Resolving House Committee Jurisdictional Disputes: A Survey of Options
Order Code RL34293
Resolving House Committee Jurisdictional
Disputes: A Survey of Options
December 26, 2007
Walter J. Oleszek
Senior Specialist
Government and Finance Division
Resolving House Committee Jurisdictional Disputes:
A Survey of Options
Summary
House committees sometimes clash over their respective jurisdictional
prerogatives. Various reasons account for inter-committee disagreements, such as
issue overlap among different panels. Any broad subject area (homeland security,
energy, health, and so on) can involve the jurisdiction of several panels. Shared
policy interests can sometimes spark inter-committee controversies.
Although jurisdictional clashes might stymie action on legislation, there are
many ways to minimize or resolve committee disputes. This report discusses several
common conflict-resolving techniques that may be employed at different junctures
of the lawmaking process, specifically the drafting of legislation, the referral of
legislation, the committee stage, and the Rules Committee’s issuance of special rules.
None of the techniques discussed in this report are guaranteed to minimize or
eliminate inter-committee jurisdictional disagreements. It is simply not feasible to
construct watertight jurisdictional compartments; too many issues affect the interests
and concerns of multiple panels. Moreover, jurisdictional competition between or
among committees, if not carried to extremes, can benefit policymaking as each
relevant panel brings its expertise to bear in resolving complex issues.
While committee cooperation is the norm on Capitol Hill, jurisdictional
disagreements between or among panels do occur. The role of the majority party
leaders, especially the Speaker, can be significant in resolving committee disputes
and in promoting committee cooperation. They are well-positioned to encourage
cooperative behavior among committees at nearly every stage of the lawmaking
process.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Drafting Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Artful Phraseology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Referral of Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Multiple Referral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Committee System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Memoranda of Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Establish a Select Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Create a Standing Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Jurisdictional Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Task Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Committee Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Joint Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Informal Staff Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Rules Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Waivers of Points of Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Structured Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Reconciling Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Self-Executing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Bifurcated Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Resolving House Committee Jurisdictional
Disputes: A Survey of Options
Introduction
There is an oft-repeated adage on Capitol Hill: “turf is power.” Turf refers to
the jurisdictional mandates of House committees as stated in House Rule X and in
other relevant matter (precedents, “memoranda of understanding” between or among
committees, and the like). The Rule X language is often specified in broad rather
than programmatic terms, such as “national energy policy generally.” Committees
clash over their respective jurisdictional prerogatives, in part because they are a
“lawmaker’s legislative power base. It is no wonder that committee boundaries are
hotly contested.”1
Various other equally important reasons account for disputes over committee
boundaries. For example, one is the matter of issue overlap among committees. Any
broad subject area (homeland security, transportation, energy, health, and so on) can
involve the jurisdiction of several panels. Shared policy interests can sometimes
spark inter-committee controversies. As one House committee chairman stated,
“Nobody in this institution gives up jurisdiction they believe is rightfully theirs.”2
Another factor that can trigger “turf wars” is that committees overlap issues. The
Energy and Commerce Committee has jurisdiction over “foreign commerce
generally;” Foreign Affairs is responsible for “international economic policy;” and
Ways and Means is in charge of “reciprocal trade agreements.” The lack of “bright
1 David C. King, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 12. See CRS Report 98-175, House Committee
Jurisdiction and Referral: Rules and Practice, by Judy Schneider; CRS Report RS21643,
House Committee System: Jurisdiction and Referral Reform Options, by Judy Schneider and
Paul Rundquist; and CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for
Considering Jurisdictional Realignment, by Michael L. Koempel.
2 Patrick Yoest and Colby Itkowitz, “Jurisdictional Disputes Could Hinder Quick
Conference Action on September 11 Measure,” CQ Today, July 19, 2007, p. 15. Also see,
for example, Adrianne Kroepsch, “Energy Legislation Leads to Turf Spat Between House
Committees,” CQ Today, July 12, 2007, p. 18, and Kate Ackley, “A Turf Battle Starts Over
Steroids,” Roll Call, December 18, 2007, p. 1. An examination of a specific policy domain
— homeland security — and its reference among House committees can be found in CRS
Report RL33061, Homeland Security and House Committees: Analysis of 109th Congress
Jurisdictional Changes and Their Impact on the Referral of Legislation, by Michael L.
Koempel and Judy Schneider, and CRS Report RL32711, Homeland Security: Compendium
of Recommendations Relevant to House Committee Organization and Analysis of
Considerations for the House, and 109th and 110th Congresses Epilogue, by Michael L.
Koempel.
CRS-2
lines” separating substantive areas may also trigger disputes among committees. For
instance, is the allocation of the radio spectrum to allow first responders to
communicate with each other during an emergency a matter for the Homeland
Security Committee or the Energy and Commerce Committee (which has jurisdiction
under House Rule X for the regulation of interstate communications)?3
Further, as new policy topics come forward, it is not always clear which of
several panels might receive legislation dealing with these emerging or emergent
issues. Given jurisdictionally ambiguous issues, turf wars can be fomented by
“policy entrepreneurs staking claims for their committees.”4 To be sure, committee
staff are alert both to repel “border poachers” and to search for opportunities to
expand their own panel’s substantive reach.5
Jurisdictional clashes can sometimes stymie action on legislation. However,
there are many ways to minimize or resolve committee disputes. This report
identifies several common conflict-resolving techniques that have been employed
at several junctures of the lawmaking process, specifically the drafting of measures,
the referral of legislation, the committee stage, and the Rules Committee’s issuance
of special rules. This is an illustrative and not an exhaustive list.6 The Speaker could
name conferees from more than one committee to accommodate another panel’s
jurisdictional interests. For instance, if the Senate adds non-germane matter to a bill,
the Speaker might resolve jurisdictional concerns by also naming conferees from the
House committee with authority over the non-germane matter. Or potential
jurisdictional conflicts on the floor might be avoided by allowing two or more
competing committees the opportunity to offer a jointly created substitute
amendment.
At each one of the aforementioned lawmaking stages, the Speaker and other top
party leaders are strategically positioned to intervene and mediate jurisdictional
3 Jonathan Kaplan, “Dems Jurisdictional Fights Slow 9/11-Related Legislation,” The Hill,
July 13, 2007, p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 13.
5 This report focuses on the “legislative,” or policy, jurisdiction of the standing committees.
(Legislative authority means the right of committees to receive and report bills and
resolutions.) These panels also have “oversight” jurisdiction — the authority to review the
actions and activities of non-governmental entities and executive branch programs and
agencies under their legislative purview. Oversight jurisdiction, compared to legislative
jurisdiction, seldom gives rise to inter-committee conflicts. There are simply more overlaps
in the conduct of oversight, in part because the rules of the House permit them to occur. For
example, House rules grant wide-ranging oversight authority to the Oversight and
Government Reform Committee, as well as “special oversight” (House Rule X, clause 3)
responsibility to a number of panels. Special oversight grants various committees the right
to oversee specific laws, programs, or activities even if they are within another panel’s
legislative responsibility.
6 There is a rarely used House rule (Rule XII, clause 7) to correct an erroneous reference
either by unanimous consent or motion. “Such a motion shall be privileged if offered by
direction of a committee to which the bill has been erroneously referred or by direction of
a committee claiming jurisdiction and shall be decided without debate.”
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disagreements between or among committees, especially on party-preferred
legislation. The Rules Committee, informally known as “the Speaker’s committee,”
is similarly situated to be a major jurisdictional mediator in two main ways: (1) its
mandate over the rules of the House, and (2) its ability to structure the debate and
amendment process on the floor.
At the outset it is important to underscore that none of these techniques are
guaranteed to minimize or eliminate inter-committee jurisdictional disagreements.
It is simply not feasible to construct watertight jurisdictional compartments; too many
issues affect the interests and concerns of multiple panels. Other relevant points are
worth brief mention. Disputes between panels might reflect rivalries between chairs
rather than true battles over turf. In the judgment of one House committee chair, it
is “not so much where the [jurisdictional] lines are drawn that either creates or
resolves jurisdictional disputes. What we really need are a greater spirit of civility
and cooperation between chairmen and their staffs.”7 Sometimes jurisdictional
conflicts between or among subcommittees of the same standing committee might
require the full committee chair to mediate an internal turf war.8 Lastly, jurisdictional
competition between and among committees, if not carried to extremes, can benefit
policymaking as each relevant panel brings its expertise to bear in resolving complex
issues.9
Drafting Legislation
Artful Phraseology. During the pre-introductory phase of lawmaking, a
Member and staff often devote considerable time crafting a bill so it will be referred
to a preferred committee. One goal is to avoid having their measure sent to an
unsympathetic panel or to two or more committees that might hold opposite views
of the bill. Accordingly, lawmakers and their staff may meet privately with the
House Parliamentarian (who refers nearly all measures on behalf of the Speaker) to
discuss various drafting issues. For example, will the bill be referred to only one
committee? If it is multiply-referred (see below), which committee might receive a
primary referral and which would receive a secondary referral? On most measures,
it is plain where they will be referred. Military measures will be sent to the Armed
Services panel or bills dealing with small businesses will go to the Small Business
Committee. However, with so many policy interdependencies, the referral of
measures might not be self-evident.
Artful drafting not only can get a bill sent to a preferred committee, but it might
also minimize jurisdictional clashes. For example, lawmakers who prefer that a
telecommunications bill be sent to the Judiciary Committee could draft it as an
amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the
7 Quoted in Committee Structure, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress, S. Hrg. 103-74, 103rd Congress, First Session, (Washington: GPO, 1993), p.
616.
8 John Baughman, Common Ground: Committee Politics in the U.S. House of
Representatives (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 213.
9 Committee Structure, p. 632.
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Judiciary Committee. Conversely, Members who want an Internet bill referred to the
Energy and Commerce Committee could draft it as an amendment to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is the purview of the Commerce panel.
Committees often prefer sole responsibility for a measure because it allows them to
control the measure’s fate through various lawmaking stages: committee hearings
and markups, floor consideration, and conference committee deliberations. A single
referral may also enhance lawmakers’ opportunities to better serve their constituents
and mediate and win the support of outside groups interested in the topic.
Various bill drafting techniques and practices provide some leeway to the
Speaker (or the Parliamentarian acting on the Speaker’s behalf) in referring bills to
one committee rather than to another. For example, the Agriculture Committee
received a measure dealing with eminent domain — the seizure of private property
for public use — even though the issue is typically handled by the Judiciary
Committee. However, the bill connected eminent domain with rural development.
As the House Parliamentarian noted: “The bill involved the Committee on
Agriculture’s jurisdiction because of the way it defined the term ‘federal economic
development program’.”10
Referral of Legislation
Multiple Referral. In 1975, on the opening day of the 94th Congress, the
House infused flexibility into the bill referral process. A new House rule was
adopted that permitted the multiple referral (joint, sequential, or split) of legislation
to two or more standing committees. Before that time, House precedents prohibited
the reference of bills or resolutions to or among two or more committees. The origin
of the multiple referral rule, which has been modified over time, emanated from the
1973-1974 bipartisan House Select Committee on Committees, chaired by Rules
member Richard Bolling of Missouri. The vice chair of the panel was David Martin
of Nebraska, also a member of the Rules Committee.11
One objective of multiple referrals is to accommodate the prerogatives of the
various standing committees that share jurisdiction over a subject matter. Thus, the
legitimate jurisdictional claims of committees can be recognized during the referral
stage. On measures that are multi-referred upon initial reference, the House
Parliamentarian includes the following language: “in each case [of multiple
committee reference] for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned.” This language can assist committee chairs
10 Michael Sandler, “Not a Job for Judiciary Committee? House Ag Handles Eminent
Domain Bill,” CQ Today, August 8, 2005, p. 7.
11 The multiple referral rule has been changed a number of times since its first adoption. In
1995, for example, the new Republican majority abolished joint referrals (retaining
sequential and split referencese) and added to House rules the requirement that the Speaker
shall “designate a committee of primary jurisdiction upon the initial referral of a measure
to a committee.” See Congressional Record, vol. 141, January 4, 1995, p. H36. Eight years
later, at the start of the 108th Congress, House rules were amended to allow joint referrals
in “extraordinary circumstances” without any designation of a primary committee. See
Congressional Record, vol. 149, January 7, 2003, p. H11.
CRS-5
during markup sessions to rule out of order amendments that trespass on other
committees’ turf.
Multiple referrals encourage more interactions between and among committees
with overlapping responsibilities for policy topics. Informal discussions or
negotiations can promote cooperation among panels having competing claims on
legislation. One manifestation of the value of inter-committee consultations —
commonly undertaken by staff of the concerned committees — is the use of so-called
“waiver” letters, which are often published in the Congressional Record. For
example, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported a bill, the Iran Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2007 (H.R. 1400), which was also referred to several other
panels. The head of one of the panels wrote to the Foreign Affairs chair and said:
[I]n order to expedite floor consideration [of H.R. 1400], I agree to forego further
consideration by the Committee on Financial Services. I do so with the
understanding that this decision will not prejudice this Committee with respect
to its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation. I request your
support for the appointment of conferees from this Committee should this bill be
the subject of a House-Senate conference.12
To be sure, multiple referrals may foment jurisdictional conflict as committees
assert their right to review provisions in bills that are only tangentially related to their
responsibilities. Yet the device gives committees the opportunity to negotiate away
their differences. If not, the Speaker has various ways to promote positive action,
such as imposing time limits on committee consideration or intervening personally
to help forge an agreement among clashing committees. With multiple referrals,
“committee members can no longer be certain of maintaining exclusive authority
over the legislation referred to their committee, but they can be virtually certain of
obtaining all the legislation to which they have claims.”13 Of course a short or
lengthy deadline for committee consideration of multi-referred measures — which
the Speaker has the authority to impose — can influence whether panels have
sufficient time to defend their jurisdictional prerogatives.
The Committee System
There are a number of ways at the committee level that inter-committee
disagreements might be resolved satisfactorily among the contending parties. There
is no guarantee that it will be the case, but the following eight methods are among the
practices utilized either to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, promote committee
coordination, or clarify committees’ policy focus. These methods are: memoranda
of understanding, select committees, standing committee creation, jurisdictional
transfers, task forces, committee composition, joint hearings, and informal staff
consultations.
12 Congressional Record, vol. 153, September 25, 2007, p. H10771.
13 Melissa P. Collie and Joseph Cooper, “Multiple Referral and the ‘New’ Committee
System in the House of Representatives,” in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer,
eds., Congress Reconsidered, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989), p. 254.
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Memoranda of Understanding. One approach for avoiding or muting
jurisdictional disagreements over shared policy areas is for paired committees to
prepare a “memorandum of understanding” that clarifies how certain overlapping
issues are to be referred. These memoranda are negotiated by the relevant
committees, signed by the respective committee chairs, often publicized in the
Congressional Record, and kept on file and observed by the Parliamentarian in the
reference of pertinent legislation. For example, on the opening day (January 4, 2007)
of the 110th Congress, a jurisdictional memorandum of understanding between the
chairs of the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure and Homeland
Security was published in the Congressional Record. It stated in part:
[W]ith regard to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s, FEMA,
emergency preparedness and response programs, the Committee on Homeland
Security has jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security’s
responsibilities with regard to emergency preparedness and collective response
only as they relate to terrorism. However, in light of the federal emergency
management reforms that were enacted as title VI of Public Law 109-295, a bill
amending FEMA’s all-hazards emergency preparedness programs that
necessarily addresses FEMA’s terrorism preparedness programs would be
referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; in addition, the
Committee on Homeland Security would have a jurisdictional interest in such
bill. Nothing in this Memorandum of Understanding affects the jurisdiction of
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and the Federal Fire Prevention
and Control Act of 1974.14
Establish a Select Committee. Select, or special, committees are
temporary panels that typically go out of business after the two-year life of the
Congress in which they are created. (Some select panels have been recreated for
several consecutive Congresses.) Resolutions to establish such panels are introduced
and normally referred to the Rules Committee, which may report them to the floor
for chamber consideration.15 The House may decide to constitute select panels for
various reasons, including to coordinate consideration of issues that overlap the
14 Congressional Record, vol. 153, January 4, 2007, pp. H15-H16. Worth mention is that
the Rules chair reaffirmed the “jurisdiction of the Committee on Small Business over the
Small Business Administration and its programs, as well as small business matters related
to the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act. Its jurisdiction under
House RuleX, clause 1(p) also includes other programs and initiatives that address small
businesses outside the confines of those Acts.” See Congressional Record, vol. 153,
January 4, 2007, p. H9. The reaffirmation of the panel’s authority will allow it, according
to the Small Business chair, “to have a voice at the table when legislation is being debated
or originated in any other committee that has an impact on small businesses. We will seek
limited referral to be able to do this.” Quoted in Bill Swindell, “Small Biz Getting Busy,”
National Journal’s CongressDailyPM, January 12, 2007, p. 13.
15 House rules (Rule XII, clause 2c) also authorize the Speaker to refer a matter “to a special,
ad hoc committee appointed by the Speaker with the approval of the House, and including
members of the committees of jurisdiction, for the specific purpose of considering that
matter and reporting to the House thereon.” Resolutions creating such ad hoc panels need
not be referred to the Rules Committee. House precedents state that resolutions creating
these select panels “are privileged when offered from the floor at the Speaker’s request.”
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jurisdiction of several standing committees. A recent example occurred at the start
of the 108th Congress (2003-2005) when the House set up a Select Committee on
Homeland Security with both legislative and oversight jurisdiction.16
Scores of House standing committees then and today have jurisdiction over
various aspects of homeland security. For example, Agriculture has jurisdiction over
animal and plant health; Energy and Commerce over public health; Financial
Services over terrorist financing; Judiciary over the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), immigration reform, and the criminal code; Science over computer security;
Transportation and Infrastructure over the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA); and Ways and Means over the Customs Service. To strengthen supervision
of the Department of Homeland Security — formed in 2002 from the merger of 22
agencies with around 180,000 employees — the Speaker and other lawmakers
wanted “a single point of oversight for the massive new department.”17 The select
committee also had the responsibility under the terms of its authorizing resolution to
recommend to the Rules Committee by September 30, 2004, “possible changes in
committee jurisdiction with respect to homeland security.” Their recommendation
contributed to the next example.
Create a Standing Committee. To create a new standing committee in the
House is no easy assignment Similarly, it is often difficult to eliminate a standing
committee. A compelling reason that helps to explain both cases is that Members
and staff of the various committees, and their allied outside groups and entities, are
reluctant to lose any of their jurisdictional responsibilities. Yet to create a new
standing committee inevitably means shifting some jurisdiction from existing
committees to the proposed new permanent panel.
Despite the many obstacles involved in revamping committee jurisdictions,
these initiatives sometimes occur to promote policy and oversight coherency for a
subject area that is fragmented and divided among numerous standing committees.
The House’s establishment in the 109th Congress (2005-2007) of a new standing
Committee on Homeland Security — as recommended by the aforementioned Select
Homeland Security Committee — is a recent illustration of this approach. On
January 4, 2005, on the opening day of the new Congress, the House adopted a
package of rules changes that included formation of a new standing Committee on
Homeland Security. As the chair of the Rules Committee explained:
[T]he House will do what the Speaker and the 9/11 Commission as well as the
President has asked us to do, consolidate jurisdiction of the House into one
committee. This committee will be dedicated to setting national homeland
16 This select committee was established by the package of rules changes (H. Res. 5)
traditionally adopted on the opening day of a new Congress. See Congressional Record,
vol. 149, January 7, 2003, p. H10.
17 Martin Kady, “Select Homeland Security,” CQ Weekly, January 11, 2003, p. 95. See also
CRS Report RS21243, Ad Hoc Select Committees: Use in the House of Representatives, by
Judy Schneider.
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security policy and to effectively overseeing that the Department of Homeland
Security carries out its mission.18
This change to House Rule X created “a primary committee for homeland
security while recognizing the other legitimate [legislative and] oversight roles of
existing committees.”19 Because homeland security overlaps many committees and
involves scores of federal agencies, the Rules chair included in the Congressional
Record a legislative history detailing and clarifying the continuing jurisdictional
authority of 10 other standing committees over parts of this policy area. For
example, the Committee on Financial Services “shall retain its jurisdiction over the
anti-money laundering, terrorist financing, and anti-counterfeiting activities within
the Department of the Treasury and the financial regulators.”20 An objective of this
jurisdictional arrangement, said the Rules chair, is to assure the American people that
lawmakers are “working to prevent anything from falling through the cracks.”21
Jurisdictional Transfers. Sometimes specific jurisdictional changes will be
made between or among committees both to minimize inter-committee
disagreements and promote integrated policymaking. These discrete changes may
also be employed creatively to avoid intra-party clashes. For example, two
influential GOP lawmakers wanted to head the Commerce Committee. Under the
six-year term limit provision stated in House rules, the chairmanship of that panel
was vacant because the former chair had reached the six-year limit. To avoid a
potentially heated contest for the Energy post that could produce hard feelings within
the GOP Conference, the Speaker endorsed a plan to rename Commerce the Energy
and Commerce Committee, abolish the Banking Committee and rename it the
Financial Services Committee, and grant it jurisdiction over securities and insurance
previously in the old Commerce Committee. The jurisdictional shifts occurred,
according to the chairman of the Rules Committee, “to increase market confidence
in the [House’s] ability to comprehend the increasingly integrated nature of the
financial services market.”22
18 Congressional Record, vol. 151, January 4, 2005, p. H14. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that “Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review
for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should
have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does
have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this
committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.” See also
The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 419.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. H25.
21 Ibid., p. H14.
22 Congressional Record, vol. 147, January 3, 2001, p. H9. The Rules chairman also made
clear that the insurance jurisdiction of other committees, such as the Agriculture
Committee’s authority for crop insurance, would not be affected by the transfer of insurance
jurisdiction to the Financial Services Committee.
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The Speaker’s intervention prevented an intra-party battle and allowed each of
the Members to chair an important committee. The House supported the changes
when it adopted a rules package on the opening day of the 107th Congress. The
Energy and Financial Services chairs soon disagreed over which panel had authority
over certain financial issues involved in the jurisdictional transfer. The Speaker
mediated this conflict over turf, which ended with the two chairs signing a
memorandum of understanding to settle their differences over jurisdiction.23
Task Forces. Informal task forces have long been created by Democratic or
Republican Speakers. They may be either partisan or bipartisan in composition, with
the membership commonly drawn from multiple committees. Task forces are
established for various reasons, including the drafting of legislation that cuts across
committees’ jurisdictional lines. Former Speaker Newt Gingrich, GA, formed a
number of party task forces in the early days of the 104th Congress (1995-1997), so
many that one newspaper article was titled “Government by Task Force: The
Gingrich Model.”24 He formed them, in part, because he determined their mandate
and timetable, appointed the chair and members, and assigned them a deadline for
legislative action. Although some committee chairs questioned whether the
proliferation of the ad hoc groups undermined their jurisdictional prerogatives, GOP
leaders were not especially sympathetic at the time to the chairs’ point of view.
Leaders of the majority party wanted to avoid committee gridlock and get their party-
preferred legislation to the floor in a timely fashion. As a deputy Republican whip
stated: “Some committee chairmen think theirs should be the only venue, but that’s
turf wars.”25 Party leaders may also establish informal working groups of Members
and staff to assist in coordinating the development of legislation that overlaps the
jurisdiction of several standing committees.
Committee Composition. House members serve, on average, on about a
half-dozen committees and subcommittee. The point is that Members who serve on
two committees with shared policy interests are sometimes able to smooth
jurisdictional relations between the two. It is unclear whether the party assignment
panels consider the “jurisdictional liaison” role as a criterion in placing their
Members on committees. Yet overlapping committee memberships may at times
promote inter-committee cooperation over shared policy issues. As a senior staffer
on the International Relations Committee (now titled the Foreign Affairs Committee)
said about having two long-time GOP members — who each also chaired another
standing committee — serve on the panel:
The chairman of the Judiciary Committee is Henry Hyde [R-IL]. He’s one of the
more senior members of our committee. The chairman of the Banking
Committee is Jim Leach [R-IA] who’s one of the more senior members of our
committee. I think that one result of that is that we tend never to have problems
23 Congressional Record, vol. 147, January 30, 2001, p. H103.
24 Deborah Kalb, “Government by Task Force: The Gingrich Model,” The Hill, February 22,
1995, p. 3.
25 Deborah Kalb, “Task Forces Get Mixed Reviews,” The Hill, June 21, 1995, p. 12.
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with those committees because they’ve all served together on this committee for
almost two decades.26
There are also two committees — Budget and Permanent Select Intelligence —
that by House rules are required to have Members drawn from other standing
committees. For example, the Permanent Select Intelligence Committee is to have
at least one Member selected from four committees with pertinent intelligence
jurisdiction. The four panels are Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs,
and Judiciary.
Joint Hearings. Another method that committees might use to accommodate
their mutual jurisdictional interests is to hold joint hearings. These types of hearings
occur often on Capitol Hill and might be employed to reduce or eliminate the
potential for jurisdictional conflicts. For example, the House Armed Services and
Foreign Affairs Committees held a joint hearing on two reports (one issued by the
Government Accountability Office and the other by a commission of military
experts) “assessing political and military conditions in Iraq.”27 Plainly, the reports
addressed concerns in both panels, and the joint hearing device protected the
jurisdictional interests of the two committees and avoided a battle over turf.
Informal Staff Consultation. It is common for the staff of committees with
shared policy mandates to communicate with each other. Sometimes the discussion
involves the staff aides of one panel informing their counterparts on other committees
that they may have a jurisdictional interest in pending legislation. Inter-committee
comity is promoted by this approach, which can lead to an amicable resolution of turf
issues. On other occasions, the staffs of two or more committees with overlapping
jurisdiction may work together in crafting legislation. In the case of an agriculture
census bill, for instance, the chair of the Government Reform Committee (now called
Oversight and Government Reform) “observed that prior negotiations between the
staffs of his panel and the Agriculture Committee helped draft the language of the
bill, permitting him to waive jurisdiction shortly after Agriculture reported it.”28
The Rules Committee
The Rules Committee reports special rules (procedural simple resolutions, H.
Res.) that grant “privilege” to measures that may lack a right-of-way to the floor.
The panel sets the conditions for debating legislation and determining whether
amendments will be in order to various measures. Special rules come in various
versions, and they are called by different names. One easy-to-understand typology is
the following: open (germane amendments from the floor may be offered to the
pending measure); closed (floor amendments are not in order); modified or structured
(a limited and specified number of floor amendments are in order); and waivers
26 Quoted in John Baughman, Common Ground: Committee Politics in the U.S. House of
Representatives (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 138.
27 Karen DeYoung, “House to Hold Hearings on Two New Reports on Iraq,” The
Washington Post, August 28, 2007, p. A8.
28 Baughman, Common Ground, p. 141.
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(points of order are set aside against all or specified parts of a bill or against specific
amendments). Waivers may be included in open, closed, or structured rules, as well
as in the array of other special rules granted by the panel — for example, structured,
reconciling, self-executing, and bifurcated, which are discussed below. The Rules
Committee may also refuse to grant special rules to committees bickering over
jurisdictional issues unless and until they have resolved their differences.
Like its rule-granting authority, Rules’ jurisdiction over the formal rules of the
House enables it to play a large role in mediating jurisdictional disputes. The Rules
Committee may also report changes to House rules that are designed to minimize
jurisdictional controversy and protect a panel’s policy prerogatives. Tax or tariff
measures or amendments, for example, are not in order unless they have been
reported by the Committee on Ways and Means (House Rule XII, clause 5). Below
is a brief review of different types of procedural resolutions that might be employed
to minimize committee conflicts.
Waivers of Points of Order. The Rules Committee commonly waives a
wide range of House rules, such as the three-day layover requirement for committee
reports and conference reports. These two House rules provide time to lawmakers
to become familiar with committee-reported legislation or the legislative compromise
(the conference report) reached when the two chambers pass different versions of the
same bill. Or Rules might waive the germaneness requirement for certain
amendments to smooth relationships among committees that have a stake in the
underlying bill.
Waivers can sometimes be useful in limiting conflicts between authorizing
committees (Agriculture, Financial Services, Small Business, and so on) and the
Appropriations Committee. Authorizing committees report legislation creating or
continuing programs and agencies while the Appropriations Committee recommends
how much money (called budget authority) these programs or agencies should
receive. Under House rules, authorizations are expected to precede appropriations;
further, appropriations measures are not to include legislation (or policy provisions).
Violations of these rules are subject to points of order (parliamentary objections) on
the floor.
As might be expected, these two sets of committees commonly have
disagreements, in part because it may not be possible for the members of the
authorization committees to win enactment of bills to reauthorize programs or
agencies. Bicameral clashes, for example, may prevent their timely enactment. As
a result, the Appropriations Committee may include reauthorizing language, as well
as new policy proposals, in their bills. These add-ons can arouse the ire of the
authorizers. To constrain the traditional rivalry between authorizers and
appropriators — and preserve their respective prerogatives — the Rules Committee
may observe an informal protocol. As one Rules chairman stated:
Under this protocol, the Committee on Rules would provide the necessary
waivers to enable the bill to come to the floor if the authorizing committee
chairmen did not object to them. If the authorizing chairmen objected to the
waivers, then under the leadership’s protocol, the Committee on Rules would
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leave the specific [policy] language in question exposed to a point of order on the
floor.29
A minority member of the Rules Committee had earlier said: “We have generally
been supportive of the majority’s stated intention to provide open, unrestricted rules
for as many of the appropriations bills as possible, and for its policy of providing
waivers of House rules only when the authorizing committees agree to those
waivers.”30
Structured Rules. A structured rule limits the number of amendments that
may be offered to a measure made in order by the procedural resolution. On major
bills that overlap the jurisdiction of several panels, it is not unusual for the Rules
Committee, perhaps in coordination with the majority leadership, to craft a rule
designed to prevent a bill’s unraveling on the floor through the adoption of so-called
“poison pill” amendments. For example, on a major energy bill — parts of which
were considered by five standing committees — the Rules Committee reported a rule,
“that severely limited the number and range of amendments that could be offered,
which insured that debate could not drag on..., that it would be structured, and that
it would focus on the key features of the [administration’s] program and the major
alternatives.”31 The energy package was agreed to by the House, in part because of
the design of the rule.
Reconciling Rules. When measures are multiply referred to several
committees, as noted above, it is not uncommon for two or more committees to
report conflicting recommendations to the same bill. It falls to the Rules Committee
to develop a special rule that identifies the base text to be made in order for floor
consideration and that also allows the House to choose between or among competing
policy alternatives. As two scholars wrote:
In drafting the rule for a multiply referred bill, the Rules Committee is more
likely than in other cases to have plausible alternative arrangements from which
to choose as it selects the text to be amended on the floor, allocates control of the
time for general debate, arranges for votes on the committees’ recommendations,
and disposes of germaneness and other procedural problems that multiple
referrals can provoke.32
Relatedly, as a precondition for a special rule, the Rules Committee may urge
several competing committees to agree on the vehicle — one of the committee’s
reported bills or a consensus product, for example — for floor debate and
amendment. This practice can limit floor fights among rival committees and
expedite floor decision making.
29 Congressional Record, vol. 144, July 10, 1997, p. H5049.
30 Congressional Record, vol. 142, July 21, 1995, p. H7386.
31 Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “Policy Effects of U.S. House Reform: Decentralization and the
Capacity To Resolve Energy Issues,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, February 1980, p. 24.
32 Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty in the House of
Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 22.
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Self-Executing Rules. This type of rule embodies a two-for-one procedure
— that is, when the House adopts a rule it also automatically agrees to dispose of a
separate matter, which is specified in the rule itself. Self-executing language in a
special rule often states something like the following: “The amendment printed in
[section 2 of this resolution or in part 1 of the report of the Committee on Rules
accompanying this resolution] shall be considered as adopted in the House and in the
Committee of the Whole.” Thus, a self-executing rule may stipulate that a discrete
policy proposal is deemed to have passed the House and been incorporated in the bill
to be taken up. The effect is that neither in the House nor in the Committee of the
Whole will lawmakers have an opportunity to amend or to vote separately on the self-
executed provision. For example, a policy recommended by one of two or more
competing committees could automatically be incorporated in the text of the bill
made in order for floor consideration, thus avoiding the potential for inter-committee
disputes on the floor. Members who oppose the self-executed provision(s) may vote
either to amend or reject the rule. (A special rule, however, might allow amendments
to the text of the self-executed material.)
Bifurcated Rules. Bifurcated rules make at least two separate bills in order
for back-to-back consideration in the chamber. Under a bifurcated rule, the House
first debates, amends, and passes one bill, and then proceeds to consider another
related but different bill. These actions can occur on separate days. Once the House
agrees to the second measure, the rule provides that the two bills will be combined
into one measure and sent to the Senate. A separate vote is not taken on the
combined legislation. This form of special rule can help to mobilize winning
majorities for party priorities, in part by joining the work product of different, and
sometimes competing, committees into one legislative measure. Consultation and
communication between the relevant panels is typically necessary to ensure that the
combined measure achieves its political and policy purposes. Party leaders and Rules
Committee members may be actively involved in facilitating substantive coordination
between the pertinent committees.
Concluding Observations
Jurisdictional claims and counterclaims for legislation are commonplace among
committees. Various factors account for this reality. For example, committees
commonly share responsibility for overseeing and legislating for the same agencies
and departments, and their policy and oversight preferences may diverge one from
the other. Committee jurisdictions, too, cannot keep pace with rapid social,
economic, or technological developments. One result is that scores of issues today
involve the jurisdictional expertise of numerous committees. When multiple
committees bring their divergent perspectives to a topic, disagreements may emerge
among them. These disagreements, it is worth noting, may result more from serious
policy differences than from battles over “turf.” Although committee cooperation is
the norm on Capitol Hill, disputes among committees occur quite often. Various
conflict-resolving techniques are utilized both to reduce committee conflicts and
promote cooperative relationships.
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In today’s House, one technique merits emphasis and specific mention: the role
of majority party leaders, especially the Speaker. They are positioned to encourage
cooperative behavior among committees because of their special resources and
responsibilities. As one congressional scholar recounted:
[H]ouse leaders are well positioned to exert formal and informal pressure on
committees at nearly every stage of the process, from the referral of bills through
the naming of conference committees. The tools of the leadership [have] the
effect of raising the costs of hostile action, for example in the setting of time
limits on referrals and limiting amendments with special rules. They could also
make accommodation more attractive, such as by acting as a guarantor for
agreements between committees struck under the direct supervision of the
[majority] leadership .... [The Speaker] can implement the [inter-committee]
agreements directly in new legislative language via his floor prerogatives and
influence over the Rules Committee. In this way, turf wars are contingent on the
patience of leaders and on the latitude they grant.33
In short, party leaders often act to facilitate committee cooperation across
numerous policy domains, and they have various ways to ensure productive
committee action on priority legislation. It is reasonable to suggest that many other
factors beside leadership involvement are important in promoting committee
cooperation, such as regular staff contacts between and among committees,
overlapping committee memberships, and recognition by committees that constant
jurisdictional bickering can be counter-productive to lawmaking. Committees have
their own incentives for cooperating — or fighting — with other panels. However,
if jurisdictional fights threaten chamber action on party-preferred legislation, then the
central leadership seems certain to intervene to resolve the differences among the
contending committees.
33 Baughman, Common Ground: Committee Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives,
p. 174.