Turkey's Incursion into Northeastern Syria: Possible Questions
MEMORANDUM
October 21, 2019
Subject:
Turkey’s Incursion into Northeastern Syria: Possible Questions
From:
Clayton Thomas, Coordinator, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, cbthomas@crs.loc.gov,
7-2719
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and Finance,
siliasakhtar@crs.loc.gov, 7-9253
Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs, pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, cblanchard@crs.loc.gov,
7-0428
Carla E. Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy,
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security, kmcinnis@crs.loc.gov, 7-1416
Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-
6819
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, drennack@crs.loc.gov, 7-
7608
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
This memorandum was prepared to enable distribution to more than one congressional office.
The recent Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria and subsequent order from President Trump to
withdraw most U.S. troops has implications for U.S. policy in Syria, U.S. relations with Turkey, regional
dynamics, and other related issues. Below are some possible questions raised by the operation that
Members of Congress may wish to consider as they debate responses to the Administration’s actions and
to the evolving regional situation. For more information and background, please contact the authors at the
extensions above.
Turkey’s “Operation Peace Spring”1
U.S.-negotiated “pause.” Is the pause that was negotiated between the United States and Turkey on
October 17 currently holding, and have Kurdish YPG forces withdrawn as anticipated? Can you explain
the geographic dimensions of the agreed-upon “safe zone”? Does the pause purport to cover only the safe
zone, or Turkish operations in Syria more broadly? Given the seemingly favorable terms of the negotiated
1 For more background, CRS Insight IN11179, Turkish Incursion into Syria: U.S. Policy Implications, by Carla E. Humud, Jim
Zanotti, and Clayton Thomas.
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pause for Turkey, might its leaders feel emboldened to act more aggressively vis-à-vis the United States
and other actors involved in northern Syria?
Turkish administration. For how long and under what auspices, legal or otherwise, does Turkey intend
to administer areas under its control in northeastern Syria? How might potential Turkish administration of
northeastern Syria differ from its rule in areas west of the Euphrates occupied by Turkish forces and their
Syrian partners since 2016? (Some human rights groups have offered evidence of Turkish human rights
violations in other areas of Syria that Turkish-led forces previously occupied.)
Turkey and the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL). To what extent are Turkish operations aimed at the
Islamic State, and does Turkey have the capacity and/or intention to combat IS remnants in eastern Syria?
President Trump has stated that Turkey is now responsible for IS prisoners that have been detained by
U.S. partner forces; does Turkey have the capability and/or intent to take on that responsibility? What
actions, if any, has Turkey taken to prepare to take control of these prisoners? At present, who is
controlling detention facilities in different areas of eastern Syria?
Turkey’s Syrian partner forces. Who are the Syrian-origin forces with which Turkey is partnering in its
incursion into northeastern Syria? To what extent does Turkey have control over these Syrian partner
forces, some of which have been accused of human rights violations or potential war crimes? How might
local Arab and Kurdish communities in eastern Syria view these forces?
Humanitarian concerns. As of October 18, the U.N. estimates that renewed conflict in northeastern
Syria has displaced more than 160,000, including 70,000 children, though organizations operating on the
ground suggest the actual figure may be closer to 300,000. (An estimated 710,000 Syrians were already
internally displaced prior to the outbreak of fighting on October 9.) The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicates that contingency plans include as many as 400,000
civilians who may require humanitarian assistance and protection in the event of enduring full-scale
military operations in the region.2 What are the most recent displacement figures in northeastern Syria? Is
Turkey providing humanitarian assistance in northeastern Syria, or allowing international and local aid
organizations access to do so? How are IDPs being accommodated? What are the most acute
humanitarian needs in northeastern Syria? Are there any U.S.-funded humanitarian partners operating in
northeastern Syria? What are the potential consequences, humanitarian or otherwise, of the likely
curtailment of U.S. stabilization activities? What are the latest estimates of casualties resulting from the
Turkish operations?
Refugee return. Turkish leaders face political pressure to facilitate the return of some of the 3.6 million
Syrian refugees in Turkey. One of Turkey’s stated goals of Operation Peace Spring is to create a zone in
northeastern Syria in which some refugees can be settled. What share of Syrian refugees in Turkey are
from this proposed zone? Do reports of some instances of forced return to Syria by Turkey before this
operation presage larger returns of Syrian refugees? How many Syrian refugees does Turkey plan to
return? What are the implications of such reported forced returns under international humanitarian and
refugee law? What are the implications of population moves that may alter regional demographics?
PKK. Turkey considers the Kurdish militia known as the People's Protection Units (YPG) to be the
Syrian branch of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a U.S.-designated terror group that has waged a
decades-long insurgency in Turkey. U.S. officials have acknowledged YPG-PKK ties, but generally
consider the two groups distinct. What are the YPG’s goals in Syria? What is the nature of ties, whether
military, political, or otherwise, between the YPG and the PKK? Do the two groups coordinate in Syria or
elsewhere?
2 CRS correspondence with UNHCR staff, October 16, 2019.
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Turkish objectives. To what extent has Turkey achieved its core objectives in reducing the YPG’s profile
in northeastern Syria given the YPG’s now-reduced territorial control and the terms under which the YPG
is cooperating with the Syrian government?
U.S. Policy and Military Presence in Syria
Residual U.S. force in eastern Syria. How accurate are reports of a possible stationing of about 200 U.S.
military personnel in eastern Syria away from the immediate Turkey-Syria border area and closer to the
Syria-Iraq border? What U.S. interests would such a residual force seek to advance or protect, what
measures would ensure its force protection, lines of communication, and capability to carry out its
mission, and what factors would determine the duration and rules of engagement surrounding its
deployment?
U.S. counter-IS operations. How is the departure of U.S. troops from northeastern Syria impacting
counter-IS operations? Will U.S. forces remain at locations east of the Euphrates River near Dayr ez-
Zour? If so, for how long, for what purposes, with what partners, and under what authorization? What are
the roles, missions, and locations of remaining U.S. troops in theater? How have logistics and resupply
lines been impacted by the departure of U.S. troops? What are the implications of the Syrian and Russian
presence at vacated U.S. bases and positions in northeastern Syria? What was the U.S. withdrawal
strategy from Syria before this, and how have recent events impacted that strategy? What is the future of
the Global Counter-IS Coalition? What role will the coalition have going forward and what approach does
the United States plan to take toward the coalition and its working groups focused on foreign fighters,
financing, and counter-extremism?
SDF and U.S.-led counter-IS campaign. The U.S. has partnered with the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) against the Islamic State in Syria. To what extent have SDF operations against the Islamic State
been impacted by Operation Peace Spring? Under what circumstances, if any, might U.S.-SDF
cooperation against the Islamic State return to pre-Operation Peace Spring levels? What evidence, if any,
exists that IS sleeper cells and other supporters may seek to capitalize on the Turkish incursion to execute
attacks or reestablish control over territory? Given that trust is an essential component of successful
partnered operations, might recent events complicate the U.S.’s ability to work with the SDF in the
future? Might non-Kurdish elements of the SDF remain open to working with the United States? Why or
why not? Should the authority and funding of the Department of Defense train and equip program for
Syria be revised to reflect new circumstances and objectives? If so, how?
Reducing the YPG’s fighting capacity. The October 17 U.S.-Turkey joint statement surrounding the
announced pause in fighting calls for “the re-collection of YPG [a key component of the SDF] heavy
weapons and the disablement of their fortifications and all other fighting positions.” Does the statement
reflect a plan to carry out these measures immediately or merely the two sides’ future aspirations? U.S.
officials previously assured Turkey that heavy weapons the U.S. provided to the YPG would be taken
back. How might reductions in the YPG’s fighting capacity take place given the change in the U.S.
military’s presence in the area? Who would be responsible for enforcing these reductions?
IS resurgence. How capable are Syrian, Russian, and Turkish forces of extending security control over
northeastern Syria and preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State group? To what extent do they
prioritize the counter-Islamic State mission in relation to other goals? What posture should the United
States take with regard to counter-IS and stabilization efforts by Turkey, Syria, and Russia?
IS prisoners. Prior to the Turkish incursion, SDF forces in Syria held approximately 10,000 IS militants
in custody at several makeshift prisons in northern Syria, and provided security at the Al Hol IDP camp
and other locations where additional IS family members and/or supporters are among the populations.
How secure are IS detention facilities following the Turkish incursion? What are the biggest security
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challenges at these facilities? To what extent does IS prioritize the freeing of these individuals? Against
whom are they likely to take up arms? How many fighters and supporters have escaped to date?
Iran. U.S. forces in northeastern Syria were not directly contesting the activities of Iran-aligned elements
of the Syrian and Iraqi security forces in the area, but were in a position to monitor them. U.S. forces
regularly operated along routes connecting the two countries. How might the withdrawal affect patterns of
Iranian weapons shipments via Syria? How, if at all, does the announced U.S. withdrawal affect U.S.
options for monitoring and interdicting Iranian weapons shipments? Does the U.S. withdrawal increase or
decrease the likelihood of the withdrawal from Syria of Iranian forces?
Asad-Kurdish reconciliation and implications for a political settlement. Political elements of the SDF
forces had created a de facto autonomous political structure in northeastern Syria that is now being
reconciled with and/or subsumed under the control of the Bashar al Asad government in Damascus. How
has the agreement between the SDF and the Syrian military affected the SDF so far? To what extent, if at
all, has the group been absorbed into Syrian military units? How might any reassertion of political and
security control by the Syrian government over northeastern Syria affect the overall balance of power in
Syria, and prospects for a political solution to the Syrian conflict? How might the Asad government and
its backers change their approach to negotiations? Why, and with what implications for the United States?
What effect does the U.S. withdrawal have on U.S. influence over future negotiations? Why?
U.S.‐Turkey Relations
U.S. sanctions. President Trump signed an Executive Order on October 14 that lays the groundwork for
sanctions to target “such sectors of the Turkish economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury,” and the Secretary designated some initial ministers and ministries for sanctions that same day.
Secretary Mnuchin has stated that “We can continue to ramp up these sanctions.”3 What would the “ramp
up” target be? What economic pressures, if any, are being considered for Turkey’s private sectors? Is the
president consulting with European and NATO allies to build multinational coordinated economic
pressure on the government of Turkey to influence its decision-making? How will the October 17 U.S.-
Turkey joint statement accompanying the announced pause in fighting affect the existing sanctions
designations and U.S. options for future designations?
Sanctions, Congress, and bilateral relations. How might sanctions on Turkey over its involvement in
Syria affect broader U.S.-Turkey relations, and what factors might determine that effect? Are broader
sanctions from Congress that could mandate sanctions on certain parties and require the Administration to
report on President Erdogan’s net worth and sources of income a good idea? Why or why not? How, if at
all, might the recent U.S.-negotiated “pause” or other developments on the ground in Syria impact
congressional consideration of possible sanctions?
CAATSA. In light of the Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria, some Members have renewed calls
that Turkey be subject to sanction under the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of
2017 (title II of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; 22
U.S.C. 9525)) for its acquisition of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. The United States
already suspended Turkey’s participation in the joint development of the F-35 fighter jet, in response to
the S-400 deal. Is the Administration considering taking any further restrictive steps, including the
imposition of sanctions under CAATSA? Is there a chance that Turkey might either reverse its
3 Vice President Pence has cited the president’s assertion that “The United States is going to continue to take actions against
Turkey’s economy until they bring the violence to an end.” “VP Mike Pence, Treasury Sec. Steven Mnuchin speak after Pres.
Trump announces Turkey sanctions via tweet,” ABC News Live, October 14, 2019.
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acquisition of the S-400 or refrain from operating it? If so, could triggering CAATSA sanctions affect
Turkey’s decision on this issue, and if so, how?
Possible Syria/S-400 linkage, sanctions, and national security waiver. Is the Administration’s
diplomacy with Turkey on Operation Peace Spring linked at all to the S-400 issue, and if so, how? Could
sticks and carrots from Congress linking Turkey’s actions in Syria with the S-400 and CAATSA be
effective? Would the Administration be inclined to support any of the pending sanctions bills triggering
CAATSA? If so, which ones? Would it be inclined to support any of these bills if they included national
security waivers for the Administration tied to changes in Turkish behavior on the S-400 as well as Syria?
Please explain your answers.
U.S. arms sales. What kinds of arms, and in what volume, does the United States sell Turkey? How
important are U.S. defense relationships for Turkey? Several European states have suspended arms
exports to Turkey; is the United States considering taking similar action?4
U.S. basing in Turkey. How, if at all, should ongoing developments affect U.S. military posture and
equipment based in Turkey? What are other basing options in the region, and what kind of feasibility
studies and other evaluations, if any, should take place in considering these options alongside options in
Turkey? Should the United States consider moving sensitive military assets—some open source reporting
speculates on the presence of possible U.S. tactical nuclear weapons—out of Turkey? If so, what
considerations should be involved? How would relocating personnel and materiel affect relations and
future military options regarding Turkey?
U.S. economic leverage. What economic leverage does the United States have with regard to
Turkey? Although Turkey is not a major trading partner of the United States, accounting for less than 1%
of U.S. exports and imports, many major U.S. companies are actively engaged in business operations with
the Turkish market. Should U.S. businesses continue “business as usual” with Turkey? How would U.S.
consumers and investors be impacted by increased sanctions on Turkey?
Financial markets. Turkey, like many countries, relies on access to U.S. financial markets to process
international payments and borrow to finance their governments. Should the United States restrict
Turkey’s access to U.S. financial markets?
Economic stability in Turkey. In September 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessed the
“current calm” in Turkey’s economy as “fragile.”5 If geopolitical uncertainty and/or increased sanctions
on Turkey trigger a broader financial and/or currency crisis in Turkey, what would the ramifications be for
(a) the domestic political situation in Turkey, and (b) the potential spillover risks to the global economy?
Halkbank indictment. Did Operation Peace Spring affect the timing of the indictment issued by the
Justice Department on October 15 against Halkbank (a Turkish bank that is majority-owned by the
government) for possible violations of Iran sanctions legislation? Does the indictment increase U.S.
leverage over Erdogan and other officials on Syria and other matters? What are the possible implications
of a guilty verdict for Halkbank and the Turkish economy?
U.S. trade policy. On October 14, 2019, the President announced that he would raise tariffs on steel
imports from Turkey back to 50% and also stop bilateral negotiations to expand U.S.-Turkey trade. Given
limited trade between the United States and Turkey, including in steel, what additional trade measures
4 One media report suggests that the Administration may be crafting waivers to explicitly permit continued U.S. arms sales to
Turkey. Tony Bertuca, “U.S. crafting waivers to continue arms sales to Turkey,” Inside Defense, October 15, 2019.
5 International Monetary Fund, “Turkey: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2019 Article IV Mission,” September 23, 2019.
Turkey, the world’s 19th largest economy, has low reserves, high private-sector debt denominated in foreign currencies, and high
external financing needs.
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could the Administration pursue to increase pressure on Turkey? How might potential further trade
restrictions affect U.S. exporters and investors who use Turkey as a regional hub for doing business?
International Reactions
Implications for NATO. On October 14, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that he would “press our
other NATO allies to take collective and individual diplomatic and economic measures in response to
these egregious Turkish actions.” What might these measures be? What has been the response within
NATO to Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria? Since 2013, NATO has provided air defense
support for Turkey along its border with Syria – is this mission ongoing? Are recent media reports
accurate regarding an impending withdrawal of Italy’s SAMP/T air defense battery and a possible
withdrawal of Spain’s Patriot battery? Has the Administration consulted with Italy, Spain, or other NATO
allies on this point? Does NATO have any established processes to adjudicate disputes between member
states? Are there institutional mechanisms within NATO by which a group of member states could seek to
change the nature of another member’s participation within the organization? Has this happened in the
past?
Europe. On October 14, all 28 member states of the European Union (22 of whom are also NATO
members) agreed to “commit to strong national positions regarding their arms export policy to Turkey.”
Several EU member states, including Italy (Europe’s top arms exporter to Turkey), France, and Germany
have suspended arms exports to Turkey, but the EU did not implement a formal EU-wide arms embargo.
What is the impact, if any, of these decisions? How else has the EU or individual European states reacted
to Turkish actions, and how might they do so in the future? To what extent are European options vis-à-vis
Turkey constrained or otherwise impacted by the Turkey-EU refugee agreement?
U.S. partners in the Middle East. How will the change in U.S. force posture affect the security of U.S.
partners in Jordan, Israel, Iraq, and the Gulf States? How have the governments of these countries
reacted? How, if at all, might they seek to secure their interests differently?
National Security and Defense Policy Concerns
Implications for partnership strategy. Despite assertions by Trump Administration officials that U.S.
support for the SDF was “temporary, tactical and transactional,” publicly-articulated frustrations by the
SDF, U.S. Special Operations Forces soldiers, and other U.S. officials suggest some believe the U.S.
betrayed a key partner. What might other U.S. security partners – both present and future – discern from a
public perception of abandonment? The U.S. partnership with the SDF has long been in tension with its
NATO-allied relationship with Turkey, which views the YPG as a terror threat and has expressed its own
frustrations regarding perceived U.S. abandonment after having opened its bases to counter-IS operations.
How can the United States better navigate this multiplicity of regional interests and security perceptions?
Implications for “strategic competition.” How might the U.S. withdrawal from northeastern Syria
affect the ongoing strategic competition between Russia and the United States, both in the Middle East
and globally? Might recent developments indicate any shifts in Turkey’s geostrategic alignment away
from the United States and towards Russia? Or, conversely, might the decision to withdraw from
northeast Syria reduce tensions in the U.S.-Turkish relationship resulting from U.S. cooperation with the
SDF?