The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress

This report discusses the global nuclear detection architecture: a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack.



Order Code RL34564
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture:
Issues for Congress
July 7, 2008
Dana A. Shea
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science and Industry Division

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture:
Issues for Congress
Summary
The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation
against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate September 11, 2001,
while others were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and
agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its
creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit acquisition and shipment of
nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons.
These disparate programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and
centralized oversight.
In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within
the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal
response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified through the
passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory
responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack,
including the responsibility to develop a “global nuclear detection architecture.”
Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack,
coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between
them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving,
ongoing tasks.
The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection
technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation’s ability to
detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are
existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new
programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is
developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing
nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the
architecture.
This architecture is a complicated system of systems. Measuring the success of
the architecture relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of
additional investments are challenges. The DNDO is developing risk and cost
methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize
the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies.
Congress, in its oversight capacity, has shown interest in the development and
implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture and in the decision-
making process attendant to investments in it. Other issues that may be foci of
congressional attention include the balance between investment in near-term and
long-term solutions for architecture gaps, the degree and efficacy of federal agency
coordination, the mechanism for setting agency investment priorities in the
architecture, and the efforts DNDO has undertaken to retain institutional knowledge
regarding this sustained architecture effort.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
What is the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Layered Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Methodology and Metrics for Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Priority Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Priority Setting and Appropriateness of Funding Levels Within the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Balance Between Incremental and Transformational Changes to the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Long-Term Maintenance of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture . . . 19
Research and Development Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
List of Figures
Figure 1. Layers of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
List of Tables
Table 1. DNDO Staff Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture:
Issues for Congress
Introduction
Detection of and protection against illicit acquisition and use of special nuclear
material (SNM) is a longstanding concern of the U.S. government.1 Since the
development of nuclear weapons, federal agencies have been involved in securing
U.S. nuclear assets against diversion, theft, and attack. Similarly, concerns that
terrorists or non-state actors might acquire a nuclear weapon or the materials
necessary to construct one have led to federal efforts to track, detect, and secure such
materials both domestically and abroad.
Preventing a terrorist or non-state nuclear attack within the United States
involves more than detection of the nuclear weapon. Detection of nuclear and
radiological material is one part of a larger system of deterrence, counterproliferation,
and response activities. Intelligence information regarding the intent and capability
of terrorist and non-state groups and law enforcement activities disrupting the
formation and action of these groups play key roles in preventing initial acquisition
of nuclear and radiological materials. Subsequent to the detection of nuclear or
radiological materials, successful interdiction of these materials is another crucial
step. Nevertheless, this report addresses only the global nuclear detection
architecture, not programs focusing on events prior or subsequent to the detection
opportunity.
The federal government has implemented a series of programs focused on
detecting the illicit shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and
securing nuclear weapons and material. Following the events of September 11, 2001,
these programs were augmented by new programs focusing on preventing
radiological and nuclear terrorism within the United States. Some of these new and
existing efforts had overlapping goals, but they generally used different approaches
to improve the detection and security of nuclear materials. These programs largely
reside within the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; agencies that became
part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation in 2002; and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Many of these agencies have both national and
international roles in nuclear defense, protecting domestic nuclear assets while aiding
in securing or detecting the transport of foreign nuclear material.
1 The term “special nuclear material” was defined by the Atomic Energy Act and includes
plutonium and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235. See 42 U.S.C.
2014.

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Programs established by the Departments of Defense and Energy and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission have focused on the security of nuclear and
radiological materials. For example, the Department of Energy (DOE) International
Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program aids in securing foreign
special nuclear material.2 The Department of Defense (DOD), through the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), has enhanced the security and safety of fissile
material storage and transportation in the former Soviet Union while dismantling and
destroying associated infrastructure.3
Other programs have focused on detection of nuclear and radiological materials
in transit, in order to detect attempts to illicitly transport a nuclear weapon or special
nuclear material across borders. The DOE Second Line of Defense (SLD) program
aids in establishing capabilities to detect nuclear and radiological materials in foreign
countries at ports of entry, border crossings, and other designated locations.4 The
Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
undertakes similar efforts to provide radiation detection capabilities at border
crossings.5 Other programs are designed to detect nuclear and radiological materials
in transit towards the United States, through screening either at foreign ports or at the
U.S. border. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses both handheld
and portal-based radiation monitoring to detect nuclear and radiological materials
entering the United States.
Once created, DHS expanded the deployment of radiation detectors, both portal
monitors through the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) program and handheld and
portable detectors through the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.
The DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate began research and
development activities to develop an improved radiation detection portal and an
integrated plan and structure for the use of federal radiation detection equipment.
Additionally, DHS developed several overarching initiatives, such as the Container
Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative, to increase the likelihood that
2 For more information about the International Nuclear Materials Protection and
Cooperation program, see online at [http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/
Office%20of%20Int’l%20Material%20Protection%20&%20Cooperation.htm]. See also
CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs
in the Former Soviet Union
, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 For more information on DTRA activities in Cooperative Threat Reduction, see online at
[http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm]. See also CRS Report RL31957,
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance, by Amy F. Woolf
4 For more information on the Second Line of Defense program, see Office of the Second
Line of Defense, National Nuclear Security Administration, SLD Implementation Strategy:
Revision B
, April 2006, online at [http://www.doeal.gov/dicce/ImplementationDocs/
SLDImplentationStrategy.pdf], and the Office of the Second Line of Defense, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Strategic Plan, 2006, online at [http://www.doeal.gov/
dicce/ImplementationDocs/StrategicPlan.pdf]. See also CRS Report RL31957,
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance, by Amy F. Woolf.
5 For more information on the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
Program, see online at [http://www.state.gov/t/isn/export/ecc/20779.htm]. See also CRS
Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance, by Amy F. Woolf.

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nuclear and radiological material or a nuclear weapon would be detected, identified,
and interdicted during shipping. These initiatives built on other federal efforts, such
as the DOE Megaports Initiative, which deploys radiation detection equipment and
aims to increase detection of nuclear materials at ports of departure rather than at
ports of entry.
The early post-September 11, 2001, efforts of the federal government, taking
place in several agencies and departments, were criticized by experts who perceived
that these activities were uncoordinated and insufficient to protect the United States
from nuclear terrorism.6 The Defense Science Board, among others, recommended
that the federal government make a greater, more organized effort to protect the
United States against the nuclear terrorism threat.7
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established by President
Bush on April 15, 2005.8 Established to centralize coordination of the federal
response to an unconventional nuclear threat, DNDO is located within the
Department of Homeland Security. Its first budget was requested as part of the S&T
Directorate, but it was subsequently established as an independent office whose
Director reports directly to the Secretary. The office was given statutory authority
in the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific responsibilities to protect the
United States against radiological and nuclear attack. Among these responsibilities
is to
develop, with the approval of the Secretary and in coordination with the Attorney
General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
Energy, an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture with implementation
under which (A) the Office will be responsible for the implementation of the
domestic portion of the global architecture; (B) the Secretary of Defense will
retain responsibility for implementation of Department of Defense requirements
within and outside the United States; and (C) the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy will maintain their respective
responsibilities for policy guidance and implementation of the portion of the
global architecture outside the United States, which will be implemented
consistent with applicable law and relevant international arrangements.9
6 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other
Countries
, GAO-05-840T, June 21, 2005.
7 See Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack
, June 2004, and Defense
Science Board, Protecting the Homeland: Report of the Defense Science Board 2000
Summer Study; Executive Summary, Volume I
, February 2001.
8 Executive Office of the President, The White House, Domestic Nuclear Detection,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-14/National Security Presidential Directive
NSPD-43, April 15, 2005.
9 6 U.S.C. 592(a)(4).

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The development and implementation of a global nuclear detection architecture
is a challenging endeavor. Because federal efforts to protect against nuclear attack
are spread among multiple agencies, determining the full range of existing efforts,
coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying any overlaps and gaps
between them, and developing an architecture integrating current and future efforts
are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks.
What is the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture?
Although the SAFE Port Act requires that DNDO establish an “enhanced global
nuclear detection architecture,” it does not define this term. A variety of
interpretations are possible. For example, an architecture could be a collection of
federal and nonfederal programs, a grouping of sensors or other technologies
designed to detect nuclear and radiological material, a mechanism for collecting and
distributing information about nuclear and radiological material, a framework for
investment and prioritization of detection assets, or various combinations of the
above and more.
The DNDO describes the global nuclear detection architecture as comprising
several key elements: “a multi-layered structure of radiological/nuclear (rad/nuc)
detection systems, deployed both domestically and overseas; a well-defined and
carefully coordinated network of interrelationships among them; and a set of systems
engineering-based principles and guidelines governing the architecture’s design and
evolution over time.”10 In implementing this definition, DNDO solicited information
about existing programs from agencies involved in nuclear detection. The DNDO
then performed a “net assessment” of federal nuclear detection capabilities. This
assessment determined that 72 programs contributed in whole or in part to the
existing global nuclear detection architecture, with total funding of more than $2.2
billion in FY2006.11
This existing global nuclear detection architecture includes programs at DHS,12
the Department of Defense (DOD),13 the Department of Energy (DOE),14 the
Department of State (DOS), and other agencies. According to DHS, before the
formation of DNDO these programs were “a disparate patchwork of systems,
10 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2009
, p. DNDO RD&O-2.
11 This estimate may understate the total investment, as programs for which nuclear
detection is only a component were prorated. This prorating may have not accurately
captured the true investment for the nuclear detection component of the program. (Office
of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
, OIG-08-19,
December 2007.)
12 Such as the Container Security Initiative, the Secure Freight Initiative, and the Radiation
Portal Monitor program.
13 Such as the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction activities.
14 Such as the DOE Second Line of Defense programs.

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distributed and implemented in recent years across multiple departments,
jurisdictions and locations without any degree of coordination.”15 Organized by
DNDO into a global nuclear detection architecture framework, the combined system
of systems relies heavily on its technological component, with the deployment of
radiation detectors at points of entry, commercial ports, and other border crossings
key to its effectiveness.
Although much focus has been given to technologies to detect nuclear or
radiological material that have been developed or procured by DNDO, the global
nuclear detection architecture encompasses more than just these sensors. Other
elements include the use of sensor data to inform decision-makers, effective reaction
to a detection event, and interdiction of the detected nuclear or radiological material.
According to the Government Accountability Office, “combating nuclear smuggling
requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of border
security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence
gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.”16 Other experts have
concluded that the deployment of radiation detectors needs to be highly integrated
with other federal efforts, prioritized on identified threats, configured for flexibility
and efficiency, and part of a global approach including international institutions.17
The DNDO has attempted to align existing federal programs so that their
capabilities can be compared and integrated into an organizing framework that can
help identify gaps and duplication. This framework consists of three partially
overlapping layers with nine sub-layers. See Figure 1.
15 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO RD&O-5.
16 Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy
Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries
, GAO-05-840T,
June 21, 2005.
17 James Goodby, Timothy Coffey, and Cheryl Loeb, Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, National Defense University, Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A
Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
, July 2007.


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Figure 1. Layers of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
Source: CRS adaptation of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, May 17, 2007, as reproduced in
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
, OIG-08-19, December
2007.
The layers are distinguished geographically: interior, border, and exterior. The
overlap between the exterior and border layers may make analysis of priorities
between and within the layers more difficult. The sublayers correspond mainly to
conceptual steps in the transportation of a threat object to a target.
The global nuclear detection architecture has a broad, international scope, so
implementing it is difficult. Multiple agency initiatives and programs must be relied
on to achieve the architecture’s goals, and its effectiveness is dependent on many
factors outside of DNDO’s direct authority and control.
By categorizing existing programs in this architecture, DNDO can analyze
federal nuclear detection capabilities, identifying gaps and vulnerabilities through
which a potential adversary might be able to avoid detection. These gaps may be
filled by redirecting existing efforts, increasing existing efforts, deploying available

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technology, and implementing research and development programs that develop
solutions to such gaps.
Layered Defense
A layered, defense-in-depth approach to a global nuclear detection architecture
was recommended by the Defense Science Board when considering how to protect
DOD assets against unconventional nuclear threats.18 Successful application of a
layered defense provides multiple opportunities to detect and interdict threats.
According to DNDO, “It is recognized that no single layer of protection can ever be
one hundred percent successful,” and a layered defense strategy acknowledges this
difficulty.19 If one sublayer fails to detect a threat, the next may succeed.
This increase in the likelihood of detection occurs in two different ways. In one
case, a threat may avoid the detector in an outer layer, but then encounter a detector
in an inner layer. In this case, having more detection rings makes it more likely that
a detector is encountered. An example of this approach could be the use of random
truck screening at weigh stations on interstate highways. The DNDO has explicitly
attempted to incorporate such redundancy into its global nuclear detection
architecture, identifying numerous areas where detection capabilities might be
integrated into existing operations
Examples include, but are not limited to, fixed and mobile detection systems
integrated into commercial vehicle inspection activities, detection enabled law
enforcement, and screening conducted for special events. Capabilities that may
require additional operational costs include mobile teams sweeping of areas of
concern, chokepoint screening at bridges and tunnels, roadway monitoring
concepts, and options for reducing the risk posed by the small maritime craft
pathway.20
Alternatively, a threat may encounter a detector in an outer layer that fails to
detect it, but then may encounter a different type of detector in an inner layer that is
more successful. In this case, it is the use of different detection technologies or
procedures that provides the increased likelihood of success. Examples might
include the screening of manifest information for shipments entering the United
States, followed by the use of radiation detection equipment, or the physical search
of a vehicle triggered by suspicious behavior even though a radiation detector did not
detect any emitted radioactivity. Prior experience has shown that nuclear smuggling
detection occurs not only through the raising of alarms by radiation detection
18 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing
and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack
, June 2004, and Protecting the
Homeland: Report of the Defense Science Board 2000 Summer Study; Executive Summary,
Volume I
, February 2001.
19 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2009
, p. DNDO ACQ-8.
20 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO ACQ-7.

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equipment at borders, but also by intelligence information and through police
investigations.21
An additional advantage to a layered system is that its multiple detection and
interdiction opportunities may increase the number of steps that a terrorist group
must take to evade detection. Because of these additional steps, the group may be
more likely to be detected by other means unrelated to the global nuclear detection
architecture. For example, if it is necessary to disassemble a nuclear device to avoid
detection, the reassembly of the device within the United States might be prevented
by unrelated law enforcement activities. Even better, the increased complexity of
evading detection might deter an attacker from even attempting a particular type of
attack.
The ability to correlate information from different layers may also enhance the
detection capability of the global nuclear detection architecture. Fusion of data from
the different layers may reveal patterns or information not apparent in any single
layer. It is the intent of the global nuclear detection architecture to integrate detection
and notification systems at the federal, state, and local level,22 but accomplishing that
goal may take significant time and effort, as procedures, technology, and data formats
may need to be harmonized to allow easy information exchange.
Methodology and Metrics for Evaluation
A significant advantage to establishing a global nuclear detection architecture
is that it provides a framework for analysis of the overall effectiveness of federal
nuclear detection efforts. Thus the performance of programs in each layer of the
architecture can be measured and judged within the context of the overall structure
rather than in isolation. In this way, effectiveness and efficiency can be maximized
for the architecture overall rather than for each program individually.
Decision-makers attempting to analyze the architecture effectiveness and
efficiency will likely require a methodology and establishing metrics, qualitative or
quantitative, for each layer or sublayer. The DNDO uses the global nuclear detection
architecture framework to identify gaps in existing detection capabilities.23
Methodology to map existing and future capabilities onto an analytical construct that
is sensitive to changes in the architecture would provide a more robust tool for
prioritization and assessment. According to DNDO, application of such a risk- and
cost-based assessment methodology to radiological and nuclear countermeasures
21 See Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy
Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries
, GAO-05-840T,
June 21, 2005.
22 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.
23 The DNDO states that the largest gaps in their border layer are air, maritime, and land
pathways between designated ports of entry. (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Justification FY2009, p. DNDO
RD&O-8.)

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would be relatively new, and DNDO planned to validate the employed methodology
in 2008 on the basis of independent peer review.24
In 2004, the DHS S&T Directorate requested studies for the development of
such an analytic framework and the identification of appropriate metrics.25 This work
was transferred to DNDO upon its creation in 2005.26 Since then, additional studies
of general aviation and maritime pathways have expanded the analytic basis for
assessment of investments in the global nuclear detection architecture.27 The degree
to which existing programs can be related to these analytic frameworks likely
determines their utility and applicability. A notional analytic framework — one in
which some elements of the framework may not reflect the actual systems in place
or some parameters are estimated or extrapolated rather than based on empirical data
— may not be adequate for deciding which programs to invest in, alter, or otherwise
optimize for maximum effect within the framework. On the other hand, a framework
derived only from existing programs may overvalue the existing assets while
undervaluing the potential contributions of new programs.
A further concern with respect to analytic methodology is its ability to reflect
the effects of both large and small changes. The global nuclear detection architecture
is a multi-billion dollar enterprise composed of dozens of programs. A methodology
that encompasses all these programs but omits significant detail may not be sensitive
enough to reflect the impact of incremental changes. For example, some experts
have advocated deployment of radiation detection sensors at specific sites based on
identified smuggling routes and at ports of entry where nuclear and radiological
materials are not adequately secure.28 Ideally, an analytic methodology would
provide the means to compare that strategy to other strategies, such as an increase in
border detectors.
A methodology that addresses all programs in sufficient detail may be
cumbersome to use and may not reflect the value of intangible concepts, such as
24 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO RD&O-7. The FY2009 congressional justification does not
state that DNDO performed an independent peer review of the employed methodology.
25 Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, S&T Directorate, Department
of Homeland Security, “Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasure System Architectures
Analysis (RNCSAA),” BAA 04-01, February 2004.
26 For an overview of the goals of this study, see Department of Homeland Security,
National Capital Region Coordination: First Annual Report, September 2005, p. F-41,
online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NCR_DHS_Congressional_Final_
090105.pdf].
27 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.
28 James Goodby, Timothy Coffey, and Cheryl Loeb, Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, National Defense University, Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A
Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
, July 2007.

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deterrence or misdirection.29 An approach involving analysis of selected components
of the global nuclear detection architecture, rather than the architecture as a whole,
may make the analytical methodology more tractable. However, this may lead to
inaccuracy when considering areas that fall between the individual component
analyses or when considering the overall context of the architecture. Optimizing the
efficiency and effectiveness of each individual component may not optimize the
overall architecture. Even if it does, such an approach may not be cost effective.
The DNDO has stated that it takes a systems engineering approach to
developing and refining the global nuclear detection architecture. Such an approach
attempts to optimize the overall performance of the architecture rather than
optimizing any particular program within it. Treating the global nuclear detection
architecture as a “system of systems” may efficiently develop an effective
architecture, but such treatment requires clear metrics around which the system is to
be engineered.
The DNDO may find identifying the appropriate metrics for evaluation
challenging. Outcome-oriented metrics, such as the number of false positives
resolved,30 the number of threats found, or the number of vehicles cleared, may not
be suitable for judging the effectiveness of the architecture, though these metrics may
help determine the efficiency or completeness of the planned architecture. On the
other hand, more desirable measures, such as the degree of risk reduction, may
require a more complete understanding of global risk than is currently available.
Metrics based on analysis of the existing global nuclear detection architecture
may have similar difficulties. If the existing architecture has insufficient detection
capability or coverage, incremental improvement to that architecture may lead to a
new architecture that still has insufficient detection ability or coverage. Conversely,
if the performance of the architecture is acceptable, incremental improvements may
not yield substantial benefit when compared with the incremental cost.
Vulnerability or gap analysis could be used to prioritize and assess architecture
effectiveness.31 A challenge for this approach is the difficulty of determining an
acceptable level of detection and geographic coverage.
The DNDO has identified gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture and
is attempting to develop options and strategies for reducing these gaps.32 A
29 An example of misdirection might be the deployment of decoy radiation detectors. While
decoys would have no radiation detection capability, opponents would not know this. They
might choose a more risky approach because of their inaccurate understanding of actual
detector deployment.
30 A false positive occurs when the system indicates a threat even though no threat is present.
31 For the purposes of this report, vulnerabilities refer to when current capabilities are at
least partly insufficient to meet current needs. Gaps refer to when no current capability
exists to meet a current need.
32 The DNDO refers to both the absence of detection capability and limitations in existing
(continued...)

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vulnerability- or gap-based approach relies on implementing or developing solutions
to these vulnerabilities or gaps, but the determination of a vulnerability may rely on
an assessment of whether the detection capabilities of the existing system are
sufficient. This assessment of a sufficient or acceptable detection capability, unlikely
to be 100%, may be open to debate.33
Finally, the nature of the terrorist nuclear threat, potentially a changing threat
based on an intelligent adversary, implies that any metrics and methodology
developed to assess the global nuclear detection architecture’s effectiveness will need
to evolve as the threat does. When advances in technology, new intelligence
information, and other factors are considered, the effectiveness of the global nuclear
detection architecture may need to be judged on active testing or “red teaming” of the
architecture.34 The results of such active testing may be misleading if the testing does
not conform to the threat for which the architecture is designed. For example, if the
architecture is designed to detect only large amounts of a nuclear material, testing it
with a small amount of nuclear material may highlight current limitations but not
address the effectiveness of the architecture at the tasks for which it is designed.35
Moreover, a robust architecture containing sublayers with varying detection success
rates may still provide sufficient protection against a particular threat, even if a single
sublayer is insufficiently protective. In order to validate the results of “red teaming”
exercises, DNDO plans to “conduct and quantify assessment results in various
directions, including scenario-based ‘bottom-up’ assessments, capabilities-based
‘top-down’ assessments, and complex metrics development.”36
Priority Setting
Gaps and vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection architecture, depending
on their nature, may be addressed now or in the future. In some cases, no solution
to gaps and vulnerabilities is currently available, and a solution will need to be
identified through research and development. The DNDO has stated that “there are
still key, long-term challenges and vulnerabilities in our detection architecture that
32 (...continued)
detection systems as gaps. See Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of
Homeland Security, Congressional Justification FY2009, p. DNDO R&DO-8.
33 The DNDO acknowledges that “no single layer of protection can ever be one hundred
percent successful.” (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland
Security, Congressional Justification FY2009, p. DNDO ACQ-8.)
34 The DNDO undertakes a series of net assessments, including “red teaming” to identify the
effectiveness of the planned and deployed global nuclear detection architecture. (Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Justification
FY2008
, p. DNDO R&DO-2.)
35 For example, individuals have been able to successfully smuggle surrogate materials into
the United States past radiation detection equipment deployed by DHS. Thomas B. Cochran
and Matthew G. McKinzie, “Detecting Nuclear Smuggling,” Scientific American, March
2008.
36 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO R&DO-24.

CRS-12
require long-range, higher risk research programs that will need to be evaluated in
terms of risk reduction, direct and indirect costs, operational feasibility, and other
relevant decision factors.”37 In other cases, the available near-term solution is an
incremental improvement over existing approaches. In these cases, decisions must
be made about whether to invest in a near-term, incomplete solution, accept the
presence of a gap or vulnerability and invest in a long-term program to develop a
more complete solution, or do both. Choosing between these options requires an
understanding of the risk posed by the existing vulnerabilities, the benefits available
through the near- and long-term options, and their relative costs.
Decision-makers are faced with difficult choices when setting priorities for
implementing the global nuclear detection architecture. In the case of existing
programs, incremental increases in the performance of a system may be challenged
on the basis of their perceived costs and benefits.38 In the case of new programs,
questions may arise about whether the effort expended on a new program would have
been better used elsewhere. Finally, given that improvement of the global nuclear
detection architecture is a multi-year project, one must determine which portion of
the architecture to focus on at any given time.
A likely benefit of casting federal efforts at nuclear detection into the framework
of a global architecture is the ability to prioritize, in a quantitative or qualitative
fashion, across programs.39 Even absent a rigorous methodology to discriminate
finely between the results of different investments, the global nuclear detection
architecture may be able to provide a rank ordering of vulnerabilities and gaps, and
thus a rank ordering of investment priorities.40 Thus, it may provide an interagency
tool to analyze current technology options and R&D investments relative to the
federal government’s detection needs.
The DNDO analysis methodology underpinning the global nuclear detection
architecture continues to undergo revision and refinement:
In order to maximize the effectiveness of the FY 2008 edition of the [global
nuclear detection architecture], DNDO will leverage the independent observation
of a full peer review to ensure that the requirements called forth in the [global
37 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO R&DO-8.
38 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal
Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All
the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits
, GAO-07-133R, October 17, 2006.
39 The DNDO states that its risk-based cost-benefit analysis methodology is used to quantify
and prioritize architecture improvements. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department
of Homeland Security, Congressional Justification FY2008, p. DNDO R&DO-9.
40 According to the DNDO Inspector General, DNDO has been able to develop a list of
detection priorities. (Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and
Response Protocols
, OIG-08-19, December 2007.) It is unclear how these priorities have
been ordered.

CRS-13
nuclear detection architecture] continue to reduce the risk from nuclear terrorism.
Accordingly, risk and economic impact methodology documents (carefully
prepared and reviewed to protect sensitive/classified vulnerability information)
will be produced and subjected to broad peer review.41
This review and these documents have not been made public. Congress may wish
to determine whether the review addresses congressional concerns and whether the
underlying architecture methodology is sufficiently robust. Alternatively, Congress
may wish to direct DNDO to perform a review of the analysis methodology through
an open process.42
Similarly, a global nuclear detection architecture may be able to highlight
regions or modalities where investment or additional focus may provide a steeper or
quicker reduction of vulnerability. For example, following the development of the
baseline global nuclear detection architecture, DNDO decided to focus efforts on
addressing vulnerabilities associated with aviation and maritime domains.43
Interagency Coordination
As well as developing the global nuclear detection architecture, DNDO is also
responsible for coordinating the activities of other federal agencies whose programs
make up the global nuclear detection architecture. For the architecture to be
successful, substantial interagency coordination must occur on the operational and
policy levels.
Congress recognized the need for DNDO to have access to specific talent
resident in other agencies. The SAFE Port Act authorizes the DHS Secretary to
“request that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the directors of other
Federal agencies, including elements of the Intelligence Community, provide for the
reimbursable detail of personnel with relevant expertise to [DNDO].”44 Under this
authority and that of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA),45 DNDO has
established a significant interagency workforce, including personnel from DOD,
DOE, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the Nuclear
41 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO RD&O-9.
42 For example, the methodology underpinning the DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
underwent review through the National Academies of Science even though the results of this
risk assessment are classified. See National Research Council, Interim Report on
Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Agent
Risk Analysis
, National Academies Press, 2007.
43 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.
44 6 U.S.C. 591(a).
45 The Intergovernmental Personnel Act allows for the temporary transfer of personnel to
a federal agency. See 5 U.S.C. 3371-76.

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Regulatory Commission, as well as intra-agency personnel from the Science and
Technology Directorate, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation
Security Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard.46
The DNDO uses the detailees and IPAs as part of its coordinating function. By
using these experts as conduits back to their agencies, DNDO is able to draw on the
expertise and address the needs and concerns of these agencies. The DNDO also has
established a more senior policy coordinating body, the Interagency Coordination
Council, to address higher level policy issues and further coordinate activities
between agencies, but the extent to which this body is able to implement and develop
new policy for the participating agencies is not known. The Interagency
Coordination Council was reportedly used to develop the deployment strategy for the
global nuclear detection architecture and studies of maritime and aviation threats.47
The successful operation of the Interagency Coordination Council is critical for
oversight and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture, but
procedural and organizational issues may pose barriers to its success. The Director
of DNDO may not be equal in authority to the officials in other agencies with whom
he is coordinating. Other officials may have more or less control of budgets,
activities, and policies. Additionally, other agencies may perceive the global nuclear
detection architecture as a DNDO document, rather than as a consensus coordination
document. If so, other agencies may not quickly adopt the premises or analytical
constructs expressed as part of the global nuclear detection architecture, preferring
to continue to operate under individual agency priorities.48
The DNDO also has implemented an Advisory Council consisting of officials
from other DHS components. The DNDO uses the Advisory Council to solicit the
opinions of and resolve intra-agency issues within DHS.49
Beyond the interagency activities organized within DNDO, coordination of
DNDO activities with other portions of the federal government occurs within the
White House through the Domestic Nuclear Defense Policy Coordinating
Committee. This joint policy coordination body was created jointly by the Homeland
Security Council and the National Security Council and provides a high-level forum
for the generation of guidance and coordination among federal agencies with
46 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2009
, p. DNDO-1.
47 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.
48 A similar situation exists with the requirement for the DHS Under Secretary for Science
and Technology to coordinate homeland security research and development across the
federal government. In this case, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology was able
to release a coordination document without the consensus of other government agencies, but
rather with other agency consultation.
49 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.

CRS-15
responsibilities for nuclear defense, detection, and interdiction.50 Other interagency
planning activities, such as coordination of long-term research and development,
occur through subcommittees of the National Science and Technology Council.51
Congress has identified such coordination and cooperation as a key issue for
DNDO, and in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007,
withheld $15 million from DNDO until a memorandum of understanding had been
established with each federal entity and organization participating in DNDO
activities.52 The DNDO entered into these agreements throughout FY2007.53
Issues for Congress
Multiple agencies implement the global nuclear detection architecture, even
though its development is located within a single agency. Congress, in its oversight
role, may be able to assess agency implementation of the global nuclear detection
architecture across the federal government and thus identify weaknesses or
inefficiencies that may occur. Additionally, Congress may be uniquely positioned
to address policy challenges. Mechanisms for policy setting, the establishment of
funding levels within the global nuclear detection architecture, implementation of
development plans for the architecture and the identification of solutions to gaps and
vulnerabilities, and the continued maintenance of the global nuclear detection
architecture all are issues that Congress may choose to address.
Priority Setting and Appropriateness of Funding Levels
Within the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

The annual federal investment in the global nuclear detection architecture is
spread across multiple agencies and across the layers and sublayers of the global
nuclear detection architecture. The appropriate balance of funds in each of the
different layers and sublayers, as well as between the different programs and
agencies, is likely an issue of policy interest. When Congress established the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1991, it focused on securing nuclear
materials at their source and preventing these materials from being transferred into
non-state hands.54 These continuing programs represent significant investment in the
50 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.
51 Testimony of DNDO Director Vayl S. Oxford, Department of Homeland Security, before
the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, on October 10, 2007.
52 P.L. 109-295, Title IV.
53 Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Justification FY2009, p. DNDO
M&A-4.
54 For more information on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, see CRS Report
(continued...)

CRS-16
exterior layer of the architecture. More recently, DNDO and Congress have focused
on the border layer of the global nuclear detection architecture. The DNDO has
invested in Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) and Cargo Advanced Automated
Radiography System (CAARS) technologies to improve the ability to detect nuclear
and radiological materials at the borders,55 and Congress has mandated the improved
screening of cargo containers shipped to the United States.56 Investment in the
interior layer of the architecture has arisen mainly through historical programs
designed to protect and safeguard national nuclear facilities and laboratories.
Congress might expand or reduce agency funding levels to more closely match
the levels determined by DNDO to meet the needs of the global nuclear detection
architecture, increase overall funding for all aspects of the global nuclear detection
architecture to increase redundancy, or decrease funding if it believes other funding
priorities are more important. Shifting funding between layers of the architecture has
complex ramifications: it may imperil international agreements, lead to perceptions
of weakness or strength in the various programs, or cause interagency disagreements.
Additionally, unless a robust evaluative system has been established for the global
nuclear detection architecture with clear metrics, tying architecture performance to
program funding, changes in investment in the different layers of the global nuclear
detection architecture may not yield optimal risk reduction. It is difficult to assess
without careful evaluation whether shifting funds from one program to another will
have a positive or negative net impact; the relative size of the two programs is not
necessarily the relevant criterion for assessing its impact on the global nuclear
detection architecture. Moreover, DNDO is not statutorily empowered to direct
changes in the funding of other agencies. Only through higher-level budgetary policy
54 (...continued)
RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former
Soviet Union
, by Amy F. Woolf.
55 The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal is a radiation detection system designed to be able to
identify the source of the detected radiation. The Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography
System is an imaging system designed to automatically detect special nuclear material by
X-ray imaging. The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal technology has been the subject of a
number of congressional hearings and Government Accountability Office audits. See, for
example, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, “Nuclear Smuggling Detection: Recent Tests
of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitors,” hearing held March 5, 2008; and House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
“Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: Status Report on the Federal Government’s Assessment of
New Radiation Detection Monitors,” hearing held September 18, 2007. See also,
Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions
Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment
,
GAO-07-1247T, September 18, 2007; and Government Accountability Office, Combating
Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of
Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis
,
GAO-07-581T, March 14, 2007.
56 Section 1701 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53) requires that, by July 1, 2012, all maritime cargo containers entering the
United States be scanned by nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection
equipment at a foreign port before departure.

CRS-17
decisions can interagency funding profiles be changed. This situation may result in
a mismatch between the optimal investment levels for the global nuclear detection
architecture and the actual investments made. Congress might choose to provide the
DNDO Director with the authority to review and assess the budgets of other
departments and agencies involved in the global nuclear detection architecture and
to comment or recommend alternative budget allocation to the Interagency
Coordinating Council or directly to the Office of Management and Budget.57
Another possible approach would be for Congress to require that agencies create
a single global nuclear detection architecture budget, to provide Congress with a
more transparent correlation between agency funding and the global nuclear detection
architecture. For example, an annual budget supplement is issued for the National
Nanotechnology Initiative, another multi-agency federal endeavor with a large
budget. Such a budget supplement for nuclear detection might be coordinated by
DNDO through the Interagency Coordinating Council, Homeland Security Council,
National Security Council, or National Science and Technology Council, or through
one of the agencies participating in the global nuclear detection architecture.
Alternately, Congress might vest a budgetary coordinating role within the Office of
Science and Technology Policy rather than within DNDO.
Congress established an Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism within the
White House. The head of this office is to advise the President, formulate national
strategy and policy, lead interagency coordination and implementation, and oversee
development of a comprehensive, coordinated budget for weapon of mass destruction
proliferation and terrorism prevention.58 While the scope of the Coordinator’s
responsibilities is broader than nuclear and radiological issues, the comprehensive,
coordinated budget so developed might be one mechanism for clarification of
priorities for nuclear detection investment. As of the writing of this report, the
position of Coordinator has not been filled.
The affected agencies may not be supportive of the establishment of a unified
budget or additional review of agency budget decisions. Reportedly, agencies
resisted similar options that were considered during the creation of DNDO, leading
to “major limits on both its scope and its power.”59 Agencies may perceive a bottom-
up process to be more effective in meeting agency and national needs than a top-
down process.
Congress has mandated an annual interagency review of the global nuclear
detection architecture. This review is to be overseen by the Secretaries of Homeland
Security, State, Defense, and Energy, the Attorney General, and the Director of
57 The Director of the National Security Agency has this type of authority for the purposes
of telecommunications systems and automated information systems security. Executive
Office of the President, The White House, Telecommunications and Computer Security,
National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD-145), September 17, 1984.
58 P.L. 110-53, Title XVII, Subtitle D, Sec. 1841.
59 Michael A. Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard University Press, November 2007, p.
146.

CRS-18
National Intelligence. Its purpose is to ensure that each participating agency assesses
and evaluates its participation in the global nuclear detection architecture. The
review is to include evaluation of detection technologies, identification of
deficiencies, and assessment of agency capacity for implementation of its
responsibilities within the global nuclear detection architecture.60 This interagency
review process may cause the agencies involved to clarify their priorities and funding
requirements and thereby cause further evolution of the global nuclear detection
architecture.
Balance Between Incremental and Transformational Changes
to the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

The DNDO aims to improve “the probability of detection by integrating and
deploying current technologies, continually improving these technologies through
both near-term enhancements and transformational research and development, and
expanding detection capabilities at the Federal, State and local levels.”61 In
expanding and improving the global nuclear detection architecture, DNDO and other
participating agencies are faced with a temporal choice. Vulnerabilities and gaps
identified through the global nuclear detection architecture could be reduced by
applying immediately available technologies that provide a partial solution or by
investing in research and development to develop technologies that will provide a
more complete solution in the long-term. In the first case, the abilities of the global
nuclear detection architecture would be incrementally improved as technologies that
marginally increase the detection capabilities of the existing architecture are adopted
and then serially replaced. Such a strategy might be costly, as multiple generations
of equipment, each with some advantage over the previous version, are purchased
and deployed. Although each generation would be an improvement, it would not
provide a fully acceptable level of detection and security. In the other case, known
vulnerabilities might not immediately be addressed at all, allowing the possibility that
attackers could exploit them while a research and development program attempted
to develop a single system that would remove the vulnerability. Thus, an appreciable
risk would remain, even though it could be partly reduced in the near term, until the
results of the research and development program came to fruition.
In practice, expansion and improvement of the global nuclear detection
architecture requires a balance of these two approaches, using incremental advances
and transformational research in coordination to develop a robust architecture. A key
concern is how this balance is achieved and identified. The DNDO is addressing this
complex problem by developing time-phased plans to address the most important
gaps in the existing global nuclear detection architecture.62 These plans will allow
“for the integration of current and near-term technologies and approaches, as well as
60 P.L. 110-53, Title XI, Sec. 1103.
61 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2008
, p. DNDO RD&O-8.
62 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2009
, p. DNDO RD&O-7.

CRS-19
longer-term options that may draw upon technologies that are currently in the R&D
phase and that may not be available for implementation for several years.”63
Additionally, DNDO has taken a spiral development approach that appears to
lean toward deploying available technologies, even if they serve only as partial
solutions, rather than leaving a gap unaddressed. In spiral development, technologies
are refined as they are implemented based on information generated during their
deployment. Thus, though the technology may serve only as a partial solution when
first implemented, the goal is for it to become a more complete solution over time.
Among key issues facing Congress are determining the optimal process for
creating a robust global nuclear detection architecture, understanding the capabilities
of near- and long-term technology and their potential effect on the global nuclear
detection architecture, and assessing the adequacy of the metrics used to measure the
risk reduction benefits. Congress bestowed upon DNDO the responsibility for
developing and implementing a global nuclear detection architecture as part of efforts
to safeguard the United States. The success of DNDO’s activities in establishing this
architecture will likely require ongoing evaluation and oversight into the future.
Long-Term Maintenance of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture

Although the use of detailees, IPAs, and liaisons from other agencies has helped
DNDO to maintain contact with other stakeholders, its reliance on these temporary
personnel may make long-term efforts difficult to sustain. As temporary personnel
return to their home agency, institutional memory may be lost. As of April 2007,
79% of DNDO’s employees were either detailees, liaisons, or contractors rather than
permanent staff.64 Efforts that rely on continued improvement and adjustment over
time, as the global nuclear detection architecture does, will likely depend on DNDO’s
ability to clearly enunciate and document the rationale and approaches that it
developed and considered when they were established. Otherwise, these efforts may
be delayed as new personnel have to reevaluate the ongoing process. Similarly,
coordination between agencies through the Interagency Coordinating Council may
suffer if consensus decisions are not well understood by the successors of the Council
participants.
The DNDO may be able to offset this potential loss of institutional memory in
a number of ways. One possibility is a mentoring process in which outgoing
personnel actively mentor their replacements during an overlap period in order to
provide continuity of information and expertise. Another would involve
comprehensive documentation of decisions, both positive and negative, so that future
staff have a written record to refer to when trying to understand why a particular
approach was taken and why a competing approach was set aside. Finally, expanding
63 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Justification FY2009
, p. DNDO RD&O-8.
64 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office: Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols
,
OIG-08-19, December 2007.

CRS-20
DNDO’s permanent staff might provide long-term stability and more retention of
core knowledge.
The DNDO does appear to be increasing its permanent federal staff. As seen
in Table 1, the number of detailees has decreased and the number of permanent staff
has increased since the creation of the office.
Table 1. DNDO Staff Levels
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
(estimate)
(estimate)
(estimate)
(requested)
Detailees
66
65
45
45-50a
Total Staff
112
130
130
144
Source: CRS analysis of DNDO congressional justifications for FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009.
a. DNDO reported a range in the number of detailees projected for FY2009.
Some positions within DNDO may be best filled by permanent DNDO staff,
while others may require the expertise possessed only by detailees. A key issue
facing decision-makers is balancing DNDO’s need for technical or subject matter
experts with building a core of permanent DNDO staff able to develop and evolve
the nascent global nuclear detection architecture. The mechanisms being used by
DNDO to retain institutional knowledge and DNDO’s strategic decisions regarding
the use of detailees may require oversight from Congress to ensure that congressional
interests in program and agency continuity are met.
Research and Development Coordination
Research and development investment plays a role in strategies for addressing
the architecture’s gaps and vulnerabilities. The aim is to develop technologies to fill
the gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture. Both DHS and DOE fund
research and development in the area of nuclear and radiological detection
equipment.
The SAFE Port Act of 2002 gave DNDO the statutory authority to
conduct, support, coordinate, and encourage an aggressive, expedited,
evolutionary, and transformational program of research and development to
generate and improve technologies to detect and prevent the illicit entry,
transport, assembly, or potential use within the United States of a nuclear
explosive device or fissile or radiological material, and coordinate with the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology on basic and advanced or
transformational research and development efforts relevant to the mission of both
organizations.65
65 6 U.S.C. 592.

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The research and development activities DNDO undertakes under this authority
addresses gaps and vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection architecture. The
DNDO has highlighted detecting threat materials from greater distances, in highly
cluttered backgrounds, and in the presence of shielding and masking materials as
particular challenges.66
Although Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 required DNDO to
“conduct, support, coordinate, and encourage an aggressive, expedited, evolutionary,
and transformational program of research and development efforts,” it also directed
the Secretary of Energy to “lead the development of nonproliferation research and
development and, where appropriate, make available dual-use counter-proliferation
and counter-terrorism nuclear detection research and development to DNDO and
other entities and officials to support the development of the domestic nuclear and
radiological detection system.”67 The long-term coordination of this research appears
to be occurring through the Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense Research and
Development of the National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Homeland Defense and National Security.68 Additional coordination occurs between
agencies participating in the global nuclear detection architecture as well.
The coordination of these research and development activities is likely to remain
of interest in Congress, to prevent duplication of effort and ensure that agencies meet
their missions and roles. Congress may use its oversight authority to assess the
balance of investments between agencies, address undue duplication of research and
development activities, and increase or decrease the resources available for particular
technology approaches under consideration.
66 Testimony of DNDO Director Vayl S. Oxford, Department of Homeland Security, before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland
Security, on July 27, 2006.
67 Executive Office of the President, The White House, Domestic Nuclear Detection,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-14/National Security Presidential Directive
NSPD-43, April 15, 2005.
68 Testimony of DNDO Director Vayl S. Oxford, Department of Homeland Security, before
the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, on October 10, 2007.