Tunisia: Examining the State of Democracy and Next Steps for U.S. Policy
Statement of
Alexis Arieff
Specialist in African Affairs
Before
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism
U.S. House of Representatives
Hearing on
“Tunisia: Examining the State of Democracy
and Next Steps for U.S. Policy”
October 12, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
TE10068
Congressional Research Service
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Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting the Congressional Research Service to testify today. My statement provides an
overview of political, economic, and security issues in Tunisia, and summarizes U.S. relations and aid. I
also identify several potential policy issues and chal enges facing Congress as you look ahead.
Introduction: Tunisia and the United States at a Crossroads
Starting on July 25, President Kaïs Saïed has asserted sweeping executive powers, unilateral y dismissing
the prime minister and suspending parliament along with much of the constitution adopted in the wake of
Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising. The president has announced his intent to rule by decree and to amend
the constitution and electoral law, without indicating how long the current “state of exception” may last.1
President Saïed’s actions have fueled uncertainty about the future of Tunisia’s nascent democracy, which
successive U.S. Administrations and Congresses have sought to foster.
Tunisians have expressed differing reactions to President Saïed’s decisions amid shared concerns about
economic suffering, partisan infighting, police abuses, and the dismissed prime minister’s ineffective
response to an acute wave of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases in mid-2021. Some Tunisians
view President Saïed as safeguarding the promise of Tunisia’s 2011 uprising from al egedly corrupt and
ineffective parliamentarians and other members of the post-2011 political class.2 Others perceive a
dangerous power grab that threatens to derail Tunisia’s fragile gains in advancing individual rights and
government checks and balances over the past decade.3 Many are adopting a wait-and-see attitude. The
potential for broad coalition building, or conversely greater polarization and confrontation, is in question.
In mid-August, a senior Biden Administration delegation traveled to Tunis and urged President Saïed to
undertake “a swift return to the path of Tunisia’s parliamentary democracy,” including by appointing “a
prime minister designate who would form a capable government able to address the immediate economic
and health crises facing Tunisia.”4 Six weeks later, on September 29, President Saïed named a new prime
minister—Najla Bouden Romdhane, a geology professor and the first woman to hold the position in
Tunisia and the Arab world—while placing constraints on her independence and authority.5 On October
11, he swore in new cabinet members, who apparently wil not undergo parliamentary confirmation.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about developments in Tunisia.6 Several have cal ed
on the executive branch to review—and possibly suspend—certain types of U.S. aid or security
1 Presidential Decree No. 2021-117, September 22, 2021; Reuters, “T unisian President Declares T ransitional Rules, New
Electoral Law,” September 21, 2021; and Reuters, “T unisia’s President Saied Indicates He Will Amend Constitution,” September
12, 2021.
2 Reuters, “ T housands rally for T unisian president urging change to political system ,” October 3, 2021. See also Fadil Aliriza,
“Why many T unisians are celebrating President Saied’s decision,” Middle East Institute (MEI), July 26, 2021.
3 The National, “As the T unisian Leader T ightens His Rule, Some Worry When Democracy Will Return ,” October 1, 2021.
4 White House, “ Readout from NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Senior Administration Officials T ravel to T unisia ,” August
13, 2021.
5 Prime Minister Bouden report edly has little government experience apart from implementing World Bank projects at the
education ministry. Under Decree No. 2021-117, the president appoints the prime minister and sets “ general policy,” which the
cabinet implements. Under the constitution, by contrast, the prime minister sets “ general policy” and is confirmed by parliament,
along with the cabinet; the president’s executive powers are limited to defense, foreign relations, and national security.
6 See, e.g., House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), “Meeks, Deutch Issue Statement on Developments in T unisia,” July 26,
2021; statement by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) on T witter, July 26, 2021, 9:21am; statement by
Representative Rashida T laib on T witter, July 26, 2021 , 3:06pm; Josh Rogin, “ Opinion: Biden Must T ry Harder to Stop the Coup
in T unisia,” July 26, 2021 [citing Senator Lindsey Graham and Rep. Joe Wilson]; HFAC Republicans, “ McCaul Statement on
Events in T unisia,” July 27, 2021; NAT O Parliamentary Assembly, “ NAT O PA President’s statement on the situation in
T unisia,” July 27, 2021; House Democracy Partnership, “Bipartisan House Democracy Partnership Co -Chairs Release Statement
on the Situation in T unisia,” July 30, 2021; SFRC, “ Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch Joint Statement on Political
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cooperation.7 Events since July 25 have unfolded after the House Appropriations Committee reported its
FY2022 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bil (H.R. 4373), which the
House passed on July 28. The bil would provide $197 mil ion in bilateral aid for Tunisia, equivalent to
the Biden Administration’s budget proposal. Reporting the bil on July 6, House appropriators asserted
that, “a stable and viable democratic Tunisia is critical to regional security” (H.Rept. 117-84).
Congress has annual y provided $191 mil ion in U.S. bilateral aid appropriations and $50 mil ion in
additional prior-year funds for Tunisia in recent years (discussed below), and did not enact aid cuts
proposed by the Trump Administration. The Defense Department also has provided military training and
equipment, and support for border security. In June 2021, the U.S. Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation
(MCC) approved a five-year, $499 mil ion development aid compact. According to MCC, the compact
has not been signed to date “due to democratic governance concerns following the events of July 25”; for
full funding to be made available, Tunisia’s parliament must also ratify the compact pursuant to Tunisian
law, and then MCC and the government of Tunisia must agree for the compact to enter into force.8
U.S. diplomatic messaging since July 25 has been broadly consistent with that of other Western donors,
which have cal ed for a return to “constitutional order.”9 Some governments in the region, such as Egypt
and Algeria, have expressed support for Saïed; Turkey has issued mixed signals, while other international
players, including Russia and China, have been publicly circumspect.10 To date, U.S. officials have not
publicly indicated what measures they might consider if President Saïed does not take steps to restore
“parliamentary democracy” or articulate an alternative inclusive political path forward.
The extent to which President Saïed may be susceptible to external pressure is debatable. He won election
in a landslide in 2019 after running an “anti-system” campaign as an independent with no prior
government experience.11 He does not have a political party, appears to rely on a smal circle of advisors,
and has castigated domestic critics as corrupt and treacherous.12 Political party leaders and Tunisia’s
powerful trade union, the UGTT, have grown more critical of President Saïed’s approach in recent weeks,
with UGTT leaders rejecting “the president’s monopoly on [constitutional] amendments” as “a danger to
democracy.”13 Saïed nonetheless appears to enjoy greater popular support at present than many of his
chief antagonists, and faces few evident institutional checks on his authority. In recent weeks, thousands
have turned to the streets in rival protests for and against the president, to uncertain effect.
Tunisians have expressed differing views on the desirability of external pressure. Debates over how to
judge and react to Saïed’s moves reflect, in part, divisions over “who gets to speak for or on behalf of
Tunisians, and to what extent international entities should influence its domestic affairs.”14 Some Tunisian
Crisis in T unisia,” August 5, 2021; Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy Statement on T unisian President’s Extension of State of
Emergency,” August 24, 2021; HFAC, “ McCaul, Meeks, Deutch, Wilson Issue Statement on Recent Develo pments in T unisia,”
August 31, 2021; U.S. Embassy in T unisia, “ U.S. Congressional Delegation Led by Senators Chris Murphy and Jon Ossoff Met
President Kais Saied,” September 5, 2021.
7 The CT Mirror, “Murphy: T unisia’s president Saied is not keeping his word,” September 27, 2021; Tunisie Numérique, “3
members of US congress call on Biden to intervene to restore Tunisian parliament ,” September 25, 2021; statement by
Representative Ilhan Omar on T witter, July 27, 2021, 11:56am.
8 MCC communications with CRS, October 2021.
9 Statement by Group of Seven (G7) Ambassadors in T unisia, September 6, 2021.
10 Reuters, “ Egypt, Algeria agree on full support for T unisian president – statement,” August 1, 2021; T ASS, “ Problems in
T unisia must be settled by legal means — Russian foreign ministry,” July 27, 2021. China’s government does not appear to have
responded publicly to President Saïed’s actions. See also Al Jazeera, “ World reacts to T unisia’s political turmoil,” July 26, 2021.
11 NDI, “T he ‘real anti-system candidate’ set to curb foreign funds, remake T unisian politics,” October 14, 2019.
12 Reuters, “ T unisian president rejects dialogue with ‘traitors,’” September 15, 2021.
13 Reuters, “ T unisia labour union rejects Saied power grab, widening opposition ,” September 24, 2021.
14 Intissar Fakir, “ A coup or not? What happened in T unisia and what comes next?” MEI, August 5, 2021. In recent years,
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politicians have cal ed for “international condemnation” of Saïed’s actions, arguing that Tunisia is a rare
example of regional democracy that is under strain and in need of protection.15 At the same time, many
Tunisians insist that their country must be seen on its own terms (not in comparison to other countries in
the region), and protected from what they view as external interference.16
Context
January 14, 2021, marked the ten-year anniversary of Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution,” in which peaceful
protesters ousted the authoritarian regime of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked protests in countries
across the Middle East and North Africa. While other countries affected by the “Arab Spring” uprisings
went on to face brutal conflicts and/or resurgent authoritarianism, in Tunisia, an elected assembly adopted
a new constitution establishing a democratic political system and protecting freedoms of expression and
conscience. A quartet of local civil society and trade union organizations that helped resolve a 2013
political crisis, securing passage of the constitution, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015. Tunisia has held
two competitive general elections under the 2014 constitution—most recently in 2019—each of which
resulted in a peaceful transfer of power. Elections were also held in 2018 to fil new municipal posts, a
key step toward political decentralization. U.S. officials heralded Tunisia’s political transition, and U.S.
aid and diplomatic engagement expanded significantly after 2011, with bipartisan support in Congress.17
Stil , many Tunisians view the promise of the 2011 uprising as unfulfil ed.18 Survey data suggest that most
Tunisians support democracy, but are disappointed by the performance of their post-2011 political system
and leaders—citing economic grievances and corruption as top concerns even prior to the depredations of
the COVID-19 pandemic (see “The Economy,” below).19 Fractious coalition governments and recurrent
political crises have stymied deeper institutional reforms and undermined politicians’ accountability to
voters.20 In recent years, grievances over high unemployment and inflation, corruption, and police
brutality have spurred protests, labor unrest, and a voter backlash against mainstream politicians. Few if
any politicians or officials have advanced a clear plan to address these issues.
Severe hardships wrought by the pandemic have fueled further popular discontent in 2021 against the
backdrop of perceived political dysfunction. In January 2021, large crowds turned out in street protests in
defiance of a nationwide curfew, to which police reportedly responded with “excessive force.”21 In July,
as Tunisian officials warned that the health system might “collapse” amid an acute wave of COVID-19
T unisian activists have expressed concerns about illicit campaign financing and foreign lobbying contracts, arguing that T uni sian
political factions are competing on an uneven playing field at home and abroad. See, e.g., Tunisie Num érique, “ New lobbying
contracts – I WAT CH files a complaint against Ennahdha,” October 5, 2021.
15 Rached Ghannouchi, “ My Country Has Been a Dictatorship Before. We Can’t Go Back.” New York Times, July 30, 2021.
16 See, e.g., Ouiem Chettaoui, “T unisia: Western Pundits or ‘Hot -Take’ Arsonists,” Jadaliyya, August 1, 2021.
17 See “T unisia,” in CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies.
18 See, e.g., Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), “ Expert Q&A – T unisians Reflect on the T enth Anniversary of the
Dignity Revolution,” December 17, 2020.
19 According to the Arab Barometer survey, 79% of T unisian respondents agreed as of 2018 that “Democracies have problems,
but are better than other systems,” but the proportion who expressed either “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in gover nment
had fallen to 20% from 62% in 2011 (Arab Barometer V, Tunisia Country Report, 2019). T unisian respondents ranked economic
issues as their top concern and expressed the view that public safety and the quality of government services had declined sin ce
2011 while corruption had expanded. A poll by the U.S. International Republican Institute (IRI) in 2019 found that 87% of
T unisians thought their country was headed in the wrong direction, the highest level registered since IRI polls began in late 2011.
Nearly half of respondents assessed T unisia’s political system as either a “ flawed democracy” or “ not a democracy at all” (IRI,
Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Tunisia, January 25 -February 11, 2019).
20 See, e.g., remarks by Amna Guellali in POMED, “Examining T unisia’s Political Crisis,” August 5, 2021; and Sharan Grewal
and Shadi Hamid, “ T he dark side of consensus in T unisia: Lessons from 2015-2019,” Brookings, January 2020.
21 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “ T unisia: Police Use Violent T actics to Quash Protests,” February 5, 2021.
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cases and deaths, 22 President Kaïs Saïed and then-Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi were in a standoff
over control of cabinet appointments and the security apparatus. Mismanagement, “lack of transparency,”
and political interference reportedly marred initial state vaccination efforts.23
Presidential Assertion of a “State of Exception”
It was in this tense context that many Tunisians celebrated President Kaïs Saïed’s announcement on July
25 that he was dismissing the prime minister, suspending parliament, and lifting parliamentary immunity,
citing Article 80 of the constitution.24 President Saïed later extended parliament’s suspension indefinitely,
asserted the right to govern by decree without constitutional review, suspended sections of the
constitution that contradict these assertions, and announced plans to amend the constitution and electoral
law via a commission of presidential appointees. Among the starkest symbols of the president’s actions
has been his deployment of the military to bar members of parliament from entering the building.
President Saïed has invoked undefined imminent threats in asserting these authorities, but he has long
been a public critic of directly elected parliaments, political parties, and Tunisia’s post-2011 political
system and leaders.25 Saïed’s anti-corruption message, pledges of systemic change, and outsider
credentials appear to have endeared him to the voters who elected him in 2019, but the extent of popular
support for various alternative political systems is uncertain.
Although President Saïed has pledged since July 25 to protect individual freedoms, human rights
advocates have expressed alarm about the concentration of powers in his hands and the apparent lack of
due process in recent actions pursued against politicians, political parties, business figures, and
journalists.26 Several members of parliament have been arrested and/or charged by military prosecutors,
some after they criticized Saïed.27 Dozens of officials and businesspersons reportedly have faced opaque
travel bans or house arrest orders, and local journalists have reported increased harassment.28 In August,
state security forces raided the national anticorruption body, suspended its activities indefinitely, and
ordered its director under house arrest without formal legal justification.29
It remains to be seen whether President Saïed can deliver improvements in Tunisians’ daily lives, and
how he might respond if more of the public turns against his leadership. Tunisia’s COVID-19 vaccination
program has registered significant advances since July, after President Saïed placed the military in charge
of pandemic response and donors, including the United States, increased vaccine deliveries.30 Addressing
22 Reuters, “ T unisia says health care system collapsing due to COVID-19,” July 8, 2021.
23 Amnesty International, “Tunisian authorities must accelerate fair access to vaccines, as Covid-19 cases soar,” July 15, 2021.
24 Article 80 authorizes and limits presidential authorities “in the event of imminent danger.” T he text states that parliament “shal
be deemed to be in continuous session throughout such a period,” does not explicitly grant the president authority to dismi ss the
cabinet, and states that measures “shall guarantee, as soon as possible, a return to the normal functioning of state institutions.”
25 Mohamed-Dhia Hammami, “Past as Prologue: Kaïs Saïed’s Prior Statements Point T o Upcoming Political Moves,” POMED,
August 10, 2021.
26 HRW, “ T unisia: President’s Repressive Policies Abrogate Rights,” op. cit.; Amnesty International, “ Carving up the
Constitution represents a threat to human rights,” October 2, 2021.
27 T unisian laws permit military courts to try certain categories of offenses by civilians, a practice international human rights
groups have criticized. Hamza Mighri and Sharan Grewal, “Reforming T unisia’s Military Courts,” Brookings, November 2019.
28 HRW, “ T unisia: President’s Repressive Policies Abrogate Rights,” op. cit.; Middle East Eye, “T unisia: Police raid opposition
T V channel as more arrest warrants issued for journalists,” October 6, 2021; Nawaat, “ Concerns over Press Freedom as
Journalists Harassed, Detained,” August 2, 2021.
29 HRW, “ T unisia: President’s Repressive Policies Abrogate Rights,” September 11, 2021. T he house arrest order has reportedly
since been lifted (T AP, “ Chawki T abib Sees House Arrest Lifted,” October 10, 2021).
30 As of September 28, T unisia had administered over 8 million COVID-19 vaccine doses, or 68 per 100 inhabitants, one of the
higher rates in Africa, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) COVID -19 Dashboard.
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deep-seated economic chal enges may prove more chal enging. In the near term, President Saïed’s actions
appear to have interrupted already tense negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over a
new lending program, elevating the chance of a fiscal and/or debt repayment crisis.31 President Saïed has
reportedly ordered local traders to charge less for food and medicine, and floated an offer of amnesty for
corrupt individuals if they agree to finance infrastructure projects, but he has not articulated a broader
economic plan. Previous governments have struggled to address economic grievances such as high
unemployment and cost of living while adhering to donor-backed appeals for greater fiscal discipline.
Tunisian views of President Saïed’s moves are reportedly divided and likely to be fluid.32 Pro-Saïed
protesters have cal ed for parliament’s full dissolution. Leaders of the largest party in parliament, self-
described Muslim Democratic Al Nahda (alt. Ennahda, “Rennaissance”), have decried President Saïed’s
actions as a “coup” and cal ed for reinstatement of the legislature and a national dialogue on political
reforms.33 As noted above, several other political parties have grown more critical of President Saïed’s
actions in recent weeks, as has the UGTT, Tunisia’s largest civic organization, which played a central role
in mediating previous political crises. Yet, polls suggest that the president remains broadly popular, and
that his political opponents—notably Al Nahda leader and speaker of parliament Rached Ghannouchi—
suffer from a comparatively deep deficit of public trust.34 Reflecting these dynamics, Al Nahda and other
parties have exhibited internal schisms over how to respond.
A Strained Political Prelude
Voters in the 2019 elections largely rejected established parties and candidates in favor of independents
and non-career politicians. President Saïed, an independent, is a constitutional scholar who, prior to his
election, was known primarily for his critique of Tunisia's post-2011 political system and his social y
conservative views.35 Saïed campaigned in 2019 as an anti-corruption and anti-establishment figure,
citing few policy specifics. After narrowly besting a crowded field of candidates in the first round of the
presidential vote, he won a landslide in a run-off against Nabil Karoui, a secularist media mogul with ties
to the Ben Ali regime, who spent most of the campaign period in jail on money laundering charges.
The parliamentary election results similarly diminished the weight of mainstream parties and scrambled
prior political al iances, rendering a durable coalition and clear policy mandate elusive. Al Nahda won a
plurality of seats (52 out of 217), and Ghannouchi was elected speaker of parliament. However, the results
cemented a continuing decline in Al Nahda’s electoral weight since 2011, and rising internal tensions
have belied the party’s reputation as a disciplined political force.36 The 2019 elections saw the rise of the
Free Destourian (“Constitutional”) Party, led by Abir Moussi, a former top official in the Ben Ali-era
ruling party who has decried Tunisia’s 2011 uprising as a foreign plot, along with a conservative Islamist
coalition known as Karama (“Dignity”). Moussi has regularly sought to disrupt parliamentary
proceedings, while an independent MP assaulted Moussi on the floor of parliament in mid-2021 and
Karama’s leader Seifeddine Makhlouf insulted her in misogynistic terms.37
31 Reuters, “ Now in charge, T unisian president faces looming fiscal crisis,” August 17, 2021.
32 Zogby Research Services, Tunisia’s Bumpy Road, public opinion poll released on October 4, 2021.
33 The Independent, “Tunisian opposition leader urges president to ‘pull back from the brink’ and engage in dialogue,” August
10, 2021.
34 Zogby Research Services, Tunisia’s Bumpy Road, op. cit.
35 See, e.g., POMED, “A Guide to T unisia's 2019 Presidential Election,” September 2019.
36 Anne Wolf, “Is Rached Ghannouchi Ennahda’s President for Life?” POMED, July 2021; and Hatem Nafti, “Ennahda défait par
l’épreuve du pouvoir,” OrientXXI, March 18, 2021.
37 T AP, “ Assault On Abir Moussi - LT DH Calls On the Ministry of Women and Public Prosecutor to T ake Necessary Measures,”
July 1, 2021.
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Prior to 2019, Al Nahda and Nidaa Tounes (“Tunisia's Cal ”), a big-tent secularist party, dominated
Tunisia’s political landscape and shared power in a series of “consensus” coalition governments. This
uneasy partnership delivered the landmark local-level elections in 2018 and the adoption of a new law
against gender-based violence in 2017. However, political leaders did not respond as effectively to public
demands for job creation, investment in impoverished interior regions, and accountability for corruption
and other abuses.38 Al Nahda and Nidaa Tounes passed a controversial 2017 law granting amnesty for
public officials implicated in corruption under Ben Ali, and Nidaa Tounes effectively disbanded Tunisia’s
post-2011 Truth and Dignity commission before its slated completion. Partisan disagreements prevented
the establishment of a constitutional court, one of several new institutions mandated under the 2014
constitution. In its absence, Tunisia lacks an institution empowered to judge constitutional disputes.
Parliamentary gridlock and internecine disputes appear to have deepened public frustrations with
government actors.39 With no party able to claim a clear legislative mandate, members of parliament twice
spent months negotiating the selection of a prime minister before settling on two successive technocrats
named by President Saïed—most recently Hichem Mechichi, whom the president dismissed on July 25.40
According to local anticorruption activists, parliamentary immunity (now suspended) has protected
several members from charges of tax evasion or embezzlement.41
As al uded to above, the proximate trigger for President Saïed’s July 25 seizure of power was a worsening
dispute with Mechichi over control of executive powers. The 2014 constitution divides executive
authorities between the president and prime minister, who is confirmed by parliament. The standoff
echoed similar frictions under Saïed’s predecessor, President Béji Caïd Essebsi (in office 2014-2019). The
constitutional court, if it existed, would be the final authority on how to resolve disagreements regarding
constitutional divisions of responsibility. In early 2021, President Saïed rejected a bil that could have
sped the process of establishing the court. He also publicly floated a return to Tunisia’s 1959 constitution,
which established a strong presidency with few checks and balances.
The Economy
The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened Tunisia’s economic chal enges through its disruptive impact on
global tourism and trade, along with the effects of local lockdown measures. Tunisia’s economy shrank
by an estimated 8.6% in 2020, following years of anemic growth, according to IMF data. These pressures
have spurred burgeoning fiscal and debt repayment chal enges; gross public debt, which stood at 74% of
GDP in 2019, has risen to an estimated 90% of GDP in 2021. Textiles, agriculture, tourism, and phosphate
mining are key sectors of Tunisia’s economy; Tunisia produces some oil, but is a net energy importer.
Economic chal enges prior to 2020 had already shrunk the size and purchasing power of Tunisia’s once
robust middle class.42 Nominal per-capita GDP dropped below the World Bank’s upper middle-income
threshold (currently $4,096) in 2015, and stood at $3,323 in 2020, per IMF data. The unemployment rate
has hovered around 15% in recent years and rose above 17% in 2020; the rate is reportedly more than
twice as high among young people. Some austerity measures implemented at the urging of donors—such
as devaluation of the dinar and tax increases—arguably deepened economic grievances without delivering
greater fiscal sustainability.43 The IMF has urged Tunisia to downsize state-owned enterprises and phase
38 See Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher, “ T unisia’s Corruption Contagion: A T ransition at Risk,” CEIP, October 25, 2017.
39 The Arab Weekly, “Violence marks new low in T unisian parliamentary politics,” December 7, 2020.
40 Under the constitution, the largest party in parliament nominates a prime minister, who must then be confirmed by a legisla tive
majority. If this does not happen, the president may put forward a nominee, again subject to parliamentary confirmation.
41 See, e.g., T weet by iWatch on T witter, August 1, 2021, 3:12pm.
42 Middle East Eye, “‘T wo classes left - rich and poor’: Sinking T unisia's currency,” May 4, 2018.
43 Fadil Aliriza, “ In surveys, T unisians tell of continuous economic grievances,” MEI, September 27, 2021; The Economist,
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out energy subsidies, but prior attempts to do so have sparked intense opposition from the UGTT and the
public.44
Tunisia’s economy has struggled since 2011 amid domestic tensions, the war in Libya (previously a
destination for Tunisian workers), and economic strains in the European Union, Tunisia’s largest trade
partner. Investor perceptions of political risk, terrorism threats, and labor unrest have chal enged efforts to
promote private sector growth and address corruption and inequalities that fed discontent during the Ben
Ali era. Successive governments do not appear to have substantively advanced reforms of state
regulations that reportedly enabled corruption and cronyism under Ben Ali.45 Wealth remains
concentrated along the urban and tourist-friendly coast, while the interior suffers from relative poverty
and a lack of investment. Many Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has general y created
low-skil ed and low-paid jobs, fueling unemployment and under-employment.
Security Concerns
Internal security has general y improved since a string of large terrorist attacks in 2015-2016,46 which
may be attributable to improved internal coordination and capacity-building assistance from donors
including the United States. Smal -scale terrorist attacks have nonetheless occurred in recent years,
including an unattributed suicide bombing near the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in early 2020 that kil ed a
Tunisian police officer, and near-simultaneous suicide bombings against two police posts in Tunis in mid-
2019, which the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) claimed. Local groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State remain active in border areas, where they periodical y attack Tunisian security forces.
Turmoil in neighboring Libya, ongoing militant activity in border regions, and the return of Tunisian
Islamist fighters from abroad (primarily Syria, Iraq, and Libya) continue to pose chal enges. The State
Department warns U.S. citizens to avoid travel to parts of southern, western, and central Tunisia, citing
terrorist threats.47 Tunisia's southernmost desert area is a military zone, where al travel is restricted.
Despite its smal population, Tunisia was reportedly a top source of foreign fighters at the height of IS
territorial influence in Iraq and Syria (2014-2015). U.N. investigators estimated in 2015 that 4,000
Tunisians were fighting in Syria, along with up to 1,500 in Libya, 200 in Iraq, 60 in Mali, and 50 in
Yemen.48 Tunisian officials reported as of 2019 that 1,000 foreign fighters had returned since 2011, and
that authorities had prevented at least 17,000 others from leaving for combat zones abroad.49 Youth
marginalization and the release of terrorism suspects under a general amnesty in 2011 may have fueled
the emergence of domestic Islamist extremist organizations and subsequent combatant outflows.50
“Fiddling While Carthage Burns,” October 2, 2021.
44 IMF, “Key Questions on T unisia,” April 10, 2020; New York Times, “Belt-T ightening Demands Put T unisia’s Democracy at
Risk,” May 3, 2018.
45 See World Bank, The Unfinished Revolution, May 2014.
46 In 2015, terrorist attacks at the Bardo Museum in T unis and the coastal city of Sousse killed dozens of people including foreign
tourists. T hese were the deadliest attacks in T unisia since an Al Qaeda bombing of a synagogue on the island of Djerba in 2002.
In early 2016, T unisian security forces and local inhabitants defeated a militant assault on the border town of Ben Guerdane (near
Libya) that prompted fears of an IS-linked insurgency. T he 2015-2016 attacks were reportedly planned from Libya; a U.S.
military strike on the Libyan town of Sabratha reportedly killed a number of T unisian fighters in February 2 016.
47 State Department, “Tunisia T ravel Advisory,” July 12, 2021.
48 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNOHCHR), “Foreign fighters: Urgent measures needed to stop
flow from T unisia – UN expert group warns,” July 10, 2015.
49 T unisie Afrique Presse (T AP), “A thousand T unisians have returned from conflict zones from 2011 until October 2018, says
Mokthar Ben Nasr,” February 18, 2019
50 See Aaron Zelin, Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad , Columbia University Press: 2020.
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U.S. Relations and Aid
The United States and Tunisia have cultivated warm ties since 2011, underpinned by U.S. support for
Tunisia’s nascent democracy and security cooperation to counter regional terrorism threats.51 According
to the State Department, “one of the United States’ priorities is to help Tunisia provide a secure
environment conducive to the development of democratic institutions and practices, and to inclusive
economic growth.”52 Prior to July 25, Biden Administration officials pursued several high-level
engagements with Tunisian counterparts, albeit constrained by COVID-19-related restrictions.53 Vice
President Kamala Harris spoke to President Saïd in May 2021, at which time she “underscored the United
States’ sustained commitment to supporting Tunisia’s democracy,” and voiced support for Tunisia’s IMF
negotiations along with “timely implementation” of economic reform commitments.54
As noted, since July 25, the Biden Administration has cal ed for a “swift return to the path of Tunisia’s
parliamentary democracy,” while acknowledging health and economic chal enges that presaged President
Saïed’s recent actions.55 On October 7, the State Department urged the president and new prime minister
“to respond to the Tunisian people’s cal for a clear roadmap for a return to a transparent, democratic
process, involving civil society and diverse political voices,” stating that it was “concerned and
disappointed by recent reports from Tunisia on infringements on freedom of the press and expression.”56
U.S. Aid and Security Cooperation
U.S. bilateral aid for Tunisia grew after 2011, and rose further after the new constitution was adopted and
elections were held (Table 1). As noted above, the MCC has approved a $499 mil ion aid compact with
Tunisia, but signature has been postponed for now. The compact would seek to strengthen Tunisia’s
transportation, trade, and water sectors. Recent U.S. bilateral economic aid administered by the State
Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has focused on promoting good
governance, encouraging private sector growth, and countering violent extremism. USAID upgraded its
presence in Tunis to a full bilateral mission in 2019, and pledged up to $352 mil ion in assistance over the
following five years.57 In the initial years following Tunisia’s 2011 uprising, Congress provided $100
mil ion for a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund with a mandate to invest in smal - and medium-sized
51 T he United States and T unisia have a Joint Economic Commission and a Joint Military Commission. President Obama initiated
a Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (alongside similar dialogues with other North African countries) and designated T unisia a Major
Non-NAT O Ally in 2015.
52 State Department, “ U.S. Relations With T unisia,” November 6, 2020 [current].
53 In June, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman undertook a “virtual visit” to T unisia focused on
democracy, human rights, economic challenges, and pandemic response coordination, and Secretary Blinken reportedly met with
T unisia’s foreign minister on the sidelines of Libya talks in Germany. State Department, “ Deputy Secretary of State Wendy
Sherman’s Engagements with T unisian Government Officials and Civil Society Leaders,” June 25, 2021; T AP, “ Jerandi Holds
T alks in Berlin With U.S. Secretary of State,” June 24, 2021.
54 White House, “ Readout of Vice President Kamala Harris Call with President Kais Saied of T unisia,” May 11, 2021.
55 White House, “ Readout from NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Senior Administration Officials T ravel to T unisia ,” August
13, 2021. Prior to the NSC delegation, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke with President Saïed to convey “ President
Biden’s strong support for the people of T unisia and for T unisian democracy based on fundamental rights, strong institutions, and
a commitment to the rule of law” (White House, “ Readout by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne of National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan’s Call with President Kais Saied of T unisia,” July 31, 2021). On July 26, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke to
President Saïed and encouraged him “to adhere to the principles of democracy and human rights that are the basis of governance
in T unisia” (State Department, “ Secretary Blinken’s Call with T unisian President Kais Saied,” July 26, 2021).
56 State Department press briefing, October 7, 2021.
57 USAID, "U.S. Signs Landmark Agreement with the Government of T unisia," August 30, 2019.
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enterprises, and provided funds for three U.S. loan guarantees that al owed Tunisia to access up to $1.5
bil ion in financing from international capital markets.58
U.S.-Tunisia security cooperation has expanded since 2011 as Tunisia has sought to maintain its U.S.-
origin defense materiel, reform its security institutions, and respond to terrorist threats. Congress has
appropriated $85 mil ion annual y in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid for Tunisia in recent years,
more than for any other country within U.S. Africa Command’s area of responsibility. Congress has also
recently provided $13 mil ion per year in State Department-administered bilateral aid for law enforcement
strengthening and reform, and the State Department has al ocated additional internal security aid under its
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
Tunisia has been a top recipient within Africa of Defense Department (DOD)-administered global train-
and-equip assistance (currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. 333). DOD has provided additional border
security support for Tunisia under nonproliferation authorities.
Over the past decade, the State Department has licensed, with congressional assent, military sales to
Tunisia of Wolverine light attack aircraft, Kiowa Warrior helicopter equipment and support, and Black
Hawk helicopters.59 The United States also has provided grant-based equipment transfers through the
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including Kiowa helicopters and C-130 aircraft; Tunisia’s
Major Non-NATO Al y status confers priority in global EDA transfers (under 22 U.S.C. 2321j). Tunisia
hosted a U.S. multinational military maritime exercise, Phoenix Express, in May 2021.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, State Department and USAID
al ocations by year of appropriation, current $ mil ions
FY2021
FY2022
FY2022
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
(enact.)
(req.)
(H.R.4373)
Total
61.4
141.9
205.2
165.3
191.4
191.4
191.4
197.1
197.1
DA
-
-
-
-
-
40.0
45.0
-
45.0
ESF
20.0
60.0
89.0
79.0
85.0
45.0
40.0
85.0
40.0
INCLE
7.0
12.0
13.0
13.0
13.0
13.0
13.0
22.8
22.8
NADR
2.2
2.6
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
2.0
2.0
IMET
2.2
2.3
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
FMF
30.0
65.0
95.0
65.0
85.0
85.0
85.0
85.0
85.0
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2017-FY2022; conference report accompanying Division
K of P.L. 116-260 (FY2021); H.Rept. 117-84 (accompanying H.R. 4373).
Notes: From FY2019 to FY2021, Congress annual y directed $50 mil ion in additional prior-year funds for Tunisia ($50
mil ion in prior-year Relief and Recovery Fund under the FY2019 act, and $50 mil ion in prior-year ESF under the FY2020
and FY2021 acts). Table does not include funding administered by other federal entities (such as the Department of
Defense) or funds al ocated on a regional or global basis. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund;
FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education & Training; INCLE = International Narcotics
Control + Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Progra ms.
Starting with FY2016, Congress has specified a minimum level of aid to Tunisia in annual appropriations
measures, most recently providing $191 mil ion in FY2021 appropriations and $50 mil ion in additional
prior-year funds under P.L. 116-260. Congress also has continued to make funds available for U.S. loan
guarantees for Tunisia (including under P.L. 116-260), although the United States has not provided one
58 USAID, "T unisia signs $500 million loan guarantee agreement with the United States," June 3, 2016. See also CRS Report
R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies.
59 Defense Security Cooperation Agency public releases, https://www.dsca.mil/tags/tunisia.
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since Tunisia’s last IMF program was agreed to in 2016. Congress has made additional funds available for
Tunisia under the State Department-administered Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF)—aimed at areas under
threat from the Islamic State—and DOD’s Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund. Congress has separately
authorized and appropriated funds for DOD to reimburse Tunisia for costs associated with securing its
border with Libya (most recently appropriated under P.L. 116-260, §9026 of Division C).
U.S. COVID-19 Assistance. The United States delivered 1 mil ion donated doses of the Moderna
COVID-19 vaccine to Tunisia on July 30, 2021, and nearly 700,000 doses of the Pfizer vaccine in mid-
September, working through the multilateral COVAX initiative.60 The State Department and USAID have
al ocated at least $1.4 mil ion in COVID-19-related health assistance for Tunisia since early 2020, and
DOD delivered oxygen cylinders in July.61
Outlook and Possible Issues for Congress
At this stage, it is unclear whether Tunisia is likely to return to a democratic political system, move
further into presidential authoritarianism, or experience greater instability as the economy worsens and
tensions among rival political factions escalate. President Saïed’s use of the military to block access to the
parliament building and the recent rise in prosecutions of civilians before military courts have drawn
attention, with some observers describing military leadership as signaling support for Saïed’s political
moves. Tunisia’s army, historical y perceived as apolitical, played a central role in the 2011 uprising by
withdrawing its support for then-President Ben Ali. President Saïed also has asserted control over the
internal security services including the police, which have a checkered reputation as perpetrators of
abuses in the post-2011 era and as tools of political repression under Ben Ali.
Stil , President Saïed’s power and claim to legitimacy arguably rest on his assertion of popular support.
Public demonstrations and coalition building among political and civic actors may therefore be crucial in
determining his future scope of action. It is also possible that the president and his supporters wil
increasingly crack down on opponents, impeding mobilization. The president also may conceivably
misinterpret, misrepresent, or disregard the extent of public backing, should it falter.62
Tunisia’s current political and economic uncertainty raise questions for U.S. policymakers, including
Congress. Over the past decade, Congress has authorized and appropriated growing foreign assistance and
security cooperation funds for Tunisia and conducted oversight of U.S. policy; Members also have
directly engaged with Tunisian leaders and civil society. Congress’s appropriation of bilateral aid for
Tunisia at a specified level in recent years has had the practical effect of ensuring funds for Tunisia amid
competing global priorities. Appropriations for Tunisia have been split between security and economic
(including governance) assistance. Congress to date has not enacted specific restrictions or conditions on
aid to Tunisia (other than those applying general y), in contrast to some countries in the region.
In committee reports accompanying foreign aid appropriation and defense authorization measures,
Members of Congress have expressed an intent to support Tunisian democracy.63 At the same time,
democracy promotion is not the sole U.S. stated policy goal in Tunisia or the region. Other priorities
include, for example, counterterrorism cooperation and countering the regional influence of rival powers.
Developments in Tunisia have unfolded amid complex chal enges nearby, including ongoing instability in
60 State Department, COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution: T unisia, at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/tunisia/.
61 COVID-19-related aid figure provided to CRS by the State Department; U.S. Embassy in T unisia, “ U.S. Donation of 310
Oxygen Canisters Over One Million Liters to the Ministry of Health ,” July 27, 2021.
62 See, e.g., Reuters, “ T unisian president says 1.8 million people protested for him on Sunday,” October 4, 2021. News reports
suggest that the pro-Saïed protesters in question numbered in the thousands.
63 See, e.g., aforementioned H.Rept. 117-84 (State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill), and S.Rept.
112-26 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012).
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Libya, renewed hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front, simmering political unrest in
Algeria, and a diplomatic crisis between Morocco and Algeria.
Among the issues for Congress is whether recent developments in Tunisia undermine or strengthen the
case for U.S. aid and engagement, and whether a shift in their scope or emphasis is warranted. As
discussed, the extent to which U.S. aid presents opportunities for leverage is debatable: President Saïed
has shown little evidence of being susceptible to external pressure or encouragement, and U.S. funds
largely seek to advance U.S. policy goals such as supporting civil society, local entrepreneurship,
COVID-19 response, law enforcement capacity, and Tunisia’s ability to provide for its own security.64
Nor is the United States the sole or necessarily most influential external actor in Tunisia: the European
Union is Tunisia’s top donor and trade partner, and the Gulf states and Turkey (among others) have
sought influence and provided aid and/or investment.65 In mid-August, amid U.S. statements of concern
over Tunisia’s political trajectory, President Saïed hosted a delegation from China’s Huawei technology
firm, whose international activities the United States has sought to constrain.66 As discussed, Tunisian
views on the desirability of external pressure vary. U.S. aid and security cooperation may nonetheless be
viewed as an expression of U.S. foreign policy ideals and priorities, and in light of current events may be
weighed not only for their impact in Tunisia but also for their possible effect on perceptions within
Tunisia and beyond its borders.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
64 See State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification.
65 See European Commission, “T unisia,” n.d.; World Bank, “T rade Summary for T unisia,” 2019 (latest); The Africa Report,
“T urkey’s push to win over the Maghreb: T he gateway to Africa,” September 4, 2020; Youssef Cherif, “ T unisia, Battlefield of
T he Gulf Countries,” OrientXXI, April 12, 2018.
66 T AP, “Huawei announces creation of research, development and innovation centre in T unisia,” August 19, 2021.
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