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Passed by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been described as a provision "unlike any other in American law"" and "unknown to any other legal system in the world." In its current form, thethe complete text of the statute provides: statute provides the following: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." While just one sentence, the ATS has been has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades,, as it has evolvedevolved from a little-known jurisdictional provision to a a prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek redress in U.S. courts for injuries caused by human rights offensesoffenses and acts of terrorism.
The ATS has its historical roots in founding-era efforts to give the federal government supremacy over the nation's power of foreign affairs and to avoid international conflict arising from disputes about the treatment of aliens in the United States. Although it has been part of U.S. law since 1789, the ATS was rarely used for nearly two centuries. In 1980, that long dormancy came to an end when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a landmark decision, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, which held that the ATS permits claims for violations of modern international human rights law.
Filártiga caused an explosion of ATS litigation in the decades that followed, but the Supreme Court has placed outer limits on ATS jurisdiction in two moreits recent decisionsjurisprudence. In a 2004 case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS allows federal courts to hear only a "narrow set" of claims for violations of international law. And in 2013, the Supreme Court held in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that the statute does not provide jurisdiction for claims between foreign plaintiffs and defendants involving matters arising entirely outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Lower courts' interpretations of these decisions are still evolving— and, in some cases, conflicting, but many observers agree that Sosa and Kiobel have significantly narrowed the scope of the ATS.
In April 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in its most recent ATS case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, an ATS case against one the largest financial institutions in the Middle East. The plaintiffs in Jesner allege that Arab Bank maintained accounts for known terrorists; accepted donations that it knew would be used to fund terrorist activity; and distributed millions of dollars to families of suicide bombers in so-called "martyrdom" payments. The Second Circuit dismissed the case on the ground that the "law of nations" that is actionable under the ATS does not impose liability on corporate entities. But every other U.S. court of appeals to consider the issue has reached the opposite conclusion, holding that corporate liability is available under the ATS. The Supreme Court ostensibly granted certiorari in Jesner to resolve this circuit split over the question of corporate liability.
Jesner has generated significant attention among observers, including some Members of Congress. Senators Whitehouse and Graham filed an amici brief advocating for reversal of the Second Circuit's decision. The Senators' brief argues that the ATS serves as part of a larger legislative scheme to address terrorism, and that a limitation on corporate liability would create gaps in the United States' legal framework for combating terrorism. The Solicitor General also filed an amicus brief on behalf of the United States arguing that Jesner was wrongly decided. However, the Solicitor General's brief suggests that the case may be dismissed on other grounds by recommending that it be remanded to the Second Circuit for consideration of whether the claims are sufficiently connected to the United States to satisfy Kiobel's presumption against extraterritoriality.
A divided Supreme Court held in Jesner that the claims must be dismissed because ATS jurisdiction does not extend to claims against foreign corporations, including Arab Bank. Separation-of-powers and foreign policy concerns led the Court to conclude that it would be "inappropriate" to permit ATS liability against foreign corporations. The High Court's narrowing of the available avenues to raise an ATS claim in Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner has led commentators to debate whether the statute remains a viable mechanism to provide redress for human rights abuses in U.S. courts.
Originally enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)2 has been described as a provision that is "unlike any other in American law" and "unknown to any other legal system in the world."3 In its current form, thethe complete text of the ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."4 Although it is only a single sentence long, the ATS has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades,, as it has evolved from a rarely used jurisdictional statute to a prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek redress in U.S. courts for human rights offenses and acts of terrorism. This report examines the development of the ATS, beginning with its origins in the First Congress and continuing through to the Supreme Court's recent grant of certioraridecision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, where the Court will consider the question of whether corporations may be held liable under the ATSheld that foreign corporations are not subject to ATS liability.5
Deconstructed, the ATS statute provides federal district courts with jurisdiction to hear cases with four elements: (1) a civil action (2) by an alien (3) for a tort (4) committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. The significance of these requirements is as follows:
Under Article III of the Constitution, Congress is empowered (but not obligated) to create a system of federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.1817 As one of its first official duties, the First Congress passed legislation, now known as the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Judiciary Act), creating a system of federal district and circuit courts.1918 The original iteration of the ATS was included in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act—a provision which broadly addressed the jurisdiction of the federal district courts.2019 Congress made minor modifications to the ATS in 18732120 and 1911.2221 The current version, quoted above, was enacted in 1948.23
The original purposes of the ATS are uncertain, and there is virtually no legislative history for this portion of the Judiciary Act.24 Still, most courts and commentators regard the law as a product of the First Congress's desire to give the federal government supremacy over the foreign affairs of the United States and to avoid international conflict arising from disputes about the treatment of aliens in the United States.25
During the early years of the Republic, During the early years of the Republic, between the end of the RevolutionaryRevolutionary War and the adoption of the Constitution, the United States faced a number of difficulties meeting its obligations regarding foreign affairs.26 24 Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had little ability to provide redress to foreign citizens for violations of international law.2725 Instead, the Confederation Congress2826 passed a resolution a resolution recommending that each state create judicial tribunals toto hear civil and criminal claims arising out of violations of the law of nations, and that, and that state legislatures criminalizecriminalize treaty infractions and other breaches of international law.29 .27 But only one state, Connecticut, passed legislation creating penalties for violations of the law of nations.30
At the same time, internationalinternational law during the founding era was understood to place an affirmative obligation on the United States to redress certain violations of the law of nations, even when those violations were perpetrated by private individuals.31 The Founders expressed concern29 The Framers expressed concern that the state governments did not fullyfully understand or appreciate the duties that arose under international law by virtue of the United States' new position as a sovereign nation.32 nation.30 These concerns led the Founders the Framers and the First Congress to provide jurisdiction to federal courts in a a number of circumstancescircumstances that may implicate foreign relationsrelations concerns—such as suitssuits involving foreign diplomats,33,31 admiralty and maritime cases,34cases,32 and disputes between U.S. citizens and citizens of foreign nations.35 There is no definitive consensus on the congressional purpose for the ATS, but many courts and commentators have reasoned that it was designed to reduce potential conflicts with foreign nations by allowing sensitive tort cases to be heard in federal courts, particularly when the United States may have had an obligation under international law to provide redress to a foreign nation.36
In the 1780s, two incidents involving foreign diplomats highlighted thethe potential for conflict in international relations underunder the Articles of Confederation. InIn 1784, , a French "adventurer," ," Julien de Longchamps,, assaulted a French diplomat, François Barbé-Marbois (Marbois), on a public street in Philadelphia.37 35 Because no national judiciary existed atat the time, any case against Longchamps could occur occur only in a Pennsylvania state court. Concerned that Pennsylvania officials may not adequately address the incident—especially after Longchamps briefly escaped following his arrest3836—the chief French diplomat in the United States lodged a protest with the Confederation Congress and threatened to leave the country unless an adequate remedy were provided.3937 Longchamps was eventually recaptured, convicted, and sentenced to two years in jail by a Pennsylvania court.4038 But Pennsylvania officials declined French requests to deliver Longchamps to French authorities,4139 and the Confederation Congress passed a resolution directing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to apologize to Marbois for its limited ability to provide redress at the federal level.42
Three years later, similar tensions arose when a New York constable entered the home of the Dutch Ambassador and arrested one of his domestic servants.4341 When the Ambassador, PeiterPieter J. Van Berckel, protested that his servant should have been afforded diplomatic immunity, U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay reported to Congress that the federal government was not "vested with any Judicial Powers competent" to adjudicate the propriety of the constable's actions.44
The United States waswas "embarrassed" by these incidents and by "its inability to provide judicial relief to the foreign officials injured in the United States[.]"4543 Moreover, such incidents were not seen as low-level diplomatic quarrels. Duringlow-level diplomatic quarrels. During the founding era, assaults on ambassadors ambassadors (among other violations of international law) were considered "were considered "just causes of war" if not adequately redressed.46 Some scholars 44 Some dispute whether the Marbois and Van Berckel incidents were an impetus for the ATS.4745 But the Supreme Court has interpreted the ATSATS as part of a class of provisions in the Judiciary Act that werewas designed, at least in part, to respond to concernsto concerns that the federal government under the Articles of Confederation was unable to provideprovide a judicial forum to protect the rights of foreign diplomats.48
Regardless of its original purpose, the ATSATS was rarely used as a source of federal jurisdiction for the first 190 years of its existence. Between 1789 Between 1789 and 1980, litigants successfully invoked the ATS as the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction in only two reported decisions.49 .47 The first case, Bolchos v. Darrel,50 48 involved a French captain attempting to recover a cargo of slaves he had captured along with a Spanish prize vessel. The second, Adra v. Clift,5149 was brought over 150 years later,, and involved the use of forged passports in an international child custody dispute.52dispute.50 The dearth of judicial opinions led one federal judge and prominent commentatorcommentator on federal jurisdiction to describe the statute as "an old but little used section [that] is a kind of a legal Lohengrin . . . . no one seems to know from whence it came"53"51—a reference to a a Germanic taletale involving a a knight who appears in a boat drawn by swans toto help a noblewoman in distress, but refuses to disclose his origins.54
After nearly two centuries of dormancy, the ATS sprang into judicial and academic prominence in 1980 after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit55))53 issued a landmark decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.5654 In that case, two Paraguayan citizens (the Filártigas) brought suit against the former Inspector General of Asuncion, Paraguay, alleging that he had kidnapped, tortured, and killed the plaintiffs' relative in retaliation for their family's support of a political opposition party.5755 The defendant, Americo Norberto Peña-Irala, was also a Paraguayan citizen who was discovered to be living in New York on an expired visa.5856 Relying on the ATS for jurisdiction, the Filártigas contended that Peña-Irala's actions constituted a tort in violation of the law of nations, but the district court initially dismissed the case on the ground that the law of nations actionable under the ATS did not include modern provisions in international law that govern how a nation (in this case, Paraguay) treats its own citizens.59
In a first-of-its-kind decision, the Second Circuit reversed and concluded that torture by a state official against its own citizen violates "established norms of the international law of human rights" and therefore provides an actionable claim under the ATS.6058 The Filártiga court reasoned that courts applying the ATS "must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."6159 Although Filártiga never reached the Supreme Court, it was a highly influential decision that caused the ATS to "skyrocket" into prominence as a vehicle for asserting civil claims in U.S. federal courts6260 for human rights violations even when the events underlying the claims occurred outside the United States.63
While Filártiga was a watershed moment in the history of the ATS, courts soon began to identify certain limits on ATS jurisdiction that were not addressed in the Second Circuit's decision. In one prominent 1984 decision, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,6462 the D.C. Circuit framed one of the chief, conceptual questions related to the ATS: Is the statute solely jurisdictional in nature, or does it also create a cause of action for plaintiffs? As a general matter, plaintiffs pursuing a civil claim in federal court must both (1) identify a court that possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and (2) have a cause of action that allows them to seek the relief requested, such as compensatory relief for monetary damages.6563 In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit addressed—but did not resolve—whether the ATS satisfies both requirements.
Tel-Oren involved a group of Israeli citizens and survivors of a terrorist attack in Israel who brought an ATS claim against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and others who allegedly orchestrated the attack.6664 In a per curiam opinion, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit unanimously agreed to dismiss the case, but each judge issued a separate opinion relying on a different rationale for dismissal.
In a widely discussed concurring opinion,6765 Judge Bork concluded that the ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute that does not create a cause of action for damages.6866 To hold otherwise, Judge Bork reasoned, would violate separation-of-powers principles by allowing judges, rather than Congress, to create causes of action that could affect U.S. foreign relations.6967 Judge Edwards disagreed, and argued that the ATS itself creates a statutory cause of action.7068 However, Judge Edwards still concurred in the dismissal under the rationale that the case lacked official state action, 7169 and that the claim for terrorism was not sufficiently recognized as a violation of international law.7270 In addition, Judge Robb found the case to raise nonjusticiable political questions—meaning it raised disputes more appropriately addressed by the legislative and executive branches.7371 But it was the broader, doctrinal disagreement between Judge Bork and Judge Edwards over the cause-of-action question that would eventually become the subject of a landmark Supreme Court decision, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,7472 discussed below.7573 However, Sosa was not decided until 20 years later. In the interim, Congress created a new statutory basis for civil claims for torture and extrajudicial killing—the same claims asserted in Filártiga—through the Torture Victim Protection Act.
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which creates a civil cause of action for damages against any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation," subjects another to torture or extrajudicial killing.7674 Legislative history of the TVPA suggests the act was designed to establish an "unambiguous basis" for the causes of action recognized in Filártiga and to respond to Judge Bork's argument in Tel-Oren that there must be a separate and explicit "grant by Congress of a private right of action" in order to assert a tort claim for a violation of international law.7775 However, there are important distinctions between the TVPA and ATS.
Whereas the TVPA expressly creates a civil cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing, the ATS refers only to the jurisdiction of federal courts.7876 Moreover, while the ATS applies only to civil actions brought by aliens, the TVPA allows a cause of action to be brought by and against "individuals."7977 Courts have interpreted this term as extending a cause of action to both U.S. and foreign nationals,8078 but excluding liability against corporations.8179 At the same time, the TVPA places limitations on civil actions that are not present in the ATS. Most notably, the TVPA requires that plaintiffs exhaust all "adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred."82
The relationship between the TVPA and the ATS is not clearly defined. Some courts concluded that the TVPA supplements (but does not displace) the ATS, and therefore plaintiffs can choose whether to bring claims for torture or extrajudicial killing under either statute.8381 Others courts reasoned that the TVPA was intended to "occupy the field," and that plaintiffs cannot avoid its exhaustion-of-remedies requirement merely by pleading their claims under the ATS.8482 Regardless of how the two statutes interact, the TVPA serves as an example of Congress providing an express cause of action for certain claims that litigants had argued were actionable under the ATS as torts in violation of the law of nations.
Twenty years after Judge Bork and Judge Edwards framed the debate over whether the ATS creates a cause of action, the Supreme Court addressed the cause-of–action question in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.85 83
Background and History of Sosa
Sosa concerned a Mexican doctor, Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), who allegedly participated in the torture and murder of a Drug Enforcement AgencyAdministration (DEA) agent in Mexico by prolonging the agent's life so he could be further interrogated and tortured.8684 When the Mexican government declined the DEA's requests for assistance in apprehending Alvarez, DEA officials approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to apprehend Alvarez and bring him to the United States for trial.87
The Supreme Court twice reviewed cases arising from Alvarez's seizure. After being brought into U.S. custody, Alvarez moved to dismiss the criminal indictment against him on the ground that his apprehension was "outrageous governmental conduct" and that it violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico.8886 In its first decision arising out of his case, United States v. Alvarez-Machain,8987 the Supreme Court rejected Alvarez's arguments, finding no grounds to justify dismissal of the criminal case against him.90
The case was remanded to district court, but the district court dismissed the charges for lack of evidence at close of the government's case during trial.9189 No longer subject to criminal charges, Alvarez filed suit in 1993 asserting ATS claims against the Mexican nationals responsible for his abduction.9290 This civil case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,9391 also reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to clarify whether the ATS "not only provides federal courts with [jurisdiction], but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations."94 92
The Sosa Holding
Adopting reasoning that largely appeared to comport with Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, the Sosa Court agreed that the "ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action . . . ."9593 Among other things, the Court noted that the ATS is written in jurisdictional language and was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act—a statute that concerned the jurisdiction of all federal courts more broadly.96
While the Sosa Court agreed that the ATS was not intended to create statutory causes of action, a majority nevertheless concluded that the statute was not meant to be "stillborn"—meaning it was not intended to be a "jurisdictional convenience to be placed on a shelf" until a future Congress authorized specific causes of action.9795 Instead, the Court held that, under the "ambient law" of the era, the First Congress would have understood a "modest number of international law violations" to have been actionable under the ATS without the need for a separate statute creating a cause of action.9896 In other words, Sosa held that, while the ATS is jurisdictional in nature, it was enacted with the expectation that federal courts could recognize a "narrow set" of causes of action as a form of judicially developed common law,9997 as opposed to a congressionally created, statutory cause of action.10098
Sosa cited three particular offenses against the law of nations in 18th18th-century English criminal law that the Court believed the Founders would have considered to have been tort claims actionable under the ATS at the time of its enactment: violations of safe conducts,10199 infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.102100 But the Court also held that ATS jurisdiction is not limited to those claims.103101 Rather, under Sosa, federal courts can recognize common law claims for violations of the "present-day law of nations," provided the claims satisfy an important and overarching limitation: only those claims that "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th18th-century paradigms" of international law are actionable under the ATS.104102 Thus, while Sosa allows federal courts to recognize some tort claims for violations of modern customary international law, the Court emphasized the need for "judicial caution" and "restraint" in identifying new causes of action.105 Under this restrained approach103 Applying these principles, the Court held that Alvarez's claim for arbitrary arrest and detention was not sufficiently defined or supported in modern-day international law to meet the newly described requirements for an ATS claim, and was thus dismissed.106
Since Sosa was decided, a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court have interpreted the case to establish a two-step framework for addressing questions related to the breadth of ATS liability.105 First, courts must determine whether the claim is based on violation of an international law norm that is "specific, universal, and obligatory."106 Second, if step one is satisfied, courts should determine whether allowing the case to proceed is an "appropriate" exercise of judicial discretion.107
Although Sosa warned that lower courts should exercise "vigilant doorkeeping" and "great caution" before recognizing causes of action under the ATS,107108 the post-Filártiga movement of using the ATS to seek redress for human rights abuses continued "largely unabated" after Sosa.108109 Beginning in 2013, that trend slowed after the Supreme Court recognized restrictions on the territorial reach of the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.109
In Kiobel, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the United States filed an ATS suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil companies for allegedly aiding and abetting human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian police and military in Nigeria.110111 The Second Circuit dismissed the case on the ground that corporations cannot be liable for violations of the law of nations under the ATS, and the Supreme Court originally granted certiorari on the question of corporate liability.111112 After hearing oral argument, the Court requested additional briefing and ordered reargument on a new issue that would become dispositive for the case: Does the ATS confer jurisdiction to hear claims for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States?112
In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Kiobel Court relied on a canon of statutory interpretation known as the "presumption against extraterritorial application" to conclude that the ATS does not reach conduct that occurred entirely in the territory of a foreign nation.113114 Also known as the "presumption against extraterritoriality," the canon of construction is intended to avoid unintended clashes between U.S. and foreign law that could result in international discord.114115 Reliance on the presumption also reflects the "more prosaic commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind."115116 Unless a statute gives "clear indication of an extraterritorial application," federal courts generally will presume that it is not intended to apply to claims that arise in foreign territory.116
According to the Kiobel Court, nothing in the text or history of the ATS suggests the First Congress intended the statute to have extraterritorial reach.117118 To the contrary, the events giving rise to the ATS—including the Marbois and Van Berckel incidentsincidents—demonstrate that the statutestatute was designed to avoid the same types of "diplomatic strife" and foreign relations frictionfriction that the presumption of extraterritoriality is intended to guard against.118 119 Accordingly, the Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, and the Nigerian plaintiffs' claims for violations of the law of nationsnations in Nigerian territory were barred.119
In a brief concluding paragraph, the Kiobel Court suggested that the presumption against extraterritoriality might be displaced in future ATS cases if the claims "touch[ed] and concern[ed]" the United States:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.120
The Court, however, did not provide any further explanation as to how an ATS claim could satisfy the "touch and concernconcern" test—leading to divergentdivergent interpretations in the lower courts, as discussed below.121
Kiobel produced two concurring opinions and one opinion concurring in the judgment only. Justice Kennedy wrote a one-paragraph concurrence, emphasizing his belief that it was the "proper disposition" for the majority to "leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation" of the ATS that will require elaboration in the future.122
Justice Alito, in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the majority's opinion "le[ft] much unanswered."123124 But Justice Alito would have further explained how litigants can satisfy the "touch and concern" requirement. Under Justice Alito's self-described "broader standard," only when the conduct that constitutes a violation of the law of nations occurred domestically will the claim "touch and concern" the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.124
In a third separate opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred in the majority's decision to dismiss the case, but disagreed with its reasoning.125126 Justice Breyer argued the presumption of extraterritoriality should not apply because the ATS was always intended to create a cause of action for at least one act, piracy, which occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.126127 Instead, Justice Breyer argued that the Court should have limited ATS jurisdiction to cases involving one of the following factors:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.127
Justice Breyer reasoned that his test was consistent with the United States' long-standing obligation under international law not to become a safe harbor for violators of fundamental international norms.128129 Applying this test to the facts of the Kiobel, Justice Breyer agreed that the matter should be dismissed because "the parties and relevant conduct lack sufficient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide jurisdiction."129
Although lower courts' interpretations of Kiobel are still evolving, many commentators see the Supreme Court's decision as having significantly limited the ATS as a vehicle to redress human rights abuses in U.S. courts.130131 In particular, Kiobel appears to preclude so-called "foreign cubed" cases in which a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign defendant for conduct and injuries that occurred in a foreign nation.131132 On the other hand, cases in which there is some connection to the United States—such as a defendant who is a U.S. citizen or corporation—are less easily resolved under Kiobel. In particular, courts have adopted differing interpretative frameworks for deciding what level of domestic conduct or contact is necessary to satisfy Kiobel's "touch and concern" test, creating a split among the circuits.132
As of the date of this report, five circuits have considered the "touch and concern" test in the context of the ATS. The Fifth and Second Circuits adopted a bright-line approach similar to Justice Alito's concurrence in Kiobel. In order to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality under this approach, the conduct that constitutes a violation of the law of nations must have occurred in the United States, regardless of whether the case has other domestic connections, such as a U.S. citizen defendant.133
The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, have developed flexible methods of interpretation. According to the Fourth Circuit, an ATS claim "touches and concerns" the United States "when extensive United States contacts are present and the alleged conduct bears . . . a strong and direct connection to the United States."134135 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that this is a fact-based analysis that most cases will not satisfy.135136 But it allowed one case to go forward that involved American employees of a U.S. corporation, even though the primary conduct giving rise to a violation of the law of nations—alleged torture at the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq—occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.136
In theThe Eleventh Circuit, has held that an ATS claim satisfies the "touch and concern test" if it "has a U.S. focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs in the United States."137138 Under this "fact-intensive" approach, the Eleventh Circuit has considered factors such as the citizenship of the defendants and potential U.S. national interests triggered by the nature of the defendants' conduct. 138139 But it deemed these factors insufficient on their own to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.139140 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned "that a defendant's U.S. citizenship or corporate status is one factor that, in conjunction with other factors, can establish sufficient connection between an ATS claim and the territory of the United States."140
Some of the disparity among the circuits arises from their interpretation of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.141.142—a pre-Kiobel Supreme Court decision analyzing how the presumption of extraterritoriality applies to Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.142143 Section 10(b) prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of a "security registered on a national securities exchange[.]"143144 The plaintiffs in Morrison argued that, although they purchased their securities on a foreign stock exchange outside the United States, their claim was domestic in nature because the deceptive conduct took place in the United States.144145 The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the presumption against extraterritoriality still defeated their case because the "focus" of Section 10(b) is on the "purchase and sale of securities"—which occurred in Australia—not the deceptive conduct.145
Application of Morrison's "focus" analysis in ATS cases may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality,146147 but courts have reached differing conclusions about whether Morrison applies to the ATS.147148 The Ninth and Fourth Circuits concluded that the Morrison "focus" analysis should not control in ATS cases because the Supreme Court deliberately announced a different standard—the "touch and concern" test—in Kiobel.148149 By contrast, the Fifth and Second Circuits were guided by Morrison's "focus" analysis in their interpretations of Kiobel.149150 And the Fifth and Second Circuits also adopted a bright line rule that plaintiffs can displace the presumption against extraterritoriality in ATS cases only when the conduct that constitutes a violation of the law of nations occurred domestically.150151 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a hybrid approach "amalgamat[ing] Kiobel's standards with Morrison's focus test[.]"151
The Supreme Court's 2016 decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community152153 may help to resolve this conflict. There, the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).153154 In the course of discussing its prior jurisprudence on extraterritoriality, including Kiobel, the Supreme Court explained:
Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues. At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. . . . If the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute's "focus."154
Some commentators interpreted this reference to Kiobel as a clarification that Morrison's "focus" analysis applies in ATS cases.155156 The Fifth Circuit also adopted this interpretation in the only court of appeals decision analyzing extraterritoriality and the ATS since the Supreme Court's ruling RJR Nabisco.156157 However, at least one district court held that RJR Nabisco did not overturn prior Ninth Circuit precedent that Morrison's "focus" test does not apply to the ATS.157158 Thus, it remains to be seen whether RJR Nabisco will streamline lower courts' interpretive frameworks for analyzing extraterritoriality under the ATS.158 159
Moreover, even if the "focus" test becomes part of all the circuits' analyses, RJR Nabisco may still leave room for courts to disagree on precisely what the "focus" of the ATS is. But if courts follow the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of RJR Nabisco in ATS cases,159160 they appear more likely to create a bright-line rule that ATS plaintiffs can overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality only if the specific conduct constituting a violation of the law of nations occurred within the United States.
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Regardless of which interpretation courts adopt, the Supreme Court's decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, discussed below, is likely to further restrict the use of the statute in pursuing extraterritorial ATS claims.161
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC: Barring Foreign Corporate Liability
In the Supreme Court's most recent ATS case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Court granted certiorari to resolve another lingering circuit split in ATS litigation: May corporations be deemed liable under the ATS?160162 Jesner iswas the second time the Supreme Court has takentook up the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. Although it ultimately decided Kiobel on extraterritoriality grounds, the Court originally granted certiorari in that case to review a holding in the Second Circuit that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability.161 The Second Circuit, however, is163 At the time certiorari was granted in Jesner, however, the Second Circuit was the only circuit to reach this conclusion. All other circuits that considered the issue havehad determined that corporate liability is available under the ATS.162 Thus, in 2015, when the Second Circuit relied on its prior circuit precedent to again hold that corporations may not be liable in ATS cases, it reinforced an existing split among the circuits. In Jesner, the Supreme Court appears poised to revisit this circuit split that it elected not to resolve in Kiobel.
Jesner involvesinvolved claims by approximately 6,000 foreign nationals (or their families or estate representatives)163 who were injured, killed, or captured by terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1995 and 2005.164165 The plaintiffs allegealleged that Arab Bank—one of the largest financial institutions in the Middle East165166—aided and abetted four terrorist organizations allegedly responsible for the attacks.166167 Among other things, the plaintiffs allegealleged that Arab Bank maintained accounts for the organizations knowing that they would be used for terrorist actions, and played an active role in identifying the families of victims of suicide bombing so that they could be compensated in so-called "martyrdom payments."167168 As one court described the allegations, Arab Bank allegedly served as a "paymaster" for terrorist groups through its branch offices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.168
Jesner iswas a consolidation of five cases filed in the Eastern District of New York, all of which assert similar allegations of facilitating and financing terrorism against Arab Bank.169170 Relying on its prior circuit precedent, both the district court and Second Circuit dismissed the ATS claims on the ground that the ATS does not permit any form of corporate liability.170171 Although the Second Circuit acknowledged there is a "growing consensus among [its] sister circuits" that the ATS allows for corporate liability, it nevertheless declined to overturn its prior circuit precedent.171
Underlying the issue of corporate liability in Jesner is a critical choice-of-law question: Should courts look to domestic law or international law in determining whether corporations are subject to ATS liability?172 Under long-standing American domestic law, corporations are "deemed persons" for "civil purposes"173 that may "sue and be sued" for torts.174 But the ATS creates jurisdiction only for torts that violate treaties or the law of nations, and the issue of corporate liability in international law is far less clearly defined. From the post-World War II Nuremberg Tribunals175 to the recently established International Criminal Court (ICC),176 international criminal tribunals have consistently recognized jurisdiction over natural persons, not corporations.177 Moreover, while some modern treaties require nations to impose liability on corporations,178 most treaties do not.179 Accordingly, when the Second Circuit first held that the ATS does not recognize corporate liability, it did so based on the conclusion that "corporate liability has not attained a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world[.]"180
Those favoring corporate liability respond that the jurisdictions of international criminal tribunals are irrelevant because their jurisdictions were crafted based on practical and political considerations rather than on any substantive limits of international law.181 More fundamentally, they argue that, although international law defines substantive standards of conduct that cannot be violated, international law delegates to each individual nation the responsibility of selecting the means of enforcing or remedying such violations.182 Under this argument, the ATS requires a cause of action to be based on a discernible and widely accepted international law standard of conduct, not a well-established international law standard of liability.183 In other words, proponents of corporate liability argue that international law simply returns the question of how to remedy a violation of an international norm to the domestic law of the United States, which has a long-standing history of recognizing corporate liability.184
As a rebuttal, opponents of corporate liability argue that, even if domestic law controls, U.S. law does not permit corporate liability in several analogous circumstances.185 For example, corporations cannot be held liable for so-called Bivens claims—implied causes of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics186 for violations of certain constitutional rights by federal employees.187 And congressionally created causes of action for torture and extrajudicial killing in the TVPA188 have been deemed by reviewing courts not to permit liability against corporations.189 Opponents of corporate liability argue that, in light of Sosa's warning that courts should exercise "great caution" when approaching ATS cases,190 it would be inappropriate to allow ATS claims against corporations when the Supreme Court has not allowed for such liability in the constitutional context and Congress precluded it in an ATS-related domestic statute.191
Ultimately, the choice-of-law question is not easily resolved, but it may be decisive in the Court's ruling in Jesner.
In addition to the ATS claims brought by foreign nationals, two of the five consolidated cases in Jesner included U.S. national plaintiffs asserting claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act.192 Those claims were not available to the foreign nationals who filed suit under the ATS because the Anti-Terrorism Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny national of the United States" injured by an act of international terrorism may sue in federal district court.193
The district court would eventually bifurcate the Anti-Terrorism Act claims from the ATS claims, and form a separate proceeding for the U.S. nationals only, Linde v. Arab Bank PLC.194 But early in the consolidated litigation, the full group of U.S. and foreign national plaintiffs obtained significant discovery sanctions against Arab Bank for its failure to produce certain financial records.195 Arab Bank asserted that foreign bank secrecy laws prohibited it from disclosing certain accounts and transaction records held abroad.196 But the district court found that the bank did not exercise the "utmost good faith" in seeking foreign governments' permission for production,197 and it sanctioned the bank with a host of adverse jury instructions.198 One instruction allows the jury to infer that the failure to produce documents shows Arab Bank knowingly and purposefully processed and distributed payments to terrorists.199
In an amicus brief filed in support of Arab Bank's attempt to appeal the sanctions ruling, the Kingdom of Jordan (where Arab Bank is headquartered) called the sanctions a "serious affront to its sovereignty."200 The appeal was unsuccessful.201 In the meantime, the foreign national plaintiffs' ATS claims in Jesner were dismissed on corporate liability grounds, while the U.S. national plaintiffs proceeded to trial on their Anti-Terrorism Act claims in Linde. Following a six-week trial during which the jury was instructed on the adverse inferences to be drawn from Arab Bank's lack of document production, the Linde plaintiffs successfully obtained a judgment against Arab Bank for violating the Anti-Terrorism Act.202 That judgment is currently on appeal in the Second Circuit, and Linde is not currently before the Supreme Court.203
Unlike in Linde, the Jesner plaintiffs face numerous potentially insurmountable legal arguments under which the federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to even hold a trial over their claims.204 However, if the Supreme Court were to reinstate the Jesner plaintiffs' ATS claims, and those claims survived subsequent pretrial motions to dismiss, the Jesner plaintiffs would receive the benefit of the same adverse jury instructions at trial that the Linde plaintiffs utilized in obtaining their 2015 judgment.205
Jesner has generated attention in a number of interested communities, including legal scholars and historians,206 human rights groups,207 national security specialists,208 and business interest groups.209 As of the date of this report, various individuals and organizations have filed 28 "friend of the court" briefs.210
Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey Graham filed amici briefs in support of the Jesner plaintiffs.211 They argue that the ATS serves as part of a larger legislative scheme to address terrorism, and that a limitation on corporate liability in the ATS would "transform Congress's solid anti-terrorism architecture into a patchwork of ill-fitting parts" that leaves dangerous "gaps in the United States' counterterrorism framework."212 Citing existing criminal law prohibitions on material support to terrorism213 and financial regulations administered by the Office of Foreign Asset Control,214 Arab Bank counters that the ATS is a not an essential element of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, and it described the Senators' concerns as "hyperbole."215
In its brief for the United States, the Solicitor General asserts there is no categorical prohibition on corporate liability in the ATS, and that the Second Circuit's decision should be vacated.216 However, the Solicitor General also argues that Jesner should be remanded to consider whether the case should be dismissed on the alternative ground that the claims are not sufficiently connected to the United States.217
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy (joined, in relevant part, by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch) placed the decision in the context of the second step of the two-part inquiry described in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for evaluating whether violations of international norms are actionable under the ATS.175 In Sosa step two, courts consider whether circumstances make it "appropriate" to deem a violation of an international norm cognizable under the ATS.176 Although Sosa described federal courts' ability to recognize claims under the ATS as within judicial discretion, the Sosa Court instructed federal courts to exercise "great caution"177 and to act with "restraint in judicially applying internationally generated norms."178 In Jesner, the Court reasoned that the same restrained approach applies when evaluating the question of whether artificial entities like corporations can be defendants in ATS suits.179 Against this backdrop of judicial caution, the Jesner Court concluded that it would be "inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations."180 Although a majority of the Jesner Court agreed to a categorical rule foreclosing ATS claims against foreign corporate entities, several Justices diverged in their rationale for the holding. A five-Justice majority joined portions of an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, described above.186 But only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined the remainder of Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion.187 In a separate opinion concurring in part with Justice Kennedy and concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito expressed the view that courts should decline to recognize ATS claims "whenever doing so would not materially advance the ATS's objective of avoiding diplomatic strife."188 Justice Gorsuch also wrote separately to describe "two more fundamental reasons" why he believed Jesner should be dismissed.189 According to Justice Gorsuch, (1) separation-of-powers principles dictate that courts should never recognize new causes of action under the ATS; (2) and a reexamination of the history of the ATS shows that the statute was intended to apply only to claims against U.S. defendants—regardless of whether they are corporations or natural persons.190 Justice Thomas also wrote a one-paragraph concurring opinion in which he stated that, although he joined Justice Kennedy's opinion because he believed it "correctly applies" the Court's precedents, he also agreed with the concurrences of Justices Alito and Gorsuch.191 Justice Sotomayor, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, argued that nothing in the "corporate form in itself raises" foreign policy concerns that require the Court to "immunize all foreign corporations from liability under ATS," regardless of the specific claim alleged.192 To the extent that ATS suits against foreign corporate entities lead to friction in foreign affairs, the dissent contended, such tension is better resolved through other limitations on ATS jurisdiction, such as Kiobel's presumption against extraterritoriality.193 Further, while the majority emphasized that the political branches are better suited to consider the foreign policy implications of ATS suits, the dissenters observed that both the U.S. Solicitor General and certain Members of Congress urged the Supreme Court to permit foreign corporate liability.194 Although not resolved in the Jesner Court's opinion,198 several Justices expressed a desire to revisit Sosa's conclusion that federal courts have discretion under the ATS to recognize new causes of action for violations of modern international norms.199 If the Supreme Court were, in a future case, to hold that federal courts do not possess such discretion, ATS jurisdiction potentially could be limited to three types of claims that were generally recognized as actionable violations of international law at the time of the ATS's enactment: (1) piracy; (2) interference with the rights of ambassadors; and (3) violations of safe conducts.200 Such a holding could cabin the scope of ATS jurisdiction so significantly that it potentially could relegate the statute to its status during the long dormancy in which it was a rarely invoked jurisdictional provision.201After nearly two centuries of relative obscurity, the ATS emerged as a prominent legal tool in human rights and terrorism-related litigation after the Second Circuit's decision in Filártiga.218 But just over three decades later, the Supreme Court's rulings in Sosa and Kiobel placed significant limitations on the scope of the statute.219 Some see Kiobel's presumption against extraterritoriality as having so significantly limited the jurisdictional reach of the ATS that it resulted in the "near-demise" of the statute, although others interpret the ruling as having left the door open for certain major categories of cases.220 Ultimately, Kiobel's true impact is uncertain as lower courts have not settled on a uniform method for deciding when a case sufficiently "touch[es] and concern[s]" the United States to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.221 Jesner presents the Supreme Court with another occasion to modify the scope of the ATS.222 A ruling that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability in that case could further reduce the scope of actionable claims under the ATS, leading litigants to seek a remedy under other sources of U.S. state or foreign law, to the extent such law provides a cause of action. But resolution of the intricate choice-of-law question underlying Jesner is not easily resolved, and the ultimate outcome of the case is difficult to predict172
The Jesner Decision
After granting certiorari in Jesner, the Supreme Court sided with the Second Circuit's minority approach regarding corporate liability under the ATS, with one modification: the Court held that foreign corporations are not subject to liability under the ATS.173 The Court left open the possibility that U.S. corporations could face claims under the ATS.174
Author Contact Information
| 1. |
An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts United States, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) [hereinafter "Judiciary Act"] ("And [district courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). |
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| 2. |
While the ATS is sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act, this terminology may be misleading because the law was not passed as a stand-alone act. See 15 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 104.21 n.1 (2015 ed.). |
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| 3. |
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). |
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| 4. |
28 U.S.C. § 1350. |
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| 5. |
Order Granting Petition for Certiorari, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (Apr. 3, 2017) (No. 16-499). |
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| 6. |
An "alien" is defined elsewhere in federal law to be "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). |
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| 7. |
See e.g., See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 375 n. 1 ( |
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| 8. |
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2333 ("Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism . . . may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States"); infra § "The Torture Victim Protection Act" (discussing the Torture Victim Protection Act, which provides a cause of action to both U.S. nationals and aliens for certain claims arising from torture and extrajudicial killing). |
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| 9. |
Tort, Black's Law Dictionary ( |
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| 10. |
See generally Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter "Agent Orange"] (describing the underlying jurisdictional requirements for an ATS claim); Arthur Miller, |
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| 11. |
See Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 116 ("[T]he law of nations has become synonymous with the term 'customary international law[.]'"). |
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| 12. |
See infra § The Supreme Court Addresses the Cause-of-Action Question: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. |
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| 13. |
The term "States" when capitalized in this context and in this report refers to sovereign nations rather than the individual "states" that form the United States of America (e.g., Rhode Island, Maryland). |
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Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §102(2) (1987) [hereinafter "Restatement"]. Certain rules of customary international law, such as the international prohibition against slavery or genocide, can acquire the status of jus cogens norms—peremptory rules which do not permit derogation. Id. §§ 331 cmt. e, 703 cmt. n. For more on the sources of international law and the development of customary international law and jus cogens norms, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). |
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542 U.S. 692 (2004). |
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See infra § "The Supreme Court Addresses the Cause-of-Action Question: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. " |
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U.S. Const. art. III, §1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). |
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Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) ("And [district courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). |
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The original version of the ATS provided that district courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. at 77. In addition to ATS-based jurisdiction, Section 9 of the Judiciary Act gave federal district courts authority to hear certain criminal cases, admiralty cases, and common law suits brought by the U.S. government and suits against certain diplomats. Id. at 76-77. |
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Revised Statutes tit. 13, ch. 3, § 563, para. 16 (1873) ("The district courts shall have jurisdiction as follows: … Of all suits brought by any alien for a tort 'only' in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States."). The 1873 version of the ATS placed the word "only" in single quotation marks, but the legislative record does not provide an explanation for this change. The 1873 recodification of the ATS placed the provision in the section establishing concurrent jurisdiction with state courts, and thus the express reference to concurrent jurisdiction "with the courts of the several States" from the 1789 version was removed as unnecessary. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, in The Alien Tort Claims Act: An Analytical Anthology 119 & n.4 (1999) [hereinafter "ACTA Anthology"]. |
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Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1093 (1911) (providing district courts with jurisdiction over "all suits brought by any alien for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations or of a treaty of the United States."). The single quotations marks were removed from the word "only" and a comma was inserted following that word, but there is no discussion of the reason for the changes in the legislative history. |
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Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (1948) (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350). In the current version of the ATS, the phrase "civil action" was reported to have been substituted for the term "suits" to comport with the terminology used in modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80-308, at 124 (1947). In addition, the phrase "An alien" was substituted for "any alien[,]" and the word "committed" was inserted prior to "in violation of the law of nations." Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350 with 36 Stat. at 1093. |
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| 26. |
For further discussion of the United States' difficulties in the realm of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715-19 (2004); Bellia & Clark, supra note 25, at 466-507. |
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See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715-16 (discussing the history of the Alien Tort Statute). |
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Although some commentators use the terms interchangeably, the term "Confederation Congress" in this report refers to the congressional body convened under the Articles of Confederation between 1781 and 1789, and the term "Continental Congress" refers to the federal, congressional body that met during the Revolutionary War prior to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 397, 401–03 (2017). |
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See Bellia & Clark, supra note |
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See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716. The text of the Connecticut law is reprinted in Bellia & Clark, supra note |
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See, e.g., Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nations, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns bk. 2, ch. 6, § 77, at 300 (Liberty Fund ed. 2008) (originally published 1758) [hereinafter "Law of Nations"] ("The sovereign who refuses to cause a reparation to be made of the damage caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty, or, in short, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.");1Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law 353 (Bumstead |
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See Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, (Nov. 27, 1784), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0083 ("Nothing seems to be more difficult under our new Governments, than to impress on the attention of our Legislatures a due sense of those duties which spring from our relation to foreign nations."); The Federalist No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it."). |
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U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (vesting the Supreme Court with jurisdiction over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls"); Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, 80 § 13 (1789) (detailing which suits involving diplomats shall be brought in the Supreme Court and which may be brought in lower federal courts). |
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U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (extending federal judicial power to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"); Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. at 76-77 § 9 ("[T]he district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction[.]"). |
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U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (extending federal judicial power to "Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects"); Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. at 78 § 11 (providing for alienage jurisdiction to federal courts under a $500 amount in controversy requirement). |
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See |
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See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-17. See also Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 111 (O. T. Phila. 1784); Alfred Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 Pa. Mag. of His. & Biog. 294 (1939). |
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Longchamps is said to have escaped after persuading Philadelphia police officials to allow him to return home to change his clothes before a preliminary court appearance. Rosenthal, supra note |
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See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., |
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See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 111 (O. T. Phila. 1784). |
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See |
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Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717 n.11 (quoting 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 314 (G. Hunt. ed. 1912)). |
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See Kiobel, |
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Report of Secretary for Foreign Affairs on complaint of Minister of United Netherlands (Mar. 25, 1788), reprinted in 34 J. Cont. Cong. 109, 111 (1788). See also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717 (discussing Jay's communication with the Confederation Congress). |
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See id. at 123-24 (quoting The Federalist No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton)). See also Sosa 542 U.S. at 715 ("An assault against an ambassador, for example, impinged upon the sovereignty of the foreign nation and if not adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war."). |
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See, e.g., |
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See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 717 (2004) (internal citations omitted) ("The Framers responded [to the Marbois and Van Berckel incidents] by vesting the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over 'all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls[,]"and the First Congress followed through. The Judiciary Act reinforced this Court's original jurisdiction over suits brought by diplomats [] created alienage jurisdiction, . . . and, of course, included the ATS[.]"). |
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Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 ( |
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3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795). |
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195. F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). |
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See id. at 859. For additional discussion of cases in which litigants successfully invoked the Alien Tort Statute between 1789 and 1980, see Bradley, supra note |
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IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.). |
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Lohengrin, Encyc. Britannica (last visited July 25, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lohengrin-German-legendary-figure. |
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This report references a large number of decisions by federal appellate courts in their respective regional circuits. For purposes of brevity, references to a particular circuit in the body of this report (e.g., the Ninth Circuit) refer to the U.S. Court of Appeals for that circuit. |
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630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). |
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Id. at 878. |
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See id. at 878-79. |
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See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (district court dismissal on remand from the Second Circuit discussing its prior dismissal). |
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Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). |
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See id. at 881. |
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As a federal statute, the ATS does not affect the availability of claims that litigants may have under U.S. state law or under the laws of foreign nations. |
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See Anthony D'Amato, Preface in ATCA Anthology, supra note |
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726 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). |
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Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (per curiam). |
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See, e.g., |
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See id. at 800-17. |
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Id. at 778. (Edwards, J., concurring). |
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|
Judge Edwards believed that a claim for torture required official state action. See id. at 791-96. And because the Palestinian Liberation Organization was not recognized as a state under international law, in his view, the torture claim failed. See id. |
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|
Id. at 795-96. |
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|
See id. at 823–27. For more background on the political question doctrine, see CRS Report R43834, The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and |
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|
542 U.S. 692 (2004). |
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|
See infra § "The Supreme Court Addresses the Cause-of-Action Question: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. " |
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|
Torture Victim Protection Act, |
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|
H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991). |
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|
Compare |
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|
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (creating liability for "any individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation" subjects another individual to torture or extrajudicial killing). |
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|
See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1346 ( |
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|
See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012) ("The text of the TVPA convinces us that Congress did not extend liability to organizations, sovereign or not."). |
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|
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. |
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|
See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1250-51 ( |
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|
See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 ( |
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|
542 U.S. 692 (2004). |
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|
Id. at 697. |
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|
See id. |
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|
Id. at 698. |
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|
504 U.S. 655 (1992). |
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|
See id. at 670. |
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|
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004). See also Bradley, supra note |
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|
Alvarez also filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, against the United States and the federal officials whom he alleged to have orchestrated his seizure. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698 |
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|
542 U.S. 692. |
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|
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 611 ( |
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|
See id.at 724. |
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|
See id. at 712-14. |
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|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692, 714-19 (2004). |
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|
See id. at 714-25. |
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|
Common law is generally understood as the "body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions[.]" Common Law, Black's Law Dictionary ( |
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|
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721-25. Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion, joined by two other Justices, in which he argued that judges should not be permitted to recognize common law claims of action, and that only causes of action created through congressional action should be permitted under the ATS. See id. at 747. |
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|
A safe conduct is a "privilege granted by a belligerent allowing an enemy, a neutral, or some other person to travel within or through a designated area for a specified purpose." Safe Conduct, Black's Law Dictionary ( |
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|
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. |
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|
See id. at 724 ("[T]hough we have found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to [ |
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|
Id. |
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|
Id. at 725. |
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|
Id. at 732-38. |
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|
|
See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018) (plurality opinion); id. at 1409 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10025, Can Corporations be Held Liable under the Alien Tort Statute?, by [author name scrubbed] (discussing references to Sosa's two-step framework during oral argument in Jesner). 106.
|
|
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). 107.
|
|
See id. at 738. |
Id. at 728-29. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 2 (2009). |
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|
|
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|
Kiobel, |
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|
See |
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|
Kiobel, |
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|
For more background on the presumption against extraterritoriality and other canons of statutory construction, see CRS Report 97-59, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, at 25 (available upon request). |
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|
|
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|
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n. 5 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). |
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|
Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). |
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|
See |
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|
See |
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|
|
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|
Id. at 124-25 (internal citation omitted). |
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|
See infra § "The |
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|
Kiobel |
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|
See id. at 125-26 (Alito, J., concurring). |
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|
See id. at |
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|
See id. at |
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|
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|
See id. at |
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|
Id. at |
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|
See supra note |
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|
See, e.g., Chen Gang v. Zhao Zhizhen, No. 3:04CV1146 RNC, 2013 WL 5313411, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2013) ("Despite plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish their claims from those in Kiobel, this case is also a paradigmatic 'foreign[-]cubed' case."); Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to "Foreign Squared" Cases, SCTOUSblog (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ ("'Foreign cubed' cases—cases in which there is a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant for acts committed on foreign soil—are off the table."). |
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|
For additional discussion of the "touch and concern" circuit split, see Note, Clarifying Kiobel's "Touch and Concern" Test, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1902, 1902-1911 (2017); Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining Balancing Factors from Kiobel's "Touch and Concern" Test, 66 Hastings L.J. 443, 455-63 (2015); John B. Bellinger III, The Alien Tort Statute and the Morrison "Focus" Test: Still Disagreement After RJR Nabisco, Lawfare (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/alien-tort-statute-and-morrison-focus-test-still-disagreement-after-rjr-nabisco. |
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|
See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 194-97 ( |
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|
Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660 ( |
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|
See id. at 659-60. |
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|
See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-29 ( |
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|
Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 ( | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
See |
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|
See id. |
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|
Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 ( |
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|
561 U.S. 247 (2010). |
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|
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). |
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|
Id. |
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|
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. |
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|
See id. at 266-67. |
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|
See infra note |
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|
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 ( |
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|
See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 195 ( |
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|
See supra note |
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|
Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 590 ( |
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|
136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). |
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|
18 U.S.C. § 1964. |
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|
See RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2101. |
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|
See Bellinger III, supra note |
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|
Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 194-97 ( |
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|
See Salim v. Mitchell, |
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|
Accord Bellinger III, supra note |
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|
See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 194-97. |
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|
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., |
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|
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021-22 ( |
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|
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| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 165. |
|
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|
Id. at 147. The organizations alleged to be responsible are the Islamic Resistance Movement (also known as Harakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya, or Hamas), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Id. |
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|
See id. at 149-51. |
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|
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal dismissed, 703 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2869 (2014). |
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|
See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-CV-556 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2004); Afriat-Kurtzer v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 05-CV-0388 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 2005); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06-CV-3869 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 9, 2006); Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08-CV-3251 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 11, 2008); Agurenko v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 10-CV-0626 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 2010). |
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|
See In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 147. |
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|
See id. at 156-58. |
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|
|
174Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) ("[T]he Court holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS."). |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 173. |
See United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 392, 412 (1826). |
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| 174. |
See Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2003). See also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 463 (1765). |
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| 175. |
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Some scholars and legal historians argue that, rather than using criminal trials, the Allies utilized other forms of punishment on corporations for violation of international law, such as military-ordered corporate dissolution. See Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curie, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499), at 18-20 [hereinafter "International Law Scholars' Brief"]; Brief of Amici Curie Nuremberg Scholars, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499), at 6-38 [hereinafter "Nuremberg Scholars' Brief"]. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 176. |
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter "Rome Statute"]. |
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|
|
See id. See also id. at 1410 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Because this case involves a foreign corporation, we have no need to reach the question whether an alien may sue a United States corporation under the ATS."); William S. Dodge, Jesner v. Arab Bank: The Supreme Court Preserves the Possibility of Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations, Just Security (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55404/jesner-v-arab-bank-supreme-court-preserves-possibility-human-rights-suits-u-s-corporations/ ("So while the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against Arab Bank, the question of corporate liability in suits against U.S. corporations remains to be decided."). 175.
|
|
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). 176.
|
|
See supra § "Sosa's Two-Step Framework." 177.
|
|
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 ("Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution."). 178.
|
|
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 179.
|
|
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018). 180.
|
|
Id. at 1403. 181.
|
|
Id. at 1403 ("[T]he separation-of-powers concerns that counsel against courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force in the context of the ATS."). 182.
|
|
Id. at 1402 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)). 183.
|
|
Id. at 1406-07. 184.
|
|
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1411 (2018) (quoting Brief for The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ma Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent at 5, Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (No. 12-1485)). 185.
|
|
Id. at 1407. 186.
|
|
See id. at 1393. 187.
|
|
See id. 188.
|
|
Id. at 1410 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 189.
|
|
Id. at 1412 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 190.
|
|
See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1412-19 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 191.
|
|
See id. at 1408 (Thomas, J., concurring). |
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Bradley, supra note 36, at 218; Linsley, supra note 158. The ad hoc criminal tribunals created by the U.N. Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda likewise had jurisdiction over natural persons only. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 5, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). |
| 178. |
See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 10(1), 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business art. 2, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 179. |
See Bradley, supra note 36, at 218-19. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 180. |
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148-149 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). See also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be quite odd for a U.S. court to allow a customary international law-based ATS claim against a corporation when no international tribunal has allowed a customary international law claim against a corporation."), vacated, 527 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). |
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| 181. |
See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011); International Law Scholars' Brief, supra note 175, at 16-23. |
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| 182. |
See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[I]nternational law defines norms and determines their scope, but delegates to domestic law the task of determining the civil consequences of any given violation of these norms."), reh'g en banc denied, 786 F.3d 801 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 798 (2016); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1019 (describing the "distinction between a principle of that law, which is a matter of substance, and a means of enforcing it, which is a matter of procedure or remedy"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499), at 17-18 [hereinafter "United States' Jesner Brief"] ("[I]nternational law . . . establishes substantive standards of conduct but generally leaves each nation with substantive discretion as to the means of enforcement within its own jurisdiction."). |
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| 183. |
United States' Jesner Brief, supra note 182, at 6. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 184. |
See supra note 182. A U.S. Attorney General opinion in 1907 suggests that a U.S. corporation could be liable under the ATS for a treaty violation, although it does not include a direct analysis of the question. See Mexican Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande., 26 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 250, 253 (1907) (opining that the ATS would provide "a right of action and a forum" for a suit against the American Rio Grande Land and Irrigation Company). |
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| 185. |
See, e.g., Brief of Respondent Arab Bank, PLC in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-499), at 29-30 [hereinafter "Jesner Opposition to Cert."]. |
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| 186. |
403 U.S. 388 (1971). |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 187. |
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). |
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| 188. |
See supra § The Torture Victim Protection Act. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 189. |
See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2012). |
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| 190. |
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692, 728-29 (2004). |
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| 191. |
See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("In exercising the restraint mandated by the Supreme Court in ATS cases, we must follow Congress's approach to fashioning the TVPA for U.S. citizens and similarly fashion the ATS for aliens."), vacated, 527 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). See also Jesner Opposition to Cert., supra note 185, at 27-31; Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as Amici Curie, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499), at 8-23 [hereinafter "Chamber of Commerce Brief"]. |
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| 192. |
18 U.S.C. § 2333. See also Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-CV-556 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2004); Afriat-Kurtzer v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 05-CV-0388 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 2005). |
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| 193. |
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added). |
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| 194. |
See 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-2119 (2d Cir. June 22, 2016). |
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| 195. |
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter "Linde Sanctions Order"], appeal dismissed, 703 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2869 (2014). |
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See id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 197. |
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| 198. |
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See id. at |
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See, e.g., Chimène Keitner, ATS, RIP?, Lawfare (Apr. 25, 2018), https://lawfareblog.com/ats-rip. 196.
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See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Five Things I Don't Like About the Jesner Opinion, Human Rights at Home Blog (Apr. 29, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2018/04/five-things-i-dont-like-about-the-jesner-decision.html. 197.
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See, e.g. Jan Von Hein, The Supreme Court Deals the Death Blow to US Human Rights Litigation, Conflict of Laws.net (Apr. 25, 2018), http://conflictoflaws.net/2018/the-supreme-court-deals-the-death-blow-to-us-human-rights-litigation/ ("[T]he decision is not necessarily the end of the US human rights litigation. The ATS is still applicable if the defending corporation has its seat in the territory of the US."). 198.
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See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) ("[T]here is an argument that a proper application of Sosa would preclude courts from ever recognizing any new causes of action under the ATS. But the Court need not resolve that question in this case."). 199.
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See id. at 1413 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing "serious doubts" about Sosa ); id. at 1409 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I am not certain that Sosa was correctly decided."); id. at 1408 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Courts should not be in the business of creating new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute"). 200.
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Brief for Amicus Curie The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Arab Bank, PLC, v. Linde (No. 12-1485) (filed July 24, 2013), at 2, 4. |
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| 201. |
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 703 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2869 (2014). |
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| 202. |
See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-2119 (2d Cir. June 22, 2016). The extent to which the jury instructions were determinative is the subject of debate. See id. at 311-22. |
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| 203. |
For information on the latest developments in the Linde appeal, see Pete Brush, 2nd Circuit Wants to See Arab Bank Hamas Terror Settlement, Law360 (May 16, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/924604/2nd-circ-wants-to-see-arab-bank-hamas-terror-settlement. |
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| 204. |
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| 205. |
See United States' Jesner Brief, supra note 182, at 30 ("The underlying actions are subject to an order, entered when they were consolidated with other actions for pretrial purposes, that was imposed as a sanction for respondent's insistence on adhering to foreign bank-secrecy laws by withholding certain documents from discovery."). |
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| 206. |
E.g., International Law Scholars' Brief, supra note 175; Brief of Amici Curie Professors of Legal History, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499). |
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| 207. |
E.g., Brief of Amicus Curie EarthRights International, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499). |
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| 208. |
E.g., Brief of Former U.S. Counterterrorism and National Security Officials as Amici Curie, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499). |
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| 209. |
E.g., Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 191. |
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| 210. |
All amici briefs are available at Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, SCOTUSblog (last visited Sep. 13, 2017, 4:54 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jesner-v-arab-bank-plc/. |
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| 211. |
Brief of Amici Curie Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey Graham, Jesner, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-499). |
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| 212. |
Id. at 15. |
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| 213. |
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339C. |
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| 214. | See 31 C.F.R. §§ 595-97. See supra § "The Long Dormancy: 1789 to 1980." |
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203See supra § "The Rebirth of the ATS: Filártiga v. Peña-Irala." |
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| 216. |
United States' Jesner Brief, supra note 182, at 5-6. |
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| 217. |
See id. |
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| 218. | See supra § The Rebirth of the ATS: Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. See supra §§ "The Jesner Decision; The Kiobel Majority; The Sosa Holding." |
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See supra §§ " |
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| 221. |
See supra § The "Touch and Concern" Circuit Split. |
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| 222. |
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