Conference of Parties No. 21, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Decision 1/CP.21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016), annex 1, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf [hereinafter, " Paris Agreement"].

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ [hereinafter, "JCPOA" JCPOA].

U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("The President .. . . shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.... [.]").

See infra § "Forms of International Agreements and Commitments."

See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-06 (2008) (discussing the distinction between the binding effect of treaties under international law versus domestic law); Peter Malanczuk, Alkhurt's Modern Introduction to International Law 64-71 (7^th7th ed. 1997) (analyzing the interplay between international law and domestic or "municipal" legal systems).

As discussed more detail below, infra, the term "international agreement" as used in this report refers only to those agreements between nations that are binding under international law. See infra § Forms of International Agreements and Commitments.

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 7-17, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"] (defining the rules under international law in which a state may consent to be bound by a treaty). The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, but it is considered in many respects to reflect customary international law. See U.S. Dep't of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (last visited May 1, 2018), http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm. See also De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, our Court relies upon it 'as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties,' insofar as it reflects actual state practices.") (quoting Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 80 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005)); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e rely upon the Vienna Convention here as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties.... . . .") (internal citations omitted). But see Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 208 reporters' n. 4 ("[T]he [Vienna] Convention has not been ratified by the United States and, while purporting to be a codification of preexisting customary law, it is not in all respects in accord with the understanding and the practice of the United States and of some other states.").

See Congressional Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, S.Rept. 192-206106-71 (2001) [hereinafter "Treaties and Other International Agreements"] (surveying the principles related to withdrawal from international agreements under international law and the domestic law of the United States); Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 1966, arts. 2 cmt. (9) & 11 cmt. (1), in II Yearbook of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 1966, at 187-88, , available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf [hereinafter, " Commentary on the Law of Treaties"] (discussing differences between international and domestic law of treaty ratification and noting that "the international and constitutional ratifications of a treaty are entirely separate procedural acts carried out on two different planes."). For a brief discussion on the history and development of the Commentary on the Law of Treaties, see Malanczuk, supra note 6, at 130.

See infra § "The Effect of Implementing Legislation."

This report addresses both withdrawal from and termination of international agreements. Withdrawal generally occurs in the context of a multilateral agreement in which one party may withdraw from the agreement, but the agreement remains in place for the remaining parties. Termination generally occurs in the context of a bilateral agreement in which the withdrawal of a single party effectively terminates the agreement. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, § 155 cmt. c (1965). For purposes of this report, the underlying legal framework is generally the same for both events, and the terms may be used interchangeably.

For further detail of various types of international commitments and their relationship with U.S. law, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed].

The term "treaty" has a broader meaning under international law than under domestic law. Under international law, "treaty" refers to any binding international agreement. Vienna Convention, art. 1(a). Under domestic law, "treaty" signifies only those binding international agreements that have received the advice and consent of the Senate. See Third Restatement, suprasupra note 58, § 303(1).

See Third Restatement, suprasupra note 58, § 303(1).

Although not mentioned expressly in the Constitution, the executive branch has entered into executive agreements on a variety of subjects without the advice and consent of the Senate since the early years of the Republic. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (discussing "executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments" dating back to "as early as 1799"); L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 219 (2d ed. 1996) ("Presidents .. . . have made many thousands of [executive] agreements, differing in formality and importance, on matters running the gamut of U.S. foreign relations."). Over the history of the Republic, it appears that well over 90% of international legal agreements concluded by the United States have taken a form other than a treaty. See CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed], supra note 12, at 4-5.

U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("The President .. . . shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.... [.]").

See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.LPub. Law No. 87-195 (codified as amended, at 22 U.S.C. §2151 et seq.§ 2151-2431k) (authorizing the President to furnish assistance to foreign nations "on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country.... [.]"). In some cases, the President enters into congressional-executive agreements based on existing statutes that do not contain an explicit legislative authorization to allow an international agreement, but in which the authorization is implied. See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 78-86 (discussing examples congressional-executive agreements).

See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 86.

Examples of sole executive agreements include the Litvinov Assignment, under which the Soviet Union purported to assign to the United States claims to American assets in Russia that had previously been nationalized by the Soviet Union, and the 1973 Vietnam Peace Agreement ending the United States' participation in the war in Vietnam. See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 88.

See id. at 58-64 (discussing various types of nonlegal agreements and their status under domestic and international law). See generally Duncan B. Hollis and Joshua J. Newcomer, "Political" Commitments and the Constitution, 49 Va. J. Int'l L. 507 (2009) (discussing the origins and constitutional implications of the practice of making political commitments).

See Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 11 (2016) ("[P]olitical commitments carry no international law obligation[.]").

See Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 301 reporters' n. 2 ("[T]he political inducements to comply with such [nonbinding] agreements may be strong and the consequences of noncompliance serious.").

Third Restatement, suprasupra note 58, § 301(1).

For more on variations of the definition of the term "treaty," see supra note 1314.

See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 76.

See supra note 1718.

SeeSee Treaties and Other International Agreements, suprasupra note 910, at 86; see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, supra note 12by [author name scrubbed], supra note 13, at 5.

See supra note 1920.

See supra notes 20-2221-23.

Vienna Convention, art. 54; Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 192. Some rules of international law known as jus cogens are recognized by the international community as peremptory, permitting no derogation. Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 102 cmt. k. These rules generally prevail regardless of the content or status of international agreements, id., and thus would not be affected by withdrawal.

See, e.g., Paris Agreement, art. 28; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 25, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [hereinafter "UNFCCC"UNFCCC]. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579, 1597-98 (2005) (analyzing denunciation and withdrawal clauses in existing treaties).

Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 192.

Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it has been described as the "most widely recognized international law source on current treaty law practice." See id. at 63. As described in note 8, suprasupra note 9, the Vienna Convention is also understood to reflect customary international law in certain respects.

Vienna Convention, art. 56.

See id., arts. 60-64; Malanczuk, supra note 6, at 142-46 (outlining the events which may give rise to a right to terminate a treaty under international law).

Vienna Convention, art. 67.

See id.

See infra § "Withdrawal Under Domestic Law."

Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 59 (stating that a "'political' undertaking is not governed by international law and there are no applicable rules pertaining to compliance, modification, or withdrawal[,]" and therefore a party may "extricate[] itself from its 'political' undertaking .. . . without legal penalty[.]") (quoting Dep't of State, Article-by-Article Analysis of START Documents 352 (1991), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 20, 102d Cong., 1086 (1991)); Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 Am. J. Int'l L. 296, 300 (1977) ("[A] nonbinding agreement, however seriously taken by the parties, does not engage their legal responsibility."). But see Nuclear Test Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1741974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20) (holding that a series of unilateral declarations by France concerning its intention to refrain from certain nuclear tests in the South Pacific were legally binding).

Political commitments may have, but often lack, express withdrawal provisions. See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 741, 791 (2010) (discussing exit provisions in certain political commitments).

See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 59.

See id. at 199 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Westel Woodbury Willoughby, 1 Constitutional Law of the United States 587 (1929)) (stating that it is a "noncontroversial observation that, "as the official spokesperson with other governments, the President is the person who communicates the notice of impending termination" of international agreements); Henkin, supra note 1716, at 42 ("That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been questioned and is not a source of significant controversy."); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 243 (2001) ("Even the most committed advocate of congressional primacy usually admits that the President is "sole organ of official communication in foreign affairs."); Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 773, 782 n.39 (2014) (citing historical sources of the "sole organ" role of the Executive from the founding era through the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Curtiss-Wright). For the Supreme Court's latest description of the President's role in communicating with foreign governments and the contours of presidential power in the field of foreign affairs in general, see Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) ("The President does have a unique role in communicating with foreign governments... . . . But whether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law.").

See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 9, at 208 infra § Domestic Legal Challenges to Unilateral Treaty Termination by the Executive.

See id. at 172; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201, 1225 (2018); Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 10, at 172; Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 339 reporters' n. 2. 339 reporter's note 2.

See Treaties and Other International AgreementsBradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 173-74 (stating that the conclusion that the President has16, at 1225 ("Presidents clearly have the authority to terminate sole executive agreements and political commitments, since those agreements by Presidents based on their own constitutional authority."); Third executive agreements unilaterally "seems invariably true in the case of executive agreements concluded by virtue of exclusive Presidential authority"); Restatement, supra note 58, § 339 reporters' n.339 reporter's note 2 ("No one has questioned the President's authority to terminate sole executive agreements.").

For a discussion of competing positions related to the Executive's constitutional authority to enter into political commitments, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed], supra note 1213, at 9-12.

See, e.g., Julian Ku, President Rubio/Walker/Trump/Whomever Can Indeed Terminate the Iran Deal on "Day One," Opinio Juris (Sep. 10, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/ydfodbbo (arguing that, because the JCPOA is a nonbinding political commitment, the President can unilaterally terminate the arrangement); Ryan Harrington, A Remedy for Congressional Exclusion from Contemporary International Agreement Making, 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 1211, 1226 (2016) ("A political commitment also provides the executive branch with the ability to terminate the agreement unilaterally or to deviate from it without consequences.").

See, e.g., Ryan Harrington, A Remedy for Congressional Exclusion from Contemporary International Agreement Making, 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 1211, 1226 (2016) ("A political commitment also provides the executive branch with the ability to terminate the agreement unilaterally or to deviate from it without consequences."); Julian Ku, President Rubio/Walker/Trump/Whomever Can Indeed Terminate the Iran Deal on "Day One," Opinio Juris (Sep. 10, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/09/10/president-rubiowalkertrumpwhomever-can-indeed-terminate-the-iran-deal-on-day-one/ (arguing that, because the JCPOA is a nonbinding political commitment, the President can unilaterally terminate the arrangement).

See Restatement, supra note 58, § 339 cmt. a; Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 174, 208; Michael J. Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 923, 926 (1986). See also Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law Making in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1362 n. 268 (2008) ("The President may withdraw from .. . . a congressional-executive agreement unilaterally unless Congress has expressly limited the President's power to withdraw through .. . . authorizing legislation[.]").

See Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 339 cmt. a.

See id. For example, Section 125 of the Free Trade Act of 1974 applies to a number of international trade agreements and, which authorizes a fast-track process for consideration of legislation implementing free trade agreements, states: "Duties or other import restrictions required or appropriate to carry out any trade agreement entered into pursuant to this chapter .. . . shall not be affected by any termination, in whole or in part, of such agreement or by the withdrawal of the United States from such agreement and shall remain in effect after the date of such termination or withdrawal for 1 year, unless" certain exceptions apply. 19 U.S.C. § 2135(e).

P.L. 99-440, § 306(b)(1), 313, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100 (1986) [hereinafter Anti-Apartheid Act] ("The Secretary of State shall terminate the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of South Africa Relating to Air Services Between their Respective Territories. . . ."), repealed by South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993, P.L. 103-149, § 4, 107 Stat. 1503, 1505. The Anti-Apartheid Act also directed the Secretary of State to terminate a tax treaty with South Africa, discussed infra note 79.

See South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).

See Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 5, 65 Stat. 72, 73 (1951).

Dep't of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v04p2/d169.

For example, the Eisenhower Administration terminated a trade agreement with Ecuador that had been authorized by statute without seeking congressional approval. See Proclamation No. 3111, 20 Fed. Reg. 6485 (Sept. 2, 1955). For additional examples of termination of congressional-executive agreements that were pre-authorized in legislation, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1225 n.93.

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1225 n.95.

See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Trump Might be Stuck with NAFTA, L.A. Times (Nov. 29, 2016) (arguing that Congress's Commerce Clause authority bars the President from terminating the NAFTA without congressional authorization); Joel P. Trachtman, Trump Can't Withdraw from NAFTA Without a 'Yes' from Congress, The Hill (Aug. 16, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y9byuyed ("If the president, acting alone, were to terminate U.S. participation in NAFTA, he would be imposing regulation on commerce, without congressional participation. This would be an unconstitutional usurpation of the powers granted to Congress.").

See Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yaaumas9 (contending that the President possesses constitutional authority to terminate congressional-executive agreements to the same as extent as presidential authority to terminate Article II treaties); Michael Ramsey, Could President Trump Unilaterally Withdraw the U.S. from its International Agreements?, Originalism Blog (Sep. 29, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yc26cfdr (arguing that the President can withdraw the United States from international trade agreements, but that he cannot terminate implementing legislation).

See infra § The Effect of Implementing Legislation.

In the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (Anti-Apartheid Act), which was passed over President Reagan's veto, Congress directed the Secretary of State to terminate an air services agreement with South Africa. P.L. 99-440, §306(b)(1), 313, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100 ("The Secretary of State shall terminate the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of South Africa Relating to Air Services Between their Respective Territories.... "). In a subsequent legal challenge, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Congress had the power to enact this provision by virtue of its constitutional powers to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and to "make all Laws [that] shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [such] Powers."). See South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 118, 126 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, §8), cert denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).

. See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 9, at 173-74 & 208.

See U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Scholars have also noted that the Framers never directly addressed the power to terminate treaties in the Federalist Papers, the Constitutional Convention, or the state ratifying conventions. See, e.g. James J. Moriarty, Congressional Claims for Treaty Termination Powers in the Age of the Diminished Presidency, 14 Conn. J. Int'l L. 123, 132 (1999).

See, e.g., Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 339 cmt. a (stating that the President has the authority to terminate treaties pursuant to the presidential powers related to foreign affairs as described in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2242 (1999) ("[W]ith treaty formation, the President retains this authority "due to his preeminent position in foreign affairs and his structural superiority in managing international relations."); Bradley, supra note 4243, at 782 (discussing the application of the President's role as the "sole organ" of communications to the concept of treaty termination); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John Bellinger, III, Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President & Legal Adviser to the Nat'l Sec. Council, Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty 7 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter "Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum"], available at], http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty11152001.pdf ("The President's power to terminate treaties must reside in the President as a necessary corollary to the exercise of the President's other plenary foreign affairs powers."). The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice later disavowed unrelated portions of the Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum, but it continued to maintain that the President may unilaterally suspend a treaty where suspension is permitted "by the terms of the treaty or under recognized principles of international law." See Memorandum of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 8-9 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/03/09/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.

See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs 158 (2007) ("[I]n eighteenth-century terms 'executive' power included general power over treaties—including, of course, the decision whether or not to withdraw."); Bradley, supra note 4243, at 780 (analyzing the so-called "Vesting Clause Thesis" and its application to treaty withdrawal); Yoo & Delhunty Memorandum, supra note 5666, at 3-13 (stating that the "treaty power is fundamentally executive in nature").

See, e.g., David Gray Adler, The Constitution and the Termination of Treaties 94 (1986); Yoo & Delhunty Memorandum, supra note 5666, at 6; Bradley, supra note 4243, at 781-82.

See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010) ("Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep [executive] officers accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.").

See sources cited supra note 5767.

See Memorandum from James Brown Scott, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of State 1-2 (June 12, 1909) (on file with author) ("A third method of terminating a treaty is by notice given by the President upon his own initiative without a resolution of the Senate or the joint resolution of the Congress"); Memorandum from R. Walton Moore, Acting U.S. Sec'y of State, to President Roosevelt 5 (Nov. 9, 1936) (on file with author) ("I have no doubt that you may authorize the giving of notice to Italy of the intention to terminate the treaty of 1871 without seeking the advice and consent of the Senate or the approval of Congress to such action."); Memorandum from William Whittington, Deputy Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Termination of Treaties: International Rules and Internal United States Procedure 5 (Feb. 10, 1958) (on file with author) ("While the practice has varied in the past, it is now generally considered that, as to a self-executing treaty .. . . it is proper for the Executive acting alone to take the action necessary to terminate or denounce the treaty."); Memorandum from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Sec'y of State, President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978) [hereinafter, " Hansell Memorandum"], reprinted in S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95^th Cong., Termination of Treaties: The Constitutional Allocation of Power 395 (Comm. Print 1978) ("This memorandum confirms my advice to you that the President has the authority under the Constitution to decide whether the United States shall give the notice of termination .. . . without Congressional or Senate action."); Yoo & Delhunty Memorandum, supra note 5666, at 3-13 (concluding that the Constitution vests the President with authority to terminate or suspend treaties unilaterally).

See, e.g., Yoo & Delhunty Memorandum, supra note 56, at 7; Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96^th Cong. 50 (1979) (testimony of State Dep't Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell); id. at 220 (letter from Larry A. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).

See, e.g., Barry M. Goldwater, Treaty Termination is a Shared Power, 65 A.B.A. J. 198 (1979); David "Dj" Wolff, Reasserting its Constitutional Role: Congress' Power to Independently Terminate a Treaty, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 953 (2012); Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United States to Condition its Consent to Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 533, 554-66 (1991); Adler, suprasupra note 5464, at 98-110. The courts' differing interpretations of the power of treaty termination is discussed below. See infra § "Domestic Legal Challenges to Unilateral Treaty Termination by the Executive ."

See, e.g., Goldwater, supra note 6271, at 199-200; Bradley, supra note 4243, at 781.

See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) ("There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) ("[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.").

See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 6271, at 966. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Tribute: The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 786, 802 (1999).

See, e.g., Adler, supra note 5464, at 93. For more arguments regarding the role of the legislative branch in treaty termination, see the sources cited supra note 6271.

Compare, e.g., Hansell Memorandum, supra note 6070 (discussing "previous Presidential treaty terminations undertaken without action by Congress" in support of the conclusion that "[w]hile treaty termination may be and sometimes has been, undertaken by the President following Congressional or Senate action, such action is not legally necessary"); with Goldwater, supra note 6271, at 198 ("[T]he weight of historical evidence proves that treaties are normally only terminated with legislative approval.").

See, e.g., Adler, supra note 5464, at 190 ("There has been no predominant method of termination, or even a discernible trend. Indeed, the record is checkered."); 5 Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law 330 (1943) ("The question as to the authority of the Executive to terminate treaties independently of the Congress or of the Senate is in a somewhat confused state... . . . No settled rule or procedure has been followed.").

For more detailed investigation of historical practices, see Bradley, supra note 4243, at 788-816 and Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 202-208.

See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, See P.L. 99-440, § § 313, 100 Stat. 1086, 1104 (mandating that "[t]he Secretary of State shall terminate immediately" a tax treaty and protocol with South Africa); Joint Resolution Concerning the Oregon Territory, 9 Stat. 109 (1846) (providing that the President "is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to give to the government of Great Britain the notice required by" a convention allowing for joint occupancy of parts of the Oregon Territory). Although the Anti-Apartheid Act was enacted over his veto, see supra note 47, President Reagan terminated the treaty at issue. See Bradley, supra note 4243, at 814-15 n. 244 (discussing history of the Anti-Apartheid Act). Likewise, after Congress enacted the Joint Resolution Concerning the Oregon Territory (Oregon Territory Treaty) in 1846, the Secretary of State informed the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain that "Congress have spoken their will upon the subject, in their joint resolution; and to this it is his (the President's) and your duty to conform." S. Doc. No. 29-489, at 15 (1846). The Oregon Territory Treaty was ultimately renegotiated. See Bradley, supra note 4243, at 790.

In 1855, the Senate authorized President Franklin Pierce to terminate a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty with Denmark, and the President subsequently relied on the Senate's action in carrying out the termination. Pres. Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message (Dec. 31, 1855), available at http://millercenter.org/president/pierce/speeches/speech-3730 ("In pursuance of the authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate of the United States passed on the 3d of March last, notice was given to Denmark" that the United States would "terminate the [treaty] at the expiration of one year from the date of notice for that purpose.").

See, e.g., Joint Resolution to Terminate the Treaty of 1817 Regulating the Naval Force on the Lakes, 13 Stat. 568 (1865) ("Be it resolved .. . . That the notice given by the President of the United States to [the] government of Great Britain and Ireland to terminate the treaty .. . . is hereby adopted and ratified as if the same had been authorized by Congress.").

See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 910, at 205-06.

See, e.g., Telegram from the U.S. Department of State to the Embassy of the Republic of China (Dec. 23, 1978), text available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d180 [hereinafter, Taiwan Treaty Termination Telegram] (providing notice of termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the government of Taiwan).

See, e.g., Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668, 733-40 (2016) (challenging the conclusions of recent studies related to past practices in treaty termination).

See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 42, at 801-20; Henkin, supra note 15, at 213-14; Adler Jean Galbraith, Treaty Termination as Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 121-26 (2014).

For additional background on Goldwater v. Carter, see Adler, supra note 54For analysis of 19th century understanding and practice related to treaty termination, see Bradley, supra note 43, at 788-801; Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement 432-66 (2d ed. 1916).

In 1899, the McKinley Administration terminated certain articles in a commercial treaty Switzerland. See Letter from John Hay, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Ambassador Leishman (Mar. 8, 1899), in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 753-754 (1901). And in 1927, the Coolidge Administration withdrew the United States from a convention to prevent smuggling with Mexico. See Letter from Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Ambassador Sheffield (Mar. 21, 1927), in 3 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, at 230, 230–231 (1942).

See Bradley, supra note 43, at 807-09.

See, e.g., Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, P.L. 94-265, § 202(b), 90 Stat. 331, 340-41 (authorizing the Secretary of State to renegotiate certain fishing treaties and expressing the "sense of Congress that the United States shall withdraw from any such treaty, in accordance with its provisions, if such treaty is not so renegotiated within a reasonable period of time after such date of enactment."). See also supra note 79 (discussing a provision in the Anti-Apartheid Act requiring the President to terminate a tax treaty with South Africa),

See Bradley, supra note 43, at 807-15.

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433 [hereinafter, " Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty"].

International Security Assistance Act of 1978, P.L. 95-384, §Pub. L. No., § 26(b), 92 Stat. 730, 746.

See Taiwan Treaty Termination Telegram, supra note 7483; President Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China (Dec. 15, 1978), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30308.

In addition, three days of hearings were held in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that "approval of the U.S. Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation." S.Res. 15, 96^th Cong. (1979); Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96^th Cong. (1979). The resolution never passed.

Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 964 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality op.).

Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 964.

Id. at 960.

See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam).

Id. at 707 (discussing and quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).

Id. at 706-07. Judge MacKinnon issued a lengthy dissent which focused on past termination practices and concluded that "congressional participation in termination has been the overwhelming historical practice." Id. at 723 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).

See id. at 709.

Id. at 708.

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality op.).

Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J, concurring) (opinion joined by Justices Stewart and Stevens and Chief Justice Burger).

For further analysis of the political question doctrine, see CRS Report R43834, The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of Powers, by [author name scrubbed].

See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J.) ("If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so."). Justice Marshall also concurred in the result without a written opinion.

For the Court's most recent holding on the President's power to recognize foreign governments, see Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).

See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government, because the defense treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the only legitimate political authority in China."). Justices Blackmun and White also dissented, but on the grounds that they felt the case should have been set for oral argument and to allow time for "plenary consideration" of the issues. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun & White, JJ., dissenting in part).

See Office of Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2002, at 202-06 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2002) (identifying 23 treaties terminated by the President between 1980 and 2002); Bradley, supra note 4243, at 815 (identifying unilateral treaty terminations since the State Department's compilation in 2002).

For example, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which was enacted over President's Reagan's veto, directed the President to terminate a tax treaty and an air service treaty with South Africa. See P.L. 99-440, §§ 306, 313, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100, 1104.

(1986)

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024.

See Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198-99 (D. Mass. 1986) ("[A] challenge to the President's power vis-a-vis treaty termination raise[s] a nonjusticiable political question"), aff'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1 (1^st1st Cir. 1987).

President George W. Bush, Remarks on National Missile Defense (Dec. 13, 2001), https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/6847.htm.

236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).

See Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 18.

See id. at 9-12. For more background on standing requirements in lawsuits by Members of Congress, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG783, Legislator Lawsuits: Checking Executive Action Through the CourtsReport R42454, Congressional Participation in Article III Courts: Standing to Sue, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

521 U.S. 811 (1997).

See Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 12-18.

International Security Assistance Act of 1978, P.L. 95-384, § § 26(b), 92 Stat. 730, 746 (emphasis added).

S.Res. 15, 96^th Cong. (1979).

For further background on this resolution, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 (1979).

343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015) ("In considering claims of Presidential power this Court refers to Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer....").343 U.S. 579 (1952).

Id. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).

Id. at 635-38.

Id. at 637-40 (Jackson, J., concurring). Accord Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015).

See sources citedYoo & Delahunty Memorandum, supra note 65, at 7 ("The President's power to terminate treaties must reside in the President as a necessary corollary to the exercise of the President's other plenary foreign affairs powers.").

See supra note 71.

Cf. South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 118, 126 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, §8), cert denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987) (holding that Congress had the power to enact legislation mandating the Secretary of State terminate an executive agreement related to airline services with South Africa pursuant to Congress's constitutional authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and to "make all Laws shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [such] Powers.").

See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008) ("What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification."); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) ("For in a strict sense the [t]reaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.").

For analysis of the differences between self-executing versus non-self-executing agreements, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed], supra note 1213, at 12-14.

See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 ("In sum, while treaties may comprise international commitments .. . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("When the [treaty] stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by congress as legislation upon any other subject."). See generally Third Restatement, supra note 58, § 111(4)(a) & cmt. h.

See, e.g., Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3913 (implementing a multilateral nonbinding commitment to adopt the "Kimberley Process" designed to decrease the trade in conflict diamonds).

See sources cited, supra note 6473.

See Hathaway, supra note 49, at 1362 n. 268 ("To the extent the legislation creates domestic law that operates even in the absence of an international agreement, that law will survive withdrawal from the international agreement by the President."); Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Treaty Power, and the Overlooked Value of Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1607, 1628 (2015) ("A President's termination of a treaty will dissolve the formal legal obligation, but the policy of the United States will still continue because he cannot repeal the implementing legislation."); John Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's Preratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. Legal Stud. S5, S15 n.20 (2002) ("If only legislation can repeal legislation, then the formal status of implementing legislation does not change merely because the president takes some action, namely, terminating the treaty that the legislation implements.")

See supra § "Withdrawal Under International Law."

See sources cited supra note 120132; Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 961, 1005 (2001) ("[T]he president could unilaterally terminate the treaty, but not the implementing legislation[.]"); Kristen E. Eichensehr, 53 Va. J. Int'l L. 247, 308 n. 245 (2013) ("If .. . . the treaty was .. . . incorporated into U.S. law with implementing legislation, then the President's termination ends only U.S. obligations to treaty partners; it does not alter the implementing legislation, which was adopted as a statute under domestic law.").

E.g., U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act §106(c) ("On the date on which the Agreement terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective.").

See, e.g., Trump Looking for Fast Ways to Quit Global Climate Deal: Source, Reuters (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-climatechange-accord-idUSKBN1370JX; Trump Seeking Quickest Way to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, Says Report, Guardian (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/13/trump-looking-at-quickest-way-to-quit-paris-climate-agreement-says-report.

Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1(a). For further analysis of the Paris Agreement, see CRS Report R44609, Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions about the 2015 Paris Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) ("The provisions of this chapter related to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government.").

United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, P.L. 108-286, §106(c), 118 Stat. 919, 923 (2004) (codified in 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-Korea Free Trade Implementation Act, P.L. 112-41, § 107(c), 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011).

See supra note 51.

Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord [hereinafter Paris Withdrawal Announcement].

See Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris Agreement, White House Blog (Sep. 3, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-agreement.

Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNFCCC (last visited Jan. 1, 2017), http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.

See supra note 3132.

See 138 Cong. Rec. S17150 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992).

See Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, Deputy Nat'l Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes, Senior Advisor, Brian Deese and Deputy Nat'l Security Advisor Int'l EconomicEconomics, Wally Adeyemo (Aug. 29, 2016) [hereinafter, " Press Briefing"], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/29/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-deputy-nsa-strategic (statement of Brian Deese) ("[T]he Paris agreement is an executive agreement. And so the President will use his authority that has been used in dozens of executive agreements in the past to join and .. . . put our country as a party to the Paris agreement."). Senior State Department Official on the Paris Agreement Signing Ceremony (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/256415.htm (statement of unnamed "Senior State Department Official") ("With respect to the Paris agreement, we have our own procedures, we have a standard State Department exercise that we are currently going through for authorizing an executive agreement, which this is[.]").

See Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris Agreement, White House Blog (Sep. 3, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-agreement.

Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNFCCC (last visited May 1, 2018), http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.

Whether the Paris Agreement should have been treated as a treaty which required the advice and consent of the Senate has been the subject of disagreement among observers. Compare e.g., Steven Groves, The Paris Agreement is a Treaty and Should be Submitted to the Senate, Backgrounder No. 3103 (Heritage Foundation, Mar. 15, 2016), available at http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/BG3103.pdf (arguing that the Paris Agreement requires the Senate's advice and consent) with David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 515 (2015) (asserting that neither Senate advice and consent nor new congressional legislation are necessarily conditions precedent to the United States becoming a party to an international agreement related to emissions reduction and climate change).

See Written Testimony of Andrew M. Gross, Pitfalls of Unilateral Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference,, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Science, Space & Technology, 104^th104th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/pitfalls-unilateral-negotiations-paris-climate-change-conference (concluding that certain procedural and reporting requirements of the Paris Agreement could be viewed as implementing the UNFCCC).

See United States, U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying Information (2015), https://tinyurl.com/oop7jpd [hereinafter U.S. INDC available at http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf [hereinafter, "U.S. INDC"] (citing the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.§ 7401-7671q, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §13201 et seq.§ 13201-13556), and the Energy Independence and Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §17001 et seq. of 2007, P.L. 110-140, as existing statutes through which the United States willwould implement the Paris Agreement). The statutes that the Obama Administration identified as allowing the United States to implement the Paris Agreement do not expressly authorize the President to enter into agreements with foreign nations. However, the executive branch has stated in the past that existing domestic laws which allow executive agreements to be implemented without subsequent action by Congressprovide a mechanism for the implementation of a contemplated agreement may bolster the Executive's authority to enter into the agreementthat pact on behalf of the United States. See Letter from Harold Koh to Sen. Ron Wyden (Mar. 6, 2016), in Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 2012, at 95 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon, ed. 2012) (asserting that the Obama Administration is "currently in a position to accept the [Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement] for the United States[,]" in part, based on "existing U.S. intellectual property law for implementation of the [Agreement], including the Copyright Act of 1976, the Lanham Act" and other statutes); see also Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 Vanderbilt J. Transat'l L. 885, 909-16 (2016) (discussing the executive branch's reliance on existing domestic statutes as a basis of authority to enter into certain executive agreements).

Eliza Northrop & Chad Smith, Domestic Processes for Joining the Paris Agreement, Technical Note 4 (2015), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/Domestic_Processes_for_Joining_the_Paris_Agreement.pdfhttps://tinyurl.com/y95t6wka (stating that the U.S. joined the Paris Agreement as a sole-executive agreement).

See David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power? Lawfare (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climate-change-legitimate-exercise-executive-agreement-powertinyurl.com/zrypkyf (citing multiple sources of executive authority for the Paris Agreement); Borandsky & Spiro, supra note 133148, at 886 (stating that that Paris Agreement would "fall somewhere in between" a sole executive agreement and a congressional-executive agreement).

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1249 ("Because the [Obama] Administration did not clearly explain its authority under domestic law to make this agreement, and because the answer is not obvious, scholars and commentators have debated what type of agreement it was.").

For more on reservations, understandings, and declarations issued by the Senate in the course of providing its advice and consent to a treaty, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed], supra note 1213, at 3.

See supra § "Withdrawal from Executive Agreements and Political Commitments Under Domestic Law."

Paris Agreement, art. 28.

Id.

See Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNFCCC (last visited Dec. 7, 2016), http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.

Compare id. with UNFCCC, art. 25.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Convention (last visited Dec. 8, 2016), http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php.

See UNFCCC, art. 25(1) ("At any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by giving written notification to the Depositary.").

Id., art. 25(2); Paris Agreement, art. 28.1.

See supra § "Withdrawal from Treaties Under Domestic Law."

See Paris Withdrawal Announcement, supra note 139 ("I'm willing to immediately work with Democratic leaders to either negotiate our way back into Paris, under the terms that are fair to the United States and its workers, or to negotiate a new deal that protects our country and its taxpayers. . . . But until we do that, we're out of the agreement."). For additional analysis of legal questions arising from the withdrawal announcement, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1817, President Trump's Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement Raises Legal Questions: Part 1, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1818, President Trump's Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement Raises Legal Questions: Part 2, by [author name scrubbed].

See Nikki R. Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Diplomatic Note (Aug. 4, 2017) ("[T]he United States will submit to the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 1 of the Agreement, formal written notification of withdrawal as soon as it is eligible to do so."). For additional background on Ambassador Haley's diplomatic note, see CRS Insight IN10746, Paris Agreement on Climate Change: U.S. Letter to United Nations, by [author name scrubbed].

See, e.g., Oliver Milman, Quitting UN Climate Change Body Could be Trump's Quickest Exit from Paris Deal, The Guardian (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/02/trump-break-from-paris-climate-deal-unfccc-exit; Steven Groves, Brett Schaefer and Nicolas Loris, The U.S. Should Withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Backgrounder No. 3130 (Heritage Foundation June 9, 2016), http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/BG3130.pdf.

See UNFCCC, art. 25.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Convention (last visited May 1, 2018), https://unfccc.int/process/the-convention/news-and-updates.

Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/13/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy [hereinafter 2017 Iran Remarks] ("As I have said many times, the Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.").

The term P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—plus Germany.

For a comprehensive review of the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and for further information related to the sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed].

See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the implications of the "Executive['s] recognition of the Peking Government" on the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan). The ABM Treaty at issue in Kucinich implicated issues related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fact that, what was formerly a bilateral treaty, now involved four "successor" states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine. See Yoo & Delhunty Memorandum, supra note 56, at 2.

U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the power to ... regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes[.]").

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality op.).

See Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1 (1^st Cir. 1987); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).

See Paris Agreement arts. 3, 4.1. For discussion of which provisions may be binding and new obligations for the United States, see CRS Report R44609, Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions about the 2015 Paris Agreement, supra note 125.

E.g., id. arts. 4.19 ("All parties strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies"); 5.2 ("Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support ... the existing framework ... already agreed under the [UNFCCC]"); 7.7 ("Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework") (emphasis added in all).

Id. art. 4.4 (emphasis added). For other examples of international agreements that contain both binding obligations and political commitments, see Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 30, at 536-37.

See, Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to The Honorable Bob Corker, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Oct. 19, 2015), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/256415.htm ("[W]e are not seeking an agreement in which Parties take on legally binding emissions targets."); COP21 Press Availability with Special Envoy Todd Stern (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.state.gov/s/climate/releases/2015/250425.htm (U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, stating that the Paris Agreement creates an emission reduction target that is not legally binding, but that the reporting and "accountability system that circles around the target" is legally binding).

The domestic laws and regulations that the Obama Administration intended to utilize to meet its emissions reduction targets are identified in the United States' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). See U.S. INDC, supra note 133. For primers on the process for repealing existing rules and regulations, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG888, How to Repeal a Rule, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1697, With the Stroke of a Pen: What Executive Branch Actions Can President-elect Trump "Undo" on Day One?, by [author name scrubbed].

See, e.g., Donald J. Trump Remarks at AIPAC (Mar. 21, 2016), available at https://www.donaldjtrump.com/media/donald-j-trump-remarks-at-aipac (statement of President Donald J. Trump).

See, e.g. Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on Shaky Ground, Reuters (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran-idUSKBN13427E; Carol Morello, Iran Nuclear Deal Could Collapse Under Trump, Wash. Post. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nuclear-deal-could-collapse-under-trump/2016/11/09/f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.382d020085d7.

The term P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—plus Germany.

For a comprehensive review of the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and for further information related to the sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed].

See JCPOA at 6.

See JCPOA at 6.

P.L. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201 (2015) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2011 note and id. § 2160e).

See Letter from Charles S. Faulkner, U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to Hon. Bob Corker, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (July 17, 2017) (on file with author); Statement by President Trump on the Iran Nuclear Deal (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/ [hereinafter 2018 JCPOA Statement].

See infra § "The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act." For additional analysis related to the result of President Trump's certification decisions, see CRS Report R44942, Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

See Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016, Revocation of Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 With Respect to Iran, Amendment of Executive Order 13628 With Respect to Iran, and Provision of Implementation Authorities for Aspects of Certain Statutory Sanctions Outside the Scope of U.S. Commitments Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015, 81 Fed. Reg. 3693 (Jan. 21, 2016); Dep't of the Treasury & Dep't of State, Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day, at 34-37 (Jan. 16, 2016), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf [hereinafter "Treasury Guidance"].

See Office of Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2015, at 123 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2002) (describing the JCPOA as a "non-binding political arrangement[]"); Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec., Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to The Honorable Mike Pompeo, House of Representatives (Nov. 19, 2015), available at http://pompeo.house.gov/uploadedfiles/151124_-_reply_from_state_regarding_jcpoa.pdf ("The [JCPOA] is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and it is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments.... . . .").

See, e.g., Daniel H. Joyner, Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law: From Confrontation to Accord 228 (2016) ("[T]he JCPOA is not a treaty, i.e. it is not a legally binding agreement among states. It is, rather, an agreement among states constituting political commitments only."); Harold Honju Koh, Triptych's End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 Yale L.J. Forum 338, 354 (2017) ("[T]he JCPOA is a political, not a legally binding, commitment in both form and substance."); Jack Goldsmith, Why Congress is Effectively Powerless to Stop the Iran Deal (and Why the Answer is Not the Iran Review Act), Lawfare (July 20, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-congress-effectively-powerless-stop-iran-deal-and-why-answer-not-iran-review-act (asserting that Congress lacked the power to block the JCPOA, in part, because the plan of action was a nonbinding political commitment); Dan Joyner, Guest Post: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program, Opinio Juris (July 15, 2015) ("The JCPOA is simply a diplomatic agreement, consisting of political and not legal commitments.").

See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Can the Next President Repudiate Obama's Iran Agreement?, The Atlantic (Sep. 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/can-the-next-president-repudiate-obamas-iran-agreement/404587/ (asserting the JCPOA received congressional approval, and is more properly understood as a congressional-executive agreement); Michael Ramsey, Is the Iran Deal Unconstitutional?, Originalism Blog (July 15, 2015), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/07/is-the-iran-deal-unconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html (arguing that the JCPOA should be treated as a treaty that requires the advice and consent of the Senate); Iuilia E. Padeanu, Is the Trump Administration Bound by the Iran Deal?, Yale J. Int'l L. (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.yjil.yale.edu/is-the-trump-administration-bound-by-the-iran-deal/ (asserting that the JCPOA is a congressional-executive agreement that is binding as a matter of international law). 171.

See sources cited supra note 3940.

See supra § "Withdrawal from Executive Agreements and Political Commitments Under Domestic Law."

JCPOA arts. 21-25.

See JCPOA, Ann. II, art. B, n. 6. See also Sahand Moarefy, Partially Unwinding Sanctions: The Problematic Construct of Sanctions Relief in the JCPOA, at § C.2, Harv. L. Sch. Nat'l Security J., July 15, 2016, http://harvardnsj.org/2016/07/partially-unwinding-sanctions-the-problematic-construct-of-sanctions-relief-in-the-jcpoa/. For detail on the sanctions lifted by the United States and sanctions relief in the JCPOA in generalgenerally, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by [author name scrubbed].

See Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016, supra note 160168.

See See CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, supra note 167by [author name scrubbed], supra note 175, at 7 (discussing the authority of the Executive to renew, alter, and revoke executive orders he issues pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and International Emergency Economic Powers Act). See generally CRS Report RS20846, Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed],, at 7 (discussing the general power of the President to revoke or modify executive orders).

The Executive's authority to issue executive order based sanctions on Iransanctions on Iran under the executive order was premised on the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1601, et seq.§§ 1601-1651, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.§ 1701-1708, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-17272, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C. §8501 et seq.§ 8501-8511, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.-8811, and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. §8701 et seq 8701-8795. For details on the requirements that the Executive must meet in order to impose sanctions under these statutes, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, supra note 167175, at Table 2.

For a summary of the statutory sanctions lifted, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], supra note 158163, at 19-22, and for a broader report on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran and the nature of the authority to waive them, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by [author name scrubbed], supra note 167175.

See 22 U.S.C. § 8803(i) (authorizing waiver of sanctions under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act for up to 180 days if the President determines such a waiver is "vital to the national security of the United States" and submits a report providing a justification for the waiver to the "appropriate congressional committees"); 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(5) (authorizing the waiver of sanctions under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 if the President determines that the waiver is "in the national security interest of the United States"); 22 U.S.C. § 8851(b) (authorizing the waiver of sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 if the President determines that the waiver "is in the national interest of the United States"); P.L. 112-158, § 205, 126 Stat. 1214, 1226 (authorizing waiver of sanctions under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 for a period of not more than one year when the President deems it "essential to the national security interests of the United States"). For summary of all legislation authorizing sanctions made inapplicable under the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, supra note 167175, at Table 3.

See Treasury Guidance, supra note 160168, at 34-37.

See Press Statement, John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Statement by Secretary Kerry on Renewing Waivers Related to Extension of the Iran Sanctions Act (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/265652.htm.

See sources cited supra note 172.

S.C. 2231, ¶ v (July 20, 2015).

Article 18 of the JCPOA calls for the termination of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, and 2224.

S.C. 2231, ¶ 7.

Id. at 1.

JCPOA at 6.

See Colum Lynch & John Hudson, Obama Turns to U.N. to Outmaneuver Congress, Foreign Policy (July 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/15/obama-turns-to-u-n-to-outmaneuver-congress-iran-nuclear-deal/; CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, supra note 158 (stating that a Security Council resolution makes a U.S. president "legally required" to comply with the many of the "key provisions" in the JCPOA) ; CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], supra note 163, at 25 (quoting an email to CRS from a European Union official as stating that "the commitments under the JCPOA have been given legally binding effect through UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015).").

The U.N. Charter does not use the term "resolutions" and instead states, "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. Charter, art 25 (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Marko Divac Öberg, Agora: The ICJ's Kosovo Advisory Opinion: The Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 105 Am. J. Intl. L. 81, 82 (2011); John Quigley, Who Admits New Members to the United Nations (Think Twice Before You Answer), 44 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 179, 222 (2012).

Article 25 states: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. Charter, art 25.

See, e.g., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v U.K.), Preliminary Objection, 1998 I.C.J. 9, ¶44 (Feb. 27) ("As to Security Council resolution 731 (1992) .. . . it could not form a legal impediment to the admissibility of the latter because it was a mere recommendation without binding effect.... . . .").

See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶114 (June 21) ("The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect."); Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 879, 880 (2005) (stating that the exact terminology of a Security Council resolution may be relevant in interpreting whether the resolution is binding); Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security – Is it Binding?, 18 Hum. Rts. Br. 2, 3 (2011) ("[T]he meaning of a decision or a recommendation can change depending on context. Therefore, a rigid application of these distinctions leads to confusion[.]").

See Öberg, supra note 186193, at 880 (explaining that certain terms, such as "shall as opposed to should, [or] recommend as opposed to demand," may indicate whether a Security Council resolution is binding) (emphasis in original); Appiagyei-Atua, supra note 186193, at 4 ("Weak language can indicate the non-binding nature of the resolution and strong language can indicate binding intent. Words such as 'decide,' 'declare,' and 'call upon' are examples of strong language, while 'urge,' 'recommend,' and 'encourage' are weak.").

Compare S.C. 2231, ¶ 10 ("Encourag[ing]" Iran and the P5+1 "to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of the JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA"); ¶ 17 ("Request[ing]" U.N. member to take certain action); ¶ 26 ("Urg[ing] all states to cooperate with the Security Council "in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution") (emphasis in original in all) with id. ¶¶ 7-9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 21-23, 25, 27 (prefacing provisions with the verb "Decides") (emphasis in original).

Id. ¶¶ 7, 21, 22, 22.

See U.N. Charter, art 41.

E.g. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The United Nations at Fifty: the Security Council's First Fifty Years, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 506 (1995); Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 870, 898 (1981).

S.C. 2231, ¶ 2. Resolution 2231 also states that Iran and the P5+1 "commit to implement the JCPOA in good faith[,]" id. ¶ viii, and that the "United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting.... . . ." Id. ¶ 26.

See John B. Bellinger, The New UNSCR on Iran: Does it Bind the United States (and Future Presidents)?, Lawfare (July 18, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-unscr-iran-does-it-bind-united-states-and-future-presidents ("[Resolution 2231] has the effect of urging the US to carry out its commitments in the JCPOA, including the lifting of sanctions, but it does not require the US to do so as a matter of international law."). See also Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 270, 282 (1972) (former President of the International Court of Justice explaining that the phrase "calls upon" in U.N. Security Council parlance is not intended to be the equivalent of a binding decision); Thilo Marauhn, Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict – The Case of Syria, 43 Ca. W. Int'l L.J. 401, 419 (2013) (noting that the phrase "calls upon" is "remarkably softer language" than a binding decision).

See James D. Fry, Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive Disarmament Measures and their Legal Implications, 29 Mich. J. Int'l L. 197, 229-33, 272-74 (2008) (discussing competing interpretations of the phrase by commentators and Member States of the U.N.).

See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Congress, the President and the United Nations, 3 Pace Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 14 n.47 (1991).

See Fry, supra note 194201, at 262-63 (describing the differing interpretations of the phrase "calls upon" in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 by China, Costa Rica, and other members of the U.N.).

See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reasoning that a specific Security Council resolution was not self-executing because it did not "by [its] terms" confer rights upon individuals); Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that certain Security Council resolutions were not self-executing because, among other reasons, there was nothing in the text of the resolutions to suggest they were intended to be self-executing). Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (interpreting Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, under which each U.N. Member "undertakes to comply" with decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as not transforming judgments of the ICJ into law which is automatically judicially enforceable by the domestic courts of U.N. Members, but instead establishing a commitment on the political branches of U.N. Members to take future action to comply with an ICJ decision).

See 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) ("[W]henever the United States is called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which said Council has decided .. . . are to be employed to give effect to its decisions under said Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to apply such measures, through any agency which he may designate, and under such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or .. . . means of communication between any foreign country .. . . and the United States or .. . . involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.").

Cf. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505-06 (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)) ("Only "[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, [will] they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.") (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).

JCPOA, arts. 36, 37; S.C. 2231, ¶¶ 11-12. The "snapback" provision would reinstate all but one of the prior Security Council Resolutions (or the relevant portions thereof) that were lifted by Resolution 2231. See S.C. 2231 ¶¶ 7(a), 12. The resolution that would not be reinstated, Resolution 2224, related to the use of a "panel of experts" designed to assist the Security Council in matters related to Iranian nuclear development. See S.C. 2224 (2015).

S.C. 2231, ¶ 11.

Id.

See P.L. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201 (2015) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2011 note and id. § 2160e).

For additional background and analysis of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], supra note 163, at 23-24.

42 U.S.C. § 2160e(d)(6).

Id. § 2160e(e).

See 2017 Iran Remarks, supra note 161.

See id.

For additional discussion of the procedures and possible congressional options related to the JCPOA, see CRS Report R44942, Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], supra note 167.

2017 Iran Remarks, supra note 161. ("[I]n the event we are not able to reach a solution working with Congress and our allies, then the [JCPOA] will be terminated. It is under continuous review, and our participation can be cancelled by me, as President, at any time.").

2018 JCPOA Statement, supra note 166.

See supra § "Structure and Terms of the JCPOA."

See U.N. Charter, art 23.

Decisions of the Security Council require the concurring vote of all permanent members except in the case of purely procedural matters. See U.N. Charter, art 27.

JCPOA arts. 19, 20, 24.

See CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, supra note 158, at 19.

Compare, e.g., Bellinger III, supra note 200 (stating that Resolution 2231 "has the effect of urging the US to carry out its commitments in the JCPOA, including the lifting of sanctions, but it does not require the US to do so as a matter of international law") with sources cited supra note 219 (citing commentators that argue that exiting the JCPOA or re-imposing sanctions would violate Resolution 2231).

For analysis of potential responses from foreign nations to U.S. action on the JCPOA, see CRS Report R44942, Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], supra note 167, at 7-9.

For analysis of options to cease implementation of the JCPOA, see CRS Report R44942, Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], supra note 167, at 1-8.

JCPOA, art. 36. Disagreements are first referred to a "Joint Commission," id., comprised of representatives from Iran and each member of the P5+1. See id. Ann. IV, art. 1.2. After consideration by the Joint Commission, any participant may refer the issue to the parties' domestic foreign affairs representative if the dispute remains unresolved, however, consideration at this level is not mandatory. See id, art. 36. If the dispute continues to remain unresolved, a party may refer the issue to a three-member "Advisory Board," which will provide a non-binding opinion. See id. The JCPOA provides reciprocal rights to Iran, meaning that Iran can invoke the same procedure if it believes the United States or a member of the P5+1 is not performing its commitments under the plan of action. See id.

Id. ("[I]f the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.").

JCPOA, arts. 36, 37; S.C. 2231, ¶¶ 11-12.

S.C. 2231, ¶ 11.

Id. The "snapback" provision would reinstate all but one of the prior Security Council Resolutions (or the relevant portions thereof) that were lifted by Resolution 2231. See S.C. 2231 ¶¶ 7(a), 12. The resolution that would not be reinstated, Resolution 2224, related to the use of a "panel of experts" designed to assist the Security Council in matters related to Iranian nuclear development. See S.C. 2224 (2015).

See, e.g., Treasury Guidance, supra note 168, at 42-43 (discussing the "snapback" procedures in the JCPOA).

Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.

See U.N. Charter, art 23.

Decisions of the Security Council require the concurring vote of all permanent members except in the case of purely procedural matters. See U.N. Charter, art 27.