.
Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions
Limiting the Normalization of Relations
Dianne E. Rennack
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
February 13May 29, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43888
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Summary
In December 2014, President Obama announced major changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
including the restoration of diplomatic relations (relations were severed in January 1961), a
review by the Department of State of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism (Cuba
was designated in 1982), and an increase in travel, trade, and the free flow of information to
Cuba. This third step required the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury to amend the
embargo regulations, which were announced on January 15, 2015.
When the President announced his policy change on Cuba, he acknowledged that he does not
have authority to lift the embargo because it is codified in legislation. While the embargo was
first imposed in the early 1960s under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the
Trading with the Enemy Act, Congress enacted additional laws over the years that strengthened
the embargo on Cuba, including the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (which codified the embargo regulations),
and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. Congress also has enacted
numerous other provisions of law that impose sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade,
foreign aid, and support from the international financial institutions.
This report provides information on legislative provisions restricting relations with Cuba. It lists
the various provisions of law comprising economic sanctions on Cuba, including key laws that
are the statutory basis of the embargo, and provides information on the authority to lift or waive
these restrictions.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43024, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th
Congress;
CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: President Obama’s New Policy Approach, by Mark P.
Sullivan;
CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative
Parameters:
In Brief; and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Tables
Table 1. Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of U.S.-Cuban Relations ................. 3
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 1816
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Introduction
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation
through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. President John F. Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade between the United
States and Cuba in February 1962,1 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA), which authorizes the President “to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade
between the United States and Cuba.”2 At the same time, the Department of the Treasury issued
the Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the United States of all goods
imported from or through Cuba.3 The authority for the embargo was later expanded in March
1962 to include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).4
In July 1963, the Treasury Department revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and replaced them
with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)—31 C.F.R. Part 515—
under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA.5 The CACR, which include a
prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in
the United States, remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations, and have been amended
many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. They are administered by the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and prohibit financial transactions as
well as trade transactions with Cuba. The CACR also require that all exports to Cuba be licensed
by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, under the provisions of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended.6 The Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
7
are found at 15 C.F.R. Sections 730-774.7
Congress subsequently strengthened sanctions on Cuba through provisions in such legislation as
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA, P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and the Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA, P.L. 106-387, Title IX).
•
Among its sanctions, the CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade
with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any sea-borne vessel to
load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within the
previous 180 days.
•
The LIBERTAD Act codified the economic embargo, including all restrictions
under the CACR, although the President retains broad authority to amend the
1
27 Federal Register 1085, February 7, 1962 (Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, February 3,
1962).
2
Previously, in October 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration, exports to Cuba were placed under strict export
controls under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 in response to the expropriation of U.S. properties. This
in effect amounted to an embargo on exports of all products with the exception of certain foods, medicines, and
medical supplies.
3
27 Federal Register 1116, February 7, 1962.
4
27 Federal Register 2765-2766, March 24, 1962.
5
28 Federal Register 6974-6985, July 9, 1963.
6
31 C.F.R. §515.533.
7
See especially 15 C.F.R. §746.2 on Cuba, which refers to other parts of the EAR.
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regulations. Nevertheless, as set forth in the LIBERTAD Act, the President
cannot eliminate the embargo regulations without making a determination that a
transition government is in power in Cuba. The LIBERTAD Act also requires the
President to end the embargo if he determines that a democratically elected
government is in power.
•
While TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial exports to Cuba, it also includes
prohibitions on U.S. assistance and financing and requires “payment of cash in
advance” or third-country financing for the exports. The act also prohibits tourist
travel to Cuba.
In addition to these key acts that constitute the economic embargo, there are numerous other
provisions of law that impose sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and
support from international financial institutions. The government of Cuba also was designated by
the State Department as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1982 under Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act and other laws because of its alleged ties to international terrorism.8
On April 14, 2015, the President announced his intention to rescind the terrorism designation
from the government of Cuba, a decision that was fulfilled by the Secretary of State on May 29,
2015.9
On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama announced major changes in policy toward
Cuba, including the intention to reestablish diplomatic relations that were severed in 1961, a
review of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism, and numerous policy
measures to increase travel, commerce, and the free flow of information to Cuba. To implement
this last step, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce issued amendments to the CACR9CACR10
and EAR to enter into effect on January 16, 2015, that significantly eased the embargo in such
areas as travel, remittances, trade (including consumer communication devices and certain goods
and services for the private sector), and financial services (permitting U.S. correspondent bank
accounts in Cuban financial institutions).1011
When announcing the policy changes, the President acknowledged that he does not have the
authority to lift the embargo, but maintained that he looks forward to engaging Congress in a
debate about doing so. Without a presidential determination required by the LIBERTAD Act that
Cuba has a democratically elected government in place, congressional action would be required
to end the embargo by amending or repealing the LIBERTAD and other embargo-related
statutes.1112
This report provides information on legislative provisions restricting relations with Cuba. Table 1
lists the various provisions of law comprising economic sanctions on Cuba, including key laws
that are the statutory basis of the embargo, and provides information on the authority to lift or
waive the restrictions.
8
8
Cuba’s designation on the state sponsor of terrorism list has allowed U.S. nationals injured by an act of international
terrorism to file lawsuits against Cuba in the United States for damages. For more information, see CRS Report
WSLG254, Can Victims of Terrorism in the United States Sue Foreign Governments? by Jennifer K. Elsea.
9
U.S. Department of State. “Rescission of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,” press statement, May 29, 2015.
10
CRS has prepared a memorandum for general distribution on Cuban Assets Control Regulations, with Final Rule of
January 16, 2015 Incorporated in Ramseyer Form, available on request from the authors.
1011
80 Federal Register 2286-2302, January 16, 2015.
1112
U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Embargo On Cuba: Recent Regulatory Changes and Potential
Presidential or Congressional Actions, GAO-09-0951R, September 17, 2009.
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that are the statutory basis of the embargo, and provides information on the authority to lift or
waive the restrictions.
Table 1. Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of U.S.-Cuban Relations
Statutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Key Restrictions that Form the Core of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Regime on Cuba: The Embargo
Sec. 620(a)(1), Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)(1))
Prohibits foreign aid “to the present
government of Cuba.”
Authorizes the President “to
establish and maintain a total
embargo upon all trade between the
United States and Cuba.”
The prohibition on aid has no
waiver, though could be overridden
by appropriations language that
provides aid “notwithstanding any
other provision of law.”
As set forth in the law, the total
embargo is a discretionary
authorization.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of sec. 620(a) only
if he determines “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204 of that Actact, furthermore,
requires the President to terminate
sanctions under sec. 620(a) and
other measures if he determines that
“a democratically elected
government in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
620(a) on President making such
a determination.
a
determination.
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 620(a)(2), Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22U.S.C. 2370(a)(2))
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Authorizes the President to prohibit
foreign aid to “any government of
Cuba.”
Denies Cuba a quota for sugar trade,
“or to receive any other benefit
under any law of the United States....
”
As set forth in the law, the
prohibitions on aid and sugar
imports are discretionary, “except as
may be deemed necessary by the
President in the interests of the
United States.”
Denies Cuba a quota for sugar trade,
“or to receive any other benefit
under any law of the United States....
”
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of sec. 620(a) only
if he determines “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 620(a) and other
measures if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
620(a) on President making such
a determination.
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Statutory Basis
a
determination.
Sec. 5(b), Trading With the Enemy
Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b))
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Authorizes the President to restrict
or prohibit trade, transactions, and
access to assets and property.
The Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515, were
issued in July 1963 under the
authority of TWEA. Pursuant to the
law, the President may terminate the
national emergency and restrictions
under TWEA at any time.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of 31 CFR Part 515
only if he determines that “a
transition government is in power in
Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate the economic
embargo of Cuba, including the
restrictions under 31 CFR Part 515 if
he determines that “a democratically
elected government in Cuba is in
power.”
Nevertheless, the Secretary of the
Treasury retains authority to amend
regulations therein, in accordance
with 31 CFR Part 515. 201, which, in
part, provides: “All of the following
transactions are prohibited, except
as specifically authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury.... ”
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Sec. 1704, Cuban Democracy Act of
1992 (22 U.S.C. 6003)
Authorizes the President to prohibit
foreign aid under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, transactions
under the Arms Export Control Act,
or debt forgiveness, to any third
country providing assistance to
Cuba.
Authority to Lift or Waive
As set forth in the law, the
prohibitions are at the President’s
discretion.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of sec. 1704 only if
he determines that “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 1704 and other measures
if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
1704 on President making such a
determination.
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Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations
Statutory Basis
Sec. 1705(d), Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004(d))
Restriction
Requires on-site verification for the
export of medicines and medical
supplies (unless the recipient is a
nongovernmental organization
receiving donations).
Authority to Lift or Waive
The President is required to
determine that the U.S. government
can verify the end use of such
exports.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064) authorizes the
President to suspend the
enforcement of sec. 1705(d) only if
he determines that “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 1705 and other measures
if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
1705(d) on President making
such a
determination.
Sec. 1705(e)(5), Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004(e)(5))
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Sec. 1705, overall, authorizes
“support for the Cuban people,”
including allowing
telecommunications services
between the United States and Cuba.
Sec. 1705(e)(5), however, clarifies
that this allowance does not
authorize a U.S. person to invest in
Cuba’s domestic telecommunications
network.
No waiver.
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 1706(a), Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6005(a))
Restriction
Prohibits specific licenses for
transactions relating to trade
between Cuba and U.S.-owned or controlled companies in third
countries “in appropriate cases,”
codifying requirements stated in 31
CFR Part 515.559 as of July 1, 1989
(effective October 23, 1992).
Authority to Lift or Waive
Sec. 1708 provides that the
President may waive if he determines
that the government of Cuba (1) has
held free and fair elections, (2)
permits opposition parties to
participate, (3) respects “basic civil
liberties and human rights of the
citizens of Cuba,” (4) is moving
toward a free market economy, and
(5) is committed to constitutional
change that ensures regular free and
fair elections.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of sec. 1706 only if
he determines that “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 1706 and other measures
if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
1706 on President making such a
determination.
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Sec. 1706(b), Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6005(b))
Prohibits entry into U.S. ports by any
vessel that has entered a Cuban port
in the previous 180 days.
Licenses may be issued at the
discretion of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
Prohibits entry into U.S. ports by any
vessel carrying goods or passengers
to or from Cuba in which Cuba or a
Cuban national has any interest.
Sec. 1708 provides that the
President may waive if he determines
that the government of Cuba (1) has
held free and fair elections, (2)
permits opposition parties to
participate, (3) respects “basic civil
liberties and human rights of the
citizens of Cuba,” (4) is moving
toward a free market economy, and
(5) is committed to constitutional
change that ensures regular free and
fair elections.
Prohibits the use of a general license
for ship stores for any vessel
carrying goods or passengers to or
from Cuba in which Cuba or a
Cuban national has any interest.
Authority to Lift or Waive
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of sec. 1706 only if
he determines that “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 1706 and other measures
if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
1706 on President making such a
determination.
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Sec. 1706(c), Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6005(c))
Requires the President to “establish
strict limits on remittances to Cuba
by United States persons for the
purpose of financing the travel of
Cubans to the United States.... ”
The term “strict limits” is undefined,
so left to the discretion of the
President.
Sec. 1708 provides that the
President may waive if he determines
that the government of Cuba (1) has
held free and fair elections, (2)
permits opposition parties to
participate, (3) respects “basic civil
liberties and human rights of the
citizens of Cuba,” (4) is moving
toward a free market economy, and
(5) is committed to constitutional
change that ensures regular free and
fair elections.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064), however,
authorizes the President to suspend
the enforcement of sec. 1706 only if
he determines that “a transition
government is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 1706 and other measures
if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
1706 on President making such a
determination.
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 102(h), Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6032(h))
Restriction
Codifies the economic embargo as in
effect on March 1, 1996, including
restrictions stated in regulations at
31 CFR Part 515.
Authority to Lift or Waive
Within 31 CFR Part 515, the
Secretary of the Treasury retains
authority to amend regulations
therein, in accordance with 31 CFR
Part 515. 201, which, in part,
provides: “All of the following
transactions are prohibited, except
as specifically authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury.... ”
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064) authorizes the
President to suspend the
enforcement of 31 CFR Part 515
only if he determines that “a
transition government is in power in
Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate the economic
embargo of Cuba, including the
restrictions under 31 CFR Part 515,
if he determines that “a
democratically elected government
in Cuba is in power.”
Sec. 103(a), Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6033(a))
Prohibits a U.S. person or entity
from financing any transaction that
involves confiscated property in
Cuba where the claim is owned by a
U.S. national.
Sec. 103(b) provides that the
President may suspend if he
determines a transition government
is in power; he may terminate if the
transition to democracy is met as
stated in secs. 203 and 204.
Sec. 104(a), Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6034(a))
Requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to instruct U.S. executive
directors to the international
financial institutions to oppose
Cuba’s admission to such institution.
The President may suspend if he
determines a democratically elected
government is in power.
Requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to withhold U.S. payment
to any international financial
institution in an amount equal to that
institution’s loan or assistance to
Cuba if that loan is opposed by the
United States.
The statute requires the United
States to oppose Cuba’s membership
(in sec. 104(a)); it does not require
opposing any loan or program of an
international financial institution. If
the United States supports a
program or abstains from a vote, this
requirement would be inapplicable.
Only if the United States opposes a
loan would proportionate
withholding be required.
Sec. 104(b), Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6034(b))
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The President may encourage
membership, and the Secretary of
the Treasury may encourage loans
and assistance, when a transition
government is in power, “to
contribute to a stable foundation for
a democratically elected government
in Cuba.”
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Sec. 111(b), Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6041(b))
Requires withholding some foreign
aid to any third country in amounts
equal to that country’s aid to Cuba
to complete its nuclear facility at
Juragua.
No waiver; however the statute
allows aid to continue for
humanitarian needs, disaster relief,
refugee relief, democracy, rule of
law, private sector and NGO
development, free market economy
development, nonproliferation, and
secondary school exchanges.
Title III, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6081-6085)
Allow U.S. nationals whose property
was confiscated by the Cuban
government a right of action to seek
compensation in U.S. federal court
from those who “traffic” in such
property.
The President may suspend the right
of action for successive 6-month
periods if he determines that such
suspension is in the U.S. national
interest and will expedite Cuba’s
transition to democracy. The
President has exercised this
suspension since the law’s
enactment.
Sec. 204 of the Actact also authorizes
the President, once he determines
that a transition government is in
power, to suspend the right of action
under title III to the extent that it
contributes to a stable foundation
for a democratically elected
government in Cuba.
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Title IV, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6091)
Requires the Secretary of State and
Attorney General to deny entry into
the United States to any person (or
family member of that person) who
has confiscated property, or has
been involved in a related
transaction, to which a U.S. person
has a claim.
Secretary of State may, case-by-case,
allow entry into the United States
for medical purposes or to attend to
litigation actions under title III of the
Actact (relating to protection of
property rights of U.S. nationals).
Sec. 906, Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export
Enhancement Act of
2000 (22 U.S.C.
7205)
Exports of agricultural commodities,
medicine, and medical supplies to
Cuba require a 1-year license and 1year contract.
No waiver.
Sec. 908, Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export
Enhancement Act of
2000 (22 U.S.C.
7207)
Prohibits U.S. aid for exports to
Cuba. Limits the means by which a
U.S. person may finance the sale of
agricultural products to Cuba to
cash in advance or third-country
financing.
No waiver.
Sec. 910(b), Trade Sanctions and
Reform
and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
2000 (22 U.S.C. 7208(b))
The Secretary of the Treasury may
not authorize travel-related
transactions listed in paragraph (c) of
section 515.560 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations, either by a
general license or on a case-by-case
basis by a specific license for travel
to, from, or within Cuba for tourist
activities.
No waiver.
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Key Restrictions that Form the Core of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Regime on Cuba: Terrorism
SecStatutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Key Restrictions that Form the Core of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Regime on Cuba: Terrorism
Sec. 620A, Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371)
Prohibits funding under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, Peace Corps Act, and
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, to
any country the government of
which the Secretary of State finds
“has repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism.”
President may lift restrictions if he
determines (1) “there has been a
fundamental change in the leadership
and policies of the government,” (2)
the government does not support
acts of international terrorism, and
(3) the government provides
assurances that it will not support
international terrorism in the future.
Alternatively, the President may lift
restrictions if he determines that the
government has not supported
terrorism in the preceding six
months, and has provided assurances
that it will not support international
terrorism in the future.
The President may waive if he
determines it is in U.S. national
security interests or that
humanitarian reasons (for non-lethal
aid) justify a waiver.
Sec. 40, Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780)
Prohibits transactions relating to
providing, directly or indirectly, any
munitions acquisition to any country
the government of which the
Secretary of State finds “has
repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism.”
U.S. persons are prohibited from
exporting, selling, leasing, loaning,
granting, providing, or facilitating the
acquisition of any munitions item
to/by Cuba.
The Secretary of State may waive
some prohibitions if he determines,
after consulting Congress, that
“unusual and compelling
circumstances require” it.
President may lift restrictions if he
determines that (1) “there has been
a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the
government,” (2) the government
does not support acts of
international terrorism, and (3) the
government provides assurances that
it will not support international
terrorism in the future.
Alternatively, the President may lift
restrictions if he determines that the
government has not supported
terrorism in the preceding six
months, and has provided assurances
that it will not support international
terrorism in the future.
The President may waive for a
specific transaction if he determines
it is “essential to the national
security of the United States” and
consults with and reports to
Congress.
Congress may block lifting this
restriction by passing a joint
resolution.
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Sec. 6(j), Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j))
Requires a validated export license,
with a presumption of denial for
such issuance, to any country the
government of which has repeatedly
provided support for acts of
international terrorism.
Authority to Lift or Waive
The Secretary of State may issue
licenses with prior notification to
Congress.
President may lift restrictions if he
determines that (1) “there has been
a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the
government,” (2) the government
does not support acts of
international terrorism, and (3) the
government provides assurances that
it will not support international
terrorism in the future.
Alternatively, the President may lift
restrictions if he determines that the
government has not supported
terrorism in the preceding six
months, and has provided assurances
that it will not support international
terrorism in the future.
Sec. 40A, Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2781)
Sec. 6, Bretton Woods Agreements
Act Amendments, 1978 (22 U.S.C.
286e-11)
Prohibits the selling or leasing of
defense articles or defense services
to any country that “is not
cooperating fully with United States
antiterrorism efforts.” Determined
annually to apply only to that fiscal
year.
President could delist (list comes out
annually by May 15).
Requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to instruct U.S. executive
directors to the International
Monetary Fund “to work in
opposition to” loans to any state
that permits entry to any person
who has committed an act of
international terrorism, or otherwise
harbors such person.
No waiver. A determination
pursuant to sec. 6(j), Export
Administration Act of 1979 to
remove Cuba from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism, made on May
29, 2015, however, however,
could indirectly
remove this
restriction.
President may waive for a specific
transaction if he finds it “important
to the national interests of the
United States.”
Additional Restrictions: Foreign Aid, Trade, and International Financial Institutions Programs
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Sec. 307, Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227)
Congressional Research Service
Withholds a proportion of U.S.
contributions to the United Nations
and other international programs
operating in Cuba (except UNICEF
and some International Atomic
Energy Agency programs).
No waiver.
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Sec. 498A(b), (c), Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295a)
Prohibits some foreign aid to any
government of an independent state
of the former Soviet Union that the
President determines is providing
assistance for, or engaging in
nonmarket trade with, the Cuban
government.
President may waive if he determines
that (1) “it is important to the
national interest of the United
States” to do so; (2) aid will foster
respect for internationally
recognized human rights, rule of law,
development of democratic
governance institutions; (3) aid
alleviates results of a disaster; (4) aid
is for secondary school programs
run by the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA).
Sec. 498A(d), Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295a)
Reduces aid to any government of an
independent state of the former
Soviet Union in proportion with that
country’s aid to Cuba’s intelligence
facilities.
President may waive if he determines
that it is important to U.S. national
security. In the case of Russia, must
further determine Russia is not
sharing intelligence data with the
Cuban government.
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 620(f), Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22U.S.C. 2370(f))
Restriction
Prohibits foreign aid to any
Communist country, explicitly
naming Cuba.
Authority to Lift or Waive
President may waive if he finds it is
vital to the security of the United
States, the recipient is not controlled
by the “international Communist
conspiracy,” and aid will promote
the independence of the recipient.
President may also remove Cuba
from the stated list of communist
countries for any period of time if he
finds it important to U.S. national
interests to do so.
Sec. 620(t), Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22U.S.C. 2370(t))
Prohibits foreign aid and sales under
the Food for Peace Act to any
government that has, or with which
the United States has, severed
diplomatic relations.
Aid and sales may resume when
diplomatic relations resume.
Sec. 620(y), Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22U.S.C. 2370(y))
Prohibits foreign aid to a third
country in amounts equal to that
country’s providing nuclear fuel and
related assistance to Cuba the
previous fiscal year.
Prohibition is lifted when Cuba signs
and complies with the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and the Treaty of
Tlatelelco, negotiates full-scope
safeguards, and is found in
compliance with the treaties.
Sec. 2(b)(2), Export-Import Bank Act
of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635(2)(b)(2))
Prohibits Ex-Im Bank funding for
Marxist-Leninist states, explicitly
naming Cuba.
President may determine Cuba has
ceased to be a Marxist-Leninist
country.
President may determine that a
specific transaction, or a transaction
of a certain kind, is in the national
interest.
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 110, Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C.
7107)
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Prohibits nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related aid to Cuba for its
failure to comply with minimum
standards or make significant efforts
related to trafficking in persons.
Determination made annually:
Secretary of State could find Cuba in
compliance the next fiscal year.
Secretary of State could make a
determination of compliance outside
the annual cycle of reporting.
The President may continue
nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related
aid if he finds it would “promote the
purposes” of the act or is otherwise
in the U.S. national interest.
Sec. 7007, 7015(f), Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2015 (Division J, P.L. 113-235)
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Sec. 7007: Prohibits direct funding to
Cuba.
Sec. 7015(f): prohibits aid to Cuba
without regular notification
procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
No waivers.
The two sections apply only to the
current fiscal year.
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Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 12, International Development
Association Act (22 U.S.C. 284j)
Sec. 21, Inter-American
Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C.
283r)
Sec. 401, Tariff Classification Act of
1962 (19 U.S.C. 1351 note)
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Requires the President to instruct
U.S. executive directors to the
relevant international financial
institution to oppose loans to any
state that has nationalized,
expropriated, or seized property
owned by a U.S. citizen; canceled
contracts with a U.S. citizen;
imposed discriminatory taxes that
have the result of property seizure.
The President may determine that
(1) arrangements for compensation
have been made; (2) the issue has
been submitted to arbitration; or (3)
good faith negotiations are
underway.Sec. 7007: Prohibits direct funding to
Cuba.
Sec. 12, International Development
Association Act (22 U.S.C. 284j)
Requires the President to instruct
U.S. executive directors to the
relevant international financial
institution to oppose loans to any
state that has nationalized,
expropriated, or seized property
owned by a U.S. citizen; canceled
contracts with a U.S. citizen;
imposed discriminatory taxes that
have the result of property seizure.
Sec. 21, Inter-American
Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C.
283r)
Congressional Research Service
Sec. 7015(f): prohibits aid to Cuba
without regular notification
procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
No waivers.
The two sections apply only to the
current fiscal year.
The President may determine that
(1) arrangements for compensation
have been made; (2) the issue has
been submitted to arbitration; or (3)
good faith negotiations are
underway.
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Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations
Statutory Basis
Sec. 401, Tariff Classification Act of
1962 (19 U.S.C. 1351 note)
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Requires Cuba to be treated as a
nation “dominated or controlled by
the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world
Communist movement,” resulting in
denying articles that are “the growth,
produce, or manufacture of Cuba”
favorable trade terms.
The restrictions ceases to apply “on
or after the date on which the
President proclaims that he has
determined that Cuba is no longer
dominated or controlled” by such a
foreign power.
The U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTS) designates Cuba in the most
restricted trade category (“Column
2”) pursuant to this provision and
other trade laws as follows:
“b) Rate of Duty Column 2.
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing
provisions of this note, the rates of
duty shown in column 2 shall apply
to products, whether imported
directly or indirectly, of the following
countries and areas pursuant to
section 401 of the Tariff
Classification Act of 1962, to section
231 or 257(e)(2) of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, to section
404(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 or
to any other applicable section of
law, or to action taken by the
President thereunder: Cuba, North
Korea.”
Sec. 401, Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2431)
Continues to deny
nondiscriminatory trade treatment
for countries that were so denied
prior to enactment of this title.
The President may temporarily
waive or lift by entering into a
bilateral commercial agreement (sec.
405; 19 U.S.C. 2435), and may
temporarily extend
nondiscriminatory terms (sec. 404;
19 U.S.C. 2434).
Granting permanent
nondiscriminatory trade treatment
(Normal Trade Relations, or NTR),
however, requires an act of
Congress (sec. 151; 19 U.S.C. 2191).
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Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations
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Statutory Basis
Sec. 402, Trade Act of 1974
(Jackson-Vanik Amendment; 19
U.S.C. 2432)
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Continues to deny
nondiscriminatory trade treatment
for countries that were so denied
prior to enactment of this title,
including countries under sec. 401,
communist countries, or non-market
economies (as defined in the Senate
report accompanying H.R. 10710,
93rd Congress, enacted as the Trade
Act of 1974).
President may suspend temporarily,
and may renew the suspension
semiannually (by June 30 and
December 31) if he determines and
notifies Congress that the
government of Cuba does not (1)
deny its citizens the right or
opportunity to emigrate; (2) impose
more than a nominal tax on
emigration and documents required
to emigrate or travel; or (3) impose
more than a nominal tax on a citizen
as a result of that citizen’s desire to
emigrate.
President may suspend temporarily,
with annual renewal, by issuing an
executive order stating that (1)
waiving will promote the objectives
of Jackson-Vanik; and (2) “he has
received assurances that the
emigration practices of that country
will henceforth lead substantially to
the achievements of the objectives of
the section.”
Congress may block the President’s
initial determinations (sec. 152; 19
U.S.C. 2192), or extension of waiver
(sec. 153; 19 U.S.C. 2193).
Granting permanent
nondiscriminatory trade treatment
however, requires an act of
Congress (sec. 151; 19 U.S.C. 2191).
Removal of Jackson-Vanik
restrictions, however, does not
require NTR status (the President
may exercise the above-described
waiver authority).
Sec. 502(b), Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2462(b))
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A country is denied “beneficiary
developing country” status under the
Generalized System of Preferences if
it is a Communist country, and if it
has expropriated property of a U.S.
citizen.
President may waive if he finds it in
the national economic interest of the
United States to do so.
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Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Authority to Lift or Waive
Sec. 212, Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (19 U.S.C. 2702)
Cuba is not eligible for CBERA
benefits because it is not listed in
sec. 212(b). In addition, a country is
denied “beneficiary country” status
under the CBERA if it is a
Communist country; has
nationalized, expropriated, or seized
property owned by a U.S. citizen;
canceled contracts with a U.S.
citizen; imposed discriminatory taxes
that have the result of property
seizure; fails to recognize certain
arbitral awards in favor of a U.S.
citizen, corporation, partnership, or
corporation; affords preferential
treatment to products of a
developed country other than the
United States (unless there is no
significant adverse effect on U.S.
commerce); if a government-owned
entity engages in the broadcast of
U.S.-owned copyrighted material
without express consent; is not a
signatory to an agreement regarding
the extradition of U.S. citizens; and
has not or is not taking steps to
afford internationally recognized
worker rights.
Congress would have to amend sec.
212(b) to add Cuba to the list of
countries eligible for CBERA
designation. Once listed, the
President could designate Cuba as
beneficiary country, despite other
restrictions, if he finds it in the
national economic interest of the
United States to do so, except if the
country affords preferential
treatment to products of a
developed country other than the
United States (unless there is no
significant adverse effect on U.S.
commerce), and is a signatory to an
agreement regarding the extradition
of U.S. citizens.
Sec. 902, Food Security Act of 1985
(7 U.S.C. 1446 note)
Denies a sugar import quota to Cuba
or third countries trading in Cubaorigin sugar.
Sec. 204, Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act (22 U.S.C. 6064) authorizes the
President to suspend the
enforcement of sec. 902 if he
determines “a transition government
is in power in Cuba.”
Sec. 204, furthermore, requires the
President to terminate sanctions
under sec. 902 and other measures if
he determines that “a democratically
elected government in Cuba is in
power.”
Sec. 204(d)(1) of that Actact repeals
sec.
902 on President making such a
determination.
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Statutory Basis
Restriction
Sec. 211, Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999 (Division
A, Title II, P.L. 105-277)
Prohibits a transaction or payment
with respect to a mark, trade, name
or commercial name that is the same
as or substantially similar to a mark,
trade name, or commercial name
used in connection with a business
or assets that were confiscated.
Prohibits U.S. courts from
considering or enforcing trademark
claims of a Cuba national, or their
successor in interest, regarding
property confiscated by the Cuban
government.
Authority to Lift or Waive
No waiver.
Author Contact Information
Dianne E. Rennack
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
drennack@crs.loc.gov, 7-7608
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Congressional Research Service
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
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