand, U.S. officials share Saudi concerns about the ouster of the Hadi government and the resulting growth of armed extremist threats from Al Qaeda and Islamic State supporters in Yemen. On the other hand, Saudi intervention has embroiled a key U.S. partner in a seemingly intractable armed conflict in which Saudi use of U.S.-origin weaponry appears to have contributed to mass displacement and resulted in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Extremist groups have gained new ground, and Houthi forces continue to threaten the kingdom's southern border, with some reported Iranian support.

The Saudi intervention in Yemen also may have broader implications for the kingdom's future leadership and stability. Insofar as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Sultan has portrayed himself as the architect and leader of the intervention, its relative success or failure may shape perceptions of his competence and judgment. Saudi casualties in the campaign also have cost the kingdom's military some key personnel and added to the domestic political sensitivity of the overall effort. The deaths of dozens of Saudi personnel in September and December 2015 rocket attacks in southern Yemen were difficult blows in this regard.

Despite possible concerns over the ramifications of Saudi-led operations, the Obama and Trump Administrations have voiced diplomatic support for Saudi efforts to reinstall Hadi's government and provided logistical and intelligence support to Saudi-led military operations. A joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate the provision of military and intelligence support for the campaign, but many of its personnel reportedly were withdrawn in June 2016.¹⁰³ The provision of U.S. assistance reportedly was adjusted over time to allow for U.S. vetting of Saudi-chosen targets.¹⁰⁴ Press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials have suggested that U.S. advice and assistance, while intended to support the Saudi campaign, was tailored to limit its potential scope and duration. U.S. officials have repeatedly spoken in clear terms about what they view as the importance of avoiding civilian casualties and reaching a negotiated solution to the crisis.

As noted above, the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-404) would require the Administration to report to Congress on U.S. strategy in Yemen, Saudi operations and policies, and U.S. support to Saudi and coalition military operations.

Syria

In general terms, Saudi officials have sought to position the kingdom as a patron and protector of Sunni Arab interests in Syria while pursuing Saudi national interests in Syria relative to Iran and fellow Sunni states such as Turkey and Qatar. Saudi officials long advocated for increasing pressure on pro-Asad forces in Syria, and Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir has frequently repeated the kingdom's view that President Asad must leave office either through negotiations or through military means. Many observers interpreted this formulation as a commitment by the Saudi government to provide continued material support to anti-Asad armed groups in the event that efforts to find a negotiated solution to the Syria crisis are unsuccessful.

Saudi Arabia supported the adoption in December 2015 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, which endorses Saudi-supported plans for transition negotiations and U.N.-monitored cease-fire arrangements, but does not explicitly call or provide for Asad's ouster. In conjunction with U.S. and Russian efforts to establish cessation of hostilities agreements, Saudi officials have voiced their support in principle while characterizing such agreements as potential tests of the Asad government's intentions and seriousness.

In 2017, Saudi officials have hosted meetings of Syrian opposition groups in an attempt to unify their positions with regard to negotiations on an end to the conflict. Groups meeting in Riyadh reportedly have differed over their views on President Asad's political future. The U.S.-Saudi joint statement released following President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom "emphasized the importance of reaching a permanent solution to the conflict in Syria based on the Geneva declaration and Security Council resolution 2254, in order to maintain the unity and integrity of Syrian territory so that it can be a country that represents the entire spectrum of the Syrian community and free from sectarian discrimination."¹⁰⁵ In August, the Saudi Foreign Ministry released a statement saying, "The position of the kingdom on the Syrian crisis is firm, and it is based on the Geneva 1 communique and on U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 that stipulated the formation of a transitional body that will run the country."¹⁰⁶ Saudi officials reiterated this position during November 2017 opposition talks in Riyadh.

Russian-Saudi diplomacy and mutual accommodation may contribute to progress in resolving existing differences among Syrian opposition groups, but Saudi attempts to persuade some opposition members to accept a transitional body that includes Asad may face persistent resistance. During King Salman's October 2017 visit to Moscow (the first by a sitting Saudi monarch), Foreign Minister Al Jubeir said, "Both our countries respect the principle of sovereignty, good neighborly relations, and non-interference in internal affairs."¹⁰⁷ In November, the departure of some leaders in the Saudi-supported High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition raised speculation that the kingdom has agreed to press opposition factions to abandon their insistence on excluding Asad as a prerequisite for a settlement and transition.

Iraq

In December 2015, Saudi officials reopened the kingdom's diplomatic offices in Iraq after a 25-year absence, marking a milestone in a relative normalization of Saudi-Iraqi relations that occurred after the 2014 change in Iraqi leadership from Nouri al Maliki to Prime Minister Hayder al Abadi. Saudi leaders viewed Maliki as unduly influenced by Iran and have appeared willing to engage Abadi in pursuit of better bilateral relations and in support of more inclusion of Iraq's Sunnis by Baghdad. Saudi Foreign Minister Al Jubeir's February 2017 visit to Baghdad and Iraqi Prime Minister Al Abadi's visits to the kingdom in June and October 2017 marked further opening in Saudi-Iraqi relations, which U.S. officials have welcomed.

Iraq-based IS supporters continue to threaten Saudi leaders, although the group did not launch any large-scale military operations against the kingdom when it held territory in western Iraq. Saudi Arabia has not participated in air strikes in Iraq as part of the counter-IS coalition. Saudi officials have offered more than $500 million in humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis, but to date Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states have not offered major new economic or security assistance initiatives to help stabilize Iraq. Saudi Arabia claims nearly $16 billion in Iraqi government debt dating to the era of Saddam Hussein's war with Iran. In March, the official Saudi Press Agency denied Iraqi press reports that the kingdom intends to cancel the debt.¹⁰⁸

Saudi officials view the empowerment of Iran-linked Shia militia groups in Iraq with suspicion. In the context of the rupture of Saudi-Iranian relations in early 2016, Saudi Arabia's then-Ambassador to Iraq Thamer al Sabhan suggested that the largely Shia Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces should play a reduced role in counter-IS operations to avoid enflaming Sunni-Shia tensions. His remarks drew criticism from some Iraqi politicians and the Iraqi Foreign Ministry summoned Al Sabhan for consultations. Al Sabhan alleged that an assassination attempt against him failed in August 2016, and in late August the Iraqi Foreign Ministry formally requested that he be replaced.¹⁰⁹ Ambassador Al Sabhan was subsequently reassigned and now serves as Saudi Arabia's Minister of State for Arabian Gulf Affairs. Abdulaziz al Shammari was confirmed as Al Sabhan's replacement in November 2017.

Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al Falih visited Iraq in May 2017 and obtained Iraq's support for an extension of OPEC oil production reductions until March 2018. The visit was the first by a Saudi energy minister to Iraq in three decades.

Egypt

Saudi Arabia was critical of what it described as a U.S. failure to back a longtime ally when former President Hosni Mubarak initially came under pressure to resign in 2011. The Saudis later embraced the Egyptian military's 2013 ouster of the elected government led by Mohammed Morsi, who was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and they have provided billions of dollars in financial assistance to the military-backed government. Some leading Saudi clerics defied the government's embrace of the Egyptian military's 2013 actions, illustrating the potential for rifts among the Saudi government, some members of the Saudi religious establishment, and their respective supporters over regional political developments.

Saudi financial and political support to the Egyptian government has continued since 2013, and King Salman has sought and obtained Egyptian support for Saudi military operations in Yemen. In September 2015, Egypt denied reports it had sent as many as 800 troops to Yemen, but Egyptian officials report that they have contributed naval forces in a mission that was extended in January 2016.

In April 2016, King Salman visited Cairo, Egypt, for consultations with Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sisi. During the visit, the leaders announced billions of dollars in joint investment and development agreements, along with plans to construct a bridge linking the two countries. King Salman also secured President Sisi's recognition of Saudi claims to sovereignty over two islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—Tiran and Senafir—that had been under Egyptian control since 1950, when the two governments agreed to station Egyptian military forces on them to dissuade military operations by Israel in the area.¹¹⁰ An Egyptian court subsequently nullified a bilateral agreement to that effect, amid public controversy in Egypt. In June 2017, Egypt's parliament voted in favor of the proposed agreement, and President Sisi signed a demarcation document transferring sovereignty over the islands to Saudi Arabia.¹¹¹

Some observers question whether Saudi financial commitments to Egypt will be sustainable as the kingdom manages its own fiscal pressures, but Saudi officials have given no indication that they intend to dramatically alter current patterns of support.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Shared antipathy to the Iranian government's policies, parallel cooperation with the United States, and shared terrorism concerns do not appear to have contributed to tangibly closer Saudi-Israeli ties in recent years, although some new, overt contacts have occurred between Saudis and Israeli government officials, driving speculation about the potential for a breakthrough in bilateral engagement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speculated in January 2016 that "Saudi Arabia recognizes that Israel is an ally rather than an enemy because of the two [principal] threats that threaten them, Iran and Daesh [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State]."¹¹²

In May 2017, President Trump flew directly to Israel from Saudi Arabia and upon his arrival said, "I was deeply encouraged by my conversations with Muslim world leaders in Saudi Arabia, including King Salman, who I spoke to at great length. King Salman feels very strongly, and I can tell you would love to see peace between Israel and the Palestinians."¹¹³ The U.S.-Saudi joint statement released following President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom says that the President and King Salman "stressed the importance of reaching a comprehensive peace between Israelis and Palestinians" and "agreed to do everything they can to promote an environment that is conducive to advancing peace."¹¹⁴

The late King Abdullah remained committed to the terms of the peace initiative he put forward under the auspices of the Arab League in 2002, which calls for normalization of Arab relations with Israel if Israel were to (1) withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, (2) agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and (3) provide for the "[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194."¹¹⁵ In September 2015, King Salman and President Obama "underscored the enduring importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and underlined the necessity of reaching a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the conflict based on two states living side-by-side in peace and security."¹¹⁶

For decades, official Saudi statements have been routinely critical of Israeli policies, and many Saudi clerics, including leading official clerics, appear to remain implacably hostile to Israel. Apart from any potential alignment of views or interests with Israel on some regional threats, Saudi leaders and government officials have remained vocal advocates for the Palestinians in the context of Israeli-Arab disputes. Saudi Arabia supports the international recognition of a Palestinian state and full Palestinian membership at the United Nations.

In response to March 2015 statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that cast doubt on Netanyahu's support for a "two state solution" to the conflict, then-Foreign Minister Saudi al Faisal said

The Kingdom considered the Prime Minister [of] the Zionist entity's statements and commitments regarding not establishment of the Palestinian state in his era as a flagrant challenge to the international will and principles of its legitimacy, resolutions and agreements. In this regard, the international community should fulfill its responsibilities towards these aggressive policies if we really want to reach a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict, restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and establishment of an independent and viable state.¹¹⁷

In April 2015, the Saudi cabinet welcomed the International Criminal Court's acceptance of "the State of Palestine as a full member," saying it "strengthens its presence in the international field to preserve the rights of the Palestinian people."

Saudi relations with Hamas have evolved over time and have grown strained in 2017, amid the deteriorating relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Saudi confrontation with Qatar. Whereas Saudi authorities vociferously criticized Israeli conduct during the summer 2014 Gaza war with Hamas, condemning what they described as "Israeli inhuman aggression" and pledging Saudi support "to the Palestinian brothers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to alleviate the difficult conditions in which they live because of the Israeli aggression and terrorism,"¹¹⁸Support to Saudi Military Operations in Yemen

Saudi Arabia established a coalition in March 2015 to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh (see "Conflict in Yemen").⁶⁴ The war in Yemen has continued unabated since then, leading, according to the United Nations, to one of the world's largest humanitarian crises. President Trump and Administration officials have signaled support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference, while imploring the Saudis and their partners to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties.

The United States' role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition's military operations in Yemen has evolved over time.⁶⁵ At present, it consists of some intelligence sharing, aerial refueling, and the deployment of advisers to Saudi Arabia for border security and anti-ballistic missile purposes.⁶⁶ In his latest biannual War Powers letters to Congress on the deployment of U.S. forces abroad in combat operations (P.L. 93-148), President Trump informed Congress about ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen and stated that U.S. forces in noncombat roles were providing "military advice and limited information, logistics, and other support to regional forces combatting the Houthi insurgency."⁶⁷ The Department of Defense argues that "the limited military and intelligence support that the United States is providing to the KSA-led coalition does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution."⁶⁸

U.S. in-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been conducted pursuant to the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the Department of Defense and the respective ministries of each country.⁶⁹ Sales and deliveries of defense articles and services continue pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales procedures established in the Arms Export Control Act.

U.S. personnel advised the Saudi-led coalition on the establishment of its Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) for investigation of civilian casualties but are not deployed to Saudi Arabia to assist in ongoing JIAT investigations or to independently verify JIAT conclusions.⁷⁰ In the wake of an August 2018 Saudi airstrike that killed dozens of children in northern Yemen, Secretary of Defense Mattis directed Lieutenant General Michael Garrett to travel to Saudi Arabia to urge Saudi authorities to thoroughly investigate the incident.⁷¹ U.S. officials welcomed the JIAT's findings that the strike had violated coalition rules and best practices and the JIAT's recommendation that those responsible for evident errors be punished.⁷²

Coalition officials acknowledge that some of their operations have inadvertently caused civilian casualties, while contesting some reports of civilian casualties by explaining coalition target selection and other factors. The JIAT continues to evaluate allegations of coalition involvement in strikes resulting in civilian deaths and periodically releases accounts assessing the nature and results of individual coalition operations.⁷³ Saudi leaders frequently state that the coalition military campaign is an act of legitimate self-defense because of their Yemeni adversaries' repeated, deadly cross-border attacks, including ballistic missile attacks.

On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified to Congress that the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates "are undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations" pursuant to Section 1290 of the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-91). Some Members of Congress criticized the certification. Congress continues to debate proposals that would place conditions on or direct an end to U.S. military support to coalition operations in Yemen (see Appendix D below). Assistance to the Saudi Ministry of Interior

U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and internal security cooperation has expanded since 2008, when a bilateral technical cooperation agreement established a U.S.-interagency critical infrastructure protection advisory mission to the kingdom. The agreement was extended in 2013 through 2023.⁷⁴ It is unclear what changes to ongoing cooperation programs, if any, may have resulted from 2017 changes of leadership in the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

The Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) is a Saudi-funded, U.S.-staffed senior advisory mission that embeds U.S. advisors into key security, industrial, energy, maritime, and cybersecurity offices within the Saudi government "focused on the protection of critical infrastructure and the Saudi public."⁷⁵ According to the State Department, "Through the OPM-MOI program, U.S. agencies are helping Saudi Arabia improve its ability to thwart terrorists before they act and to defend against terrorist attacks if they occur."⁷⁶

In parallel to these advisory efforts, the U.S. Army Material Command-Security Assistance Command oversees a Saudi-funded Ministry of Interior Military Assistance Group (MOI-MAG) and Facilities Security Force-Training Advisor Group (FSF-TAG). The FSF protects key infrastructure locations, such as Abqaiq, the globally critical petroleum operations facility in eastern Saudi Arabia targeted by Al Qaeda in February 2006. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as of September 2016, the U.S. government had reached sales agreements worth $262 million in support of Saudi Ministry of Interior programs since FY2009.⁷⁷

U.S.-Saudi Trade

Saudi Arabia was the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East by overall value in 2017.⁷⁸ According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States in 2017 were worth more than $18.8 billion (down from the 2008 value of $54.8 billion). In 2017, U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at more than $16.3 billion (up more than $6 billion since 2009). To a considerable extent, the high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia.

Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in the value of Saudi exports to the United States in some recent years. Declines in global oil prices from 2014 through 2017 and increases in U.S. domestic oil production had pronounced effects on the value of Saudi exports to the United States. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), as of September 2018, Saudi Arabia was the second-largest source of U.S crude oil imports, providing an average of 948 thousand barrels per day of the 7.6 million barrels per day (mbd) in gross U.S. crude imports, behind Canada.⁷⁹

Energy Issues Global Energy Trends and Saudi Policy

Saudi Arabia holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world (16% of global total) and was the largest exporter of crude oil and petroleum products in the world in 2016. The kingdom produces an average of more than 10 mbd of its estimated 12 mbd capacity and has indicated that it may not expand that capacity in light of current trends in international oil markets. In 2016, 69% of Saudi crude oil exports went to Asia, with Japan, China, South Korea, and India as the top consumers.⁸⁰ The reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran has raised questions about the kingdom's ability and willingness to durably increase its output and exports to maintain overall market supply. Saudi leaders stated their intent to affect such an increase, and production levels have fluctuated since June 2018. Industry analysts differ on the sustainability and potential effects of longer-term output increases by the kingdom.⁸¹

Since Saudi Arabia remains dependent on oil export revenues for much of its national budget, a trend of lower oil prices from 2014 through mid-2017 was viewed with some public and official concern in the kingdom. To meet related challenges, Saudi authorities devised a three-track strategy:

• 1. Negotiation of agreements with other oil producers to reduce and control output,
• 2. Increases in domestic energy prices to reduce consumption, and
• 3. A now-delayed plan to offer public shares in the state owned oil company Saudi Aramco and reinvest proceeds in the kingdom's Public Investment Fund (PIF).

Negotiations with Producers. Mutual reliance on oil export revenues creates parallel interests and competition for market share between Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and Iraq. With oil markets adequately supplied after 2014, Saudi officials have attempted to preserve and expand the kingdom's market share, with mixed results.⁸² In 2016, Saudi authorities reversed their commitment to maintaining high production levels in the face of sustained competition from U.S. producers and surplus conditions in global oil markets. Instead, Saudi Arabia convinced fellow OPEC members to embrace shared productions cuts and reached an agreement with Russia to support a production cut arrangement that market observers credit with stabilizing prices. In November 2017, officials from Saudi Arabia, other OPEC countries, and Russia agreed to extend agreed joint cuts through 2018, but agreed in general terms to increase production in June 2018 as a response to unrest in Venezuela and U.S. sanctions on Iran. In June 2018, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a bilateral energy cooperation agreement that Saudi and Russian Energy Ministers said would seek "a balanced market that is supported by a reliable and sufficient supply."⁸³

Domestic Energy Policy. Saudi energy use has declined since 2016, partly as a result of government-imposed domestic price increases. Prior to increases on prices of subsidized domestic oil products, some reports warned that the volume of oil consumed in Saudi Arabia could exceed oil exports by 2030 if domestic energy consumption patterns did not change.⁸⁴ Price increases also may help make stakes in the kingdom's energy producers more attractive to investors drawn by the higher revenue potential of exports over domestic consumption.⁸⁵

Saudi Aramco IPO. Saudi officials apparently have now delayed plans for a partial public offering of shares in Saudi Aramco.⁸⁶ Proceeds from the offering were to benefit the kingdom's Public Investment Fund (PIF) and enable it to better support Saudi economic transformation initiatives and help manage the kingdom's fiscal needs.⁸⁷ Market analysts vigorously debated the potential value of the share offering, with Saudi officials reportedly having hoped for a valuation of $2 trillion and other sources having suggested a valuation of $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion. Corresponding proceeds of a ~5% offering could have netted the PIF $50 billion to $100 billion.⁸⁸ In discussing the potential sale, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in a May 2017 interview that the Saudi government would retain sovereign control over oil and gas reserves and production decisions under any circumstances.⁸⁹ An alternate plan is now under consideration to sell bonds to enable Saudi Aramco to purchase the PIF's stake in the petrochemical company SABIC.⁹⁰

Potential U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Saudi Energy Consumption and Nuclear Plans

In July 2017, the Saudi cabinet approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity production and sea water desalination. The decision comes amid a larger effort to diversify the economy and expand renewable energy use. Specifically, Saudi officials at the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA CARE) have stated their intent to develop as many as 16 nuclear power reactors by 2040 in order to reduce the domestic consumption of oil and natural gas for electricity production.⁹¹ The Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources and KA CARE envision these reactors generating up to 17.6 GW of nuclear energy, which could provide 15-20% of Saudi Arabia's projected electricity needs.

Saudi Arabia is the largest oil consumer in the Middle East, and oil consumption for electricity generation was estimated in 2017 at 700,000 barrels per day on average and 850,000 barrels per day during peak use. As of 2017, oil and natural gas generated 40% and nearly 60% of the kingdom's electricity, respectively. The use of domestically produced oil and oil products for power generation imposes a fiscal tradeoff, with opportunities lost for export revenue in an environment where market trends have strained Saudi state finances in some recent years.

Saudi leaders have stated that they intend to solicit bids for the construction of two nuclear power reactors in 2018, of a total capacity between 2 GW and 3.2 GW, with contracts to be signed for reactor construction by year's end for delivery by 2027.⁹² According to KA CARE consultant Abdul Malik Al Sabery, the kingdom planned to evaluate request-for-information submissions from firms in Russia, the United States, France, China, and South Korea during January and February 2018, with the goal of prequalifying firms from two or three countries for bidding on these reactors by April or May, although that deadline has passed without an announcement.⁹³

In January, Al Sabery stated that he expected that the winning firm, to be chosen in late 2018, would enter into a joint venture with the Saudi government in 2019. A separate process with South Korean partners to study the use of relatively small SMART reactors to generate electricity in remote areas also is underway. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has entered into a range of agreements concerning possible civil nuclear cooperation with several countries (Table 2). Table 2. Recent Nuclear Cooperation Developments Involving Saudi Arabia

March 2015

Argentine-Saudi joint nuclear R&D venture agreed.

Saudi-South Korean mutual nuclear cooperation agreements signed, including an MOU on building two small reactors for Saudi water desalination.

June 2015

KA CARE officials sign a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Russia's Rosatom.

Agreements signed with France on cooperation, including EPR reactor feasibility studies.

January 2016

Saudi Arabia and China memorandum of understanding signed regarding cooperation in the possible future construction of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom.

October 2016

Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan sign a nuclear cooperation agreement focused on nuclear fuel.

March 2017

Agreement signed for Chinese-Saudi feasibility study of HTGR construction in Saudi Arabia.

March-August 2017

KA CARE officials visit China to begin HTGR study implementation planning. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Saudi Geological Survey sign agreements on uranium exploration cooperation.

December 2017

Russia's Rosatom and KA CARE sign implementing agreement related to small and medium reactors, personnel and fuel management.

Saudi nuclear facilities would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under the terms of the country's comprehensive safeguards agreement, which has been in force since 2009. Such safeguards present a significant hurdle to the development of nuclear weapons. The IAEA completed an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) in Saudi Arabia at the kingdom's invitation in July 2018.⁹⁴ To date, Saudi Arabia has not agreed to an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. The country also has a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to its safeguards agreement, which in some cases the IAEA has noted when suspending certain verification requirements for NPT state-parties with small quantities of fissionable materials. The agency's Board of Governors in 2005 approved changes that were designed to bolster verification obligations under the protocol, and Saudi Arabia has not accepted the modified text. Saudi Arabia would need to rescind its SQP to build nuclear reactors.

U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia

In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which stated the countries' intentions to cooperate on a variety of nuclear activities in the fields of medicine, industry, and electricity production. Previous U.S. Administrations had explored a civil nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia but had not finalized an agreement.

Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 28, 2017, that renewed discussions with Saudi Arabia about a nuclear cooperation agreement are "underway." In 2017, the Trump Administration expedited consideration of required regulatory approvals for U.S. firms to provide marketing information to Saudi officials, and U.S. companies have provided proposals to Saudi authorities in relation to the planned 2018 tender for nuclear reactor construction. In September 2018, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources Khalid al Falih met in Washington, DC, and discussed, inter alia, "the potential for U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear engagement and new technologies such as Small Modular Reactors."⁹⁵

Congressional Views, Legislation, and Administration Perspectives

It remains to be seen whether or when the Trump Administration might propose a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement for Congress to consider. Nuclear cooperation agreements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq), are required for significant nuclear cooperation such as the transfer of certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of reactors and critical reactor components; and other commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. A "123 agreement" is required for any covered nuclear exports but appears to be unnecessary for U.S companies to conclude contracts for nuclear reactors. Whether Saudi Arabia would be willing to conclude such a contract without a 123 agreement in place that would be required for related exports is unclear. Whether a U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement can enter into force by the end of 2018 depends on a number of variables, such as the length of the governments' negotiations and the adjournment of the 115th Congress. Congress also could enact legislation to approve an agreement notwithstanding the AEA congressional review requirements.⁹⁶

Some Members of Congress have criticized the potential for U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation in the absence of a firm Saudi commitment to forego uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing technologies. In the 115^th Congress, H.R. 5357 would amend the procedures for consideration of 123 agreements to require congressional approval of any agreement not containing, inter alia, commitments by cooperating countries to forego enrichment and reprocessing. In July 2018, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 541 to the Senate, which would state the sense of the Senate

that any United States-Saudi Arabia civilian nuclear cooperation agreement under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), commonly known as a "123 Agreement", concluded in the future should prohibit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or separating plutonium on Saudi Arabian territory in keeping with the strongest possible nonproliferation "gold standard" as well as require the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to bring into force the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Some Administration officials and nuclear industry advocates have warned of the potential for Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear cooperation with other countries, including Russia or China, if the United States insists on including enrichment and reprocessing commitments in a bilateral agreement. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration has indicated it is seeking such commitments in discussions with Saudi authorities. In May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in Senate testimony, "we want a gold-standard Section 123 Agreement from them, which would not permit them to enrich."⁹⁷ Secretary of Energy Rick Perry also told a House committee that if Saudi Arabia does not reach an agreement with the United States, "the message will be clear to the rest of the world that the kingdom is not as concerned about being leaders when it comes to nonproliferation in the Middle East."⁹⁸

Saudi Views on Fuel Cycle Technologies

Analysts have examined Saudi nuclear plans and proposals for decades in light of the kingdom's economic profile, energy resources, and security dilemmas. Saudi state policy underscores that the kingdom's nuclear energy pursuits are limited to peaceful purposes, but senior officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also have stated that if Iran pursues or obtains a nuclear weapon, then the kingdom also would work to do so. In March 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said, "Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible."⁹⁹

The 2008 U.S.-Saudi MOU on nuclear cooperation, which is a statement of intent and is not legally binding, described the Saudi government's intent "to rely on existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing." Saudi Arabian officials have not publicly stated that they will reject prohibitions on uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing if such prohibitions are required to enter into a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. However, Saudi officials also have not forsworn enrichment or reprocessing and have stated their intent to use and develop domestic resources and capabilities to support their nuclear program.

Saudi official statements since late 2017 have implied that the country seeks, at a minimum, to preserve the option to pursue uranium enrichment. KA CARE officials have said that the Saudi program may use indigenous uranium resources for fuel,¹⁰⁰ and, in December 2017, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al Falih said, "we intend to localize the entire value chain with nuclear energy.... Whatever we do is going to be under strict compliance with international agreements. But we will not deprive ourselves of accessing our natural resources and localizing an industry that we intend to be with us for the long term."¹⁰¹ In February 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said "we want to have the same rights as other countries."¹⁰²

Saudi Foreign Policy

Close U.S.-Saudi security cooperation continues in parallel with work to overcome U.S.-Saudi differences of opinion on some regional security threats. The latter years of President Obama's Administration were characterized by reports of tension between U.S. and Saudi leaders on key issues, most notably the conflict in Syria, Iran's nuclear program, and U.S. policy toward Egypt. Many of those issues—in addition to political-military developments in Yemen and campaigns against the Islamic State and other violent extremists—remain prominent on the U.S.-Saudi policy agenda and were identified as issues of interest during President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's March 2018 visit to the United States.

President Trump and King Salman bin Abd al Aziz agreed to a "Strategic Partnership for the 21^st Century" during the President's May 2017 trip to Riyadh. King Salman and President Obama had previously formed such a partnership in September 2015. President Trump and King Salman further agreed to a "Joint Strategic Vision for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America" and announced plans for a "Strategic Joint Consultative Group" that is intended to meet "at least once a year, alternating between the two countries" to review bilateral cooperation.¹⁰³

King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman have actively pursued Saudi interests across the Middle East since 2015, challenging Iran, reopening dialogue with Iraq, seeking to isolate Qatar, and fighting an ongoing war in Yemen. This Saudi activism in regional affairs has created new questions for the Trump Administration and Congress to consider, including with regard to defense cooperation.

Iran, Iraq, and Syria

Saudi policies toward Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon continue to reflect the kingdom's overarching concerns about Iran and its ties to state and nonstate actors in these countries. Statements by Saudi leaders suggest that they see Iran's policies as part of an expansionist, sectarian agenda aimed at empowering Shia Muslims in the Middle East at the expense of Sunnis.¹⁰⁴ Iranian leaders attribute similarly sectarian motives to their Saudi counterparts and remain critical of Saudi cooperation with the United States.¹⁰⁵

Saudi concern about Iranian nuclear activities also persists. The kingdom scrutinized and then accepted the Iran-P5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), later calling for its rigorous enforcement and reconsideration. In May 2018, the kingdom welcomed President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA and announced its support for the reimposition of economic sanctions on Iran and efforts to curtail Iranian support to the Syrian government and various nonstate actors in the region.¹⁰⁶

At present, limits on arms sales to Iran imposed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 are set to remain in place until 2020. In the interim, ongoing initiatives to improve U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation and sales of new defense systems (see "Arms Sales, Security Assistance, and Training") may further improve Saudi Arabia's conventional military advantage over Iran and strengthen its ability to meet unconventional threats from Iran or Iranian proxies.

Short of outright war between the two regional contenders, their apparent proxy competitions may intensify. Such intensification could complicate the Administration's desired outcomes in places like Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and could affect stated U.S. national security objectives across the Middle East.

Iraq

In December 2015, Saudi officials reopened the kingdom's diplomatic offices in Iraq after a 25-year absence, marking a milestone in a relative normalization of Saudi-Iraqi relations that occurred after the 2014 change in Iraqi leadership from Nouri al Maliki to Prime Minister Hayder al Abadi. U.S. officials have praised a series of official visits by senior Saudis to Iraq intended to strengthen ties with Iraq's government. Border crossings between the two countries have been reopened, although to date Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states have not offered major new economic or security assistance or new debt relief initiatives to help stabilize Iraq.¹⁰⁷ Saudi officials view the empowerment of Iran-linked Shia militia groups in Iraq with suspicion. It remains to be seen whether or how Saudi-Iraqi relations may be affected by the selection of a new government in Iraq following May 2018 elections.¹⁰⁸

Syria

With regard to Syria, Saudi authorities back the U.N. Security Council's call for a negotiated settlement to the conflict and would prefer that such a settlement result in a transition away from the Iran-aligned government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad.¹⁰⁹ Saudi efforts to consolidate and align the views of various Syrian opposition actors and armed groups bore some fruit in 2017, but divisions among Syrian factions persist. In conjunction with the Trump Administration's plans to reduce some U.S. spending on stabilization efforts in areas of Syria liberated from the Islamic State, Saudi authorities have agreed to make contributions and, in August 2018, announced plans to spend $100 million on related programs.

Conflict in Yemen

Saudi Arabia has long exercised a strong role in Yemen, seeking to mitigate various threats to the kingdom through liaison relationships and security interventions. Saudi officials expressed increasing concern about developments in Yemen over the course of 2014, as the Saudi- and GCC-backed transition process there stalled. An alliance between the northern-Yemen based Zaydi Shia movement known as the Houthis/Ansar Allah (see text box below) and forces loyal to the now deceased former president Ali Abdullah Saleh grew more aggressive in their attempts to coerce transitional authorities.

In mid-2014, pro-Saleh and Houthi forces took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, and, in September 2014, they continued military operations in contravention of an agreed power-sharing arrangement with the Hadi government. Houthi forces' unwillingness to withdraw from the capital and unilateral moves by Houthi leaders and Saleh supporters to circumvent Hadi's authority precipitated a crisis that culminated in the outbreak of renewed conflict and Hadi's resignation and de facto house arrest in January 2015. Houthi leaders announced a new governance plan in February 2015 and in March launched an offensive against pro-Hadi forces in central and southern Yemen.

In response, the Saudi Foreign Minister decried what the kingdom considered a "serious escalation… carried out by an Al Houthi militia coup against constitutional legitimacy."¹¹⁰ Days later, as Houthi forces advanced on the southern city of Aden, Saudi Arabia and members of a coalition launched air strikes in response to a specific request from President Hadi.¹¹¹ Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition of mostly Arab states since March 2015 in efforts to reinstate the Hadi government.¹¹²

Since April 2015, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 has demanded that the Houthis take a number of steps immediately and unconditionally that remain unfulfilled, including

• ending their use of violence;
• withdrawing their forces from all areas they have seized, including the capital Sana'a;
• relinquishing all additional arms seized from military and security institutions, including missile systems;
• ceasing all actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen; and
• refraining from any provocation or threats to Yemen's neighbors, including through acquiring surface-surface missiles and stockpiling weapons in territory adjacent to Yemen's borders.

Yemen and U.S.-Saudi Relations

Saudi Arabia's military intervention in neighboring Yemen has placed the United States in a difficult position. On the one hand, U.S. officials share Saudi concerns about the ouster of the Hadi government, Iranian ties to the Houthi movement, and armed extremist threats from Al Qaeda and Islamic State supporters in Yemen. On the other hand, Saudi intervention has embroiled a key U.S. partner in a seemingly intractable armed conflict in which Saudi use of U.S.-origin weaponry appears to have contributed to mass displacement and resulted in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. As the conflict continues, extremist groups have remained active, and Houthi forces conduct cross-border attacks and threaten maritime security in the Red Sea, with some Iranian support.

The Saudi intervention in Yemen also may have broader implications for the kingdom's future leadership and stability. Insofar as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Sultan has portrayed himself as the architect and leader of the intervention, its relative success or failure may shape perceptions of his competence and judgment. Saudi casualties in the campaign also have cost the kingdom's military some key personnel and added to the domestic political sensitivity of the overall effort.

Despite possible concerns over the ramifications of Saudi-led operations, both the Trump and Obama Administrations have voiced diplomatic support for Saudi efforts to reinstall Hadi's government and have provided logistical and intelligence support to Saudi-led military operations. U.S. officials have repeatedly spoken about what they view as the importance of avoiding civilian casualties and reaching a negotiated solution to the crisis.

• Congressional concerns expressed in the 114^th and 115^th Congress have been driven in part by civilian casualties and deteriorating humanitarian conditions resulting from Saudi and coalition military operations in Yemen. Related legislative proposals and debates are discussed in detail in CRS Report R45046, The War in Yemen: A Compilation of Legislation in the 115th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
• Congress reviews proposed foreign military and commercial arms sales pursuant to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, and some Members have sought to condition or disapprove of proposed sales to Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁴ Critics of proposed sales argue that Saudi airstrikes in Yemen using U.S. munitions and weapons platforms violate international humanitarian law and that further U.S. sales of identical or related items risk facilitating further such airstrikes or otherwise indelibly associating the United States with Saudi conduct. Proponents of the sales argue that in order to improve Saudi military operations and targeting, the United States should provide more advanced U.S. technology and expand training and intelligence support to the Saudi air force.
• Congress also authorizes and appropriates funds for Department of Defense activities in support of the Saudi-led coalition, and some Members have proposed conditions on U.S. support and sought certifications on Saudi and coalition activities and additional information about U.S. programs.
• Congress also reviews U.S. military operations pursuant to its war powers under the Constitution and pursuant to the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148). Some Members have proposed legislation directing the President to withdraw U.S. military forces from missions in Yemen not expressly authorized by Congress.

U.S. officials have acknowledged¹¹⁵ that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict, and Congress continues to debate legislative proposals seeking variously to

• Require additional oversight reporting on U.S. activities;
• Restrict or prohibit the deployment of U.S. military personnel or the use of U.S. funds for certain purposes in Yemen; and/or
• Condition or prohibit the provision of certain support or the sale of certain weaponry to Saudi Arabia.

Since 2015, Houthi fighters have launched attacks on Saudi border areas that have killed Saudi civilians and security personnel, and Saudi military operations have continued to strike Houthi positions across Yemen. Iranian material and advisory support to the Houthi war effort—including the provision of missiles that have been fired into Saudi Arabia—has amplified Saudi leaders' anxieties and concerns. Saudi forces have intercepted missile attacks from Yemen on several occasions, including a missile attack on Riyadh in November 2017.

As the military campaign has continued, reports of civilian casualties and displacement; food, medicine, and water shortages; advances by AQAP forces; Islamic State attacks; and persistence by the Houthis and their allies have fueled international criticism of Saudi policy. In August 2018, U.N. officials estimated that 6,660 civilians have been killed in the conflict since March 2015 and another 10,563 injured.¹¹⁶ A report issued by the U.N. Human Rights Council-organized Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on Yemen attributed most direct civilian casualties to coalition airstrikes based on data from the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and also described potential violations of international law by Houthi forces and their allies.¹¹⁷ Humanitarian conditions worsened significantly in Yemen in 2017 amid Saudi coalition-enforced limits on air and sea access that have remained in place, with some changes. Periodic coalition strikes that cause civilian casualties continue.

Saudi officials have acknowledged some shortcomings in their operations, while placing most of the blame for reported civilian deaths and for difficult humanitarian conditions on the activities of and threats posed by their adversaries. Saudi officials accuse Houthi forces of conspiring to restrict flows of humanitarian goods to areas under their control and of profiting from the illicit diversion and sale of such goods. Saudi officials also underscore their view of the Houthis as a hostile minority movement that is opposed by many other Yemenis and continues to benefit from Iranian security support to the detriment of the kingdom's security.

Saudi and coalition officials have taken some steps to improve humanitarian access and implement more effective military targeting, but criticism has grown among some Members of Congress and several legislative proposals have been made to condition, reduce, or eliminate related U.S. assistance (see Appendix D).¹¹⁸

Successive U.S. Administrations have expressed varying degrees of criticism of some coalition actions while emphasizing a consistent view that strictly military solutions to the Yemen conflict are not possible. At present, the U.S. government continues to provide limited military support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, while stating that, for the United States, "ending the conflict in Yemen is a national security priority."¹¹⁹

In September 2018, the Administration certified to Congress pursuant to the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232) that the Saudi and Emirati governments are taking steps to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure, engaging in good-faith efforts to diplomatically resolve the conflict, and acting to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and reduce unnecessary delays to shipments entering Yemen. The Administration's certifications described steps taken by U.S. government officials to engage Saudi and Emirati officials on related issues and to encourage them to take specific actions. Updated certifications are required under the provisions of the FY2019 NDAA not later than 180 and 360 days from August 13, 2018. Some Members of Congress have criticized the Administration's decision to certify the coalition's actions and may propose new legislation related to U.S. operations in Yemen and arms sales to coalition countries.¹²⁰

Qatar and Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Tensions

Saudi-Qatari disputes have flared periodically over the last 20-plus years and soured significantly in 2017.¹²¹ Saudi Arabia has taken issue with the pro-Islamist and independent foreign policy pursued by Qatar's leaders and opposed Qatar's maintenance of ties to Iran, with which Qatar shares lucrative natural gas reserves.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both sought to shape the outcome of regional uprisings since 2011, in some cases using their own military forces, such as in Libya and Yemen, and, in other cases, such as Syria, supporting different nonstate armed groups. In March 2014, these and related differences—including over the 2013 military overthrow of an elected Muslim Brotherhood-linked President of Egypt—widened to the point where Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha. The ambassadors returned in November 2014 in exchange for mutual pledges not to interfere in each other's affairs. Nevertheless, underlying policy differences remained.

Emir Tamim bin Hamad participated in the May 2017 U.S.-Gulf summit and met with President Donald Trump, but there were indications of Qatari-Saudi discord prior to and during the summit. On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia abruptly severed diplomatic relations with Qatar, closed the land border between the two countries, closed its air space and waters to Qatari vessels, prohibited Saudi nationals from visiting or transiting Qatar, and gave Qatari nationals 14 days to leave the kingdom. The moves followed a period of escalation in official Saudi-Qatari confrontation marked by mutual recriminations and accusations.

Saudi Arabia accuses Qatar's government of supporting terrorism, interfering in the internal affairs of fellow Arab states, and facilitating Iranian efforts to destabilize Saudi Arabia and its neighbors.¹²² Qatar rejects the charges and views Saudi Arabia as seeking to violate Qatari sovereignty and impose its will on the country's leaders and population.¹²³ Qatar has rejected some demands presented by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain, but has sought to resolve the confrontation through negotiation. Saudi authorities have kept their isolation measures in place. Both sides of the dispute have sought to influence the United States to support their position.

The United States maintains close defense cooperation, including arms sales, with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar and continues to operate from military bases in Qatar. U.S. officials have called for reconciliation and have offered to facilitate dialogue among the parties. Limitations imposed on travel and transit to Qatar by Saudi Arabia could impact U.S. nationals and businesses, and U.S. nationals and businesses operating in the kingdom may face pressure to limit or curtail their contacts with Qatar as the dispute continues.

Israeli-Palestinian Affairs

For decades, official Saudi statements have been routinely critical of Israeli policies, and many Saudi clerics, including leading official clerics, appear to remain implacably hostile to Israel. Apart from any potential alignment of views or interests with Israel on some regional threats, Saudi leaders and government officials have historically been vocal advocates for the Palestinians in the context of Israeli-Arab disputes. Saudi Arabia supports the international recognition of a Palestinian state and full Palestinian membership at the United Nations.

Shared antipathy to the Iranian government's policies, parallel cooperation with the United States, and shared terrorism concerns do not appear to have contributed to tangibly closer Saudi-Israeli ties in recent years. However, some new, overt contacts have occurred between Saudis and Israeli government officials, and this has driven speculation about the potential for a breakthrough in bilateral engagement.¹²⁴

In May 2017, President Trump flew directly to Israel from Saudi Arabia and upon his arrival said, "I was deeply encouraged by my conversations with Muslim world leaders in Saudi Arabia, including King Salman, who I spoke to at great length. King Salman feels very strongly, and I can tell you would love to see peace between Israel and the Palestinians."¹²⁵ The U.S.-Saudi joint statement released following President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom says that the President and King Salman "stressed the importance of reaching a comprehensive peace between Israelis and Palestinians" and "agreed to do everything they can to promote an environment that is conducive to advancing peace."¹²⁶

King Salman has remained committed to the terms of the peace initiative his predecessor (the late King Abdullah) put forward under the auspices of the Arab League in 2002. The initiative calls for normalization of Arab relations with Israel if Israel were to

• 1. withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967,
• 2. agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and
• 3. provide for the "[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194."¹²⁷

In January 2018, King Salman reiterated the kingdom's "firm position on the Palestinian cause and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital and on continuing efforts to find a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian cause in accordance with relevant international resolutions."¹²⁸ Saudi officials reportedly have consulted with other Arab states on joint responses to the Trump Administration's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and U.S. decisions to reduce contributions to U.N. relief efforts for Palestinian refugees.

At an Arab League meeting in September 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir said, "the Palestinian cause is the top priority and concern of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which seeks to achieve the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people based on the Arab Peace Initiative and the resolutions of international legitimacy for the establishment of an independent state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital."¹²⁹

Saudi relations with Hamas have evolved over time and have grown strained since 2017, amid the deteriorating relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Saudi confrontation with Qatar. Whereas Saudi authorities vociferously criticized Israeli conduct during the summer 2014 Gaza war with Hamas, condemning what they described as "Israeli inhuman aggression" and pledging Saudi support "to the Palestinian brothers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to alleviate the difficult conditions in which they live because of the Israeli aggression and terrorism,"¹³⁰ in June 2017, Foreign Minister Al Jubeir called on Qatar "to stop supporting groups like Hamas."

Outlook As described above, Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United States anchored for decades by long-standing military training programs and supplemented by high-value weapons sales, critical infrastructure security cooperation, and counterterrorism initiatives. Joint in June 2017, Foreign Minister Al Jubeir called on Qatar "to stop supporting groups like Hamas."

U.S.-Saudi Trade and Energy Issues

Saudi Arabia was the second-largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East by overall value in 2016.¹¹⁹ Israel was the first. According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States in 2016 were worth more than $16.9 billion (down from the 2008 value of $54.8 billion). In 2016, U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at more than $18 billion (up nearly $8 billion since 2009). To a considerable extent, the high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in the value of Saudi exports to the United States in some recent years. Declines in global oil prices from their early 2014 highs have had a pronounced effect on the value of Saudi exports to the United States.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of November 2017, Saudi Arabia was the second-largest source of U.S crude oil imports, providing about an average of 1 million barrels per day (mbd) of the 7.9 mbd in gross U.S. crude imports, behind Canada.¹²⁰ In 2016, 69% of Saudi crude oil exports went to Asia, with Japan, China, South Korea, and India as the top consumers.¹²¹ As oil markets have remained adequately supplied since 2014, Saudi officials have attempted to preserve and expand the kingdom's market share, with apparently mixed results.¹²² Saudi Arabia produces an average of more than 10 mbd of its estimated 12.5 mbd capacity and has indicated that it may not expand that capacity in light of current trends in international oil markets.

Since Saudi Arabia remains dependent on oil export revenues for much of its national budget, low oil prices have been viewed with some public and official concern in the kingdom. To meet related challenges, Saudi authorities have devised a three-track strategy: (1) negotiation of agreements with oil producers to reduce output, (2) increases in domestic energy prices to reduce consumption, and (3) development of a plan to offer public shares in Saudi Aramco.

Mutual reliance on oil export revenues creates parallel interests and competition for market share between Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and Iraq. In mid-2016, Saudi authorities reversed their commitment to maintaining high production levels in the face of sustained competition from U.S. producers and surplus conditions in global oil markets. In late 2016, Saudi Arabia convinced fellow OPEC members to embrace shared productions cuts and reached an agreement with Russia to support a production cut arrangement that market observers credit with stabilizing prices in the $50-$55 dollar range. Sufficient global oil stocks have precluded further price rises, and in May 2017 Saudi and Russian authorities agreed to extend shared cuts through March 2018.¹²³

Prior to increases on prices of subsidized domestic oil products, some reports warned that the volume of oil consumed in Saudi Arabia could exceed oil exports by 2030 if domestic energy consumption patterns did not change.¹²⁴ Declines in Saudi energy use since 2016 have been attributed in part to domestic price increases and may help make stakes in the kingdom's energy producers more attractive to investors drawn by the higher revenue potential of exports over domestic consumption.¹²⁵

Saudi officials are planning a partial public offering of shares in Saudi Aramco, with proceeds benefitting the kingdom's Public Investment Fund to support Saudi economic transformation initiatives and help manage the kingdom's fiscal needs.¹²⁶ Market analysts are vigorously debating the potential value of the share offering, with Saudi officials reportedly hoping for a valuation of $2 trillion and other sources suggesting a valuation of $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion, with corresponding proceeds of the ~5% offering netting $50 billion to $100 billion.¹²⁷ Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in a May 2017 interview that the Saudi government would retain sovereign control over oil and gas reserves and production decisions.¹²⁸

Outlook

As described above, Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United States anchored by long-standing military training programs and supplemented by ongoing high-value weapons sales and new critical infrastructure security cooperation and counterterrorism initiatives. These security ties would be difficult and costly for either side to fully break or replace. While Saudi and U.S. officials have taken steps to maintain and deepen these ties, differences in preferred tactics and methods may continue to complicate bilateral coordination on regional security issues, including on Iran and action against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Increased U.S. willingness to arm and train Saudi security forces may reduce potential burdens on U.S. forces, but may also more deeply entangle the United States in dilemmas or disputes in cases where U.S.-equipped or -trained Saudi forces are deployed.

In recent years, U.S. policymakers have engaged with an emerging class of Saudi leaders during a particularly challenging and tumultuous period for the kingdom and its neighbors. In 2013, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Smith attributed what he viewed as an atmosphere of tension and anxiety among some Saudis and their leaders to the range of economic, social, political, and foreign policy challenges that the kingdom faces, saying

on one hand you have those [Saudis] with a deep and abiding confidence in the kingdom—its religion, its culture, and they're excited about the future. On the other hand you have those who are deeply worried that somehow the culture is weak, that it is vulnerable, that social change might erode the very fabric of their society. The chorus of caution feels the need to control events, to keep out new ideas and outside views as if the proud heritage will be threatened....

As the Saudi leadership scans the neighborhood they see an uncertain future, political instability, economic chaos, refugee flows, and meddling from Iran and other regional players. Domestically they see a demand for jobs, the need for energy alternatives, and requests for more freedom and opportunity. They have a full plate.¹²⁹

In July 2014, Smith described the regional challenges facing the kingdom as "a maelstrom."¹³⁰

The period since has seen new pressures created by Islamic State attacks, King Abdullah's deathIslamic State attacks, leadership transition and consolidation in the kingdom, the collapse of the Saudi-backed transitional government in neighboring Yemen, plummeting oil pricesoil market trends, Russian military intervention in Syria, and the results of multilateral nuclear negotiations with Iran, which have led to the removal of some sanctions on the kingdom's chief rivalIranian nuclear policy and regional activism have all created pressure on Saudi leaders and tested U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia's pursuit of an independent and assertive course on regional security issues and its leaders' ambitious plans to transform the kingdom's economy and fiscal base reflect these concerns and offer both new opportunities for U.S.-Saudi partnership and shared risks.

Over time, Saudi and U.S. officials have periodically attempted to articulate a shared "strategic vision" that includes, but extends beyond, defense and counterterrorism partnership. As the kingdom repositions itself as a hub for global investment, commercial ties and investment opportunities may forge new bonds between Saudis and Americans, even if U.S. firms may not enjoy the privileged role they once held in the increasingly open Saudi market. In June 2017, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Joseph Westphal identified education and judicial reform as potential areas for expanded U.S.-Saudi cooperation.

Recent changesChanges to succession arrangements have elevated Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and raised the prospect that, while still in his 30s, he could succeed his father and potentially remain as monarch for decades. The Crown Prince's economic and social reform proposals would overturn decades of precedent, and he has taken dramatic steps against high-profile individuals accused of corruption and/or abuse of power, including fellow royal family members.

The changes unfolding may eliminate uncertainty about the consolidation of power among the next generation of Saudi leaders, but also may signal an end to the system of ostensibly consensus-based rule among the Al Saud family that has prevailed since the 1960s. Successive U.S. Administrations have cultivated ties to different royal actors and security entities in Saudi Arabia in an effort to build a broad-based partnership with different power centers. Consolidated control could alter the dynamics of U.S.-Saudi cooperation, particularly with regard to Saudi purchases of military equipment. Alternatively, if the Crown Prince's initiatives stall or fail, recent events could mark the beginning of a more volatile period in the kingdom and in U.S.-Saudi relations, with varying and potentially serious economic and security consequences.

If past patterns in the bilateral relationship prevail, leaders on both sides may seek to maintain U.S.-Saudi solidarity, while managing points of friction and resisting calls from some parties on both sides for a more fundamental reevaluation of a productive, if imperfect, partnership. Congress may continue to shape bilateral relations through its oversight of U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and its engagement on regional economic and diplomatic policy issues.

Appendix A. Historical Background

The modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the third state established in the Arabian Peninsula since the end of the 18^th century based on the hereditary rule of members of the Al Saud family. In the mid-18^th century, a local alliance developed between the Al Saud and the members of a puritanical Sunni Islamic religious movement led by a cleric named Mohammed ibn Abd Al Wahhab. Alliances between the Al Saud family and supporters of Abd Al Wahhab (referred to by some as Wahhabis) built two states in the Arabian Peninsula during the next century. Each eventually collapsed under pressure from outside powers and inter- and intrafamily rivalries.

During the first quarter of the 20^th century, an Al Saud chieftain named Abd al Aziz ibn Abd al Rahman Al Saud (commonly referred to as Ibn Saud) used force to unify much of the Arabian Peninsula under a restored Al Saud state. Ibn Saud's forces overcame numerous tribal rivals with the support of an armed Wahhabi contingent known as the Ikhwan (or brotherhood), and, at times, with the financial and military backing of the British government. By 1932, King Abd al Aziz and his armies had crushed an Ikhwan revolt, consolidated control over most of the Arabian Peninsula, and declared the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Six of Ibn Saud's sons—Kings Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, Abdullah, and Salman—have succeeded him as rulers of the Saudi kingdom during the subsequent eight decades. This era has been dominated by the development and export of the kingdom's massive oil resources, the resulting socioeconomic transformation of the country, and accompanying religious and cultural debates spurred by rapid change. During this period, Al Saud rulers have managed a complex consensus-based system of governance, balancing the various interests of tribal, religious, regional, political, and economic constituencies.

A series of agreements, statements by successive U.S. Administrations, arms sales, military training arrangements, and military deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S. security commitment to the Saudi monarchy since the 1940s. That security commitment was built on shared economic interests and antipathy to Communism and was tested by regional conflict during the Cold War. It has survived the terrorism-induced strains of the post-Cold War era relatively intact, and has continued as new arms sales to Saudi Arabia—the largest in U.S. history—are implemented. Transition to a new generation of leadership in the Al Saud family, evolution in the Saudi economy, and instability in the regional security environment may continue to create challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

Appendix B. Proposed Major U.S. Defense Sales to Saudi Arabia

Appendix C. Saudi Arabia and Inquiries into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

The report of the congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, released in December 2002, brought attention to the alleged role of Saudi Arabia in supporting terrorism.¹³¹ In the 900-page report, a chapter on alleged foreign support for the September 11 hijackers was redacted virtually in its entirety—Part Four of the report, often referred to as "the 28 pages" (actually 29)—because executive branch officials determined at the time that its public release was contrary to U.S. national security interests.

The congressional Joint Inquiry's report stated that the committee had "made no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues [alleged foreign support for the hijackers] that was found contained in FBI and CIA documents. It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of such alleged support to the hijackers." U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies subsequently investigated information in the redacted portion of the report further. Some information reportedly remains under investigation.

In the years since, speculation and periodic media reporting focused on the degree to which the redacted pages may have addressed the question of whether or not there was some degree of official Saudi complicity in the September 11 attacks. For years, some people who claimed to have read the formerly classified sections of the report said it addressed some Saudi nationals' links with individuals involved in the attacks.¹³² In 2003, the Saudi government appealed to U.S. authorities to publish the redacted pages so as to enable Saudi Arabia to rebut related allegations.¹³³ On April 19, 2016, President Barack Obama stated that he had asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to review the redacted pages of the congressional Joint Inquiry's report for potential release.¹³⁴

On July 15, 2016, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a declassified version of Part Four of the congressional Joint Inquiry as well as two declassified pages from the executive summary of the September 2005 Joint FBI-CIA Intelligence Report Assessing the Nature and Extent of Saudi Government Support of Terrorism.¹³⁵ The latter report focused in part on investigating information discussed in the 2002 Joint Inquiry and was originally submitted as required by the classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004.

The "28 pages" of the congressional Joint Inquiry released in 2016 address a number of reports that individual Saudi nationals had contact with and may have provided assistance to some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. Specifically, the pages discuss information that suggested that (emphasis added)

"…while in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of those individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry's review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of it which has yet be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups."

As noted above, the pages of the 2002 report discuss allegations that were then under consideration and not investigatory conclusions of law enforcement or intelligence officials.

The declassified pages from the September 2005 FBI-CIA report state that, "There is no evidence that either the Saudi government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere." The executive summary of the joint FBI-CIA report further states that "there is evidence that official Saudi entities, [redacted portion], and associated nongovernmental organizations provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity. The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida."

The 2004 final report of the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (aka "The 9/11 Commission") states that the commission "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda]."¹³⁶ The report also states that Saudi Arabia "was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities," and indicates that "charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship" may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda.

In July 2016, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir argued that the pages' release exonerated the Saudi government with regard to allegations that it supported or had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks, saying that "when the appropriate agencies, the 9/11 Commission and the FBI and CIA investigated those leads and came out with their conclusions they said that 'there's no there there.'"¹³⁷ The Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, has consistently responded to news reports about the so-called 28 pages' contents by citing some of the findings of later investigations and noting the dismissal of some lawsuits against the kingdom.¹³⁸

Appendix D. Legislative Developments

Developments in the 114^th Congress

When the Obama Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification. After the formal notification in November 2015,¹³⁹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments.¹⁴⁰

No related joint resolutions of disapproval of this proposed sale were introduced during the 30-calendar-day consideration period outlined in the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2776), but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern. Then, in April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia (S.J.Res. 32 and H.J.Res. 90). Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs (FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 2943) or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia (Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 5293).

The Senate did not consider the PGM amendment submitted in conjunction with its consideration of the FY2017 NDAA, but the House narrowly defeated the Saudi cluster munitions prohibition amendment in a June 2016 House floor vote.¹⁴¹ Saudi use of U.S. cluster munitions in Yemen has been reported, and unnamed U.S. officials have indicated that the Obama Administration placed a hold on further cluster munitions transfers.¹⁴²

In August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia, and some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.¹⁴³ In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). U.S. tanks form the core of the Royal Saudi Land Forces fleet, and a series of contracts concluded since 2006 has seen Saudi M1 series tanks first sold to the kingdom in the 1990s upgraded to the M1A2S standard.¹⁴⁴ On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).¹⁴⁵

In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sana'a that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration announced that it was initiating a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia. In December 2016, press reports cited Obama Administration officials as stating that a planned commercial sale of precision guided munitions technology, including more than 16,000 air-to-ground munitions kits, would not proceed and that U.S. intelligence sharing would be further limited in favor of enhanced training for the Saudi Air Force.¹⁴⁶

Developments in the 115^th Congress

The Trump Administration has attempted to balance its condemnation of the Houthis and their Iranian backers with more direct calls for the coalition to ease its restrictions on access to Yemen, limit civilian casualties, and pursue negotiations. Some lawmakers have suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition have enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others have argued that U.S. support to the coalition improves its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties. Some Senators have focused on Yemen-related questions in considering nominations, some Members of both chambers have conducted enhanced oversight, and Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia or to prohibit the use of funds for coalition support operations.¹⁴⁷

Legislation seeking to place conditions on future transfers or sales of precision guided munitions technology was modified and reintroduced in the 115^th Congress (S.J.Res. 40 and H.J.Res. 104) and sought to condition the sale or transfer of munitions on a presidential certification that the Saudi government and coalition were taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians, "demonstrable efforts" to facilitate flows of aid and goods, and "effective measures" to target Islamic State and AQAP terrorists. Neither resolution has been considered, but their formulations have influenced other legislation, including Section 1290 of the FY2019 NDAA, which requires a similar set of certifications as a condition for the use of FY2019 defense funding for refueling support to Saudi and coalition aircraft engaged in certain missions in Yemen.

On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to the kingdom, President Trump notified Congress that he is proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.¹⁴⁸ The proposed sales would include equipment and services related to joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), Paveway laser-guided munitions kits, and programmable bomb fuzes. Pursuant to Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, the executive branch may proceed with a proposed direct commercial sale case 30 days after formally notifying Congress. Legislation in the House (H.J.Res. 102) and Senate (S.J.Res. 42) was proposed to disapprove of the three proposed sales. On June 13, the Senate voted to reject a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 (47-53, Record Vote 143).

On March 20, 2018, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution that would direct the President to remove U.S. forces from "hostilities in or affecting" Yemen (except for those U.S. forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces).

In May, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that are not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained at 30-, 180-, and 360-day intervals. The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would enable the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary provides an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would require a report on, among other things, United States objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those objectives.

The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-91). The potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft do not apply to certain types of operations, including missions related to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State or "related to countering the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or components in Yemen." Under the modified version, the Administration must certify that the Saudi and Emirati governments are undertaking

• an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen;
• appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food, fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including through the appropriate use of Yemen's Red Sea ports, including the port of Hudaydah, the airport in Sana'a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and
• demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by (1) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United States, and (2) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure

With specific regard to Saudi Arabia, the Administration also must certify that "the Government of Saudi Arabia is undertaking appropriate actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary inspection and clearance processes other than UNVIM." The Administration may waive the certification requirement if certain explanatory submissions are made. Reporting and strategy submission requirements also were included in the final version.

On September 12, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the Saudi and Emirati governments are "undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians" in Yemen.

Senator Robert Menendez, the Ranking Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has refused to consent to formal congressional notification of a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said,

I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…. Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis.¹⁴⁹

Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act (H.R. 6157) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certified in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians." The provision would not have applied to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen. The amendment was not considered after an objection on the Senate floor.¹⁵⁰

Author Contact Information

[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

Footnotes

1. U.S. State Department, Saudi Arabia Travel Warning, November 21

Footnotes

4. 8. See Simon Henderson, "Meet the Next Generation of Saudi Rulers," Foreign Policy, November 10Nov. 10, 2017; and, Bruce Riedel, "Saudi Arabia Shifts Policy From Risk Averse to Downright Dangerous," YaleGlobal Online, Nov. 28, 2017.

35. 37. 44. 52. 55. 82. 127. 130. Congressional Record, Volume 164, Number 140, August 22, 2018, p. S5797.

1.	U.S. State Department, Saudi Arabia Travel Warning, March 29, 2017.
2.	The White House, Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
3See also CRS Report R45046, The War in Yemen: A Compilation of Legislation in the 115th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
3.	For a summary of debates and perspectives, see, Nicolas Niarchos, "How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse," The New Yorker, January 22, 2018.
For background see CRS Report RL34726, In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Claims Against Saudi Defendants Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), by [author name scrubbed].
45.	The White House, Readout of the President's Call with King Salman bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, January 29Joint Statement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
56.	Limited civil service and commercial codes supplement the Islamic legal system, with some court reforms beingwhich is based on the Quran and traditions (hadith) of the Prophet Mohammed. Some court reforms have been implemented since 2011 to strengthen the training of judges and increase the consistency of judicial outcomes. For an overview of the politics surrounding reform debates and the legal system in Saudi Arabia, seeSee Joseph A. Kéchichian, Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia, New York, Routledge, 2013.
6.	The April 2015 succession changes reversed a key decision taken by King Abdullah before his death—King Abdullah had named his half-brother Prince Muqrin as Deputy Crown Prince in March 2014, and Prince Muqrin briefly served as Crown Prince after King Abdullah's death. In April 2015, Saudi authorities stated that Prince Muqrin stepped down as Crown Prince at his own choosing and credited new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef with selecting King Salman's son Mohammed bin Salman to serve as Deputy Crown Prince, with the approval of a majority of the Allegiance Council. Prince Miteb bin Abdullah (the late King Abdullah's most prominent son) leads the security forces of the Ministry of the National Guard.
77.	Some members of the royal family reportedly have objected to some changes under the leadership of King Salman and his son, the Crown Prince, in a series of intrafamily letters reported since 2015 and during meetings of the Allegiance Council. See David Ignatius, "A Cyclone Brews over Saudi Arabia," Washington Post, October 13, 2015; Hugh Miles, "Saudi Royal Calls for Regime Change in Riyadh," The Guardian (UK) September 28, 2015; and Simon Henderson, "Meet the Next Generation of Saudi Rulers," Foreign Policy, November 10, 2017.	King Salman and the late Crown Prince Nayef were full brothers: their sons are full first cousins. Their "Sudayri" branch of the Al Saud family is named for their grandmother Hassa bint Ahmad al Sudayri—among the best known of the late King Abd al Aziz's late wives and one of three drawn from the Al Sudayri family. She was the mother of the late King Fahd bin Abd al Aziz, the late Crown Prince Sultan bin Abd al Aziz, the late Crown Prince Nayef bin Abd al Aziz, King Salman bin Abd al Aziz, Prince Ahmad bin Abd al Aziz, two other senior princes, and four daughters. Analysts of past Saudi succession dynamicsSaudi affairs have often referred to King Fahd and his younger full brothers as the "Sudayri Seven," because of their propensity to support one another. In the future, analysis of relationships and potential competition within the so-called Sudayrithis branch may be of more interest than analysis that presumes Sudayri solidarity in competition with other wings of the family. For detailed background on Saudi succession history and issues, see Joseph Kéchichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, New York: Palgrave, 2001. For analysis of recent succession changes and Saudi law, see Chibli Mallat, "'Riyadhology' and Muhammad bin Salman's Telltale Succession," Lawfare, June 8, 2018.
89.	See David Ignatius, "A Cyclone Brews over Saudi Arabia," Washington Post, October 13, 2015; Hugh Miles, "Saudi Royal Calls for Regime Change in Riyadh," The Guardian (UK) September 28, 2015; andFrom 1958 to 1964, supporters of King Saud (the first son to succeed King Abd al Aziz) struggled for influence with supporters of Saud's brother Faisal (the following successor). Disputes over Saudi foreign policy and the management of government finances contributed to the family's decision to force King Saud from power in favor of Faisal, who served as king until he was assassinated by his nephew in 1975.	10.
911.	See, for example, Yaroslav Trofimov, "New Saudi King Brings Major Change at Home and Abroad," Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2015.
10.	From 1958 to 1964, supporters of King Saud (the first son to succeed King Abd al Aziz) struggled for influence with supporters of Saud's brother Faisal (the following successor). Disputes over Saudi foreign policy and the management of government finances contributed to the family's decision to force King Saud from power in favor of Faisal, who served as king until he was assassinated by his nephew in 1975.
11.	See for example, The Economist, "The Economist meets Saudi Arabia's deputy crown prince, the man who wields power behind the throne of his father, King Salman," January 6, 2016.
12.	Peter Waldman, "The $2 Trillion Project to Get Saudi Arabia's Economy Off Oil," Bloomberg Businessweek, April 25-May1, 2016.
13.	Benchmark prices for Brent crude oil and West Texas Intermediate crude oil dropped by more than half to roughly $46 per barrel from June 2014 to January 2015. Prices moved upward in spring 2015, but again headed downward, returning to the mid-$40 range by late August 2015.
14.	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance, "Press Release: Recent Economic Developments and Highlights of Fiscal Years 1435/1436 (2014) & 1436/1437 (2015)," December 25, 2014.
15.	Ben Hubbard, "Saudi King Unleashes a Torrent of Money as Bonuses Flow to the Masses," New York Times, February 19, 2015; and, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance, "Budget Highlights for Fiscal Years 1436/1437 & 1437/1438," December 29, 2015.
16.	Ibid.
17.	Ibid.
18.	Thomas Hale and Simeon Kerr, "Saudi Arabia taps bond market for $12.5bn," Financial Times (UK), September 27, 2017.
19.	Ibid.
20.	IMF Press Release 17/178, IMF Staff Completes 2017 Article IV Mission to Saudi Arabia, May 17, 2017.
21.	Institute of International Education, Open Doors Fact Sheet: Saudi Arabia, Educational Exchange Data from Open Doors 2016, November 2016.
22.	Elizabeth Redden, "Saudi Enrollment Declines," Inside Higher Ed, July 18, 2016.
23.	Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia: 'Unofficial' Guardianship Rules Banned, May 9, 2017.
24IMF Article IV Reports, 2017/2018 and, "The $2 Trillion Project to Get Saudi Arabia's Economy Off Oil," Bloomberg Businessweek, April 25-May 1, 2016; Ben Hubbard and Kate Kelly, "Saudi Arabia's Grand Plan to Move Beyond Oil: Big Goals, Bigger Hurdles," New York Times, October 25, 2017; Ahmed Al Omran, "Saudi Arabia's sleepy city offers prince a cautionary tale," Financial Times (UK), May 27, 2018; Al Omran, "Record numbers of foreign workers leave Saudi Arabia," Financial Times (UK), July 10, 2018; and, Rory Jones, "In Rare Step, Saudi's Sovereign-Wealth Fund Raises $11 Billion Loan," Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2018.
12.	Ibid.
13.	IMF Press Release 17/178, IMF Staff Completes 2017 Article IV Mission to Saudi Arabia, May 17, 2017.
14.	IMF Country Report No. 18/263, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 28, 2018.
15.	IMF Country Report No. 18/263, June 2018. Bloomberg estimated in September 2018 that the kingdom has issued $50 billion in bonds since the end of 2016. Archana Narayanan and Allan Lopez, "Saudi Arabia Raises $2 Billion in Islamic Bond Sale," Bloomberg September 12, 2018.
16.	IMF Country Report No. 18/263, June 2018.
17.	Habib Toumi, "About 60,000 Saudi students studying in US," Gulf News (Bahrain), March 21, 2018.
18.	Elizabeth Redden, "Saudi Enrollment Declines," Inside Higher Ed, July 18, 2016.
19.	State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017.
20.	Arab News (Jeddah), "Saudi Arabia to penalize individuals who create or promote social media content that disrupts public order," September 5, 2018.
21.	The State Department's 2017 report on human rights said, "evidence available at year's end indicated that CPVPV officers were less visibly present and active after implementation of the new strictures."
22.	Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia: Intensified Repression of Writers, Activists," February 6, 2017.
23.	According to Amnesty International, the defendants were convicted on charges including "breaking allegiance to and disobeying the ruler, questioning the integrity of officials, seeking to disrupt security and inciting disorder by calling for demonstrations, disseminating false information to foreign groups and forming an unlicensed organization." Amnesty International, "Saudi Arabia punishes two activists for voicing opinion," March 11, 2013.
24.	Raif Badawi was sentenced in May 2014 to 1,000 lashes (to be administered in 20 sessions of 50 lashes) and 10 years in prison. After the first session, his subsequent punishments were delayed for medical reasons. According to the State Department's 2017 Human Rights Report, Raif Badawi remained in prison in Jeddah at year's end.
25.	Ben Hubbard, "Saudi Arabia Frees Samar Badawi, Human Rights Activist, After Questioning," New York Times, January 13, 2016. Her former husband is a prominent human rights activist and lawyer who also was jailed in 2014 on a range of charges related to his advocacy. See Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia: 15-Year Sentence for Prominent Activist," July 7, 2014.
26.	Amanda Coletta and Kareem Fahim, Saudi Arabia expels Canadian ambassador after Ottawa criticizes arrests of Saudi activists, August 6, 2018.
27.	Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, August 6, 2018.
28.	State Department Press Briefing, August 7, 2018.
29.	Ben Hubbard, "Saudi Prince, Asserting Power, Brings Clerics to Heel," New York Times, November 5, 2017.
30.	For a critical account, see Yasmine Farouk, "The Penalties of a Death," Carnegie Middle East Center, Diwan, September 17, 2018.
31.	For an overview on the guardianship system and related activism, see Nora Doaiji, "Saudi Women's Online Activism: One Year of the 'I Am My Own Guardian' Campaign," Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, October 2017; and, Margaret Coker, "How Guardianship Laws Still Control Saudi Women," New York Times, June 22, 2018.
32.	State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Saudi Arabia. The report attributes the differences in status among men and women in political life to "guardianship laws requiring a male guardian's permission for legal decisions, restrictions on women candidates' contact with male voters in the 2015 elections, and the ban on women driving, which the government announced would be lifted in 2018."
33.	National Public Radio, "Saudi Women React to Election Results," December 20, 2015; and, "After Historic Elections in Saudi Arabia, What's The Future for Women?" December 22, 2015.
34.	Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia: 'Unofficial' Guardianship Rules Banned, May 9, 2017.
Women's rights activists Loujain Hathloul and Maysa al Amoudi were detained at the Saudi-UAE border in December 2014 for attempting to drive and publicizing their efforts and detention using social media. Their cases were referred to the Specialized Criminal Court (also referred to as the terrorism court), where cases involving those accused of "undermining social cohesion" are tried. Both were released in February 2015. See Ben Hubbard, "Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive," New York Times, September 26, 2017.
25.	U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, Saudi Arabia, March 2017. The report attributes the differences in status among men and women in political life to "guardianship laws requiring a male escort, restrictions on women candidates' contact with male voters in this year's elections, and the ban on women driving."
26.	National Public Radio, "Saudi Women React To Election Results," December 20, 2015; and, "After Historic Elections In Saudi Arabia, What's The Future For Women?" December 22, 2015.
27Hathloul was detained again in May 2018. Samar Badawi, Hatoon al Fassi, and Nassima al Sada were similarly detained. See Ben Hubbard, "Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive," New York Times, September 26, 2017; Kareem Fahim and Loveday Morris, "Saudi Arabia Detains Womens Rights Advocates Who Challenged Driving Ban," Washington Post, May 18, 2018; and, Margherita Stancati, "Saudi Arabia Detains More Women's Rights Activists," Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2018.
36.	Kristin Smith Diwan, "Saudi Nationalism Raises Hopes of Greater Shia Inclusion," Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, May 3, 2018.
While Nimr had studied in Iran and Syria and used public sermons and statements as vehicles for acidic criticism of the Saudi royal family's rule, a review of his available statements and sermons suggests that he did not explicitly advocate in public for the use of violence by Saudi Shia or for the adoption of Iranian-style theocratic government. Nevertheless, his rhetoric was taken as crossing several Saudi red lines in questioning the legitimacy of the Saudi royal family's rule and in calling for mass protests and civil disobedience. The Saudi government has clearly stated its view of his activity as treasonous without reference to sectarian differences, and has described his sentence as the result of due process, even as it has struggled to convince some international observers that the execution was just, warranted, or wise given the current regional security environment.
28.	According to Amnesty International, the defendants were convicted on charges including "breaking allegiance to and disobeying the ruler, questioning the integrity of officials, seeking to disrupt security and inciting disorder by calling for demonstrations, disseminating false information to foreign groups and forming an unlicensed organization." Amnesty International, "Saudi Arabia punishes two activists for voicing opinion," March 11, 201338. BBC, "Awamiya: Inside Saudi Shia town devastated by demolitions and fighting," August 16, 2017; and, Saudi Gazette, "Work on Awamiya development in full swing," August 4, 2018.
2939.	Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia: Intensified Repression of Writers, Activists," February 6, 2017. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2017.
3040.	State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia, February 2, 2017.
41.	U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, August 2017. A report by the private consultancy The Soufan Group cites a 2016 Saudi Ministry of Interior estimate that more than 3,200 Saudi foreign fighters had travelled abroad, with 760 having returned home, and more than 7,000 Saudi nationals had been "stop listed" by Turkish interior security officials. See, Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, The Soufan Group, October 2017.
42.	See, for example, Letter from 55 House Members to President Donald Trump, April 10, 2017.
43.	Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Contributes $100 Million for Syria's Stabilization Efforts," August 16, 2018.
According to the State Department's 2015 Human Rights Report, "As of year's end, Badawi remained in Burayman Prison in Jeddah; authorities had not yet carried out the remainder of the lashing sentence."
31.	Ben Hubbard, "Saudi Arabia Frees Samar Badawi, Human Rights Activist, After Questioning," New York Times, January 13, 2016.
32.	Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia: 15-Year Sentence for Prominent Activist," July 7, 2014.
33.	State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations With Saudi Arabia, February 2, 2017.
34.	The coalition members reportedly include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinians, Qatar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
35.	Saeed Shah and Margherita Stancati, "Saudi-Led Antiterror Coalition Sharpens Its Focus," Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2017.
36.	Riyadh Declaration, Final Communiqué Arab-Islamic-American Leaders' Summit, May 21, 2017.
37.	Ibid.
38.	Attacks include shootings of police officers, suicide bombing attacks on Shiite mosques in the Eastern Province, a suicide bombing at a prison checkpoint, an attack on Saudi security personnel in a mosque in the southwestern city of Abha, a shooting attack on a Shia meeting place in the Eastern Province, and a bombing attack targeting Ismaili Shia in the southern city of Najran.
3945.	OSE Report TRL2015080661723979, "First Statement From ISIL's 'Wilayah Al-Hijaz' Claims Deadly Attack On Saudi 'Emergency Forces',"Statement attributed to Wilayah al Hijaz, Twitter, August 6, 2015.
4046.	Ahmed Al Omran, "Saudi Brothers Suspected of Links to Kuwait Mosque Bombing Arrested," Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2015.
4147.	Ahmed Al Omran, "Saudi Arabia Arrests 431 People With Suspected Islamic State Links," Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2015; and, Isa al Shamani, "Forty-Six Saudi Women are with DA'ISH in Syria; 1,375 Individuals Accused of being Members of the Organization," Al Hayah (London), September 3, 2015; Reuters, Saudi Arabia says arrests 17 Islamic State attack plotters, September 19, 2016; Reuters, "Saudi Arabia arrests 46 militant suspects involved in Medina attack," April 30, 2017. ; and, Reuters, "Islamic State claims responsibility for Saudi checkpoint attack," July 12, 2018.
4248.	U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, August 2017Al Qaeda leaders have long criticized Saudi leaders and pledged support for leaders of the Taliban movement, but largely have refrained from establishing their own rival proto-state entities.
4349.	U.S. government Open Source Enterprise (OSE) Report TRL2015051469325796, "ISIL Leader Urges Emigration to Islamic State, Dismisses Saudi Strikes in Yemen, Praises 'Soldiers,'" May 14, 2015.
44.	See Nawaf Obaid and Saud Al-Sarhan, "The Saudis Can Crush ISIS," New York Times, September 8, 2014.
45Baghdadi Statement, "Go Ye Forth Lightly or Heavily," Twitter, May 14, 2015. In a series of videos released in mid-December 2015, Islamic State-controlled "provinces" launched a coordinated media campaign condemning the Al Saud family as apostate tyrants, promising attacks in the kingdom, and encouraging IS supporters to rise up and overthrow the Saudi government. The videos promised to free prisoners held in Saudi jails and condemned the Al Saud for protecting Shia in the kingdom and for cooperating with the United States and others in military operations targeting Muslims. Themes, terms, threats, and promises were largely consistent among the December 2015 videos, which were released by most of the self-declared IS "provinces" in Iraq and Syria as well as "provinces" in Yemen, Libya, and Egypt.
50.	Islamic State propaganda has argued "…the palace scholars of the Saudi regime …are at the forefront of this effort to dissuade Muslims from jihad and from upholding the Shari'ah, averting them from the path of Allah." See "Kill the Imams of Kufr," Dabiq Magazine, Issue 13, January 2016.
51.	Baghdadi statement, "But Give Glad Tidings to Those Who Patiently Persevere," August 22, 2018.
For a detailed look at this question, see Cole Bunzel, The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 18, 2016.
4653.	Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islømism since 1979, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
54.	See Nawaf Obaid and Saud Al-Sarhan, "The Saudis Can Crush ISIS," New York Times, September 8, 2014.
U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, August 20172017, September 2018. The report included nearly identical language from the 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016and 2015 reports. According to a July 2016 State Department report, "Bulk cash smuggling and money transfers from individual donors and Saudi-based charities have reportedly been a significant source of financing for extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25 years. Despite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism originating within the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia is still home to individuals and entities that continue to serve as sources of financial support for Sunni-based extremist groups. Saudi Arabia has publicly imposed targeted sanctions on more than 20 Hizballah-affiliated individuals and companies since May 2015. Funds are allegedly collected in secret and illicitly transferred out of the country in cash, often via pilgrims performing Hajj and Umrah. The government has responded in recent years and increased policing to counter this smuggling. Recent regional turmoil and sophisticated usage of social media have facilitated charities outside of Saudi Arabia with ties to extremists to solicit donations from Saudi donors. Some Saudi officials acknowledge difficulties in following the money trail with regard to illicit finance, in large part due to a preference for cash transactions and regulatory challenges posed by hawala networks, which are illegal and dismantled upon discovery." U.S. State Department, 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)—Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database, July 2016.
4756.	U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, August 2017.
482017, September 2018. The 2016 reports had stated that "Despite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism within the Kingdom, some individuals and entities in Saudi Arabia probably continued to serve as sources of financial support for terrorist groups." 57.	Saudi Ministry of Interior, List of the Security and Intellectual Prohibitions for the Citizens and Residents, Saudi Press Agency, March 7, 2014.
4958.	OSE Report IML2014081943429793, "Saudi Grand Mufti Issues Statement Saying ISIL, Al-Qa'ida Are 'Khawarij,' 'Primary Enemies' of Islam,"Saudi Grand Mufti: DA'ISH and Al-Qa'ida Are Not Affiliated to Islam and Muslims" Al Sharq (Dammam), August 19, 2014.
5059.	Section 21(c) of P.L.90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), states that IMET recipient countries are eligible to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L. 99-83 amended the AECA to provide this reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower cost to U.S. military training purchased by Saudi Arabia and other IMET recipient countries through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. "Incremental rates" applied to the FMS training purchases of IMET recipient countries are calculated according to the terms outlined in Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 15, Chapter 7 (Sections 0711 and 0712). The net benefit in cost savings to the kingdom is not regularly reported, although in the past, Congress has directed the executive branch to report to it on the matter. The conference report for H.R. 3288 (H.Rept. 111-366 ) required the Obama Administration to report to Congress within 180 days (by June 14, 2010) on the net savings this eligibility provides to Saudi Arabia and other IMET recipients.
60.	From 2004 to 2009, Congress adopted several legislative proposals to prohibit the extension of U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. As the total amount of U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia has been relatively minuscule in recent years, the practical effect of the prohibitions was to rescind Saudi Arabia's eligibility to purchase U.S. military training at a reduced cost, absent the issuance of presidential waivers or the assertion of existing executive authority. Some supporters of the prohibitions raised questions regarding Saudi Arabia's reliability as a counterterrorism partner, while opponents of the assistance bans argued that the provisions would unnecessarily jeopardize continuance of cooperative diplomatic and security efforts with a longstanding regional ally. Each legislative proposal differed in its cited reasons for prohibiting aid as well as whether or not it provided national security waiver authority for the President.
61.	Consideration of Amendment offered by Senator Chris Murphy to S. 3117, Senate Appropriations Committee, June 29, 2016. Committee vote—14 in favor, 16 opposed.
62.	Katie Paul, "Saudi prince, relieved from National Guard, once seen as throne contender," Reuters, November 4, 2017; and, Glen Carey and Zaid Sabah, "Saudi King Replaces Military Commanders as Yemen War Lingers On, Bloomberg, February 26, 2018.
63.	The executive branch declined to make an accounting of the proposed sales publicly available. Aaron Mehta, "Revealed: Trump's $110 billion weapons list for the Saudis," Defense News, June 8, 2017.
64.	In early December 2017, the Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on December 4, 2017.
65.	For background on the evolution of U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, see CRS Report R45046, The War in Yemen: A Compilation of Legislation in the 115th Congress.
66.	In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of then-current U.S. support, and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties." According to the Department of Defense, "roughly 50" U.S. personnel are in Saudi Arabia for related activities including efforts focused on Houthi ballistic missile threats to the kingdom. Press reports also have included unconfirmed details about U.S. border security and counter-missile operations. See Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018; Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018; and, Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, "Army Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis Combat Threat From Yemen Rebels," New York Times, May 18, 2018.
67.	See, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 8, 2018.
68.	Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018.
69.	ACSA agreements are governed by 10 U.S.C. 2341-2350. The agreements provide for reciprocal logistical support under a variety of circumstances, and their underlying statutory authority does not prohibit U.S. support to partner forces engaged in armed conflict. U.S. ACSA agreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide for the transfer of support to third parties with the prior written consent of both the original provider and original recipient. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed in May 2016. The executive branch has not publicly specified what legal authority or agreement provided for refueling support to Saudi aircraft from March 2015 through May 2016. Section 1271 of the FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515) amends the underlying authority for ACSA agreements to prohibit the transfer of logistic support, supplies, and services to parties with whom no ACSA agreement has been signed and creates an annual reporting requirement on standing ACSA agreements and their use.
70.	Samuel Oakford "One American's Failed Quest to Protect Civilians in Yemen," The Atlantic, August 17, 2018.
71.	Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Commander Urges More Transparency in Yemen Strike on School Bus," New York Times, August 27, 2018.
72.	Arab News (Jeddah), "Coalition 'regrets' Yemen bus strike, JIAT says those responsible should be accountable," September 2, 2018.
73.	Lojien Ben Gassem, "Fact-finding team presents results of 7 incidents in Yemeni conflict," Arab News (Jeddah), September 12, 2018.
74.	Adriane Elliot, "Security assistance growth prompts restructuring," U.S. Army, September 2, 2015.
75.	"Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia" in U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, April 2016. The program is modeled loosely on embedded advisory and technology transfer programs of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, established in the 1970s.
76.	Ibid.
77.	Defense Security Cooperation Agency Fiscal Year Series Data, September 30, 2017.
78.	Based on U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade, September 2018. Comparable 2017 figures for Israel, the second largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were more than $21.9 billion in exports to the United States and more than $12.5 billion in U.S. exports to Israel. U.S. exports to the United Arab Emirates in 2017 were worth more than $20 billion.
79.	Based on EIA data, "Weekly Imports & Exports: Crude" and "Weekly Preliminary Crude Imports by Country of Origin," Four Week Averages, September 7, 2018.
80.	EIA Country Analysis Brief—Saudi Arabia, October 2017.
81.	Reuters, "Can Saudi Arabia pump much more oil?," July 1, 2018; and, Tom DiChristopher, "OPEC's oil output jumps in June as Saudi Arabia opens the taps to tame crude prices," July 11, 2018.
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S.Rept. 107-351/H.Rept. 107-792.
51.	CBS News 60 Minutes, "Top secret '28 pages' may hold clues about Saudi support for 9/11 hijackers," April 8, 2016.
52.	Josh Meyer, "Saudis to Seek Release of Classified Parts of 9/11 Report," Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2003.
53.	President Barack Obama interviewed by Charlie Rose, PBS, April 19, 2016.
54.	Both documents are available on the website of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
55.	Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004.
56.	Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, "Saudi Foreign Minister: '28 Pages' Were Misleading," July 16, 2016.
57.	Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, "Saudi Arabia Responds to 60 Minutes Report," April 10, 2016.
58.	Successive Administrations have argued that the discount supports continued Saudi participation in U.S. training programs and this participation supports the maintenance of important military-to-military relationships and improves Saudi capabilities. The conference report for H.R. 3288 (H.Rept. 111-366) required the Obama Administration to report to Congress within 180 days (by June 14, 2010) on the net savings this eligibility provides to Saudi Arabia and other IMET recipients.
59.	The executive branch has declined to make an accounting of the proposed sales publicly available. For an account based on a reported White House document, see Aaron Mehta, "Revealed: Trump's $110 billion weapons list for the Saudis," Defense News, June 8, 2017.
60.	See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by [author name scrubbed].
61.	Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015.
62.	The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (SFRC/HFAC) to jointly request that the President provide such a "pre-shipment notification" 30 days prior to a shipment. The preshipment notification would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking further action to modify or block the shipment.
63.	Hon. Conyers Amendment No. 40, Roll Call Vote 327, Consideration of H.R. 5293, June 16, 2016.
64.	John Hudson, "White House Blocks Transfer of Cluster Bombs to Saudi Arabia," Foreign Policy (online), May 27, 2016. U.S. officials had previously said that they "have discussed reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions" in Yemen with Saudi officials and consider their use "permissible" if "used appropriately" and according to "end-use rules." State Department Daily Press Briefing, August 20, 2015.
65.	See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016.
66.	A series of contracts have been signed to implement the sale proposed in Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 06-31, July 28, 2006.
67.	Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.
68.	Helene Cooper, "U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia Amid Concerns Over Yemen War," New York Times, December 13, 2016.
69.	DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043 (Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017.
70.	"Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia" in U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, April 2016.
71.	Ibid.
72.	Defense Security Cooperation Agency Fiscal Year Series Data, September 30, 2015.
73.	Bruce Riedel, "What the Iran deal has meant for Saudi Arabia and regional tensions," Brookings Institution, Markaz, July 13, 2016.
74.	Amir Vadhat and Jon Gambrell, "Saudis cut ties with Iran following Shiite cleric execution" Associated Press, Jan. 3, 2016.
75.	Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, "Saudi Foreign Minister Meets with President Obama," July 17, 2015.
76.	Joint Statement on the Meeting between President Barack Obama and King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud, September 4, 2015.
77.	The White House, Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
78.	Dan Drollette Jr., "View from the inside: Prince Turki al-Faisal on Saudi Arabia, nuclear energy and weapons, and Middle East politics," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 72, Issue 1, January 2016.
79.	World Nuclear News, "China, Saudi Arabia begin HTGR feasibility study," May 17, 2017. Anjli Raval, "Saudi Arabia loses oil market share to rivals in key nations," Financial Times (UK), March 28, 2016.
8083.	Reem Shamseddine, Stephen Kalin, and Geert De Clercq, "Westinghouse discussing group bid for Saudi nuclear tender – sources," Reuters, November 21Stanley Reed, "As Their Clout Wanes, Saudi Arabia and Russia Extend Oil Production Cuts," New York Times, May 15, 2017.
81.	The United States has attempted to persuade certain countries with which it is negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements to forgo enrichment and reprocessing and conclude additional protocols. Washington has argued that its December 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) could set a useful precedent for mitigating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. For example, President Obama argued in May 2009 that the agreement "has the potential to serve as a model for other countries in the region that wish to pursue responsible nuclear energy development." Similarly, then-State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley described the agreement as "the gold standard" during an August 5, 2010, press briefing. See President Barack Obama, Message to the Congress Transmitting a Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, May 21, 2009; and, State Department Press Briefing, August 5, 2010.
82.	Sylvia Westall, "Saudi Arabia to extract uranium for 'self-sufficient' nuclear program," Reuters, October 30, 2017.
83.	For background, see Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Qatar: The Gulf's Problem Child," Atlantic Monthly, June 5, 2017, and, CRS Report R44533, Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].
84.	Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, June 5, 2017.
85.	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, June 5, 2017.
86.	For background on Yemen, its transition process, conflict there, and U.S. Policy, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].
87.	The Ansar Allah movement is a predominantly Zaydi Shia revivalist political and insurgent movement that formed in the northern province of Sa'da in 2004 under the leadership of members of the Al Houthi family. It originally sought an end to what it viewed as efforts to marginalize Zaydi communities and beliefs, but its goals grew in scope and ambition in the wake of the 2011 uprising and government collapse to embrace a broader populist, antiestablishment message. Members of its Zaydi Shia base of support are closer in their beliefs to Sunni Muslims than most other Shia, and some Yemeni observers argue that the motives of the Houthi movement are evolving to include new political and social goals that cannot be explained strictly in sectarian terms. Skeptics highlight the movement's ideological roots, its alleged cooperation with Iran, and the slogans prominently displayed on its banners: "God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory to Islam!"
88.	See, for example, International Crisis Group, "The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa," June 10, 2014.
89.	Statement of His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Before the United ·Nations General Assembly, 69th Regular Session, September 27, 2014.
90.	Office of the State Department Spokesperson, Taken Question on Yemen, Washington, DC, October 31, 2014.
91.	Minister of Foreign Affairs Stresses Depth of Historical and Strong Relations Between Saudi Arabia and Britain.
92.	Text of Hadi request letter in "GCC statement: Gulf countries respond to Yemen developments," The National (UAE), March 26, 2015.
93.	Ahmed Al Omran, Asa Fitch, and Adam Entous, "Saudi-Led Coalition Announces End of Yemen Military Operation," Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2015.
94.	OSE Report IMN2015042022777830, "Yemen: Top Huthi Leader Says Israel, US Play Role in Saudi 'Aggression,' Vows To Counter 'Invasion,'" Al-Masirah TV (Beirut) April 19, 2015.
95.	Sam LaGrone, "U.S. Navy Seizes Suspected Iranian Arms Shipment Bound for Yemen," April 4, 2016.
96.	State Department Press Office Director Elizabeth Trudeau, Daily Press Briefing, August 15, 2016.
97.	Remarks of Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'Brien at Meeting of U.N. Security Council, U.N. Document S/PV.7897, March 10, 2017.
98.	Michelle Nichols, "U.N. warns if no Yemen aid access, world will see largest famine in decades," Reuters, November 9, 2017.
99.	Remarks of U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Michele Sison at Meeting of U.N. Security Council, U.N. Document S/PV.7897, March 10, 2017.
100.	Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir, Joint Remarks, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 20, 2017.
101.	The White House, Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
102.	Oriana Pawlyk, "2 Years Into Yemen War, US Ramps Up Refueling of Saudi Jets," Military Times, February 15, 2017.
103.	Reuters, "U.S. withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen planning," August 19, 2016.
104.	Maria Abi-Habib and Adam Entous, "U.S. Widens Role in Saudi-led Campaign Against Houthi Rebels in Yemen," Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2015.
105.	The White House, Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
106.	Reuters, "Saudi Arabia still sees no role for Assad in Syrian transition," August 6, 2017.
107.	Ghazanfar Ali Khan, "Saudi Arabia aims to develop relations with Russia Federation in all spheres: Al-Jubeir," Reuters, October 5, 2017.
108.	Ibrahim Al Hatlani, "Is Saudi Arabia really willing to normalize ties with Iraq?," Al Monitor, April 17, 2017.
109.	Ben Kesling, "Iraq Asks Saudi Arabia to Recall Ambassador Who Criticized Shiite Militias," Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2016.
110.	On January 30, 1950, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry informed the U.S. Embassy in Cairo of its action to militarily occupy the two islands "in perfect accord" with the Saudi Arabian government. See U.S. State Department Telegram 774.54/1-3050, The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, Cairo, January 30, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume 5, p. 711. See also, Tamer El-Ghobashy and Margherita Stancati, "Saudi King's Speech to Egypt's Parliament Avoids Controversial Island Agreement," Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2016; "Protests in Cairo over Egypt-Saudi Tiran and Sanafir island deal," Euronews, April 16, 2016.
111.	Reuters, "Egyptian President Agrees to Cede 2 Islands to Saudi Arabia," June 24, 2017.
112.	i24 News, "Netanyahu urges EU to adopt policy of moderate Arab states on Israel," January 22, 2016.
113.	President Donald Trump, Remarks with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, May 22, 2017.
114.	The White House, Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
11584.	Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia, Chatham House (UK), December 2011; and, John Sfakianakis, "Saudi Arabia's Essential Oil," Foreign Affairs, January 8, 2014.
85.	Rania El Gamal, "Burning less oil at home will help Saudi exports and Aramco IPO," Reuters, March 7, 2017.
86.	Matthew Campbell and Glen Carey, "Aramco's Stalled IPO Tarnishes Saudi Prince's Grand Vision," Bloomberg, August 23, 2018.
87.	Anthony Dipaola & Wael Mahdi, "QuickTake: Saudi Aramco," Bloomberg, May 5, 2017.
88.	Summer Said, "Potential Saudi Aramco IPO Wouldn't Include Oil Reserves," Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2016; Sam Wilkin, "Saudi Aramco's Valuation Could Top $1 Trillion After Tax Cut," Bloomberg, March 28, 2017; Alan Livsey, "Lex in depth: The $2tn Saudi Aramco question," Financial Times (UK), April 3, 2017; and, Simeon Kerr and Ahmed Al Omran, "Saudi Aramco IPO sparks fears of loss of cash cow," Financial Times (UK), May 10, 2017.
89.	Wael Mahdi, "Saudis to Control Crude Reserves, Output After Aramco IPO," Bloomberg, May 3, 2017.
90.	Katie Paul and Tom Arnold, "Saudi sovereign fund picks Goldman, BAML, Klein for SABIC sale: sources," Reuters, September 10, 2018.
91.	KA CARE 2011 statement cited in World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia," October 2017.
92.	Reuters, "Saudi Arabia aims to prequalify firms by April or May for first nuclear plant," January 15, 2018.
93.	Ibid.
94.	IAEA, "IAEA Reviews Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development," 35/2018, July 31, 2018.
95.	U.S. Department of Energy, "Secretary Perry Meets with Khalid Al-Falih, Minister of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," September 10, 2018.
96.	Such legislation has precedent; bills introduced in the House and Senate in 2010 would have approved the 123 agreement between the United States and Australia. See CRS Report R41312, U.S.-Australia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
97.	Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 24, 2018.
98.	Sec. of Energy Rick Perry, Testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, May 9, 2018.
99.	Reuters, "Saudi crown prince says will develop nuclear bomb if Iran does: CBS TV," March 15, 2018
100.	Ibid.
101.	Rania El Gamal and Katie Paul, "Saudi Arabia hopes to start nuclear pact talks with U.S. in weeks – minister," Reuters, December 20, 2017.
102.	CNBC, Interview with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir, Munich, Germany, February 19, 2018.
103.	Joint Statement by President Trump and King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, May 23, 2017.
104.	"Saudi FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Reject Iran's Sectarian Strife, Support for Terrorism," July 11, 2018.
105.	Reuters, "Iran's leader accuses Saudis of 'treason' against Muslims," January 16, 2018.
106.	Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, Statement on the United States Withdrawal from the JCPOA, May 8, 2018.
107.	Saudi Arabia claims nearly $16 billion in Iraqi official debt dating to the era of Saddam Hussein's war with Iran.
108.	See CRS Report R45096, Iraq: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].
109.	U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, adopted in 2015, endorsed a "road map" for a political settlement in Syria, including the drafting of a new constitution and the administration of U.N.-supervised elections.
110.	Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stresses Depth of Historical and Strong Relations Between Saudi Arabia and Britain, March 24, 2015.
111.	Text of Hadi request letter in "GCC statement: Gulf countries respond to Yemen developments," The National (UAE), March 26, 2015.
112.	See CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by [author name scrubbed].
113.	For a detailed discussion, see Michael Knights, "The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture," U.S. Military Academy Combatting Terrorism Center, Sentinel, Volume 11, Issue 8, September 2018.
114.	See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by [author name scrubbed].
115.	Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018.
116.	U.N. Document A/HRC/39/43, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts, August 17, 2018.
117.	According to the OHCHR data, OHCHR, coalition airstrikes have killed at least 4,300 civilians. See Annex 4, U.N. Document A/HRC/39/43, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts, August 17, 2018.
118.	Also see CRS Report R45046, The War in Yemen: A Compilation of Legislation in the 115th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
119.	Statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, September 12, 2018.
120.	Joe Gould, "Yemen skeptics in Congress see politics shifting their way — and against Trump," Defense News, September 13, 2018.
121.	For background, see Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Qatar: The Gulf's Problem Child," Atlantic Monthly, June 5, 2017, and, CRS Report R44533, Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].
122.	Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, June 5, 2017.
123.	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, June 5, 2017.
124.	Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speculated in January 2016 that "Saudi Arabia recognizes that Israel is an ally rather than an enemy because of the two [principal] threats that threaten them, Iran and Daesh [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State]." i24 News, "Netanyahu urges EU to adopt policy of moderate Arab states on Israel," January 22, 2016.
125.	President Donald Trump, Remarks with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, May 22, 2017.
126.	The White House, Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, May 23, 2017.
Adopted in December 1948, General Assembly Resolution 194 states that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." This resolution is often cited by advocates for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former homes in what is now Israel. In April 2013, representatives of the Arab League agreed that land swaps could be an element of a conflict-ending agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, in early 2014, Arab foreign ministers reportedly informed Secretary of State John Kerry that they will "not accept Israel as a Jewish state nor compromise on Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem." Elhanan Miller, "Arab ministers back Abbas in rejecting 'Jewish' Israel," Times of Israel, January 13, 2014.
116.	Joint Statement on the Meeting between President Barack Obama and King Salman bin Abd alAziz Al Saud, September 4, 2015.
117.	Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal's Introductory Remarks to the Joint Press Conference with British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, March 24, 2015.
118In September 2015, King Salman and President Obama "underscored the enduring importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and underlined the necessity of reaching a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the conflict based on two states living side-by-side in peace and security." Joint Statement on the Meeting between President Barack Obama and King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud, September 4, 2015.
128.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement on Phone Conversation between King Salman and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, January 9, 2018.
129.	Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir, Statement to 150th session of the Arab League Council in Cairo, Sept. 11, 2018.
Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), Deputy Crown Prince Chairs Cabinet's Session, August 18, 2014.
119.	Based on U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade, May 2017. Comparable 2016 figures for Israel, the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were more than $22.2 billion in exports to the United States and more than $13.1 billion in U.S. exports to Israel. U.S. exports to the United Arab Emirates in 2016 were worth more than $22.3 billion.
120.	Average of weekly preliminary crude imports, January – November 2017. Based on EIA data, "Weekly Imports & Exports: Crude" and "Weekly Preliminary Crude Imports by Country of Origin," Four Week Averages, November 3, 2017.
121.	EIA Country Analysis Brief—Saudi Arabia, October 2017.
122.	Anjli Raval, "Saudi Arabia loses oil market share to rivals in key nations," Financial Times (UK), March 28, 2016.
123.	Javier Blas and Jack Farchy, "Riyadh Dances With Trump But Goes Home With Putin to Prop Up Oil," Bloomberg, May 21, 2017; and, Stanley Reed, "As Their Clout Wanes, Saudi Arabia and Russia Extend Oil Production Cuts," New York Times, May 15, 2017.
124.	Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia, Chatham House (UK), December 2011; and, John Sfakianakis, "Saudi Arabia's Essential Oil," Foreign Affairs, January 8, 2014.
125.	Rania El Gamal, "Burning less oil at home will help Saudi exports and Aramco IPO," Reuters, March 7, 2017.
126.	Anthony Dipaola & Wael Mahdi, "QuickTake: Saudi Aramco," Bloomberg, May 5, 2017.
127.	Summer Said, "Potential Saudi Aramco IPO Wouldn't Include Oil Reserves," Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2016; Sam Wilkin, "Saudi Aramco's Valuation Could Top $1 Trillion After Tax Cut," Bloomberg, March 28, 2017; Alan Livsey, "Lex in depth: The $2tn Saudi Aramco question," Financial Times (UK), April 3, 2017; and, Simeon Kerr and Ahmed Al Omran, "Saudi Aramco IPO sparks fears of loss of cash cow," Financial Times (UK), May 10, 2017.
128.	Wael Mahdi, "Saudis to Control Crude Reserves, Output After Aramco IPO," Bloomberg, May 3, 2017.
129.	Ambassador James Smith (ret.), Remarks at National Council on U.S. Arab Relations Conference, October 2013.
130.	Ambassador James Smith (ret.), Conversation with Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, July 14, 2014131.	Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S.Rept. 107-351/H.Rept. 107-792.
132.	CBS News 60 Minutes, "Top secret '28 pages' may hold clues about Saudi support for 9/11 hijackers," April 8, 2016.
133.	Josh Meyer, "Saudis to Seek Release of Classified Parts of 9/11 Report," Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2003.
134.	President Barack Obama interviewed by Charlie Rose, PBS, April 19, 2016.
135.	Both documents are available on the website of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
136.	Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004.
137.	Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, "Saudi Foreign Minister: '28 Pages' Were Misleading," July 16, 2016.
138.	Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, "Saudi Arabia Responds to 60 Minutes Report," April 10, 2016.
139.	Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015.
140.	The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (SFRC/HFAC) to jointly request that the President provide such a "pre-shipment notification" 30 days prior to a shipment. The preshipment notification would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking further action to modify or block the shipment.
141.	Hon. Conyers Amendment No. 40, Roll Call Vote 327, Consideration of H.R. 5293, June 16, 2016.
142.	John Hudson, "White House Blocks Transfer of Cluster Bombs to Saudi Arabia," Foreign Policy (online), May 27, 2016. U.S. officials had previously said that they "have discussed reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions" in Yemen with Saudi officials and consider their use "permissible" if "used appropriately" and according to "end-use rules." State Department Daily Press Briefing, August 20, 2015.
143.	See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016.
144.	A series of contracts have been signed to implement the sale proposed in Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 06-31, July 28, 2006.
145.	Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.
146.	Helene Cooper, "U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia Amid Concerns Over Yemen War," New York Times, December 13, 2016.
147.	In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State Department's nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the coalition's blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, "GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen," Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, "Trump Nominee Concedes Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law," Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that the coalition's blockade triggers, per the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378–1(a)), a prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See, Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia's Actions in Yemen, December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4333104-20171114-Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html.
148.	DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043 (Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017.
149.	Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez Demands more Answers from Trump Admin before letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia move forward," June 28, 2018.
150.