Options to Address Social Security Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model–Detailed Distributional Tables

ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱ Š—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’ŽœDZȱŽœž•œȱ ›˜–ȱ‘Žȱ¢—Šœ’–ȱ’Œ›˜œ’–ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜Ž•ȯ ŽŠ’•Žȱ’œ›’‹ž’˜—Š•ȱŠ‹•Žœȱ Šž›Šȱ Š•£Ž•ȱ ™ŽŒ’Š•’œȱ’—ȱ —Œ˜–ŽȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ Š —ȱžœŒ‘•Ž›ȱ ™ŽŒ’Š•’œȱ’—ȱ —Œ˜–ŽȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ Š‘•ŽŽ—ȱ˜–’ȱ —Š•¢œȱ’—ȱ —Œ˜–ŽȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ Š›¢ȱ’˜›ȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱ™ŽŒ’Š•’œȱ Œ˜ȱ£¢–Ž—Ž›Šȱ —Š•¢œȱ’—ȱ’œŠ‹’•’¢ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ ’””’ȱŽŸ’—ŽȱŠ’ȱ ™™•’ŒŠ’˜—œȱŽŸŽ•˜™Ž›ǰȱ•’Ž—ȬŽ›ŸŽ›ȱŠ—ȱȱ Ž‹›Šȱǯȱ‘’–Š—ȱ ȱ Š—žŠ›¢ȱŘşǰȱŘŖŖŝȱ ȱŽ™˜›ȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœ Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ    ǯŒ›œǯ˜Ÿȱ řřŞŚŗȱ řȱ ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ž––Š›¢ȱ This report presents detailed tables showing the distributional effects of 12 Social Security solvency options on Social Security beneficiaries in 2035 compared with current law. The 12 options presented fall into 6 categories of reform proposals. For some reform options, we present two or more variations on how they could be approached. They include the most commonly discussed or introduced proposals to improve cash flow and achieve Social Security solvency: • reducing the annual cost of living adjustment (COLA) • increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula • increasing the full retirement age (FRA) • longevity indexing initial Social Security benefits • progressive price indexing initial Social Security benefits • increasing earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes by raising or eliminating the taxable earnings base. These tables provide the modeling results used to produce the full analysis of these options contained in a companion report, CRS Report RL33840, Options to Address Social Security Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model. That report presents the distributional effects of these reform options in terms of Social Security beneficiaries’ median payroll tax increase or benefit reduction and shows the varied effect of these reforms on beneficiaries along certain socio-economic lines (i.e., age, type of benefit received, and income quintile). Those readers interested in a complete explanation of these results are encouraged to read that report. The tables contained in this report provide some additional detail not included in the previously mentioned report. The first table for each option summarizes the effect of the policy change on beneficiaries in 2035 across socio-economic groups (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). These tables show the number in the population, the mean percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option, and the median percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option. Subsequent tables show the varied effects of these reforms on beneficiaries in 2035 overall and then within each socio-economic group (i.e., gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). CRS analysts used the Dynasim microsimulation model to project the effects of these reforms on Social Security beneficiaries in 2035, assuming the reforms first take effect in 2013. This report will not be updated. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ˜—Ž—œȱ Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Interpreting the Results ................................................................................................................... 2 Why These Options?........................................................................................................... 2 When Would the Options Begin?........................................................................................ 3 How Far Into the Future Does This Analysis Look?........................................................... 3 What Do the Tables Show?................................................................................................. 4 How to Read the Tables ...................................................................................................... 6 Why Do Some of the Results Seem Counterintuitive? ....................................................... 7 Who Is Included in the Analysis? ....................................................................................... 7 How Does Dynasim Estimate Future Benefits?.................................................................. 8 Where Can Readers Find Out More?.................................................................................. 8 Option 1: Reducing the Annual Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) by Half a Percentage Point ............................................................................................................................................. 9 Option 2: Reducing the Annual COLA by One Percentage Point ................................................. 14 Option 3: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35 to 38 for All Beneficiaries .......................................................................................................... 19 Option 4: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35 to 38 For All But Disability Beneficiaries.................................................................................. 24 Option 5: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35 to 40 for All Beneficiaries .......................................................................................................... 30 Option 6: Increasing the Number of Computation Years in the Benefit Formula From 35 to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries................................................................................... 35 Option 7: Increasing the Full Retirement Age (FRA) by Accelerating the Increase From Age 66 to Age 67 Scheduled Under Current Law and Further Increasing the FRA From Age 67 to Age 70........................................................................................................................ 41 Option 8: Longevity Indexing Initial Social Security Benefits by Reducing the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Formula Factors ................................................................................. 46 Option 9: Longevity Indexing Initial Social Security Benefits by Reducing the PIA Value and Holding Disability Beneficiaries Harmless Until They Reach the FRA ............................. 52 Option 10: Progressive Price Indexing Initial Social Security Benefits........................................ 57 Option 11: Increasing Earnings Subject to Social Security Payroll Taxes by Raising the Dollar Amount of the Taxable Earnings Base to 100% of Aggregate Covered Earnings in the U.S. (Eliminating the Taxable Earnings Base) ................................................................. 62 Option 12: Increasing Earnings Subject to Social Security Payroll Taxes by Raising the Dollar Amount of the Taxable Earnings Base to 90% of Aggregate Covered Earnings in the U.S........................................................................................................................................ 77 Š‹•Žœȱ Table 1. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035........................................................................................ 9 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 2. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in 2035 ............ 10 Table 3. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in 2035............ 10 Table 4. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035..........11 Table 5. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Education Level in 2035.........................................................................................................................................11 Table 6. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035 ................. 12 Table 7. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 12 Table 8. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 13 Table 9. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035........................................................................................................................................ 13 Table 10. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035...................................................................................... 14 Table 11. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in 2035.............. 15 Table 12. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in 2035 ............. 15 Table 13. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 .......... 16 Table 14. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Education Level in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 16 Table 15. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035 .................. 17 Table 16. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 17 Table 17. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 18 Table 18. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 18 Table 19. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035................................... 19 Table 20. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 .................................................................................................. 20 Table 21. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035.................................................................................................. 21 Table 22. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035............................................................................................... 21 Table 23. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 ................................................................................... 21 Table 24. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035 ....................................................................................................... 22 Table 25. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 ....................................................................................... 22 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 26. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035......................................................................................... 23 Table 27. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 ................................................................................... 23 Table 28. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035............ 24 Table 29. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 ........................................................................... 25 Table 30. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035........................................................................... 26 Table 31. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035........................................................................ 26 Table 32. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 ............................................................ 27 Table 33. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035................................................................................ 27 Table 34. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035................................................................ 28 Table 35. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035.................................................................. 28 Table 36. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 ............................................................ 29 Table 37. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035................................... 30 Table 38. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 .................................................................................................. 31 Table 39. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035.................................................................................................. 32 Table 40. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035............................................................................................... 32 Table 41. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 ................................................................................... 32 Table 42. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035 ....................................................................................................... 33 Table 43. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 ....................................................................................... 33 Table 44. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035......................................................................................... 34 Table 45. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 ................................................................................... 34 Table 46. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035............ 35 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 47. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 ........................................................................... 36 Table 48. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035........................................................................... 37 Table 49. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035........................................................................ 37 Table 50. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 ............................................................ 38 Table 51. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035................................................................................ 38 Table 52. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035................................................................ 39 Table 53. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035.................................................................. 39 Table 54. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 ............................................................ 40 Table 55. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Summary of Mean Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 ......................................................................................................................... 41 Table 56. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Impact in 2035............................... 42 Table 57. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Gender in 2035 .............................. 42 Table 58. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 ........................... 43 Table 59. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Education Level in 2035................ 43 Table 60. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Age in 2035.................................... 44 Table 61. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035.................... 44 Table 62. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 ..................... 44 Table 63. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 ................ 45 Table 64. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035...................................................................................... 46 Table 65. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035 ........... 47 Table 66. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035........... 48 Table 67. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035........ 48 Table 68. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level in 2035........................................................................................................................................ 49 Table 69. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035................ 49 Table 70. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 50 Table 71. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 50 Table 72. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035........................................................................................................................................ 51 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 73. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 ........................................................................................................ 52 Table 74. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035............................. 53 Table 75. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035............................ 53 Table 76. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035......................... 54 Table 77. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 ............. 54 Table 78. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035 ................................. 55 Table 79. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 ................. 55 Table 80. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 ................... 56 Table 81. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035.............. 56 Table 82. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035................................... 57 Table 83. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Impact in 2035 .................................................................................................. 58 Table 84. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Gender in 2035.................................................................................................. 58 Table 85. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035............................................................................................... 59 Table 86. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 ................................................................................... 59 Table 87. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Age in 2035 ....................................................................................................... 60 Table 88. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 ....................................................................................... 60 Table 89. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035......................................................................................... 61 Table 90. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 ................................................................................... 61 Table 91. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay No Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 ........................................................................... 62 Table 92. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 ............................................................................................. 63 Table 93. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population in 2035 ................ 65 Table 94. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in 2035.......................... 66 Table 95. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in 2035......................... 66 Table 96. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035...................... 67 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 97. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings of the Total Population: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035 ............................................................................................................ 67 Table 98. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035 .............................. 68 Table 99. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035 .............. 68 Table 100. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035 ................ 69 Table 101. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035........... 69 Table 102. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay No Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035 ............................................................................ 70 Table 103. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035 ............................................................................ 71 Table 104. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population in 2035....................................... 72 Table 105. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in 2035..................... 73 Table 106. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035 .................. 73 Table 107. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 74 Table 108. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in 2035 .......................... 74 Table 109. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population Marital Status in 2035 ............... 75 Table 110. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earning: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035 ............ 75 Table 111. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 76 Table 112. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay No Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035....................................................................... 77 Table 113. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 ........................................................................... 78 Table 114. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Total Population in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 80 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 115. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in 2035 ......... 81 Table 116. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in 2035......... 81 Table 117. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 82 Table 118. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035.............................................................................................................................. 82 Table 119. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035 .............. 83 Table 120. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035........................................................................................................................................ 83 Table 121. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 84 Table 122. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035........................................................................................................................................ 84 Table 123. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay No Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035............................................................... 85 Table 124. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 .................................................................... 86 Table 125. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Impact in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 87 Table 126. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 88 Table 127. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035............................................................................................................................................ 88 Table 128. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035.............................................................................................................................. 88 Table 129. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in 2035 .......... 89 Table 130. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035 ............................................................................................................................. 90 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 131. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035........................................................................................................................................ 90 Table 132. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035.......................................................................................................................... 90 Table C-1. Retirement Earnings Test Application Rules ............................................................... 96 ™™Ž—’¡Žœȱ Appendix A. Computation of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Under Current Law ............ 92 Appendix B. Interaction of Spouse and Aged Survivor Benefit Rules with Policy Options......... 94 Appendix C. Interaction of the Retirement Earnings Test with Policy Options............................ 96 Appendix D. Technical Description of the Progressive Price Indexing Option ............................ 99 Appendix E. Background on the Urban Institute’s Dynasim Microsimulation Model ............... 101 Appendix F. Glossary .................................................................................................................. 105 ˜—ŠŒœȱ Author Contact Information .........................................................................................................110 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ —›˜žŒ’˜—ȱ This report presents detailed tables showing the distributional effects of 12 Social Security solvency options on Social Security beneficiaries in 2035 compared with current law.1 The options presented are 1. Reducing the annual cost of living adjustment (COLA) by half a percentage point 2. Reducing the annual COLA by one percentage point 3. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 38 for all beneficiaries 4. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 38 for all but disability beneficiaries 5. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 40 for all beneficiaries 6. Increasing the number of computation years in the benefit formula from 35 to 40 for all but disability beneficiaries 7. Increasing the full retirement age (FRA) by accelerating the increase from age 66 to age 67 scheduled under current law and further increasing the FRA from age 67 to age 70 8. Longevity indexing initial Social Security benefits by reducing the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) formula factors 9. Longevity indexing initial Social Security benefits by reducing the PIA value and holding disability beneficiaries harmless until they reach the FRA 10. Progressive price indexing initial Social Security benefits 11. Increasing earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes by raising the dollar amount of the taxable earnings base to 100% of aggregate covered earnings in the U.S. (eliminating the taxable earnings base) 12. Increasing earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes by raising the dollar amount of the taxable earnings base to 90% of aggregate covered earnings in the U.S. These tables provide the modeling results used to produce the full analysis of these options contained in a companion report, CRS Report RL33840, Options to Address Social Security Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model. 1 Those unfamiliar with the Social Security reform debate or the Social Security program may wish to first read the following reports: CRS Report RL33544, Social Security Reform: Current Issues and Legislation, by Dawn Nuschler; CRS Report 94-27, Social Security: Brief Facts and Statistics, by Gary Sidor; and, CRS Report RL32279, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), by Scott Szymendera. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ That report presents the distributional effects of these reform options in terms of Social Security beneficiaries’ median payroll tax increase or benefit reduction and shows the varied effect of these reforms on beneficiaries along certain socio-economic lines (i.e., age, type of benefit received, and income quintile). Those readers interested in a complete explanation of these results are encouraged to read that report. The tables contained in this report provide some additional detail not included in the previously mentioned report. The first table for each option summarizes the effect of the policy change on beneficiaries in 2035 across socio-economic groups (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). These tables show the number of people in the population, the mean percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option, and the median percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option. Subsequent tables show the varied effects of these reforms on beneficiaries in 2035 overall and then within each socio-economic group (i.e., gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). The options presented below include the most commonly discussed or introduced proposals to improve cash flow and achieve Social Security solvency. CRS takes no position for or against any of the options presented in this report.2 The presentation of options in the report moves from least complex to most complex. The ordering of the 12 options, and the assumptions used in their analysis, reflect no policy recommendations or preferences on the part of CRS. For some reform options, we present two or more variations on how they could be approached. Each option would affect beneficiaries differently. This report assumes that all of the options take effect in 2013 and shows the distributional impact of each option in 2035 using results from the Dynasim microsimulation model.3 The Dynasim model is not an actuarial model and so cannot produce solvency estimates for these options. —Ž›™›Ž’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽœž•œȱ ‘¢ȱ‘ŽœŽȱ™’˜—œǵȱ The primary rationale for all of the options in this report is to improve the solvency of the Social Security system. All of the options would enhance long-range solvency by either cutting benefits or increasing payroll taxes. There are also secondary rationales behind most of the options—for example, some would reward longer working careers or account for increases in longevity. The options in this report include the most commonly discussed or introduced proposals to improve cash flow and achieve Social Security solvency. Each option in this report is analyzed in isolation, but it is important to note that the options are typically proposed in combination with one another and/or with other Social Security reform features (such as individual accounts or 2 Some solvency options, such as increasing the Social Security coverage of state and local government workers, altering the taxation of Social Security benefits, or investing a portion of the Social Security surplus in equities, cannot currently be modeled in this version of Dynasim. Therefore, these options are not included among the options analyzed in this report. 3 For additional information on the Dynasim microsimulation model, please see Appendix E. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ benefit enhancements for low earners).4 The options analyzed in this report can be viewed as a set of building blocks for comprehensive Social Security reform. ‘Ž—ȱ˜ž•ȱ‘Žȱ™’˜—œȱŽ’—ǵȱ All of the options in this report are assumed to be implemented starting in 2013. The year 2013 was chosen since many policymakers have indicated a desire to leave the benefits of individuals who are currently age 55 or older unchanged, since they would have little time to alter their savings, work, or retirement plans. With the exception of the option to increase the full retirement age, none of the options presented in this report are phased in gradually over time. Any of the options could be implemented before or after 2013, or could be phased in gradually. This analysis aims to compare all of the reform options using consistent assumptions and under identical circumstances. However, for some options, all beneficiaries would be affected starting in 2013, including those who became eligible for benefits before 2013 (e.g., reducing the COLA). For other options, only new beneficiaries—those who become eligible for benefits in 2013 or later—would be affected (e.g., progressive price indexing initial Social Security benefits). These differences are dictated by the nature of the reform options themselves and the particular Social Security program rules affected by these reform options. ˜ ȱŠ›ȱ —˜ȱ‘Žȱžž›Žȱ˜Žœȱ‘’œȱ—Š•¢œ’œȱ˜˜”ǵȱ This report focuses on the effects of policy changes on beneficiaries in 2035. The tables presented are essentially a snapshot of the projected beneficiary population in this single year. Focusing on a different year would lead to different results. The year 2035 was selected for this analysis because it balances two competing goals. The first goal is to allow a sufficient amount of time to pass for the differing effects of the policy options to become clear once the new policies are implemented. Since all of the options are assumed to begin in 2013, by 2035 most beneficiaries would be affected. An earlier date may not capture the disparate effects of the options, particularly for those options with relatively small annual changes. The second goal is to provide the most reliable information possible. Since it is impossible to accurately predict the future, all projection models contain some level of uncertainty. The further into the future one projects, the greater the estimates may ultimately deviate from reality. The most accurate data are the actual observations that exist when the projection period began. The youngest individuals eligible to receive retirement benefits in 2035 would have been born in the early 1970s, and so actual data would be included in the model’s projection of their retirement benefits. Extending the analysis to periods much later than 2035 would rely more heavily on the model’s assumptions about future trends. Under some of the options, not all beneficiaries in 2035 would be affected. This is because some of the options apply only to beneficiaries who become eligible for benefits in 2013 or later (e.g., progressive price indexing). For these options, the analysis in 2035 will show a sizable group of beneficiaries who are not subject to the change since they became eligible for benefits before 2013. Because the proportion of beneficiaries who become eligible for benefits before 2013 4 Combining any of the options with one another or with other features could significantly alter their distributional impacts. Thus, it is not possible to sum the results of any combination of options shown in this report since the options could interact in unexpected ways. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ varies significantly by socio-economic characteristics, the date of implementation drives many of the results in 2035, particularly the results by age. Results shown for 2035 also do not reflect the full impact of the options over time. The effect of some options increases over time (e.g., longevity indexing). Under these options, each successive cohort of beneficiaries would be affected more than the last, so that a beneficiary who becomes eligible 50 years after implementation would be affected much more than a beneficiary who becomes eligible in the first year, all other things being equal. For other options, the magnitude of the benefit change does not increase over time (e.g., increasing the number of computation years). Under these options, each successive cohort of beneficiaries would be subject to the same rules, so that a beneficiary who becomes eligible 50 years after implementation would experience the same magnitude of change as a beneficiary who becomes eligible in the first year, all other things being equal. Since the tables in this report focus on a single year, these distinctions are not shown. ‘Šȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŠ‹•Žœȱ‘˜ ǵȱ The first table for each option breaks down the effect of the policy change on beneficiaries in 2035 by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile. (For more information on income quintiles, please see the subsection below called “Breakdowns by Income Quintile.”). These tables show the number of people in the population,5 the mean percent change, and the median percent change in benefits between current law and the policy option.6 Since Dynasim projects a representative sub-sample of the population, the number of observations in the model must be weighted (in this case multiplied by a constant) so that the numbers total the entire population. Population numbers in the tables are presented in thousands. The mean, or average, is determined by adding all the values in a data set and dividing the sum by the number of values in the data set. The median is the midpoint in a group of values, such that half the values are above the median and half are below. Unlike a mean, a median will not be skewed by a small number of extremely large or extremely small values. For example, consider five beneficiaries affected by a policy option. One loses her entire benefit under the option (meaning she has a change of -100%). The other four beneficiaries have benefit changes of -3%, -2%, -2%, and -1%, compared with current law. The median percentage change for this group would be -2% because -2% is the third value of the five values arranged from least to greatest. The mean percentage change would be -22% because it is the sum of all five values divided by five. Since policy changes sometimes result in very large benefit changes (such as beneficiaries gaining or losing a benefit) for a few beneficiaries, the median is a good measure of how a policy would affect a typical beneficiary. For both the mean and median percent change in benefits, numbers have been rounded to the nearest full percentage point. The results for each option include tables that show the overall distribution of the estimated benefit change for all beneficiaries as well as for beneficiaries broken down by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile. For example, the 5 In this version of Dynasim, each observation had a weight of 2,517.3811. Thus, 10 raw observations would be shown as about 25,000 individuals in the tables presented. All projected population numbers are rounded to the nearest thousand. 6 The report compares benefits under each option to scheduled benefits under current law. Some other analyses compare benefits under policy options to payable benefits, or the level of benefits that could be funded with current funding levels. However, the 2005 Trustees Report (on which this analysis is based) projects that the trust funds will remain solvent until 2041. Since the analysis in this report focuses on 2035, scheduled benefits and payable benefits would be the same amount. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ tables show what proportion of beneficiaries in each of the five income quintiles have benefit reductions of up to -10%, reductions from -10% to -19%, etc. Every attempt has been made to be consistent in the presentation of the results of the analysis. The same benefit reduction categories have been used in all tables across the various reform options so as not to skew the results. Furthermore, the tables for all of the options include the entire Dynasim population, with one exception. For the options to raise or eliminate the taxable earnings base, the report contains additional separate tables describing the mean and median impact for only those beneficiaries who would be affected by the option and for only those beneficiaries who would pay no additional taxes. These additional breakdowns are presented since a relatively small share of beneficiaries would be affected by the options to raise or eliminate the taxable earnings base. Tables that include the entire Dynasim population for these options show that the median beneficiary in each subgroup is not affected. ›ŽŠ”˜ —œȱ‹¢ȱŽ—Ž’ȱ¢™Žȱ All of the options include tables in the report that break down the beneficiary population by the type of Social Security benefits they receive. Four types of Social Security beneficiaries are presented in this report: retired worker beneficiaries who receive a Social Security benefit based on their own earnings; disabled worker beneficiaries who receive a Social Security disability benefit based on their own earnings; spouse beneficiaries who receive a Social Security retirement benefit based on their working spouse’s earnings; and, survivor beneficiaries who receive Social Security survivor benefits based on their deceased spouse’s earnings. Some individuals may qualify for more than one type of benefit. In the tables that follow, the retired worker only category and the disability only category are made up of beneficiaries who receive solely a retired or disabled worker benefit, not a spouse or survivor benefit. The survivor category and the spouse category include both beneficiaries who receive solely spouse or survivor benefits as well as those who receive both a spouse or survivor benefit and a retired or disabled worker benefit (i.e., dually entitled beneficiaries). The disability benefit only category includes both beneficiaries receiving disability benefits in 2035 and those who originally received disability benefits but automatically converted to retirement benefits at the full retirement age (as required by law). ›ŽŠ”˜ —œȱ‹¢ȱŽȱ All of the policy options include tables in the report that break down the beneficiary population by age group. These categories reflect beneficiaries’ ages as of 2035. It is important to note that beneficiaries in the age 61 and younger category are primarily disability beneficiaries but also include some aged survivor beneficiaries who began to receive benefits at age 60 or 61. (Other Social Security beneficiaries who are eligible to receive benefits before age 60—such as children of retired, disabled, or deceased workers—are not included in the analysis in this report.) For retirement beneficiaries, the earliest age of eligibility is age 62. Thus, no retirement beneficiaries are included in the age 61 and younger category. ›ŽŠ”˜ —œȱ‹¢ȱ —Œ˜–Žȱž’—’•Žȱ All of the policy options include tables in the report that break down the beneficiary population by income quintile. In other words, they separate the Dynasim population into five equal parts— ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ the one-fifth with the highest incomes, the one-fifth with the second-highest incomes, etc., down to the one-fifth with the lowest income. For the purposes of this analysis, income includes Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, pension payments, earnings, and the annuitized value of financial assets. Income is calculated on a per capita basis, which means that for married couples the income of both spouses is averaged together. It is important to note the distinction between income levels and Social Security benefit amounts. Some beneficiaries with relatively low Social Security benefit amounts may be included in one of the higher income quintiles and vice versa. For example, a beneficiary married to a person with a high income may be in one of the higher income quintiles despite receiving a small Social Security benefit. Similarly, a beneficiary with a relatively large Social Security benefit but with no other income may be in one of the lower income quintiles. ˜ ȱ˜ȱŽŠȱ‘ŽȱŠ‹•Žœȱ There are three types of tables presented in this report: The first shows the mean and median changes under the policy option across socio-economic groups; the second shows the overall distribution of benefit or tax changes in the population; and the third shows the distribution of benefit or tax changes within each socio-economic group. ŽŠ—ȱŠ—ȱŽ’Š—ȱ‘Š—ŽœȱŒ›˜œœȱ ›˜ž™œȱ The first table for each option summarizes the effect of the policy change on beneficiaries in 2035 across socio-economic groups (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). These tables show the number in the population, the mean percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option, and the median percent change in benefits or taxes between current law and the policy option. For example, if a reader is interested in the average benefit reduction caused by reducing the COLA by half a percentage point, he or she should turn to Table 1. The first row (labeled “All”) shows the total number in the population in thousands (e.g., the total population for Table 1 is 80,362,000). The first row also shows the mean change in benefits overall (-6%) and median change in benefits overall (-6%). In other words, it shows that among the 80 million beneficiaries in the Dynasim population, reducing the COLA by half a percentage point would result in a mean benefit reduction of 6% and also a median benefit reduction of 6%. (The mean and the median may vary for other options.) Table 1 also shows the mean and median change in benefits for each socio-economic group (i.e., by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). For example, the second and third rows of Table 1 show a breakdown by gender. Females make up the majority of the population (i.e., there are 43,566,000 females wompared with 36,766,000 males). Females and males have the same mean benefit reduction (6%). Males have a smaller median benefit reduction (5%) than do females (6%). ’œ›’‹ž’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Š—ŽœȱŸŽ›Š••ȱ The second table for each option show how the effects of each reform vary among the overall population. This table shows the number and percent of the population, broken down by the magnitude of the change in benefits. For example, the table shows the number and percent of ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Ŝȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ beneficiaries whose benefits would be reduced by 20% or more, then the number and percent of beneficiaries whose benefits would be reduced by 10% to 19%, and so forth. For example, if a reader is interested in knowing whether the cuts caused by reducing the COLA by half a percentage point are spread equally across the entire sample, he or she should turn to Table 2. Table 2 shows that a small number of beneficiaries (103,000 people, or less than 0.5%) would have benefit reductions of 20% or more. A larger number (14,973,000 people, or about 19%) have benefit reductions of 10% to 19%. Most beneficiaries (63,232,000 people, or about 79%) would have benefit reductions of up to 10%. The last two columns in Table 2 show the cumulative number and percent of beneficiaries. ’œ›’‹ž’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Š—Žœȱ’‘’—ȱ ›˜ž™œȱ The subsequent tables for each option show the varied effects of these reforms on beneficiaries in 2035 within each socio-economic group (i.e., gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, marital status, benefit type, and income quintile). For example, if a reader is interested in knowing how the cuts caused by reducing the COLA by half a percentage point are distributed by gender, he or she should turn to Table 3. There, the reader could see that the majority of both females and males would have a benefit cut of up to 10% (i.e., 75% of females and 83% of males). The reader could also see that females are more likely than males to receive a cut that is greater than 10% (i.e., 23% of females and 14% of males). The percentages in each horizontal row add up to 100%. ‘¢ȱ˜ȱ˜–Žȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽœž•œȱŽŽ–ȱ˜ž—Ž›’—ž’’ŸŽǵȱ Sometimes the results shown in this report may be unexpected. For example, an option to cut Social Security benefits could result in a small number of beneficiaries receiving an increase in their benefits. Such counterintuitive results are not errors, but interactions between the option and the current law Social Security rules. For example, the interaction between the current law retirement earnings test (RET) and certain options to reduce benefits leads to benefit increases for some beneficiaries who were subject to the RET before reaching the full retirement age, but are currently older than the full retirement age. (For a full explanation of how this interaction works, please see Appendix C.) One of the advantages of a microsimulation model such as Dynasim is that it brings unexpected interactions between policy options and program rules to light. Social Security is a complex program, and changes to its structure could result in unintended consequences. ‘˜ȱ œȱ —Œ•žŽȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ—Š•¢œ’œǵȱ The results presented in this report focus on individuals who are projected to receive Social Security retired worker, spouse, aged survivor and/or disability benefits in 2035. However, the Dynasim population does not include individuals who are projected to receive other types of Social Security benefits, including the children of retired, disabled, or deceased workers, surviving spouses under age 60 with a child in care, and the aged parents of deceased workers. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ˜ ȱ˜Žœȱ¢—Šœ’–ȱœ’–ŠŽȱžž›ŽȱŽ—Ž’œǵȱ The Dynasim model estimates future Social Security benefits by using a mix of historical data and projections. The historical data—which include actual beneficiaries’ earnings, marital histories, Social Security benefits, and more—come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and other sources. Using the historical data as a base, Dynasim projects future economic and demographic patterns by using the 2005 Social Security Trustees’ official assumptions about future trends as well as statistical methods that take into account individual beneficiaries’ characteristics. When interpreting the results of Dynasim or any other model, it is important to note that projections are inherently imprecise; the further into the future one looks, the wider the range of possible outcomes. (For a full explanation, please see Appendix E.) ‘Ž›ŽȱŠ—ȱŽŠŽ›œȱ’—ȱžȱ˜›Žǵȱ A full written analysis of all 12 policy options is available in CRS Report RL33840, Options to Address Social Security Solvency and Their Impact on Beneficiaries: Results from the Dynasim Microsimulation Model. For each reform option, that report explains current Social Security policy, reasons why some policymakers propose this particular type of reform, how the reform proposal works, the distributional effects of the reform proposal on various types of Social Security beneficiaries, and legislation related to the reform being analyzed. That report presents the distributional effects of these reform options in terms of Social Security beneficiaries’ median payroll tax increase or benefit reduction and shows the varied effect of these reforms on beneficiaries along certain socio-economic lines (i.e., age, type of benefit received, and income quintile). That report, however, does not contain detailed analysis of the effects of these reforms on Social Security beneficiaries by gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, or marital status. When interpreting the distributional results of these reform options, it is important for the reader to have a solid understanding of Social Security program rules, technical details, and terminology. Detailed explanations of certain Social Security program rules and their potential interactions with policy options, along with an explanation of how the Dynasim model works and a glossary of Social Security and technical terms may be found in the following appendices of the report: • Appendix A, “Computation of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Under Current Law” • Appendix B, “Interaction of Spouse and Aged Survivor Benefit Rules with Policy Options” • Appendix C, “Interaction of the Retirement Earnings Test with Policy Options” Appendix D, “Technical Description of the Progressive Price Indexing Option” • Appendix E, “Background on the Urban Institute’s Dynasim Model” • Appendix F, “Glossary.” ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŗDZȱŽžŒ’—ȱ‘Žȱ——žŠ•ȱ˜œȱ˜ȱ’Ÿ’—ȱ “žœ–Ž—ȱǻǼȱ‹¢ȱ Š•ȱŠȱŽ›ŒŽ—ŠŽȱ˜’—ȱ . Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Table 1 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -6 -6 43,596 36,766 -6 -6 -6 -5 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -6 -5 -5 -5 -5 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 -4 -3 -4 -6 -8 -10 -10 -3 -1 -3 -5 -8 -10 -11 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -5 -8 -6 -5 -5 -9 -6 -5 46,274 6,842 -5 -6 -5 -6 şȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 12,139 15,107 -9 -6 -10 -6 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -5 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 2. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category Number (000s) -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Percent 103 14,973 63,232 1,911 143 0 19 79 2 0 Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent 103 15,077 78,308 80,219 80,362 0 19 97 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 3. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in 2035 -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change Up to 10% Total Percent 0 0 23 14 75 83 2 3 0 0 100 100 103 14,973 63,232 1,911 143 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Table 4 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White nonHispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 0 103 20 19 15 16 14 14,973 78 77 82 81 83 63,232 Total Total percent Up to 10% 2 4 2 3 3 1,911 0 0 0 0 0 143 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 5. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total Percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 20 20 19 77 77 79 3 3 2 0 0 0 100 100 100 0 103 17 14,973 81 63,232 2 1,911 0 143 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035 Table 6 -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 103 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 12 4 4 7 13 45 96 14,973 78 85 96 93 87 55 4 63,232 9 10 0 0 0 0 0 1,911 Up to 10% Total percent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 7. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 103 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 10 40 17 15 14,973 86 59 80 81 63,232 3 1 2 3 1,911 Up to 10% Total percent 0 0 0 0 143 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Table 8 -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 103 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 9 11 50 25 14,973 88 86 50 71 63,232 3 1 0 4 1,911 Up to 10% Total percent 0 1 0 0 143 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 9. Reduce the COLA by Half a Percentage Point: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 0 103 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 24 20 18 16 16 14,973 74 78 80 81 82 63,232 2 2 2 3 2 1,911 Up to 10% Total percent 0 0 0 0 0 143 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗřȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™’˜—ȱŘDZȱŽžŒ’—ȱ‘Žȱ——žŠ•ȱȱ‹¢ȱ—Žȱ Ž›ŒŽ—ŠŽȱ˜’—ȱ Table 10. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -11 -11 43,596 36,766 -12 -11 -12 -10 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -12 -11 -11 -11 -10 -12 -10 -10 -10 -9 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -11 -12 -12 -11 -11 -11 -12 -11 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 -8 -5 -7 -11 -15 -18 -20 -6 -3 -7 -10 -14 -19 -20 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -10 -15 -11 -10 -9 -17 -11 -9 46,274 6,842 -10 -11 -9 -11 ŗŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 12,139 15,107 -16 -11 -19 -11 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -12 -11 -11 -11 -12 -12 -11 -11 -10 -11 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 11. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category Number (000s) -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Cumulative Number (000s) Percent 12,967 32,527 32,822 1,906 141 16 40 41 2 0 Cumulative Percent 12,967 45,494 78,316 80,221 80,362 16 57 97 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 12. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 20 12 41 40 37 45 2 3 0 0 100 100 12,967 32,527 32,822 1,906 141 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Table 13 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White nonHispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 17 17 14 14 12 42 36 39 39 37 39 43 45 43 48 2 4 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 12,967 32,527 32,822 1,906 141 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 14. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 18 18 16 37 40 43 42 39 39 3 3 2 0 0 0 100 100 100 14 12,967 40 32,527 43 32,822 2 1,906 0 141 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Age in 2035 Table 15 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) 11 4 3 6 10 31 94 12,967 24 10 11 56 87 67 5 32,527 55 76 85 37 2 1 1 32,822 Total percent Up to 10% 9 10 0 0 0 0 0 1,906 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 141 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 16. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 9 35 15 14 40 45 42 34 49 19 40 48 3 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 12,967 32,527 32,822 1,906 141 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Table 17 -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. 8 8 44 23 12,967 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 42 47 43 33 32,527 48 44 12 40 32,822 3 1 0 4 1,906 Up to 10% Total percent 0 1 0 0 141 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 18. Reduce the COLA by One Percentage Point: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. 21 17 15 14 14 12,967 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 40 41 42 40 40 32,527 36 39 41 44 44 32,822 2 2 2 3 2 1,906 Up to 10% Total percent 0 0 0 0 0 141 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŞȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™’˜—ȱřDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱ‘Žȱž–‹Ž›ȱ˜ȱ˜–™žŠ’˜—ȱ ŽŠ›œȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽ—Ž’ȱ˜›–ž•Šȱ›˜–ȱřśȱ˜ȱřŞȱ˜›ȱ••ȱ Ž—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 19. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -3 -2 43,596 36,766 -3 -3 -2 -3 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -3 -3 -2 -4 -4 -2 -3 -2 -3 -3 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 -3 -5 -3 -3 -3 -2 0 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 ŗşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -2 -1 -3 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 20. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) 272 254 65,830 13,964 43 Percent 0 0 82 17 0 Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent 272 526 66,356 80,320 80,362 0 1 83 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Table 21 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) 0 0 272 0 0 254 78 86 65,830 Total percent Up to 10% 21 13 13,964 0 0 43 100 100 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 22. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change Category Total percent -20% or more -19% to -10% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 1 0 272 0 0 1 0 0 254 81 81 84 84 86 65,830 19 18 15 15 13 13,964 0 0 0 0 0 43 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 23. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 81 82 19 19 18 Up to 10% 0 0 0 Total percent 100 100 100 Řŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ -20% or more College graduate Total number (000s) Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 0 272 0 254 84 65,830 Up to 10% 15 13,964 Total percent 0 43 100 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 24. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035 -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 272 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 254 88 93 95 92 88 66 5 65,830 12 3 5 8 12 33 95 13,964 Up to 10% Total percent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 25. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 272 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 0 0 0 0 254 89 62 83 85 65,830 10 37 16 14 13,964 Up to 10% 0 0 0 0 43 Total percent 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Table 26 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 91 89 53 76 8 11 47 24 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 272 254 65,830 13,964 43 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 27. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 78 82 84 84 83 22 18 16 15 16 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 272 254 65,830 13,964 43 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŚDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱ‘Žȱž–‹Ž›ȱ˜ȱ˜–™žŠ’˜—ȱ ŽŠ›œȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽ—Ž’ȱ˜›–ž•Šȱ›˜–ȱřśȱ˜ȱřŞȱ˜›ȱ••ȱ žȱ’œŠ‹’•’¢ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Table 28 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -2 -2 43,596 36,766 -2 -2 -2 -2 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 -3 -2 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 0 -4 -2 -2 -2 -2 0 0 -3 -2 -2 -2 -1 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -3 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 -2 -1 ŘŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income quintile - CL Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 0 0 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 29. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 Percent 0 0 67 33 0 Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent 274 549 54,076 80,204 80,362 0 1 67 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Table 30 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 0 65 69 34 30 0 0 100 100 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 31. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 68 59 67 69 65 31 40 32 29 34 0 0 1 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Table 32 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 63 70 44 36 29 0 0 0 100 100 100 0 274 0 274 72 53,527 27 26,128 0 159 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 33. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 73 83 81 82 64 4 97 23 17 18 18 36 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Table 34 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 54 66 55 24 46 33 44 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 35. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 91 86 45 0 8 13 55 100 0 1 0 0 100 100 100 100 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 38 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Table 36 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 59 61 67 71 75 41 38 33 28 23 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 274 274 53,527 26,128 159 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řşȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™’˜—ȱśDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱ‘Žȱž–‹Ž›ȱ˜ȱ˜–™žŠ’˜—ȱ ŽŠ›œȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽ—Ž’ȱ˜›–ž•Šȱ›˜–ȱřśȱ˜ȱŚŖȱ˜›ȱ••ȱ Ž—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Table 37. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Levels (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -5 -4 43,596 36,766 -5 -5 -4 -4 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -4 -5 -4 -6 -6 -4 -5 -4 -6 -5 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -6 -5 -5 -4 -5 -4 -4 -4 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 -5 -8 -5 -5 -4 -3 0 -5 -6 -5 -4 -4 -3 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -5 -3 -5 -5 -5 -3 -4 -5 řŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile - CL Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -5 -4 -3 -4 -5 -4 -2 -5 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -5 -5 -5 -5 -4 -5 -5 -4 -4 -3 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 38. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 Percent 1 4 79 16 0 Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent 430 3,313 67,156 80,327 80,362 1 4 84 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Table 39 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 1 1 4 3 75 85 20 12 0 0 100 100 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 40. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 1 0 1 1 2 5 4 6 8 80 77 83 79 79 17 17 13 14 12 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 41. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ 0 1 0 11 4 3 71 78 80 18 18 17 Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 100 100 100 řŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ -20% or more College graduate or higher Total number (000s) 1 430 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 2 2,882 84 63,843 Up to 10% 14 13,171 Total percent 0 35 100 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 42. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 3 3 3 2 0 84 86 93 90 86 66 5 11 3 4 7 11 32 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 43. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Total percent Up to 10% Married 1 4 87 8 0 100 Widowed 0 2 61 37 0 100 Divorced 1 4 80 15 0 100 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 5 80 14 0 100 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 44. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 0 0 4 3 1 4 87 90 52 73 8 7 47 24 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 45. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 1 11 2 1 2 2 67 80 83 83 84 22 18 15 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 430 2,882 63,843 13,171 35 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŜDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱ‘Žȱž–‹Ž›ȱ˜ȱ˜–™žŠ’˜—ȱ ŽŠ›œȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽ—Ž’ȱ˜›–ž•Šȱ›˜–ȱřśȱ˜ȱŚŖȱ˜›ȱ••ȱ žȱ’œŠ‹’•’¢ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ he Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Table 46. Increase t Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -4 -3 43,596 36,766 -4 -4 -3 -3 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -3 -4 -3 -5 -4 -3 -3 -2 -5 -4 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3 -3 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 0 -6 -4 -4 -4 -3 0 0 -5 -4 -4 -4 -2 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -4 -3 -4 -3 -4 -2 -3 -3 řśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -5 -4 -2 0 -5 -3 0 0 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 47. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 Percent 1 3 64 32 0 Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent 428 2,706 54,184 80,229 80,362 1 3 67 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Table 48 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 1 3 3 62 67 34 30 0 0 100 100 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 49. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 1 0 1 1 2 4 2 6 6 67 55 66 64 59 31 40 32 29 34 0 0 1 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Table 50 -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 1 0 1 428 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change 8 3 2 1 2,278 48 60 68 71 51,478 44 36 29 27 26,045 Up to 10% Total percent 0 0 0 0 133 100 100 100 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 51. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Age in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 3 2 2 0 3 67 80 79 80 62 4 97 23 17 18 18 36 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Table 52 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 1 0 3 2 3 3 72 52 64 52 24 45 32 44 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 53. Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 0 0 4 2 1 0 87 84 44 0 8 12 55 100 0 1 0 0 100 100 100 100 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Number of Computation Years to 40 for All But Disability Beneficiaries: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Table 54 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest Quintile Second Quintile Third Quintile Fourth Quintile Highest Quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 1 8 1 1 2 1 50 60 66 69 74 41 38 33 28 23 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 428 2,278 51,478 26,045 133 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŚŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŝDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱ‘Žȱž••ȱŽ’›Ž–Ž—ȱŽȱǻǼȱ ‹¢ȱŒŒŽ•Ž›Š’—ȱ‘Žȱ —Œ›ŽŠœŽȱ›˜–ȱŽȱŜŜȱ˜ȱŽȱŜŝȱ Œ‘Žž•Žȱ—Ž›ȱž››Ž—ȱŠ ȱŠ—ȱž›‘Ž›ȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱ‘Žȱȱ›˜–ȱŽȱŜŝȱ˜ȱŽȱŝŖȱ . Increase the Full Retirement Age: Summary of Mean Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Table 55 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Status (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -2 -2 43,596 36,766 -2 -2 -1 -2 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -2 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -2 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 0 -5 -2 -1 -2 -2 0 0 -4 -3 -2 -2 -1 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -3 -1 -2 -2 -2 0 -2 -1 Śŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -3 -2 0 0 -3 -2 0 0 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -2 -2 -2 -2 -3 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 56. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) Percent 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 Cumulative Number (000s) 0 1 61 36 3 Cumulative Percent 360 821 49,565 78,348 80,362 0 1 62 97 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 57. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 1 0 1 59 63 38 33 2 3 100 100 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŚŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Table 58 Percentage Change Category - -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent 19% to Up to No Up to -10% -10% change 10% 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 61 55 57 64 60 35 42 40 32 37 3 2 2 3 2 100 100 100 100 100 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 59. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 0 1 1 51 58 64 46 40 32 1 2 3 100 100 100 1 360 1 461 65 48,744 30 28,784 4 2,014 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Age in 2035 Table 60 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 71 82 76 62 58 1 99 23 18 23 24 42 99 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 61. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 70 43 61 52 26 54 35 45 3 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 62. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Total percent Up to 10% Retired worker only 1 1 85 9 4 100 Spouse 0 0 81 17 2 100 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŚŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 0 30 0 68 100 1 0 100 100 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 63. Increase the Full Retirement Age: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 56 57 60 63 66 43 41 37 31 27 1 2 2 3 4 100 100 100 100 100 360 461 48,744 28,784 2,014 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŞDZȱ˜—ŽŸ’¢ȱ —Ž¡’—ȱ —’’Š•ȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ Ž—Ž’œȱ‹¢ȱŽžŒ’—ȱ‘Žȱ›’–Š›¢ȱ —œž›Š—ŒŽȱ –˜ž—ȱǻ Ǽȱ˜›–ž•ŠȱŠŒ˜›œȱ . Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Table 64 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -6 -5 43,596 36,766 -5 -6 -5 -6 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -5 -6 -5 -6 -6 -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -5 -5 -5 -6 -5 -5 -5 -5 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 -7 -12 -7 -5 -3 -1 0 -8 -10 -8 -5 -3 -1 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -6 -3 -6 -6 -6 -2 -5 -6 ŚŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -7 -5 -2 -5 -6 -5 -1 -5 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -5 -5 -5 -6 -7 -4 -5 -5 -5 -6 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 65. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 Percent 1 7 76 16 0 Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent 982 6,193 67,156 80,332 80,362 1 8 84 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Table 66 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 1 2 6 8 73 79 20 12 0 0 100 100 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 67. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 2 1 2 1 6 9 5 6 9 76 73 81 78 78 17 17 13 14 12 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŚŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Table 68 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 1 1 8 7 6 74 75 77 18 18 17 0 0 0 100 100 100 2 982 7 5,211 78 60,963 14 13,176 0 30 100 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035 Table 69 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 19 28 1 0 0 0 0 70 62 96 93 89 67 5 11 3 4 7 11 33 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 80,367 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Table 70 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 2 0 1 1 8 2 6 9 82 61 77 76 9 36 15 14 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 71. Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 2 0 0 0 7 6 1 9 83 86 52 68 8 8 46 24 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index the PIA Formula Factors for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Table 72 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 6 73 76 77 76 78 22 18 15 14 13 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 982 5,211 60,963 13,176 30 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱşDZȱ˜—ŽŸ’¢ȱ —Ž¡’—ȱ —’’Š•ȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ Ž—Ž’œȱ‹¢ȱŽžŒ’—ȱ‘Žȱ ȱŠ•žŽȱŠ—ȱ ˜•’—ȱ ’œŠ‹’•’¢ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Š›–•Žœœȱ—’•ȱ‘Ž¢ȱŽŠŒ‘ȱ ‘Žȱȱ . Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Table 73 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -3 -2 43,596 36,766 -3 -3 -2 -3 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 -2 -3 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 0 -7 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 0 -6 -5 -3 -2 -1 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -4 -2 -3 -3 -3 -1 -2 -2 śŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 -4 -3 -1 -1 -4 -3 0 0 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -2 -2 -3 -3 -4 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 74. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) Percent 549 717 55,929 23,067 101 Cumulative Number (000s) 1 1 70 29 0 Cumulative Percent 549 1,266 57,195 80,262 80,362 1 2 71 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 75. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 1 1 1 1 68 72 31 26 0 0 100 100 549 717 55,929 23,067 101 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Table 76 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 71 63 72 72 69 28 35 27 26 30 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 549 717 55929 23067 101 80367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Table 77 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 1 1 1 1 1 61 67 73 38 32 26 0 0 0 100 100 100 1 549 1 717 74 55,929 24 23,067 0 101 100 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Age in 2035 Table 78 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 68 89 88 86 67 5 97 23 11 12 13 33 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 549 717 55,929 23,067 101 80,367 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 79. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 77 58 70 58 21 41 28 40 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 549 717 55,929 23,067 101 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Table 80 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 90 88 50 15 8 11 49 85 0 0 1 0 100 100 100 100 549 717 55,929 23,067 101 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 81. Index the PIA Value for Longevity: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 63 66 71 73 76 37 33 28 24 20 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 549 717 55,929 23,067 101 80,367 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śŜȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™’˜—ȱŗŖDZȱ›˜›Žœœ’ŸŽȱ›’ŒŽȱ —Ž¡’—ȱ —’’Š•ȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱ ŽŒž›’¢ȱŽ—Ž’œȱ Table 82. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits in 2035 Number (000s) All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Mean Median 80,362 -6 -4 43,596 36,766 -5 -7 -3 -5 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 -6 -5 -6 -6 -5 -5 -3 -5 -4 -2 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 -3 -5 -6 -8 0 -3 -4 -7 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 -5 -12 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 -2 -8 -9 -7 -4 -1 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 -7 -4 -6 -5 -6 -1 -4 -3 46,274 6,842 -7 -7 -6 -6 śŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Survivor Disability only Income Quintile - CL Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Mean Median 12,139 15,107 -3 -4 0 -1 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 -1 -4 -6 -8 -10 0 -3 -5 -7 -9 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 83. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Impact in 2035 Percentage Change Category -20% or more -10% to -19% Up to -10% No change Up to 10% Number (000s) Percent 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,982 25 Cumulative Number (000s) 2 21 46 31 0 Cumulative Percent 1,624 18,175 55,355 80,337 80,362 2 23 69 100 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 84. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 1 3 17 25 46 47 36 26 0 0 100 100 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,983 25 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Ethnicity in 2035 Table 85 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 2 2 1 2 2 22 16 26 23 16 48 45 47 43 42 28 37 27 33 39 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,983 25 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 86. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 1 1 2 10 15 19 36 48 51 53 36 28 0 0 0 100 100 100 3 1,624 31 16,552 45 37,179 20 24,983 0 25 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Age in 2035 Table 87 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more 61 or younger 62—66 67—70 71—75 76—80 81—85 86 or older Total number (000s) Total percent Up to 10% 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 23 34 43 23 2 1 0 38 31 37 56 74 57 3 38 25 19 20 24 42 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,983 25 80,362 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 88. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 3 1 2 2 25 12 20 18 48 43 47 43 24 44 31 37 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,983 25 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŜŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Benefit Type in 2035 Table 89 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 3 2 1 0 24 27 9 16 50 51 39 39 23 19 51 45 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,983 25 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 90. Index Initial Benefits to a Combination of Wage Growth and Price Growth: Distribution by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change Category -19% to Up to No -10% -10% change -20% or more Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent Up to 10% 0 0 1 4 5 3 13 21 28 38 31 56 54 50 41 66 31 23 19 16 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 1,624 16,552 37,179 24,983 25 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Ŝŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŗŗDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱŠ›—’—œȱž‹“ŽŒȱ˜ȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱ ŽŒž›’¢ȱŠ¢›˜••ȱŠ¡Žœȱ‹¢ȱŠ’œ’—ȱ‘Žȱ˜••Š›ȱ –˜ž—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŠ¡Š‹•ŽȱŠ›—’—œȱŠœŽȱ˜ȱŗŖŖƖȱ˜ȱ ›ŽŠŽȱ˜ŸŽ›ŽȱŠ›—’—œȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱǯǯȱ ǻ•’–’—Š’—ȱ‘ŽȱŠ¡Š‹•ŽȱŠ›—’—œȱŠœŽǼȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay No Table 91 Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay no additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or Younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 62,406 0 0 36,283 26,123 0 0 0 0 40,711 7,499 345 3,796 10,054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,990 24,570 15,029 13,818 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4,743 10,087 10,102 12,476 11,009 7,900 6,090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ŜŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individuals who pay no additional taxes Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 30,382 15,004 9,211 7,809 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 31,193 6,779 11,464 12,970 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 15,610 14,394 13,058 11,263 8,081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 92. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 17,956 2 5 7,313 10,643 1 2 5 6 13,506 994 2 1 5 6 a a a 1,558 1,830 2 1 4 8 Ŝřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individuals who pay additional taxes Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or Younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 541 2,684 3,497 11,235 2 1 1 2 5 4 3 6 896 3,801 4,456 4,368 2,971 1,271 194 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 5 12 4 3 3 2 2 10,641 2,804 2,578 1,933 2 1 2 2 5 6 5 4 15,082 2 6 a a a 675 2,137 0 1 2 5 461 1,679 3,013 4,811 7,993 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 5 8 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Number not presented due to insufficient sample size. Note: a. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŜŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for the Table 93 Total Population in 2035 Total population All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate Age 61 or Younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Simple Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 80,362 0 1 43,596 36,766 0 0 1 2 54,217 164 413 5,354 11,885 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 1 1 0 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 Ŝśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Number (000s) Total population Income Quintile - Current Law Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Median percent Mean percent change in benefits 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 change in benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 94. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in 2035 Number (000s) Percentage Change in Benefits Category Cumulative Number (000s) Percent Cumulative Percent Up to -10% 8 0 8 0 No change 62,303 78 62,310 78 Up to 10% 16,046 20 78,356 98 1,234 2 79,590 99 697 1 80,287 100 76 0 80,362 100 10% to 19% 20% to 100% More than 100% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 95. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Female Male Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 0 0 80 75 18 22 1 2 1 1 0 0 100 100 8 62,303 16,046 1,234 697 76 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŜŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035 Table 96 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent White nonHispanic Black nonHispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 0 75 22 2 1 0 100 0 0 0 0 89 82 72 84 10 14 25 14 0 2 3 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 8 62,303 16,046 1,234 697 76 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 97. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings of the Total Population: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 0 92 7 0 1 0 100 0 0 89 82 10 16 1 1 0 1 0 0 100 100 0 8 57 62,303 38 16,046 3 1,234 2 697 0 76 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Ŝŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035 Table 98 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 61 or Younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 72 70 73 78 86 97 12 23 27 24 20 13 3 1 3 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 62,303 16,046 1,234 697 76 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 99. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% percent 0 0 0 0 74 82 79 84 23 16 19 15 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 8 62,303 16,046 1,234 697 76 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŜŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035 Table 100 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. percent 0 0 0 0 73 65 88 89 24 30 11 10 2 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 8 62,303 16,046 1,234 697 76 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 101. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Benefits for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% Lowest Quintile 0 97 3 0 0 0 100 Second Quintile 0 90 10 1 0 0 100 Third Quintile 0 81 18 1 0 0 100 Fourth Quintile 0 70 27 2 1 0 100 Highest Quintile 0 50 42 5 3 0 100 Total number (000s) 8 62,303 16,046 1,234 697 76 80,362 Source: model. Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Ŝşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay No Table 102 Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay no additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Birth Year <= 1930 1931-1941 1942-1945 1946-1955 1956-1964 1965-1970 1971+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes Mean percent change in taxes 60,903 0 0 35,344 25,559 0 0 0 0 39,621 7,343 340 3,726 9,873 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,909 24,290 14,707 12,997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a a 755 1,528 12,831 21,000 14,596 10,160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,602 14,462 9,030 7,809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,193 5,916 10,825 12,970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ŝŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individuals who pay no additional taxes Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes 15,432 14,135 12,776 10,923 7,638 Mean percent change in taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Number not presented due to insufficient sample size. Note: a. Table 103. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Birth Year 1931-1941 1942-1945 1946-1955 1956-1964 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes Mean percent change in taxes 17,956 3 8 7,313 10,643 3 3 8 8 13,506 994 3 2 8 7 a a a 1,558 1,830 4 3 7 7 541 2,684 3,497 11,235 3 2 2 4 12 7 5 9 a a a a a a 1,921 6,862 2 3 5 7 ŝŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individuals who pay additional taxes 1965-1970 1971+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Simple Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile - Current Law Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes Mean percent change in taxes 6,346 2,807 4 4 9 11 10,641 2,804 2,578 1,933 3 3 3 3 8 7 9 9 15,082 3 8 a a a 675 2,137 2 3 5 10 461 1,679 3,013 4,811 7,993 2 2 2 3 4 5 5 5 7 11 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Number not presented due to insufficient sample size. Note: a. Table 104. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Number (000s) Percent Cumulative Number (000s) Cumulative Percent No change 62,645 79 62,645 79 Up to 10% 12,824 16 75,469 96 10% to 19% 1,991 3 77,460 98 20% to 100% 1,246 2 78,706 100 154 0 78,859 100 More than 100% Number Missing (000s) = 1503 Source: model. Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in 2035 Table 105 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Total percent Up to -10% Female Male Total number (000s) Source: model. 85 73 62,645 No change Up to 10% 10% to 19% 20% to 100% 13 1 1 20 4 2 12,824 1,991 1,246 Number Missing (000s) = 1503 0 0 154 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 106. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Total percent Up to -10% White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. 77 90 85 73 86 62,645 No change Up to 10% 10% to 19% 20% to 100% 18 3 2 9 1 1 10 2 3 20 4 3 12 1 1 12,824 1,991 1,246 Number Missing (000s) = 1503 0 0 0 0 0 154 100 100 100 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035 Table 107 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Total percent Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to -10% change 10% 19% 100% 95 92 84 57 62,645 4 7 15 0 0 1 32 7 12,824 1,991 Number Missing (000s) = 1503 1 1 1 0 0 0 100 100 100 4 1,246 0 154 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 108. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Total percent Up to -10% No change Up to 10% 10% to 19% 20% to 100% 61 or Younger 85 11 2 1 0 100 62-66 75 19 3 2 0 100 67-70 72 21 4 3 0 100 71-75 76 19 3 2 0 100 76-80 80 17 2 1 0 100 81-85 88 11 1 1 0 100 86+ 97 3 0 0 0 100 12,824 1,991 1,246 Number Missing (000s) = 1503 154 78,860 Total number (000s) Source: model. 62,645 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population Marital Status in 2035 Table 109 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Up to -10% Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. 76 85 80 82 62,645 No change Up to 10% Total percent 10% to 19% 20% to 100% 19 3 2 12 1 1 16 3 1 15 2 1 12,824 1,991 1,246 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 0 0 0 0 154 100 100 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 110. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earning: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Up to -10% Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. 71 99 95 87 62,645 No change Up to 10% Total percent 10% to 19% 20% to 100% 23 4 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 10 2 1 12,824 1,991 1,246 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 0 0 0 0 154 100 100 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax All Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035 Table 111 Percentage Change in Taxes Category Total percent Up to -10% No change Up to 10% 10% to 19% 20% to 100% Lowest quintile 98 2 0 0 0 100 Second quintile 91 8 1 0 0 100 Third quintile 83 15 2 1 0 100 Fourth quintile 73 23 3 2 0 100 Highest quintile 53 35 7 5 1 100 12,824 1,991 1,246 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 154 78,860 Total number (000s) Source: model. 62,645 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™’˜—ȱŗŘDZȱ —Œ›ŽŠœ’—ȱŠ›—’—œȱž‹“ŽŒȱ˜ȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱ ŽŒž›’¢ȱŠ¢›˜••ȱŠ¡Žœȱ‹¢ȱŠ’œ’—ȱ‘Žȱ˜••Š›ȱ –˜ž—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŠ¡Š‹•ŽȱŠ›—’—œȱŠœŽȱ˜ȱşŖƖȱ˜ȱ ›ŽŠŽȱ˜ŸŽ›ŽȱŠ›—’—œȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱǯǯȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Table 112 Pay No Additional Taxes Over their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay no additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or Younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Marital Status Married Widowed ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 62,406 0 0 36,283 26,123 0 0 0 0 40,711 7,499 345 3,796 10,054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,990 24,570 15,029 13,818 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4,743 10,087 10,102 12,476 11,009 7,900 6,090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,382 15,004 0 0 0 0 ŝŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individu als who pay no additional taxes Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 9,211 7,809 0 0 0 0 31,193 6,779 11,464 12,970 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 15,610 14,394 13,058 11,263 8,081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 113. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 17,956 2 4 7,313 10,643 1 2 3 5 13,506 994 2 1 4 4 a a a 1,558 1,830 2 1 3 6 541 2,684 3,497 11,235 2 1 1 2 4 2 2 5 ŝŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individuals who pay additional taxes Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits Age 61 or younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. 896 3,801 4,456 4,368 2,971 1,271 194 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 9 3 3 2 2 1 10,641 2,804 2,578 1,933 2 1 1 2 4 4 4 3 15,082 2 4 a a a 675 2,137 0 1 2 3 461 1,679 3,013 4,811 7,993 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 6 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Number not presented due to insufficient sample size. Note: a. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Benefits for Table 114 Total Population in 2035 Total population All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Age 61 or younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Simple Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in benefits Mean percent change in benefits 80,362 0 1 43,596 36,766 0 0 1 1 54,217 8,494 413 5,354 11,885 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 9,531 27,253 18,525 25,053 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5,639 13,888 14,558 16,844 13,979 9,171 6,283 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 41,023 17,808 11,789 9,742 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 46,274 6,842 12,139 15,107 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 ŞŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Total population Number (000s) Income Quintile - Current Law Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Note: Median percent Mean percent change in benefits 16,071 16,073 16,071 16,073 16,073 change in benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Table 115. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Impact in 2035 Number (000s) Percentage Change in Benefits Category Cumulative number (000s) Percent Cumulative percent Up to -10% 8 0 8 0 No change 62,323 78 62,330 78 Up to 10% 16,592 21 78,922 98 1,057 1 79,980 100 350 0 80,330 100 33 0 80,362 100 10% to 19% 20% to 100% More than 100% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 116. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Female Male Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 0 0 80 75 19 23 1 2 0 1 0 0 100 100 8 62,323 16,592 1,057 350 33 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 117. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% White nonHispanic 0 75 23 1 0 0 100 Hispanic 0 89 10 0 0 0 100 Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) 0 0 0 82 72 84 15 26 15 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 8 62,323 16,592 1,057 350 33 80,362 Black non- Source: model. Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 118. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 0 92 7 1 0 0 100 0 0 89 82 11 17 1 1 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 8 57 62,323 39 16,592 3 1,057 1 350 0 33 100 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŞŘȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Age in 2035 Table 119 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 61 or younger 62-66 67-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86+ Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 72 70 73 78 86 97 12 24 28 25 21 13 3 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 62,323 16,592 1,057 350 33 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 120. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% 0 0 0 0 74 82 79 84 24 17 19 15 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 8 62,323 16,592 1,057 350 33 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şřȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Table 121. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. 0 0 0 0 73 65 88 89 25 32 12 10 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 8 62,323 16,592 1,057 350 33 80,362 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 122. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Benefits for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change in Benefits Category Total percent Up to No Up to 10% to 20% to More than -10% change 10% 19% 100% 100% Lowest quintile 0 97 3 0 0 0 100 Second quintile 0 90 10 0 0 0 100 Third quintile 0 81 18 0 0 0 100 Fourth quintile 0 70 28 1 0 0 100 Highest quintile 0 50 44 4 2 0 100 Total number (000s) 8 62,323 16,592 1,057 350 33 80,362 Source: model. Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŞŚȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Table 123 Pay No Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay no additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Birth Year <= 1930 1931-1941 1942-1945 1946-1955 1956-1964 1965-1970 1971+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes Mean percent change in taxes 60,903 0 0 35,344 25,559 0 0 0 0 39,621 7,343 340 3,726 9,873 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,909 24,290 14,707 12,997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a a 755 1,528 12,831 21,000 14,596 10,160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,602 14,462 9,030 7,809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,193 5,916 10,825 12,970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Şśȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Ind ividuals who pay no additional taxes Income Quintile Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes 15,432 14,135 12,776 10,923 7,638 Mean percent change in taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Number not presented due to insufficient sample size. Note: a. Table 124. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Summary of Mean and Median Percentage Change in Taxes Paid for Individuals Who Pay Additional Taxes Over Their Lifetime in 2035 Individuals who pay additional taxes All Gender Female Male Ethnicity White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Education Level (highest level completed) Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college College graduate or higher Birth Year 1931-1941 1942-1945 1946-1955 1956-1964 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes Mean percent change in taxes 17,956 3 6 7,313 10,643 3 3 6 6 13,506 994 3 2 6 5 a a a 1,558 1,830 4 3 6 6 541 2,684 3,497 11,235 3 2 2 4 8 5 4 7 a a a a a a 1,921 6,862 2 3 4 5 ŞŜȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Individuals who pay additional taxes 1965-1970 1971+ Marital Status Married Widowed Divorced Never married Simple Benefit Type - Current Law Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Income Quintile - Current Law Lowest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Highest quintile Source: model. Number (000s) Median percent change in taxes Mean percent change in taxes 6,346 2,807 4 4 7 7 4,227 1,114 1,024 768 3 3 3 3 6 5 6 6 15,082 3 6 a a a 675 2,137 2 3 4 7 461 1,679 3,013 4,811 7,993 2 2 2 3 4 5 4 4 5 7 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Number not presented due to insufficient sample size. Note: a. Table 125. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Impact in 2035 Number (000s) No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Percent Cumulative number (000s) 62,645 79 13,168 17 2,042 3 1,004 1 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 62,645 75,813 77,855 78,859 Cumulative percent 79 96 99 100 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şŝȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Table 126. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Gender in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Female Male Total number (000s) 85 73 62,645 13 2 21 4 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 Total percent 1 2 1,004 100 100 78,860 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation model. Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 127. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Ethnicity in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more White non-Hispanic Black non-Hispanic Native American Asian Hispanic Total number (000s) Source: model. 77 90 85 73 86 62,645 19 3 9 1 10 2 21 4 12 1 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 Total percent 1 1 2 2 1 1,004 100 100 100 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 128. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Education Level in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% Did not graduate high school High school graduate Some college ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ 95 92 84 4 7 15 0 0 1 Total percent 20% or more 1 1 1 100 100 100 ŞŞȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more 57 34 7 62,645 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 3 1,004 College graduate or higher Total number (000s) Source: model. Total percent 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: . Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Age in 2035 Table 129 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Total percent 61 or younger 85 11 2 1 100 62-66 75 19 4 2 100 67-70 72 22 4 2 100 71-75 76 20 3 1 100 76-80 80 17 2 1 100 81-85 88 11 1 0 100 86+ 97 3 0 0 100 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 1,004 78,860 Total number (000s) Source: model. 62,645 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şşȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Table 130. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Marital Status in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Married Widowed Divorced Never married Total number (000s) Source: model. 76 85 80 82 62,645 19 3 12 1 16 3 15 1 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 Total percent 2 1 1 1 1,004 100 100 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 131. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Benefit Type in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Retired worker only Spouse Survivor Disability only Total number (000s) Source: model. 71 99 95 87 62,645 24 4 1 0 5 0 10 2 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 Total percent 2 0 0 1 1,004 100 100 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: Table 132. Increase the Taxable Earnings Base to Tax 90% of Covered Earnings: Distribution of Percentage Change Taxes Paid for the Total Population by Income Quintile in 2035 Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Total percent Lowest quintile 98 2 0 0 100 Second quintile 91 8 1 0 100 Third quintile 83 15 2 1 100 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŖȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ Percentage Change in Taxes Category No change Up to 10% 10% to 20% 20% or more Fourth quintile Highest quintile Total number (000s) Source: model. 73 53 62,645 23 3 36 7 13,168 2,042 Number Missing (000s) = 1,503 1 4 1,004 Total percent 100 100 78,860 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations using the Urban Institute’s Dynasim microsimulation Categories may not add to 100% due to rounding. Individuals without earnings are not included (missing) from table. Please see the section on “What Do the Tables Show?” in the report Introduction. Note: ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŗȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ȱ ™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ ˜–™žŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ›’–Š›¢ȱ —œž›Š—ŒŽȱ –˜ž—ȱǻ Ǽȱ—Ž›ȱž››Ž—ȱŠ ȱ The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is the basic Social Security monthly benefit amount payable to an individual upon entitlement to retirement benefits at the normal retirement age (i.e., the PIA does not reflect any adjustments for early or delayed retirement) or disability benefits. In addition, the PIA is the base amount used to determine monthly benefits payable to family members on the worker’s record (such as a spouse or surviving spouse). Under current law, the PIA is determined by applying a benefit formula to the worker’s average lifetime covered earnings. In the first step of the benefit computation, the worker’s nominal earnings (up to 2 calendar years prior to the year of eligibility—for example, earnings prior to age 60 in the case of a retirement benefit) are indexed to wage growth to reflect the change in average wages over time. (Earnings in subsequent years are counted at nominal value.) For purposes of computing a basic retirement benefit, the 35 highest years of indexed earnings are then averaged and a monthly amount is computed to determine the worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). (If a worker has fewer than 35 years of covered earnings, years of “zero” earnings are counted in the computation of the AIME.)7 The benefit formula is then applied to the worker’s AIME. The benefit formula that applies to individuals who first become eligible for retirement or disability benefits in 2006, or who die in 2006 before becoming eligible for benefits, is as follows: • 90% of the first $656 of AIME, plus • 32% of AIME over $656 through $3,955, plus • 15% of AIME over $3,955 For example, the PIA for a worker who reaches age 62 in 2006, based on an AIME of $4,500, would be $1,727.80. The PIA would be computed as follows: • 90% x $656 = $590.40, plus • 32%x$3,299 = $1,055.68, plus • 15% x $545 = $81.75 PIA = $1,727.80 (rounded to the next lower 10 cents) The worker’s PIA is based on the benefit formula that applies in the year the worker first becomes eligible for benefits (age 62 for retired-worker benefits, the year of disability for disabled-worker benefits, or the year of the worker’s death for survivor benefits ), rather than the first year of 7 The number of computation years used to determine the AIME varies, depending on the type of benefit (retirement, survivor or disability). The number of computation years is based on the number of “elapsed years” (i.e., the number of calendar years after 1950 or, if later, attainment of age 21) up to the year the worker attains age 62 (for retirement benefits); the year of death or, if earlier, attainment of age 62 (for survivor benefits); or the year of disability (for disability benefits) minus any “dropout years.” The number of dropout years also varies, depending on the type of benefit. For purposes of retirement and survivor benefits, up to 5 dropout years apply. For purposes of disability benefits for workers disabled before age 47, 1 to 4 dropout years apply, depending on the worker’s age and the number of dropout years. However, no fewer than 2 computation years may be used for disability benefit calculations. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŘȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ benefit receipt. Beginning with the first year of eligibility, the PIA is increased by the annual Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for any intervening years between eligibility and benefit receipt. For example, if an individual who first becomes eligible for retired-worker benefits at age 62 in 2006 elects to receive benefits at the normal retirement age (age 66 in 2010), the PIA effective at the normal retirement age would be the PIA calculated using the benefit formula for 2006 (shown above) adjusted annually according to the COLA effective in December 2006, December 2007, December 2008 and December 2009. The dollar amounts that separate the three brackets of AIME in the benefit formula ($656 and $3,955) are referred to as bend points. Under current law, the bend points are indexed to wage growth on an annual basis to provide stable replacement rates over time for workers with similar earnings patterns. (The replacement rate is based on Social Security benefits in the first year of retirement divided by final earnings.) For example, under current law, the benefit formula is designed to provide a replacement rate of approximately 40% for average-wage earners regardless of the year of retirement. The percentages that apply to each of the three brackets of AIME in the benefit formula (90%, 32% and 15%) are referred to as formula factors (or replacement factors). The formula factors, which are fixed under current law, are structured such that Social Security benefits replace a greater share of pre-retirement earnings for lower-wage workers wompared with higher-wage workers. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şřȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ —Ž›ŠŒ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ™˜žœŽȱŠ—ȱŽȱ ž›Ÿ’Ÿ˜›ȱŽ—Ž’ȱž•Žœȱ ’‘ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ™’˜—œȱ The current-law Social Security rules regarding spouses and survivors can increase the benefits of some married, widowed, and divorced beneficiaries. When these spouse and survivor rules interact with policy options that reduce Social Security benefits, they can mitigate the effect of benefit reductions, causing smaller reductions than would have been expected under the policy option. ž››Ž—ȱŠ ȱ™˜žœŽȱŠ—ȱž›Ÿ’Ÿ˜›ȱž•ŽœȱŠ—ȱ —Œ›ŽŠœŽȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱŽ—Ž’œȱ The Social Security rules regarding spouses and aged survivors allow some individuals to receive a benefit when they otherwise would have received none, and allow other individuals to receive a higher benefit than they otherwise would have received. Individuals who do not qualify for a Social Security benefit based on their own work records may qualify for a benefit based on their current or former spouses’ work records. Social Security spouse benefits are payable to the spouse or divorced spouse of a retired or disabled worker, based on the worker’s earnings record.8 The primary insurance amount (PIA) for a spouse beneficiary is generally 50% of his or her spouse’s PIA. Social Security survivor benefits are payable to the survivors of a deceased worker, based on the worker’s earnings record. The PIA for an aged widow or widower is 100% of his or her deceased spouse’s final benefit amount.9 Individuals who do qualify for Social Security benefits based on their own work records may receive a partial spouse or survivor benefit in addition to their own worker benefit, if the amount of their spouse or survivor benefit would be greater than their worker benefit. These so-called dually entitled beneficiaries receive a total Social Security benefit that is the higher of the worker benefit and the spouse or survivor benefit to which they are entitled, not the sum of the two benefits. Some individuals marry more than once throughout the course of their lives, either because they were divorced or widowed. Some of these individuals may qualify for spouse and/or survivor benefits based on the work records of more than one spouse.10 In such a case, an individual would receive the highest benefit to which he or she is entitled. ™˜žœŽȱŠ—ȱž›Ÿ’Ÿ˜›ȱŽ—Ž’ȱž•ŽœȱŠ—ȱ’’ŠŽȱŽ—Ž’ȱŽžŒ’˜—œȱ—Ž›ȱ ˜•’Œ¢ȱ™’˜—œȱ When Social Security’s spouse and survivor rules interact with policy options that would reduce benefits, they can mitigate the effect of benefit reductions, causing smaller reductions than would have been expected under the policy option. There are two mechanisms that could mitigate the 8 Divorced spouses must have been married to the worker for at least 10 years to qualify for spouse or survivor benefits. Other types of survivor benefits—those for children, mothers or fathers with a child in care, and dependent parents of Social Security beneficiaries—are not analyzed in this report. 10 In some cases, beneficiaries do not qualify for benefits based on a former spouse’s work record if they remarry. 9 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŚȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ effect of the policy option for a beneficiary: (1) if his or her benefit type changes under the option, or (2) if the spouse on whose work record his or her the benefit is based changes under the option. Some individuals could change benefit types under a policy option because of the spouse and survivor rules, thus mitigating the effect of the option’s benefit reduction. For example, consider a couple in which the wife receives a $600 retired worker benefit and the husband receives a $1,100 retired worker benefit under current law. The woman would not qualify for a spouse benefit under current law, since her worker benefit ($600) is greater than 50% of her husband’s primary insurance amount (assuming he is not subject to any reductions or credits, this amount would be $550). If the wife is younger than the husband, she would be subject to a greater benefit reduction in 2035 under most of the policy options analyzed in this report. Continuing the example above, let’s assume under a policy option that the wife’s benefit were reduced by $100 (making her retired worker benefit $500) and the husband’s benefit is reduced by $50 (making his retired worker benefit $1,050). As a result, the wife would become dually entitled to receive a partial spouse benefit in addition to her full worker benefit. Her total benefit amount under the option would be equal to 50% of her husband’s PIA, or $525 in this case (i.e., $500 in worker benefits and $25 in spouse benefits). Thus, the dual entitlement rule leads the wife to receive a $75 benefit reduction rather than a $100 reduction. Some individuals could receive a spouse or survivor benefit based on a different marriage than under current law as a result of a policy change, thus mitigating the effect of a benefit reduction that would otherwise result from the policy option. For example, consider a woman who divorced after 15 years of marriage, then remarried. Under current law, she receives a spouse benefit of $600. Her spouse benefit is based on her current husband’s PIA of $1,200; her former husband’s PIA is $1,180. Under the policy option, her current husband’s PIA is reduced by $100 (to $1,100), and her former husband’s PIA remains at $1,180 since he retired before the policy option was implemented. Under the policy option, she would receive a divorced spouse benefit based on her former husband’s work record—rather than her current husband’s work record—since the benefit she would receive based on her former husband’s record ($590) would be greater than the benefit she would receive based on her current husband’s record ($550). Thus, the rule that allows beneficiaries to receive the highest spouse or survivor benefit to which they are entitled means that the wife in this example receives a $10 benefit reduction rather than a $50 benefit reduction. It is important to note that in either scenario—changing benefit type or changing the spouse on which the benefit is based—the affected beneficiary would receive a higher-than-expected benefit under the option due to Social Security’s spouse and survivor rules. The reason for this effect is that the Social Security rules always allow beneficiaries to receive a total benefit that is equal to the highest of the various benefits to which they may be entitled. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şśȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ —Ž›ŠŒ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽ’›Ž–Ž—ȱŠ›—’—œȱ Žœȱ ’‘ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ™’˜—œȱ The current-law Retirement Earnings Test (RET) can affect benefits received before and after the full retirement age (FRA). When the RET provision interacts with policy options that reduce Social Security benefits, it can magnify the size of the benefit reduction received before the FRA and reduce the size of the benefit reduction received after the FRA relative to what is expected under the policy option, or even lead to apparent benefit increases relative to current law. ž››Ž—ȬŠ ȱȱŽžŒŽœȱŽ—Ž’œȱŽŒŽ’ŸŽȱ›’˜›ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱž••ȱŽ’›Ž–Ž—ȱŽȱ The RET is a current-law provision that reduces the Social Security benefits paid to some individuals who work before their full retirement age (FRA). Specifically, the RET applies to non-DI beneficiaries below the FRA who have earnings from employment in excess of certain thresholds.11 Generally, for workers who fall under the full retirement age for the entire year, the threshold is $12,480 in 2006. For every two dollars in earnings over this threshold, the worker’s Social Security benefit is reduced by one dollar. In the year that the worker attains the full retirement age, a higher threshold of $33,240 applies in 2006 for those months worked prior to the full retirement age. For every three dollars in earnings over this threshold, the worker’s Social Security benefit is reduced by one dollar. These thresholds rise annually with increases in the national average wage. Monthly benefits are eliminated or reduced until all excess earnings have been offset. The RET does not apply to workers after they attain the full retirement age. Table C-1. Retirement Earnings Test Application Rules Age of Social Security Beneficiary Threshold in 2006 Benefit Reduction Under FRA Entire Year In Year of Attaining FRA, for Months Prior to the FRA Over the FRA $12,480 $33,240 No threshold $1 for every $2 of excess earnings $1 for every $3 of excess earnings No reduction For example, Joe is 62 and will not reach the full retirement age this year. Thus, Joe could earn up to $12,480 in 2006 without penalty. Joe earns $30,000 this year, so his Social Security benefit would be reduced under the RET. For every two dollars of earnings over the $12,480 threshold, his benefit would be reduced by one dollar. Joe has ‘excess’ earnings of $17,520 in 2006 ($30,000 - $12,480). Thus, the reduction to his Social Security benefit is $8,760 ($17,520 x 0.5) in 2006. Joe’s current-law Social Security benefit is $1,500 per month ($18,000 per year) before the RET is applied. Therefore, Joe would lose his Social Security benefit payments for 5 full months and would lose a portion of his benefit for a 6th month ($8,760/$1,500) because of his excess earnings under the RET. After application of the RET, Joe’s annual Social Security benefit would be $9,240 ($18,000 - $8,760). 11 The RET does not apply to disabled workers receiving Disability Insurance (DI) benefits because these individuals are subject to their own earnings test, the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) test. See CRS Report 98-789, Social Security: Proposed Changes to the Earnings Test, by Debra B. Whitman for additional information on the RET. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŜȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ž››Ž—ȬŠ ȱȱ —Œ›ŽŠœŽœȱŽ—Ž’œȱŽŒŽ’ŸŽȱŽ›ȱ‘Žȱž••ȱŽ’›Ž–Ž—ȱŽȱ Those individuals who face benefit reductions due to the RET have their benefits increased at the full retirement age. Under current law, workers are only subject to the RET if they have excess earnings, receive non-DI benefits and have not yet reached the full retirement age. When individuals receive non-DI benefits prior to the full retirement age, they are subject to an actuarial benefit reduction, the size of which is dependent on the number of months of benefits the individual is projected to receive benefits before the full retirement age. The greater the number of months of benefit receipt prior to the full retirement age, the greater the actuarial reduction. Those retiring at the earliest eligibility age (60 for survivors benefits, 62 for retirement benefits) face the largest reduction. For every month that an individual’s early retirement or early survivor benefit is eliminated as a result of the RET, the actuarial reduction that he or she is subject to goes down as compensation for these lost benefits. When the individual reaches the full retirement age, the actuarial reduction is lowered and the retirement or survivor benefit is adjusted upward to account for the lost months of benefits under the RET. Following on the previous example, if Joe takes Social Security benefits at the earliest eligibility age, 62, his benefits will be 25% lower than if he retired at his FRA of 66.12 If Joe’s full retirement benefit (PIA) was $2,000 per month, his monthly benefit after the early retirement reduction would be $1,500 ($2,000 x 0.75). However, if Joe continues working, as described in the previous example, he would lose benefits for over five months out of the year due to the RET. If Joe worked intermittently between age 62 and 66 and the RET ultimately eliminated Joe’s benefit for a total of 12 months over this period, essentially, Joe delayed taking up Social Security benefits for an additional year. Therefore, his actuarial reduction for early retirement should be adjusted to reflect his receipt of Social Security benefits for only 36 months prior to his full retirement age instead of 48. Joe’s actuarial reduction would be reduced from -25% to -20% at the full retirement age of 66. Thus, at age 66 the RET would increase Joe’s monthly benefit from $1,500 to $1,600 ($2,000 x .80) under current-law, about a 7% increase. On an annual basis, the RET would increase Joe’s benefit from $18,000 per year to $19,200 per year. ‘ŽȱȱŠ—ȱŠ—’¢ȱŽ›ŒŽ—ȱŽ—Ž’ȱŽžŒ’˜—œȱ¡™Ž›’Ž—ŒŽȱ—Ž›ȱŠȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ ™’˜—ȱ›’˜›ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱž••ȱŽ’›Ž–Ž—ȱŽȱ The RET can magnify the effect of policy options that reduce benefits relative to current law. Those affected by the RET appear to receive larger benefit reductions than what could be attributed to the policy change alone. The RET calculation is based on a worker’s excess earnings. Since earnings are not affected by the policy option, the RET reduction is the same dollar amount under both current law and the policy option. If a policy option reduces Social Security benefits, this smaller Social Security benefit is being reduced by the same dollar amount under the RET as under current law. Therefore, the RET creates a larger percent reduction in benefits than is expected under the policy change. 12 The benefit reduction of 25% is calculated based on the number of months Joe retires before his full retirement age. By retiring at age 62, Joe will collect Social Security benefits for 48 months before his full retirement age of 66. For information on how the actuarial reduction is determined, see Table 2.A17.1 in the Social Security Administration’s Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2005 available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ statcomps/supplement/2005/2a8-2a19.html#table2.a17.1. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŝȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Continuing the current-law example, assume that a policy option reduces Joe’s initial benefit by 10% (prior to the application of the RET). Thus, his annual benefit prior to the RET is $18,000 and the policy option reduces his benefit by 10% ($1,800) to $16,200. Since Joe’s earnings don’t change, and he still has excess earnings of $17,520 in 2006, the RET still reduces his annual Social Security benefit by $8,760. So, Joe’s final annual benefit (after the policy option and the RET) is $7,440 ($16,200 - $8,760), which is approximately a 20% decrease ($7,440/$9,240) from the current law annual benefit of $9,240 (after the RET). Thus, the interaction of the policy option with the RET program rules is responsible for the larger than expected reduction in Joe’s benefit. ‘ŽȱȱŠ—ȱ’’ŠŽȱ˜›ȱ•’–’—ŠŽȱ‘ŽȱŽ—Ž’ȱŽžŒ’˜—ȱ—Ž›ȱŠȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ ™’˜—ȱŽ›ȱ‘Žȱž••ȱŽ’›Ž–Ž—ȱŽȱ Some policy options might reduce the Social Security benefit to a size where the fixed dollar amount of the RET fully eliminates the Social Security benefit for a greater number of months than under current law. Because of the interaction of the policy option with the RET and the actuarial benefit reduction, the ultimate consequence of this benefit elimination is a later increase in benefits relative to current law. When a policy option reduces the size of the Social Security benefit, the unchanging dollar amount of the RET requires more months of benefits to be eliminated than under current law. Thus, at the full retirement age, when the benefits are adjusted upward for this loss, they are increased relative to current law, making some individuals receive benefit increases that would seem to be counterintuitive under a policy change that reduces benefits. For example, if Joe’s benefit were reduced relative to current law, let’s say that the RET would eliminate his now smaller Social Security benefit for 16 months instead of 12 months during the period he worked between age 62 and 66. Joe’s actuarial reduction would be adjusted to reflect his receipt of Social Security benefits for only 32 months prior to his full retirement age instead of 36 months under current law (after the RET). Joe’s actuarial reduction would be reduced from -20% to approximately -16.7%. Thus, under the policy option, at age 66 Joe’s benefit increases from $1,600 (PIA of $2,000 x 0.80) under current law to $1,666 ( PIA of $2,000 x .83) under the policy option, a benefit increase of 4%. In summary, the RET can either magnify the size of a benefit reduction under a policy change or appear to create a benefit increase relative to current law, depending on whether an individual is below or above the full retirement age. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şŞȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ ŽŒ‘—’ŒŠ•ȱŽœŒ›’™’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ›˜›Žœœ’ŸŽȱ›’ŒŽȱ —Ž¡’—ȱ™’˜—ȱ ›˜›Žœœ’ŸŽȱ›’ŒŽȱ —Ž¡’—ȱ The progressive price indexing policy option would constrain the growth of initial benefits for future retirees by using a combination of wage indexing and price indexing in the benefit formula to apply differing degrees of benefit reduction based on the worker’s career-average level of earnings. The following section explains the mechanics of the progressive price indexing option examined in this report.13 The basic steps used to calculate initial benefits for future retirees under the progressive price indexing option include: Ž™ȱŗǯȱ›ŽŠŽȱŠȱ—Ž ȱ‹Ž—ȱ™˜’—ȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ‹Ž—Ž’ȱ˜›–ž•Šȱ The benefits of low-wage workers would be preserved by establishing a new bend point in the PIA formula, below which initial benefits would continue to be fully wage-indexed. For the option analyzed in this report, the new bend point would be established at the 30th percentile of earnings. This means that workers with career-average earnings in the lowest 30% of the earnings distribution would experience no change in benefits relative to current law. The new bend point would fall between the first and second bend points under current law. The replacement factors for the now four brackets of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings in the benefit formula would be set initially at 90%, 32%, 32% and 15%. The new bend point would increase each year after 2013 by the rate of growth of the national average wage, just as the two current bend points are wage-indexed. All workers with career-average earnings below this new bend point would continue to have their initial benefits fully wage-indexed. Workers with careeraverage earnings above the new bend point would have their initial benefits reduced because the third and fourth replacement factors (32% and 15%) would be adjusted downward each year (described in Step 3 below). Ž™ȱŘǯȱŠ•Œž•ŠŽȱŠȱ‘¢™˜‘Ž’ŒŠ•ǰȱž••¢ȱ™›’ŒŽȬ’—Ž¡Žȱ ȱ For those who become eligible for retired-worker benefits in 2013 and each year thereafter, calculate a hypothetical fully price-indexed PIA for a worker who had maximum earnings over his/her career and the percentage reduction in benefits between this hypothetical PIA and the current law PIA. SSA would compute the percentage benefit reduction that would apply for a career high-wage earner14 if all three of the current-law PIA factors (90%, 32%, and 15%) were fully price-indexed. For example, if the benefit for a career high-wage earner retiring at the full retirement age in a future year were determined to be, say, $2,800 per month and the percentage changes in prices 13 These steps follow those described in a memorandum from Stephen Goss, Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration to Robert Pozen dated Feb. 10, 2005. See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/RPozen_20050210.pdf. 14 A career high-wage earner is someone who earned at or above the taxable wage base for at least 35 years in their entire career. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şşȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ and wages since 2011 were 2.8% and 3.9%, respectively, the benefit for a high-wage earner would be recalculated with each of the three PIA factors multiplied by the ratio 1.028/1.039 or .989.15 Thus, in this example, the benefit of a high-wage earner under full price indexing would be reduced by 1.1% in 2013, the first year that price indexing would be in effect. After ten years—assuming that prices and wages continued to grow annually by 2.8% and 3.9%—the PIA factors would be multiplied by 1.02810/1.03910 = .899, representing a benefit reduction of 10.1%. Ž™ȱřǯȱŠ”Žȱ˜ — Š›ȱŠ“žœ–Ž—œȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ‘’›ȱŠ—ȱ˜ž›‘ȱ›Ž™•ŠŒŽ–Ž—ȱŠŒ˜›œȱ ’—ȱ‘Žȱ‹Ž—Ž’ȱ˜›–ž•Šȱ The third step of the process would be to calculate the percentage reduction only to the PIA factors above the new bend point (32% and 15%) that would result in the same benefit reduction for career-long maximum-wage earners (those always at or above the annual maximum taxable wage) as would have applied to these earners if price indexing had been applied to all workers. This would reduce benefits for career-long maximum-wage earners by the same percentage as they would have been reduced if the benefit formula were fully price-indexed for workers at all earnings levels. Benefits would be reduced by a smaller percentage for workers with career-long average wages and not at all for workers with average wages that fall in the lowest 30% of the earnings distribution. 15 Earnings are indexed to the average wage level two years prior to the worker’s first year of eligibility because there is a two-year lag time associated with the release of official wage data for a given year. Thus, if the first year the policy applies is 2013, it would be necessary to obtain the official wage data from 2011. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŖȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ ŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ›‹Š—ȱ —œ’žŽȂœȱ ¢—Šœ’–ȱ’Œ›˜œ’–ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜Ž•ȱ ‘Šȱ’œȱ¢—Šœ’–ǵȱ The Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (Dynasim) is a computer model that uses survey data to project demographic changes, retirement income, and Social Security benefits. It was created by the Urban Institute and was purchased by the Congressional Research Service. Dynasim can be used to analyze the consequences of retirement and aging policy issues on individual and family income and benefits. One of the major advantages of using the Dynasim model is the ability to analyze the distributional effects of Social Security proposals. For example, Dynasim can be used: 1) to analyze the difference in benefit levels between a particular Social Security reform proposal and current law; 2) to model the combined effects of multiple and complex policy changes on individual and family benefits and total income; 3) to model the effect of a change in Social Security policy on an individual’s eligibility for other means-tested federal programs (e.g. SSI). The effect on individuals and families can be broken down along multiple demographic and economic lines, such as gender, educational attainment, marital status, race, and wealth. ˜ ȱ˜Žœȱ¢—Šœ’–ȱ˜›”ǵȱ Through statistical adjustments of the data sources listed below, Dynasim projects the major pillars of retirement income. Starting with a representative sample of individuals and nuclear families, the model “ages” the data year by year from 1993 to 2050. Characteristics such as an individual’s year of birth, educational attainment, marital status, and race are used to predict future values of variables such as earnings, marital changes, and wealth. For each year, Dynasim simulates such demographic events as births, deaths, marriages and divorces, and such economic events as labor force participation, earnings, hours of work, disability onset, and retirement. The large amount of demographic and income information makes Dynasim particularly suitable to analyze the distributional effects of various Social Security reform proposals and other issues relating to the aged population. For example, retired worker Social Security benefits are based on 35 years of a worker’s earning history. Having a tool, such as Dynasim, that contains an individual’s earning history as well as the individual’s traits over his/her entire career is essential to modeling Social Security reforms. One such policy option that requires 40 years of a worker’s earning history is to increase the number of computation years from 35 to 40. In addition to modeling provisions that require long work histories, we can analyze how benefits change due to changes in life events (such as a marital status change or the death of a spouse) over the span of the individual’s lifetime. At the end of the simulation process, we have detailed information on the lifetimes of multiple individuals, with all of the information needed to calculate Social Security benefits and total incomes. In addition to workers’ earning histories, the Dynasim model includes additional retirement income projections useful for analyzing policy options. These projections include but are not limited to: Social Security coverage, eligibility and benefit levels, pension coverage and participation, income from assets, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŗȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ‘Šȱ›Žȱ‘Žȱ—Ž›•¢’—ȱŠŠǵȱ The Dynasim model was created using a complex combination of various data resources. The base population is comprised of households from the 1990 through 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This sample consists of over 100,000 people and 44,000 families and is limited to individuals who answered questions regarding assets and pensions.16 Annual earnings are created from a mixture of historical and projected data. Earnings histories are calculated for SIPP respondents by matching individuals from the SIPP to individuals interviewed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and to individuals interviewed in the 1972 Current Population Survey (CPS). The 1972 Current Population Survey is a unique dataset because it is matched to Social Security Administrative records. The 1972 CPS is matched to the Social Security Administration’s Summary of Earnings Records and is used to provide SIPP respondents with earnings between the years 1951 and 1967. The PSID also collects annual earnings information and provides SIPP respondents with earnings between the years 1968 and 1992. Once earnings are imputed for the years 1968 through 1992, earnings are then projected for the years 1993 through 2050. Dynasim uses information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to project individual earnings from 1993 through 2050 using a series of statistical regression equations. The earnings are projected in 5 steps. First, hourly wages are estimated using a random-effects model. Second, results from the hourly wage model are used to calculate predicted wages for all individuals in the PSID. Third, the number of annual hours worked is predicted using a tobit model that includes the predicted wage results from the previous regression. In the fourth step, labor force participation is estimated using a random-effect probit model. Finally, the labor force participation rates are adjusted to reflect projected employment rates from the OASDI Trustees’ Report by age and gender. The model utilizes survey data to estimate population growth, family formation, education and health, earnings, employee benefits, asset accumulation, pension and Social Security benefits, and payroll taxes. Some of the survey data used to estimate these processes include the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Current Population Survey, the Health and Retirement Survey, the National Longitudinal Mortality Study, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, estimates from the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary, Vital Statistics, the Pension Simulation Model from the Policy Simulation Group, and the Pension Insurance Modeling System from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. All of these data sources are used to validate and readjust the underlying data for the Dynasim model as necessary. ‘Šȱ˜ȱ ȱŽŽȱ˜ȱ —˜ ȱ‘Ž—ȱ —Ž›™›Ž’—ȱ¢—Šœ’–ȱŽœž•œǵȱ Despite the many advantages of using a microsimulation model, such as Dynasim, one must keep in mind the caveats that are common to the use of microsimulation models, in general. Such caveats include, but are not limited to: 1. Microsimulation models require the use of a large number of assumptions. For example, Dynasim utilizes assumptions from the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) to determine future fertility and mortality patterns and to project 16 The questions regarding assets and pensions can be found in the SIPP long asset/pension topical module wave. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŘȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ employment rates and wage growth. Individuals who believe that OCACT’s fertility and mortality assumptions are too optimistic or pessimistic will also have the same views of Dynasim’s fertility and mortality assumptions. In addition, Dynasim models mortality using an individual’s age, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, disability status and work history. There may be other variables that affect mortality that are not used in this model. 2. Like all projections, historical information is used to calculate future information for individuals such as future earnings, future marital status changes, future pensions, etc. There may be historical information, however, that will not provide good estimates of future values. For example, 40 years ago, it could not have been foreseen how technological advancements would have altered mortality and earnings. Similarly, future technology and medical advancements will have an effect on the population that can not currently be predicted. A model, such as Dynasim, would not be able to factor in these kinds of advancements unless they are already, somehow, accounted for in historical information. Put another way, the model assumes that the future will resemble the past. The model often uses a variety of techniques (e.g., cohort effects) to place heavier weight on more recent experience than on less recent experience. The model projects social and economic change mainly through change in the composition of the population. 3. Microsimulation models require many assumptions and utilize many specific mathematical equations. Therefore, care should be taken when interpreting results. For example, because of their detailed assumptions, microsimulation models better represent relative changes in benefits rather than exact benefit levels. All microsimulation models are estimates of what a given population will look like in the future. Because they are estimates, all microsimulation models contain some level of error. By analyzing relative differences, rather than point estimates such as average benefits, some of the error is controlled for because the underlying error will be the same under both options. Thus, microsimulation models will be more accurate in stating that “Plan A is estimated to result in a 23% increase in benefits over current law” than stating that “Individuals, under Plan A, receive a monthly benefit of $900” because the error found in microsimulation models is difficult to quantify, but can be mitigated by comparing plans across the same population and, in essence, holding the error constant. In addition to the caveats associated with microsimulation models, there are caveats that are specific to the Dynasim model. For example: 1. Dynasim does not model the “old law” Social Security benefit rules in place prior to 1979. Therefore, the benefits for the oldest individuals may not precisely reflect the level of benefits that they actually received. 2. Dynasim does not include behavioral changes resulting from the modification of the Social Security benefit and tax structures. Thus, changes to Social Security’s tax or benefit structure will not automatically alter an individual’s work patterns or retirement decision. 3. Dynasim does not include macroeconomic feedbacks. A change in the Social Security program can affect other segments of the economy. For example, a benefit cut could have effects on the labor force participation and the savings rate. These kinds of macroeconomic effects cannot automatically be modeled using the Dynasim model. Thus, second order microeconomic effects such as the effect of the savings rate on the interest rate earned by individual accounts cannot be modeled. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖřȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ 4. This version of Dynasim does not currently include an income tax module. Because Social Security benefits may be subject to income taxation, reform options that alter the level of Social Security benefits can also alter the amount of income tax paid by individuals. Although income taxes cannot be modeled, the amount of Social security payroll taxes paid can easily be calculated from an individual’s earnings. 5. Dynasim is not a Social Security actuarial model and thus cannot estimate the solvency effect of a proposed policy change. The Dynasim model does not contain all of the information required to produce solvency estimates. For example, Dynasim does not calculate children’s benefits and so a complete account of benefit payments cannot be calculated. In addition, Dynasim simulates the population between the years 1993 and 2050. The benefits received by individuals outside of this yearly range would not be included in the calculations. For these same reasons, long-term cost estimates cannot be calculated. 6. Dynasim incorporates differences in processes on the basis of race/ethnicity where the data suggest that such differences are significant. The literature is not always definitive on the magnitude of differences by race, and measurement issues can complicate estimation of such effects. We thus suggest conservative interpretation of differences by race and Hispanicity. Despite the caveats related to microeconomic models and specifically to Dynasim, the Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation Model is an extremely useful tool for analyzing the effects of Social Security reform proposals and other topics related to the aged. The wealth of demographic and economic information found in the Dynasim model enables CRS to provide members of Congress with in-depth analysis regarding the distributional effects of reform proposals that would not be possible without the use of a microsimulation model. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŚȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ™™Ž—’¡ȱǯ •˜œœŠ›¢ȱ Actuarially Fair Adequacy Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) Average Wage Index (AWI) Baseline Basic Benefit Amount Basic Benefit Formula Bend Points Cohort Computation Years Consumer Price Index (CPI) Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) Contribution and In the context of Social Security, holding constant the value of lifetime Social Security benefits for a person of average life expectancy, regardless of when he or she takes up benefits. For example, the early retirement reduction and delayed retirement credit were intended to make lifetime Social Security benefits equal in actuarial terms regardless of when beneficiaries began to collect benefits. In the context of Social Security, the goal of providing some basic level of income to beneficiaries. Measures of benefit adequacy include poverty rates and replacement rates. The average monthly amount of a worker’s taxable earnings, which is wage indexed (or adjusted to reflect increasing wages) and used to determine the primary insurance amount (PIA) when a worker applies for Social Security benefits. In the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) calculation for a retired worker, the highest 35 years of taxable earnings are wage indexed, averaged, and divided by 12. Fewer years of earnings may be used to calculate the AIMEs of workers who die or become disabled. The average amount of total national wages for each year after 1950, as measured by annual wage data tabulated by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Average Wage Index (AWI) includes earnings that are not covered and/or taxable by Social Security. The AWI is used for wage indexing values in the Social Security program. In the context of this report, current law Social Security benefits and payroll taxes, against which Social Security benefits and payroll taxes under various alternative policies are compared. Also see payable baseline and scheduled baseline. See primary insurance amount (PIA). See primary insurance amount (PIA) formula. The dollar amounts that define the brackets in the primary insurance amount (PIA) formula used to calculate basic Social Security benefits. The bend points are wage indexed, or adjusted annually to reflect increasing wages. In 2006, the bend points were $656 and $3,955. The use of bend points in the Social Security benefit formula creates a progressive benefit structure, where lower earners receive proportionately higher benefits, relative to covered earnings, than do higher earners. A group of individuals sharing a particular characteristic and studied over time. For example, a birth cohort is a group of individuals born in the same year or period of time. The years of earnings used to calculate a worker’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) in the Social Security benefit formula. For retirement benefits, the highest 35 years of earnings are used. For disability and survivor benefits, the number of computation years depends on the age when the wage earner became disabled or died; the number of computation years varies from 2 to 35. An official measure of inflation (i.e., the change over time in prices) calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor. The Social Security program uses the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) to calculate annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) to benefits. The annual increase in Social Security benefits reflecting the increase in the cost of living inflation), as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI-W). The cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is effective in December of each year and is calculated as the change in the CPI-W from the third calendar quarter of the prior year to the third calendar quarter of the current year. If the CPI-W increases during this period, Social Security benefits for the next year increase proportionately. If the CPI-W decreases, Social Security benefits stay the same. (i.e., See taxable earnings base. Benefit Base ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖśȱ ȱ Covered Earnings Covered Worker Credits Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) Disabled Distributional Analysis Dually Entitled Beneficiaries Early Retirement Age Early Retirement Reduction Earnings Eligibility Entitlement ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ Earnings from a job which requires contributions to the Social Security program. (See covered worker for more information.) All covered earnings below the taxable wage base—that is, taxable earnings—are subject to Social Security payroll taxes. Covered earnings above the taxable wage base are exempt from the Social Security payroll tax. A worker who is employed in a job at which he or she contributes a portion of earnings to Social Security, or a worker who is self-employed. Workers not covered by Social Security are either covered by a similar eligible contributory system offered by their employers outside of Social Security, do not have high enough earnings for mandatory participation, or have another special exemption. (About 96% of all workers are covered by Social Security.) To be insured for retired worker benefits, an individual must accumulate at least 40 credits in the Social Security system, which is equivalent to at least 10 years of covered employment. In 2006, a worker received one credit (up to a total of four per year) for each $970 in covered earnings. Fewer credits may be required in some survivor and disability cases; in these cases, benefits may be granted with as few as six credits. The amount of earnings required for a credit is wage indexed. An increase to the primary insurance amount (PIA) if a beneficiary delays claiming Social Security benefits beyond his or her full retirement age (FRA). The amount of the increase varies depending on the beneficiary’s date of birth and how long a beneficiary delays benefit take-up beyond his or her FRA. However, the increase stops when a person reaches age 70, even if he or she continues to delay taking up benefits. For Social Security purposes, a person who is unable to work because of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least one year. Disabled individuals under the age of 62 may qualify for Social Security disability benefits (after which they qualify for retirement benefits). No benefits are payable for short-term disability or partial disability. A method of analyzing how the costs and benefits of a program or a policy option are distributed among different subgroups (e.g., birth cohort or income level). Workers who qualify for Social Security benefits based on their own work records (i.e., worker benefits) as well as benefits based on their spouses’ work records (i.e., spouse benefits or survivor benefits). Dually entitled beneficiaries receive a total Social Security benefit that is the higher of the worker benefit and the spouse/survivor benefit to which they are entitled, not the sum of the two benefits. The age at which individuals qualify for reduced Social Security retired worker benefits if they choose to collect benefits before the full retirement age (FRA). The early retirement age is 62. Individuals who begin to receive retired worker benefits early will be subject to the early retirement reduction. (Also called the early eligibility age.) The amount which a person’s monthly Social Security benefit is permanently reduced for taking up retirement benefits before the full retirement age (FRA). The amount of the reduction varies depending on the beneficiary’s date of birth and how long before his or her FRA that he or she takes up benefits. The maximum amount of the reduction ranges from 20% to 30%, depending on the year in which the worker was born (because of the increase in the FRA). The early retirement reduction is intended to be actuarially fair. Wages or self-employment income. Also see covered earnings and taxable earnings. To be eligible for Social Security benefits, a worker (or his or her family members) must be insured and must meet age, disability status, family relationship, and/or other criteria established by law. Any federal program—including Social Security—that legally requires payments to any individual who meets the eligibility criteria established by law. (To be entitled to Social Security benefits, an individual must meet eligibility criteria and file an application for benefits.) Generally, entitlement programs are not subject to the annual appropriations process. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŜȱ ȱ FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) Taxes Full Retirement Age (FRA) Hold Harmless Income Inflation (Prices) Insolvency Insured Intermediate Assumptions Life Expectancy Long Range Mean Median Microsimulation Model Nominal Dollars Normal Retirement Age (NRA) ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ See payroll taxes. The age at which an individual may first become entitled to unreduced Social Security retirement benefits. The full retirement age (FRA) was age 65 for most of Social Security’s history, and is now gradually increasing to age 67. In 2006, the FRA was 65 years and 6 months. (Also called the normal retirement age.) In the context of Social Security, a group of beneficiaries is held harmless if benefit cuts and/or tax increases are not applied to that group. In the context of this report, Dynasim projections of total income in the year 2035, including Social Security benefits, defined-benefit pension benefits, income from retirement accounts, earnings, SSI, and the annuitized value of financial assets. Individuals are the unit of observation, but income estimates include income of the spouse, if the individual is married. A rate of increase in the general price level of all goods and services. The official measure of inflation in the United States is the Consumer Price Index. In the context of Social Security, the inability of the trust funds to pay all current expenses out of current tax income and accumulated trust fund assets. Insolvency would mean that Social Security’s trust funds were unable to pay full benefits on time. (Insolvency would not mean that Social Security would be completely broke and unable to pay any benefits.) In the context of Social Security, having enough credits to meet eligibility requirements for retired or disabled worker benefits, or to permit the worker’s spouse and children or survivors to establish eligibility for benefits in the event of the worker’s retirement, disability, or death. The Social Security Administration actuaries’ “best estimate” of future demographic and economic trends. The actuaries also produce high cost (pessimistic) assumptions and low cost (optimistic) assumptions. These assumptions are published annually in the Social Security Trustees Report. This report uses the Trustees’ intermediate assumptions. An estimate of the average remaining number of years expected prior to death for a given cohort. In the context of Social Security, life expectancy at age 65 is most commonly used. In the context of Social Security, the next 75 years. Long-range actuarial estimates are made for this period because it is approximately the maximum remaining lifetime of workers currently covered by Social Security. The annual Social Security Trustees Report includes long-range projections of Social Security’s financial status. (See also short range.) The mean is the average value in a data set. It is determined by adding all the values and dividing the sum by the number of values in the data set. In this report, the median is generally used instead of the mean. The middle number in a series of numbers arranged from least to greatest. Half the data values are above the median, and half are below. The value of a median is not affected by a few extremely high or extremely low values, as a mean would be. In the context of policy analysis, a computer model that simulates how a government program would operate under policy changes and how participants would be affected. For more information on the Dynasim microsimulation model used in this report, please see Appendix E. The face value of an amount of money during a given year, using the prices prevailing during that year. Nominal dollars are not adjusted for inflation. See full retirement age (FRA). ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŝȱ ȱ Payable Baseline Payroll Tax Price Indexing Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Factors Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Formula Progressive Purchasing Power Quarters of Coverage Quintile Real Dollars Regressive ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ In the context of Social Security, a baseline that includes benefits payable with current tax income and accumulated trust fund assets, even if those benefits are less than those which would be paid according to the formula set forth in the law. Payable benefits would be less than scheduled benefits in the case of Social Security insolvency. (See also scheduled benefits.) In the context of Social Security, a tax levied on all covered earnings, up to the contribution wage base in a given year. The Social Security payroll tax is paid in equal parts by employers and employees. Currently the Social Security payroll tax rate is 12.4% (of which 6.2% is paid by each employee and employer). Payroll taxes are also known as FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or SECA (Self-Employment Contributions Act) taxes. FICA and SECA taxes include both the Social Security tax and a Medicare Hospital Insurance tax of 2.9% of all covered earnings (of which 1.45% is paid by each employee and employer). In the context of Social Security, a proposed alternative method of calculating benefits. The most commonly discussed form of price indexing would increase individuals’ benefit levels at the rate of price growth (i.e., inflation) rather than at the rate of wage growth (as under current law). Under this form of price indexing, the primary insurance amount (PIA) factors would be multiplied each year by the ratio of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the Average Wage Index (AWI) for the second prior year. Under a system of price indexing, beneficiaries’ Social Security benefits would be lower than under current law. (Other parts of the Social Security benefit formula which are wage indexed under current law, such as bend points, could also be price indexed, but the term “price indexing” is typically used in reference to reducing the PIA factors.) The monthly Social Security benefit amount payable to a retired worker who begins to receive benefits at the full retirement age (FRA) or, generally, to a disabled worker. This amount, which is based on the worker’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), is also used to calculate benefits payable on the worker’s earnings record—for example, benefits paid to his or her spouse or survivors. Also referred to as a basic benefit amount. For more information on the PIA calculation, please refer to Appendix A. The factors by which the dollar amounts in the primary insurance amount (PIA) formula are multiplied. The PIA factors are 90%, 32% and 15%; each is applied to a worker’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) amounts between the bend points in the PIA formula. The formula to calculate the primary insurance amount (PIA) for workers who attain age 62, become disabled, or die after 1978. The PIA is equal to 90% of a worker’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) up to the first bend point, plus 32% of AIME between the first and second bend points, plus 15% of AIME above the second bend point. A system in which lower earners receive proportionately higher benefits (or pay proportionately lower taxes) than do higher earners. The Social Security benefit formula is progressive. The amount of goods and services that a given amount of money can buy. In the context of Social Security, beneficiaries receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in which benefits are adjusted according to the growth in prices (i.e., inflation) as a way to maintain the purchasing power of benefits over the course of a beneficiaries lifetime. See credits. One of five segments of a distribution that has been divided into fifths. For example, an individual in the second-from-the-bottom quintile of an income distribution is one whose income falls between the 20th and 40th percentile of the income of the population. In this report, income quintiles are used to illustrate the effects of policy changes on individuals of different income levels. The value of an amount of money measured in terms of purchasing power in a given year. Real dollars are adjusted for inflation. In this report, real values are in 2005 dollars. A system in which lower earners pay proportionately higher taxes (or receive proportionately lower benefits) than do higher earners. The Social Security payroll tax is regressive, since the tax rate is flat and the amount of taxable earnings is capped. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖŞȱ ȱ Replacement Rate Retirement Earnings Test (RET) Scheduled Baseline Short Range ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ In the context of Social Security, the proportion of taxable earnings before retirement that are replaced by benefits. A Social Security replacement rate is calculated by dividing a worker’s initial Social Security benefit by his or her average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). Replacement rates are one way of measuring the adequacy of a person’s benefits. A provision of the law which reduces Social Security benefits on account of earnings from work before the full retirement age (FRA). In 2006, the RET applied to beneficiaries earning more than $12,480 before the year in which they reach the FRA, and to beneficiaries earning more than $33,240 during the year in which they reach the FRA (i.e., during the months before their birthdays). For more information on the RET, please see Appendix C. In the context of Social Security, a baseline that includes benefits according to the formula set forth in the law, regardless of whether those benefits would be payable with current tax income and accumulated trust fund assets. Scheduled benefits would be greater than payable benefits in the case of Social Security insolvency. (See also payable baseline.) In the context of Social Security, the next 10 years. The annual Social Security Trustees Report includes short-range projections of Social Security’s financial status. (See also long range.) Social Insurance Solvency Spouse Benefits Survivor Benefits Taxable Earnings Taxable Earnings Base Taxable Maximum Wage Indexation Worker Benefits A system that insures workers and their families against economic insecurity caused by the loss of earnings or health care due to some event (e.g., retirement, unemployment, disability, or death). Benefit amounts are based on workers’ and employers’ contributions to the social insurance system. Social Security is a system of social insurance. In the context of Social Security, the ability to pay scheduled benefits when due out of current tax income and accumulated trust fund assets. Social Security is considered solvent as long as the Social Security trust funds maintain a positive balance. Social Security benefits payable to the spouse or divorced spouse of a retired or disabled worker, based on the worker’s earnings record. The primary insurance amount (PIA) for a spouse beneficiary is generally 50% of his or her spouse’s PIA. For more information on how spouse benefits are calculated, please see Appendix B. Social Security benefits payable to the survivors of a deceased worker, based on the worker’s earnings record. Potential survivor beneficiaries include widow(er)s, former spouses, children, and parents of the deceased worker. The primary insurance amount (PIA) for an aged widow or widower is 100% of his or her deceased spouse’s actual benefit amount (i.e., the deceased spouse’s PIA after applying the early retirement reduction or delayed retirement credit (DRC), if applicable). Other types of survivor benefits—child’s, mother’s, father’s, and parent’s benefits—are not analyzed in this report. For more information on how survivor benefits are calculated, please see Appendix B. In the context of Social Security, wages and/or self-employment income earned in covered employment that is less than the taxable earnings base. (About 85% of covered earnings were taxable in 2005.) The maximum annual amount of covered earnings that are subject to Social Security payroll taxes and credited toward Social Security benefits. Covered earnings above this amount are neither taxable nor creditable for benefit computation purposes. The amount of the taxable earnings base is wage indexed (i.e., rises each year with overall wage growth). In 2006, the amount of the taxable earnings base was $94,200. (Also called the contribution and benefit base, taxable wage base, or the taxable maximum.) See taxable earnings base. In the context of Social Security, a method by which dollar values are adjusted to account for the annual growth in national wages. The Average Wage Index (AWI) is used to increase values in the Social Security program, including the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) formula, the taxable wage base, the bend points in the primary insurance amount (PIA) formula, and the retirement earnings test (RET) exempt amounts. Social Security benefits payable to a retired or disabled worker, based on his or her own earnings record. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖşȱ ȱ ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ›Žœœȱ˜Œ’Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜•ŸŽ—Œ¢ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱŽ—Ž’Œ’Š›’Žœȱ ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ Laura Haltzel Specialist in Income Security lhaltzel@crs.loc.gov, 7-4895 Dawn Nuschler Specialist in Income Security dnuschler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6283 Kathleen Romig Analyst in Income Security kromig@crs.loc.gov, 7-3742 Gary Sidor Information Research Specialist gsidor@crs.loc.gov, 7-2588 Scott Szymendera Analyst in Disability Policy sszymendera@crs.loc.gov, 7-0014 Mikki Devine Waid Applications Developer, Client-Server and WEB mwaid@crs.loc.gov, 7-3908 Debra B. Whitman ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŗŖȱ