Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
Anna C. Henning
Legislative Attorney
Edward C. Liu
Legislative Attorney
March 16October 29, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40138
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
Summary
Several recentThree amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will sunset on
are set to expire (sunset)
on December 31, 2009. H.R. 1467, introduced in the 111th Congress, would extend these three
provisions until December 31, 2019.
Section 6001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA), also known as
the “lone wolf” provision, changed the rules regarding the types of individuals that could be
targets of FISA-authorized searches. It permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in
international terrorism, without requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign
power or terrorist organization.
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended FISA to permit multipoint, or “roving,”
wiretaps by S. 1692, a bill reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute, would extend the sunset date by four years and make
various modifications to existing authorities. H.R. 3845 would likewise establish a new sunset of
December 31, 2013, but it would reauthorize only two of the three expiring provisions.
The three sunsetting amendments expanded the scope of federal intelligence-gathering authority
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Two were enacted as part of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section
206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit multipoint, or “roving,” wiretaps by
adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility
subject to
electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified.
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT enlarged the scope of documents
materials that could be sought
under FISA, and lowered the standard required before issuance of a court order compelling the
production of documents.
While these provisions will cease to be prospectively effective on December 31, 2009, a
grandfather clause permits them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or
potential offenses that took to include “any tangible thing.” It also lowered the
standard required before a court order may be issued to compel their production.
The third amendment was enacted in 2004, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Protection Act (IRTPA). Section 6001(a) of the IRTPA changed the rules regarding the types of
individuals who may be targets of FISA-authorized searches. Also known as the “lone wolf”
provision, it permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism without
requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization.
Although these provisions are set to sunset on December 31, 2009, grandfather clauses permit
them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took
place, before the sunset date.
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
Contents
Overview ....................................................................................................................................1
“Lone Wolf” Terrorists .....Background ...........................................................................................................2
Historical Context .................................................................................................................2
Legislative Responses 2
Distinction Between FISA Court Orders and Warrants in Criminal Investigations ..................2
Distinction Between FISA Court Orders and National Security Letters ..................................4
Expiring FISA Amendments........................................................................................................5
“Lone Wolf” Terrorists .................................3
Sunset .........................................................................5
Historical Context ..........................................................4
Roving Wiretaps .................................................5
Legislative Responses ........................................................................4
Background ...............................6
Roving Wiretaps ...........................................................................................4
Section 206 and “Other Persons”........................7
Background ...................................................................5
Particularity Requirement of the Fourth Amendment .............................................................5
Sunset 7
Section 206 and “Other Persons”.......................................................................................7
Particularity Requirement of the Fourth Amendment .......................................................68
Access to Business Records Under FISA.....................................................................................79
Background ..........................................................................................................................79
Expansion of the Scope of Documents Subject to FISA...............................................................8 10
Changes to the Standard of Review .......................................................................................8 11
Nondisclosure and Judicial Review .......................................................................................9 11
DOJ OIG Report ................................................................................................................. 10
Sunset ................... 12
Effect of Sunset Provisions.............................................................................................................. 10 13
Proposed Legislation in the 111th Congress................................................................................ 1114
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 1115
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
Overview
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) provides a statutory framework for government
agencies to seek a court order from a specialized Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
authorizing the collection of foreign intelligence information via electronic surveillance1 or
physical searches. 2 FISA also provides procedures governing the use of pen registers and trap and
trace devices,3 and access to certain business records for foreign intelligence collection. 4 The
extent to which the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is applicable to the government’s
collection of foreign intelligence is unclear.5 But, FISA’s statutory requirements arguably provide
a minimum standard that must be met before foreign intelligence searches or surveillance may be
conducted by the government. 6
A substantial purpose of a FISA court order must be the collection of foreign intelligence
information. 7 Therefore, the procedures for obtaining a court order under FISA differ from the
procedures used in the criminal law enforcement context. While both FISA orders and criminal
warrants incorporate impartial judicial review to determine if probable cause exists, the
propositions that must be supported by probable cause are substantially different in either case. In
the case of a FISA court order, the FISC must find probable cause to believe both (1) that the
person targeted by the order is a foreign power or its agent, and (2) that the subject of the search
(i.e., the telecommunications or place to be searched) will be used by the target.8
1
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1808 (2008).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1822-1826 (2008).
3by which
government agencies may, when gathering foreign intelligence investigation,1 obtain
authorization to conduct electronic surveillance2 or physical searches,3 utilize pen registers and
trap and trace devices, 4 or access specified business records and other tangible things.5
Authorization for such activities is typically obtained via a court order from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized court created to act as a neutral judicial
decision maker in the context of FISA.
Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, in part, to
“provid[e] enhanced investigative tools” to “assist in the prevention of future terrorist activities
and the preliminary acts and crimes which further such activities.”6 That act and subsequent
measures7 amended FISA to enable the government to obtain information in a greater number of
circumstances.
The expanded authorities prompted concerns regarding the appropriate balance between national
security interests and civil liberties. Perhaps in response to such concerns, Congress established
sunset provisions which apply to three of the most controversial amendments to FISA. These
amendments include:
•
Section 6001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act
(IRTPA), also known as the “lone wolf” provision, which simplifies the
evidentiary showing needed to obtain a FISA court order to target non-U.S.
persons who engage in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor, specifically by authorizing such orders in the absence of a proven link
between a targeted individual and a foreign power;8
•
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which permits multipoint, or “roving,”
wiretaps—i.e., wiretaps which may follow a target even when he or she changes
phones—by adding flexibility to the manner in which the subject of a FISA court
order is specified;9 and
1
Although FISA is often discussed in relation to the prevention of terrorism, it applies to the gathering of foreign
intelligence information for other purposes. For example, it extends to the collection of information necessary for the
conduct of foreign affairs. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2008) (definition of “foreign intelligence information”).
2
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1808 (2008).
3
50 U.S.C. §§ 1822-1826 (2008).
4
50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846 (2008). Pen registers capture the numbers dialed on a telephone line; trap and trace devices
identify the originating number of a call on a particular phone line. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2008).
4
50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (2008).
5
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies in instances of domestic
security surveillance. U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323-4 (1972) (also referred to as the Keith case, so
named for the District Court judge that initially ordered disclosure of unlawful warrantless electronic surveillance to the
defendants). But, see In re Directives, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27417 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Survellance Ct. Rev. 2008)
(holding that the foreign intelligence surveillance of targets reasonably believed to be outside of the U.S. qualifies for
the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement). See, also, CRS Report WD00002, Presidential Authority to
Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, by Elizabeth B. Bazan and
Jennifer K. Elsea, at 9-12 (discussing courts’ differing application of the Fourth Amendment to searches for the
purpose of foreign intelligence collection).
6
But,5
50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (2008).
6
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56 (2001); H.Rept. 107-236, pt. 1, at 41 (2001).
7
See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act, P.L. 108-458 (2004).
8
Id. at § 6001(a), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C) (2008).
9
P.L. 107-56, § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
•
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which broadens the types of records and
other tangible things that can be made accessible to the government under
FISA.10
Although the amendments were initially set to expire in 2005, a 2005 reauthorization measure set
a new sunset date of December 31, 2009.11 While leaving the expansions of authority generally
intact, Congress modified the three amendments as part of the 2005 reauthorization act and
various other measures.12
The impending sunset date has prompted congressional interest and several legislative proposals
regarding the expiring provisions. Most prominently, S. 1692, a bill reported favorably by the
Senate Judiciary Committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, would extend the
provisions for an additional four years. This report discusses background information, the three
expiring provisions, and relevant legislative proposals.
Background
FISA, enacted in 1978, provides a statutory framework which governs governmental authority to
conduct, as part of an investigation to gather foreign intelligence information, electronic
surveillance and other activities to which the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would
apply if they were conducted as part of a domestic criminal investigation.13 Its statutory
requirements arguably provide a minimum standard that must be met before foreign intelligence
searches or surveillance may be conducted by the government.14
Distinction Between FISA Court Orders and Warrants in
Criminal Investigations
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”15 In domestic criminal law investigations, it generally requires law enforcement
10
Id. at § 215, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-2 (2008).
See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-177 (2006).
12
See, e.g., An act to amend the USA PATRIOT Act to extend the sunset of certain provisions of that Act and the lone
wolf provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to July 1, 2006, P.L. 109-160 (2005);
USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, P.L. 109-178 (2006); Protect America Act of
2007, P.L. 110-55 (2007); FISA Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-261 (2008).
13
The scope of activities governed by FISA relates to the scope of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement insofar
as the statute refers to the warrant requirement in its definitions. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (restricting the definition of
electronic surveillance to instances “in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes”) (emphasis added).
14
But see CRS Report WD00002, Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather
Foreign Intelligence Information, by Elizabeth B. Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea, at 29-33 (“While the congressional
intent to cabin the President’s exercise of any inherent constitutional authority to engage in foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance may be clear from the exclusivity provision in FISA and from the legislative history of the
measure, some support may be drawn from the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance] Court of Review’s decision in In re
Sealed Case for the position that the President continues to have the power to authorize warrantless electronic
surveillance to gather foreign intelligence outside the FISA framework”).
7
See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2008). Prior to 2001, the statute had required that “the purpose” of a FISA
warrant be foreign intelligence collection.
8
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2008). In contrast, federal criminal search warrants require probable cause to believe that
instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c).
Criminal warrants authorizing electronic surveillance additionally require probable cause to believe that the target is
engaged in criminal activities, that normal investigative techniques are insufficient, and that the facilities that are the
subject of surveillance will be used by the target. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2008).
2
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009
Three relatively recent amendments to FISA will expire on December 31, 2009. These provisions
are:
•
Section 6001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act
(IRTPA), also known as the “lone wolf” provision, which simplified the
evidentiary showing needed to obtain a FISA court order to target individuals,
other than U.S. citizens or permanent residents, engaged in international
terrorism; 9
•
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which permitted multipoint, or “roving,”
wiretaps in certain circumstances by adding flexibility to the manner in which the
subject of a FISA court order is specified;10 and
•
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which broadened the types of records that
could be made accessible to the government under FISA. 11
This report will discuss the state of the law prior to enactment of these provisions, the changes
wrought by each of these provisions, and the expected state of the law after the pending sunset
date.
“Lone Wolf” Terrorists
Commonly referred to as the “lone wolf” provision, § 6001(a) of IRTPA simplified the
evidentiary standard used to determine whether an individual, other than a citizen or a permanent
resident of the U.S., who was engaged in international terrorism, could be the target of a FISA
court order. This amendment did not modify other standards used to determine the secondary
question of whether the electronic surveillance or a physical search of the subject of a court order
is justified in a specific situation.
Historical Context
The historical impetus behind enactment of the “lone wolf” provision came to light shortly after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. During the examination of the events leading up to
those attacks, it was reported that investigations into one of the individuals believed to be
responsible for those attacks had been potentially hampered by the legal requirements governing
FISA.12 Specifically, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents investigating Zacarias
Moussaoui suspected him of planning a terrorist attack involving piloting commercial airliners,
and had detained him in October of 2001 based on a violation of immigration law.13 The FBI
agents had then sought a court order under FISA to examine the contents of Moussaoui’s laptop
9
P.L. 108-458, § 6001(a).
P.L. 107-56, § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
11
P.L. 107-56, § 215, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-2 (2008).
10
12
NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report, at 273-274 [hereinafter “9/11
Comm’n Rep.”]
13
Id. at 273. Moussaoui, a French national, was present in the United States with an expired visa.
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009
computer.14 But, the agency apparently concluded that it had insufficient information at that time
to demonstrate that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power, as required by FISA.15
FISA, as it then existed, would have authorized, among other things, physical searches of a laptop
if probable cause existed to believe the laptop was owned or used by a foreign power or its
agent.16 The definition of a “foreign power” included “groups engaged in international terrorism
or activities in preparation therefor.”17 Individuals involved in international terrorism for or on
behalf of those groups were considered “agents of a foreign power.”18 In the weeks leading up to
the attacks, it appears that the FBI encountered an actual or perceived insufficiency of
information demonstrating probable cause to believe that Moussaoui was acting for or on behalf
of an identifiable group engaged in international terrorism. 19
Legislative Responses
Following these revelations, a number of legislative proposals were put forth to amend the
definition of “agents of a foreign power” under FISA so that individuals engaged in international
terrorism did not need to be linked to a specific foreign power.20 One such amendment was
ultimately enacted with passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA).21 This “lone wolf” provision provides that persons, other than citizens or permanent
residents of the U.S., that are engaged in international terrorism are presumptively considered to
be agents of a foreign power. 22 Enactment of this provision obviated any need to provide an
evidentiary connection between that individual and a foreign government or terrorist group.
Critics of the “lone wolf” provision argued that the laptop in the Moussaoui case could have been
lawfully searched under FISA or the laws governing generic criminal warrants.23 Critics also
expressed concern that the simplified “lone wolf” standard would lead to “FISA serving as a
substitute for some of our most important criminal laws.”24
On the other hand, proponents of the “lone wolf” provision note that the increased selforganization among terror networks has made proving connections to identifiable groups more
14
Id. at 273-274.
Id. at 274. Based upon this conclusion, the FBI “declined to submit a FISA application” to the FISC.
16
50 U.S.C. § 1821-1824 (2001).
17
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2001). At the time, foreign powers also included foreign governments, entities controlled by
those governments, and factions of foreign nations and foreign-based political organizations that are not substantially
composed of United States persons. Id. at § (a)(1-6)
18
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) (2001).
19
See 9/11 Comm’n Rep. at 274. It is unclear whether a search of Moussaoui’s laptop before September 11, 2001,
would have provided enough information to prevent or minimize those attacks.
20
S. 2586, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 113, 108th Cong. (2003).
21
P.L. 108-458, § 6001(a).
22
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(3) (2008).
15
23
See S.Rept. 108-40 at 33-41 (additional views of Sen. Leahy and Sen. Feingold on a similar “lone wolf” provision in
S. 113).
24
Id. at 73 (additional views of Sen. Feingold).
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009
difficult, and that a “lone wolf” provision is necessary to combat terrorists who use a modern
organizational structure.25
Sunset
The “lone wolf” provision was originally scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2005.26 However,
§ 103 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 extended the sunset
date of the “lone wolf” provision until December 31, 2009.27 The original sunset provision also
included a grandfather clause which allowed it to continue to be effective with respect to
investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the provision’s sunset
date. 28 For example, if an individual is engaged in international terrorism on December 30, 2009,
he may still be considered a “lone wolf” for FISA court orders sought after the provision has
expired. This grandfather clause is unaffected by the extension of the sunset date to December 31,
2009.
Roving Wiretaps
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended FISA to permit multipoint, or “roving,”
wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility
subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified.29 It is often colloquially
described as allowing FISA wiretaps to target persons rather than places.
Background
Prior to enactment of § 206, the scope of electronic surveillance authorized by a court order was
limited in two ways. First, the location or facility that was the subject of surveillance had to be
identified. 30 Second, only identifiable third-parties could be directed to facilitate electronic
surveillance by the government. 31 Conducting electronic surveillance frequently requires the
assistance of telecommunications providers, landlords, or other third-parties. Furthermore,
telecommunications providers are generally prohibited from assisting in electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes, except as authorized by FISA.32 In cases where the location or
facility was unknown, the identity of the person who would need to assist the government could
not be specified in the order. Therefore, limiting the class of persons who could be directed to
assist the government by a FISA court order effectively limited the reach of FISA court orders to
known and identifiable locations.
25
S.Rept. 108-40 at 4-6.
P.L. 108-458, § 6001(b).
27
P.L. 109-177, § 103.
28
P.L. 108-458, § 6001(b) (referencing PATRIOT Act sunset provision in P.L. 107-56, § 224(b)).
29
P.L. 107-56, § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
30
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(B) (2001) (requiring FISA warrants to specify the “nature and location of each of the
facilities or places at which electronic surveillance will be directed”).
31
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2001).
32
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809(a) and 1810 (2008).
26
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Section 206 and “Other Persons”
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended § 105(c)(2)(B) of FISA to provide that “in
circumstances where the Court finds, based on specific facts provided in the application, that the
actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a
specified person” a FISA order may direct “other persons” to assist with the electronic
surveillance. 33 In a technical amendment later that year, the requirement that the order specify the
location of the surveillance was also changed so that this requirement only applied if the facilities
or places were known.34 These modifications had the effect of permitting FISA orders to direct
unspecified individuals to assist the government in performing electronic surveillance, thus
permitting court orders to authorize surveillance of places or locations that were unknown at the
time the order was issued.
This section was further amended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005 to require that the FISC be notified within 10 days after “surveillance begins to be
directed at any new facility or place.”35 In addition, the FISC must be told the nature and location
of each new facility or place, the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the new
surveillance, a statement of any proposed minimization procedures that differ from those
contained in the original application or order, and the total number of facilities or places subject
to surveillance under the authority of the present order. 36
Particularity Requirement of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment imposes specific requirements upon the issuance of warrants authorizing
searches of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”37 One of the requirements, referred to as the
particularity requirement, states that warrants shall “particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched.”38 Under FISA, roving wiretaps are not required to identify the location that may be
subject to surveillance. Therefore, some may argue that roving wiretaps do not comport with the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Initially, it is not clear that the Fourth
Amendment would require that searches for foreign intelligence information be supported by a
warrant,39 but prior legal challenges to similar provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III) may be instructive in the event that challenges to § 206 are
brought alleging violations of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Similar roving wiretaps have been permitted under Title III since 1986, in cases where the target
of the surveillance takes actions to thwart such surveillance.40 The procedures under Title III are
similar to those currently used under FISA, but two significant differences exist. First, a roving
33
P.L. 107-56, § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
P.L. 107-108, § 314(a)(2)(A).
35
P.L. 109-177, § 108(b)(4), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3) (2008). This deadline for notification can be extended
to up to 60 days by the FISC upon a showing of good cause.
36
Id.
37
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that electronic surveillance of private conversations qualifies as
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
38
Id.
39
See supra footnote 5.
40
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, P.L. 99-508, § 106(d)(3), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (2008).
34
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009
wiretap under Title III must definitively identify the target of the surveillance.41 Fixed wiretaps
under Title III and all wiretaps under FISA need only identify the target if the target’s identity is
known. FISA permits roving wiretaps via court orders that only provide a specific description of
the target.42 Second, Title III requires that the surveilled individuals be notified of the
surveillance, generally 90 days after surveillance terminates. 43 FISA contains no similar
notification provision.
In United States v. Petti, the Ninth Circuit was presented with a challenge to a roving wiretap
under Title III alleging that roving wiretaps do not satisfy the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.44 The Ninth Circuit initially noted that
the test for determining the sufficiency of the warrant description is whether the place to be
searched is described with sufficient particularity to enable the executing officer to locate
and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable
probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched.45
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit held that roving wiretaps under Title III satisfied the
particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment. 46 The court in this case relied upon the fact that
targets of roving wiretaps had to be identified and that they were only available where the target’s
actions indicated an intent to thwart electronic surveillance. 47
Critics of roving wiretaps under FISA may argue that § 206 increases the likelihood that innocent
conversations will be the subject of electronic surveillance. They may further argue that the threat
of these accidental searches of innocent persons is precisely the type of injury sought to be
prevented by the particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment. Such a threat may be particularly
acute in this case given the fact that there is no requirement under FISA that the target of a roving
wiretap be identified, although the target must be specifically described.48
Sunset
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT was initially set to sunset on December 31, 2005.49 But, it
was extended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 until
December 31, 2009. After this date, § 105(c)(2) of FISA will read as it read on October 25,
2001,50 eliminating the authority for FISA court orders to direct other unspecified persons to
assist with electronic surveillance. 51
41
18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (2008).
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3), 1805(c)(1)(A) (2008).
43
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2008). This notification may be postponed upon an ex parte showing of good cause.
44
U.S. v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1443-5 (9th Cir. 1992).
45
Id. at 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
Id. at 1445.
42
47
Id. See also, United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1124 (2nd Cir. 1993) (similarly holding that a similar provision
authorizing roving bugs under Title III was constitutional).
48
50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3), 1805(c)(1)(B) (2008).
49
P.L. 107-56, § 224(a).
50
P.L. 109-177, § 102(b). The relevant section of FISA will then provide
that, upon the request of the applicant, a specified communication or other common carrier,
(continued...)
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The original sunset provision also provided a grandfather clause for investigations that began, or
potential offenses that took place, before the date of the provision’s expiration. 52 For example, if
an individual is engaged in international terrorism on December 30, 2009, he may be the target of
a roving wiretap under FISA even after authority for new roving wiretaps has expired. This
grandfather clause is unaffected by the extension of the sunset date to December 31, 2009.
Access to Business Records Under FISA
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT enlarged the scope of documents that could be sought
under FISA, as well as lowered the standard required before a court order could be issued
compelling the production of documents.
Background
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that an individual’s bank account records did not fall within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. 53
Subsequently, Congress passed laws protecting various types of transactional information, but
built in exceptions providing some access to statutorily protected records for counter intelligence
purposes. 54 Similar statutory protections were also enacted for electronic communications records
and credit bureau records.55 As with financial records, these later statutes also included exceptions
for access to records relevant to counter intelligence investigations. These exceptions comprise
the authority for so-called national security letters (NSL), which can be used to compel the
production of certain types of records.
In 1998, Congress amended FISA to provide access to certain records that were not available
through NSL’s.56 Specifically, it created a mechanism for federal investigators to compel the
production of records from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facilities,
and vehicle rental facilities.57 Applications for orders under this section had to be made by FBI
agents with a rank of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or higher and investigations could not be
conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment.58 Under these
(...continued)
landlord, custodian, or other specified person furnish the applicant forthwith all information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a
manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that
such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing that target of electronic surveillance.
50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2) (2001).
51
The sunset will not repeal the provision of FISA that permits a FISA warrant to fail to identify facilities or places that
will be subject to electronic surveillance. However, the authority for most new roving wiretaps may be effectively
repealed because new orders may not direct unspecified persons to assist with surveillance.
52
P.L. 107-56, § 224(b).
53
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
54
See CRS Report RL33320, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background and
Recent Amendments, by Charles Doyle, at 3.
55
Id. at 3-4.
56
P.L. 105-272, tit. VI, § 602.
57
50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2001).
58
50 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1) (2001).
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procedures the FISC would issue an order if, inter alia, the application contained “specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.”59 Recipients of an order under this section were required
to comply with it, and were also prohibited from disclosing to others that an order had been
issued.60
Expansion of Scope of Documents Subject to FISA
In 2001, § 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT made several changes to the procedures under FISA
for obtaining business records. 61 Among these was an expansion of the scope of records that were
subject to compulsory production. Whereas, prior to enactment of the USA PATRIOT ACT, only
records from four explicit categories of businesses could be obtained, § 215 applied to “any
tangible things.”62
This expanded scope drew strong opposition from the library community, so much so that § 215
came to be known as the “library provision” despite the fact that the original text of the provision
did not mention libraries.63 Opposition from this group appears to have been primarily based upon
the chilling effect such access could have on the exercise of First Amendment rights and
purported intrusions into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment.64 Opposition from library
advocates may have also been a residual response to prior attempts by the FBI to gather foreign
intelligence information from library staff and records during the Cold War.65
In response to these concerns, a library-specific amendment was made to the § 215 procedures by
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. Under this amendment, if the
records sought were “library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, book
customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, or medical records
containing information that would identify a person,” the application has to be approved by one
of three high-ranking FBI officers.66
Changes to the Standard of Review
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT also modified the standard that had to be met before an
order compelling production of documents could issue from the FISC. Prior to enactment of §
59
50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2001).
50 U.S.C. § 1862(d)(1)-(2) (2001).
61
P.L. 107-56, § 215 codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a)-(b) (2008).
62
50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2008).
63
E.g. Richard B. Schmitt, House Weakens Patriot Act’s ‘Library Provision’, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at A-1.
64
See, e.g., AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, Resolution on the USA Patriot Act and Related Measures That Infringe
on the Rights of Library Users, Jan. 29, 2003, available at http://www.ala.org; Judith King, Director ALA Office for
Intellectual Freedom, Letter to the Editor, FBI ‘Fishing Expeditions’ Librarians’ Biggest Worry, WALL ST. J., May 24,
2004, at A15; David Mehegan, Reading Over Your Shoulder: The Push Is On To Shelve Part Of The Patriot Act,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2004, at E5.
65
See Ulrika Ekman Ault, The FBI’s Library Awareness Program: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532 (1990).
60
66
Applications for these records could be made only by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Deputy
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security. This
authority cannot be further delegated. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(3) (2008).
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009
215, an applicant had to have “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”67 In
contrast, under § 215 as originally enacted, the applicant only needed to “specify that the records
concerned [were] sought for a [foreign intelligence investigation.]”68
Subsequently, in 2005, Congress further amended FISA procedures for obtaining business records
as part of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. The applicable
standard was again changed to require “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to a [foreign intelligence
investigation.]”69 Records are presumptively relevant if they pertain to
•
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
•
the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such
authorized investigation; or
•
an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power
who is the subject of such authorized investigation;
Nondisclosure and Judicial Review
Orders issued under § 215 are accompanied by nondisclosure orders prohibiting the recipients
from disclosing that the FBI has sought or obtained any tangible things pursuant to a FISA order.
However, the recipient may discuss the order with other persons as necessary to comply with the
order, with an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance, or with other persons as permitted by
the FBI. 70 The recipient must identify persons to whom disclosure has been made, or is intended
to be made, if the FBI requests, except that attorneys with whom the recipient has consulted do
not need to be identified. 71
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 also provided procedures for
recipients of § 215 orders to challenge the judicial review of orders compelling the production of
business records.72 Once a petition for review is submitted by a recipient, a FISC judge must
determine whether the petition is frivolous within 72 hours.73 If the petition is frivolous, it must
be denied and the order affirmed. 74 Otherwise the order may be modified or set aside if it does not
meet the requirements of FISA or is otherwise unlawful.75 Appeals by either party may be heard
by the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and the Supreme Court.76
67
50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2001).
P.L. 107-56, § 215.
69
P.L. 109-177, § 106(b).
70
50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) (2008).
71
50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(2)(C) (2008).
72
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
73
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(ii) (2008).
74
Id.
75
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(B) (2008).
76
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) (2008).
68
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Judicial review of nondisclosure orders operates under a similar procedure,77 but such orders are
not reviewable for one year after they are initially issued.78 If the petition is not determined to be
frivolous, a nondisclosure order may be set aside if there is
no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States,
interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere
with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.79
A petition to set aside a nondisclosure order may be defeated if the government certifies that
disclosure would endanger the national security or interfere with diplomatic relations.80 Absent
any finding of bad faith, such a certification is to be treated as conclusive by the FISC. If a
petition is denied, either due to a certification described above, frivolity, or otherwise, the
petitioner may not challenge the nondisclosure order for another year.81 Appeals by either party
may be heard by the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and the Supreme Court.82
DOJ OIG Report
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 directed the Inspector General
of the Department of Justice (OIG) to audit the FBI’s use of § 215 authority and report its
findings to Congress.83 The OIG’s most recent audit for calendar year 2006 was released in
March of 2008.84 According to that report, 21 applications for § 215 orders were made in 2006, of
which six were withdrawn and 15 granted. The report also indicates that one of the six
applications was withdrawn because the FISC indicated that it would not sign the order due to
First Amendment concerns.85
Sunset
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT was initially set to sunset on December 31, 2005.86 But, it
was extended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 until
December 31, 2009. After this date, § 501 and 502 of FISA will read as they read on October 25,
2001,87 restricting the types of business records that are subject to FISA and reinstating the
77
Judicial review of nondisclosure orders was added by P.L. 109-178, § 3.
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
79
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(i) (2008).
80
Such certifications must be made by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General,
or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(ii) (2008).
81
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(iii) (2008).
82
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) (2008).
83
P.L. 109-177, § 106A.
78
84
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business
Records in 2006, Mar. 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf.
85
Id. at 33. In indicating that it would deny the application, the FISC appears to have decided that “the facts were too
‘thin’ and that this request implicated the target’s First Amendment rights.” Id. at 68.
86
P.L. 107-56, § 224(a).
87
P.L. 109-177, § 102(b). Access will then be limited to records held by common carriers, public accommodation
facilities, physical storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(2) (2001).
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009
requirement for “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom
the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”88
The original sunset provision also provided a grandfather clause for investigations that began, or
potential offenses that took place, before the date of the provision’s expiration. 89 For example, in
the case of investigations that had already begun before December 30, 2009, a broader scope of
records could be made accessible to the government under FISA even after the expiration date.
This grandfather clause is unaffected by the extension of the sunset date to December 31, 2009.
Proposed Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.R. 1467, the Safe and Secure America Act of 2009, would extend all three provisions for ten
years, creating a new sunset date of December 31, 2019. This bill would not otherwise change
any of the procedures or legal standards relevant to these three provisions.
Author Contact Information
Edward C. Liu
Legislative Attorney
eliu@crs.loc.gov, 7-9166
88
89
50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2001).
P.L. 107-56, § 224(b).
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U.S. Const. amend. IV.
11
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
officers to obtain a court-issued warrant before conducting a search.16 When the warrant
requirement does not apply, government activity is generally subject to a “reasonableness” test
under the Fourth Amendment.17
The extent to which the warrant requirement applies to the government’s collection of foreign
intelligence is unclear. In a 1972 case, the Supreme Court invalidated warrantless electronic
surveillance of domestic organizations on Fourth Amendment grounds, despite the government’s
assertion of a national security rationale. 18 However, it indicated that its conclusion might be
different in a future case involving the electronic surveillance of foreign powers or their agents,
within or outside the United States.19 In a 2002 case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review upheld FISA, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, against a Fourth Amendment
challenge. 20 The court assumed, without deciding the question, that FISA court orders do not
constitute warrants for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis. Relying on a general
reasonableness analysis, it nonetheless upheld such orders, emphasizing both the privacy
protections in the statutory framework and the governmental interest in preventing national
security threats.21
Thus, although they apply to similar government activities, different standards govern FISA court
orders and warrants issued by judges in criminal investigations. Search warrants in the general
criminal law context must be justified by indicia of criminal conduct. In contrast, a substantial
purpose of court orders obtained pursuant to FISA must be the collection of foreign intelligence
information. 22 Although both FISA orders and criminal warrants require impartial judicial review
to determine whether probable cause exists, the propositions that must be supported by probable
cause are substantially different in the two frameworks. In the case of a FISA court order, the
FISC, in authorizing electronic surveillance or a physical search, must find probable cause to
believe both (1) that the person targeted by the order is a foreign power or its agent, and (2) that
the subject of the search (i.e., the telecommunications or place to be searched) is owned,
possessed, or will be used by the target.23
16
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process without prior
approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”).
17
Also called the “general balancing,” “general reasonableness,” or “totality-of-the circumstances” test, it requires a
court to determine the constitutionality of a search or seizure “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [a
search or seizure] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
18
U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321-24 (1972) (also referred to as the Keith case, so named for the District
Court judge who initially ordered disclosure of unlawful warrantless electronic surveillance to the defendants).
19
Id. at 321-22. See also In re Directives, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27417 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Survellance Ct. Rev.
2008) (holding that the foreign intelligence surveillance of targets reasonably believed to be outside of the U.S.
qualifies for the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement); CRS Report WD00002, Presidential Authority
to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, by Elizabeth B. Bazan and
Jennifer K. Elsea, at 9-12 (discussing courts’ differing application of the Fourth Amendment to searches for the
purpose of foreign intelligence collection).
20
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intell. Survellance Ct. Rev. 2002).
21
Id. at 738-46.
22
See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2008). Prior to 2001, the statute had required that “the purpose” of a FISA
warrant be foreign intelligence collection.
23
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2008) (electronic surveillance); Id. at § 1824(a)(3) (physical searches). In contrast, federal
criminal search warrants require probable cause to believe that instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of a crime will be
found in the place to be searched. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c). Criminal warrants authorizing electronic surveillance
(continued...)
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Distinction Between FISA Court Orders and
National Security Letters
Among the more complex questions regarding the expiring FISA amendments are those
concerning authorities for the production of business records and other tangible materials. One
reason for the complexity is that national security letters provide an overlapping source of
authority in some circumstances. National security letters, which are analogous to administrative
subpoenas and are authorized by five federal statutes,24 require businesses to produce specified
records to federal officials in national security investigations. 25 As a practical matter, national
security letters are issued much more frequently than are FISA court orders for the production of
documents. In 2006, for example, less than 50 such FISA orders were issued, compared with the
FBI’s issuance of more than 50,000 national security letters.26 However, FISA court orders
provide access to categories of records and other tangible things not available via national
security letters, which are relatively limited in scope.
Like orders issued pursuant to FISA, national security letters are justified by national interests
other than criminal law enforcement and are often presumed to be exempt from the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.27 They differ from FISA orders in several respects, however.
FISA orders must be obtained from the FISC; national security letters are issued directly by
federal agency officials. In addition, as mentioned, the scope of documents which may be
obtained pursuant to a national security letter is more limited than that which might be authorized
in a FISA order. As mentioned, the authority for national security letters is derived from five
statutes, each of which pertains to only a narrow category of documents.28
The USA PATRIOT Act expanded authorities for the issuance of national security letters. For
example, key amendments extended issuing authority to the Special Agents in Charge at FBI field
offices. The authority had previously been limited to officials at FBI headquarters. It also
extended issuing authority in some circumstances to officials from federal agencies other than the
FBI. Other provisions addressed the government’s authority to prohibit recipients of national
(...continued)
additionally require probable cause to believe that the target is engaged in criminal activities, that normal investigative
techniques are insufficient, and that the facilities that are the subject of surveillance will be used by the target. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2008).
24
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
25
For a detailed examination of national security letters, see CRS Report RL33320, National Security Letters in
Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background and Recent Amendments, by Charles Doyle.
26
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security Letters:
Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006, Mar. 2008, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/
special/s0803b/final.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section
215 Orders for Business Records in 2006, Mar. 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf.
27
Support for the exemption may be found in a 1976 Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), in
which the Court held that the warrant requirement does not apply to an individual’s bank account records.
28
See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5) (records of 21 specified types of financial institutions); 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (records of
telecommunications providers); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (credit reports); and 50 U.S.C. § 436 (various specified
types of records related to the finances and travel of government employees, which may be obtained only in
investigations involving alleged leaks of classified information by such employees).
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire in 2009
security letters to disclose that they have received such requests. Such authorities have been
modified since the USA PATRIOT Act by legislation and judicial decisions.29
Additional USA PATRIOT Act amendments to national security letter authorities resembled the §
215 amendment governing FISA orders for the production of documents, discussed infra. In both
cases, the relevant amendments broadened the predicate circumstances which trigger authority for
the request of documents. National security letters previously required the government to
demonstrate a connection to a foreign power or its agent. The USA PATRIOT Act amendments
authorize their issuance when documents sought are shown to be relevant to an investigation to
protect against international terrorism or foreign spying. The § 215 amendment makes an
analogous change. Unlike the § 215 amendment, however, the national security letter amendment
contains no sunset provision.
Expiring FISA Amendments
As discussed, three amendments to FISA are set to sunset at the end of 2009—the “lone wolf,”
“roving wiretap,” and § 215 provisions. Although the amendments are often discussed as a group
and may implicate similar questions regarding what legal standards govern the FISC’s
determinations, unique historical and legal issues apply to each amendment.
“Lone Wolf” Terrorists
Commonly referred to as the “lone wolf” provision, § 6001(a) of IRTPA simplifies the evidentiary
standard used to determine whether an individual, other than a citizen or a permanent resident of
the U.S., who engages in international terrorism, may be the target of a FISA court order. It does
not modify other standards used to determine the secondary question of whether the electronic
surveillance or a physical search of the subject of a court order is justified in a specific situation.
Historical Context
The historical impetus for the “lone wolf” provision involved Zacarias Moussaoui, one of the
individuals believed to be responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. During the examination of the
events leading up to the attacks, it was reported that investigations regarding Moussaoui’s
involvement were hampered by limitations in FISA authorities.30 Specifically, FBI agents
investigating Moussaoui suspected that he had planned a terrorist attack involving piloting
29
The 2005 reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 109-177, created a judicial enforcement mechanism,
tightened and clarified the circumstances in which an agency can prohibit a provider from disclosing the receipt of a
national security letter, expanded congressional oversight, and called for an audit by the Justice Department Office of
the Inspector General, among other measures. Judicial decisions preceding the reauthorization measure had struck
down provisions which denied judicial review and prohibited disclosure. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 471
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.Conn. 2005). In a decision which post-dates the
reauthorization, John Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the national security letter provision related to electronic communications records is unconstitutional to the
extent that it imposes a nondisclosure requirement without government-initiated judicial review in which the
government bears the burden of proving that nondisclosure is necessary.
30
NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report, at 273-274 [hereinafter “9/11
Comm’n Rep.”]
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commercial airliners, and had detained him in August of 2001 on an immigration charge. 31 The
FBI agents then sought a court order under FISA to examine the contents of Moussaoui’s laptop
computer.32 However, the agency apparently concluded that it had insufficient information at that
time to demonstrate that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power as then required by FISA.33
Prior to its amendment, FISA authorized the FISC to approve, among other things, physical
searches of a laptop only if probable cause existed to believe the laptop was owned or used by a
foreign power or its agent.34 The definition of a “foreign power” included “groups engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”35 Individuals involved in international
terrorism for or on behalf of those groups were considered “agents of a foreign power.”36 In the
weeks leading up to the attacks, it appears that the FBI encountered an actual or perceived
insufficiency of information demonstrating probable cause to believe that Moussaoui was acting
for or on behalf of an identifiable group engaged in international terrorism. 37
Legislative Responses
Following these revelations, a number of legislative proposals were put forth to amend the
definition of “agents of a foreign power” under FISA so that individuals engaged in international
terrorism need not be linked to a specific foreign power.38 One such amendment was ultimately
enacted with passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).39
Section 6001 of the legislation, known as the “lone wolf” provision, provides that persons, other
than citizens or permanent residents of the U.S., who are engaged in international terrorism are
presumptively considered to be agents of a foreign power. 40 The provision obviates any need to
provide an evidentiary connection between an individual and a foreign government or terrorist
group.
Critics of the “lone wolf” provision argued that the laptop in the Moussaoui case could have been
lawfully searched under FISA or the laws governing generic criminal warrants.41 Critics also
expressed concern that the simplified “lone wolf” standard would lead to “FISA serving as a
substitute for some of our most important criminal laws.”42
31
Id. at 273. Moussaoui, a French national, was present in the United States with an expired visa.
Id. at 273-274.
33
Id. at 274. Based upon this conclusion, the FBI “declined to submit a FISA application” to the FISC.
34
50 U.S.C. § 1821-1824 (2001).
35
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2001). At the time, foreign powers also included foreign governments, entities controlled by
those governments, and factions of foreign nations and foreign-based political organizations that are not substantially
composed of United States persons. Id. at § (a)(1-6)
36
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) (2001).
37
See 9/11 Comm’n Rep. at 274. It is unclear whether a search of Moussaoui’s laptop before September 11, 2001,
would have provided enough information to prevent or minimize those attacks.
38
S. 2586, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 113, 108th Cong. (2003).
39
S. 2845, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted).
40
P.L. 108-458, § 6001(a), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(3) (2008).
32
41
See S.Rept. 108-40 at 33-41 (additional views of Sen. Leahy and Sen. Feingold on a similar “lone wolf” provision in
S. 113).
42
Id. at 73 (additional views of Sen. Feingold).
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Proponents of the provision noted that the increased self-organization among terror networks has
made proving connections to identifiable groups more difficult. Thus, a “lone wolf” provision is
necessary to combat terrorists who use a modern organizational structure or who are selfradicalized.43
Roving Wiretaps
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit multipoint, or “roving,” wiretaps
by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to
electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified.44 It is often colloquially described as
allowing FISA wiretaps to target persons rather than places.
Background
Prior to enactment of § 206, the scope of electronic surveillance authorized by a court order was
limited in two ways. First, the location or facility that was the subject of surveillance had to be
identified. 45 Second, only identifiable third parties could be directed by the government to
facilitate electronic surveillance.46 Conducting electronic surveillance frequently requires the
assistance of telecommunications providers, landlords, or other third parties. Furthermore,
telecommunications providers are generally prohibited from assisting in electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes, except as authorized by FISA.47 In cases where the location or
facility was unknown, the identity of the person needed to assist the government could not be
specified in the order. Therefore, limiting the class of persons that could be directed to assist the
government by a FISA court order effectively limited the reach to known and identifiable
locations.
Section 206 and “Other Persons”
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended § 105(c)(2)(B) of FISA. It authorizes FISA
orders to direct “other persons” to assist with electronic surveillance if “the Court finds, based on
specific facts provided in the application, that the actions of the target ... may have the effect of
thwarting the identification of a specified person.”48 In a technical amendment later that year, the
requirement that the order specify the location of the surveillance was also changed so that this
requirement only applies if the facilities or places are known.49 These modifications have the
effect of permitting FISA orders to direct unspecified individuals to assist the government in
performing electronic surveillance, thus permitting court orders to authorize surveillance of
places or locations that are unknown at the time the order is issued.
43
S.Rept. 108-40 at 4-6. But see Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, at 5 (Sept. 14,
2009) (acknowledging that the amendment has not yet been relied upon in an investigation).
44
P.L. 107-56, § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
45
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(B) (2001) (requiring FISA warrants to specify the “nature and location of each of the
facilities or places at which electronic surveillance will be directed”).
46
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2001).
47
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809(a) and 1810 (2008).
48
P.L. 107-56, § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
49
P.L. 107-108, § 314(a)(2)(A).
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This section was further amended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005 to require that the FISC be notified within 10 days after “surveillance begins to be
directed at any new facility or place.”50 In addition, the FISC must be told the nature and location
of each new facility or place, the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the new
surveillance, a statement of any proposed minimization procedures—i.e., rules to limit the
government’s acquisition and dissemination of information involving United States citizens—that
differ from those contained in the original application or order, and the total number of facilities
or places subject to surveillance under the authority of the present order.51
Particularity Requirement of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment imposes specific requirements upon the issuance of warrants authorizing
searches of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”52 One of the requirements, referred to as the
particularity requirement, states that warrants shall “particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched.”53 Under FISA, roving wiretaps are not required to identify the location that may be
subject to surveillance. Therefore, some may argue that roving wiretaps do not comport with the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. It is not clear that the Fourth Amendment
would require that searches for foreign intelligence information be supported by a warrant,54 but
prior legal challenges to similar provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act may be instructive in the event that challenges to § 206 are brought alleging violations
of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Similar roving wiretaps have been permitted under Title III since 1986 in cases where the target
of the surveillance takes actions to thwart such surveillance.55 The procedures under Title III are
similar to those currently used under FISA, but two significant differences exist. First, a roving
wiretap under Title III must definitively identify the target of the surveillance.56 Fixed wiretaps
under Title III and all wiretaps under FISA need only identify the target if the target’s identity is
known. FISA permits roving wiretaps via court orders that only provide a specific description of
the target.57 Second, Title III requires that the surveilled individuals be notified of the
surveillance, generally 90 days after surveillance terminates. 58 FISA contains no similar
notification provision.
In United States v. Petti, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with a
challenge to a roving wiretap under Title III alleging that roving wiretaps do not satisfy the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.59 The court initially noted that:
50
P.L. 109-177, § 108(b)(4), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3) (2008). This deadline for notification can be extended
to up to 60 days by the FISC upon a showing of good cause.
51
Id.
52
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that electronic surveillance of private conversations qualifies as
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53
Id.
54
See supra footnotes 16-17 and accompanying text.
55
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, P.L. 99-508, § 106(d)(3), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (2008).
56
18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (2008).
57
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3), 1805(c)(1)(A) (2008).
58
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2008). This notification may be postponed upon an ex parte showing of good cause.
59
973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
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... the test for determining the sufficiency of the warrant description is whether the place to
be searched is described with sufficient particularity to enable the executing officer to locate
and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable
probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched.60
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit held that roving wiretaps under Title III satisfied the
particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment. 61 The court in this case relied upon the fact that
targets of roving wiretaps had to be identified and that they were only available where the target’s
actions indicated an intent to thwart electronic surveillance. 62
Critics of roving wiretaps under FISA may argue that § 206 increases the likelihood that innocent
conversations will be the subject of electronic surveillance. They may further argue that the threat
of these accidental searches of innocent persons is precisely the type of injury sought to be
prevented by the particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment. Such a threat may be particularly
acute in this case given the fact that there is no requirement under FISA that the target of a roving
wiretap be identified, although the target must be specifically described.63
Access to Business Records Under FISA
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act broadened federal officials’ access to materials in
investigations to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.64 It both enlarged
the scope of materials that may be sought and lowered the standard for a court to issue an order
compelling their production. In all investigations, the production of items pertaining to a U.S.
person may not be compelled solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment
to the Constitution.65
Background
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that an individual’s bank account records did not fall within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. 66
Subsequently, Congress passed laws protecting various types of transactional information, but
built in exceptions to provide some access to statutorily protected records sought for counter
intelligence purposes. 67 These exceptions comprise the authority for national security letters,
60
61
Id. at 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1445.
62
Id. See also United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1124 (2nd Cir. 1993) (similarly holding that a provision
authorizing roving bugs under Title III was constitutional).
63
50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3), 1805(c)(1)(B) (2008).
64
The gathering of intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person was authorized by a technical amendment to
§ 215 passed a few months after its enactment. See P.L. 107-56, § 215, amended by P.L. 107-108, § 314, codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1861 (2008).
65
50 U.S.C. § 1861(a) (2008).
66
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The rationale was that persons have a diminished expectation of privacy when
information sought has already been revealed to a third party.
67
See CRS Report RL33320, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background and
Recent Amendments, by Charles Doyle, at 3-4.
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discussed supra, which are relied upon to compel the production of records in limited
circumstances.
In 1998, Congress first amended FISA to authorize the production of documents not available
through national security letters. Four types of documents initially could be sought in foreign
intelligence or international terrorism investigations, including records from common carriers,
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. 68 Applications for
orders under this section had to be made by FBI agents with a rank of Assistant Special Agent in
Charge or higher and investigations could not be conducted solely on the basis of activities
protected by the First Amendment.69 Under these procedures the FISC would issue an order if,
inter alia, the application contained “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that
the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”70
Recipients of an order under this section were required to comply with it, and were also
prohibited from disclosing to others that an order had been issued.71
Expansion of the Scope of Documents Subject to FISA
As mentioned, § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act made several changes to the procedures under
FISA for obtaining business records.72 Among these was an expansion of the scope of records that
are subject to compulsory production. Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act amendment, only records
from the four categories of businesses mentioned above could be obtained. In contrast, § 215
authorizes the production of “any tangible things.”73
This expanded scope drew strong opposition from the library community, so much so that § 215
came to be known as the “library provision” despite the fact that the original text of the provision
did not mention libraries.74 Opposition from this group appears to have been primarily based upon
the chilling effect such access could have on the exercise of First Amendment rights and
purported intrusions into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment.75 Opposition from library
advocates may have also been a residual response to prior attempts by the FBI to gather foreign
intelligence information from library staff during the Cold War.76
In response to these concerns, a library-specific amendment was made to the § 215 procedures by
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. Under this amendment, if the
records sought are “library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, book
68
50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2001).
50 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1) (2001).
70
50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2001).
71
50 U.S.C. § 1862(d)(1)-(2) (2001).
72
P.L. 107-56, § 215 codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a)-(b) (2008).
73
50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2008).
74
E.g. Richard B. Schmitt, House Weakens Patriot Act’s ‘Library Provision’, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at A-1.
69
75
See, e.g., AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, Resolution on the USA Patriot Act and Related Measures That Infringe
on the Rights of Library Users, Jan. 29, 2003, available at http://www.ala.org; Judith King, Director ALA Office for
Intellectual Freedom, Letter to the Editor, FBI ‘Fishing Expeditions’ Librarians’ Biggest Worry, WALL ST. J., May 24,
2004, at A15; David Mehegan, Reading Over Your Shoulder: The Push Is On To Shelve Part Of The Patriot Act,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2004, at E5.
76
See Ulrika Ekman Ault, The FBI’s Library Awareness Program: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532 (1990).
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customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, or medical records
containing information that would identify a person,” the application must be approved by one of
three high-ranking FBI officers.77
Changes to the Standard of Review
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act also modified the standard for the FISC to issue an order
compelling the production of documents. Prior to enactment of § 215, an applicant had to have
“specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records
pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”78 In contrast, under § 215 as originally
enacted, the applicant only needed to “specify that the records concerned [were] sought for a
[foreign intelligence, international terrorism, or espionage investigation.]”79
In 2005, Congress further amended FISA procedures for obtaining business records. The
applicable standard was changed to require “a statement of facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to a [foreign
intelligence, international terrorism, or espionage investigation.]”80 Under this standard, records
are presumptively relevant if they pertain to:
•
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
•
the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such
authorized investigation; or
•
an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power
who is the subject of such authorized investigation.
Nondisclosure and Judicial Review
Orders issued under § 215, as amended, are accompanied by nondisclosure orders prohibiting the
recipients from disclosing that the FBI has sought or obtained any tangible things pursuant to a
FISA order. However, the recipient may discuss the order with other persons as necessary to
comply with the order, with an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance, or with other persons
as permitted by the FBI.81 The recipient must identify persons to whom disclosure has been made,
or is intended to be made, if the FBI requests, except that attorneys with whom the recipient has
consulted do not need to be identified.82
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 provided procedures by
which a recipient of a § 215 order may challenge orders compelling the production of business
records.83 Once a petition for review is submitted by a recipient, a FISC judge must determine
77
Applications for these records could be made only by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Deputy
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security. This
authority cannot be further delegated. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(3) (2008).
78
50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2001).
79
P.L. 107-56, § 215.
80
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-177, § 106(b).
81
50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) (2008).
82
50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(2)(C) (2008).
83
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
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whether the petition is frivolous within 72 hours.84 If the petition is frivolous, it must be denied
and the order affirmed. 85 The order may be modified or set aside if it does not meet the
requirements of FISA or is otherwise unlawful.86 Appeals by either party may be heard by the
Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and the Supreme Court.87
Judicial review of nondisclosure orders operates under a similar procedure,88 but such orders are
not reviewable for one year after they are initially issued.89 If the petition is not determined to be
frivolous, a nondisclosure order may be set aside if there is:
... no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United
States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation,
interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.90
A petition to set aside a nondisclosure order may be defeated if the government certifies that
disclosure would endanger the national security or interfere with diplomatic relations.91 Absent
any finding of bad faith, such a certification is to be treated as conclusive by the FISC. If a
petition is denied, either due to a certification described above, frivolity, or otherwise, the
petitioner may not challenge the nondisclosure order for another year.92 Appeals by either party
may be heard by the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and the Supreme Court.93
DOJ OIG Report
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 directed the Inspector General
of the Department of Justice (OIG) to audit the FBI’s use of § 215 authority and report its
findings to Congress.94 An unclassified version of the OIG’s audit for calendar year 2006 was
released in March of 2008.95 According to the report, the number of requests for § 215 orders
submitted to the FISC in 2006 totaled 47, although more than half were requests to renew or
extend previous orders. The FISC granted all 47 of the requests submitted that year. However, six
additional requests were processed but withdrawn before formal consideration by the FISC. The
84
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(ii) (2008).
Id.
86
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(B) (2008).
87
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) (2008).
88
Judicial review of nondisclosure orders was added by P.L. 109-178, § 3.
89
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
90
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(i) (2008).
91
Such certifications must be made by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General,
or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(ii) (2008).
92
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(C)(iii) (2008).
93
50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) (2008).
94
P.L. 109-177, § 106A.
95
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business
Records in 2006, Mar. 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf. For more recent statistics
regarding the use of both § 215 requests and § 206 roving wiretap authority, see Reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act:
Ensuring Liberty and Security: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2009) (written
testimony of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
85
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report indicates that the FBI withdrew at least one such request because the FISC had indicated
that it would not sign the order due to First Amendment concerns. 96
The report identified several issues related to the implementation of § 215 for Congress’
consideration. For example, it noted that no settled procedure governs situations in which
providers, in response to a § 215 request for documents, submit information that is outside of the
scope of the § 215 order. It also stated that in at least one instance, the FBI had issued a national
security letter to obtain the same information that had been the subject of a § 215 request that was
withdrawn due to First Amendment concerns.97 It also concluded that the interim minimization
procedures, promulgated by the Justice Department to fulfill a requirement that it implement rules
to limit the government’s acquisition and dissemination of information involving United States
citizens, were inadequate.98
Effect of Sunset Provisions
As mentioned, the expiring FISA amendments were originally scheduled to sunset on December
31, 2005,99 but the sunset date for each was extended to December 31, 2009.100 If that date passed
without reauthorization, the amended FISA authorities would read as they did before the
enactment of the amendments. For example, regarding roving wiretaps, § 105(c)(2) of FISA
would read as it did on October 25, 2001,101 eliminating the authority for FISA court orders to
direct other unspecified persons to assist with electronic surveillance. 102 Likewise, regarding
FISA orders for the production of documents, §§ 501 and 502 of FISA would read as they did on
October 25, 2001,103 restricting the types of business records that are subject to FISA and
reinstating the requirement for “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”104
However, a grandfather clause applies to each of the three provisions. 105 The grandfather clauses
authorize the continued effect of the amendments with respect to investigations that began, or
96
Id. at 33. In indicating that it would deny the application, the FISC appears to have decided that “the facts were too
‘thin’ and that this request implicated the target’s First Amendment rights.” Id. at 68.
97
Id. at 5.
98
Id. at 6.
99
P.L. 108-458, § 6001(b); P.L. 107-56, § 224(a).
100
P.L. 109-177, § 103.
101
P.L. 109-177, § 102(b). The relevant section of FISA will then provide:
... that, upon the request of the applicant, a specified communication or other common carrier,
landlord, custodian, or other specified person furnish the applicant forthwith all information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a
manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that
such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing that target of electronic surveillance.
50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2) (2001).
102
The sunset will not repeal the provision of FISA that permits a FISA warrant to fail to identify facilities or places
that will be subject to electronic surveillance. However, the authority for most new roving wiretaps may be effectively
repealed because new orders may not direct unspecified persons to assist with surveillance.
103
P.L. 109-177, § 102(b). Access will then be limited to records held by common carriers, public accommodation
facilities, physical storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(2) (2001).
104
50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2001).
105
The 2005 reauthorization act and other measures did not affect the grandfather provisions.
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potential offenses that took place, before the provision’s sunset date.106 Thus, for example, if an
individual were engaged in international terrorism on December 30, 2009, he would still be
considered a “lone wolf” for FISA court orders sought after the provision has expired. Similarly,
if an individual is engaged in international terrorism on December 30, 2009, he may be the target
of a roving wiretap under FISA even after authority for new roving wiretaps has expired.
Proposed Legislation in the 111th Congress
Several bills introduced in the 111th Congress would extend all three of the expiring FISA
amendments. S. 1692, a bill reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute on October 13, 2009, would extend them for four years,
creating a new sunset date of December 31, 2013.107 Examples of other bills that would extend all
three amendments include H.R. 1467, which would extend the sunset until December 31, 2019,108
and S. 1686, which would repeal the sunset provisions.109
An alternative proposal introduced in the House, H.R. 3845, would extend the roving wiretap and
§ 215 amendments but would allow the lone wolf provision to expire. 110 This approach might be
prompted in part by indications that the “lone wolf” provision has not yet been relied upon in an
investigation.111
Some bills propose changes to existing authorities.112 S. 1692 would alter neither the lone wolf
nor the roving wiretap amendments now in effect. However, for the production of documents, it
would lower the standard that must be met in an application for a court order. Rather than a
“statement of facts showing” that things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation, as is
currently required, it would authorize a court order based on a “statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon to justify the belief” that the documents are relevant to such an
investigation. However, the bill would preserve the existing standard for library and bookstore
records. In contrast, H.R. 3845 would impose a higher standard than is currently in effect,
requiring a “statement of specific and articulable facts,” rather than a mere “statement of facts,”
to show that documents or other tangible things sought are relevant to a foreign intelligence
investigation. It would also remove the one-year time bar on judicial review of nondisclosure
orders associated with FISA court orders for the production of documents. In addition, it would
ban the production of library and bookstore records sought “with either the purpose or effect of
searching for, or seizing from, a bookseller or library documentary materials that contain
personally identifiable information concerning a patron of a bookseller or library.” Both bills
retain the second part of the amended standard, relevance to an authorized investigation, rather
than require a showing that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or its agent,
as would be required if § 215 were to expire.
106
P.L. 107-56, § 224(b); P.L. 108-458, § 6001(b) (referencing PATRIOT Act sunset provision in P.L. 107-56, §
224(b)).
107
USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, S. 1692, 111th Cong. (2009).
108
Safe and Secure America Act of 2009, H.R. 1467, 111th Cong. (2009).
109
Judicious Use of Surveillance Tools In Counterterrorism Efforts Act of 2009, S. 1686, 111th Cong. (2009).
110
USA PATRIOT Amendments Act of 2009, H.R. 3845, 111th Cong. (2009).
111
See Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, at 5 (Sept. 14, 2009).
112
In contrast, H.R. 1467 would make no changes to the provisions.
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H.R. 3845 would also narrow somewhat the circumstances in which the FISC may approve a
roving wiretap. It would require that the “identity or description of the specific target of electronic
surveillance included in the application ... is sufficient to allow the judge to determine that the
target is a single individual.”
S. 1692, S. 1686, H.R. 3845, and other bills would modify statutory authorities pertaining to
national security letters. S. 1692 and H.R. 3845 would make various authorities for national
security letters subject to a December 31, 2013 sunset date, which would mirror the sunset for the
expiring amendments to FISA.
Author Contact Information
Anna C. Henning
Legislative Attorney
ahenning@crs.loc.gov, 7-4067
Congressional Research Service
Edward C. Liu
Legislative Attorney
eliu@crs.loc.gov, 7-9166
15