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Footnotes

A current list of countries with which the United States has an extradition treaty is found at Appendix A. A slightly less up-to-date listing is found at 18 U.S.C. § 3181 note. A list of countries with which the United States has no extradition treaty in force is found at Appendix B.

Until the early 1970s, the United States received and submitted fewer than 50 extradition requests a year; by the mid 1980's- 1990s the number had grown to over 500 requests a year, IV Michael Abbell & Bruno A. Ristau, International Judicial Assistance: Criminal (Abbell & Ristau) 11-18 (1990).

Even the term "extradition"700 requests a year; a decade later U.S. requests alone accounted for close to 600 fugitives. Michael Abbell, Extradition to and from the United States (Abbell) 10 (2010).

1-9 (history in the United States).

Restatement, supra footnote 1, Introductory Note to Subchapter 7B (citing Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Vol.II, ch.21, §§ 3-4 (Scott ed. 1925)).

"By the latter part of the nineteenth century that [principle] had yielded to the view that delivery of persons charged with, or convicted of, crimes in another state was at most a moral duty, not required by customary international law, but generally governed by treaty and subject to various limitations. A network of bilateral treaties, differing in detail but having considerable similarity in principle and scope, has spelled out these limitations, and in conjunction with state legislation, practice, and judicial decisions has created a body of law with substantial uniformity in major respects. But the network of treaties has not created a principle of customary law requiring extradition, and it is accepted that states are not required to extradite except as obligated to do so by treaty." Id.

From the perspective of one commentator, "The history of extradition can be divided into four periods: (1) ancient times to the seventeenth century—a period revealing an almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth century—a period of treaty-making chiefly concerning military offenders characterizing the condition of Europe during that period; (3) 1833 to 1948—a period of collective concern for suppressing common criminality; and (4) post 1948 developments which ushered in a greater concern for protecting human rights of persons and revealed an awareness of the need to have international due process of law regulate international relations,." Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 5.

8 Stat. 116, 129 (1794).

A list of countries with which the United States has bilateral extradition treaties is found at Appendix A.

Inter-American Convention on Extradition, entered into force Jan.January 25, 1935, 49 Stat. 3111. The Convention provides that it "does not abrogate or modify the bilateral or collective treaties, which at the present date are in force between the signatory States. Nevertheless, if any of said treaties lapse, the present Convention will take effect and become applicable immediately among the respective States…." Id., art. 21. The United States has bilateral extradition treaties with each of the 11 other parties to the Convention, all but three of which were in effect prior to the Convention's entry into force.

Extradition Agreement with the European Union, entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14.

February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-210.

February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-210.

Restatement, supra footnote 1, §475.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196.

18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994) ("The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government"); 18 U.S.C. § 3184 ("Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign government ...") (1994).

E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992) (citing Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1935), as standing for the proposition that the "United States may not extradite a citizen in the absence of a statute or treaty obligation"). MoreoverYet, if the United States has seized a person in foreign territory, it appears that it may surrender the person to the territory's sovereign for criminal prosecution, even in the absence of an extradition treaty or authorizing statute. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2227674, 704-705 (2008) (surrender by U.S. military authorities of two U.S. citizens captured in Iraq to the Iraqi government "was not an extradition" requiring authorizing treaty or statute to occur).

18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) ("The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the exercise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries without regard to the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that—(1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indicates that had the offenses been committed in the United States, they would constitute crimes of violence as defined under section 16 of this title; and (2) the offenses charged are not of a political nature.").

Under U.S. law, legally binding international agreements may take the form of treaties or executive agreements. In order for a treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become the "Law of the Land," the Senate must provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2. Executive agreements are legally binding agreements entered by the executive branch that are not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Uponupon U.S. Law, by [author name scrubbed].

18 U.S.C. § 3181 note, P.L. 104-132, §443, 110 Stat. 1280 (1996). See also Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United States and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, entered into force Feb.February 14, 1996, TIAST.I.A.S. 12570; Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United States and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, entered into force Feb.February 14, 1996, T.I.A.S. 12601.

The magistrate judge wrote that:

: The Constitution calls for the Executive to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Throughout the history of this Republic, every extradition from the United States has been accomplished under the terms of a valid treaty of extradition. In the instant case, it is undisputed that no treaty exists between the United States and the Tribunal. This is so even when, the Government insists, and the Court agrees, the Executive has the full ability and right to negotiate such at a treaty. The absence of a treaty is a fatal defect in the Government's request that the Extraditee be surrendered. Without a treaty, this Court has no jurisdiction to act, and Congress' attempt to effectuate the Agreement in the absence of a treaty is an unconstitutional exercise of power.

Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp. 1038, 1042 (S.D. Tex. 1997).

In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, No. CIV. A. L-98-43, 1998 WL 655708 (S.D.Tex. Aug.August 6, 1998). 6, 1998).

23. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 426 (5^th Cir. 1999) The circuit court described the Supreme Court as having "repeatedly stated that a treaty or statute may confer the power to extradite,…." Id. (citing Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker], 299 U.S. 5, 18 (1935); and quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 191 (1902)) ("Congress has a perfect right to provide for the extradition of criminals in its own way, with or without a treaty to that effect, and to declare that foreign criminals shall be surrendered upon such proofs of criminality as it may judge sufficient.") (internal citation omitted); and Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) ("In the United States, the general opinion and practice have been that extradition should be declined in the absence of a conventional or legislative provision.") (internal citation omitted)).

528 U.S. 1135 (2000).

For example, extraditions between the United States and Pakistan continue to be governed by the terms of the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, entered into force Jun.June 24, 1935, 47 Stat. 2122.

Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 562-63 (3d Cir. 2006); Kastnerova v. United States, 365 F.3d 980, 986-87 (11^th Cir. 2004); Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 853-55 (9^th Cir. 1996); cf., Basic v. Steck, 819 F.3d 897, 898 n.1 (6^th Cir. 2016) ("On appeal, the parties agree that the 1902 Treaty applies in this case since Bosnia is a successor state of the Kingdom of Serbia."). See generally Abbell). See generally Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 52-3, 180-81.

10 Stat. 964, 966 (1852) ("murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged papers, or the fabrication or circulation of counterfeit money, whether coin or paper money, or the embezzlement of public moneys").

Section 203 of P.L. 105-323 purports to require construction of an extradition treaty that permits extradition for kidnaping to also be interpreted to authorize extradition for parental kidnaping. The impact of § 203 remains to be seen.

E.g., Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 4(1), entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14February 1, 2010, T.I.A. S. 10-201 (applying in place of any provision in an earlier extradition agreement between the United States and an EU Member State which only authorized extradition only for an exclusive list of offenses, and instead providing that "An[a]n offense shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws of the requesting and requested States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty"); Argentine Extradition Treaty, art.2(1), entered into force Jun.June 15, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18, TIAST.I.A.S. 12866; Paraguyan Extradition Treaty, art. II(1), entered into force Mar. 9, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-4, TIASMarch 9, 2001, T.I.A.S. 12995; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. II(1), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 96-112; French Extradition Treaty, art.2(1), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13February 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 02-201; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art.2(1), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art.2(1), entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Italian Extradition Treaty, art. II(1), entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023. Where Here and throughout where an official citation is unavailable for particular treaty, we have usedthis report uses the Senate Treaty Document citation along with the date upon which the treaty entered into force according the State Department. The most recent publicly available compendium of U.S. agreements is Treaties In Force 20092013, available on Mar. 17, 2010, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123746.pdfs/l/treaty/tif/, augmented by 2014/2015 Supplement to Treaties In Forces, available at the same site, which also indicates that a revised compilation will be available in 2016. Beginning with the 104^th Congress, Senate Treaty Documents are available on the Government PrintingPublishing Office's website, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/.

E.g., Extradition Treaty with Latvia, art. 4(4), entered into force Apr.April 15, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. 109T.I.A.S. 09-415-15, art. 4(4) ("The executive authority of the Requested State may refuse extradition for offenses under military law that are not offenses under ordinary criminal law."); Italian Extradition Treaty, art. V(3), entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023 ("Extradition shall not be granted for offenses under military law which are not offenses under ordinary criminal law"). See generally In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 676, 702-3 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (the military offense exception covers crimes like "mutiny and desertion which are outside the realm of ordinary criminal law"); Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 732-34; Abbell & Ristau739-40; Abbell, supra footnote 3, at 116-17, 212-13.

Michael Abbell, Extradition to and From the United States (Abbell) §3-2(25) (No United States extradition treaty negotiated prior to 1960 contains an express military offense exception).

Even there the political offense exception was thought more hospitable, except in the case of desertion. See generally David A. Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradition, 32 Alb. L. Rev. 337 (1968).

See generally Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 650-732669-738; Restatement, supra footnote 1, §476, Comment g. & Reporters' Notes 4-8; Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 199-212§3-2(24); R. Stuart Phillips, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition Scheme and Proposals for its Future, 15 Dick. J. Int'l L. 337 (1997); Michelle N. Lewis, Note, The Political Offense Exception: Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 585 (1995).

Egyptian Extradition Treaty, art. III, entered into force Apr.April 22, 1875, 19 Stat. 574 ("The provisions of this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offence of a political character").

Kostotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 171 (1^st Cir. 1991) (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7^th Cir. 1981)). Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596-97 (4^th Cir. 2007); Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9^th Cir. 2006); Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 750 (9^th Cir. 2005 Nezirovic v. Holt, 779 F.3d 233, 240 (4^th Cir. 2015); Meza v. United States Attorney General, 693 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11^th Cir. 2012); Kostotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 171 (1^st Cir. 1991) (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7^th Cir. 1981)). Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9^th Cir. 2006); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5^th Cir. 1980); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807-9 (9^th Cir. 1986); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 689, 692 (1896).

E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 4(2), entered into force Mar.March 18,1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318 ("For purposes of this Treaty, the following offenses shall not be considered to be political offenses: a. a murder or other willful crime against the person of a Head of State of one of the Contracting Parties, or a member of the Head of State's family; ... c. murder, manslaughter, or other offense involving substantial bodily harm; d. an offense involving kidnaping or any form of unlawful detention, including the taking of a hostage; e. placing or using an explosive, incendiary or destructive device capable of endangering life, of causing substantial bodily harm, or of causing substantial property damage; and f. a conspiracy or any type of association to commit offenses as specified in Article 2, paragraph 2, or attempt to commit, or participation in the commission of, any of the foregoing offenses"); Polish Extradition Treaty, art.5(2), entered into force Sept.September 17, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14T.I.A.S. 99-917 (murder or other offense against heads of state or their families; murder, manslaughter, assault; kidnaping, abduction, hostage taking; bombing; or attempt or conspiracy to commit any of those offenses); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, art. 4(2), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-10, TIASFebruary 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 12804 (virtually the same); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 4(2)(a), entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (violent crimes against a Head of State or a member of his or her family).

Jamaican Extradition Treaty, art. III(2), entered into force July 7, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 ("Extradition shall also not be granted if ... (b) it is established that the request for extradition, though purporting to be on account of the extraditable offence, is in fact made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions; or (c) the person sought is by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, likely to be denied a fair trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty for such reasons" ); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 3(1)(c), entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 ("Extradition shall not be granted when: ... the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request was politically or racially motivated"); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, art.4(3), entered into force Sept.September 14, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-16T.I.A.S. 99-914 (politically motivated); French Extradition Treaty, art.4(4), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13February 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 02-201 (prosecution or punishment on account of the fugitive's "race, religion, nationality or political opinions").

Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art.4(2)(b), entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17; Peruvian Extradition Treaty, art. IV(1)-(3), entered into force Aug.August 25, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. 107-6T.I.A.S. 03-825; Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 4(2)(b), entered into force Dec. 20, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2, TIASDecember 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962; Indian Extradition Treaty, art.4(2), entered into force July 21, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30, TIAST.I.A.S. 12873; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 4(2), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318 ("For purposes of this Treaty, the following offenses shall not be considered to be political offenses ... an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution"). The State Department has noted that the list of crimes subject to such international agreements includes air piracy, aircraft sabotage, crimes of violence committed against foreign dignitaries, hostage taking and narcotics trafficking. See State Dept., Letter of Submittal for Hungarian Extradition Treaty, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5,T.I.A.S. 97-318 at VI. Unless restricted in the Treaty, the list apparently also includes, inter alia, genocide, war crimes, theft of nuclear materials, slavery, torture, violence committed against the safety of maritime navigation or maritime platforms, theft or destruction of national treasures, counterfeiting currency and bribery of foreign officials. Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 714-28.

See Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at Appendix I (listing multilateral conventions containing provisions on extradition).

See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. VII, entered into force for the United States on Feb.February 23, 1989, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M. 763 ("Genocide and the other acts enumerated…shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition." ); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 11, entered into force for the United States on July 26, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 106-6 ("None of the offences set forth…shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives."); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 14, entered into force for the United States on July 26, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 106-49 (same).

William A. Schabas, The International Sourcebook on Capital Punishment, 239-45 (1997); Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A World-Wide Perspective, 240-47 (2d ed. 1996).

E.g., Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 13, entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (provision that may be applied in place or in absence of comparable requirement in existing extradition agreement between the United States and an EU Member State, stating that when "the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the requested State, the requested State may grant extradition on the condition that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person sought, or if for prosecural reasons such condition cannot be complied with …, on the condition that the death penalty if imposed shall not be carried out."); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 7, entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 ("when the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the Requested State, the Requested State may refuse extradition unless the Requesting State provides such assurances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty, if imposed, shall not be carried out"). See also Argentine Extradition Treaty, art. 6, entered into force June 15, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18, TIAST.I.A.S. 12866; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. IV(1), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 7(1), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; South African Extradition Treaty, art. 5, entered into force June 25, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24T.I.A.S. 13060; Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 5, entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17. On the other hand, the capital punishment mutuality provision can redound to U.S. interests when another nation has a wider range of capital offenses than does the United States. See, e.g., S. Comm. on For. Relat., Report on Extradition Treaty with Jordan, S. Exec. Rep. 104-2, at 9 (1995) (report on Extradition Treaty with Jordan) ("The United States delegation sought this provision because Jordan imposes the death penalty for some crimes that are not punishable by death in the United States"). Some capital punishment clauses do not apply in murder cases. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 7, entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 ("When the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the Requested State, the competent authority of the Requested State may refuse extradition unless: (a) the offense constitutes murder under the laws in the Requested State; or (b) the competent authority of the Requesting State provides such assurances as the competent authority of the Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out"); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 6, entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16; Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, art. 7, entered into force Jan.January 12, 2001, T.I.A.S. 13066.

Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 621-38; Abbell & Ristau646-56; Abbell, supra footnote 3, at 117-19, 295-6§§6-2(25), 3-2(27); Melinda Lim, Note, Will Amanda Knox Go Back to Italy? An Examination of Extradition Law and the Necessity of Repurposing Agreements in the Fight Against Transnational Crime, 23 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 205 (2014); Anne Mori Kobayashi, Note, International and Domestic Approaches to Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights: Reconciling the Soering and Kindler Decisions, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 225 (1996); Craig R. Roecks, Comment, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged with a Capital Crime, 25 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 189 (1994).

7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1613.4.

Restatement, supra footnote 1, §476. See also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1^st Cir. 1995). Examples include the Italian Extradition Treaty, art. II(1), entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023 ("An offense, however denominated, shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty ..."); Extradition Treaty with Belize, art. 2(1), entered into force Mar.March 27, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-38T.I.A.S. 13089; Argentine Extradition Treaty, art. 2(1), entered into force June 15, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18, TIAST.I.A.S. 12866; Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 2, entered into force Apr.April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197 (with respect to enumerated offenses); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(1), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty DocT.I.A.S. 97-318. 104-5; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(1), entered into force Jul.July 29, 1995; S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. II(1), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 2(1), entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17; Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 2(1), entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16; Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 2(1), entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17.

In re Extradition of Loharoia, 932 F. Supp. 802, 810 (N.D. Tex. 1996) ("The principle is a general policy of extradition, and arguably applies even absent explicit inclusion in the treaty in question. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903); Bauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1^st Cir. 1980). On the other hand, there is authority suggesting that the principle does not apply unless it is expressly stated in the treaty. See Factor [v. Laubenheimer], 290 U.S. [276], at 287-90 [(1933)]").

John T. Soma, Thomas F. Muther, Jr., & Heidi M.L. Brissette, Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes; Are New Treaties and Laws Needed? 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 317, 324 (1997).

Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922). See also Zhenli Ye Gon v. Holt, 774 F.3d 207, 217 (4^th Cir. 2014); Man-Seok Choe v. Torres, 525 F.3d 733, 738 (9^th Cir. 2008also United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 664-65 (9^th Cir. 2006); Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11^th Cir. 2000); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7^th Cir. 1997); LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1112 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1^st Cir. 1995)Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 766; In re Extradition of Platko, 213 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1236 (S.D.Cal. 2002Liuksila, 74 F. Supp. 3d 4, 10-2 (D.D.C. 2014). See generally Test of "Dual Criminality" Where Extradition toTo or From Foreign Nation Is Sought, 132 ALR Fed 525 (1996 & Sept. 2009September 2015 Supp.) [hereinafter ALR].

Balzan v. United States, 702 F.3d 220, 223 n.5 (5^th Cir. 2012) (citing Wright, 190 U.S. at 58-62); Jonathan O. Hafen, Comment, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 191, 207 ("The current state of the law appears to be that if the offense is considered criminal under federal law, the law of the asylum State, or under the law of the preponderance of States, the dual criminal requirement is satisfied"); ALR, supra footnote 4848, at 539-40. , at 539-40.

50. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions prohibit acquisition or operation of an interstate commercial enterprise through the patterned commission of various other "predicate" offenses, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1966. The Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) or drug kingpin provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 848, outlaw management of a large drug trafficking operation. Along with attempt, conspiracy and federal crimes with distinctive jurisdictional elements, they pose difficulties when they approximate but do not exactly matching the elements for extraditable offenses. They present a distinct problem, however, when they are based entirely on predicate offenses that are not themselves extraditable offenses. Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 531-537532-538; Barbara Sicalides, Comment, RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 Temp.Temple L. Rev. 1281 (1989).

E.g., Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 4(2), entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (superceding certain types of extradition agreements between the United States and EU Member States so that, in extradition requests made between those countries, an offense shall be considered extraditable "regardless of whether the offence is one for which United States federal law requires the showing of such matters as interstate transportation, or use of the mails or of other facilities affecting interstate or foreign commerce, such matters being merely for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a United States federal court"); Protocol Amending U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, art. 1, entered into force Jan.January 10, 2007, S. Treaty Doc.109-3T.I.A.S. 07-110 (replacing art. II of earlier treaty); Lithuanian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(3), entered into force Mar.March 31, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. 107-4T.I.A.S. 113166; Austrian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(4)(c), entered into force Jan. 1, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50, TIASJanuary 1, 2000, T.I.A.S. 12916; Extradition Treaty with Belize, art. 2(3)(b), entered into force Mar.March 27, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-38T.I.A.S. 13089; Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 2(3)(c), entered into force Dec. 20, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2, TIAS 12962.

December 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962.

E.g., South African Extradition Treaty, art. 2(6), entered into force June 25, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24T.I.A.S. 13060 ("Where extradition of a person is sought for an offense against a law relating to taxation, customs duties, exchange control, or other revenue matters, extradition may not be refused on the ground that the law of the Requested State does not impose the same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, customs duty, or exchange regulation of the same kinds as the law of the Requesting State"); Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 4(3)(c), entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (applying in place of provisions contained in any earlier extradition treaty between the United States and an EU Member State that allowed for extradition only for a specified list of offenses); Austrian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(4)(B), entered into force Jan. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50, TIASJanuary 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 12916; Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 2(6), entered into force Dec. 20, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2, TIASDecember 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962; Polish Extradition Treaty, art. 3, entered into force Sept.September 17, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14T.I.A.S. 99-917. But see Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, art. 5(1), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-10, TIASFebruary 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 12804 ("The executive authority of the Requested State shall have discretion to deny extradition when the offense for which extradition is requested is a fiscal offense [i.e., purely a tax, customs, or currency offense]."). Historically, offenses of a fiscal character were not extraditable. "Such offenses are, however, "gradually appearing in extradition treaties, but difficulty remains in satisfying the requirement of duedual criminality because of the problem of defining such offenses and determining their significance in the economic system of each particular country." Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 735-736.

Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 64-7, 278-80.

Even among countries with a fairly expansive view of the extraterritorial jurisdiction, there may be substantial differences between the perceptions of common law countries and those of civil law countries,. Charles L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 685 (1984).

E.g., Peruvian Extradition Treaty, art. II(3)(c), entered into force Mar.March 25, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. 107-6T.I.A.S. 03-825 ("For the purposes of this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable offense, regardless of ... (c) where the offense was committed"); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. II(3)(b), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112 ("To determine ... whether an offense is punishable under the laws in the Requested State, it shall be irrelevant ... where the act or acts constituting the offense were committed"); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(4), entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 ("An offense described in this Article shall be an extraditable offense regardless of where the act or acts constituting the offense were committed"); Austrian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(6), entered into force Jan. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50, TIASJanuary 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 12916; Indian Extradition Treaty, art. 2(4), entered into force July 21, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30, TIAST.I.A.S. 12873; Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, art. 2(4), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-10, TIAS 12804.

February 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 12804.

See generally Law Library of Congress, Law on Extradition of Citizens (July 2013) (a chart indicating which of 157 countries have domestic constitutional or statutory impediments to extradition of their own citizens) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/extradition-of-citizens/extradition-of-citizens-chart.pdf.

Restatement, supra footnote 1, §475, Reporters' Note 4.

The Supreme Court in Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936), held that a national exemption clause, which denied that the United States had any obligation to extradite American citizens, could not be construed to provide the Executive with authority to extradite such persons as a matter of discretion. Some 50 years later, Congress sought to reverse the result of this ruling with the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3196 ("If the applicable treaty or convention does not obligate the United States to extradite its citizens to a foreign country, the Secretary of State may, nevertheless, order the surrender to that country of a United States citizen whose extradition has been requested by that country if the other requirements of that treaty or convention are met"). There have been differing court rulings as to the interplay between 18 U.S.C. § 3196 and extradition treaties that contain national exemption clauses but lack provisions affirmatively granting parties' the discretionary authority to extradite their nationals. In Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1992), the district court interpreted § 3196 as amending the national exemption clause contained in the 1908 U.S.-Portugal extradition treaty, which provided that neither party was "bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects" to the other. The Gouveia court interpreted § 3196 as a statutory amendment to the U.S.-Portugal treaty and other extradition agreements which contained national exemption clauses, and suggested that a statutory amendment to an extradition treaty would unconstitutionally infringe upon the President's treaty-making power. Id. at 258-259. However, the court avoided striking down § 3196 on constitutional grounds by construing the statute as non-retroactive in effect, thereby precluding its application to the case before it, which concerned a U.S. national whose extradition to Portugal had already been denied prior to the statute's enactment. On the other hand, in Hilario v. United States, 854 F. Supp.165 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), a federal district court expressly rejected the reasoning of Gouveia, and found § 3196 to be constitutionally valid. Here again, the case centered on the relationship between § 3196 and the U.S.-Portugal treaty. The Hilario court held that § 3196 did not "override, alter, or amend any provision" of the treaty, because although the agreement did not require a party to surrender its nationals to the requesting State, "each signatory retains full sovereign discretion [to extradite its nationals] without any risk of breach." Id. at 169. The court also ruled that "the power to extradite can be conferred either by legislation or by treaty amendment," and interpreted § 3196 as permitting the extradition of U.S. nationals whose alleged criminal conduct and conviction predated the statute's enactment. Id. at 175-176. Subsequent rulings by other courts have also found § 3196 to be constitutionally valid. See In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, No. CIV. A. L-98-43, 1998 WL 655708, at *15-16 (S.D. Tex. Aug.August 6, 1998) (favorably discussing Hilario); Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, No. C98-1414, 1999 WL 38906, at *2 (N.D. Cal.,Jan. January 28, 1999) ("the Court agrees with the Hilario court's determination that Congress' decision to use a statute to empower the Secretary of State to extradite U.S. citizens is consistent with the Treaty"). See also Sacirbey v. Guccione, 589 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing § 3196 as authorizing Secretary of State to extradite U.S. citizen when underlying treaty gave the Secretary discretion to refuse extradition of U.S. nationals); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1325-326 (9^th Cir. 1997)(section (Section 3196 and a treaty provision stating that the parties "may" extradite their own nationals affords discretion to the Secretary of State).

Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 739; Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 67-71, 186-87, 280-81.

; Basic v. Steck, 819 F.3d 897, 899-900 (6^th Cir. 2016) (The statute authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite a U.S. citizen to Bosnia notwithstanding the treaty provision which absolves the Parties of the obligation to extradite their nationals).

Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 746; Abbell supra footnote 3, at §§6-2(6), 2-2(18).

See Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. III(1), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112 ("Neither Party shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals, except when the extradition request refers to ... (b) murder; voluntary manslaughter; kidnaping; aggravated assault; rape; sexual offenses involving children; armed robbery; offenses related to the illicit traffic in controlled substances; serious offenses related to terrorism; serious offenses related to organized criminal activity; fraud against the government or involving multiple victims; counterfeiting of currency; offenses related to the traffic in historical or archeological items; offenses punishable in both States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least ten years; or (c) an attempt or conspiracy, participation in, or association regarding the commission of any of the offenses described in subparagraphs (a) and (b)").

Extradition Treaty with Malta, art. 3(1), entered into force Feb.February 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-17 (precluding fugitive's nationality from serving as the sole basis to refuse extradition in relation to 30 listed offenses); Bulgarian Extradition Treaty, art. 3(1), entered into force May 21, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. 110-12 (same).

Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. III(1)(a), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112 ("Neither Party shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals, except when the extradition request refers to: (a) offenses as to which there is an obligation to establish criminal jurisdiction pursuant to multilateral international treaties in force with respect to the Parties").

Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 749-63; Abbell & Ristau754-68; Abbell, supra footnote 3, at 96-100, 192-98, 290-93.

§§3-2(19), 6-2(18), (19), (20), (21).

E.g., Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, art. 5, entered into force Apr.April 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 108-23T.I.A.S. 07-426 ("1. Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is requested. 2. The Requested State may refuse extradition when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted in a third state in respect of the conduct for which extradition is requested. 3. Extradition shall not be precluded by the fact that the competent authorities of the Requested State: (a) have decided not to prosecute the person sought for the acts for which extradition is requested; (b) have decided to discontinue any criminal proceedings which have been instituted against the person sought for those acts; or (c) are still investigating the person sought for the same acts for which extradition is sought."); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. V(2), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112 ("Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is requested. Extradition shall not be precluded by the fact that the authorities of the Requested State have decided to refrain from prosecuting the person sought for the acts for which extradition is requested or to discontinue any criminal proceedings which have been initiated against the person sought for those acts."). See also Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, art. 5, entered into force Jan.January 12, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34T.I.A.S. 13066; Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, art. 5, entered into force Nov.November 29, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-21; Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 5, entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 5, entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3. Some include language to avoid confusion over whether an American dismissal with prejudice is the same as an acquittal, Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 5(1), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318 ("Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed by court order with finding and final effect in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is requested").

E.g., Argentine Extradition Treaty, art. 7, entered into force June 15, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18, TIAS 12866 T.I.A.S. 12866; French Extradition Treaty, art. 9(1), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13.

February 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 02-201. In the United States, the applicable statute of limitations is the one in place when the extradition request is made. Nezirovic v. Holt, 779 F.3d 233, 238 (4^th Cir. 2015) (citing in accord Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1927)).

E.g., Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 5, ¶ 2, entered into force April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197.

; Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451, 456 (6^th Cir. 2016) (citing Sainez v. Venables, 588 F.3d 713, 717 (9^th Cir. 2009) (holding that under the comparable provision of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, "a Mexican arrest warrant is the equivalent of a United States indictment and may toll the United States statute of limitations"); In re Extradition of Liuksila, 133 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256-57 (D.D.C. 2016) ("mere absence" from the requesting country is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations).

§§6-2(17), 3-2(18), 4-3(8); Roberto Iraola, Statutes of Limitations and International Extradition, 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 103.

Patterson v. Wagner, 785 F.3d 1277, 1280-83 (9^th Cir. 2015) (finding discretion in a treaty provision which provides, "Extradition may be denied under this Treaty when the prosecution or the execution of punishment of the offense for which extradition is requested would have been barred because of the statute of limitations of the Requested State had the same offense been committed in the Requested State." South Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 6, entered into force December 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962 (emphasis of the court)).

U.S.Const. Amends. V, XIV; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9^th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farmer, 312 F.3d 933, 936 (8^th Cir. 2003).

U.S.Const. Amends. VI, XIV; Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 774 (8^th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 777-78 (6^th Cir. 2003).

18 U.S.C. § ; but see Martinez, 828 F.3d at 4576-69 (the "lapse of time" provision does not incorporate either the U.S. constitutional or statutory speedy trial provisions).

Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, art. 20(2)-(3), entered into force Apr.April 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 108-23T.I.A.S. 07-426 ("2. The Requesting State shall bear the expenses related to the translation of documents and transportation of the person surrendered. The Requested State shall pay all other expenses incurred in that State by reason of the extradition proceedings. 3. Neither State shall make any pecuniary claim against the other State arising out of the arrest, detention, examination, or surrender of persons sought under this Treaty"); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 20(2)-(3), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Indian Extradition Treaty, art. 20(2)-(3), entered into force July 21, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30, TIAST.I.A.S. 12873; French Extradition Treaty, art. 22(2), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13February 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 02-201; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 19(2)-(3), entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, arts. 20-21, entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17; Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 18, entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16; Jamaican Extradition Treaty, art. XVII, entered into force July 7, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (also providing that requesting State may be subject to a claim due to special expenses or concerning third party interests in transferred property); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 18(2)-(3), entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17; Italian Extradition Treaty, art. XXI, entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023. But see Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. XVI(3)-(4), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112 ("The Requesting State shall bear expenses related to the translation of documents and the transportation of the person sought…. Neither Party shall make any pecuniary claim against the other arising from the arrest, detention, custody, examination, or surrender of a person sought under this Treaty") (note absence of language as to the responsibility for cost other than transportation or translation); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 18, entered into force Apr.April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197.

The typical clause provides that:

All [a]ll articles, instruments, objects of value, documents, and other evidence relating to the offense may be seized and, upon granting of extradition, surrendered to the requesting State. The property mentioned in this Article may be surrendered even when extradition cannot be granted or effected due to the death, disappearance, or escape of the person sought. The rights of third parties in such property shall be duly respected.

Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 18, entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17. See also Bulgarian Extradition Treaty, art. 15, entered into force May 21, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. 110-12; South African Extradition Treaty, art.16, entered into force June 25, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24T.I.A.S. 13060; Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, art. 13, entered into force Nov.November 29, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-21; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 15, entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 16(1), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 16, entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. XIV, entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 16, entered into force April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197; Italian Extradition Treaty, art. XVIII, entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023; Jamaican Extradition Treaty, art. XVI, entered into force July 7, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18; Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 16, entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16.

E.g., Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 17, entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 ("(1) Either Contracting State may authorize transportation through its territory of a person surrendered to the other State by a third State. A request for transit shall be made through the diplomatic channel and shall contain a description of the person being transported and a brief statement of the facts of the case. (2) No authorization is required where air transportation is used and no landing is scheduled on the territory of the Contracting State. If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory of the other Contracting State, transit shall be subject to paragraph (1) of this Article. That Contracting State shall detain the person to be transported until the request for transit is received and the transit is effected, so long as the request is received within 96 hours of the unscheduled landing"). See also Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 12(1)-(2), entered into force Feb.February 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14 (authorizing transit of fugitive through territory of EU Member State or U.S. in the absence of governing provision in an existing bilateral agreement between an EU Member State and the United States); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, art. 19, entered into force Apr.April 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 108-23T.I.A.S. 07-426; Argentine Extradition Treaty, art. 18, entered into force June 15, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18, TIAST.I.A.S. 12866; Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 17, entered into force Dec. 20, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2, TIASDecember 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962; Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 19, entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 18, entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 19, entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. XV, entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 17, entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16; Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 17,, entered into force Apr.April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197; Italian Extradition Treaty, art. XIX, entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023.

U.S. Const. art. III, §2.

Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1924).

Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vac'd on juris. grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 469-70 (9^th Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn after grant of rehearing, In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9^th Cir. 2001); LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1105-10 (2d Cir. 1996); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7^th Cir. 1997). See also Zhenli Ye Gon v. Holder, 992 F. Supp. 2d 637, 648-49 (W.D. Va. 2014); In re Extradition of Seong-I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154-156 (D.N.M. 2004); Noel v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1304-305 (M.D. Fla. 1998); In re Extradition of Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 508-9 (D. Del. 1996); Sandhu v. Bransom, 932 F.Supp. 822, 826 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Werner v. Hickey, 920 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (M.D. Cal. 1996); Allison Marston, Comment, Innocence Abroad: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of International Extradition, 33 Stan. J. Int'l L. 343 (1997).

Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9^th Cir. 2006). "[T]hrough the diplomatic channel" seems to be the phrase favored most recently. See, e.g., Bulgarian Extradition Treaty, art. 10, entered into force May 21, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. 110-12 ("Requests for extradition and supporting documents shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel…."); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, art. 8(1), entered into force Apr.April 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 108-23T.I.A.S. 07-426 ("All requests for extradition shall be made through the diplomatic channel"); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 8(1), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Polish Extradition Treaty, art. 9(1), entered into force Sept.September 17, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14T.I.A.S. 99-917; Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 8(1), entered into force Dec. 20, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2, TIASDecember 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962; Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 8(1), entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 8(1), entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. VI(1), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Italian Extradition Treaty, art. X(1), entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023; Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 10, ¶1, entered into force April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197.

Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 8(2)-(4), entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 ("2. All requests shall contain: (a) documents, statements, photographs (if possible), or other types of information which describe the identity, nationality, and probable location of the person sought; (b) information describing the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; (c) the text of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is requested; (d) the text of the law prescribing the punishment for the offense; and (e) the documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of this Article, as applicable.; 3. A request for extradition of a person who is sought for prosecution shall also contain: (a) a copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; (b) a copy of the charging documents; and (c) such information as would provide a reasonable basis to believe that the person sought committed the offense for which extradition is requested. 4. A request for extradition relating to a person who has been found guilty of the offense for which extradition is sought shall also contain: (a) a copy of the judgment of conviction or, if such copy is not available, a statement by a judicial authority that the person has been found guilty; (b) information establishing that the person sought is the person to whom the finding of guilt refers; (c) a copy of the sentence imposed, if the person sought has been sentenced, and a statement establishing to what extent the sentence has been carried out; and (d) in the case of a person who has been found guilty in absentia, the documents required in paragraph 3"). See also South African Extradition Treaty, art. 9(2)-(4), entered into force June 25, 2001; S. Treaty Doc. 106-24, T.I.A.S. 13060; Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, art. 8(2)-(4), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-10, TIASFebruary 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 12804; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 8(2)-(4), entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 8(2)-(4), entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. VI(2)-(6), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, T.I.A.S. 196-112.

Abbell, supra footnote 213, at §3-3(7).

18 U.S.C. § 3184 provides in part that:

Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign government, or in cases arising under section 3181(b)[relating to the extradition from the United States of foreign nationals charged with, or convicted of, crimes of violence committed against Americans overseas, without reference to an extradition treaty], any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention ... issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.

See also Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9^th Cir. 2005). See generally Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 159-71. The requesting nation is usually represented in federal court by an Assistant United States Attorney or other Justice Department attorney. Abbell, supra footnote 213, at §3-3(9); Jacques Semmelman & Karen Snell, Defending the International Extradition Case, The Champion 20, 21 (June, 2006).

United States Attorneys Manual (USAM) § 9-15.700, available on Mar. 17, 2010, at http://www.usdoj9-15.700, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-15000-internation-extradition.

Abbell, supra footnote 3, at §3-3(7).

Abbell, supra footnote 21, at §3-3(7).

E.g., Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 10(1)-(2), entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 ("In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of any accused or convicted person. Application for provisional arrest shall be made through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Department of Justice ... and the Ministry of Interior in Thailand.... (2) The application shall contain: a description of the person sought; the location of that person, if known; a brief statement of the facts of the case including, if possible, the time and location of the offense; a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction against that person ... and a statement that a request for extradition of the person will follow"); Extradition Treaty with Estonia, art. 12, entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-16;Protocol Amending U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, art. 7, entered into force Jan.January 10, 2007, S. Treaty Doc.109-3T.I.A.S. 07-110 (replacing art. 11 of earlier treaty). Such provisions usually also call for the release of the fugitive upon the failure to submit a formal request within a designated period of time. E.g., Extradition Treaty with Thailand, supra, art. 10(4) (60 days); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, art. 12(4), entered into force Apr.April 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 108-23T.I.A.S. 07-426 (discretionary release after 60 days); Argentine Extradition Treaty, art. 11(4), entered into force June 15, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18, TIAST.I.A.S. 12866 (60 days); Korean Extradition Treaty, art. 10(4), entered into force Dec. 20, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2, TIASDecember 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. 12962 (two months); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 11, entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318 (60 days); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, art. 10(4), entered into force Sept.September 22, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (60 days) ; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 11(4), entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (60 days with a possible 30-day extension); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. VIII(4), entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112 (60 days); Italian Extradition Treaty, art. XII(4), entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023 (45 days); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, art. 11, ¶1, entered into force Apr.April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197 (45 days).

See, e.g., Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 12, entered into force Oct.Russell, 805 F.3d 1215, 1216 (5^th Cir. 1986); United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 1986); Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 786 (9^th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that the strong presumption against bail be abandoned), opinion withdrawn upon the flight of the respondent, 143 F.3d 508 (9^th Cir. 1998); Nathaniel A. Persily, Note, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 Stan. J. Int'l L. 407 (1998).

The defendant bears the burden of establishing that "special circumstances" exist and that he poses no risk of flight or danger to the community, In re Extradition of Drumm, 152 F. Supp. 3d 92, 96 (D. Mass. 2015); Nezirovic v. Holt, 990 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (W.D. Va. 2013). Bail will be granted only under extraordinary circumstances, see United States v. Wroclawski, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (D. Ariz. 2008) (bail granted where "(1) defendant's contribution to the sport of Greco-Roman wrestling in the United States and the U.S. athletes' need for his coaching assistance in the process of training for and participating in the upcoming Olympics, (2) the unexplained fact that the Polish government did not seek the extradition warrant until nearly 11 years after defendant was first charged in this case, (3) the fact that defendant has lived openly and notoriously in this country since 1993, and during this time applied for political asylum, (4) the fact that defendant poses a very low flight risk, and (5) the fact that Article 102 of the Polish Criminal Code on its face, indicates that after a 10 year passage of time since the filing of criminal charges, a defendant may not be punished for the crime. More than 10 years had passed since the initial filing of the criminal charges. Thus, the continued detention of the defendant may be contrary to Polish legal authority."); United States v. Ramnath, 533 F. Supp. 2d 662, 676 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ("An extradition respondent can prove a special circumstance warranting admission to pre-hearing bail ... by showing a likelihood of success in the action in the requesting state.... Such showing[] require[s] proof ... the requesting state cannot prove the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt…. [T]he court concludes that Dr. Ramnath clearly and convincingly has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success in the action in the requesting state.").

In re Extradition of Valdez-Mainero, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1114-115 (S.D. Cal. 1998). See also Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 172-241. Shorthand versions appear in Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)("The judicial officer's inquiry is confined to the following: whether a valid treaty exists, whether the crime charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is sufficient under the applicable standard of proof"); and §§4-2 to 4-5. The task is sometimes reduced to a shorthand version: Zhenli Ye Gon v. Holder, 774 F.3d 207, 210 (4^th Cir. 2014) ("The extradition hearing is not a full trial; rather, its purpose is to determine (1) whether there is probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of the laws of the foreign country requesting extradition, (2) whether such conduct would have been criminal if committed in the United States, and (3) whether the fugitive is the person sought by the foreign country for violating its laws"); Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9^th Cir. 2006) ("The authority of a magistrate judge serving as an extradition judicial officer is thus limited to determining an individual's eligibility to be extradited, which he does by ascertaining whether a crime is an extraditable offense under the relevant treaty and whether probable cause exists to sustain the charge"). See also United States v. Lin Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1^st Cir. 1997).

; Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The judicial officer's inquiry is confined to the following: whether a valid treaty exists, whether the crime charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is sufficient under the applicable standard of proof").

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 749 (9^th Cir. 2005); Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2006). Additionally, a few courts have ruled that the United States is obligated to turn over any exculpatory evidence in its possession that would undercut a probable cause finding that the accused committed the offense for which he was charged in the requesting State. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovksy, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6^th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 914 (1994); In re Extradition of Drayer, 190 F.3d 410, 415 (6^th Cir.1999); In re Zhenly Ye Gon, Misc. No. 08-596(JMF), 2010 WL 169468 (D.D.C., Jan. 8, 2010).

DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7^th Cir. 1997)(legal custodian defense to kidnaping charge)(citing Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), and Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922)); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9^th Cir. 1997)(due process bar to criminal trial of incompetent defendant); In re Extradition of Schweidenback, 3 F.Supp.2d 113, 117 (D.Mass. 1998)(evidence related to a defense is excludable); In re Extradition of Diaz Medina, 210 F.Supp.2d 813, 819 (N.D.Tex. 2002).

Ferriolo, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2015) ("Probable cause is established when the evidence presented supports a reasonable belief that a fugitive committed the charged offenses"); In re Extradition of Liuksila, 74 F. Supp. 3d 4, 15 (D.D.C. 2014) ("Probable cause signifies evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt").

Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554,

18 U.S.C. §3190; Balzan, 702 F.3d at 224.

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 749 (9^th Cir. 2005); Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2006); but see Santos v. Thomas, 779 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9^th Cir. 2015) (citing Barapind) (recantation evidence may be excluded). Additionally, a few courts have ruled that the United States is obligated to turn over any exculpatory evidence in its possession that would undercut a probable cause finding that the accused committed the offense for which he was charged in the requesting State. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovksy, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6^th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 914 (1994); In re Extradition of Drayer, 190 F.3d 410, 415 (6^th Cir.1999).

DeSilva, 125 F.3d at 1112 (legal custodian defense to kidnaping charge) (citing Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), and Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922)); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9^th Cir. 1997) (due process bar to criminal trial of incompetent defendant); In re Extradition of Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (D. Mass. 1998) (evidence related to a defense is excludable); In re Extradition of Diaz Medina, 210 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (N.D. Tex. 2002).

Yapp v. Reno, 26 F.3d 1562, 1565 (11^th Cir. 1994); McMaster v. United States, 9 F.3d 47, 49 (8^th Cir. 1993); Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11^th Cir. 1993); Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 260 (7^th Cir. 1993); Sabatier v. Daborwski, 586 F.2d 866, 869 (1^st Cir. 1978); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (internal citations omitted) ("the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth Amendment right against undue delay are inapplicable to an extradition. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel does not apply to extradition proceedings. The Supreme Court has found no constitutional infirmity where those subject to extradition proceedings have been denied an opportunity to confront their accusers. Finally, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and the right to a Miranda warning are inapplicable to an extradition proceeding").

DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868-69 (7^th Cir. 1999).

In re Extradition of Khochinsky, 116 F. Supp. 3d 412, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 798-99 (D. Conn, 1997) ("The rule of non-inquiry is well-established in the circuits and has been applied in extraditions to a panoply of nations. Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824 (11^th Cir. 1993) (Canada); Koskotas v. Rocke, 931 F.2d 169 (1stCir1^st Cir. 1991) (Greece); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9^th Cir. 1986 (U.K.); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7^th Cir. 1981) (Israel); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5^th Cir. 1980) (Mexico) ..."). See also Hilton v. Kerry, 754 F.3d 79, 84-5 (1^st Cir. 2014); Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, (3d Cir. 2006); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9^th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1^st Cir. 1997); United States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9^th Cir. 1995) (explaining the exception in the U.K. Supplementary Treaty); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1198 (1991). Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), declined to depart from the rule but observed that under some circumstance an extraditee might face "procedures or punishments so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require re-examination" of the question. The courts appear to have rarely if ever encountered such procedures or punishments. In re Extradition of Marinero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("There is no legal support for a judicially created 'humanitarian exception' [of the type foreseen in Gallina] in an extradition proceeding"); In re Extradition of Sandhu, 886 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The 'Gallina exception' to the rule of non-inquiry has yet to be applied"); Corneljo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9^th Cir. 2000) ("Our research failed to identify any case in which this [humanitarian exception] has been applied.... "). In the 2008 case of Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S. Ct. 2207, the Supreme Court declined to grant habeas relief to two U.S. citizens challenging their proposed surrender to the Iraqi government by U.S. military authorities in Iraq, despite arguments that they would likely face torture. Citing several prior cases involving the rule of non-inquirynoninquiry, the Court stated that in "the present context that concern is to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary." Id. at 2225700. The Court noted the stated U.S. policy not to transfer persons to countries where torture was likely to result, and distinguished the case before it from "a more extreme case in which the Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway." Id. at 2226.

Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829-30 (11^th Cir. 1993) (quoting Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901)). See generally also Hilton, 754 F.3d at 89; Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 668-73 (4^th Cir. 2007) (discussing origins and development of rule of non-inquiry).

For example, unique irritants in the diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain stimulated the 1985 signing of a supplementary extradition treaty with singular characteristics. British Supplementary Extradition Treaty, entered into force Dec. 23, 1986, TIAS 12050. The Ninth Circuit described this supplementary treaty as "alter[ing] the extradition procedures in force under the 1977 [U.S.-U.K.] Treaty in three significant ways: (1) it limits the scope of the political offense exception; (2) it authorizes a degree of judicial inquiry into the factors motivating a request for extradition; and (3) it creates a limited right to appeal an extradition decision." In re Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d at 465 (9^th Cir. 1998), redesignated In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9^th Cir. 2001)). See also British Supplementary Extradition Treaty, supra, at arts. 1, 3. The United States and the United Kingdom subsequently negotiated a more contemporary replacement, which entered into force in 2007, that transfers responsibility for determining whether an extradition request is politically motivated from the courts to the Executive. Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, entered into force Apr. 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 108-23. For a more extensive discussion, see CRS Report RL32096, Extradition Between the United States and Great Britain: The 2003 Treaty, by [author name scrubbed], available in abbreviated form as CRS Report RS21633, Extradition Between the United States and Great Britain: A Sketch of the 2003 Treaty, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf).

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), art. 3, entered into force for U.S. on Oct. 21, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20.

P.L. 105-277, § 2242; 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998)

See, e.g., Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673 (4^th Cir. 2007) (holding that common law rule of non-inquiry did not bar consideration of CAT-based claims in habeas proceedings, but still finding that consideration of such claims had nonetheless been barred by statute); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9^th Cir. 2000) (CAT-implementing legislation superceded common law rule of non-inquiry, permitting habeas review of petitioner's claim that he would face torture if extradited). But see Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 WL 191707 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000) (unpublished) (finding that rule of non-inquiry precluded consideration of petitioner's CAT-based claims, as CAT was ratified under the understanding that it was non-self executing and FARRA did not authorize judicial enforcement of CAT's provisions).

FARRA asserts that its declaration of policy and the accompanying enforcement responsibilities of federal agencies are not intended to create a basis for judicial review for CAT-based claims, except as part of the review of a final order of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. P.L. 105-277, § 2242(d). Whether or not this provision is intended to preclude judicial review of CAT-based claims in non-immigration proceedings is the subject of conflicting judicial opinion. Compare Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (wartime detainees held at Guantanamo could not bring CAT- or FARRA-based challenges to their proposed military transfer to a foreign country, as Congress had precluded judicial review of such claims except as part of a final order of immigration removal); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673 (4^th Cir. 2007) (court could not review petitioner's CAT-based challenged to his extradition, as the language of FARRA "plainly conveys that although courts may consider or review CAT or FARR[A]…claims as part of their review of a final removal order, they are otherwise precluded from considering or reviewing such claims"); with Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9^th Cir.2000), rejected by 379 F.3d 1075 (9^th Cir. 2004), latter opinion vacated by 389 F.3d 1307 (9^th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (although FARRA precludes a facial challenge of CAT-implementing regulations promulgated by State Department, individual subject to an extradition order may seek judicial review based on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when his surrender would be contrary to U.S. laws and regulations implementing CAT). In 2008, the Supreme Court appeared to invoke the rule on non-inquiry in consideration of a habeas petition by two U.S. citizens held by U.S. military authorities in Iraq who claimed that their surrender to the Iraqi government would likely result in their torture. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2225-2226 (2008). The Court noted that the habeas petitions did not assert claims under FARRA, but suggested in dicta that several issues would have to be addressed in the event that a FARRA claim was raised on remand, including the possibility that FARRA-based claims "may be limited to certain immigration proceedings." Id. at 2226, n. 6 (2008). On remand, the district court considered an amended habeas challenge by one of the petitioners that invoked FARRA as barring his surrender. The court held that FARRA limited "judicial review to claims challenging a final order of removal by immigration authorities-which is not the case here-…[and therefore] does not provide the petitioner a grounds for habeas relief." Omar v. Geren, 2009 WL 3069716, at *1 (D.D.C., Sept. 28, 2009).

Gill v. Imundi, 747 F.Supp. 1028, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing In re Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 503 (2d Cir. 1986)). See also In re Extradition of Massieu, 897 F.Supp. 176, 179 (D.N.J. 1995); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9^th Cir. 1978) (citing, inter alia, Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923)); Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 252-54.

Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 598 (4^th Cir. 2007); Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9^th Cir. 2006); Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11^th Cir. 2005); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920)); Abbell & Ristau, supra footnote 3, at 243-52.

Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 598 (4^th Cir. 2007)(quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)). See also Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11^th Cir. 2002); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9^th Cir. 2000); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7^th Cir. 1997); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997); Smith v. United States, 82 F.3d 964, 965 (10^th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 116-17 (1^st Cir. 1997) (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1997); Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 854 (9^th Cir. 1996); Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11^th Cir. 2002)). See also Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11^th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1002 (2010).

United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1^st Cir. 1997)("It is then within the Secretary of State's sole discretion to determine whether or not the relator should actually be extradited. See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 ('The Secretary of State may order the person committed under section 3184 ... of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government ... '"); Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 Columbia Law Review 1313 (1962).

Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing In re Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 503 (2d Cir. 1986)). See also In re Extradition of Massieu, 897 F. Supp. 176, 179 (D.N.J. 1995); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9^th Cir. 1978) (citing, inter alia, Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923)); Abbell, supra footnote 3, at §4-7(2).

Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451, 455 (6^th Cir. 2016); Zhenli Ye Gon v. Holt, 774 F.3d 207, 210 (4^th Cir. 2014); United States v. Balzan, 702 F.3d 220, 223 n.3 (5^th Cir. 2012); Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9^th Cir. 2006); Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11^th Cir. 2005); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920)); Abbell, supra footnote 3, at §4-6.

Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 598 (4^th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)). See also United States v. Balzan, 702 F.3d 220, 223 (5^th Cir. 2012); Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2011); Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11^th Cir. 2002); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9^th Cir. 2000); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7^th Cir. 1997); Sidali, 107 F.3d at 195; Smith v. United States, 82 F.3d 964, 965 (10^th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 116-17 (1^st Cir. 1997) (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)). See also Balzan, 702 F.3d at 223; Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11^th Cir. 2009).

See John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1973 (2010). As an example, unique irritants in the diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain stimulated the 1985 signing of a supplementary extradition treaty with singular characteristics. British Supplementary Extradition Treaty, entered into force December 23, 1986, T.I.A.S. 12050. The Ninth Circuit described this supplementary treaty as "alter[ing] the extradition procedures in force under the 1977 [U.S.-U.K.] Treaty in three significant ways: (1) it limits the scope of the political offense exception; (2) it authorizes a degree of judicial inquiry into the factors motivating a request for extradition; and (3) it creates a limited right to appeal an extradition decision." In re Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d at 465 (9^th Cir. 1998), redesignated In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9^th Cir. 2001)). See also British Supplementary Extradition Treaty, supra, at arts. 1, 3. The United States and the United Kingdom subsequently negotiated a more contemporary replacement, which entered into force in 2007, that transfers responsibility for determining whether an extradition request is politically motivated from the courts to the Executive. Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, entered into force April 26, 2007, T.I.A.S. 07-426. For a more extensive discussion, see CRS Report RL32096, Extradition Between the United States and Great Britain: The 2003 Treaty, by [author name scrubbed], available in abbreviated form as CRS Report RS21633, Extradition Between the United States and Great Britain: A Sketch of the 2003 Treaty, by [author name scrubbed].

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), art. 3, entered into force for the United States on October 21, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20. See generally Evan King, Note, The Effect of the United Nations Convention Against Torture on the Scope of Habeas Review in the Context of International Extradition, 38 Fordham Int'l L. J. 779 (2015); Caroline Stover, Note, Torture and Extradition: Using Trinidad y Garcia to Develop a New Rule for Courts, 45 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 325 (2013).

P.L. 105-277, Title XXII, §2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998), 8 U.S.C. §1231 note.

Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673 (4^th Cir. 2007) (holding that common law rule of noninquiry did not bar consideration of CAT-based claims in habeas proceedings, but still finding that consideration of such claims had nonetheless been barred by statute). Section 2242(d) states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in the regulations described in subsection (b), no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth in subsection (a), except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252)."

Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9^th Cir. 2012). The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to consider the question until after the Secretary of State had decided to extradite in the face of the fugitive's torture claims. Meza v. U.S. Attorney General, 693 F.34d 1350, 1357 (11^th Cir. 2012) ("Yacaman's argument that the Convention Against Torture bars his extradition is not ripe for adjudication because it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.").

Martinez, 828 F.3d at 455; United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1^st Cir. 1997) ("It is then within the Secretary of State's sole discretion to determine whether or not the relator should actually be extradited. See 18 U.S.C. §3186 ('The Secretary of State may order the person committed under section 3184 ... of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government ... '")); Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 Columbia Law Review 1313 (1962).

18 U.S.C. § 3186 ("The Secretary of State may order the person committed under sections 3184 or 3185 of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be tried for the offense of which charged. Such agent may hold such person in custody, and take him to the territory of such foreign government, pursuant to such treaty. A person so accused who escapes may be retaken in the same manner as any person accused of any offense").

18 U.S.C. § 3188 ("Whenever any person who is committed for rendition to a foreign government to remain until delivered up in pursuance of a requisition, is not so delivered up and conveyed out of the United States within two calendar months after such commitment, over and above the time actually required to convey the prisoner from the jail to which he was committed, by the readiest way, out of the United States, any judge of the United States, or of any State, upon application made to him by or on behalf of the person so committed, and upon proof made to him that reasonable notice of the intention to make such application has been given to the Secretary of State, may order the person so committed to be discharged out of custody, unless sufficient cause is shown to such judge why such discharge ought not to be ordered").

E.g., Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 10, entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (when the United States or an EU Member State receives competing extradition request from the other State and a third country, the requested State shall consider "all relevant factors" when determining which request to honor, including but not limited to "(a) whether the requests were made pursuant to treaty; (b) the places where each of the offenses were committed; (c) the respective interests of the requesting States; (d) the seriousness of the offenses; (e) the nationality of the victim; (f) the possibility of any subsequent extradition between the requesting States; and (g) the chronological order in which the requests were received from the requesting States" ); Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, art. 12, entered into force Nov.November 29, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 105-21; Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 13, entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16; Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 15, entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17; Jamaican Extradition Treaty, art. XIII, entered into force July 7, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18; Extradition Treaty with the Uruguay, art. 14, entered into force Apr.April 11, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3197; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. X, entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 14, entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3.

E.g., Jamaican Extradition Treaty, art. XII, entered into force July 7, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 ("If the extradition request is granted in the case of a person who is being prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the territory of the Requested State for a different offence, the Requesting State shall, unless its laws otherwise provide, defer the surrender of the person sought until the conclusion of the proceedings against that person or the full execution of any punishment that may be or may have been imposed"); Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, art. 13(2), entered into force Jan.January 12, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34T.I.A.S. 13066; French Extradition Treaty, art. 16(2), entered into force Feb. 1, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13February 1, 2002, T.I.A.S. 02-201; Hungarian Extradition Treaty, art. 14, entered into force Mar.March 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5T.I.A.S. 97-318; Extradition Treaty with Thailand, art. 12, entered into force May 17, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16; Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, art. 14, entered into force Oct.October 11, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. XI, entered into force Nov.November 21, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22T.I.A.S. 196-112; Jordanian Extradition Treaty, art. 13, entered into force July 29, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3; Italian Extradition Treaty, art. XIV, entered into force Sept.September 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 3023.

E.g., Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 9, entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. 109-14February 1, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (when preexisting agreement between EU Member State and United States lacks similar provision, allowing requested State to surrender the relator with the understanding that he will be kept in custody and returned under circumstances and conditions agreed upon by the two States); Peruvian Extradition Treaty, art. X(2), entered into force Aug.August 25, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. 107-6T.I.A.S. 03-825; Second Protocol Amending Extradition Treaty with Canada, art. 1, entered into force Apr.April 30, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. 107-11T.I.A.S. 03-430 (adding art. 7 bis to earlier treaty); Protocol Amending Extradition Treaty with Mexico, art. 1, entered into force May 25, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. 105-46, TIAST.I.A.S. 12897 (adding art. 15(2)-(3) to earlier treaty).

Restatement, supra footnote 1, § 478, Comment e ("Requests for extradition of persons from foreign states may be made only by the Department of State. If the offense with which the person is charged or of which he has been convicted is one under federal law, the application for extradition must be submitted by the prosecutor to the Department of Justice, which will review the documents and, if satisfied of their sufficiency, transmit them to the Department of State for forwarding to the requested state. If the offense is one under [the law of any of the states of the United States], the application must be submitted by or with the endorsement of the Governor of the State, and must be reviewed by the Department of Justice before transmission to the Department of State. If the State Department is satisfied that the conditions for extradition under the applicable treaty have been met, it will request extradition in the name of the United States, and, where appropriate, will arrange for representation of the United States at the proceedings in the requested state. When extradition proceedings in the foreign state have been completed and the person sought has been certified to be extraditable, the Secretary or [her] authorized deputy may issue a warrant to federal or State officials to act as agents of the United States for the purpose of taking custody of the person in the requested state for return to the United States.").

"The Office of International Affairs (OIA) provides information and advice to Federal and State prosecutors about the procedure for requesting extradition from abroad. OIA also advises and provides support to Federal prosecutors handling foreign extradition requests for fugitives found in the United States. Every formal extradition request for international extradition based on Federal criminal charges must be reviewed and approved by OIA. At the request of the Department of State, formal requests based on State charges are also reviewed by OIA before submission to the Department of State…." USAM § 9-15.210.

9-15.210.

CRM § 603[A].

Id.

CRM § 603[B].

CRM § 603[C].

Id.

CRM § 603[F].

CRM §603[A].

Id.

CRM §603[B].

CRM §603[C].

Id.

CRM §603[F].

CRM § 603[F].

Abbell, supra footnote 21, at § 6-2(25).

USAM § ; United States v. Alexander, 817 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9^th Cir. 2016).

CRM §603[F].

Abbell, supra footnote 3, at §6-2(25).

CRM § CRM §604; USAM § 9-15.230.

CRM § 605; USAM § 9-15.240.

CRM § 607; USAM § 9-15.240.

CRM § 609; USAM § 9-15.240..

CRM § 606; USAM § 9-15.240.

CRM § 608; USAM § 9-15.240.

Abbell, supra footnote 21, at §7-1(8); USAM § 9-15.250.

9-15.230.

CRM §605; USAM §9-15.240.

CRM §607; USAM §9-15.240.

CRM §609; USAM §9-15.240.

CRM §606; USAM §9-15.240.

CRM §608; USAM §9-15.240.

Abbell, supra footnote 3, at §7-1(8); USAM §9-15.250.

§6-2(11).

United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 577-78 (6^th Cir. 2004);

United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 784 (1^st Cir. 1995).

United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7^th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11^th Cir. 1995); but see United States v. Suarez, 791 F.3d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2007)) ("Although the rule of specialty is typically applied in cases where the defendant is tried for a crime not enumerated in the applicable extradition treaty or agreement, it also 'has application in the sentencing context.' Because 'the cauldron of circumstances in which extradition agreements are born implicate the foreign relations of the United States ..., a district court delicately must balance its discretionary sentencing decision with the principles of international comity in which the rule of specialty sounds'").

United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 723 (4^th Cir. 2012); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 784 (1^st Cir. 1995).

United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7^th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171, 1179-1181 (11^th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that "[t]he rule of specialty applies only to extraditions pursuant to treaty," and finding that defendant lacked standing to claim a rule of specialty violation when his extradition from Colombia was not pursuant to the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty, but was instead effectuated by way of an informal agreement between the countries).

Stokes, 726 F.3d at 889; United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205 (1^st Cir. 1998); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11^th Cir. 1995)Puentes, 50 F.3d at 1575; United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300-1301 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9^th Cir. 1986).

Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422.

; see also Samantha K. Drake, Dangerous Precedents: Circumventing Extradition to Implement the Death Penalty, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 333 (2013).

§§6-3(11), 3-3(8).

E.g., I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 Fordham Law ReviewL. Rev. 317 (1992).

E.g., Kalejs v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 441 (7^th Cir. 1993) (deportation to Australia of a member of a German mobile killing unit in World War II who falsified immigration forms but who came to this country by way of Australia).

The United States has denaturalized and deported former Nazi death camp guards who gained entry into the United States and/or American citizenship by concealing their pasts. E.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 670 (1998); United States v. Stelmokas, 110100 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 19971996). See also In re Extradition of Breyer, 32 F. Supp. 3d 574, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2014); ). See also John Francis Stephens, Note, The Denaturalization and Extradition of Ivan the Terrible, 26 Rutgers L. J. 821 (1995); Bassiouni, supra footnote 4, at 203-71213-72 (summarizing alternatives and criticizing their use in some instances).

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-62 (1992); United States v. Torres Gonzalez, 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1^st Cir. 2001Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226, 1231-232 (11^th 2015); United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 442-43 (D.C. Cir. 2006Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 2343-44 (4^th Cir. 2013); United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11^th Cir. 2006); Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 493-500 (4^th Cir. 2002)Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 571-73 (9^th Cir. 2010); United States v. Torres Gonzalez, 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1^st Cir. 2001); Mejia, 448 F.3d at 442-43. See also United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 666 (9^th Cir. 2006) ("a court is deprived of jurisdiction over an extradited defendant, if either (1) the transfer of the defendant violated the applicable extradition treaty, or (2) the United States government engaged in 'misconduct of the most shocking and outrageous kind,' to obtain his presence").