Introduction

Several Turkish foreign and domestic policy issues have significant relevance for U.S. interests, and Congress plays an active role in shaping and overseeing U.S. relations with Turkey.

This report provides information and analysis relevant for Congress on the following:

• General assessments of U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish foreign policy.
• Specific aspects of U.S.-Turkey dealings regarding Syria and Iraq, including a number of complicated issues involving the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh), Kurdish groups and other regional and international actors (i.e., Syrian government, Russia, European Union, Iran, Arab Gulf states), refugees and migrants, "safe zones," border security, and terrorism.
• Key issues regarding Turkey's domestic politics. These include controversies and questions involving Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP), and the Turkish government's ongoing hostilities with the Kurdish nationalist insurgent group PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan).

There have been many situations in which the United States and Turkey have cooperated during their decades-long alliance in NATO, but at many times they have also been at odds. Differences have stemmed largely from on divergences in leaders' assessments of respective interests given their differing (1) geographical positions, (2) threat perceptions, and (3) roles in regional and global political and security architectures. Nonetheless, both countries have continued to affirm the importance of an enduring strategic relationship.

Since President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan and Prime Minister (formerly Foreign Minister) Davutoglu began exercising control over foreign policy in the previous decade, Turkey has sought greater influence in the Middle East as part of a more outward looking foreign policy vision than that embraced by past Turkish leaders.¹ Turkey's "range of critical and overlapping roles" as a Muslim-majority democracy with a robust economy and membership in NATO has largely been viewed by the West as an asset for promoting its ties with the region.² However, recent foreign and domestic policy developments may have constrained Turkey's role as a shaper of regional outcomes, a model for neighboring countries, and a facilitator of U.S. interests. In response to recent turmoil at and within Turkey's borders, and to some conflicting priorities Turkey appears to have with the United States and other major actors in the region, one Turkish analyst said in early 2016 that Turkey "cannot protect its vital interests, and it is at odds with everyone, including its allies."³ A journalist reporting on his extensive March 2016 interview with President Obama about his Administration's foreign policy decisions wrote the following:

Early on, Obama saw Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey, as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West—but Obama now considers him a failure and an authoritarian, one who refuses to use his enormous army to bring stability to Syria.⁴

Regardless of some difficulties with the United States and other key actors, Turkey remains a key regional power that shares linkages and characteristics with the West that may distinguish it from other Muslim-majority regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Therefore, cooperation with Turkey, along with other actors, is likely to remain relevant for the advancement of U.S. interests in the volatile region.⁶

Turkey's NATO membership and economic interdependence with Europe appear to have contributed to important Turkish decisions to rely on, and partner with the West on security and other matters. However, Turkey's significant economic development over the past three decades has contributed to its efforts to seek greater overall self-reliance and independence in foreign policy.⁷

A number of developments, such as international jihadist terror incidents and refugee flows, particularly in the past year, have driven U.S. expectations regarding Turkish cooperation with respect to Syria and Iraq. Such expectations seem to center on Turkey's willingness and ability to

• prevent the flow of fighters, weapons, oil, and other non-humanitarian supplies into and out of Syria from benefitting the Islamic State and other global jihadist movements; and
• clearly prioritize anti-IS efforts in relation to other strategic concerns regarding Kurdish groups and the Asad regime in Syria.

Though some observers alleged that Turkey had been slow in 2013 and 2014 to curtail activities involving its territory that were seen as bolstering ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups,⁸ Turkey has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition, including through hosting coalition aircraft (since summer 2015) that strike targets in Syria and Iraq. Other regional U.S. partners include several Arab states, Iraq's central government, and Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria.

But Turkish leaders still confront domestic pressures and security vulnerabilities.⁹ They have sought greater intelligence sharing from foreign fighters' countries of origin, with some success.¹⁰ Turkey also faces the significant burden of hosting refugees from Syria and elsewhere; more than two million refugees have entered Turkey since 2011, and they are particularly concentrated in its southeast and its main urban centers. Turkish priorities for Syria and Iraq seem to include

• countering threats to Turkish security, territorial integrity, and domestic stability;
• reducing Turkey's responsibilities for refugees; and
• achieving lasting resolutions in order to relieve refugee flows and other challenges to Turkey, promote Turkey's regional influence, and provide substantive political empowerment for Sunni Arabs and Turkmen.

Over the past two years, Turkey has stepped up IS-focused border security and counterterrorism measures, presumably in response to international pressure,¹¹ An additional motivation may be concerns regarding Turkey's stability and economic well-being (including its tourist industry).¹² Since the last half of 2014, Turkey has introduced or boosted initiatives aimed at (1) preventing potential foreign fighters from entering Turkey, (2) preventing those who enter Turkey from traveling to Syria, and (3) curbing illicit oil smuggling used to finance jihadist activities.¹³ Since July 2015, a number of apparent Islamic State suicide bombings (though the Islamic State has not acknowledged responsibility for the bombings) have taken place in Turkey—in Suruc, Ankara, and Istanbul—causing significant fatalities. Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, submitted written testimony for a February 10, 2016, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing that stated:

ISIL's only remaining outlet to the world remains a 98-kilometer strip of the Syrian border with Turkey. Our NATO ally Turkey has made clear that it considers ISIL on their border a national security threat, and the government, in part due to U.S. and international pressure, has taken aggressive measures in recent weeks to impede the flow of ISIL resources and fighters through that segment of the border. The importance of this effort cannot be overstated.¹⁴

However, various interrelated dynamics may be preventing Turkish officials from undertaking more robust direct operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, including the following:

Turkey's strategic calculations in areas close to its border with Syria have been affected by late 2015 and early 2016 military operations by the Syrian government, its allies (including Russia, Iran, and various Shiite militias). These calculations may factor into larger Turkish geopolitical anxieties regarding (as mentioned above) the regional influence of Turkey and other Sunni-majority countries relative to the Kurds, Russia, and Iran, particularly if these recent developments play a decisive role in shaping the political outcome of Syria's civil war. Short-term Turkish concerns apparently include the following:

• Turkey's reduced ability to supply Syrian opposition militias via the Bab al Salam crossing south of the Turkish border town of Kilis; and
• External (Syrian, Russian, even U.S.) efforts that could possibly facilitate Syrian Kurdish territorial ambitions in a key area between the town of Azaz and the Euphrates River that would connect other Kurdish-controlled enclaves.¹⁸ The leading Syrian Kurdish militia, the People's Protection Units (Kurdish acronym YPG), is dominated by the Syrian Kurdish group known as the Democratic Union Party (Kurdish acronym PYD).

In early 2016, Turkish artillery has periodically targeted YPG positions in or around the Azaz-Euphrates corridor, and Turkish officials have hinted that more direct military action is possible if the YPG continues operations in the area.¹⁹ Yet, most reports indicate that the Turkish military strongly opposes mounting large-scale operations in Syria, especially without U.N. Security Council backing.²⁰ Moreover, stepped-up Western intervention seems unlikely.²¹ U.S. officials have "urged the YPG to avoid moves that will heighten tensions with Turkey and with other Arab opposition forces in northern Syria," while also urging Turkey to cease artillery fire across the border.²² In February, Turkey invited Saudi Arabia to base fighter aircraft at Incirlik air base, ostensibly in connection with anti-IS coalition efforts.²³ The invitation may also been part of a larger effort to communicate Sunni resolve against Bashar al Asad's regime²⁴ at a time when recent conflict and international diplomacy (including a partial cease-fire that began in February and Russia's March announcement of a drawdown of some type) may have led to greater confidence among Asad and his Russian and Iranian allies regarding their position in Syria.²⁵

Given that the PYD/YPG has close ties with the PKK, gains by the YPG during the Syrian conflict have raised the possibility of PKK-affiliated control over most of Syria's northern border.²⁶ Media reports from March 2016 indicate that Syrian Kurdish leaders are considering declaring a federal region for the various ethnic groups (including Arabs and Turkmen) in areas under de facto PYD control.²⁷ Turkey would oppose such a move, and it would have implications for a number of other stakeholders in Syria's conflict.²⁸ In a March 17 daily press briefing, the State Department spokesperson said, in response to whether the United States would accept a choice by "the Syrian people" to have a federal system, "I think we'd have to wait and see what the outcome of this transitional process is.... And when you say 'federal,' you and I might think something different in 'federal.' We're not interested in self-rule, self-autonomous zones. That can be a completely different thing than a federal system."

PYD leaders routinely insist that their organization maintains an independent identity, yet several sources indicate that PYD-PKK links persist, including with respect to personnel.²⁹ In June 2015, President Erdogan said, "We will never allow the establishment of a state in Syria's north and our south. We will continue to fight in this regard no matter what it costs."³⁰ In September 2015, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said:

By mounting operations against [IS] and the PKK at the same time [in summer 2015], we also prevented the PKK from legitimizing itself. Until the PYD changes its stance, we will continue to see it in the same way that we see the PKK.³¹

Although the United States has considered the PKK to be a terrorist group since 1997, it does not apply this characterization to the PYD/YPG. A State Department deputy spokesperson said in an October 20, 2014, daily press briefing that "the PYD is a different group than the PKK legally, under United States law." In a September 21, 2015, daily press briefing, the State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not consider the YPG to be a terrorist organization, and in a February 23, 2016, press briefing, the Defense Department spokesperson said that "we will continue to disagree with Turkey [with] regard [to] … our support for those particular [Kurdish] groups that are taking the fight to ISIL, understanding their concerns about terrorist activities."

While the U.S. military has provided air support to the YPG, the State Department deputy spokesperson said at a February 17, 2016, daily press briefing that U.S. support for the YPG has not included directly arming the group. U.S. officials have referred to U.S. military airdrops of arms or ammunition in Syria to non-YPG groups, including groups that associate or may associate with the YPG via an umbrella group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).³² Most media reports, however, support one source's claim that "the YPG is the main element of the [SDF] coalition and outnumbers all other groups."³³ Evidence of significant Turkish Kurdish participation in YPG military operations³⁴ and of cross-border tunnels³⁵ suggest the possibility that fighters and weapons have traveled from Syria to Turkey to assist PKK or PKK-affiliated militants against the Turkish government (see "Ongoing Turkey-PKK Violence and Future Prospects" below).³⁶ In a February 8, 2016, daily press briefing, the State Department spokesperson responded to a question about whether "arms given to [the] PYD" might have been used against the Turkish military by saying that "we've seen no indication that that's borne out by the facts."

In February 2016, Erdogan demanded that the United States choose between Turkey and the PYD,³⁷ and in March he alleged that weapons confiscated from the PKK and PYD/YPG have Russian and Western (including U.S.) origins.³⁸ U.S. officials have expressed their intentions to continue cooperating with both Turkey and the PYD/YPG on specific aspects of the crisis in Syria.³⁹ Media reports suggest ongoing debates among U.S. officials about how closely to work with the PYD/YPG in the context of other partnering options and the PYD's relations with Russia and other regional and international actors.⁴⁰ In March 2016, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that U.S. officials have "made it very clear to the PYD that any actions it takes to either support the PKK or to [militarily] engage the other opposition groups [beyond the Islamic State] are profoundly problematic and we look to the PYD to act responsibly and to focus its efforts on the fight against Daesh."⁴¹ Later in March, Turkey's interior ministry blamed a deadly suicide car bombing in Ankara on a PKK member whom the YPG allegedly trained.⁴²

Turkey has long advocated the creation of one or more "safe zones" within Syria along the two countries' border. To some extent, such advocacy resembles pleas that Turkish leaders made following the 1991 Gulf War for help in preventing refugee burdens.⁴³ In that case, the United States established a humanitarian safe zone with ground forces and then patrolled a no-fly zone in northern Iraq.⁴⁴ In December 9, 2015, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter addressed the case of Syria:

With respect to safe zones, ... I've certainly thought about that a great deal. [The] concept of a safe zone would be to create a patch of Syria [wherein] people who are inclined to go there, could go there and be protected. They would need to be protected because you can foresee that at least ISIL and other radical groups, and quite possibly elements of the Assad regime, [would] undertake to prove that it wasn't safe.

And so it would have to be made safe. And that takes us back to the question of [what's] an appropriate force of that size to protect a zone of that size. [In] our estimate, it's substantial. And again, I don't see, much as I wish otherwise, anybody offering to furnish that force.

I also think we have thought about who might want to reside in such a zone. I think it would be undesirable [if it] became a place into which people were pushed, say, from Turkey or Europe, expelled, so to speak, into this zone. I don't know what the people who now live in the zone would think about other people coming into the zone. That would have to be taken into account, and whether other people want to live there.

[So] we have thought about it. It's complicated. We have not recommended that because it's an undertaking of substantial scale where [in] my judgment, the costs outweigh the benefits.

In a December 1, 2015, House Armed Services Committee hearing, General Joseph Dunford (USMC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, equated a hypothetical establishment of a no-fly zone to declaring war on Syria.

Turkish officials have expressed hopes that a protected zone of some type in northern Syria might create opportunities for the more than two million Syrian refugees that Turkey currently hosts—as well as others from Iraq and elsewhere—to return to their home country and to mitigate future refugee flows.⁴⁷ Various media reports from early 2016 indicate that the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation⁴⁸ has coordinated the setup of tent camps for displaced persons on the Syrian side of the Syria-Turkey border because Turkey has closed its crossings to most refugees.⁴⁹ Some observers question what might happen were these camps to face attack or impending danger.⁵⁰

Many refugees have lived in Turkey for months or years and have reportedly had difficulty accessing basic services and jobs because Turkey does not grant them full refugee status.⁵¹ Some refugees from third countries and undocumented migrants have crossed over Turkish territory to Europe via land. However, given relatively strong controls at Turkey's land borders with European Union countries, particularly under current circumstances, many refugees and migrants have opted for sea routes—especially to nearby Greek islands—on crowded boats under dangerous conditions. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than one million refugees and migrants—many of whom use Turkey as a point of transit—arrived in Europe via sea in 2015, and more than 130,000 have arrived in 2016 through early March,⁵² with higher rates of migration reportedly expected in the coming warm-weather months.⁵³ According to a Turkish government source,⁵⁴ in 2015 the Turkish Coast Guard initiated two new operations—one in the Aegean Sea and one in the Mediterranean—aimed at maintaining safety and security via rescue and interdiction efforts.⁵⁵

The European Union (EU) has engaged with Turkey to assist it in its efforts to deal with refugee and migrant populations while stemming or controlling the flow of these populations to Europe. In November 2015, Turkey and the EU finalized a joint action plan, which included an initial EU pledge of €3 billion in humanitarian aid⁵⁶ for Syrian refugees in Turkey (along with other pledges related to possible visa-free travel and resumption of EU accession negotiations) in return for more robust Turkish cooperation in stopping migrant smugglers and human traffickers.⁵⁷ Some observers questioned, however, whether Turkish authorities—including those with the mandate to prevent smugglers and traffickers from leaving shore—would be able or willing to control refugee and migrant flows under this arrangement.⁵⁸

Following the November 2015 summit, European leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel have met frequently with Turkish leaders in efforts to reach more specific understandings. Additionally, in February 2016, NATO announced that it would deploy a maritime mission in the Aegean Sea to help support efforts "to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean."⁵⁹ The mission seeks to increase the capacity of Turkish and Greek security and border control personnel, and improve information-sharing, including with national coast guards of EU countries and Frontex (the EU's borders management agency, which oversees two EU maritime rescue missions—one in the Aegean and the other in the central Mediterranean between Italy and Libya). In early March, NATO announced that its ships would expand their area of operation to include Greek and Turkish territorial waters.⁶⁰

In light of ongoing refugee and migrant flows into Europe, the EU agreed in principle in early March to (1) expedite the disbursement of the aid promised in November 2015 and contemplate additional aid to help Turkey with its efforts; (2) consider allowing visa-free travel for Turks by June 2016 and opening new chapters in Turkey's EU accession negotiations; and (3) potentially cooperate with Turkey in facilitating within Syria areas for the local population that would be "more safe."⁶¹ In concert with these proposals, Turkey would agree to take back "all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands" and, in exchange, one Syrian refugee from Turkey would be resettled in the EU for every Syrian "readmitted by Turkey from Greek islands."⁶²

Officials from international organizations and other observers have raised concerns regarding the legality and morality of the proposed Turkey-EU arrangement:

• On March 8, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi expressed deep concern "about any arrangement that would involve the blanket return of anyone from one country to another without spelling out the refugee protection safeguards under international law."⁶³ Perhaps partly in hopes of addressing such concerns to some extent, the Turkish government issued a regulation in January permitting employment (with some limitations) for those Syrians who have officially registered for temporary protection in Turkey.⁶⁴ UNHCR also said on March 8 that "Europe's resettlement commitments remain however, very low compared to the needs."⁶⁵
• A leader of one of the political blocs in the European Parliament warned in March about the EU making a deal with "a country [Turkey] that imprisons journalists, attacks civil liberties and [has] a highly worrying human rights situation."⁶⁶
• Amnesty International released a statement decrying the EU's dependence on Turkey as its "border guard," given the burdens Turkey already faces with three million refugees. Amnesty claimed that it had evidence of Turkish maltreatment of some refugees and asylum-seekers, including "unlawful detentions and deportations" and the "forcible return" of some refugees to Syria.⁶⁷

On March 18, Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu finalized the proposed arrangement with EU leaders in Brussels. The resulting EU-Turkey statement included the following passage:

All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order. Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey.⁶⁸

According to one media report, returns from Greek islands to Turkey will commence on April 4.⁶⁹

Turkish domestic politics feature controversies regarding power, constitutional democracy, corruption, and civil liberties. Contentious discussions also focus on ongoing Turkey-PKK conflict with the potential to destabilize significant areas of the country, security concerns regarding Syria and Iraq, and economic issues.⁷⁰ Vigorous debate over whether (and, if so, how) President Erdogan exercises authoritarian control over Turkey's government and society will likely continue for the foreseeable future, especially after the AKP, the party he founded and still leads de facto, regained its parliamentary majority in November 2015 elections (after having lost the majority in June 2015 elections). Since the November elections, Erdogan and Davutoglu have sought sufficient popular and cross-party support to enact constitutional changes that would increase Erdogan's presidential power.

During and since the recent election campaigns, the government has reportedly intimidated or arrested several Turkish journalists with a history of criticizing Erdogan and the AKP, and has taken over a number of media outlets. In March 2016, Turkey's constitutional court ordered the release of two prominent journalists from prison, though they still face charges of aiding terrorism and violating state security.⁷¹ Also in March, the government appointed a trustee to run Zaman, Turkey's largest-circulating newspaper. A Turkish court approved the action on the basis of Zaman's affiliation with the Fethullah Gulen movement, a civil society network that had largely aligned itself with the AKP until the government branded the movement a hostile actor and terrorist group based on its purported role in a late 2013 corruption crisis.⁷² In a March 4 daily press briefing, the State Department spokesman said that the Zaman takeover was "the latest in a series of troubling judicial and law enforcement actions taken by the Turkish Government targeting media outlets and others critical of it." A week later, on March 11, the White House press secretary provided context for views attributed to President Obama on Turkish domestic issues (see "Overall Assessment of U.S.-Turkey Dealings" above)⁷³ by stating, "There are some ways in which we feel the [Turkish] government has not been sufficiently supportive of universal human rights—the kind of human rights that we obviously deeply value here in the United States and that we advocate for around the world."⁷⁴ The press secretary cited the Zaman takeover as one example.⁷⁵

Despite this criticism, it is unclear whether non-Turkish actors will play a significant role in resolving questions about Turkey's commitment to democracy and limited government, its secular-religious balance, and its Kurdish question. Moreover, some observers assert that various security-related concerns—such as those involving the Islamic State and refugees—make the United States and the European Union less likely to take significant measures to check Turkish officials' domestic actions.⁷⁶ Erdogan and his supporters periodically resort to criticism of Western countries in apparent efforts to galvanize domestic political support against outside influences,⁷⁷ and some officials and pro-government media have pushed back against U.S. criticism of the Zaman takeover.⁷⁸

Turkey's government and the PKK resumed hostilities in July 2015 amid mutual recrimination, ending a cease-fire that had been in place since March 2013 as part of a broader Turkey-PKK "peace process." Since the resumption, Turkish authorities have arrested hundreds of terrorism suspects in southeastern Turkey, and Turkey-PKK violence in Turkey and the PKK's northern Iraqi safe havens has resulted in hundreds of casualties⁷⁹ and the reported displacement of around 200,000 people.⁸⁰

Turkey-PKK violence has led Turkish authorities to take emergency measures to pacify conflict in key southeastern urban areas.⁸¹ This has fueled international concerns about possible human rights abuses.⁸² The October 10, 2015, suicide bombings—linked by many reports to the Islamic State organization—that killed more than 100 people at a pro-Kurdish rally in Ankara led to renewed nationalistic recriminations and allegations that the government provided insufficient security for the event.⁸³ Subsequently, a number of events have further fueled nationalistic tensions, including (1) the assassination of a prominent Kurdish nationalist figure under disputed circumstances in late November 2015,⁸⁴ (2) controversial December 2015 statements from the leaders of the pro-Kurdish party in Turkey's parliament that may endanger their parliamentary immunity,⁸⁵ and (3) suspected PKK-linked suicide car bombings against targets in Ankara in February and March 2016.

U.S. officials, while supportive of Turkey's prerogative to defend itself from attacks, have advised Turkey to show restraint and proportionality in its actions against the PKK. They also have expressed desires for the parties to resolve their differences peaceably.⁸⁶ Many European officials have called for an immediate end to violence and resumption of peace talks.⁸⁷ In early 2016, some observers have called for greater Western efforts to press Turkey, the PKK, and possibly the PYD/YPG to calm tensions and facilitate a renewed domestic political process on the issue in Turkey.⁸⁸ Analysts anticipate that fighting could intensify in spring conditions.⁸⁹

Author Contact Information

Footnotes