Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information
Memorandum
January 5, 2006
SUBJECT: Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information
FROM:
Elizabeth B. Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorneys
American Law Division
Recent media revelations that the President authorized the National Security Agency
(NSA) to collect signals intelligence1 from communications involving U.S. persons within
the United States, without obtaining a warrant or court order,2 raise numerous questions
1 “Signals intelligence” is defined in the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Publication 1-02 (April 12, 2001), as follows:
1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all
communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications,
electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. . . .
Id. at 390 (cross-references omitted). “Communications intelligence” is defined as “Technical
information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the intended
recipients. Also called COMINT.” Id. at 84. “Electronic intelligence” is defined as “Technical and
geolocation intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations
emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. Also called ELINT. . . .” Id.
at 140 (cross-references omitted). “Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence” is defined as:
Technical information and intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign
electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-
US aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence is a subcategory of signals intelligence. Foreign instrumentation signals
include but are not limited to telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data
links. Also called FISINT. . . .
Id. at 167 (cross-references omitted).
2 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2005, at 1, 22 (citing anonymous government officials to report that the executive order, which
allows some warrantless eavesdropping on persons inside the United States, “is based on classified
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Congressional Research Service Washington, D.C. 20540-7000
CRS prepared this memorandum to enable distribution to more than one congressional client.
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regarding the President’s authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance. Little
information is currently known about the full extent of the NSA domestic surveillance, which
was revealed by the New York Times in December, 2005, but allegedly began after the
President issued a secret order in 2002. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales laid out some
of its parameters, telling reporters that it involves “intercepts of contents of communications
where one . . . party to the communication is outside the United States” and the government
has “a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al
Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or
working in support of al Qaeda.”3 The aim of the program, according to Principal Deputy
Director for National Intelligence General Michael Hayden, is not “to collect reams of
intelligence, but to detect and warn and prevent [terrorist] attacks.”4
The President has stated that he believes his order to be fully supported by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States,5 and the Attorney General clarified that the
Administration bases its authority both on inherent presidential powers and the joint
resolution authorizing the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” to engage militarily
those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (“AUMF”).6 Although the
2 (...continued)
legal opinions that assert that the president has broad powers to order such searches, derived in part
from the September 2001 Congressional resolution authorizing him to wage war on Al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups”).
3 See Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General
Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) (hereinafter
G o n z a l e s P r e s s C o n f e r e n c e ) , a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html]. The Attorney General
emphasized that his discussion addressed the legal underpinnings only for those operational aspects
that have already been disclosed by the President, explaining that “the program remains highly
classified; there are many operational aspects of the program that have still not been disclosed and
we want to protect that because those aspects of the program are very, very important to protect the
national security of this country.” Id.
4 Id.(describing the program as more “aggressive” than traditional electronic surveillance under
FISA, but also as “less intrusive”).
5 President Bush’s Radio Address of December 17, 2005, excerpted in ‘A Vital Tool,’ USA TODAY,
December 19, 2005, at A12.
6 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“the AUMF”), Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
Attorney General Gonzales explained
Justice O’Connor . . . said, it was clear and unmistakable that the Congress had
authorized the detention of an American citizen captured on the battlefield as an enemy
combatant for the remainder — the duration of the hostilities. So even though the
authorization to use force did not mention the word, ‘detention,’ she felt that detention
of enemy soldiers captured on the battlefield was a fundamental incident of waging war,
and therefore, had been authorized by Congress when they used the words, ‘authorize the
President to use all necessary and appropriate force.’
For the same reason, we believe signals intelligence is even more a fundamental incident
of war, and we believe has been authorized by the Congress. And even though signals
intelligence is not mentioned in the authorization to use force, we believe that the Court
would apply the same reasoning to recognize the authorization by Congress to engage in
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resolution does not expressly specify what it authorizes as “necessary and appropriate force,”
the Administration discerns the intent of Congress to provide the statutory authority
necessary take virtually any action reasonably calculated to prevent a terrorist attack,
including by overriding at least some statutory prohibitions that contain exceptions for
conduct that is “otherwise authorized by statute.” Specifically, the Administration asserts that
a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)7 that punishes those who conduct
“electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute”8 does not bar the
NSA surveillance at issue because the AUMF is just such a statute.9 On December 22, 2005,
the Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs released a letter to certain members
of the House and Senate intelligence committees setting forth in somewhat greater detail the
Administration’s position with regard to the legal authority supporting the NSA activities
described by the President.10
The Administration’s views have been the subject of debate. Critics challenge the
notion that federal statutes regarding government eavesdropping may be bypassed by
executive order, or that such laws were implicitly superceded by Congress’s authorization
to use military force. Others, however, have expressed the view that established wiretap
procedures are too cumbersome and slow to be effective in the war against terrorism, and that
the threat of terrorism justifies extraordinary measures the President deems appropriate, and
some agree that Congress authorized the measures when it authorized the use of military
force.
This memorandum lays out a general framework for analyzing the constitutional and
statutory issues raised by the NSA electronic surveillance activity. It then outlines the legal
framework regulating electronic surveillance by the government, explores ambiguities in
those statutes that could provide exceptions for the NSA intelligence-gathering operation at
issue, and addresses the arguments that the President possesses inherent authority to order
the operations or that Congress has provided such authority.
Constitutional Separation of Powers
Foreign intelligence collection is not among Congress’s powers enumerated in Article I
of the Constitution, nor is it expressly mentioned in Article II as a responsibility of the
President. Yet it is difficult to imagine that the Framers intended to reserve foreign
intelligence collection to the states or to deny the authority to the federal government
altogether. It is more likely that the power to collect intelligence resides somewhere within
6 (...continued)
this kind of electronic surveillance.
Gonzales Press Conference, supra note 3.
7 Pub. L. 95-511, Title I, 92 Stat. 1796 (Oct. 25, 1978), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801
et seq.
8 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (emphasis added).
9 See Gonzales Press Conference, supra note 3.
10 Letter from Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella to Chairman Roberts and Vice
Chairman Rockefeller of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Chairman Hoekstra and
Ranking Minority Member Harman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Dec.
22, 2005) (hereinafter “OLA Letter”).
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the domain of foreign affairs and war powers, both of which areas are inhabited to some
degree by the President together with the Congress.11
The Steel Seizure Case12 is frequently cited as providing a framework for the courts to
decide the extent of the President’s authority, particularly in matters involving national
security. In that Korean War-era case, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
presidential order seizing control of steel mills that had ceased production due to a labor
dispute, an action justified by President Truman on the basis of wartime exigencies and his
role as Commander-in-Chief,13 despite the fact that Congress had considered but rejected
earlier legislation that would have authorized the measure,14 and that other statutory means
were available to address the steel shortage.15 The Court remarked that
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in
some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional
language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power
should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular
reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that ‘The executive Power shall
be vested in a President . . .’; that ‘he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’; and that he ‘shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States.’
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by
citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in
day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though
11 The Constitution specifically gives to Congress the power to “provide for the common Defence,”
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water,” id. § 8, cl. 11; “To raise and support Armies,” and “To
provide and maintain a Navy,” id. § 8, cls. 12-13; “To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” id. § 8, cl. 14, “To declare War,” id. § 8, cl. 1; and to
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof,” id. § 8, cl. 18. The President is responsible for “tak[ing] Care
that the Laws [are] faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3, and serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy, id. § 2, cl. 1.
12 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
13 Id. at 582 (explaining the government’s position that the order to seize the steel mills “was made
on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which
would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave
emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s
Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.”).
14 Id. at 586 (noting that “[w]hen the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress
rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of
emergency”).
15 Id. at 585. The Court took notice of two statutes that would have allowed for the seizure of
personal and real property under certain circumstances, but noted that they had not been relied upon
and the relevant conditions had not been met. In particular, the Court dismissed the government’s
reference to the seizure provisions of § 201 (b) of the Defense Production Act, which the government
had apparently not invoked because it was “‘much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming
for the crisis which was at hand.’” Id. at 586.
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‘theater of war’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our
constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the
ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its
military authorities. 16
The Court also rejected the argument that past similar assertions of authority by presidents
bolstered the executive claims of constitutional power:
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of
private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true,
Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution ‘in the
Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof.’17
The Steel Seizure Case is not remembered as much for the majority opinion as it is for
the concurring opinion of Justice Robert Jackson, who took a more nuanced view and laid
out what is commonly regarded as the seminal explication of separation-of-powers matters
between Congress and the President. Justice Jackson set forth the following oft-cited
formula:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate. . . . A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an
Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon
any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.18
To ascertain where in this framework the President’s claimed authority might fall
appears to require a determination of the Congress’s will and an assessment of how the
Constitution allocates the asserted power between the President and Congress, if at all. If the
16 Id. at 587.
17 Id. at 589.
18 Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Constitution forbids the conduct, then the court has a duty to find the conduct invalid, even
if the President and Congress have acted in concert. In the absence of a constitutional bar,
Congress’s support matters, except in the rare case where the President alone is entrusted
with the specific power in question. In other words, under this view, the President may
sometimes have the effective power to take unilateral action in the absence of any action on
the part of Congress to indicate its will, but this should not be taken to mean that the
President possesses the inherent authority to exercise full authority in a particular field
without Congress’s ability to encroach.
William Rehnquist, at the time an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, took the
opportunity in Dames & Moore v. Regan19 to refine Justice Jackson’s formula with respect
to the cases falling within the second classification, the “zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”20
In such a case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity of the President’s
action, at least so far as separation-of-powers principles are concerned, hinges on a
consideration of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the
Legislative Branch toward such action, including “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence.”21
[I]t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly
in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from
explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. This is
particularly true as respects cases such as the one before us, involving responses to
international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to
anticipate in any detail.22
In Dames & Moore, petitioners had challenged President Carter’s executive order
establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of an executive agreement he
had entered into for the purpose of ending the hostage crisis with Iran. The orders, among
other things, directed that legal recourse for breaches of contract with Iran and other causes
of action must be pursued before a special tribunal established by the Algiers Accords.
President Carter relied largely on the International Economic Emergency Powers Act
(IEEPA),23 which provided explicit support for most of the measures taken, but could not be
read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in U.S. courts. The Carter
Administration also cited the broad language of the Hostage Act, which states that “the
President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper to obtain or effectuate the release” of the hostages.24 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the Hostage Act directly
authorizes the President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore
19 453 U.S. 668 (1981) (citing Youngstown at 637).
20 Id. at 668-69.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 669.
23 Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et.seq.
24 Id at 676 (citing the Hostage Act, 22 U. S. C. § 1732).
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the general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the
President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted,
Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the
President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act.
Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially . . . in the
areas of foreign policy and national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of
action taken by the Executive. On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely
related to the question of the President’s authority in a particular case which evinces
legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to “invite”
“measures on independent presidential responsibility.” At least this is so where there is
no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.25
The Court remarked that Congress’s implicit approval of the longstanding presidential
practice of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that
the challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.26 The Court cited Justice
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown stating that “a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . .
may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”27
Finally, the Court stressed that its holding was narrow:
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as
against foreign governmental entities. . . . But where, as here, the settlement of claims
has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy
dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that
Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the
President lacks the power to settle such claims.28
A review of the history of intelligence collection and its regulation by Congress suggests
that the two political branches have never quite achieved a meeting of the minds regarding
their respective powers. Presidents have long contended that the ability to conduct
surveillance for intelligence purposes is a purely executive function, and have tended to make
broad assertions of authority while resisting efforts on the part of Congress or the courts to
impose restrictions. Congress has asserted itself with respect to domestic surveillance, but
has largely left matters involving overseas surveillance to executive self-regulation, subject
to congressional oversight and willingness to provide funds.29
Background: Government Surveillance
Investigations for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence give rise to a tension
between the Government’s legitimate national security interests and the protection of privacy
interests and First Amendment rights.
25 Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
26 Id. at 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
27 Id at 686 (citing Youngstown at 610-611(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
28 Id. at 688.
29 For background on the evolution of U.S. intelligence operations, see CRS Report RL32500,
Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004, by Richard A. Best, Jr.
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The Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was originally applied only
to tangible things, Supreme Court jurisprudence eventually expanded the contours of the
Fourth Amendment to cover intangible items such as conversations. As communications
technology has advanced, the technology for intrusion into private conversations has kept
pace, as have government efforts to exploit such technology for law enforcement and
intelligence purposes. At the same time, the Court has expanded its interpretation of the
scope of the Fourth Amendment with respect to such techniques, and Congress has legislated
both to protect privacy and to enable the government to pursue its legitimate interests in
enforcing the law and gathering foreign intelligence information. Yet the precise boundaries
of what the Constitution allows, as well as what it requires, are not fully demarcated, and the
relevant statutes are not entirely free from ambiguity.
The Origin of Wiretap Warrants. In Katz v. United States,30 the Court held for the
first time that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to circumstances involving
electronic surveillance of oral communications without physical intrusion.31 In response,
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(“Title III”)32 to provide for search warrants to authorize electronic surveillance for law
enforcement purposes, but prohibiting such surveillance in other instances not authorized by
law. The Katz Court noted that its holding did not extend to cases involving national
security, and Congress did not then attempt to regulate national security surveillance. Title
III, as originally enacted, contained an exception. It stated that
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act . . . shall
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. . . .33
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928).
31 Id. at 359 n.23.
32 Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. For more
background see CRS Report 98-326: Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing
Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by Charles Doyle and Gina Stevens.
33 82 Stat. 214, formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). The Supreme Court interpreted this
provision not as a conferral or recognition of executive authority, but rather, an indication that
Congress had “left presidential powers where it found them.” United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972). The Senate Judiciary Committee noted, however, that the “highly
controversial disclaimer has often been cited as evidence of a congressional ratification of the
president’s inherent constitutional power to engage in electronic surveillance in order to obtain
foreign intelligence information essential to the national security.” S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 6-7
(1978).
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Intelligence Surveillance. Several years later, the Supreme Court addressed
electronic surveillance for domestic intelligence purposes. In United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the Keith case), the United States sought a writ of
mandamus to compel a district judge to vacate an order directing the United States to fully
disclose electronically monitored conversations. The Sixth Circuit refused to grant the writ,34
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the lower court decision. The
Supreme Court regarded Katz as “implicitly recogniz[ing] that the broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.”35 Mr. Justice Powell, writing
for the Keith Court, framed the matter before the Court as follows:
The issue before us is an important one for the people of our country and their
Government. It involves the delicate question of the President’s power, acting through
the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters
without prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more than one-quarter of a
century have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees, without guidance from the
Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This case brings the issue here for the
first time. Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both to the
Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the
citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable Government intrusion.36
The Court held that, in the case of intelligence gathering involving domestic security
surveillance, prior judicial approval was required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.37 Justice
34 444 F. 2d 651.
35 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972).
36 407 U.S. at 299.
37 Id. at 313-14, 317, 319-20. Thus, the Court stated, “These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the
discretion of the Executive Branch. . . . The Government argues the special circumstances applicable
to domestic security surveillances necessitate a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would obstruct the President in the discharge of
his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. . . .” Id. at 317-18. The Government also argued
that such surveillances were for intelligence gathering purposes; that the courts “as a practical matter
would have neither the knowledge nor the techniques to determine whether there was probable cause
to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security;” and that disclosure to a
magistrate and court personnel of information involved in the domestic security surveillances “would
create serious potential dangers to the national security and to the lives of informants and agents”
due to the increased risk of leaks. Id. at 318-19. The Court found that “these contentions on behalf
of a complete exemption from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf of the President and
the national security in its domestic implications, merit the most careful consideration,” but
concluded that a case had not been made for a departure from Fourth Amendment standards. Id. at
319-20. Justice Powell also observed that,
National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values not present in cases of “ordinary” crime. Though the investigative duty of the
executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech. “Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and
press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure
power,” Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). . . . Fourth Amendment
protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be
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Powell emphasized that the case before it “require[d] no judgment on the scope of the
President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or
without the country.”38 The Court expressed no opinion as to “the issues which may be
involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents,”39 but invited Congress
to establish statutory guidelines.40 Thus, at least insofar as domestic surveillance is
concerned, the Court has recognized that Congress has a role in establishing rules in matters
that touch on national security.
37 (...continued)
those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent
is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to
protect “domestic security.” . . .
Id. at 313-14.
38 Id. at 308.
39 Id. at 321-22. The Keith Court also stated, “Further, the instant case requires no judgment on the
scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers within
or without this country." Id. at 308.
40
We recognize that domestic surveillance may involve different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of “ordinary crime.” The gathering of security
intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify
than in surveillance operations against many types of crime specified in Title III [of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.]. Often, too, the
emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or
the enhancement of the Government’s preparedness for some possible future crisis or
emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that
directed against more conventional types of crimes. Given these potential distinctions
between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving domestic security, Congress
may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with
the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the
warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and
the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. . . . It may be that Congress, for
example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not
follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but should allege other circumstances more
appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authorization
could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court . . .; and
that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in § 2518. The
above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to guide the congressional judgment but
rather to delineate the present scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt to detail the
precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz
sought to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal surveillances which now
constitute Title III. We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for the
type of domestic surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be made
in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe.
407 U.S. at 323-24 (emphasis added). Some of the structural elements mentioned here appear to
foreshadow the structure Congress chose to establish for electronic surveillance to gather foreign
intelligence information in FISA.
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Court of appeals decisions following Keith met more squarely the issue of warrantless
electronic surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence gathering. In United States v.
Brown,41 while affirming Brown’s conviction for a firearm violation, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the legality of a warrantless wiretap authorized by the Attorney General for foreign
intelligence purposes where the conversation of Brown, an American citizen, was
incidentally overheard.42 The Third Circuit, in United States v. Butenko,43 in affirming the
district court’s denial of an espionage defendant’s application for disclosure of wiretap
records, concluded that warrantless electronic surveillance was lawful, violating neither
Section 605 of the Communications Act44 nor the Fourth Amendment, if its primary purpose
was to gather foreign intelligence information.45
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Buck,46 affirmed the conviction of a defendant
found guilty of furnishing false information in connection with the acquisition of ammunition
and making a false statement with respect to information required to be kept by a licensed
firearm dealer. In responding to Buck’s contention on appeal that it was reversible error for
the district court to fail to articulate the test it applied in ruling, after an in camera inspection,
that the contents of one wiretap did not have to be disclosed to the appellant because it was
expressly authorized by the Attorney General and lawful for purposes of gathering foreign
intelligence, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[f]oreign security wiretaps” were “a recognized
exception to the general warrant requirement and disclosure of wiretaps not involving illegal
surveillance was within the trial court’s discretion.” The court found a determination that
the surveillance was reasonable was implicit in the lower court’s conclusion.47
In its plurality decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell,48 a case involving a suit for damages
brought by 16 members of the Jewish Defense League against Attorney General John
Mitchell and nine FBI special agents and employees for electronic surveillance of their
telephone calls without a warrant, the District of Columbia Circuit took a somewhat different
view. The surveillance was authorized by the President, acting through the Attorney
General, as an exercise of his authority relating to the nation’s foreign affairs and was
asserted to be essential to protect the nation and its citizens against hostile acts of a foreign
power and to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the
United States. The D.C. Circuit, in a plurality decision, held that a warrant was
constitutionally required in such a case involving a wiretap of a domestic organization that
was not an agent of a foreign power or working in collaboration with a foreign power posing
41 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
42 Id. at 426.
43 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
44 Pub. L. 73-416, Title VII, § 705, formerly Title VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 605 (providing that except as authorized in Title III, “no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person”).
45 494 F.2d at 602, 604, and 608. However, it would be unlawful if the interception were conducted
on a domestic group for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 606.
46 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 890 (1977).
47 Id. at 875-76.
48 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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a national security threat.49 The court further held that the appellants were entitled to the
liquidated damages recovery provided in Title III unless appellees on remand establish an
affirmative defense of good faith.50 While its holding was limited to the facts before it, the
plurality also noted that “an analysis of the policies implicated by foreign security
surveillance indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic
surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.” 51
Surveillance for Foreign Intelligence Purposes. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)52 sought to strike a balance between national security
interests and civil liberties. The legislation was a response both to the Senate Select
Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
(hereinafter the Church Committee) revelations of past abuses of electronic surveillance for
national security purposes and to the somewhat uncertain state of the law on the issue. The
Church Committee found that every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt had both asserted
the authority to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance and had utilized that authority.53
Concerns over abuses of such authority provided impetus to the passage of the legislation.
As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted in its statement of the need for legislation:
49 516 F.2d at 650-55.
50 Id. at 659-73.
51 Id. at 613-14. In the context of the its broad dictum, the court did not clarify what “exigent
circumstances” might entail. The court explained its understanding of the distinction between
“domestic” and “foreign” as follows:
Throughout this opinion, “internal security” and “domestic security” will refer to threats
to the structure or existence of the Government which originate directly from domestic
organizations which are neither agents of nor acting in collaboration with foreign powers,
and “internal security” or “domestic security” surveillance will refer to surveillance
which is predicated on such threats. “Foreign security” will refer to threats to the
structure or existence of the Government which emanate either directly or indirectly from
a foreign power, and a “foreign security” surveillance will refer to surveillance which is
predicated on such threats. A surveillance is a foreign security surveillance regardless of
the stimulus that provoked the foreign power; thus the surveillance in this case will be
treated as a foreign security surveillance even though the Soviet threats were provoked
by actions of a hostile domestic organization. We believe such treatment is required by
the limited holding of the Supreme Court in Keith. “National security” will generally be
used interchangeably with “foreign security,” except where the context makes it clear that
it refers to both “foreign security” and “internal security.”
Id. at 614 n.42 (internal citations omitted).
52 Pub. L. 95-511, Title I, 92 Stat. 1796 (Oct. 25, 1978), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801
et seq.
53 See S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 7, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908. The Senate Judiciary Committee
report’s “Background” section traces in some detail the history of Executive Branch wiretap practice
from the 1930’s (after the Supreme Court in Olmstead held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply
to “intangible” conversations and therefore no warrant was necessary) to the time of the
consideration of FISA. See id. at 9-15, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3911-16. Olmstead was overruled
by Katz, see supra note 30 and accompanying text. The report of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, in its “Background” section, also provides a detailed recitation on the
subject in H. REP. NO. 95-1283 at 15-21.
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The need for such statutory safeguards has become apparent in recent years. This
legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations that warrantless electronic
surveillance in the name of national security has been seriously abused. . . . While the
number of illegal or improper national security taps and bugs conducted during the Nixon
administration may have exceeded those in previous administrations, the surveillances
were regrettably by no means atypical. In summarizing its conclusion that surveillance
was “often conducted by illegal or improper means,” the Church committee wrote:
Since the 1930’s, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged
American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant . . . . . past subjects of
these surveillances have included a United States Congressman, Congressional staff
member, journalists and newsmen, and numerous individuals and groups who
engaged in no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national
security, such as two White House domestic affairs advisers and an anti-Vietnam
War protest group. (Vol. 2, p.12)
* * * *
The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and bugging has
resulted in electronic surveillances which, by any objective measure, were improper
and seriously infringed the Fourth Amendment rights of both the targets and those
with whom the targets communicated. The inherently intrusive nature of electronic
surveillance, moreover, has enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of
information — unrelated to any legitimate government interest — about the
personal and political lives of American citizens. The collection of this type of
information has, in turn, raised the danger of its use for partisan political and other
improper ends by senior administration officials. (Vol. 3, p. 32.)54
The Senate Judiciary Committee also focused on the potentially chilling effect of warrantless
electronic surveillance upon the exercise of First Amendment rights:
Also formidable — although incalculable — is the “chilling effect” which warrantless
electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights of those who were not
targets of the surveillance, but who perceived themselves, whether reasonably or
unreasonably, as potential targets. Our Bill of Rights is concerned not only with direct
infringements on constitutional rights, but also with government activities which
effectively inhibit the exercise of these rights. The exercise of political freedom depends
in large measure on citizens’ understanding that they will be able to be publicly active
and dissent from official policy, within lawful limits, without having to sacrifice the
expectation of privacy that they rightfully hold. Arbitrary or uncontrolled use of
warrantless electronic surveillance can violate that understanding and impair that public
confidence so necessary to an uninhibited political life.55
The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the bill was “designed . . . to curb the
practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on
its own unilateral determination that national security justifies it,” while permitting the
legitimate use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. Echoing
the Church Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that electronic
surveillance has enabled intelligence agencies to obtain valuable and vital information
54 Id. at 7-8, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3909.
55 Id. at 8, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3909-10.
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relevant to their legitimate intelligence missions which would have been difficult to acquire
by other means.56
Electronic Surveillance: The Current Statutory Framework
The interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications57 is regulated by Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”), as amended.58
Government surveillance for criminal law enforcement is permitted under certain
circumstances and in accordance with the procedures set forth in Title III. Government
surveillance for the gathering of foreign intelligence information is covered by FISA. These
statutes are relevant to the analysis of the legality of the reported NSA surveillance to the
extent that their provisions are meant to cover such surveillance, prohibit it, or explicitly
exempt it from requirements therein. If Congress meant for FISA to occupy the entire field
of electronic surveillance of the type that is being conducted pursuant to the President’s
executive order, then the operation may fall under the third tier of Justice Jackson’s formula,
in which the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb” and a court could sustain it only by
“disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”59 In other words, if FISA, together
with Title III, were found to occupy the field, then for a court to sustain the President’s
authorization of electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information outside
the FISA framework, FISA would have to be considered an unconstitutional encroachment
on inherent presidential authority. If, on the other hand, FISA leaves room for the NSA
surveillance outside its strictures, then the claimed power might fall into the first or second
categories, as either condoned by Congress (expressly or implicitly), or simply left
untouched.
Title III. Title III provides the means for the Attorney General and designated assistants
to seek a court order authorizing a wiretap or similar electronic surveillance to investigate
certain crimes (18 U.S.C. § 2516). Most other interceptions of electronic communications
are prohibited unless the activity falls under an explicit exception. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2511,
any person who “intentionally intercepts . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication”
or “intentionally uses . . . any electronic, mechanical, or other device [that transmits a signal
over wire or radio frequencies, or is connected with interstate or foreign commerce] to
intercept any oral communication,” without the consent of at least one party to the
conversation, is subject to punishment or liability for civil damages. The statute also
prohibits the intentional disclosure of the contents of an intercepted communication. It
prohibits attempts to engage in the prohibited conduct as well as solicitation of other persons
to carry out such activity.
56 Id. at 8-9, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3910.
57 For definitions of “wire communications,” “oral communications,” and “electronic
communications,” see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2), and (12). The latter includes, with certain
exceptions, the transfer of any signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
58 Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.
59 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See supra notes 10 et seq., and accompanying text.
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Certain exceptions in Title III apply to federal employees and other persons “acting
under color of law,”60 including exceptions for foreign intelligence acquisition. Section 2511
excepts officers, employees, and agents of the United States who, in the normal course of
their official duty, conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA (18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e)).
Furthermore, Congress emphasized in § 1511(2)(f) that
Nothing contained in [chapters 119 (Title III), 121 (stored wire or electronic surveillance
or access to transactional records) or 206 (pen registers and trap and trace devices) of title
18, U.S. Code], or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934,61 shall be deemed to
affect the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence
information from international or foreign communications, or foreign intelligence
activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a
foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means other than electronic
surveillance as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, and procedures in this chapter [119] or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance,
as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and
electronic communications may be conducted.62
Title III does not define “international or foreign communications” or “domestic.” It is
unclear under the language of this section whether communications that originate outside the
United States but are received within U.S. territory, or vice versa, were intended to be treated
as foreign, international or domestic. Recourse to the plain meaning of the words provides
60 Title III also contains some exceptions for private parties, including communications service
providers with respect to activity incident to the provision of such service (§ 2511(2)(a)), and for
activity related to equipment maintenance and repair, prevention of fraud or unauthorized access,
and protection from unlawful interference (§ 2511(2)(g)-(h)). Listening to broadcasts and electronic
communications that are available to the general public and not encrypted, such as police band radio,
is not prohibited (§ 2511(2)(g)).
61 47 U.S.C. § 605 (“[N]o person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in
transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized
channels of transmission or reception. . . .”).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), added by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), §
201(b), Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. Prior to this amendment, the section read:
Nothing contained in this chapter, or section 605 [now 705] of the Communications Act
of 1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United States Government of
foreign intelligence information from international or foreign communications by means
other than electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures in this chapter and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance,
as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of wire and oral
communications may be conducted.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. 99-508, § 101(c)(1)(A), substituted “wire, oral,
or electronic communication” for “wire or oral communications.” Pub. L. 99-508, § 101(b)(3),
added the references to “chapter 121,” which deals with stored wire and electronic communications
and access to transactional records. That subsection also substituted “foreign communications, or
foreign intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law
involving a foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means” for “foreign
communications by a means.”
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some illumination. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977), in pertinent part, defines
“international” to mean “affecting or involving two or more nations” or “of or relating to one
whose activities extend across national boundaries.” Therefore, “international
communications” might be viewed as referring to communications which extend across
national boundaries or which involve two or more nations. “Foreign” is defined therein, in
pertinent part, as “situated outside a place or country; esp situated outside one’s own
country.” Thus, “foreign communications” might be interpreted as referring to
communications taking place wholly outside the United States. “Domestic” is defined, in
pertinent part, in Webster’s to mean “of, relating to, or carried on within one and esp. one’s
own country.” Therefore, “domestic communications” may be defined as communications
carried on within the United States.
The phrase “utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance [under FISA]” could
be interpreted as modifying only the clause immediately before it or as modifying the
previous clause as well. If it is read not to pertain to the clause regarding acquisition of
intelligence from foreign or international communications, then Title III and the other named
statutes would not affect the interception of foreign and international communications,
whether they are acquired through electronic surveillance within the meaning of FISA or
through other means. The legislative history does not support such a reading, however, for
two reasons. First, the second clause, relating to intelligence activities involving foreign
electronic communications systems,63 was inserted into the law in 1986 between the first
clause and the modifying phrase.64 It is thus clear that the modifier initially applied to the
first clause, and nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to effect
such a radical change as exempting any electronic surveillance involving communications
covered by FISA from the procedures required therein. Second, this conclusion is bolstered
by the last sentence of the subsection, which specifies that the methods authorized in FISA
and the other statutes are to be the exclusive methods by which the federal government is
authorized to intercept electronic communications. Whether given communications are
covered by the exclusivity language would require an examination of the definitions of
covered communications in Title III and in FISA.65
63 The statute does not explain whether “involving a foreign electronic communications system”
encompasses only communications that are transmitted and received without ever traversing U.S.
wires, cables, or broadcasting equipment, or whether a communication carried primarily by a U.S.
carrier that is at any point routed through a non-U.S. communication system “involves” the foreign
system. Either way, the interception would have to be carried out pursuant to “otherwise applicable
Federal law.”
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the language was meant
to clarify that nothing in chapter 119 as amended or in proposed chapter 121 affects
existing legal authority for U.S. Government foreign intelligence activities involving
foreign electronic communications systems. The provision neither enhances nor
diminishes existing authority for such activities; it simply preserves the status quo. It
does not provide authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 18 (1986). “Proposed chapter 121” refers to FISA.
64 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101(b)(3), Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
65 See infra section defining “electronic surveillance.”
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As originally enacted, § 2511 contained what appeared to be a much broader exception
for national security intercepts. It excluded from the coverage of Title III surveillance carried
out pursuant to the “constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack . . ., [and] to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States. . . .66 Congress
repealed this language when it enacted FISA, and inserted § 2511(2)(f), supra, to make the
requirements of Title III or FISA the exclusive means to authorize electronic surveillance
within the United States, and to “put[] to rest the notion that Congress recognizes an inherent
Presidential power to conduct such surveillances in the United States outside of the
procedures contained in chapters 119 and 120 [of title 18, U.S. Code].”67 Subsection (2)(f)
was intended to clarify that the prohibition does not cover NSA operations (as they were then
being conducted) and other surveillance overseas, including that which targets U.S.
persons.68
FISA. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) provides a framework for the
use of “electronic surveillance,” as defined in the Act,69 and other investigative methods70 to
66 82 Stat. 214, formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). The Supreme Court interpreted this
provision not as a conferral or recognition of executive authority, but rather, as an indication that
Congress had “left presidential powers where it found them.” United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972). The Senate Judiciary Committee noted, however, that the “highly
controversial disclaimer has often been cited as evidence of a congressional ratification of the
president’s inherent constitutional power to engage in electronic surveillance in order to obtain
foreign intelligence information essential to the national security.” S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 6-7
(1978).
67 S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 64 (1978). Further, the Committee stated, “[a]s to methods of acquisition
which come within the definition of ‘electronic surveillance’ in this bill, the Congress has declared
that this statute, not any claimed presidential power, controls.” Id. (emphasis added). The reference
to chapter 120 of Title 18, U.S.C., in the report language quoted in the text above is to the foreign
intelligence provisions in S. 1566, which became FISA. The Senate version of the measure would
have included the foreign intelligence surveillance provisions as a new chapter 120 of Title 18, U.S.
Code.
68 The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that the provision was designed “to make clear the
legislation does not deal with international signals intelligence activities as currently engaged in by
the National Security Agency and electronic surveillance conducted outside the United States.” S.
REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 64 (1978). The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence echoed this
understanding. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 71 (1978). While legislation then pending that would have
regulated these types of operations was not enacted (S. 2525, 95th Cong.), Congress established
oversight over such intelligence activities through a review of relevant executive branch procedures
and regulations by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 18
(1986) (“As in the past, the Senate expects that any relevant changes in these procedures and
regulations will be provided to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees prior to their taking
effect.”). The President is also required to report “illegal intelligence activity” to the intelligence
committees, 50 U.S.C. § 413(b). “Illegal intelligence activity” is undefined, but legislative history
suggests it includes activities that violate the Constitution, statutes, or Executive orders. See S. REP.
NO. 102-85, at 31 (1991) (explaining that the definition of “illegal intelligence activity” was not
changed from the previous version of § 413).
69 See discussion of the scope of “electronic surveillance” under FISA in the next section of this
memorandum, infra.
70 FISA also authorizes the use for foreign intelligence purposes of physical searches, 50 U.S.C. §
(continued...)
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acquire foreign intelligence information.71 In pertinent part, FISA provides a means by
which the government can obtain approval to conduct electronic surveillance of a foreign
power or its agents without first meeting the more stringent standard in Title III that applies
to criminal investigations. While Title III requires a showing of probable cause that a
proposed target has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, FISA requires
a showing of probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
Congress amended FISA so that it no longer requires a certification that the (primary)
purpose of a search or surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence information.72 As
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act,73 FISA requires that a “significant purpose” of the
investigation be the collection of foreign intelligence information, which has been interpreted
70 (...continued)
1821 et seq.; pen registers and trap and trace devices, 50 U.S.C. § 1842 et seq.; and orders for
production of business records or any tangible thing “for an investigation to obtain foreign
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution.”
71 “Foreign intelligence information” is defined in FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e), to mean:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to,
the ability of the United States to protect against —
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if
concerning a United States person is necessary to —
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
72 See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the
Statutory Framework for Electronic Surveillance. “Foreign intelligence information” is defined in
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) to mean:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to,
the ability of the United States to protect against —
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if
concerning a United States person is necessary to —
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
73 P.L. 107-56 § 218.
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to expand the types of investigations that may be permitted to include those in which the
primary purpose may be to investigate criminal activity, as long as there is at least a
measurable purpose related to foreign intelligence gathering.74 Congress later enacted a
measure that removed, for a time,75 the requirement for the government to show that the
intended target, if a non-U.S. person, is associated with a foreign power.76
Electronic Surveillance Under FISA. Whether FISA applies to the electronic
surveillances at issue turns in large part on the definition of “electronic surveillance” under
FISA. To constitute “electronic surveillance” under FISA, the surveillance must fall within
one of four categories set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f), FISA. These include:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person77 who is in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the
consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not
include the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be
permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
74 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002) (“The
addition of the word ‘significant’ to section 1804(a)(7)(B) imposed a requirement that the
government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal prosecution of
even foreign intelligence crimes.”).
75 This amendment, added by section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,
Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3742 (2004), is subject to the sunset provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.
See CRS Report RL32186, USA PATRIOT Act Sunset: Provisions That Expire on December 31,
2005, by Charles Doyle.
76 See CRS Report RS22011, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: ‘Lone
Wolf’ Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, by Elizabeth B. Bazan.
77 “United States person” is defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) to mean:
(i) “United States person” means a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated
association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States
or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association
which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.
Under the definition of “foreign power” in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a), the foreign powers defined in
subsections 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) are either foreign governments or components thereof, factions
of a foreign nation or foreign nations which are not substantially composed of U.S. persons, or
entities openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled
by that government or those governments. These three subsections of the “foreign power” definition
do not include international terrorist organizations. See infra note 87 for the full definition of
“foreign power” under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a).
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purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United
States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the
United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.78
The legislative history of the Act suggests that some electronic surveillance by the
National Security Agency involving communications taking place entirely overseas, even
involving U.S. persons, was not intended to be covered.79 At the same time, FISA was
clearly meant to cover some communications even if one party to the communication is
overseas. The interception of wire or radio communications sent by or intended to be
received by a targeted United States person80 in the United States is covered under 50 U.S.C.
78 With respect to the ability of FISA to keep pace with the rapidly changing level of communications
technology, it is possible that 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(3) and (4) may provide some or all of the needed
statutory flexibility. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-604(I) at 34-35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3936,
discussing the congressional intent that subsection 1801(f)(4) was intended to be “broadly inclusive,
because the effect of including a particular means of surveillance is not to prohibit it but to subject
it to judicial oversight.” Thus, it was intended to include “the installation of beepers and
‘transponders,’ if a warrant would be required in the ordinary criminal context. . . . It could also
include miniaturized television cameras and other sophisticated devices not aimed merely at
communications.” Id. See United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 (C.D. Cal. 1990),
aff’d and remanded on other grounds, 29 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128
(1995).
79 For example, in discussing the definition of “electronic surveillance,” in H.R. 7308, the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence stated,
Therefore, this bill does not afford protections to U.S. persons who are abroad, nor does
it regulate the acquisition of the contents of international communications of U.S. persons
who are in the United States, where the contents are acquired unintentionally. The
committee does not believe that this bill is the appropriate vehicle for addressing this
area. The standards and procedures for overseas surveillance may have to be different
than those provided in this bill for electronic surveillance within the United States or
targeted against U.S. persons who are in the United States.
The fact that this bill does not bring the overseas surveillance and activities of the U.S.
intelligence community within its purview, however, should not be viewed as
congressional authorization of such activities as they affect the privacy interests of
Americans. The committee merely recognizes at this point that such overseas
surveillance activities are not covered by this bill. In any case, the requirements of the
fourth amendment would, of course, continue to apply to this type of communications
intelligence activity.
H. REP. NO. 95-1283(I), at 50-51 (June 5, 1978). The House passed H.R. 7308, amended (Roll No.
737), 124 Cong. Rec. 28427 (Sept. 7, 1978). Then the House passed S. 1566, having stricken all but
the enacting clause of S. 1566 and having inserted in lieu thereof the text of S. 7308. H.R. 7308 was
laid on the table, 124 Cong. Rec. 28427-28432 (Sept. 7, 1978).
80 The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence described the import of “intentionally
targeting” in the context of subsection (1) of the definition of “electronic surveillance” as follows:
Paragraph (1) protects U.S. persons who are located in the United States from being
(continued...)
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§ 1801(f)(1). The interception of international wire81 communications to or from any person
(whether or not a U.S. person) within the United States without the consent of at least one
party is covered under § 1801(f)(2), where the communications are acquired within the
United States. The interception of a radio communication is covered under § 1801(f)(3) if
all parties to it are located within the United States, unless there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy and a warrant would not be required under Title III, even if the interception is
acquired by using a device located outside of the United States. The interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications that is not included within the definition of “electronic
surveillance” for the purposes of FISA may nevertheless be prohibited by or subject to a
warrant requirement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Title III).
In discussing the repeal in the conforming amendments to FISA of the “national security
disclaimer” in former 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), and the addition of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(f) in the
conforming amendments in S. 1566, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed:
80 (...continued)
targeted in their domestic or international communications without a court order no
matter where the surveillance is being carried out. The paragraph covers the acquisition
of the contents of a wire or radio communication of a U.S. person by intentionally
targeting that particular, known U.S. person, provided that the person is located within
the United States. Thus, for example, any watchlisting activities of the National Security
Agency conducted in the future, directed against the international communications of
particular U.S. persons who are in the United States, would require a court order under
this provision.
Only acquisition of the contents of those wire or radio communications made with a
reasonable expectation of privacy where a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes is covered by paragraph (1). It is the committee’s intent that acquisition of the
contents of a wire communication, without the consent of any party thereto, would clearly
be included.
The term “intentionally targeting” a particular, known U.S. person who is in the United
States includes the deliberate use of a surveillance device to monitor a specific channel
of communication which would not be surveilled but for the purpose of acquiring
information about a party who is a particular, named U.S. person located within the
United States. It also includes the deliberate use of surveillance techniques which can
monitor numerous channels of communication among numerous parties, where the
techniques are designed to select out from among those communications the
communications to which a particular U.S. person located in the United States is a party,
and where the communications are selected either by name or by other information which
would identify the particular person and would select out his communications.
This paragraph does not apply to the acquisition of the contents of international or foreign
communications, where the contents are not acquired by intentionally targeting a
particular known U.S. person who is in the United States. . . .
H. REP. NO. 95-1283(I), at 50-51 (June 8, 1978) (emphasis in original).
81 “Wire communication” means “any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or
other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing
or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.”
50 U.S.C. § 1801(l).
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Specifically, this provision is designed to make clear that the legislation does not deal
with international signals intelligence activities as currently engaged in by the National
Security Agency82 and electronic surveillance conducted outside the United States. As
to methods of acquisition which come within the definition of ‘electronic surveillance’
in this bill, the Congress has declared that this statute, not any claimed presidential
power, controls.83
82 The legislative history of FISA reflects serious concerns about the past NSA abuses reflected in
the Church Committee reports. See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
U
th
NITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. NO. 94-755, 94 Cong., 2d Sess., at 733-86 (1976), cited in S. REP.
NO. 95-604(I) at 34 n. 39, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3936. Some actions had been taken to address some
of these concerns by the President and the Attorney General near the time that FISA was being
considered. The decision not to cover NSA activities “as they were then being conducted” in FISA
may, in part, have been an acknowledgment of constraints that had been imposed upon some of these
practices in E.O. 11905 (Feb. 18, 1976), cited in S. REP. NO. 95-604(I) at 34 n. 40, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3936; and in the “substantial safeguards [then] currently embodied in classified
Attorney General procedures, ” H.
th
REP. NO. 95-1283 at 21. In addition, S. 2525 (95 Cong.) was
then pending, which, had it passed, would have addressed those areas excluded from FISA in
separate legislation. The House Permanent Select Committee also noted the value of congressional
oversight in adding an additional safeguard. Nevertheless, the Committee deemed these protections
insufficient without the statutory structure in FISA:
In the past several years, abuses of domestic national security surveillances have been
disclosed. This evidence alone should demonstrate the inappropriateness of relying
solely on executive branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties. This committee is well
aware of the substantial safeguards respecting foreign intelligence electronic surveillance
currently embodied in classified Attorney General procedures, but this committee is also
aware that over the past thirty years there have been significant changes in internal
executive branch procedures, ant there is ample precedent for later administrations or
even the same administration loosening previous standards. Even the creation of
intelligence oversight committee should not be considered a sufficient safeguard, for in
overseeing classified procedures the committees respect their classification, and the result
is that the standards for and limitations on foreign intelligence surveillances may be
hidden from public view. In such a situation, the rest of the Congress and the American
people need to be assured that the oversight is having its intended consequences–the
safeguarding of civil liberties consistent with the needs of national security. While
oversight can be, and the committee intends it to be, an important adjunct to control of
intelligence activities, it cannot substitute for public laws, publicly debated and adopted,
which specify under what circumstances and under what restrictions electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes can be conducted.
Finally, the decision as to the standards governing when and how foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance should be conducted is and should be a political decision, in the
best sense of the term, because it involves the weighing of important public policy
concerns–civil liberties and national security. Such a political decision is one properly
made by the political branches of Government together, not adopted by one branch on its
own and with no regard for the other. Under our Constitution legislation is the
embodiment of just such political decisions.
H. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 21-22.
83 S. REP. NO. 95-604(I) at 62-65, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3964-66. See also S. REP. NO. 95-701 at
(continued...)
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At the same time, the Committee signaled its intent to reserve its option to regulate U.S.
electronic surveillance operations that did not fall within the ambit of FISA:
The activities of the National Security Agency pose particularly difficult conceptual and
technical problems which are not dealt with in this legislation. Although many on the
committee are of the opinion that it is desirable to enact legislative safeguards for such
activity, the committee adopts the view expressed by the attorney general during the
hearings that enacting statutory controls to regulate the National Security Agency and the
surveillance of Americans abroad raises problems best left to separate legislation. This
language insures that certain electronic surveillance activities targeted against
international communications for foreign intelligence purposes will not be prohibited
absolutely during the interim period when these activities are not regulated by chapter
120 and charters for intelligence agencies and legislation regulating international
electronic surveillance have not yet been developed.84
FISA Exceptions to Requirement for Court Order. Three current provisions
of FISA provide for some measure of electronic surveillance without a court order to gather
foreign intelligence information in specified circumstances, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802 (electronic
surveillance of certain foreign powers without a court order upon Attorney General
certification);85 1805(f) (emergency authorization of electronic surveillance for up to 72
83 (...continued)
71-72, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4040-41.
84 Id.
85 50 U.S.C. § 1802 provides:
(a)
(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General,
may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter
to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year if the
Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that —
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at —
(i) the acquisition of the contents of communications transmitted by
means of communications used exclusively between or among foreign
powers, as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title; or
(ii) the acquisition of technical intelligence, other than the spoken
communications of individuals, from property or premises under the
open and exclusive control of a foreign power, as defined in section
1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title;
(B) there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party; and
(C) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to such surveillance
meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h) of this
title; and
if the Attorney General reports such minimization procedures and any changes
thereto to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence at least thirty days prior to their effective date,
unless the Attorney General determines immediate action is required and notifies
the committees immediately of such minimization procedures and the reason for
their becoming effective immediately.
(2) An electronic surveillance authorized by this subsection may be conducted only
in accordance with the Attorney General’s certification and the minimization
procedures adopted by him. The Attorney General shall assess compliance with
(continued...)
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hours, while an order approving such surveillance is sought from a judge of the Foreign
85 (...continued)
such procedures and shall report such assessments to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under
the provisions of section 1808(a) of this title.
(3) The Attorney General shall immediately transmit under seal to the court
established under section 1803(a) of this title a copy of his certification. Such
certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief
Justice with the concurrence of the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless —
(A) an application for a court order with respect to the surveillance is made
under sections 1801(h)(4) and 1804 of this title; or
(B) the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the surveillance
under section 1806(f) of this title.
(4) With respect to electronic surveillance authorized by this subsection, the
Attorney General may direct a specified communication common carrier to —
(A) furnish all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its
secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such
carrier is providing its customers; and
(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the surveillance
or the aid furnished which such carrier wishes to retain.
The Government shall compensate, at the prevailing rate, such carrier for furnishing
such aid.
(b) Applications for a court order under this subchapter are authorized if the President
has, by written authorization, empowered the Attorney General to approve applications
to the court having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title, and a judge to whom an
application is made may, notwithstanding any other law, grant an order, in conformity
with section 1805 of this title, approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information,
except that the court shall not have jurisdiction to grant any order approving electronic
surveillance directed solely as described in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (a) of this
section unless such surveillance may involve the acquisition of communications of any
United States person.
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Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC));86 and 1811 (electronic surveillance without a court
order for 15 days following a declaration of war by the Congress).
In particular, 50 U.S.C. § 1802 permits the Attorney General to order electronic
surveillance without a court order for up to one year to acquire foreign intelligence
information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney General certifies in writing under
oath that the electronic surveillance is solely directed at means of communications used
exclusively between or among foreign powers or on property or premises under the open and
exclusive control of a foreign power (the definition here does not include international
terrorist organizations)87 where “there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will
86 The emergency authorization provision in 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) states:
(f) Emergency orders
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General
reasonably determines that —
(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing
such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter to approve such
surveillance exists;
he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having
jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his
designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ
emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this
subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours after
the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. If the Attorney General authorizes
such emergency employment of electronic surveillance, he shall require that the
minimization procedures required by this subchapter for the issuance of a judicial order
be followed. In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the
surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the
application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 72 hours from the time of
authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. In the event that such
application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the electronic surveillance
is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no information obtained
or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or otherwise
disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning
any United States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or
disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of
such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates
a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. A denial of the application made
under this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 1803 of this title.
87 “Foreign power” for purposes of electronic surveillance under FISA is defined in 50 U.S.C. §
1801(a)(1) through (6) as:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States
persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
(continued...)
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acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party;” and
minimization procedures are put in place.88 The Attorney General is also required to report
minimization procedures to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 30 days in advance. The 30-day requirement can
be waived if the Attorney General determines immediate action is required, in which case
he is to notify the committees immediately of the minimization procedures and the reason
for the urgency. The FISA court is to receive a copy of the certifications under seal.
The emergency authorization provision in 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) authorizes the Attorney
General to issue emergency orders to permit electronic surveillance prior to obtaining a court
order if the Attorney General determines that emergency conditions make it impossible to
obtain an order with due diligence before the surveillance is begun. The Attorney General
or his designee must immediately inform a FISA judge and submit a proper application to
that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours89 after the Attorney General
authorizes such surveillance. Minimization procedures must be followed. In the absence of
a judicial order, the surveillance must terminate when the information sought is obtained,
when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 72 hours from the time
the surveillance was authorized. No information obtained or evidence derived from such
surveillance may be used as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other
government proceeding, and no information concerning any U.S. person may be disclosed
at all without that person’s consent except with the Attorney General’s approval where the
information indicates a threat of disaster or serious bodily harm to any person.
Where Congress has passed a declaration of war, 50 U.S.C. § 1811 authorizes the
Attorney General to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order for fifteen calendar
days following a declaration of war by Congress. This provision does not appear to apply
to the AUMF, as that does not constitute a congressional declaration of war.90 Indeed, even
if the authorization were regarded as a declaration of war, the authority to conduct
87 (...continued)
directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States
persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
However, for the purpose of § 1802, only subsections 1801(a)(1) through (3) are included.
88 “Minimization procedures” are specific procedures implemented with respect to a particular
surveillance in order to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
information concerning unconsenting U.S. persons required to be protected. See 50 U.S.C. §
1801(h).
89 Section 314(a)(2)(B) of P.L. 107-108, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 115
Stat. 1402 (Dec. 28, 2001), H.Rept. 107-328, replaced 24 hours with 72 hours in each place that it
appears in 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).
90 For a discussion of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of military force, see CRS
Report for Congress RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military
Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by David M. Ackerman and Richard F.
Grimmett.
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warrantless electronic surveillance under 50 U.S.C. § 1811 would only extend to a maximum
of 15 days following its passage.91
The Administration’s Position
The Administration’s position, as set forth in the Office of Legislative Affairs letter to
the leaders of the House and Senate intelligence Committees, is that the President has the
constitutional authority to direct the NSA to conduct the activities he described, and that this
inherent authority is supplemented by statutory authority under the AUMF.92 The
Administration interprets the AUMF, based on its reading of the Supreme Court opinion in
Hamdi,93 as authorizing the President to conduct anywhere in the world, including within the
United States, any activity that can be characterized as a fundamental incident of waging war.
It includes communications intelligence among the fundamental incidents of waging war.
The following sections analyze the extent to which the President’s authority to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance is inherent, whether the AUMF authorizes the
operations,94 and whether the NSA operations are consistent with FISA and Title III.95
The President’s Inherent Authority to Conduct Intelligence Surveillance.
The statutory language in FISA and the legislative history of the bill that became FISA,
S. 1566 (95th Cong.), reflect the Congress’s stated intention to circumscribe any claim of
inherent presidential authority to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined by the Act, to
collect foreign intelligence information, so that FISA would be the exclusive mechanism for
the conduct of such electronic surveillance. Thus, in the conforming amendments section
of the legislation, the previous language explicitly recognizing the President’s inherent
authority was deleted from 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), and the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(f) was
added to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended,
which states, in part, that “procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of that Act, and the interception of domestic wire,
oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.”96 The House amendments to the
91 This provision originated in the House version of the bill, which would have allowed the President
to authorize electronic surveillance for periods up to a year during time of war declared by Congress.
The conference substituted a compromise provision authorizing electronic surveillance without a
court order to acquire foreign intelligence information for 15 days following a declaration of war.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1720, at 34 (1978). The 15-day period was intended to “allow time for
consideration of any amendment to [FISA] that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency.”
Id. The conferees also expressed their intent that “all other provisions of this act not pertaining to
the court order requirement shall remain in effect during this period.” Id.
92 OLA Letter, supra note 10, at 2.
93 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
94 See OLA Letter, supra note 10, at 3 (“Because communications intelligence activities constitute,
to use the language of Hamdi, a fundamental incident of waging war, the AUMF clearly and
unmistakably authorizes such activities directed against the communications of our enemy.”).
95 We do not address the Administration’s argument that the NSA electronic surveillance at issue is
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. For analysis pertinent to that issue, see supra section on
the Background of Government Surveillance.
96 For further discussion of the pertinent provisions of Title III, see the discussion at notes 54 et seq.
(continued...)
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bill provided that the procedures in the bill and in 18 U.S.C., Chapter 119 (Title III), were
to be the exclusive “statutory” means by which electronic surveillance as defined in the bill
and the interception of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted, while the
Senate bill did not include the word “statutory.” The House Conference Report, in accepting
the Senate approach, stated, in part, that
The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the
President may conduct electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by
the Supreme Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case: “When a President takes
measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at the
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional power minus any
constitutional power of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).97
In this language, the conferees acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court, as the final
arbiter of constitutional power, might reach a different conclusion. The Court has yet to rule
on the matter.98
96 (...continued)
and accompanying text.
97 H. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1720, at 35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4064 (Oct. 5, 1978); see also S. REP.
NO. 95-604(I) at 62-65, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3964-66; S. REP. NO. 95-701 at 71-72, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4040-41.
98 However, some lower court decisions provide significant support for the argument that the
exclusivity provision circumscribes the President’s use of inherent authority to engage in electronic
surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information outside the FISA structure. See, e.g., United
States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d and remanded on other grounds, 29
F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). The Andonian court found that the
exclusivity language in FISA
reveals that Congress intended to sew up the perceived loopholes through which the
President had been able to avoid the warrant requirement. The exclusivity clause makes
it impossible for the President to ‘opt-out’ of the legislative scheme by retreating to his
‘inherent’ Executive sovereignty over foreign affairs. At the time of the drafting of FISA,
such a retreat would have meant completely unfettered use of electronic surveillance in
the foreign affairs arena, as the Supreme Court had twice declined to hold such Executive
action captive to the warrant requirement [citing Keith, 407 U.S. 297, Katz, 389 U.S. at
358, n. 23, and S. REP. NO. 95-604[(I)] at 12-14, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3913-16]. . . . The
exclusivity clause in 18 U.S.C. section 2511(2)(f) assures that the President cannot avoid
Congress’ limitations by resort to ‘inherent’ powers as had President Truman at the time
of the ‘Steel Seizure Case.’ Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
. . . The difficulty in the case was due to Congressional silence. . . . When the President
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or acquiescence may sometimes, at least
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
and events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. . .
. To foreclose the arguments which piqued the Court in Youngstown, Congress denied
the President his inherent powers outright. Tethering executive reign, Congress deemed
(continued...)
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The passage of FISA and the inclusion of such exclusivity language reflects Congress’s
view of its authority to cabin the President’s use of any inherent constitutional authority with
respect to warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. The Senate
Judiciary Committee articulated its view with respect to congressional power to tailor the
President’s use of an inherent constitutional power:
The basis for this legislation is the understanding — concurred in by the Attorney
General — that even if the President has an “inherent” constitutional power to authorize
warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to
regulate the exercise of this authority by legislating a reasonable warrant procedure
governing foreign intelligence surveillance.99
98 (...continued)
that the provisions for gathering intelligence in FISA and Title III were ‘exclusive.’
Id. at 1474-76. Cf., United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The court stated
that
FISA is the fifth legislative attempt since the Watergate era to bridle the Executive’s
‘inherent’ power. Congress believes that FISA has provided a ‘secure framework by
which the Executive Branch may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes within the context of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and
individual rights.’ . . . The Act received broad support in Congress and from the then
Attorney General Griffin Bell and President Carter. . . . When, therefore, the President
has, as his primary purpose, the accumulation of foreign intelligence information, his
exercise of Article II power to conduct foreign affairs is not constitutionally hamstrung
by the need to obtain prior judicial approval before engaging in wiretapping. While the
executive power to conduct foreign affairs exempts the President from the warrant
requirement when foreign surveillance is conducted, the President is not entirely free of
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. The search and seizure resulting from the
surveillance must still be reasonable. With the enactment of FISA, . . . Congress has
fashioned a statute for foreign surveillance that fully comports with the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 1311-12. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The court
noted that
All of the circuit cases finding a foreign intelligence exception [to the warrant
requirement] arose before the enactment of FISA (which sets forth procedures for foreign
intelligence collection, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.) and are probably now governed by
that legislation. FISA only governs foreign intelligence searches conducted within the
United States. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f)(1-4), 1803(a), 1821(5), 1822(c).
Id. at 272 n. 8.
99 S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 16, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3917. See also Attorney General Bell’s
testimony with respect to the Administration’s position, id. at 4, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3905-06; S.
REP. NO. 95-701, at 6-7, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3975. The need to comply with FISA for the
collection of foreign intelligence information through electronic surveillance is reiterated in
E.O. 12333 (“United States Intelligence Activities” (December 4, 1981), as amended), Section 2.5,
dealing with Attorney General approval required for certain collection techniques:
2.5 Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to
approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United
(continued...)
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On the other hand, the Administration asserts constitutional authority under Article II
of the Constitution, including his Commander-in-Chief authority, to order warrantless
foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States:
This constitutional authority to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance within
the United States, as all federal appellate courts, including at least four circuits, to have
addressed the issue have concluded. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742
(FISA Ct. of Review 2002) (“[A]ll the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held
that the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain
foreign intelligence information . . . . We take for granted that the President does have
that authority . . . .”).100
The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Court of Review) was
created by FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803, and has appellate review over denials of FISA
applications by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court which was also established under
that section. Denials of such applications by the Court of Review may be appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court. The Court of Review has decided only one published case, which is
cited by the Administration above. The case was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
As the Court of Review is a court of appeals and is the highest court with express authority
over FISA to address the issue, its reference to inherent constitutional authority for the
President to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance might be interpreted to
carry considerable weight.
The Court of Review, in its opinion, make two references which appear pertinent to the
Administration’s position. The first statement, which is cited by the Administration, was
made by the Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case,101 in its discussion of the
constitutionality of FISA and its exploration of the underlying rationale of the “primary
purpose” test as articulated in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung,102 (which dealt with a pre-
FISA surveillance). The Court of Review, in this portion of its constitutional analysis, was
considering whether the primary purpose of a FISA electronic surveillance must be to gather
foreign intelligence information in order for it to pass constitutional muster. Truong saw
such a standard as a constitutional minimum. In assessing and rejecting the Truong
approach, the Court of Review stated:
It will be recalled that the case that set forth the primary purpose test as constitutionally
required was Truong. The Fourth Circuit thought that Keith’s balancing standard implied
the adoption of the primary purpose test. We reiterate that Truong dealt with a pre-FISA
surveillance based on the President’s constitutional responsibility to conduct the foreign
affairs of the United States. 629 F.2d at 914. Although Truong suggested the line it drew
was a constitutional minimum that would apply to a FISA surveillance, see id. at 914 n.
99 (...continued)
States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if
undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be
undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable
cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.
100 OLA Letter, supra note 10, at 2.
101 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002).
102 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
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4, it had no occasion to consider the application of the statute carefully. The Truong
court, as did all the other courts to have decided the issue, held that the President did have
inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence
information. It was incumbent upon the court, therefore, to determine the boundaries of
that constitutional authority in the case before it. We take for granted that the President
does have that authority, and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the
President’s constitutional power. The question before us is the reverse, does FISA
amplify the President’s power by providing a mechanism that at least approaches a classic
warrant and which therefore supports the government’s contention that FISA searches are
constitutionally reasonable.103
While the Court of Review does not cite to the cases to which it is referring, its allusion to
the holdings of “all the other courts to have considered the issue,” appears to have been to
cases which pre-date FISA’s passage or which address pre-FISA surveillances.104 Such cases
dealt with a presidential assertion of inherent authority in the absence of congressional action
to circumscribe that authority. Where the Congress has exercised its constitutional authority
103 310 F.3d at 742 (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 742, n. 26; cf., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Prior to the
enactment of FISA, virtually every court that had addressed the issue had concluded that the
President had the inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to collect foreign
intelligence information, and that such surveillances constituted an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908,
912-14 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied,419 U.S. 88 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 633-51
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). The Supreme Court specifically
declined to address this issue in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308,
321-22 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as “Keith”), but it had made clear that the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment may change when differing governmental interests are at stake, see Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and it observed in Keith that the governmental interests
presented in national security investigations differ substantially from those presented in traditional
criminal investigations. 407 U.S. at 321-24, 92 S.Ct. at 2138-40.”); Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d
at 914 (“Perhaps most crucially, the executive branch not only has superior expertise in the area of
foreign intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent authority in foreign
affairs. See First National Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-68, 92 S.Ct. 1808,
1812-1814, 32 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309,
310, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918). The President and his deputies are charged by the constitution with the
conduct of the foreign policy of the United States in times of war and peace. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936). Just as the separation of
powers in Keith forced the executive to recognize a judicial role when the President conducts
domestic security surveillance, 407 U.S. at 316-18, 92 S.Ct. at 2136-2137, so the separation of
powers requires us to acknowledge the principal responsibility of the President for foreign affairs
and concomitantly for foreign intelligence surveillance. In sum, because of the need of the executive
branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should
not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.
Accord, United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3 Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United
States, 419 U.S. 881, 95 S.Ct. 147, 42 L.Ed.2d 121 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418
(5 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S.Ct. 1490, 39 L.Ed.2d 575 (1974); United States v.
Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5 Cir. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698, 91 S.Ct. 2068, 29 L.Ed.2d
810 (1971). Contra, Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C.Cir.1975) (dictum in plurality opinion
in case involving surveillance of domestic organization having an effect on foreign relations but
acting neither as the agent of nor in collaboration with a foreign power).”).
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in the areas of foreign affairs and thereby has withdrawn electronic surveillance, as defined
by FISA, from the “zone of twilight,” between Executive and Legislative constitutional
authorities, it might be argued that the President’s asserted inherent authority to engage in
warrantless electronic surveillance was thereby limited. In the wake of FISA’s passage, the
Court of Review’s reliance on these pre-FISA cases or cases dealing with pre-FISA
surveillances as a basis for its assumption of the continued vitality of the President’s inherent
constitutional authority to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence information might be viewed as somewhat undercutting the
persuasive force of the Court of Review’s statement.
The second reference to the “President’s inherent constitutional authority” in In re
Sealed Case is in the conclusion to the opinion. Here the Court of Review makes an oblique
reference to the President’s inherent authority:
Even without taking into account the President’s inherent constitutional authority to
conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, we think the procedures and
government showings required under FISA, if they do not meet the minimum Fourth
Amendment warrant standards, certainly come close. We, therefore, believe firmly,
applying the balancing test drawn from Keith, that FISA as amended is constitutional
because the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.105
The latter statement was made in support of the Court of Review’s conclusion that the
procedures for electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence information under FISA,
as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, were constitutionally sufficient
under Fourth Amendment standards, whether the court orders under FISA were viewed as
warrants for Fourth Amendment purposes or not. While not an explicit recognition of
presidential inherent constitutional authority, it might be argued that, when viewed in light
of the earlier statement, some level of recognition of that authority might also be inferred
from this reference.
Both statements were made in a case in which the Court of Review upheld the
constitutionality of FISA, an act which, in express legislative language in its conforming
amendments to Title III and in its legislative history, was clearly intended to cabin any
inherent presidential authority over electronic surveillance within its sweep, and to provide
an exclusive structure for the conduct of such electronic surveillance. It might be argued that
the adoption of one of two possible interpretations of the statement would avoid internal
inconsistency within the court’s decision. One approach would be to interpret these
statements by the Court of Review as referring to the President’s inherent authority to
conduct such surveillances outside the scope of “electronic surveillance” under FISA. In
essence, the court’s statements would then be seen as a reference to presidential authority
over those areas of NSA activities which were intentionally excluded from FISA when it was
enacted. Alternatively, it might be argued that the court’s statements may refer to continuing
exercise of inherent presidential authority within the FISA structure, which the Court of
Review found to be constitutional.
In light of the exclusivity language in Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) and the legislative
history of FISA, it might be argued that electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA is subject
to the statutory framework, and does not rely upon an assertion of Presidential inherent
authority to support it. Alternatively, it might be contended that, in enacting FISA, the
105 310 F.3d at 746.
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Congress circumscribed the manner in which the President might exercise his inherent
constitutional authority with respect to foreign intelligence electronic surveillance, rather
than eliminating the President’s authority.
As this discussion suggests, while the congressional intent to cabin the President’s
exercise of any inherent constitutional authority to engage in foreign intelligence electronic
surveillance may be clear from the exclusivity provision in FISA and from the legislative
history of the measure, some support may be drawn from the Court of Review’s decision in
In re Sealed Case for the position that the President continues to have the power to authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence outside the FISA
framework. Whether such authority may exist only as to those areas which were not
addressed by FISA in its definition of “electronic surveillance” or is of broader sweep
appears to be a matter with respect to which there are differing views.
The Authorization to Use Military Force. In the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, attacks, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.106
Pursuant to that authority, the President ordered U.S. armed forces to invade Afghanistan for
the purpose of rooting out Al Qaeda terrorists and toppling the Taliban government that had
provided them safe harbor.
The Administration regards the AUMF as providing the authority to conduct electronic
surveillance of the type reported in the press.107 This conclusion, it argues, is supported by
the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,108 in which the Supreme Court
issued its most thorough interpretation of the AUMF to date.109 In Hamdi, a plurality of the
Court affirmed the President’s power to detain a U.S. citizen as an “enemy combatant” as
part of the necessary force authorized by Congress in the AUMF, despite an earlier statute
which provides that no U.S. citizen may be detained except pursuant to an act of Congress.110
However, the Court appears to have relied on a more limited interpretation of the scope of
the AUMF than that which the Administration had asserted in its briefs, and, declaring that
a “state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
106 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“the AUMF”), Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
For a discussion of the scant legislative history accompanying the AUMF, see CRS Report RS22357,
Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (Pub. L. 107-40):
Legislative History, by Richard F. Grimmet.
107 See OLA Letter, supra note 10.
108 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
109 See CRS Report RS21884, The Supreme Court and Detainees in the War on Terrorism: Summary
and Analysis, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
110 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). For more background and analysis of that statute, see CRS Report RL31724
Detention of American Citizens as Enemy Combatants, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RS22130,
Detention of U.S. Citizens, by Louis Fisher.
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Nation’s citizens,”111 the Court clarified that notwithstanding the authorization, such
detainees have some due process rights under the U.S. Constitution.112
The Administration’s position would seem to rely on at least two assumptions. First,
it appears to require that the power to conduct electronic surveillance for intelligence
purposes is an essential aspect of the use of military force in the same way that the capture
of enemy combatants on the battlefield is a necessary incident to the conduct of military
operations. Second, it appears to consider the “battlefield” in the war on terrorism to extend
beyond the area of traditional military operations to include U.S. territory. Both assumptions
have been the subject of debate.
The Use of Force. The government finds support in the Hamdi decision for its
assertion that the AUMF implies authority to conduct electronic surveillance operations as
a necessary incident to the use of force. This implied authority, it is urged, provides the
statutory authority required to dispense with FISA requirements in the same way the Hamdi
court found the requirement in the Non-Detention Act (18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)), which prohibits
the detention of U.S. citizens except pursuant to an act of Congress, to be satisfied by the
AUMF.
There is reason, however, to limit Hamdi to actual military operations on the battlefield
as that concept is traditionally understood. Justice O’Connor wrote for the plurality that
we understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate
force’ to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical
circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed
the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.113
Hamdi may be limited to a confirmation that the authorization to employ military force
against an enemy army necessarily encompasses the authority to capture battlefield enemies,
because such captures are an essential aspect of fighting a battle.114 International law does
not permit the intentional killing of civilians or soldiers who are hors de combat, preferring
capture as the method of neutralizing enemies on the battlefield.115 The capture of an enemy
combatant is arguably as much a use of force as killing or wounding one. Justice O’Connor
wrote for the plurality
111 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
112 Id. at 517 (2004).
113 Hamdi at 520.
114 Padilla v. Hanft, another case involving an American citizen detained by the military as an
“enemy combatant,” could be read as an expansion of the detention authority to encompass persons
arrested in the United States, far from any battlefield. 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), petition for cert.
filed, 74 USLW 3275 (Oct 25, 2005)(NO. 05-533). The Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court’s
finding that the detention was unlawful, but the appellate finding was based on an understanding that
the petitioner had taken up arms against American forces in Afghanistan prior to traveling to the
United States with the intent of carrying out acts of terrorism. Whether Hamdi would also extend
to a person detained as an enemy combatant based wholly on activity carried out within the United
States has not been addressed by any court.
115 See generally Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956).
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There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in
Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda
terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target
in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited
category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
“necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President to use.116
While the collection of intelligence is also an important facet of fighting a battle, it is
not clear that the collection of intelligence constitutes a use of force. The Hamdi plurality
cited the Geneva Conventions and multiple authorities on the law of war to reach its
conclusion that the capture of combatants is an essential part of warfare.117 The
Administration has not pointed to any authority similar to those cited by the Hamdi plurality
to support its proposition that signals intelligence is a fundamental aspect of combat. To be
sure, there can be little doubt that Congress, in enacting the AUMF, contemplated that the
armed forces would deploy their military intelligence assets in Afghanistan or wherever else
the conventional aspect of the conflict might spread, but a presumption that the authorization
extends to less conventional aspects of the conflict could unravel the fabric of Hamdi,
especially where measures are taken within the United States. While five Justices were
willing to accept the government’s argument that the detention of enemy combatants
captured on the battlefield118 is a vital aspect of war-fighting, Justice Thomas alone indicated
his agreement with the government’s argument that wartime detention is also necessary for
intelligence purposes.119 Justice O’Connor agreed that the law of war supports detention of
enemy combatants to prevent their return to the battlefield, but agreed with the petitioner that
“indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”120
116 Hamdi at 518. Justice Thomas agreed with this proposition, supplying the fifth vote. Id. at 587
(“Although the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our
troops, I agree with the plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has
authorized the President to do so.”).
117 Hamdi at 518-19.
118 The Hamdi plurality limited its decision to “enemy combatants” as defined to mean “an individual
who, it alleges, was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’
in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ there.” Hamdi at
516.
119 Id. at 595 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Government seeks to further [its security] interest by
detaining an enemy soldier not only to prevent him from rejoining the ongoing fight. Rather, as the
Government explains, detention can serve to gather critical intelligence regarding the intentions and
capabilities of our adversaries, a function that the Government avers has become all the more
important in the war on terrorism.”). Justice Scalia, with Justice Stevens, recognized that the
government’s security needs include the “need to obtain intelligence through interrogation,” but
declined to evaluate whether the need could be met within the criminal justice system, noting that
such determinations are “beyond . . . the Court’s competence . . . but . . . not beyond Congress’s.”
Id. at 577-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120 Hamdi at 521. Justices Souter and Ginsberg, while accepting the government’s position that the
AUMF could be read to authorize actions consonant with the usages of war, rejected the assertion
that such usages could be invoked to justify the detention of a captive where the military’s actions
are incompatible with the law of war. Id. at 549-50 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justices Scalia and Stevens would have found that a U.S. citizen enjoys the full range of due
process rights, the AUMF notwithstanding. Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The boundaries of the authority available under this argument are difficult to discern.
May any statutory prohibition arguably touching on national security that applies “unless
otherwise authorized by statute” be set aside based on the AUMF? Presidential assertions
of wartime power have faltered for lack of express congressional approval, especially where
civil liberties are implicated.121 A less expansive interpretation of the AUMF might dictate
that “necessary and appropriate force” must be read, if possible, to conform to the
Constitution and Congress’s understanding of what activity constitutes a use of force as
opposed to an exercise of authority within the domestic sphere.
The Domestic Sphere versus Military Operations. Although the lack of a
formal declaration of war is not relevant to the existence of an armed conflict and is arguably
unnecessary for the President to invoke some war powers, it may be argued that a formal
declaration makes a difference in determining what law applies within the United States,
whether to aliens or citizens.122 For example, the Alien Enemy Act and the Trading with the
Enemy Act (TWEA),123 both of which regulate the domestic conduct of persons during a war,
expressly require a declared war and are not triggered simply by an authorization to use
force.124 The Supreme Court long ago held that the President has no implied authority to
promulgate regulations permitting the capture of enemy property located in the United States
during hostilities short of a declared war, even where Congress had authorized a “limited”
121 Compare Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (authority to detain U.S. citizen during war not authorized by implication), Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (civilian accused of violating the law of war in non-hostile
territory could not be tried by military commission), and Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804)
(where Congress had authorized as part of a limited war the seizure of vessels bound to French ports,
the President could not authorize the seizure of vessels coming from French ports) with Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1942) (President’s order establishing military commissions to try enemy
combatants for violating the law of war was valid where Congress had recognized military
commissions in statute), Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1943) (discriminatory
wartime curfew implemented by the executive branch could be enforced against U.S. citizen where
Congress had expressly provided for such enforcement) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (same). The Administration cites the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863),
for the proposition that “the President has the responsibility to protect the Nation from further
attacks, and the Constitution gives him all necessary authority to fulfill that duty.” OLA Letter,
supra note 10, at 2. The Prize Cases have generally been interpreted as supporting an assertion of
inherent presidential power to thwart an attack. See CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, S. REP. NO. 108-17,
at 328-29. It may, however, be significant that the naval blockade there at issue was instituted prior
to Congress’s having had the opportunity to take action rather than in the face of a statutory
prohibition against such action, and was quickly ratified by Congress. See id. at 461-62. Given the
Court’s tendency to treat the latter question as one calling for judicial avoidance based on the
“political question” doctrine, id. at 329, it is possible that the question may never reach a fuller
exegesis. However, the area has been characterized by concessions between the President and
Congress with respect to the scope of authority of each. See id., id. at 473-75.
122 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that separation-of-powers
concerns are “heightened when the Commander-in-Chief’s powers are exercised in the domestic
sphere”).
123 50 U.S. App. § 1 et seq.
124 See generally CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force: Background and Legal Implications, by David M. Ackerman and Richard F.
Grimmett (identifying statutes effective only during declared wars or during hostilities).
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war.125 More pertinently, FISA contains an exception to its requirements for 15 days after a
congressional declaration of war.126 The inclusion of this exception strongly suggests that
Congress intended for FISA to apply even during wartime, unless Congress were to pass new
legislation. The fact that Congress amended FISA subsequent to September 11, 2001, in
order to maximize its effectiveness against the terrorist threat further bolsters the notion that
FISA is intended to remain fully applicable. To conclude otherwise would appear to require
an assumption that Congress intended the AUMF to authorize the President to conduct
electronic surveillance, even against American citizens not involved in combat, under fewer
restrictions than would apply during a declared war, notwithstanding FISA provisions
strengthened to take such circumstances into account. Even assuming, for argument’s sake,
that the NSA operations are necessary to prevent another terrorist attack, a presumption that
Congress intended to authorize them does not necessarily follow.
It might be argued that the United States is part of the battlefield in the war against
terrorism in more than just a metaphorical sense. Proponents of this point of view would
argue that the AUMF to authorizes the use of force anywhere in the world,127 including the
territory of the United States, against any persons determined by the President to have
“planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such
organizations or persons.” Under this view, the United States is under actual and continuing
enemy attack, and the President has the authority to conduct electronic surveillance in the
same way the armed forces gather intelligence about the military operations of enemy forces,
even if no actual combat is taking place. After all, intelligence efforts are aimed at identifying
an attack before it occurs. If electronic surveillance is considered to be a use of force, the
AUMF would seem to limit it to those who “planned, authorized, committed, aided” the
Sept. 11 attacks or who “harbored such . . . persons.” To the extent that the President’s
executive order authorizes surveillance of persons who are suspected of merely supporting
Al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations, it may be seen as being overly broad.
Are the NSA electronic surveillances consistent with FISA and Title III?
Having concluded that the AUMF authorizes the NSA activity, the Administration finds that
the activity meets FISA requirements as well. Although the Administration appears to accept
the premise that the surveillance is “electronic surveillance” within the meaning of FISA, it
argues that it is excused from following the required procedures because section 109 of
FISA128 exempts from criminal liability those who conduct electronic surveillance without
following the FISA procedures where such surveillance is “authorized by statute.”
125 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170
(1804).
126 50 U.S.C. § 1811. The legislative history indicates that the 15-day period was intended to “allow
time for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a wartime
emergency.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1720, at 34 (1978).
127 See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311, 320 (D. D.C. 2005) (noting that “the AUMF does not
place geographic parameters on the President’s authority to wage this war against terrorists”).
128 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1).
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Subsection (a) of section 109 of FISA provides criminal sanctions129 for a person who
intentionally “engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by
statute;” or who “discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by electronic
surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through
electronic surveillance not authorized by statute.” Under subsection (b), it is a defense to
a prosecution under subsection (a) that the defendant was a law enforcement or investigative
officer engaged in the course of his official duties and the electronic surveillance was
authorized by and conducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under subsection (d), there is federal jurisdiction over an offense
under this section if the person committing the offense was an officer or employee of the
United States at the time the offense was committed.130
The language of this section was drawn by the conferees from the House version of the
measure, with modifications taken from the Senate version.131 The House Conference
129 Subsection (c) provides, “An offense described in this section is punishable by a fine of not more
than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.” In light of the general fines
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3571, the maximum fine would appear to be $250,000 for an individual
defendant, and $500,000 for an institutional defendant.”
130 Under 50 U.S.C. § 1810, an aggrieved person, other than a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power, as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) or (b)(1)(A), who has been subjected to electronic
surveillance or about whom information obtained by electronic surveillance of that person has been
disclosed or used in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1809 may bring an action against any person who
committed that violation for actual and punitive damages, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and other
reasonably incurred investigation and litigation costs. Actual damages may not be less than
liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100 per day for each day of the violation, whichever is greater.
131 The Senate Judiciary Committee, in S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), at 61, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3962-
3963; see also, pertinent portion of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s S. REP. NO. 95-
701, at 68-69, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4037-4038, described the Senate version of this provision,
which would have provided conforming amendments to Title 18 of the U.S. Code:
[Section 4(a)(1) and (2) are]. . . designed to establish the same criminal penalties for
violations of [FISA, conceived in the Senate bill as a new chapter 120 of Title 18, U.S.
Code] as apply to violations of chapter 119 [of Title 18, U.S.C.]. As amended, these
sections will make it a criminal offense to engage in electronic surveillance except as
otherwise specifically provided in chapters 119 and 120. This amendment also provides,
however, that “with respect to techniques used by law enforcement officers” which do
not involve the actual interception of wire or oral communications, yet do fall within the
literal definition of electronic surveillance in Chapter 120 [FISA] — such as the use of
a pen register — the procedures of chapter 120 do not apply. In such cases criminal
penalties will not attach simply because the government fails to follow the procedures in
chapter 120 (such penalties may, of course, attach if the surveillance is commenced
without a search warrant or in violation of a court order.) In all cases involving electronic
surveillance for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information, however, the
prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. 2511 would apply.
(a)(3), (4), (5), and (6). These amendments make clear that the prohibitions in chapter
119 concerning disclosure and use of information, obtained through the interception of
wire or oral communications in sections 2511(1)(c) and (d), also apply to disclosure and
use of information obtained through electronic surveillance as defined in chapter 120.
The statute calls for a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
(continued...)
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Report, H. CONF. REP. 95-1720, at 33, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4062, adopted the House
version of these provisions, with amendments to include the Senate provision regarding
disclosure or use of information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic
surveillance not authorized by statute. The House Conference Committee described its
actions as follows:
The Senate bill provided, by conforming amendment to title 18, United States Code, for
criminal penalties for any person who, under color of law, willfully engages in electronic
surveillance except as provided in this bill; for any person who willfully discloses, or
endeavors to disclose to any other person information obtained under color of law by
electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through unlawful electronic surveillance; and for any person who willfully uses,
or endeavors to use, information obtained through unlawful electronic surveillance.
The House amendments provided for separate criminal penalties in this act, rather than
by conforming amendment to title 18, for any person who intentionally engages in
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute. A defense was
provided for a defendant who was a law enforcement or investigative officer engaged in
the course of his official duties and the electronic surveillance was authorized by and
conducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The conference substitute adopts the House provision modified to add the Senate criminal
penalty for any person who discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by
electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through electronic surveillance not authorized by statute. The conferees agree
that the criminal penalties for intelligence agents under this Act should be essentially the
same as for law enforcement officers under title 18.132
The Administration appears to rely upon the Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF), Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), in arguing that the NSA electronic
surveillances at issue are “authorized by statute,” as that phrase is used in 50 U.S.C. §
1809(a). The FISA bill as passed included the House version of Section 109(a)(1) of the
measure, while Section 109(a)(2) was drawn from the Senate passed bill. The House
Permanent Select Committee’s Report, H. Rep. No. 95-1283(I), at 96 (June 8, 1978), sheds
some light on the intended meaning of Section 109(a)(1) of H.R. 7308 (95th Cong.) which
became 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1):
131 (...continued)
five years, or both, for each violation.
132 The House Intelligence Committee discussed the meaning of “intentionally” in the context of
Section 109(a)(2) of the House bill, which was replaced by the Senate language. However, as the
legislative language was written, the word “intentionally” applied to both Section 109(a)(1) and
Section 109(a)(2). The House Report, H. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 97, emphasized that “intentionally”
as used in this section was “intended to reflect the most strict standard for criminal culpability. What
is proscribed is an intentional violation of an order or one of the specified provisions, not just
intentional conduct. The Government would have to provide beyond a reasonable doubt both that
the conduct engaged in was in fact a violation, and that it was engaged in with a conscious objective
or desire to commit a violation. . . .”
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Section 109(a)(1) carries forward the criminal provisions of chapter 119 [of Title 18,
U.S.C.] and makes it a criminal offense for officers or employees of the United States to
intentionally engage in electronic surveillance under color of law except as specifically
authorized in chapter 119 of title III [of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968] and this title. Since certain technical activities — such as the use of a pen
register — fall within the definition of electronic surveillance under this title, but not
within the definition of wire or oral communications under chapter 119 [of Title 18,
U.S.C.], the bill provides an affirmative defense to a law enforcement or investigative
officer who engages in such an activity for law enforcement purposes in the course of his
official duties, pursuant to a search warrant or court order.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also noted that, “[o]ne of the
important purposes of the bill is to afford security to intelligence personnel so that if they act
in accordance with the statute and the court order, they will be insulated from liability; it is
not to afford them immunity when they intentionally violate the law.”
Thus, the legislative history appears to reflect an intention that the phrase “authorized
by statute” was a reference to chapter 119 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code (Title III) and to FISA
itself, rather than having a broader meaning, in which case a clear indication of Congress’s
intent to amend or repeal it might be necessary before a court would interpret a later statute
as superceding it. Nevertheless, without taking into account the legislative history, the
phrase might be seen as having a more expansive application. This broader view appears to
have been taken by the Administration in its position regarding the authority provided by the
AUMF.
Next, the Administration turns to the wiretap prohibition contained in Title III, which
contains an exception for surveillance carried out pursuant to FISA. Pointing out that the
exception in section 109 is broad in comparison to the exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2511, whose
prohibition applies “except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter,” the
Administration appears to conclude that the broader FISA exception subsumes the narrower
exception in Title III, at least with respect to national security wiretaps. It cites two of the
specific exceptions in Title III. First, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(e) provides a defense to criminal
liability to government agents who “conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section
101 of [FISA], as authorized by that Act.” The Administration appears to interpret “as
authorized by [FISA]” to include activity exempt from the FISA prohibition by virtue of its
being authorized by other statute. Under this interpretation, subsection 2511(2)(e) should
be read to exempt electronic surveillance “as authorized by FISA or any other statute.”
Similar analysis leads the Administration to conclude that the Title III exclusivity
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) poses no impediment. Section 2511(2)(f), which exempts
U.S. foreign intelligence activities not covered by FISA, also provides that the procedures
in Title III and FISA “shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as
defined in section 101 of [FISA], and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic
communications may be conducted.” The Administration argues that
By expressly and broadly excepting from its prohibition electronic surveillance
undertaken “as authorized by statute,” section 109 of FISA permits an exception to the
“procedures” of FISA referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) where authorized by another
CRS-41
statute, even if the other authorizing statute does not specifically amend section
2511(2)(f).133
In other words, it appears, the FISA “procedures” described in Title III (in 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(f)) can include any other procedures authorized, expressly or implicitly, by any
other statute, because these would not be prohibited by FISA section 109. This reading
would seem to make the exclusivity provision meaningless, a construction not ordinarily
favored by courts. It may be questioned whether Congress actually intended for the
exception to the criminal prohibition in FISA to negate the more specific requirements in
Title III and its exclusivity provision.
The Administration continues
Some might suggest that FISA could be read to require that a subsequent statutory
authorization must come in the form of an amendment to FISA itself. But under
established principles of statutory construction, the AUMF and FISA must be construed
in harmony to avoid any potential conflict between FISA and the President’s Article II
authority as Commander in Chief. Accordingly, any ambiguity as to whether the AUMF
is a statute that satisfies the requirements of FISA and allows electronic surveillance in
the conflict with al Qaeda without complying with FISA procedures must be resolved in
favor of an interpretation that is consistent with the President’s long-recognized
authority.134
It is unclear how FISA and the AUMF are seen to collide. Principles of statutory
construction generally provide guidance for interpreting Congress’s intent with respect to a
statute where the text is ambiguous or a plain reading leads to anomalous results; and where
possible, a statute that might be read in such a way as to violate the Constitution is to be
construed to avoid the violation. However, such principles are only to be applied where there
is a genuine ambiguity or conflict between two statutes,135 and where there is some possible
reading that might avoid a conflict. While the Court has been known to read into a statute
language that does not appear, it would be unusual for the Court to read express statutory
language out of a statute, except by declaring at least that portion of the statute to be
unconstitutional. It would not ordinarily be presumed that Congress meant the opposite of
what it said, merely because its words are constitutionally problematic.
It appears that the Administration’s views regarding the statutory authorization
supporting the NSA activity also rely on an assumption that FISA, at least to the extent that
133 OLA Letter, supra note 10, at 3.
134 Id. at 4 (citing INS v. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 v. (2001) (holding that “if an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative
interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such
problems”) (internal citation omitted); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (noting that a
“‘cardinal principle’ of statutory interpretation [is] that when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious
doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided’”) (citations omitted)). Both cited cases
involved due process implications rather than whether a statute violated the principle of separation
of powers by encroaching on presidential powers.
135 See, e.g, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) (“Where two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CRS-42
its provisions apply to activity conducted in the war against terrorism, may be an
unconstitutional encroachment into presidential powers. Its argument, partly based on the
exigencies of the post-9/11 period, seems to imply such a view of FISA:
As explained above. the President determined that it was necessary following September
11 to create an early warning detection system. FISA could not have provided the speed
and agility required for the early warning detection system. In addition, any legislative
change, other than the AUMF, that the President might have sought specifically to create
such an early warning system would have been public and would have tipped off our
enemies concerning our intelligence limitations and capabilities.
Insofar as the Administration’s position is founded upon a concern that FISA was not
adequate to the needs of the moment, it might be considered whether 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802
(Attorney General certification that certain conditions are met) and 1805(f) (72-hour
emergency order), where applicable, may have provided some of the flexibility that the
President considered warranted under the circumstances. To the extent that a lack of speed
and agility is a function of internal Department of Justice procedures and practices under
FISA, it may be argued that the President and the Attorney General could review those
procedures and practices in order to introduce more streamlined procedures to address such
needs. Where FISA’s current statutory framework proved inadequate to the task, legislative
changes might be pursued.
The Administration argues that, “any legislative change, other than the AUMF, that the
President might have sought specifically to create such an early warning system would have
been public and would have tipped off our enemies concerning our intelligence limitations
and capabilities.”136 However, some of these concerns may be minimized or addressed by
virtue of the fact that, where appropriate, oversight may be conducted in executive session;
and access to classified information, including information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods, may be limited by statute, by House and Senate procedures, or both.
Nevertheless, to some degree, the federal legislative process is, by its very nature, public.
Depending upon how such legislation was structured, an argument may be made that it might
give rise to some inferences as to present or future intelligence practices or capabilities. On
the other hand, the legislative vehicle chosen and the legislative language used might
minimize some of those concerns. In addition, no legal precedent appears to have been
presented that would support the President’s authority to bypass the statutory route when
legislation is required, based an asserted need for secrecy.137
Conclusion
Whether an NSA activity is permissible under the Fourth Amendment and the statutory
scheme outlined above is impossible to determine without an understanding of the specific
136 See OLA Letter, supra note 10, at 5.
137 C.f. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 603-04 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring):
The utmost that the Korean conflict may imply is that it may have been desirable to have
given the President further authority, a freer hand in these matters. Absence of authority
in the President to deal with a crisis does not imply want of power in the Government.
Conversely the fact that power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President.
The need for new legislation does not enact it. Nor does it repeal or amend existing law.
CRS-43
facts involved and the nature of the President’s authorization, which are for the most part
classified. If the NSA operations at issue are encompassed in the definition of “electronic
surveillance” set forth under FISA, it would seem consistent with Congress’s intent that such
surveillance must be carried out in accordance with FISA procedures. Although section
109(a) of FISA does not explicitly limit the language “as authorized by statute” to refer only
to Title III and to FISA, the legislative history suggests that such a result was intended. The
exceptions to the criminal prohibition under Title III, however, are specifically limited to
those mentioned within Title III. Even if the AUMF is read to provide the statutory
authorization necessary to avoid criminal culpability under FISA, it does not necessarily
follow that the AUMF provides a substitute authority under FISA to satisfy the more specific
language in Title III. To the extent that any of the electronic surveillance at issue may be
outside the sweep of FISA or Title III, Congress does not appear to have legislated
specifically on the subject, nor, by the absence of legislation, to have authorized or
acquiesced in such surveillance.
Whether such electronic surveillances are contemplated by the term “all necessary and
appropriate force” as authorized by the AUMF turns on whether they are, under the Hamdi
analysis, an essential element of waging war. Even assuming that the President’s role as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is implicated in the field of electronic surveillance
for the collection of foreign intelligence information within the United States, it should not
be accepted as a foregone conclusion that Congress has no role to play.138 By including the
emergency authorization for electronic surveillance without a court order for fifteen days
following a declaration of war, Congress seems clearly to have contemplated that FISA
would continue to operate during war, although such conditions might necessitate
amendments. Amendments to FISA in the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation
further demonstrate Congress’s willingness to make adjustments. The history of Congress’s
active involvement in regulating electronic surveillance within the United States leaves little
room for arguing that Congress has accepted by acquiescence the NSA operations here at
issue.
To the extent that the Administration seems to base its interpretation of the AUMF and
FISA on the assumption that a reading contrary to the one they rely upon would be an
unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles, it appears to regard the matter
as deserving the highest level of deference under Youngstown’s first category139 simply by
virtue of the assumption that it would survive scrutiny under the third category. To conclude
that Congress’s enactments are unconstitutional and therefore could not reflect Congress’s
intent seems to beg the question.
138 Id. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).
There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the
country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’ whatever
they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and
navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command. It is also empowered
to make rules for the ‘Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,’ by which
it may to some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions.
139 See OLA Letter, supra note 10, at 3 (asserting that “the President’s ‘authority is at its maximum,’”
under Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown and suggesting that the NSA operations contrast
with the seizure invalidated in that case, which resulted from “the absence of a statute ‘from which
[the asserted authority] [could] be fairly implied’” (citing Youngstown at 585)).
CRS-44
Court cases evaluating the legality of warrantless wiretaps for foreign intelligence
purposes provide some support for the assertion that the President possesses inherent
authority to conduct such surveillance. The Court of Review, the only appellate court to
have addressed the issue since the passage of FISA, “took for granted” that the President has
inherent authority to conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance under his Article
II powers, stating that, “assuming that was so, FISA could not encroach on that authority.”140
However, much of the other lower courts’ discussions of inherent presidential authority
occurred prior to the enactment of FISA, and no court has ruled on the question of
Congress’s authority to regulate the collection of foreign intelligence information.
From the foregoing analysis, it appears unlikely that a court would hold that Congress
has expressly or impliedly authorized the NSA electronic surveillance operations here under
discussion, and it would likewise appear that, to the extent that those surveillances fall within
the definition of “electronic surveillance” within the meaning of FISA or any activity
regulated under Title III, Congress intended to cover the entire field with these statutes. To
the extent that the NSA activity is not permitted by some reading of Title III or FISA, it may
represent an exercise of presidential power at its lowest ebb, in which case exclusive
presidential control is sustainable only by “disabling Congress from acting upon the
subject.”141 While courts have generally accepted that the President has the power to conduct
domestic electronic surveillance within the United States inside the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment, no court has held squarely that the Constitution disables the Congress from
endeavoring to set limits on that power. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated that
Congress does indeed have power to regulate domestic surveillance,142 and has not ruled on
the extent to which Congress can act with respect to electronic surveillance to collect foreign
intelligence information. Given such uncertainty, the Administration’s legal justification,
as presented in the summary analysis from the Office of Legislative Affairs, does not seem
to be as well-grounded as the tenor of that letter suggests.
140 310 F.3d at 742; see also id. at 746.
141 Id. at 638.
142 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972).
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