Order Code RL32501
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
9/11 Commission Recommendations:
New Structures and Organization
Updated September 1, 2004
Harold C. Relyea
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜
The Library of Congress
9/11 Commission Recommendations:
New Structures and Organization
Summary
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the structures and organization
of the federal government have been modified, changed, and adjusted in various ways
with a view to better achieving domestic security. Among the more visible entities
to have been established in this regard are the Office of Homeland Security, the
Department of Homeland Security, and two versions of the Homeland Security
Council. The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (9/11 Commission), issued on July 22, 2004, held out the possibility
of further developments with several recommendations for new entities and the
suggested merger of the functions of the current Homeland Security Council into
those of the National Security Council. These proposals, offered to address
perceived shortcomings concerning civil liberties protection, intelligence
development, intelligence community management, and intelligence expertise, are
set out in this report, along with some assessment of their implications, and
discussion of efforts to implement them. A chronology of developments regarding
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, including the progress of
implementing legislation, is provided at the end of this report, which will be updated
as events warrant.
Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
9/11 Commission Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9/11 Commission Recommendations:
New Structures and Organization
When the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission) issued its final report on July 22, 2004, the panel recommended
new structures with a view to strengthening the security of the nation. Statutorily
established in November 2002, the commission was tasked with a fact-finding
examination of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which would build upon
the investigations of other government entities, and production of a full and complete
accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks. The commission was
directed to “report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of
terrorism.”1
The day after receiving the report of the 9/11 Commission, House and Senate
leaders announced an immediate effort to develop draft legislation to implement the
panel’s recommendations, particularly two of them calling for new structures for
better managing intelligence. Simultaneously, President George W. Bush ordered his
chief of staff, Andrew H. Card, Jr., to lead an administration-wide review of the
recommendations and to report to him “as quickly as possible.”2
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission for new governmental structures
are the most recent development in efforts to better organize and manage the federal
government for domestic security. These previous efforts are reviewed in the
paragraphs below, and are followed by an examination of the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendations.
Background
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, President George W. Bush issued E.O. 13228 on October 8, which
established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the Executive Office of
the President to develop, and coordinate the implementation of, a comprehensive
national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks, and to
coordinate the efforts of the executive branch to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the nation. Later in the
day, Tom Ridge was appointed as the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and, by virtue of this position, became the director of OHS. The President’s
1 116 Stat. 2408.
2 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Philip Shenon, “Congress Plans Special Hearings on 9/11
Findings,”
New York Times, July 24, 2004, pp. A1, A8; Dan Eggen and Helen Dewar,
“Leaders Pick Up Urgency of 9/11 Panel,”
Washington Post, July 23, 2004, pp. A1, A11.
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order also established the Homeland Security Council (HSC) to “serve as the
mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of
executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation
of homeland security policies.”
From the outset of Director Ridge’s leadership of OHS, concerns were
expressed that he did not have adequate and clearly stated authority to carry out his
responsibilities. During the early months of 2002, press reports indicated that he was
“facing resistance to some of his ideas, forcing him to apply the brakes on key
elements of his agenda and raising questions about how much he can accomplish,”3
and that, “instead of becoming the preeminent leader of domestic security, Tom
Ridge has become a White House adviser with a shrinking mandate, forbidden by the
president to testify before Congress to explain his strategy, overruled in White House
councils and overshadowed by powerful cabinet members reluctant to cede their turf
or their share of the limelight.”4
In late April, the President directed senior officials, including Ridge, to begin
drafting a proposal for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security. This
initiative reflected a decision to move beyond the indeterminate coordination efforts
of OHS to a strong administrative structure for managing consolidated programs
concerned with border and transportation security, making effective response to
domestic terrorism incidents, and ensuring homeland security. This proposal was
publicly unveiled on June 6, 2002, transmitted to Congress as a draft bill on June 18,
and, five months later, with various modifications, was signed into law on
November 25.5 The statute transferred 26 major components (22 agencies) to the
new department, which counted 170,000 employees, only 18,000 of whom worked
in the Washington, DC, area, indicating a considerable field organization.6
The DHS statute also reconstituted the HSC and, in addition to advising the
President on homeland security matters, directed it to “(1) assess the objectives,
commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of homeland security and
to make resulting recommendations to the President; (2) oversee and review
homeland security policies of the Federal Government and to make resulting
recommendations to the President; and (3) perform such other functions as the
President may direct.”7
As DHS began operations in the early months of 2003, the future of OHS came
into question. In late July, a House report on appropriations legislation revealed that
3 Eric Pianin and Bill Miller, “For Ridge, Ambition and Realities Clash,”
Washington Post,
Jan. 23, 2002, pp. A1, A10.
4 Elizabeth Becker, “Big Visions for Security Post Shrink Amid Political Drama,”
New York
Times, May 3, 2002, pp. A1, A16.
5 116 Stat. 2135.
6 Tim Kaufmann, “OPM Promises Homeland Security Personnel System by June,”
Federal
Times, Dec. 2, 2002, pp. 1, 5; Christopher Lee, “OPM Begins Sorting Security Personnel,”
Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2002, p. A21.
7 116 Stat. 2258.
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the Bush Administration had changed the “Office of Homeland Security” account to
one for the “Homeland Security Council.” The report also noted the shift of 66 staff
from OHS to the HSC.8 Subsequently, the final funding legislation provided $7.2
million for the Homeland Security Council in the White House Office account, but
made no allocation for OHS.9 The President’s FY2005 budget made no mention of
OHS, which, while not formally abolished, has become dormant.
9/11 Commission Recommendations
Among the many recommendations in its final report, the 9/11 Commission
offered several pertaining to new structures with a view to strengthening the security
of the nation. These are set out below, along with some assessment of their
implications, and discussion of efforts to implement them. The first, calling for the
creation of a civil liberties oversight board, traces its origins to the fifth and final
report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by former Virginia Governor James
S. Gilmore III (Gilmore Commission). Its proposal, like the one of the 9/11
Commission, arose from a concern that efforts at combating terrorism could result
in the erosion of civil liberties, and that the board could function as a watchdog in
this regard.10
The second structural recommendation of the 9/11 Commission would
transform the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which also had been proposed by
the Gilmore Commission in December 2003, into a National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) with responsibility for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence
by, and for, the intelligence community.11 The NCTC would override the current
bifurcated arrangement in which principal players — the Central Intelligence Agency
and Departments of Defense and Justice — are seen as operating without effective
coordination and cooperation.
The suggestion of the 9/11 Commission, made in passing, that the Homeland
Security Council be merged into the National Security Council (NSC) is consistent
with the February 2001 recommendations of the Commission on National
Security/21st Century, cochaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren B.
Rudman, which sought to concentrate coordination of a number of national security
activities in the NSC.12 The underlying view of both commissions in this regard
appears to be that the President is better served by a single hub of coordinated
8 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations,
Departments of Transportation and
Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2004, a report to accompany H.R.
2989, 108th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 108-243 (Washington: GPO, 2003), p. 163.
9 118 Stat. 321.
10 U.S. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction,
V. Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our
Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2003), pp. 22-23.
11 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
12 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century,
Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change (Washington: Feb. 15, 2001), pp. 51, 52, 80.
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security policy advice with supporting staff resources. The President has the
discretion to add to the NSC’s statutory members and advisers such other
participants, standing or otherwise, as he so desires.
Finally, the recommendation for a National Intelligence Director has its roots
in a 1955 proposal of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, that the Director of
Central Intelligence “employ an executive officer or ‘Chief of Staff’” to manage the
CIA.13 The 9/11 Commission’s recommendation in this regard is the most recent of
a series of such suggestions, and legislative measures, to vest a national director with
responsibility and authority to manage and coordinate the intelligence community
without functioning, as well, as the head of the CIA.14 The report pointed out,
however, that the DCI currently “lacks the three authorities critical for any agency
head or chief executive officer: (1) control over purse strings, (2) the ability to hire
or fire senior managers, and (3) the ability to set standards for the information
infrastructure and personnel.”15
The structural changes recommended by the 9/11 Commission, as the
New York
Times editorially commented recently, “will not work unless Congressional oversight
changes too.” The 9/11 Commission has made recommendations in this regard, as
well. “It makes no sense to streamline the executive branch,” observed the
Times
editorial, “while leaving the legislative branch, which provides guidance and money,
in chaos.”16
“Recommendation: At this time of increased and consolidated government
authority, there should be a board within the executive branch to oversee
adherence to the guidelines we [the 9/11 Commission] recommend and the
commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties.”17 This
recommendation is the third and final one made in a section of the commission’s
report captioned “The Protection of Civil Liberties.” In the other two, the
commission recommended that (1) the President, in the course of determining the
guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by them with the
private sector, “should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information
is shared”; and (2) the “burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power
should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances
security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the
powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted,” the report
added, “there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its
13 U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Intelligence Activities (Washington: June 1955), p. 71.
14 See CRS Report RL32506,
The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for
Congress, by Alfred Cumming.
15 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11
Commission Report (Washington: GPO, 2004), p. 410.
16 Editorial, “And Now, the Hard Part,”
New York Times, Aug. 8, 2004, p. WK10.
17 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11
Commission Report, p. 395.
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use.”18 Read together, these recommendations call for a board to oversee adherence
to presidential guidelines on information sharing that safeguard the privacy of
individuals about whom information is shared, and adherence to guidelines on the
executive’s continued use of powers that materially enhance security.
The report offered no additional commentary on the composition, structure, or
operations of the recommended board. It might be similar to the eight-member U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, an independent agency within the executive branch that
makes findings of fact but has no enforcement authority. The commission’s findings
and recommendations are submitted to the President and Congress for consideration
and appropriate action. The panel collects and studies information on discrimination
or denials of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, age,
disability, or national origin; or in the administration of justice in such areas as voting
rights, enforcement of federal civil rights laws, and equal opportunity in education,
employment, and housing.19
On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush issued E.O. 13353 establishing
the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties within the
Department of Justice.20 Chaired by the Deputy Attorney General and composed of
19 other senior counsels and leaders largely from within the intelligence and
homeland security communities, the board may advise the President regarding civil
liberties policy, gather information and make assessments regarding such policy and
its implementation, make recommendations to the President, refer information about
possible violations of such policy by a federal official or employee for prompt action,
enhance cooperation and coordination among federal departments and agencies in
implementing such policy, and undertake other efforts to protect the civil liberties of
the citizenry as the President may direct.
It might be noted that, pursuant to Section 892 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, the President is responsible for prescribing and implementing procedures
under which federal agencies “share relevant and appropriate homeland security
information with other Federal agencies, including the Department [of Homeland
Security], and appropriate State and local personnel.”21
Of related interest in terms of new structures is the August 27, 2004,
establishment, with E.O. 13356, of an Information Systems Council, which shall be
chaired by a designee of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and
composed of 10 other designees of the Secretary of State, the Treasury, Defense,
Commerce, Energy, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Director of
Central Intelligence; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the
Director of the newly created National Counterterrorism Center.22 The council is
18 Ibid., pp. 394-395.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1975-1975a.
20
Federal Register, vol. 69, Sept. 1, 2004, p. 53585-53587.
21 116 Stat. 2253.
22
Federal Register, vol. 69, Sept. 1, 2004, pp. 53600-53601.
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tasked with planning for, and overseeing, the establishment of an interoperable
terrorism information sharing environment to facilitate automated sharing of
terrorism information among appropriate agencies.
“Recommendation: We recommend the establishment of a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of
national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint
operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the
various agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to evaluate the
performance of the people assigned to the Center.”23 The report emphasized that
the recommended NCTC, to be located in the Executive Office of the President,
would combine operational planning and intelligence functions, while “keeping
overall policy coordination where it belongs, in the National Security Council.” It
“should lead strategic analysis, pooling all-source intelligence, foreign and domestic,
about transnational terrorist organizations with global reach” and “should task
collection requirements both inside and outside the United States,” according to the
report. The new center also “should perform joint planning,” which would result in
the assignment of “operational responsibilities to lead agencies, such as State, the
CIA, the FBI, Defense and its combatant commands, Homeland Security, and other
agencies.” It should not, however, “direct the actual execution of these operations”
or “be a policymaking body.”24
The report indicated that the “head of the NCTC should be appointed by the
president, and should be equivalent in rank to a deputy head of a cabinet
department,” and “would report to the national intelligence director,” a new position
recommended by the commission. The individual nominated to head the NCTC
“should be confirmed by the Senate and he or she should testify to the Congress.”
In an unusual gesture, the report proffered that “the head of the NCTC must have the
right to concur in the choices of personnel to lead the operating entities of the
departments and agencies focused on counterterrorism,” and “should also work with
the director of the Office of Management and Budget in developing the president’s
counterterrorism budget.”25
Finally, acknowledging that the “proposed NCTC would be given the authority
of planning the activities of other agencies,” the report specified that a “[l]aw or
executive order must define the scope of such line authority.” Furthermore, to
“improve coordination at the White House,” the commissioners declared: “we
believe the existing Homeland Security Council should soon be merged into a single
National Security Council.”26
23 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11
Commission Report, p. 403.
24 Ibid., pp. 403-404, 411.
25 Ibid., p. 405.
26 Ibid., p. 406.
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TTIC, which the NCTC would replace, arose from the President’s January 28,
2003, state of the union address, where he announced he was instructing the leaders
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense to develop a center
“to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.”27 TTIC was
subsequently established with a memorandum of understanding (unpublished) signed
on March 4, 2003, by the Attorney General, DCI, and Secretary of Homeland
Security. Its mission is to bring together and analyze all terrorist threat-related
information available to the federal government from overseas and domestic
collections, and to disseminate this information and analysis to appropriate recipients.
Supervised by a director who reports directly to the DCI, TTIC began with “a little
over one hundred (100) officers drawn from partner agencies,” and anticipated a
workforce of “several hundred” by the end of its first year of operations.28
Speaking from the Rose Garden of the White House on August 2, 2004,
President Bush announced, “we will establish a National Counter-Terrorism Center,”
which “will build on the analytical work, the really good analytical work of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and will become our government’s knowledge
bank for information about known and suspected terrorists.” He indicated that the
director of the new center “will report to the National Intelligence Director, once that
position is created.” The President endorsed the establishment of this latter position
at the same news conference.29
Several days later, United Press International reported that the recently retired
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Richard J. Kerr, had warned, in a secret
report to departing DCI George J. Tenet in March or April, that TTIC could
undermine the CIA’s offensive operations against suspected terrorist operations
overseas. The concern was that CIA’s offensive international efforts would be
diluted by deploying its best personnel outside the agency to a center performing
largely defensive work. The creation of NCTC, it was thought, could make the
situation even more critical.30
On August 27, 2004, President Bush signed E.O. 13354 establishing a National
Counterterrorism Center headed by a director who is appointed by the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) with the approval of the President.31 This NCTC is
mandated to serve as the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all
27
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 39, Feb. 3, 2003, p. 113.
28 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary and Select Committee on Homeland
Security,
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and Its Relationship with the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, joint hearing, 108th Cong., 1st sess., July 22,
2003 (Washington: GPO, 2004), p. 11.
29 White House Office, “Remarks by the President on Intelligence Reform,” Washington,
DC, Aug. 2, 2004, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040802-2.html].
30 Shaun Waterman (UPI), “CIA Insider Warns Against Reform,”
Washington Times, Aug.
13, 2004, p. A6.
31
Federal Register, vol. 69, Sept. 1, 2004, pp. 53589-53592.
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intelligence possessed or acquired by the federal government pertaining to terrorism
and counterterrorism; conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism
activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic,
financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities
within and among agencies; assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for
counterterrorism activities; and otherwise serve as a central and shared knowledge
bank and provider of all-source intelligence support for agencies to execute their
counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis. The relationship
of this NCTC to the DCI Counterterrorism Center, operative since 1986, or the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), operative since May 2003, was not
immediately clear. Another executive order, issued the same day as the one
establishing this NCTC, indicated that a representative of the NCTC director, upon
that official’s appointment, would serve on the newly created Information Systems
Council, and that a representative of the TTIC director would serve on the council in
the interim.32
“Recommendation: The current position of Director of Central Intelligence
[DCI] should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director [NID] with two
main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on
specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the
national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.”33
In addition to the NCTC recommended earlier, the report anticipated the
establishment of other national intelligence centers on, specifically,
counterproliferation, crime and narcotics, Middle East, Russia/Eurasia, and
China/East Asia, which “would be housed in whatever department or agency is best
suited for them.” The management of these centers — their manner of creation,
number, and replacement or elimination — was not discussed. While the report
anticipated that the “National Intelligence Director would retain the present DCI’s
role as the principal intelligence adviser to the president,” the commissioners also
expressed the “hope that the president will come to look directly to the directors of
the national intelligence centers to provide all-source analysis in their areas of
responsibility, balancing the advice of these intelligence chiefs against the contrasting
viewpoints that may be offered by department heads at State, Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and other agencies.” In addition, “the National Intelligence
Director should manage the national intelligence program and oversee the component
agencies of the intelligence community.”34
Concerning current arrangements, the report offered the following critical
commentary on the responsibilities of the DCI.
The DCI now has at least three jobs. He is expected to run a particular agency,
the CIA. He is expected to manage the loose confederation of agencies that is
the intelligence community. He is expected to be the analyst in chief for the
government, sifting evidence and directly briefing the President as his principal
32
Federal Register, vol. 69, Sept. 1, 2004, p. 53600.
33 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11
Commission Report, p. 411.
34 Ibid., pp. 411-412.
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intelligence adviser. No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively.
Usually what loses out is management of the intelligence community, a difficult
task even in the best case because the DCI’s current authorities are weak. With
so much to do, the DCI often has not used even the authority he has.35
The NID recommended by the report “should be located in the Executive Office
of the President ... would be confirmed by the Senate and would testify before
Congress,” and “would have a relatively small staff of several hundred people, taking
the place of the existing community management offices housed at the CIA.”36 Thus,
it appears that the commission wants the NID to be structurally in close proximity to
the President — he is, after all, an adviser to the Chief Executive — but also subject
to congressional approval and availability in terms of briefings and testimony. The
report was silent regarding a particular term of office for the NID; allowing or
proscribing a second appointment to the position; conditions for removing an
incumbent from the position; or reporting to Congress when such a removal would
occur. Also, shortly after the 9/11 Commission issued its report, a
Washington Post
news analysis speculated that President Bush would take exception to having the
leaders of units within the Executive Office of the President — the NID and the head
of the NCTC — confirmed by the Senate. The analysis pointed out that, when a
legislative effort was made in 2002 to install a Senate-confirmed counterterrorism
director in the White House, a presidential veto was threatened because, the White
House said, the bill “seeks to interject Congress into the daily operations of the
Executive Office of the President by requiring the director and a senior advisor to the
president, within the president’s own executive office, to report directly to Congress
and participate in agency budget processes in a statutorily mandated fashion that is
unacceptable. The creation of this office,” it was contended, “represents undue
interference with presidential prerogatives and management of his own staff and
support structures.”37 Another press account, however, reported that two senior
Senators had expressed concern about the political independence a National
Intelligence Director would have if located in close proximity to the President within
the Executive Office of the President.38 Reporting on the President’s videoconference
with senior advisers regarding the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations indicated
that among the many questions the administration was exploring were whether the
NID “would be part of the cabinet or part of the executive office of the president and
whether its term would overlap the president’s.”39
Speaking from the Rose Garden of the White House on August 2, President
Bush asked Congress to create the position of a National Intelligence Director (NID)
to oversee and coordinate the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence
35 Ibid., p. 409.
36 Ibid., p. 414.
37 Dana Milbank, “White House Notebook: Keeping the Power,”
Washington Post, July 27,
204, p. A21.
38 Walter Pincus, “Bush, Aides Discuss Findings of 9/11 Panel,”
Washington Post, July 27,
2004, p. A2.
39 Richard Stevenson and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Administration Moves to Regain Initiative
on 9/11,”
New York Times, July 27, 2004, pp. A1, A12.
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community and to serve as the President’s principal adviser on intelligence matters.
He indicated that this official should be appointed by the President with Senate
confirmation, but should not be placed in the White House Office, the Executive
Office of the President, or the Cabinet. In response to a question, the President said
the office of the NID “ought to be a stand-alone group,” such as an independent
agency within the executive branch. Creating the position, he acknowledged, “will
require a substantial revision of the 1947 National Security Act.” It was not clear,
however, if a draft proposal would be offered in this regard.40
Some senior Senate and House members, including some serving on the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government
Reform where NID legislation is being developed, called for giving the new director
more authority — budgetary and personnel powers — than proposed by President
Bush. Without this authority, it was contended, the NID would be a “figurehead,”
by one estimation, or a “shell game,” according to another view. Recognizing the
issue to be a flashpoint of disagreement, a White House spokesman reportedly
indicated that President Bush may be willing to negotiate on the matter.41 At a
August 4 hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
concerning the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, five senior intelligence
officials said they believed the NID would be ineffective without budget authority.42
In an August 22 appearance on the CBS news program “Face the Nation,”
Senator Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
outlined an intelligence community and activities reform proposal, which he said had
the support of eight Republican members of his panel.43 The measure, which
appeared to be more extensive than the reorganization recommended by the 9/11
Commission, would break up the CIA and divide its responsibilities among three new
intelligence entities — national assessments, national clandestine service, and
technical support — under the direct supervision of a NID, who would have virtually
complete control over the intelligence budget, including the counterterrorism and
counterintelligence programs of the FBI.. The Pentagon would surrender its current
sizable authority over the intelligence budget, as well as some of its intelligence
agencies, such as the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. The proposal reportedly
was a surprise to the White House and Senate Democrats.
40 White House Office, “Remarks by the President on Intelligence Reform,” Washington,
DC, Aug. 2, 2004, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040802-2.html].
41 Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Plan Reviewed,”
Washington Post, Aug. 4, 2004, p. A17;
Philip Shenon, “The Recommendations: Critics Say Bush’s Intelligence Chief Would Be
Toothless,”
New York Times, Aug. 4, 2004, p. A12..
42 Walter Pincus, “Caution Is Urged in Intelligence Overhaul,”
Washington Post, Aug. 5,
2004, p. A10.
43 Dan Eggen, “GOP Plan Calls for Revamping Intelligence,”
Washington Post, Aug. 23,
2004, pp. A1, A7; Philip Shenon, “A G.O.P. Senator Proposes a Plan to Split Up C.I.A.,”
New York Times, Aug. 23, 2004, pp. A1, A14.
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On August 27, 2004, President Bush issued E.O. 13355, which was intended to
strengthen the capability of the DCI to manage the intelligence community.44 The
order emphasized the authority of the DCI as the principal adviser to the President,
the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence
matters; for ensuring the timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence; for structuring the national foreign intelligence
program (NFIP); and for establishing, operating, and directing new national
intelligence centers, among other matters. Of particular importance, the order
appeared to some to vest the DCI with coequal status vis-a-vis the Secretary of
Defense regarding the establishment of collection requirements for the intelligence
community and the tasking of national collection assets. Similarly, some noted that
the DCI was authorized not only to develop and present to the President the annual
consolidated NFIP budget, but also to “determine” that budget. Others were less
certain that any significant change had occurred regarding these matters.
“Recommendation: A specialized and integrated national security
workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts,
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and
retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a
deep expertise in intelligence and national security.”45 This proposal, which the
report indicated should be implemented by the President through the issuance of an
executive order, appears to have been offered in support of FBI Director Robert
Mueller’s proposed creation of an Intelligence Directorate within his agency, as well
as “to ensure that the Bureau’s shift to a preventive counterterrorism posture is more
fully institutionalized so that it survives beyond Director Mueller’s tenure.”46
Establishing the recommended workforce would heighten the need to create,
administratively or statutorily, organizational arrangements for its successful
utilization.
Chronology
July 22, 2004
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (9/11 Commission) issued its final report.
July 23, 2004
Leaders of the House of Representatives and Senate announced
plans for August committee hearings preparatory to the drafting
of legislation to implement recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. The Senate majority and minority leaders
deputized the chair and ranking minority member of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs to produce bills by October
1 that would carry out commission recommendations for a
National Intelligence Director and a National Counterterrorism
Center.
44
Federal Register, vol. 69, Sept. 1, 2004, pp. 53593-53597.
45 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11
Commission Report, pp. 425-426.
46 Ibid., p. 425.
CRS-12
July 26, 2004
From his Crawford, TX, ranch, President Bush spoke with
nearly all of his most senior advisers by videoconference
regarding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
July 29, 2004
President Bush held a second videoconference with his senior
advisers regarding the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission.
July 30, 2004
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing
to receive testimony from 9/11 Commission chairman Thomas
H. Kean, a former Governor of New Jersey, and vice chairman
Lee H. Hamilton, a former member of the House of
Representatives.
August 2, 2004
In remarks from the Rose Garden of the White House, President
Bush asked Congress to create the position of a National
Intelligence Director to oversee and coordinate the foreign and
domestic activities of the intelligence community and to serve,
as well, as the President’s principal intelligence adviser. To be
appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, this
official, according to the President, should not be placed in the
White House Office, Executive Office, or Cabinet. The
President also indicated his intent to establish a National
Counterterrorism Center, which would build on the work of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
August 3, 2004
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing
to receive testimony on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation
to establish a National Counterterrorism Center.
The House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee
on National Security, held a hearing to receive testimony on the
9/11 Commissions recommendations.
August 4, 2004
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held an
initial hearing on recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
concerning counterterrorism analysis and collection.
August 6, 2004
The House Committee on International Relations held a hearing
on the 9/11 Commission recommendation on denying
sanctuaries to terrorists.
August 10, 2004
The House minority leader held a meeting with the 9/11
Commission for House Democratic members.
The House Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on the
9/11 Commission report.
August 11, 2004
The House Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on the
9/11 Commission report.
CRS-13
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held a
hearing on recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
concerning sufficiency of time, attention, and legal authority.
August 16, 2004
The Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on
proposals to reorganize the intelligence community.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation held a hearing on the transportation security
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing
on reorganization of the intelligence community.
August 17, 2004
The House Select Committee on Homeland Security held a
hearing on the information sharing findings and
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on the
9/11 Commission’s report concerning intelligence and the
military.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing
with representatives of the families of 9/11 victims regarding the
need for implementing the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission.
August 18, 2004
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held a
hearing on recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
concerning intelligence community operational considerations.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held a hearing on
intelligence reform.
August 19, 2004
The House Committee on International Relations held a hearing
on the Department of State’s strategy for diplomacy in the age
of terrorism.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the
9/11 Commission report concerning the future of federal
enforcement and border security.
August 20, 2004
The House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law and Subcommittee on the
Constitution, held a hearing on the 9/11 Commission report and
the Department of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory
Committee.
August 22, 2004
Senator Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, outlined, during an appearance on CBS’ “Face
CRS-14
the Nation,” an intelligence community and activities reform
proposal endorsed by eight Republican members of his
committee.
August 23, 2004
The House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on
further steps to be taken to impede terrorist financing and money
laundering in light of the 9/11 Commission report.
Senator Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, released the draft text of an intelligence
community and activities reform bill endorsed by eight
Republican members of his committee.
August 24, 2004
The House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee
on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, held a hearing on overclassification as a barrier to
information sharing.
The House Committee on International Relations held a hearing
on 9/11 Commission recommendations for U.S. diplomacy.
August 25, 2004
The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation, held a hearing on the 9/11
Commission’s aviation security recommendations.
The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
held a hearing on 9/11 Commission recommendations.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held a
hearing on recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
concerning intelligence community reconstruction.
August 26, 2004
The House Committee on Veterans Affairs held a hearing on the
preparedness of the Department of Veterans Affairs to fulfill its
homeland security roles.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing
to reorganize the intelligence community, focusing on the
authority of the National Intelligence Director over intelligence
funding and the operational planning authority of the National
Counterterrorism Center.