States' Obligations Under Additional Protocols to IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
MEMORANDUM
October 23, 2017
Subject:
States’ Obligations Under Additional Protocols to IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements
From:
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation , pkerr@crs.loc.gov, 7-8693
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation, mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
This memorandum was prepared to enable distribution to more than one congressional office.
Introduction1
Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) treaty, which entered into force in 1970, requires
nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), which are
of indefinite duration, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).2 These agreements are based
on a model described in Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153), which states that such agreements
“should provide for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied” to all
nuclear material of potential proliferation concern “in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of
the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of
verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”3
The scope of a CSA agreement is not limited to nuclear material declared by a state, but includes all
nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within that country. This was a change from the pre-
NPT version of IAEA safeguards, described in Information Circular 66 (INFCIRC/66), which depended
on verifying declared material at specific facilities. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability
to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to
a CSA is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government. After a CSA enters
into force, the government is required to provide the IAEA with lists of all nuclear material in the country
and nuclear facilities, along with associated design information. The agency subsequently verifies the
correctness and completeness of those declarations using various verification methods.
1 For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by
Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear
program, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr. Unless otherwise noted, all
quotations are from Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540.
2 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
3 This is to apply to all “source or special fissionable material.” See also Nuclear Regulatory Commission definition of source
material: https://www.nrc.gov/materials/srcmaterial.html
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Additional Protocol
After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, IAEA inspection teams working with the U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM) revealed an extensive covert nuclear weapons program that had been virtually
undetected by annual IAEA inspections of Baghdad's declared facilities. This spurred efforts to strengthen
the IAEA's access to information and its authority to conduct more intrusive inspections. In 1997, IAEA
member states adopted a "Model Additional Protocol" (INFCIRC/540), which states could conclude
voluntarily, with the IAEA. To date, 148 countries have signed an Additional Protocol (AP) and 129 have
entered into force, including in the United States.
The Additional Protocol increases the IAEA’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and
activities in nonnuclear-weapon states by increasing the agency’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-
related facilities and to demand information from member states. For example, it requires an adherent to
disclose to the IAEA its nuclear fuel cycle research and development activities, all parts of its nuclear fuel
cycle (from uranium mines to nuclear waste) as well as the manufacturing and export of nuclear-related
equipment and material. It also provides IAEA inspectors with short-notice inspection authority, access to
any declared location related to the nuclear fuel cycle, and environmental sample collection at any
location.4
Information Required under the AP
Article 2 of the Model Additional Protocol requires a state to provide the IAEA with information about a
variety of nuclear-related activities that supplements the information provided by a state pursuant to its
comprehensive safeguards agreement. This information includes:
A “general description of and information specifying the location of [government-controlled]
nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material.”5
These activities include those “specifically related to any process or system development aspect”
of uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel fabrication, and spent
fuel reprocessing. The Protocol also requires the state to “make every reasonable effort to
provide” the IAEA with a “general description of and information specifying the location of
nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities” which are not government-
controlled and do not involve nuclear material.
A “description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in
Annex I” to the Protocol. This Annex covers a variety of activities related to enrichment,
reprocessing, and nuclear reactors.
A description of the use and contents of each building in the vicinity of facilities with nuclear
material declared under a signatory’s safeguards agreement.
Information about “the location, operational status” and production capacity of uranium mines
and uranium mills.
Information, including imports and exports, regarding certain nuclear material that is not covered
by the comprehensive safeguards agreement.
4 Environmental sampling involves swiping surfaces during verification activities followed by laboratory analysis to detect the
presence of undeclared material or activity. See also, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/safeguardslab.pdf
5 As noted, a state’s comprehensive safeguards agreement requires states to declare nuclear material of potential proliferation
concern.
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Information regarding the import and export of items listed in Annex II to the Protocol. This
Annex overs items related to enrichment, reprocessing, and nuclear reactors.
“General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel
cycle” when approved by the government.
Locations and Access
Depending on the type of facility, the IAEA may request access to a location in order to “assure the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities” in the facility or to “resolve a question relating to
the correctness and completeness” of a signatory’s declaration pursuant to Article 2 of the Model
Additional Protocol. For sites other than those that the state declares to the IAEA, the Additional Protocol
would require the agency to notify the government at least 24 hours before inspecting “[a]ny location
specified by the Agency.” For certain inspections of declared nuclear facilities, the IAEA is required to
give the government at least two hours’ notice; the agency may provide less notice “in exceptional
circumstances.” The methods and activities (e.g., environmental sampling, radiation detection) that IAEA
inspectors may undertake when accessing such a location vary depending on the facility’s type. Both the
comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol permit the IAEA to access military
facilities in order to conduct its safeguards mission.
The Protocol would allow the IAEA access to the following types of nuclear locations:
Uranium mines, uranium mills, and uranium ore processing facilities located at the
mines.
Buildings around facilities with nuclear material declared under the signatory’s
safeguards agreement.
Locations of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving
nuclear material.
Locations engaged in activities specified in Annex I of the Model Additional Protocol. As
noted, these activities include the manufacture of some components related to
enrichment, reprocessing, and nuclear reactors.
If a state refuses to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities, the IAEA Director-General can call for a
special inspection; the inspection could require approval from the IAEA Board of Governors.6 It is worth
noting that the Protocol contains provisions for resolving questions about the state’s nuclear program that
arise during implementation. For example, Article 2 requires the state to respond to IAEA requests for
“amplifications or clarifications of any information it has provided under this Article.”
6 For a description of special inspections, see CRS Report R44142, Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress, by
Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.