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Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA): Status and Implementation

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Order Code RL31286 Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act: Status and Implementation Updated March 20, 2008 Pervaze A. Sheikh Analyst in Natural Resources Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act: Status and Implementation Summary In the late 1980s, extensive foreign debt and degraded natural resources in developing nations led to the creation of debt-for-nature initiatives that reduced debt obligations, allowed for debt repayments in local currency as opposed to hard currency, and generated funds for the environment. These initiatives, called debt-fornature swaps, typically involved restructuring, reducing, or buying a portion of a developing country’s outstanding debt, with a percentage of proceeds (in local currency) being used to support conservation programs within the debtor country. Most early transactions involved debt owed to commercial banks and were administered by non-governmental conservation organizations and referred to as three-party swaps. Since 1987, three-party transactions have generated more than an estimated $117 million in local currency for conservation projects, as a result of the purchase of approximately $168 million in debt (face value) for $49 million. Other debt-for-nature initiatives involved official (public) debt and were administered by creditor governments directly with debtor governments (termed bilateral swaps). In the early 1990s, the United States restructured, and in one case sold, debt equivalent to a face value of nearly $1 billion owed by Latin American countries; these transactions were authorized by Congress as part of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), which broadened the scope of debt swaps to include a number of social goals. Nearly $178 million in local currency for environmental, natural resource, health protection, and child development projects within debtor countries was generated from these swaps. The model for debt-for-nature initiatives, outlined in the EAI, was expanded in the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) to include countries around the world with tropical forests. Under this program, debt can be restructured in eligible countries, and funds generated from the transactions are used to support programs to conserve tropical forests within the debtor country. Since 1998, $95.2 million has been used under the TFCA to restructure loan agreements in 12 countries, and nearly $162.5 million in local currency will be generated in the next 12-26 years for tropical forest conservation projects. The TFCA was authorized for appropriations under P.L. 108-323 until FY2007. The TFCA is being considered for reauthorization under H.R. 2185 and S. 2020 in the 110th Congress. Debt-for-nature transactions are generally viewed as a success by conservation organizations and debtor governments because of the funds generated for conservation efforts. The appeal of debt-for-nature transactions has been tempered in recent years, however, by higher debt prices on secondary markets and lower appropriations. As a result, fewer transactions have taken place. This report provides a description of debt-for-nature transactions and a summary of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act. Contents Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and Their Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Three-Party Swaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Bilateral and Multilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Tropical Forest Conservation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Congressional Role in Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authority for Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Rationale for and Criticism of Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Decline of Debt-for-Nature Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Emergence of Subsidized Debt-for-Nature Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix: List of Related Laws and Appropriations That Support Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 List of Tables Table 1. Countries Participating in Three-Party Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 1987-Present (excluding TFCA transactions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Table 2. Countries Other than the U.S. Participating in Bilateral and Multilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Table 3. U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transactions Under EAI . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Table 4. U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transactions Under TFCA . . . . . . . . . . 9 Table 5. Appropriations Provided Under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 List of Figures Figure 1. An Illustrative Example of a Three-Party Debt-for-Nature Swap Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Figure 2. An Example of a Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transaction Modeled After the TFCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure 3. Three Party and Bilateral U.S. Debt-for-Nature Transactions 1987-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act: Status and Implementation Background Information Debt-for-nature initiatives were conceived to address the rapid loss of resources and biodiversity in developing countries that were heavily indebted to foreign creditors. Conservationists had noted that the pressure to pay off foreign debts in hard currency was leading to increased levels of natural resource exports (i.e., timber, cattle, minerals, and agricultural products) at the expense of the environment. In many cases, indebted developing countries had difficulty meeting their hard currency debt obligations and defaulted. Reducing foreign debt and allowing for portions of it to be paid with local currency while increasing funds for the environment was thought to improve environmental conditions in developing countries and had the advantage of relieving the debtor country’s difficulties in procuring sufficient hard currency to pay off its debts.1 Money generated from debt-for-nature transactions has been used to fund a variety of projects, ranging from national park protection in Costa Rica to supporting ecotourism in Ghana and conserving tropical forests in Bangladesh. Since 1993, there has been a declining trend in the number of debt-for-nature transactions involving official (public) and private funds. Accounting changes requiring new appropriations to support official (public) debt transactions in creditor countries such as the United States, and a higher price of commercial debt on secondary markets, are two reasons suggested for the decline of debt-for-nature transactions. While Congress has periodically authorized U.S. participation in threeparty debt-for-nature swaps and has supported two bilateral debt-for-nature initiatives, appropriations to support these types of efforts have generally diminished over the years. Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and Their Mechanisms Three-Party Swaps Three-party debt-for-nature swaps, involving nongovernmental organizations such as The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International, were the first debtfor-nature agreements to be formed. In a three-party swap, a conservation group purchases a hard currency debt owed to commercial banks on the secondary market 1 Thomas E. Lovejoy III, “Aid Debtor Nations’ Ecology,” New York Times, Oct. 4, 1984, sec. A, p. 31. CRS-2 or in some cases a public (official) debt owed to a creditor government at a discounted rate compared to the face value of the debt, and then renegotiates the debt obligation with the debtor country.2 The debt is generally sold back to the debtor country for more than it was purchased for by the NGO, yet less than what it was on the secondary market. The proceeds generated from the renegotiated debt, to be repaid in local currency, are typically put into a fund that often allocates grants to 30, 2010 (RL31286)

Contents

Summary

In the late 1980s, extensive foreign debt and degraded natural resources in developing nations led to the creation of debt-for-nature initiatives that reduced debt obligations, allowed for debt repayments in local currency as opposed to hard currency, and generated funds for the environment. These initiatives, called debt-for-nature swaps, typically involved restructuring, reducing, or buying a portion of a developing country's outstanding debt, with a percentage of proceeds (in local currency) being used to support conservation programs within the debtor country. Most early transactions involved debt owed to commercial banks and were administered by nongovernmental conservation organizations and referred to as three-party swaps. Since 1987, three-party transactions have generated more than an estimated $140 million in local currency for conservation projects, as a result of the purchase of approximately $170 million in debt (face value) for approximately $49 million. Other debt-for-nature initiatives involved official (public) debt and were administered by creditor governments directly with debtor governments (termed bilateral swaps).

In the early 1990s, the United States restructured, and in one case sold, debt equivalent to a face value of nearly $1 billion owed by Latin American countries; these transactions were authorized by Congress as part of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), which broadened the scope of debt swaps to include a number of social goals. Nearly $178 million in local currency for environmental, natural resource, health protection, and child development projects within debtor countries was generated from these swaps. The model for debt-for-nature initiatives, outlined in the EAI, was expanded in the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) to include countries around the world with tropical forests. Under this program, debt can be restructured in eligible countries, and funds generated from the transactions are used to support programs to conserve tropical forests within the debtor country.

Since 1998, $124.8 million has been used under the TFCA to restructure loan agreements in 13 countries (15 transactions), and nearly $218.4 million in local currency will be generated in the next 12-26 years for tropical forest conservation projects. The TFCA is authorized to receive appropriations through FY2007. The TFCA is being considered for reauthorization in the 111th Congress.

Debt-for-nature transactions are generally viewed as a success by conservation organizations and debtor governments because of the funds generated for conservation efforts. The appeal of debt-for-nature transactions has been tempered in recent years, however, by higher debt prices on secondary markets and lower appropriations. As a result, fewer transactions have taken place. This report provides a description of debt-for-nature transactions and a summary of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act.

Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act: Status and Implementation

Background Information

Debt-for-nature initiatives were conceived to address the rapid loss of resources and biodiversity in developing countries that were heavily indebted to foreign creditors. Conservationists had noted that the pressure to pay off foreign debts in hard currency was leading to increased levels of natural resource exports (i.e., timber, cattle, minerals, and agricultural products) at the expense of the environment. In many cases, indebted developing countries had difficulty meeting their hard currency debt obligations and defaulted. Reducing foreign debt and allowing for portions of it to be paid with local currency while increasing funds for the environment was thought to improve environmental conditions in developing countries and had the advantage of relieving the debtor country's difficulties in procuring sufficient hard currency to pay off its debts.1 Money generated from debt-for-nature transactions has been used to fund a variety of projects, ranging from national park protection in Costa Rica to supporting ecotourism in Ghana and conserving tropical forests in Bangladesh.

Since 1993, there has been a declining trend in the number of debt-for-nature transactions involving official (public) and private funds. Accounting changes requiring new appropriations to support official (public) debt transactions in creditor countries such as the United States, and a higher price of commercial debt on secondary markets, are two reasons suggested for the decline of debt-for-nature transactions. While Congress has periodically authorized U.S. participation in three-party debt-for-nature swaps and has supported two bilateral debt-for-nature initiatives, appropriations to support these types of efforts have generally diminished over the years.

Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and Their Mechanisms

Three-Party Swaps

Three-party debt-for-nature swaps, involving nongovernmental organizations such as The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International, were the first debt-for-nature agreements to be formed. In a three-party swap, a conservation group purchases a hard currency debt owed to commercial banks on the secondary market or in some cases a public (official) debt owed to a creditor government at a discounted rate compared to the face value of the debt, and then renegotiates the debt obligation with the debtor country.2 The debt is generally sold back to the debtor country for more than it was purchased for by the NGO, yet less than what it was on the secondary market. The proceeds generated from the renegotiated debt, to be repaid in local currency, are typically put into a fund that often allocates grants to local environmental organizations for conservation projects (see Figure 1). In these cases, the fund is administered by the conservation organization, representatives from local environmental groups, and the debtor government. Money to buy the debt initially may come from the nongovernmental organization, governments, banks, or other private organizations. Figure 1. An Illustrative Example of a Three-Party Debt-for-Nature Swap Agreement Step 1 $200,000 to purchase debt Bank or Creditor Government Non-governmental Organization $1 million of debt Step 2 $1 million of debt is restructured Local Conservation Groups Debtor Government $300,000 in local currency Step 3 ! Step 1 = An outstanding debt is sold to a NGO at a discounted rate (e.g., 20% of a face value of $1 million, which is $200,000). ! Step 2 = The debt is cancelled by the NGO as part of an agreement that requires the debtor country to provide funds in local currency equivalents for local conservation groups (e.g., 30% of the original face value, which is $300,000). ! Step 3 = The debtor country provides the agreed to funds to local conservation groups. Debt-for-Nature Swap Agreement In 1989, Congress authorized the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide assistance to nongovernmental organizations to purchase the commercial debt of foreign countries as part of a debt-for-nature agreement (P.L. 101-240; 22 U.S.C. 2282-2286). Several nongovernmental organizations participated in debt-for-nature swaps with financial assistance from 2 Sometimes debt is donated to the NGO in the three-party swap. CRS-3 USAID; however, specific information on funds given by USAID to support threepartythree-party debt-for-nature swaps is not available. While debt initiatives conducted with three-party swaps are numerous, they have resulted in less reduction in total debt than the debts swapped under bilateral agreements (government-to-government), and slightly less in conservation funds generated. In total, approximately $170$168 million in debt (face value) has been reduced, restructured, or swapped using this mechanism, generating approximately $117140 million in local currency for conservation purposes (see Table 1). ). Table 1. Selected Countries Participating in Three-Party Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 1987-Present (excluding TFCA transactions) Country BOLIVIA Total Bolivia BRAZIL COSTA RICA Year 1993 1987 1992 1991 1989 1989 1988 1988 TNC SW/WWF/ TNC TNC Sweden Holland NPF 1990 PRCT/TNC 1992 1989 1987 Japan WWF/FN WWF 2000 1991 CI CI/SI 1992 1991 CI/USAID TNC 1990 Total Costa Rica DOMINICAN REP. ECUADOR Total Ecuador GHANA Total Ghana GUATEMALA Total Guatemala JAMAICA MADAGASCAR 3 (U.S.$, in thousands)3 Purchaser Cost Face Value of Conservation Debt Funds Generated TNC/WWF $0 $11,500 $2,860 CI 100 650 250 100 12,150 3,110 TNC 748 2,200 2,200 RA/MCL/ 360 600 540 1,953 10,574 9,603 784 3,500 5,000 918 12,515 116 5,600 24,500 33,000 5,400 79,674 582 1,680 17,100 9,900 4,050 42,873 582 1991 TNC/USAID/ NA 640 354 994 80 250 330 1,200 75 1,275 300 NA 5,400 1,000 6,400 100 1,000 1,100 1,334 100 1,434 437 1,000 5,400 1,000 7,400 90 1,000 1,090 1,334 90 1,424 437 PRCT WWF/JPM CI WWF CI CI/UNDP WWF 0 50 909 1,500 59 446 1,341 200 1,868 3,200 118 919 1,072 160 1,868 3,200 119 919 1994 1994 1993 1993 1991 1990 A cost of $0 indicates that funds were written off by the bank to restructure the debt. CRS-4 Country Year Purchaser 1989 Total Madagascar 1998 MEXICO 1996 1996 1996 1995 1994 1994 1994 1993 1992 1991 1991 Total Mexico 1991 NIGERIA 1993 PERU 2002 Total Peru PHILIPPINES Total Philippines POLAND ZAMBIA Grand Total WWF/ USAID CI CI CI CI CI/USAID CI CI CI CI CI/USAID CI CI NCF WWF WWF, CI, TNC, U.S. WWF 1993 WWF/USAID 1992 1990 WWF/USAID WWF 1989 1990 1989 WWF WWF Cost Face Value of Conservation Debt Funds Generated 950 2,111 2,111 3,914 256 192 327 440 246 399 236 248 208 355 0 183 3,092 65 NA 5,500 9,758 550 391 496 671 488 480 280 290 252 441 250 250 4,838 150 2,860 14,000 9,449 318 254 443 561 337 480 280 290 252 441 250 250 4,155 93 1,573 10,600 5,500 13,000 5,000 439 200 18,639 11 454 16,860 19,000 10,000 900 390 30,290 50 2,270 12,173 17,100 9,000 900 390 29,090 50 2,500 49,001 168,193 117,627 Sources: M. Moye, (excluding TFCA transactions)

(U.S.$, in thousands)

Country

Year

Purchaser

Cost

Face Value of Debt

Conservation Funds Generated

BOLIVIA

1993

TNC/WWF

$0

$11,500

$2,860

 

1987

CI

100

650

250

Total Bolivia

   

100

12,150

3,110

BRAZIL

1992

TNC

748

2,200

2,200

COSTA RICA

1991

RA/MCL/ TNC

360

600

540

 

1990

SW/WWF/ TNC

1,953

10,574

9,603

 

1989

TNC

784

5,600

1,680

 

1989

Sweden

3,500

24,500

17,100

 

1988

Holland

5,000

33,000

9,900

 

1988

NPF

918

5,400

4,050

Total Costa Rica

   

12,515

79,674

42,873

DOMINICAN REP.

1990

PRCT/TNC

116

582

582

ECUADOR

1992

Japan

NA

NA

1,000

 

1989

WWF/FN

640

5,400

5,400

 

1987

WWF

354

1,000

1,000

Total Ecuador

   

994

6,400

7,400

GHANA

2000

CI

80

100

90

 

1991

CI/SI

250

1,000

1,000

Total Ghana

   

330

1,100

1,090

GUATEMALA

1992

CI/USAID

1,200

1,334

1,334

 

1991

TNC

75

100

90

Total Guatemala

   

1,275

1,434

1,424

JAMAICA

1991

TNC/USAID/ PRCT

300

437

437

MADAGASCAR

2008

WWF/France

n/a

n/a

20,000

 

1996

WWF/Netherlands Development Corporation

n/a

2,000

1,500

 

1994

WWF/JPM

0

1,341

1,072

 

1994

CI

50

200

160

 

1993

WWF

909

1,868

1,868

 

1993

CI

1,500

3,200

3,200

 

1991

CI/UNDP

59

118

119

 

1990

WWF

446

919

919

 

1989

WWF/USAID

950

2,111

2,111

Total Madagascar

   

3,914

11,757

30,949

MEXICO

1998

CI

256

550

318

 

1996

CI

192

391

254

 

1996

CI

327

496

443

 

1996

CI

440

671

561

 

1995

CI/USAID

246

488

337

 

1994

CI

399

480

480

 

1994

CI

236

280

280

 

1994

CI

248

290

290

 

1993

CI

208

252

252

 

1992

CI/USAID

355

441

441

 

1991

CI

0

250

250

 

1991

CI

183

250

250

Total Mexico

   

3,092

4,838

4,155

NIGERIA

1991

NCF

65

150

93

PERU

1993

WWF

n/a

2,860

1,573

 

2002

WWF, CI, TNC, U.S.

5,500

14,000

10,600

Total Peru

   

5,500

16,860

12,173

PHILIPPINES

1993

WWF

13,000

19,000

17,100

 

1992

WWF/USAID

5,000

10,000

9,000

 

1990

WWF/USAID

439

900

900

 

1989

WWF

200

390

390

Total Philippines

   

18,639

30,290

29,090

POLAND

1990

WWF

11

50

50

ZAMBIA

1989

WWF

454

2,270

2,500

           

Grand Total

   

60,501

170,192

139,127

Sources:M. Moye, Commercial Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Summary Table (Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund, 2003). M. Guerin-McManaus, Ten Years of Debt for Nature Swaps 1987-1997 (Washington, DC: Conservation International, 2000). The World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1996 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1996). Notes: A cost of $0 indicates that funds were written off by the bank to restructure the debt.Funds generated may be cash or bonds. Figures given do not include interest earned over the life of the bonds. Full titles of abbreviations are given below. Grand total given is an estimate since some figures were not available. USAID = Agency for International Development NPF = National Parks Fdn. of Costa Rica CABEI = Central American Bank for Economic PRCT = Puerto Rican Conservation Trust RA = Rainforest Alliance Integration SI = Smithsonian Institution CI = Conservation International TNC = The Nature Conservancy FN = Fundacion Natura UNDP = United Nations Development Prog. JPM = J. P. Morgan Chase and Co. U.S. = U.S. federal government MBG = Missouri Botanical Garden WWF = World Wildlife Fund MCL = Monteverde Conservation League NCF = Nigerian Conservation Foundation CRS-5 Bilateral and Multilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives CABEI = Central American Bank for Economic Integration

CI = Conservation International

FN = Fundacion Natura

JPM = J. P. Morgan Chase and Co.

MBG = Missouri Botanical Garden

MCL = Monteverde Conservation League

NCF = Nigerian Conservation Foundation

NPF = National Parks Fdn. of Costa Rica

PRCT = Puerto Rican Conservation Trust

RA = Rainforest Alliance

SI = Smithsonian Institution

TNC = The Nature Conservancy

UNDP = United Nations Development Prog.

U.S. = U.S. federal government

WWF = World Wildlife Fund

Bilateral and Multilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives

Bilateral debt transactions are conducted with official (public) funds directly between the creditor and debtor governments. The creditor government determines the criteria for eligibility, which usually involve the existence of certain financial and political conditions in the debtor country. Debt agreements are usually cancelled and then restructured to extend payback periods, or in some cases, debt is bought back by the debtor country for a discounted price. Money for the environment can be generated through interest payments from the debtor country if the debt is restructured, or from a percentage of the buyback price (see Figure 2). Multilateral debt-for-nature agreements have also been conducted between more than one creditor country and a debtor country (see Table 2). Poland, for example, benefitted from a multilateral debt-for-nature agreement from 1991 to 1997. During this time, five countries restructured debt obligations with Poland, generating over $473 million in local currency for environmental projects. The United States was the primary participant in this deal, swapping 10% of Poland’'s debt to generate $367 million for environmental programs.4 3 Table 2. Countries Other than the U.S. Participating in Bilateral and Multilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives Creditor Canada Belgium Finland France Germany Holland Norway Sweden 4 Debtor Country Columbia El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Peru Bolivia Poland Peru Egypt Philippines Poland Cameroon Peru Indonesia Peru Costa Rica Costa Rica Egypt Egypt Nigeria Costa Rica Tunisia Tunisia (U.S.$, in thousands) Year Face Value Face Value of Conservation Reduction Debt Funds Generated 1993 67% reduction 18,000 12,000 1993 100% forgiven 7,500 6,000 1993 n/a 22,000 15,000 1993 n/a 12,000 9,000 1994 75% reduction 15,000 3,800 1992 n/a 13,000 n/a 1990 n/a n/a 14,000 1995 70% reduction 27,000 8,100 1992 n/a n/a 11,600 1992 n/a n/a 4,000 1993 10% reduction 520,000 52,000 2006 n/a n/a 25,000 1994 70% reduction 22,970 6,100 2003 15,000,000 n/a n/a 1996 n/a n/a n/a 1996 100% reduction 17,000 17,000 1988 5,000,000 33,000 9,900 1993 n/a 17,300 n/a 1993 n/a 6,200 n/a 1993 n/a 10,200 n/a 1989 3,500,000 24,500 17,100 1992 100% reduction 1,100 1,100 1993 100% reduction 520 520 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Swapping debt for the environment: The Polish EcoFund,” Paris: EU Phare program (1996). CRS-6 Creditor Debtor Country Bolivia Switzerland Peru Tanzania Poland Bulgaria Egypt Guinea Bissau Philippines U.K. Nigeria Tanzania Year 1993 1992 1993 1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1993 1993 Face Value Reduction n/a n/a n/a 10% reduction 20% reduction 20% reduction 100% 50% reduction 7,300,000 n/a Face Value of Conservation Debt Funds Generated 35,400 3,900 130,800 32,600 22,200 3,300 480,000 48,000 83,500 16,700 115,000 69,000 8,400 400 32,300 16,100 7,300 n/a 15,400 15,400 Source: Various sources and R. Curtis. “Bilateral Debt Conversions for the Environment, Peru: An Evolving Case Study,” IUCN World Conservation Congress, Montreal (1996). n/a = information not available. U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives. The model for bilateral debtfor-nature agreements conducted by the United States was first defined in 1990 by the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (Title 15, Section 1512 of the Food, Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, “1990 Farm Bill,” P.L. 101-624; 7 U.S.C. 1738) and has since been expanded numerous times (see Appendix). It was Bilateral and Multilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives

(U.S.$, in thousands)

Creditor

Debtor Country

Year

Value of Debt Treated

Conservation Funds Generated

Canada

Columbia

1993

12,000

12,000

 

El Salvador

1993

7,500

6,000

 

Honduras

1993

24,900

12,450

 

Nicaragua

1993

13,600

2,700

 

Peru

1994

11,250

3,800

Belgium

Bolivia

1992

13,000

n/a

Finland

Poland

1990

17,000

17,000

 

Peru

1995

18,900

8,100

France

Egypt

1992

n/a

11,600

 

Philippines

1992

n/a

4,000

 

Poland

1993

66,000

66,000

 

Cameroon

2006

n/a

25,000

Germany

Peru

1994

16,079

6,100

 

Jordan

1995

13,400

6,700

 

Jordan

1995

22,700

11,300

 

Philippines

1996

5,800

1,800

 

Vietnam

1996

18,200

5,400

 

Bolivia

1997

3,700

1,150

 

Honduras

1999

1.068

534

 

Peru

1999

5,140

2,060

 

Vietnam

1999

16,400

5,000

 

Jordan

2000

43,600

21,800

 

Bolivia

2000

15,800

3,200

 

Jordan

2001

11,300

5,700

 

Vietnam

2001

7,000

n/a

 

Syria

2001

31,700

15,900

 

Ecuador

2002

9,500

3,081

 

Ecuador

2002

10,200

3,235

 

Madagascar

2002

25,092

14,843

 

Indonesia

2003

n/a

n/a

 

Indonesia

     

Holland

Peru

1996

n/a

n/a

 

Costa Rica

1996

14,100

14,100

 

Costa Rica

1988

33,000

9,900

Italy

Poland

1998

32,000

32,000

Norway

Egypt

1993

17,300

n/a

 

Egypt

1993

6,200

n/a

 

Nigeria

1993

10,200

n/a

 

Poland

2000

27,000

27,000

Spain

Costa Rica

1999

5,222

2,180

Sweden

Costa Rica

1989

24,500

17,100

 

Tunisia

1992

1,100

1,100

 

Tunisia

1993

520

520

 

Bolivia

1993

35,400

3,900

 

Poland

1997 & 1999

13,000

13,000

Switzerland

Peru

1992

130,800

32,600

 

Tanzania

1993

22,200

3,300

 

Bolivia

1993

35,400

1,365

 

Poland

1993

48,000

48,000

 

Honduras

1993 &1997

42,030

8,430

 

Ecuador

1994

46,300

4,524

 

Bulgaria

1995

16,700

16,200

 

Egypt

1995

23,000

18,000

 

Guinea Bissau

1995

8,400

400

 

Philippines

1995

16,100

16,100

U.K.

Nigeria

1993

7,300

n/a

 

Tanzania

1993

15,400

15,400

Source: Various sources and R. Curtis. "Bilateral Debt Conversions for the Environment, Peru: An Evolving Case Study," IUCN World Conservation Congress, Montreal (1996). n/a = information not available.

U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives

The model for bilateral debt-for-nature agreements conducted by the United States was first defined in 1990 by the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (Title 15, Section 1512 of the Food, Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, "1990 Farm Bill," P.L. 101-624; 7 U.S.C. 1738) and has since been expanded numerous times (see Appendix). It was last amended by the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) in 1998 (P.L. 105214105-214; 22 U.S.C. 2431). Figure 2. An Example of a Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transaction Modeled After the TFCA Step 1 New debt agreement is created Debtor Government United States Step 2 Principal payments to the United States Interest from the principal of the loan Tropical Forest Fund Local Conservation Groups Interest earned from the Tropical Forest Fund Step 3 ! Step 1 = The current debt agreement is cancelled and a new one is created. ! Step 2 = A Tropical Forest Agreement is created and interest payments for the principal of the loan are deposited in local currency equivalents into a Tropical Forest Fund. ! Step 3 = Interest earned and the principal of the Tropical Forest Fund is generally given in the form of local currency as grants to local conservation groups. CRS-7 Modeled After the TFCA The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative legislation authorizes the sale, reduction, cancellation and country buyback of eligible P.L. 4805 (4804 (P.L. 101-624; 7 U.S.C. 1738m, p-r, etc.), AID6 (AID5 (P.L. 102-549; 22 U.S.C. 2430 and 2421), CCC7 (P.L. CCC6 (P.L. 102-549; 22 U.S.C. 2430 and 2421), and Exim8 (Exim7 (P.L. 102-429; 12 U.S.C. 635i-6) debt of eligible Latin American and Caribbean countries.98 Debtor countries must meet certain political and macroeconomic criteria in order to be eligible. Eligible countries are required to (1) have a democratically elected government, (2) not support terrorism, (3) not fail to cooperate with the United States on drug control, and (4) not engage in gross violations of human rights. From an economic perspective, eligible countries are required to have (1) an IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) or IDA (International Development Association) structural or sectoral adjustment loan or its equivalent, (2) a macroeconomic agreement with the International Monetary Fund or equivalent, and (3) instituted investment reforms, as evidenced by a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, an investment sector loan, or progress towards implementing an open investment regime. Each country that participates in the EAI must enter into an America’ America's Framework Agreement with the United States to establish an America’s 's Trust Fund and create enforcement mechanisms to insure payments into the fund and prompt disbursements out of the fund.109 Funds can be used to support environmental, natural resource, health protection, and child development programs within the debtor country. Debt swaps, buybacks, and restructuring are three mechanisms used to conduct debt-for-nature transactions under the EAI. Seven of the eight countries that have participated in debt-for-nature transactions under the EAI used the debt-restructuring mechanism to generate environmental funds (see Table 3); only Peru took advantage of the debt buyback option. In a debt-restructuring agreement, the original debt agreement is cancelled (i.e., a percentage of the face value of the debt is reduced) and a new agreement is created with a provision for an annual amount of money (in local 5 P.L. 480 “Food for Peace” loans were low-interest loans given to developing countries to purchase U.S. agricultural products. For more information, see CRS Report RS20520, Foreign Food Aid Programs: Background and Selected Issues, by Geoffrey S. Becker and Charles E. Hanrahan. 6 USAID Foreign assistance loans. 7 Commodity Credit Corporation loans are given to developing countries to enable them to import U.S. agricultural products. 8 Export-Import Bank loans are made to foreign importers of U.S. goods and services. 9 Although debt under the P.L. 480 program was the first to be authorized for debt-for-nature transactions, authorization quickly followed for reduction of debt owed to the United States under three other programs: (1) Commodity Credit Corporation programs, (2) Export-Import Bank loans, and (3) foreign aid loans administered by USAID. 10 The America’s Trust Fund can be either an endowed fund or a sinking fund depending on the agreement reached by the United States and the debtor country. Interest payments made by debtor countries on their new restructured loans are deposited into the fund. These payments form the principal of the fund, and interest earned on this principal and the principal itself can be used to fund environmental, community development, and child survival and development programs. CRS-8 a new agreement is created with a provision for an annual amount of money (in local currency) to be deposited into an environmental fund. In 1992, for example, the United States reduced 10% of a $310 million (face value) debt owed by Colombia in return for the deposit of $41.6 million in local currency into an environmental fund by the Colombian government over 10 years.1110 In a debt buyback, the debtor country purchases its debt at a reduced price. The lesser of either 40% of the repurchase price or the difference between the face value of the debt and the repurchase price is deposited in local currency into an environmental trust to support environmental and child support programs in the debtor country (P.L. 104-107, Title V, Sec. 574). For example, in 1998 Peru took advantage of this program and bought back $177 million in debt for $57 million, generating nearly $23 million (40% of the repurchase price) in local currency funds for conservation and child development programs. For all eight debtor countries, nearly $1 billion (face value) of debt was reduced from a total debt of $1.8 billion, and almost $180 million of conservation funds were generated under the guidelines of the EAI (see Table 3). ). Six transactions under the EAI continued to operate in 20072010 (Chile and Uruguay have been concluded). These programs support small projects with grants and monitor existing projects that have been funded. Some examples of projects include coastal zone marine management and hurricane relief projects in Jamaica, environmentally based development projects in the Peruvian Andes, and community production grants in Bolivia.12 11 Table 3. U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transactions Under EAI Bolivia (U.S.$, in thousands) Face Value Face Value of Conservation Duration Reduction Debt Funds Generated (years) 1991 30,700 38,400 21,800 15 El Salvador 1992 463,300 613,000 41,200 20 Uruguay 1992 3,700 34,400 7,030 12 Columbia 1992 31,000 310,000 41,600 10 Chile 1991 & 1992 31,000 186,000 18,700 10 Jamaica 1991 & 1993 311,000 406,000 21,500 19 Argentina 1993 3,800 38,100 3,100 14 Peru 1998 120,000 177,000 22,840 n/a 993,998 1,803,300 177,770 Country TOTAL Year Source: The United States Department of Treasury. “The Operation of the Enterprise for the Americas Facility and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, Report to Congress,” March, 2001. Tropical Forest Conservation Act. Acknowledging that tropical rainforests were valuable for preserving biodiversity, reducing atmospheric carbon 11 R. Curtis, “Bilateral Debt Conversions for the Environment, Peru: An Evolving Case Study,” IUCN World Conservation Congress, Montreal (1996). 12 Tropical Forest Conservation Act Secretariat, Operation of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, 2006 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Mar. 2007). CRS-9 dioxide, and regulating hydrological cycles, Congress sought to expand the EAI authorization to countries throughout the world with tropical forests. The result was the 1998 Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), which was established to generate funds to conserve tropical forests by reducing external debt in countries with such forests. TFCA is an extension of the Enterprise for the Americas Act, in that it allows debt swaps, debt restructuring and debt buybacks to generate conservation funds. These funds, however, are specifically designated for the conservation of tropical forests and are not confined to Latin America. To date, 12 countries have participated in this program, establishing 13 agreements (Panama has two agreements) that will reduce a total of at least $20.0 million from the face value of their debts to the United States and generate $162.5 million in local currency in the

(U.S.$, in thousands)

Country

Year

Face Value Reduction

Face Value of Debt

Conservation Funds Generated

Duration (years)

Bolivia

1991

30,700

38,400

21,800

15

El Salvador

1992

463,300

613,000

41,200

20

Uruguay

1992

3,700

34,400

7,030

12

Columbia

1992

31,000

310,000

41,600

10

Chile

1991 & 1992

31,000

186,000

18,700

10

Jamaica

1991 & 1993

311,000

406,000

21,500

19

Argentina

1993

3,800

38,100

3,100

14

Peru

1998

120,000

177,000

22,840

n/a

TOTAL

 

993,998

1,803,300

177,770

 

Source: The United States Department of Treasury. "The Operation of the Enterprise for the Americas Facility and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, Report to Congress," March, 2001.

Tropical Forest Conservation Act

Acknowledging that tropical rainforests were valuable for preserving biodiversity, reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide, and regulating hydrological cycles, Congress sought to expand the EAI authorization to countries throughout the world with tropical forests. The result was the 1998 Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), which was established to generate funds to conserve tropical forests by reducing external debt in countries with such forests. TFCA is an extension of the Enterprise for the Americas Act, in that it allows debt swaps, debt restructuring and debt buybacks to generate conservation funds. These funds, however, are specifically designated for the conservation of tropical forests and are not confined to Latin America. To date, 13 countries have participated in this program, establishing 15 agreements (Panama and Peru have two agreements) that will reduce a total of at least $20.0 million from the face value of their debts to the United States and generate $218.4 million in local currency in the next 12-26 years for tropical forest conservation projects (see Table 4). For 2009, the Republic of Indonesia completed the largest ever debt-for-nature swap under the TFCA.

Table 4. U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transactions Under TFCA

(U.S.$, in thousands)

Countrya

Year

Budget Cost

Private Funds Leveragedb

Face Value Reduction of Debt

Conservation Funds Generated

Duration (years)

Bangladesh

2000

$6,000

$0.0

$600

$8,500

18

Belize

2001

5,500

1,300

1,400

9,000

26

El Salvador

2001

7,700

0.0

3,000

14,000

26

Peru I

2002

5,500

1,100

3,700

10,600

12

Philippines

2002

5,500

0.0

100

8,300

14

Panama I

2003

5,600

1,200

10,000

10,000

14

Columbia

2004

7,000

1,400

n/a

10,000

12

Panama II

2004

6,500

1,300

n/a

10,900

12

Jamaica

2004

6,500

1,300

n/a

16,000

20

Paraguay

2006

4,800

0.0

n/a

7,400

12

Guatemala

2006

15,000

2,000

n/a

24,400

15

Botswana

2006

7,000

0.0

n/a

8,300

10

Costa Rica

2007

12,600

2,500

n/a

26,000

16

Peru II

2008

19,600

0.0

n/a

25,000

7

Indonesia

2009

20,000

2.0

n/a

30,000

8

TOTAL

 

$124,800

$14,100

n/a

$218,400

n/a

Source: Email communications with Scott Lampman, 2004-2009, and U.S. Agency for International ). For 2007, Costa Rica completed a debt-for-nature transaction, and the Republic of Indonesia is presently negotiating for a debt-for-nature swap under the TFCA. For the Republic of Indonesia, the swap is reported to entail $19.6 million from the United States, potentially making it the largest transaction to date. Table 4. U.S. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Transactions Under TFCA (U.S.$, in thousands)13 Face Value Conservation Duration Country Year Budget Private Reduction of Funds Generated (years) Cost Funds Debt Leveragedb $0.0 $600 $8,500 18 Bangladesh 2000 $6,000 a 2001 5,500 1,300 1,400 9,000 26 El Salvador 2001 7,700 0.0 3,000 14,000 26 2002 5,500 1,100 3,700 10,600 12 Philippines 2002 5,500 0.0 100 8,300 14 Panama I 2003 5,600 1,200 10,000 10,000 14 Columbia 2004 7,000 1,400 n/a 10,000 12 Panama II 2004 6,500 1,300 n/a 10,900 12 Jamaica 2004 6,500 1,300 n/a 16,000 20 Paraguay 2006 4,800 0.0 n/a 7,400 12 Guatemala 2006 15,000 2,000 n/a 24,400 15 2006 7,000 0.0 n/a 8,300 n/a Costa Rica 2007 12,600 2,500 n/a 26,000 16 $95,200 $12,100 n/a $162,500 n/a Belize Peru Botswana TOTAL Source: Email communications with Scott Lampman, 2004-2006, and U.S. Agency for International Development, Operation of the Enterprise of the Americas Facility and Tropical Forest Conservation Act, Annual Act, Report to Congress (Washington, DC, March 2004, 2005, and 2006). 13 -2009).Note: In the transaction with Peru in 2002, $1.1 million was given by The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, and Conservation International, and $5.5 million was given by the U.S. government. CRS-10 a n/a = not available.a. The Republic of Thailand signed a debt reduction agreement in September 2001. The signing of the second required agreement, the Tropical Forest Agreement (TFA), never took place. The government annulled the agreement on January 30, 2003, amidst false media reports that warned that the U.S. government would retain control over forests involved in the agreement. b b. In some debt-for-nature transactions, a third party is involved (generally a non-governmental organization or NGO) in the process and subsidizes a portion of the debt-reduction done by the United States. Non-governmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy, and Conservation International have subsidized these transactions. To be eligible for this program, a developing country must contain at least one tropical forest with unique biodiversity, or a tropical forest tract that is representative of a larger tropical forest on a global, continental or regional scale.1412 Political and macroeconomic criteria for eligibility are almost identical to those used for participation under the EAI.1513 Conservation funds (in local currency) from these transactions are deposited in a tropical forest fund for each country. The fund is overseen by an administrating body composed of one or more appointees chosen by the U.S. government and the government of the beneficiary country, and individuals who represent a broad range of environmental, academic, and scientific organizations in the beneficiary country (the majority of the board is represented by these individuals). This fund operates in the same manner as the America’'s Fund: Local currency payments of interest accrued on restructured loans are deposited into a tropical forest fund and serve as the principal. Interest earned from this principal balance and the principal itself is usually given in the form of grants to fund tropical forest conservation projects. Eligible conservation projects include (1) the establishment, maintenance, and restoration of parks, protected reserves, and natural areas, and the plant and animal life within them; (2) training programs to increase the capacity of personnel to manage parks; (3) development and support for communities residing near or within tropical forests; (4) development of sustainable ecosystem and land management systems; and (5) research to identify the medicinal uses of tropical forest plants and their products. The TFCA was reauthorized for appropriations in 2004, including $20 million for FY2005, $25 million for FY2006, and $30 million for FY2007. This law also authorizes funds to conduct audits and evaluations of debt-for-nature programs. A “ "TFCA Evaluation Sheet”" has been created to evaluate the performance of TFCA country programs. The Evaluation Sheet establishes criteria for TFCA program categories and functions and will be completed each year by the U.S. government representative on the local TFCA board or oversight committee. ManySome of the programs under the TFCA are in beginning stages and have not disbursed grants to local non-government organizations. However, in Peru, El Salvador, and Belize, 14 Developing country is defined as a “low” or “middle” income country as determined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its World Development Report. In 2001, the cutoff for low-income countries was a per capita annual income of $745 or less. For middle-income countries, the range is $746-$9,205, and the cutoff is $9,205. 15 Instead of having in place major investment reforms in conjunction with an IADB loan or making progress toward implementing an open investment regime, the country must have in place a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, investment sector loans with the IADB, World Bank supported reforms, or other measures as appropriate (22 U.S.C. 2431c). CRS-11 local non-government organizations. However, in Peru, El Salvador, and Belize, some grants have been disbursed for projects and project monitoring has begun. This law would also allow the principal of restructured loans to be used in debt-for-nature transactions. Currently, interest accrued on restructured loans are deposited into a tropical forest fund for disbursement. Congressional Role in Debt-for-Nature Initiatives Authority for Debt-for-Nature Initiatives Early debt-for-nature legislation concentrated on understanding and promoting third-party debt-for-nature swaps (see AppendixAppendix for legislation summaries and United States Code citations). Congress in 1989 directed the Secretary of the Treasury to ask the U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank to develop a pilot debt-for-nature program and other ways of reducing debt owed by foreign countries while generating funds for the environment. A subsequent law, the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, authorizes USAID to make grants to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to purchase debt in three-party swaps. Official (public) P.L. 480 debt owed to the United States by eligible Latin American countries was authorized to be reduced by the 1990 farm bill (P.L. 101-624; 7 U.S.C. 1738b). The 102nd102nd Congress authorized debt reduction for foreign assistance loans made by USAID (P.L. 102-549; 22 U.S.C. 2430 and 2421), the Export-Import Bank ( (P.L. 102-429; 12 U.S.C. 635i-6), and the Commodity Credit Corporation (P.L. 102549102-549; 22 U.S.C. 2430 and 2421). Together, the P.L. 480, USAID, CCC, and Ex-Im debt reduction authorizations were undertaken as part of President George H. W. Bush’ Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. In 1996, USAID was further authorized by Congress to conduct swaps, buybacks, and cancellations of debt owed to the United States by eligible Latin American and Caribbean countries (P.L. 104-107). In 1998, the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) was passed, allowing debt swaps, buybacks, and restructuring to generate funds for tropical forest conservation worldwide. Funding for the TFCA was reauthorized by Congress in 2004 (P.L. 108223108-323) and is currently being considered for authorization in the 110th Congress in the House (H.R. 2185) and Senate (S. 2020). The reauthorization bills being considered would both expand the TFCA to include coral reefs. H.R. 2185 further expands the TFCA by including all forest types as eligible for conservation activities. (S. 2020 would maintain activities only to tropical forests.) H.R. 2185 would authorize $30 111th Congress under H.R. 52 and S. 345. Both bills would expand the TFCA to include coral reefs and associated coastal marine ecosystems.14 H.R. 52 would authorize $30 million annually in appropriations for the TFCA from FY2007 through FY2010. S. 2020 would reportedly authorize $20 million in FY2008,FY2011; S. 345 would reauthorize $25 million in FY2009, and $30 million in FY2010. annually from FY2010 through FY2012. Rationale for and Criticism of Debt-for-Nature Initiatives Advocates of debt-for-nature initiatives argue that reducing debt in developing countries will help create free-market systems (as part of the reforms required for eligibility), stimulate economic growth and trade liberalization, provide incentives for foreign investment, and help protect the environment. Converting hard currency debts to local currency debts, advocates argue, will lower debt burdens on developing countries and in the long run may reduce resource extraction at the expense of the CRS-12 environment. Critics of debt-for-nature initiatives argue that only a small percentage of debt is reduced, thereby minimizing the positive benefits of debt reduction in developing countries. For example, in some transactions under the TFCA, the interest paid for the debt is used for conservation projects, while the principle of the debt remains. Supporters point out that while the percentage of debt reduced by debtfordebt-for-nature transactions is small, conservation funds generated for debtor countries are generally significant relative to what the country would have originally spent on conservation.1615 The relationship between debt reduction and lower resource extraction rates is controversial. Some analysts suggest that debt reduction has no direct relationship to lower extraction rates of minerals or timber in developing countries with foreign debt.17 16 Advocates of debt-for-nature initiatives note that the United States has a history of supporting debt reduction initiatives in developing countries and appropriating funds for environmental causes. Recent appropriations by the United States to support the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (22 U.S.C. §262p-6) support the claim for reducing debt in developing countries.1817 HIPC was created by international creditors, the World Bank, and IMF to reduce debt of poor countries that have demonstrated social and economic policy reforms that enable fluid export revenues and capital inflows.1918 Funds generated for the environment in developing countries are argued to improve local environmental conditions, promote sustainable resource use, and help to preserve global biodiversity and ecosystem services. Advocates also suggest that debt-for-nature transactions that generate funds to support tropical forest conservation are especially appropriate. Most tropical countries with high levels of total debt owed to the United States also have some of the largest areas of tropical forest cover. For example, Brazil and Peru have debts to the United States totaling over $1 billion each, and have two of the largest areas of tropical forest cover in the world.20 Other countries, such as the Democratic Republic 16 For example, Ecuador reduced its external debt of $8.3 billion by only $1 million from a debt-for-nature swap, yet doubled its budget for parks and reserves with money received from the resulting conservation fund. 17 Dal Didia, “Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Market Imperfections, and Policy Failures as Determinants of Sustainable Development and Environmental Quality,” Journal of Economic Issues (2001), pp. 477-486; and Esben Brandi-Hanson and Kaspar Svarrer, “Debtfor-Nature Swaps: One or the Other, or Both?” Royal Veterinarian and Agricultural University of Denmark, Department of Economics, 1998, 17 pp. 18 Eligibility requirements for participating in the HIPC program include that a country must receive only concessional financing from the World Bank and IMF (i.e., borrowing only from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) and from the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)), establish a track record of economic reforms under IMF and World Bank-sponsored programs, and hold a debt burden that is unsustainable under existing (Naples terms) relief arrangements. 19 See CRS Report RL30214, Debt Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, by Larry Nowels. 20 U.S. Department of Treasury and Office of Management and Budget, “United States Government Foreign Credit Exposure As of December 31st 1999” (2001). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “State of the World’s Forests 2001,” Rome (continued...) CRS-13 of Congo and Sudan, also fit this pattern; however, these countries may be ineligible for debt-for-nature transactions under the TFCA due to political and economic eligibility requirements.21 Those who oppose debt-for-nature transactions often argue that they are not adequately enforced by debtor countries, generate insufficient funds to improve environmental problems, and may infringe on national sovereignty.22 Three-party debt swaps have historically had weak enforcement mechanisms; however, bilateral debt swaps such as those conducted under the EAI generally include safeguards and default provisions to protect the U.S. government from losing funds. National sovereignty became an issue in Bolivia when a conservation organization was reported to have obtained title to forested lands. There was a public outcry and ensuing political crisis when the Bolivian people thought a large part of their country had been given to a foreign organization. Consequently, conservation organizations involved in recent three-party swaps have generally refrained from directly buying land in debtor countries with conservation funds earned from swaps. Decline of Debt-for-Nature Transactions The number of debt-for-nature transactions has declined in recent years, perhaps due to accounting changes that require greater appropriations to fund debt-for-nature transactions with official (public) debt, and a higher price of commercial debt on the to address climate change. Deforestation19 is responsible for the largest share of additional carbon dioxide (CO2) released to the atmosphere due to land use changes, approximately 20% of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions annually.20 Much of the deforestation responsible for CO2 releases occurs in tropical regions, specifically in developing countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most tropical countries with high levels of total debt owed to the United States also have some of the largest areas of tropical forest cover. For example, Brazil and Peru have debts to the United States totaling over $1 billion each, and have two of the largest areas of tropical forest cover in the world.21 Other countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, also fit this pattern; however, these countries may be ineligible for debt-for-nature transactions under the TFCA due to political and economic eligibility requirements.22

Those who oppose debt-for-nature transactions often argue that they are not adequately enforced by debtor countries, generate insufficient funds to improve environmental problems, and may infringe on national sovereignty.23 Three-party debt swaps have historically had weak enforcement mechanisms; however, bilateral debt swaps such as those conducted under the EAI generally include safeguards and default provisions to protect the U.S. government from losing funds. National sovereignty became an issue in Bolivia when a conservation organization was reported to have obtained title to forested lands. There was a public outcry and ensuing political crisis when the Bolivian people thought a large part of their country had been given to a foreign organization. Consequently, conservation organizations involved in recent three-party swaps have generally refrained from directly buying land in debtor countries with conservation funds earned from swaps.

Decline of Debt-for-Nature Transactions

The number of debt-for-nature transactions has declined in recent years, perhaps due to accounting changes that require greater appropriations to fund debt-for-nature transactions with official (public) debt, and a higher price of commercial debt on the secondary market (see Figure 3). Before 1991, no appropriations were required for debt cancellations, and the United States cancelled between $11 and $12 billion in debt between 1988 and 1991. This changed with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a et seq.). This law requires that the net present value (NPV) to the United States of debts of foreign countries be used to report the cost of debt restructuring, buybacks, swaps, and cancellations to the U.S. government. The NPV of the cash flow of the loan is calculated often giving consideration to projected default losses, fees, and interest subsidies. Therefore, appropriated funds for these programs must be used to cover the interest fee no longer coming to the United States (in the case of funds set up under EAI and TFCA) and the difference in the NPV of the loan that may result from restructuring.23 24 A decline in three-party commercial debt-for-nature swaps may also be due to the conclusion of Brady Plan operations by Latin American countries. The Brady 20 (...continued) (2001). 21 Participation in three-party debt-for-nature swaps through USAID is not subject to the same economic and political criteria required for participation in TFCA and EAI debt-fornature transactions. An eligible country must be committed to, plan for, and have a government or local nongovernmental organization responsible for the long-term viability of the programs under the swap agreement. 22 R. T. Deacon and P. Murphy, “The Structure of an Environmental Transaction: The Debtfor-Nature Swap,” Land Economics (1997), pp. 1-24. 23 Stacy Warden, “The Tropical Forest Conservation Act,” PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C., 2001. CRS-14 the conclusion of Brady Plan operations by Latin American countries. The Brady Plan allowed for partial debt forgiveness with a restructuring of the remaining debt into bonds that could be traded on the securities markets. When this program was concluded, the price of debt on the secondary market increased and financing leverage decreased, making it difficult and less attractive for environmental organizations to acquire debt for resale.2425 Further, debt relief for developing countries is available through other programs that allow for relatively greater amounts of debt to be cancelled (e.g., HIPC). These programs may be more desirable to developing countries with debt than debt-for-nature initiatives under the EAI or TFCA. Under the TFCA, there was an 18-month period from 2004 to 2006 when no transactions were made. Lastly, the political and economic requirements needed to be eligible for debt-for-nature transactions make it difficult for several countries to participate in EAI or TFCA programs. Figure 3. Three Party and Bilateral U.S. Debt-for-Nature Transactions 1987-2007 14 Number of swaps 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 87 88 89 9 0 91 92 93 94 95 9 6 9 7 98 99 00 0 1 0 2 0 3 04 05 06 0 7 1 9 19 19 19 1 9 1 9 1 9 19 19 1 9 1 9 1 9 19 20 20 2 0 2 0 20 20 20 20 Year Three-party Swaps EAI/TFCA Transactions Transactions 1987-2007 Source: Created by CRS. Emergence of Subsidized Debt-for-Nature Transactions In 2001, a different form of a debt-for-nature transaction emerged under the TFCA. The Nature Conservancy and the United States joined to buy down a portion of debt that Belize owed to the United States. This partnership in debt-for-nature transactions is referred to as a subsidized debt swap. In a subsidized debt swap, an NGO generally matches 20% of the U.S. government contribution toward a debt-fornaturefor-nature transaction. For example, in a recent transaction with Panama in 2003, the 24 The World Bank, “World Debt Tables, 1996,” Washington, D.C., 1996. CRS-15 U.S. government provided $5.6 million and the The Nature Conservancy provided $1.2 million to reduce Panama’'s debt by $10 million and generate $10 million in conservation funds. The transaction is completed when three agreements are signed: (1) the U.S. government and the beneficiary country sign a debt restructuring agreement; (2) the U.S. government and the NGO sign an agreement to transfer NGO funds; and (3) the NGO and the beneficiary country sign a Forest Conservation Agreement.2526 In a subsidized swap, the U.S. government is notnot a signatory to the Forest Conservation Agreement, yet generally has representatives on the oversight committee.2627 Subsidized swaps have been implemented in the last three out of four transactions under the TFCA (see Table 4).28

Appropriations

).27 Appropriations Appropriations for debt reduction activities authorized by the EAI have totaled $90 million. Forty million dollars was appropriated for P.L. 480 debt reduction for FY1993 (P.L. 102-341) and $50 million for other debt restructuring under EAI in FY1993 (P.L. 102-391). For debt reduction activities under TFCA, appropriations have totaled up to $117 million from FY2000 to FY2006 (see Table 5). ). Appropriations are not authorized for FY2008 and beyond under TFCA. Table 5. Appropriations Provided Under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 Fiscal Year Requested Amount ($ in millions) Appropriated Amount ($ in millions) Actual Amount Used ($ in millions)a 2000 $50.0 $13.0 $6.0 2001 $37.0 $13.0 $14.4 2002 $13.0 Up to $25.0 ($11.0 was given for the TFCA)b $11.0 2003 Up to $40.0 Up to $40.0 ($20.0 was given for the TFCA) $6.0 2004 $20.0 $19.8 $20.0 2005 $20.0 $20.0 $0.0c 2006 $20.0 $20.0 $26.0 2007 $8.0 $20.0 $12.6 2008 $20.0 $50.0 n/a 2009 $20.0 n/a n/a a Cells with n/a indicate that funds have not yet been determined. This figure consists of $5 million in direct funds and $6 million in funds transferred from unobligated balances. c No transactions under the TFCA were conducted in 2005. b 25 The U.S. government is a signatory on a Tropical Forest Agreement, which is used with debt-for-nature transactions that are not subsidized. 26 This agreement generally addresses the structure of the conservation fund, its administrative council, and the use of monies from the fund, among other things. 27 Scott Lampman, “Debt Swaps Create New Conservation Opportunities,”Biodiversity 13 (2003), pp. 1-3. CRS-16 Future Directions Bilateral debt-for-nature initiatives implemented by the U.S. government have been supported with appropriations (e.g., under the EAI and now the TFCA authorization) for 7 of the last 10 years. Debt-for-nature transactions administered by the United States have focused on transactions under the TFCA. Since most of the transactions are relatively new, there have been no comprehensive analyses of their effectiveness in preventing the destruction of tropical forests. Some contend that a fair analysis might not be possible until 10 years after the implementation of a transaction. Nevertheless, many conservation organizations support the framework of the TFCA and suggest that it should serve as a model for conserving other ecosystems such as coral reefs and grasslands. Transactions under the TFCA are expected to continue since it is included in the Administration’s strategy to address global climate change.28 Tropical forests make up the largest proportion of carbon stored in terrestrial land masses and are thought

Fiscal Year

Appropriated Amount ($ in millions) Annual Obligation ($ in millions)a

2000

$13.0

$7.0

2001

$13.0

$13.2

2002

Up to $25.0 ($11.0 was given for the TFCA)b

$11.0

2003

Up to $40.0 ($20.0 was given for the TFCA)

$5.6

2004

$19.8

$20.0

2005

$20.0

$0.0c

2006

$20.0

$20.0

2007

$20.0

$19.6

2008

$20.0

$19.6

2009

$20.0

$20.0

2010

$20.0

n/a

2011

(request is $20.0)

n/a

a. Cells with n/a indicate that funding totals are not available.

b. This figure consists of $5 million in direct funds and $6 million in funds transferred from unobligated balances.

c. No transactions under the TFCA were conducted in 2005.

Future Directions

Bilateral debt-for-nature initiatives implemented by the U.S. government have been supported with appropriations (e.g., under the EAI and now the TFCA authorization) for the last 10 years. Debt-for-nature transactions administered by the United States have focused on transactions under the TFCA. Since most of the transactions are relatively new, there have been no comprehensive analyses of their effectiveness in preventing the destruction of tropical forests. Some contend that a fair analysis might not be possible until 10 years after the implementation of a transaction. Nevertheless, many conservation organizations support the framework of the TFCA and suggest that it should serve as a model for conserving other ecosystems such as coral reefs and grasslands.

Transactions under the TFCA are expected to continue since it is included in strategies to address global climate change.29 Tropical forests make up the largest proportion of carbon stored in terrestrial land masses and are thought to be a carbon sink.30to be a carbon sink. Despite uncertainties on the part of some, it is generally thought that maintaining existing tropical forests will store carbon, and that preventing deforestation will reduce the entry of carbon into the atmosphere.2931 Indeed, a pending recent debt-for-nature swap with Indonesia under the TFCA has been billed as a cooperative effort to deal with climate change by the Indonesian President.30 28 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html], last updated February 2002, and last accessed Oct. 11, 2006. (Hereafter referred to as Climate Change Policy.) 29 T. K. Rudel, Sequestering Carbon in Tropical Forests: Experiments, Policy Implications, and Climate Change, Society and Natural Resources, vol. 14 (2001), pp. 525-531. 30 President of the Republic of Indonesia to Seek Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Deal with Climate Change, Antara (Sept. 10, 2007) CRS-17 Appendix: effort to deal with climate change by Indonesia.Appendix. List of Related Laws and Appropriations That Support Debt-for-Nature Initiatives ! Continuing Appropriations Act for 1988 (P.L. 100-202; Section 537(C)(1--3)). Directs Secretary of the Treasury to analyze initiatives that would enable developing countries to repay portions of their debt obligations through investments in conservation activities. ! International Development and Finance Act of 1989 (P.L. 101240101-240; Title VII, Part A, Section 711) (22 U.S.C. 2282 -- 2286). Authorizes USAID to provide assistance to nongovernmental organizations to purchase debt of foreign countries as part of a debtfordebt-for-nature agreement (i.e., three-party swap). Authorizes USAID to conduct a pilot program for debt-for-nature swaps with eligible subSaharansub-Saharan African countries. ! Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 ( (P.L. 101-179; Title I, Section 104) (22 U.S.C. 5414). Authorizes the President to undertake the discounted sale, to private purchasers, of U.S. government debt obligations from eligible Eastern European countries. ! FY1990 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-167; ; Title V, Section 533(e)) (22 U.S.C. 262p-4i- 262p--4i - 262p-4j). Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to (1) support sustainable development and conservation projects when negotiating reduction of commercial debt and assisting with reduction of official (public) debt obligations, (2) encourage the World Bank to assist countries in reducing or restructuring private debt through environmental project and policy-based loans, and (3) encourage multilateral development banks to support lending portfolios that will allow debtor countries to restructure debt that may offer financial resources for conservation. ! Enterprise for the Americas Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (Title XV, Section 1512 of the Food, Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-624; 104 Stat. 3658) (7 U.S.C. 1738b). Amends the Agriculture Development and Trade Act of 1954 to allow the President to reduce the amount of P.L. 480 sales credit debt owed to the United States by Latin American and Caribbean countries. ! Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-429; Title I, Section 108) (12 U.S.C. 635i--6). Authorizes the sale, reduction, cancellation, and buyback of outstanding Export-Import Bank (Exim) loans for EAI purposes. CRS-18 ! Jobs Through Exports Act of 1992 (debt forgiveness authority under EAI) (P.L. 102-549; Title VI, Section 704) (22 U.S.C. 2430) and (22 U.S.C. 2421). Authorizes the sale, reduction, cancellation, and country buyback (through right of first refusal) of eligible Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) debt. Also authorizes the reduction of foreign assistance (USAID) debt. ! Enterprise for the Americas Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-532) (7 P.L. 102532)(7 U.S.C. 1738m, p--r, etc.). Establishes guidelines for debtfordebt-for-nature swaps for Latin American and Caribbean countries. ! Agriculture Appropriations for FY1993 (P.L. 102-341).). Provided $40 million for P.L. 480 debt reduction under EAI. ! Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY1993 (P.L. 102-391). ). Provided $50 million for debt restructuring under EAI. ! Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY1995 (P.L. 103-306; ; Title II, Section 534). Authorizes nongovernmental organizations associated with the Agency for International Development to place funds from economic assistance provided by USAID in interestbearinginterest-bearing accounts. Earned interest may be used for the purpose of the grants given. ! Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY1996 (P.L. 104-107; ; Title V, Section 571). Provides authority to perform debt buybacks/swaps with eligible loans made before January 1, 1995. For buybacks, the lesser of either 40% of the price paid or the difference between price paid and face value must be used to support conservation, child development and survival, or community development programs (Title V, Section 574). ! Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-214) (22 U.S.C. 2431). Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to facilitate the protection of tropical forests through debt restructuring, buybacks, and swaps in eligible developing countries with tropical forests. ! Reauthorization of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (P.L. 107-26).). Authorizes the appropriation of $50 million, $75 million, and $100 million for FY2002, FY2003, and FY2004. Reduces the magnitude of investment reforms that must be in place for eligible countries. ! Reauthorization of Appropriations under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (P.L. 108-323).). Authorizes the appropriation of $20 million, $25 million, and $30 million for FY2005, FY2006, and FY2007, respectively. Includes authorization for evaluating programs and allows for the principal on debt agreements to be treated by the debt-for-nature transaction.

Footnotes

1.

Thomas E. Lovejoy III, "Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology," New York Times, October 4, 1984, sec. A, p. 31.
2.

Sometimes debt is donated to the NGO in the three-party swap.
3.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Swapping debt for the environment: The Polish EcoFund," Paris: EU Phare program (1996).
4.

P.L. 480 "Food for Peace" loans were low-interest loans given to developing countries to purchase U.S. agricultural products.

5.

USAID Foreign assistance loans.
6.

Commodity Credit Corporation loans are given to developing countries to enable them to import U.S. agricultural products.
7.

Export-Import Bank loans are made to foreign importers of U.S. goods and services.
8.

Although debt under the P.L. 480 program was the first to be authorized for debt-for-nature transactions, authorization quickly followed for reduction of debt owed to the United States under three other programs: (1) Commodity Credit Corporation programs, (2) Export-Import Bank loans, and (3) foreign aid loans administered by USAID.
9.

The America's Trust Fund can be either an endowed fund or a sinking fund depending on the agreement reached by the United States and the debtor country. Interest payments made by debtor countries on their new restructured loans are deposited into the fund. These payments form the principal of the fund, and interest earned on this principal and the principal itself can be used to fund environmental, community development, and child survival and development programs.
10.

R. Curtis, "Bilateral Debt Conversions for the Environment, Peru: An Evolving Case Study," IUCN World Conservation Congress, Montreal (1996).
11.

Tropical Forest Conservation Act Secretariat, Operation of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, 2006 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: March 2007).
12.

Developing country is defined as a "low" or "middle" income country as determined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its World Development Report. In 2001, the cutoff for low-income countries was a per capita annual income of $745 or less. For middle-income countries, the range is $746-$9,205, and the cutoff is $9,205.
13.

Instead of having in place major investment reforms in conjunction with an IADB loan or making progress toward implementing an open investment regime, the country must have in place a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, investment sector loans with the IADB, World Bank supported reforms, or other measures as appropriate (22 U.S.C. 2431c).
14.

S. 345 defines associated coastal marine ecosystems as "any coastal marine ecosystem surrounding, or directly related to, a coral reef and important to maintaining the ecological integrity of that coral reef, such as seagrasses, mangroves, sandy seabed communities, and immediately adjacent coastal areas." H.R. 52 does not have a definition for associated coastal marine ecosystems.
15.

For example, Ecuador reduced its external debt of $8.3 billion by only $1 million from a debt-for-nature swap, yet doubled its budget for parks and reserves with money received from the resulting conservation fund.
16.

Dal Didia, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Market Imperfections, and Policy Failures as Determinants of Sustainable Development and Environmental Quality," Journal of Economic Issues (2001), pp. 477-486; and Esben Brandi-Hanson and Kaspar Svarrer, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: One or the Other, or Both?" Royal Veterinarian and Agricultural University of Denmark, Department of Economics, 1998, 17 pp.
17.

Eligibility requirements for participating in the HIPC program include that a country must receive only concessional financing from the World Bank and IMF (i.e., borrowing only from the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) and from the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)), establish a track record of economic reforms under IMF and World Bank-sponsored programs, and hold a debt burden that is unsustainable under existing (Naples terms) relief arrangements.
18.

See CRS Report RL30214, Debt Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf).
19.

Deforestation is the conversion of forests to pasture, cropland, urban areas, or other landscapes that have few or no trees. Afforestation is planting trees on lands that have not grown trees in recent years, such as abandoned cropland.
20.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change," Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (2007). Available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/wg1-report.html. (Hereafter referred to as 2007 IPCC WG I Report.)
21.

U.S. Department of Treasury and Office of Management and Budget, "United States Government Foreign Credit Exposure As of December 31st 1999" (2001). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "State of the World's Forests 2001," Rome (2001).
22.

Participation in three-party debt-for-nature swaps through USAID is not subject to the same economic and political criteria required for participation in TFCA and EAI debt-for-nature transactions. An eligible country must be committed to, plan for, and have a government or local nongovernmental organization responsible for the long-term viability of the programs under the swap agreement.
23.

R. T. Deacon and P. Murphy, "The Structure of an Environmental Transaction: The Debt-for-Nature Swap," Land Economics (1997), pp. 1-24.
24.

Stacy Warden, "The Tropical Forest Conservation Act," PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Department of Treasury, Washington, DC, 2001.
25.

The World Bank, "World Debt Tables, 1996," Washington, DC, 1996.
26.

The U.S. government is a signatory on a Tropical Forest Agreement, which is used with debt-for-nature transactions that are not subsidized.
27.

This agreement generally addresses the structure of the conservation fund, its administrative council, and the use of monies from the fund, among other things.
28.

Scott Lampman, "Debt Swaps Create New Conservation Opportunities,"Biodiversity 13 (2003), pp. 1-3.
29.

See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html, last updated February 2002, and last accessed October 11, 2006. (Hereafter referred to as Climate Change Policy.)
30.

For more information, see CRS Report R41144, Deforestation and Climate Change, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
31.

T. K. Rudel, Sequestering Carbon in Tropical Forests: Experiments, Policy Implications, and Climate Change, Society and Natural Resources, vol. 14 (2001), pp. 525-531.