The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s FY2004 Budget Request: Description, Analysis, and Issues for Congress
Order Code RL31821
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2004 Budget Request:
Description, Analysis, and Issues for Congress
Updated September 23, 2003
Marcia S. Smith, Daniel Morgan, and Wendy H. Schacht
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s
FY2004 Budget Request: Description, Analysis, and
Issues for Congress
Summary
NASA’s budget request for FY2004 is $15.469 billion, approximately a 1%
increase over its FY2003 appropriations level of $15.339 billion, or a 3.1% increase
over its FY2003 request of $15.0 billion. The House-passed version of the FY2004
VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.R. 2861) adds $71 million to the request. The
Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a $130 million cut (S. 1584).
Debate over NASA’s FY2004 budget is taking place against the backdrop of the
space shuttle Columbia tragedy, which could have significant impacts on NASA’s
budget. There are immediate questions of how funding will change for the shuttle
program itself, the space station program (which uses the shuttle to take people and
cargo to and from the station), the Office of Biological and Physical Research (which
funds research on the shuttle and station), and plans to develop an Orbital Space
Plane. One aspect of that discussion is whether to continue permanent occupancy of
the space station if the shuttle is grounded for a long period of time. For the longer
term, Congress is expected to address more fundamentally whether human space
flight is worth its risks and costs, and what should be the balance between human and
robotic space flight activities.
The agency’s FY2004 budget was formulated prior to the Columbia tragedy,
but initial deliberations, at least, will focus on what is presented in that budget
estimate and two associated documents (a strategic plan, and a FY2002 performance
and accountability report) that herald NASA’s adoption of performance based
budgeting. Care should be taken in using the FY2004 budget materials. First, they
are presented in “full cost accounting” where all program costs, including personnel
and facilities, are included in individual program budgets instead of separately. It
may appear that programs are receiving funding increases; yet a higher figure in
FY2004 may be the result of full cost accounting, not program content, changes.
Second, NASA revised the organizational structure of its budget, making it difficult
in some cases to trace program budgets. Apart from Columbia, other major NASA
budget issues include:
!
International Space Station Program: Assuming construction and operation
of ISS continues, will the Bush Administration commit to building it so that it can
accommodate seven crew members, as originally planned, instead of three?
!
Project Prometheus: Can NASA afford this multi-billion dollar program to
build a nuclear powered, nuclear propelled spacecraft, and what are the policy
implications of expanding the use of nuclear power in space?
!
Aeronautics: Is NASA investing sufficiently in aeronautics R&D?
!
Technology Transfer: Should Congress approve NASA’s decision to terminate
several of its technology transfer activities?
This report will be updated as events warrant. An abbreviated version is
available as CRS Report RS21430.
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction to NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NASA’s Historical Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Key Issues in the FY2004 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Overview of NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Full Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
New Appropriations Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Comparing FY2003 and FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
NASA’s Six Enterprises and 18 “Themes” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
New Initiatives in FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Overview of Congressional Action on NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request . . . . . 11
House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Agency-Wide Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Space Shuttle Columbia Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Should Crews Remain Aboard the Space Station While the Shuttle
Is Grounded? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Who Will Pay For Additional Cargo Flights to the Space Station? . . 14
Should the Orbital Space Plane Program be Accelerated? . . . . . . . . . 15
What Are the Impacts on the FY2004 Budget? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Is Human Space Flight Worth the Risks and Costs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Vision, Mission, and Performance Based Budgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Detailed FY2004 Budget Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Science, Aeronautics & Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Space Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 21
Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Project Prometheus (Nuclear Systems Initiative and JIMO) 22
New Frontiers (Pluto Probe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Space Telescopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Earth Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 27
Key Issue: NASA’s Reformulated Global Climate Change
Research Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Biological and Physical Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 29
Key Issue: Impact of the Columbia Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Aeronautics Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 30
Key Issue: Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 33
Key Issue: “Educator Astronauts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Space Flight Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Space Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Space Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 36
Key Issue: After the Shuttle Returns to Flight . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Space Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 39
Key Issue: Return to Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Space and Flight Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 41
Crosscutting Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Space Launch Initiative: OSP and NGLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 42
Key Issue: Orbital Space Plane—“Crew Return” versus
“Crew Transport” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Mission and Science Measurement Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 44
Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 44
Key Issue: Termination of the Commercial Technology
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Out-Year Budget Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
List of Figures
Figure 1: NASA Funding FY1959-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1: NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 3. NASA’s FY2003 Request v. FY2003 Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 4: NASA’s 18 Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 5: NASA’s Nine New Initiatives in FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 6: FY2004 Space Science New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 7: FY2004 Earth Science New Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 8: FY2004 Biological and Physical Research New Initiative . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 9: FY2004 Aeronautics New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 10: FY2004 Education New Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Table 11: NASA FY2004 and Out-Year Budget Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2004 Budget Request:
Description, Analysis, and
Issues for Congress
Preface
Congress is debating the $15.469 billion FY2004 budget request of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This report discusses the major
issues, particularly the potential ramifications of the February 2003 space shuttle
Columbia accident. Several other CRS reports are available on NASA-related topics,
and are referenced herein. An abbreviated version of this report is available as CRS
Report RS21430.
Throughout this report, FY2003 funding levels are based on amounts contained
in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7), which included a
0.65% rescission for all NASA activities except the space shuttle. FY2004 request
figures are from NASA’s FY2004 budget estimate, available at
[http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/]. Program descriptions are condensed from
material provided by NASA in that or previous budget estimates.
This report continues the series of annual CRS analyses of NASA budget
requests initiated by former CRS Specialist David Radzanowski, and continued by
former CRS Senior Specialist Richard Rowberg. It draws upon some of the content
of the earlier reports.
Introduction to NASA
NASA was created by the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-
568). NASA’s charter is to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities.
Military space and aeronautics activities are conducted by the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the intelligence community. The organizations cooperate in some areas
of technology development and occasionally have joint programs. NASA opened its
doors on October 1, 1958, almost exactly one year after the Soviet Union ushered in
the Space Age with the launch of the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on October 4,
1957. In the 45 years that have elapsed, NASA has conducted far reaching programs
in human and robotic spaceflight, technology development, and scientific research.
The agency is managed from NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. It has
nine major field centers around the country: Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,
CA; Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA; Glenn Research Center,
CRS-2
Cleveland, OH; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD; Johnson Space
Center, Houston, TX; Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, FL: Langley
Research Center, Hampton, VA; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL;
and Stennis Space Center, near Slidell, MS. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Pasadena, CA (often counted as a 10th NASA center), is a federally funded research
and development center operated for NASA by the California Institute of
Technology. Goddard Space Flight Center manages the Goddard Institute of Space
Studies (New York, NY), the Independent Validation and Verification Facility
(Fairmont, WV); and the Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops, VA). Ames Research
Center manages Moffett Federal Airfield, Mountain View, CA. Johnson Space
Center manages NASA activities at the White Sands Test Facility, White Sands, NM.
Web links to all these can be found at [http://www.nasa.gov/nasaorgs/index.html].1
NASA employs approximately 19,000 civil servants (full time equivalents), and
40,000 on-site and near-site support contractors and grantees. For more details on
NASA’s workforce, see [http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm].
NASA is headed by an Administrator. The current Administrator is Mr. Sean
O’Keefe, who was confirmed by the Senate on December 20, 2001. Immediately
prior to his appointment, he was deputy director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Previously, he was staff director for the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense, the Comptroller of DOD, Secretary of the Navy, and a
professor at Pennsylvania State University and Syracuse University. Mr. O’Keefe
is the 10th NASA Administrator. His predecessor was Mr. Daniel Goldin, who held
the position for almost 10 years.
NASA’s Historical Budget
Since its creation, NASA has experienced periods of budget growth and decline,
some of which were dramatic. Figure 1 displays the agency’s budget history, both
in current year dollars (unadjusted for inflation) and in 2003 dollars. In the early
1960s, as the nation strived to put an American on the Moon by 1969, NASA’s
budget increased rapidly, peaking at $5.25 billion (current year dollars) in FY1965.
Then, as other national priorities gained precedence, NASA’s budget declined
sharply from the FY1965 peak to about $3 billion (current year dollars) by FY1974.
Subsequently, it increased steadily for almost two decades (the one-year spike in
1987 was to build a replacement space shuttle orbiter), but declined in the mid-1990s
as efforts to restrain federal funding took hold. Since 2000, it has been rising
gradually to its FY2003 level of $15.339 billion (current year dollars). For
information on NASA’s FY2003 budget, see CRS Report RL31347, The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s FY2003 Budget Request: Description,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress.
1 CRS Report RL30577, National Aeronautics and Space Administration: History and
Organization, by Erin Hatch, provides further information on NASA’s origin and structure.
CRS-3
Figure 1: NASA Funding FY1959-2003
Billions of Dollars
30
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1959
1964
1969
1974
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999 2003
, Current Year Dollars
' 2003 Dollars
Source: Data on NASA budget authority in current dollars through 2000 are from the Aeronautics and
Space Report of the President: FY 2000; for 2001-2002 are from the Historical Tables of the Budget
of the U.S. Government, FY2004; for 2003 are from P.L. 108-7, adjusted for the 0.65% across-the
board rescission for all NASA activities except the space shuttle. Constant dollars (adjusted for
inflation to reflect 2003 dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP (chained) price index.
Table 1: NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year
Current Dollars
2003 Dollars
(unadjusted for inflation)
1994
14,570
17,037
1995
13,854
15,856
1996
13,884
15,579
1997
13,709
15,088
1998
13,648
14,812
1999
13,653
14,623
2000
13,601
14,291
2001
14,257
14,620
2002
14,893
15,091
2003
15,339
15,339
Source: Current dollars for 1994-2000 are from the Aeronautics and Space Report of the President:
FY 2000; for 2001-2002 are from the Historical Tables of the Budget of the U.S. Government,
FY2004; for 2003 are from P.L. 108-7, adjusted for the 0.65% across-the board rescission for all
NASA activities except the space shuttle. Constant dollars (adjusted for inflation to reflect 2003
dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP (chained) price index.
CRS-4
Key Issues in the FY2004 Budget Request
This report examines issues that Congress may consider as it reviews NASA’s
activities in the context of the FY2004 budget request. Key questions are listed
below. More details can be found in the subsequent sections of the report.
•
What will be the impact of the space shuttle Columbia accident on NASA’s
budget, and on the space program as a whole? Should the United States remain
committed to human exploration of space, or should the agency shift more
resources into robotic exploration, which avoids the risks to human life?
•
While many consider the likelihood of the United States abandoning human
exploration to be extremely small, what would be the future of the International
Space Station program if it did? ISS is a cooperative program among the
United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia. Would the other countries
assume ownership and operation of the facility? The United States has spent
more than $30 billion on building a space station since 1985. How would the
American public react to a decision to walk away from the project at this point?
•
Assuming the United States continues its participation in the space station
program, will the Bush Administration commit to building it as agreed in 1993
so that it can accommodate a crew of seven? Or is the Administration still
willing to commit only to building the truncated version it announced in 2001,
which accommodates a crew of three? The number of crew members affects
how much scientific research can be conducted there, and the U.S. decision to
build a truncated version is a contentious issue with U.S. scientists who plan to
use the facility and with the other partners in the program.
•
Assuming the United States continues its participation in the space station
program, should NASA accelerate development of the Orbital Space Plane
(OSP) to take crews to and from the space station now that there are only three
space shuttle orbiters in the fleet? The OSP concept is early in its formulation
stage. How much could its schedule be accelerated if desired? How much
would it cost? Does NASA need to build a vehicle that can both take crews to
the space station as well as return them in an emergency, or should the agency
focus on a simpler, less expensive vehicle that performs only the crew return
(“lifeboat”) function, which is all that is required under the international
agreements that govern the program?
•
Can NASA afford Project Prometheus, a new multibillion initiative in the
Office of Space Science to build a spacecraft to study three moons of Jupiter?
It would use nuclear power and propulsion systems whose development was
approved in the FY2003 budget. NASA’s preliminary cost estimate is $3
billion over the next 5 years (FY2004-2008), or $8-9 billion through 2012 when
the spacecraft would be launched. Additionally, will the public accept an
expansion of the use of nuclear power in space?
•
What are the implications of NASA’s latest reformulation of its earth science
program on the long-term study of global climate change? NASA’s new plan
CRS-5
is to rely on instruments aboard weather satellites operated by two other
agencies (the Department of Defense and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration), instead of building additional satellites in its
Earth Observation Satellite series, to fulfill its commitment to provide a 15-year
set of climate data. Budget constraints already are arising in the DOD/NOAA
program. What guarantees are there that DOD and NOAA will include the
instruments needed for the scientific community, since their primary
responsibility is short term weather forecasting, not long term scientific
research?
•
How will the Office of Biological and Physical Research recoup from the space
shuttle Columbia accident in terms of the science experiments it sponsored
aboard Columbia, and the research it is hoping to conduct on the International
Space Station? The research program for the space station was reformulated
last year in the wake of funding cuts and the possibility that space station crews
would be limited to three, instead of seven, astronauts, thereby reducing the
amount of time available to conduct research. While the shuttle is grounded,
space station crews are being reduced to two. How will that affect the scientific
research that can be conducted there in the short term?
•
Is NASA investing sufficiently in aeronautics research and development
(R&D)? NASA funding for aeronautics R&D is down by about half from its
FY1998 peak and is projected to decline further in coming years. Aeronautics
R&D contributes to increasing air traffic capacity, reducing the impact of
aircraft noise and emissions, improving aviation safety and security, and
meeting other needs such as national defense and commercial competitiveness.
•
What are the implications of NASA’s decision to terminate many of its
technology transfer activities? NASA plans to close its six Regional
Technology Transfer Centers (RTTCs) in Los Angeles, CA; College Station,
TX; Cleveland, OH; Newport News, VA; Westborough, MA; and Atlanta, GA.
It also will discontinue its annual “Spinoff” books that provide examples of
successfully commercialized NASA technology. In the wake of the space
shuttle Columbia accident, questions are again arising as to what value
taxpayers receive from their investment in NASA. While some are comfortable
with intangible benefits such as gaining knowledge of the universe or satisfying
a desire to explore, others prefer tangible benefits, which these technology
transfer activities emphasize.
CRS-6
Overview of NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request
NASA’s FY2004 budget request is $15.469 billion (see Table 2), a 3.1%
increase over the agency’s FY2003 request, or an approximately 1% increase over
its FY2003 appropriation of $15.339 billion.2 Congressional action is summarized
in the Overview of Congressional Action on NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request
section below, and provided in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.
As described below, care must be taken when reviewing NASA’s FY2004
budget request figures because of two significant changes in the agency’s budget
structure: the shift to full cost accounting, and new appropriations accounts.
Full Cost Accounting
Users of NASA’s FY2004 budget material should bear in mind that it reflects
NASA’s shift to “full cost accounting.” In full cost accounting, funding for each
program (such as the Mars program) includes the costs for personnel and facilities.
Previously, those costs were accounted for separately. NASA began its Full Cost
Initiative in 1995, and asserts that today it is a key component in implementing the
President’s Management Agenda (discussed below). NASA began the transition to
full cost accounting in its FY2002 budget by assigning these costs to each enterprise
(e.g. the Space Science Enterprise). This year, NASA is taking the further step of
assigning the costs directly to each program.
The intent of full cost accounting is to show more accurately a program’s total
cost. A consequence of this approach during the transition period, however, is to
make it appear that funding for many programs has increased substantially. Looking
quickly at NASA’s FY2004 request, one might conclude, for example, that funding
for the space shuttle increased more than $700 million from a request of $3.2 billion
in FY2003, to a request of $3.9 billion FY2004. A closer look shows, however, that
the FY2004 request is only $182 million higher than the FY2003 request. The
remainder of the difference is due to inclusion of personnel and facilities costs that
were included in the “Investments and Support” line in NASA’s Human Space Flight
budget last year. Full cost accounting is discussed in more depth below (see Vision,
Mission, and Performance Based Budgeting).
New Appropriations Accounts
A second significant change in FY2004 is different appropriations accounts.
NASA has two accounts.3 Last year, the two accounts were Human Space Flight
2 NASA’s FY2003 appropriations are included in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-7). That Act includes a 0.65% rescission from all activities covered by the
Act, with a few exceptions. One of those exceptions is NASA’s space shuttle program in
the aftermath of the February 2003 space shuttle Columbia tragedy. The $15.339 billion
figure is adjusted for the rescission.
3 NASA refers to its “two account” budget structure. That terminology does not include
(continued...)
CRS-7
(HSF), and Science, Aeronautics, and Technology (SAT). The HSF account included
funding for: space station; space shuttle; payload and Expendable Launch Vehicle
support; space communications and data support; and safety, mission assurance, and
engineering. SAT funding included: space science, earth science, biological and
physical research, aerospace technology, and academic programs. This year, NASA
revamped the budget structure to better reflect its priorities and activities. NASA is
seeking to demonstrate that its mission is “Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration,”
and that mission is supported by “Space Flight Capabilities” such as a space station,
space transportation (the space shuttle and expendable launch vehicles), space
communications systems, and investing in new technologies. Everything that NASA
does is not a perfect fit for the new structure. For example, NASA’s investment in
nuclear propulsion technologies is included in the Space Science request, not in
Crosscutting Technologies with NASA’s other investments in space transportation
technologies.
Comparing FY2003 and FY2004
Thus, care should be exercised in making comparisons between FY2003 and
FY2004. Because of the change in the budget structure and the shift to full cost
accounting in FY2004, CRS cannot create a meaningful table comparing the FY2003
request, FY2003 appropriations, and the FY2004 request, as would normally be
provided in this report. Instead, two tables are presented. Table 2 shows the original
FY2003 request (without full cost accounting), the FY2003 request with full cost
accounting, and the FY2004 request in full cost accounting, all provided by NASA.
These are followed by columns showing congressional action. Special attention
should be paid to the column headings, which explain what the figures
represent. Table 3 shows what Congress appropriated for NASA for FY2003 using
the FY2003 appropriations categories, with no full cost accounting.
3 (...continued)
funding for the Inspector General, however, which is a separate (third) account.
CRS-8
Table 2: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional
Action
(In millions of dollars)
Category
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
House-
Senate-
Request
Request
Request
passed VA-
reported
(Nov. 2002)
Expressed
Expressed in
HUD-IA
VA-HUD-
Not in full
in Full Cost
Full Cost
appro-
IA appro-
cost
Accounting
Accounting
priations
priations
accounting
Science, Aeronautics &
7,015
7,101
7,661
7,708**
7,731**
Exploration
Space Science
3,414
3,468
4,007
Earth Science
1,628
1,610
1,552
Biological & Physical
842
913
973
Research
Aeronautics
986
949
959
Education
144
160
170
Space Flight Capabilities
7,960
7,875
7,782
7,806
7,582
Space Flight
6,131
6,107
6,110
6,110
5,910
Space Station*
(1,492)*
(1,851)*
(1,707)*
(1,707)
(1,507)
Space Shuttle
(3,208)
(3,786)
(3,968)
(3,968)
(3,968)
Other
(1,431)
(471)
(434)
(434)
(434)
Crosscutting Technologies
1,829
1,768
1,673
1,697
1,673
Space Launch Initiative
(879)
(1,150)
(1,065)
(1,065)
(1,065)
Other
(950)
(617)
(607)
(631)
(607)
Inspector General
25
25
26
26
26
Total
15,000
15,000
15,469
15,540
15,339
Source: NASA FY2003 and FY2004 budget documents, H.R. 2861 ( H.Rept. 108-235), and S. 1584 (S.Rept.
108-143). Column totals may not add due to rounding. NASA submitted an amended FY2003 budget request
in November 2002, which NASA used in developing the numbers in the second and third columns of this table.
The figures in the third (shaded) column adjust the FY2003 numbers as though they had been prepared
in full cost accounting. They are for comparison purposes only and do not reflect actual funding increases
or decreases.
*Does not include funding for space station research, embedded in the Biological and Physical Research line.
For FY2004, that amount is $578 million, making the total FY2004 space station request $2,285 million.
**It is not possible in all cases to determine from the committee reports what changes were made to which SAE
subaccounts, so only the total funding for the SAE account is shown here.
CRS-9
Table 3. NASA’s FY2003 Request v. FY2003 Appropriations
(in $ millions)
FY2003
Funding Category
FY2003 Request
Appropriations
Human Space Flight
6,130.9
6,058.6
International Space Station
1,492.1*
1,462.4*
Space Shuttle
3,208.0
3,252.8†
Payload and ELV Support
87.5
84.4
Investments and Support
1,178.2
1,094.9†
Space Comm. & Data Systems
117.5
115.3
Safety, Mission Assur., Engineering
47.6
48.8
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology
8,844.5
9,254.9
Space Science
3,414.3
3,529.2
Biological. & Physical Research
842.3*
896.0*
Earth Science
1,628.4
1,697.4
Aero-Space Technology
2,815.8
2,933.6
Academic Programs
143.7
198.6
Inspector General
24.6
25.4
TOTAL
15,000.0
15,338.9
Sources: NASA FY2003 budget estimate and initial FY2003 operating plan. Columns may not add
due to rounding.
*Total funding for the space station is the sum of the funding under Human Space Flight plus a portion
of the funding in Biological and Physical Research. The total FY2003 request for the space station
was $1.839 billion; Congress approved that amount and added $8 million for ISS plant and animal
habitats. With the rescission and adjustments NASA made in its FY2003 initial operating plan, the
amount available for the space station in FY2003 is $1.810 billion.
† Space shuttle is exempt from the rescission (both the amount in the” space shuttle” line, and
personnel and other related costs in the “investments and support” line). Congress added $50 million
for the investigation and remedial actions stemming from the space shuttle Columbia accident.
NASA’s Six Enterprises and 18 “Themes”
In the FY2004 budget estimate, NASA divides its activities into six
“enterprises.” Five of them—the Aerospace Technology Enterprise, the Biological
and Physical Research Enterprise, the Earth Science Enterprise, the Space Flight
Enterprise (formerly the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise),
and the Space Science Enterprise—correspond to NASA’s five major program
offices: the Office of Aerospace Technology (OAT), the Office of Biological and
Physical Research (OBPR), the Office of Earth Science (OES), the Office of Space
Flight (OSF), and the Office of Space Science (OSS). The sixth enterprise,
Education, cuts across the other five enterprises.
In the FY2004 budget request, NASA also introduced 18 “themes” it has
decided to use to organize the agency’s activities. According to NASA, theme
managers will have responsibility and accountability for the programs within those
themes. In some parts of NASA, it is difficult to ascertain the difference between a
“theme” manager and a division director or other official within an enterprise. These
distinctions may become clearer with experience. The 18 themes are:
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Table 4: NASA’s 18 Themes
Space Science
1. Solar System Exploration
2. Mars Exploration
3. Astronomical Search for Origins
4. Structure & Evolution of the Universe
5. Sun-Earth Connections
Earth Science
6. Earth System Science
7. Earth Science Applications
Biological & Physical Research
8. Biological Sciences Research
9. Physical Sciences Research
10. Research Partnership and Flight Support
Aerospace Technology
11. Aeronautics Technology
12. Space Launch Initiative
13. Mission and Science Measurement
Technology
14. Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships
Education
15. Education
Space Flight
16. Space Station
17. Space Shuttle
18. Space Flight Support
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
New Initiatives in FY2004
NASA lists nine new initiatives in its FY2004 request. Traditionally, the term
“new initiative” was used to indicate initiation of a new program or project. In the
FY2004 request, however, NASA also uses it to represent new emphasis on an
existing program or project. Thus, not all of the nine initiatives are new programs
or projects. They are described under the appropriate enterprise later in this report.
The nine initiatives are:
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Table 5: NASA’s Nine New Initiatives in FY2004
Initiative
FY2004
Projected
Request ($
Funding
millions)
FY2004-2008
($ millions)
To Understand and Protect Our Home Planet
Climate Change Research Acceleration
26
72
Aviation Security
21
196
National Airspace System Transition Augmentation
27
100
Quiet Aircraft Technology Acceleration
15
100
To Explore the Universe and Search for Life
Project Prometheus*
*279
*3,000
Optical Communications
31
233
Beyond Einstein Initiative
59
765
Human Research Initiative
39
347
To Inspire the Next Generation of Explorers
Education Initiative
26
130
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate, p. AS-10, AS-11, and SAE 2-21.
*Project Prometheus combines the Nuclear Systems Initiative begun in FY2003 to develop space
nuclear power and propulsion systems, with new plans to build a spacecraft, the Jupiter Icy Moons
Orbiter (JIMO), to use those systems. However, the NASA chart (p. AS-10) on which this table is
based shows a request of $93 million for Project Prometheus in FY2004, and a 5-year runout of $2.07
billion, which are the costs only for JIMO, not for the nuclear power and propulsion systems. On
p. SAE 2-21 of its budget estimate, NASA shows the total FY2004 request for Project Prometheus as
$279.2 million. On p. AS-11, NASA identifies the 5-year runout for Project Prometheus as $3 billion.
Hence, those are the figures used in this table.
Overview of Congressional Action on NASA’s
FY2004 Budget Request
This section provides an overview of actions taken by Congress on NASA’s
FY2004 budget request. More detail is provided in subsequent sections. Table 2
(above) shows the changes compared with the request.
House Action
As passed by the House on July 25, the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
bill (H.R. 2861, H.Rept. 108-235) includes a $71 million net increase above the
$15.469 billion request. The net increase comprises $96 million in cuts and $167
million in additions.
The House took no action on NASA’s space shuttle, International Space Station,
Orbital Space Plane, or Next Generation Launch Technology programs pending
release of the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The major
programmatic changes are the addition of $24 million to continue commercial
program initiatives proposed for termination (see Innovative Technology Transfer
Partnerships below), several additions for aeronautics (see Aeronautics
Technology), and cuts to four space and earth science programs—the New Frontiers
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program, which involves sending a probe to Pluto, was cut $55 million; the James
Webb Space Telescope was cut $20 million; the Space Interferometry Mission was
cut $8.15 million, and Earth Science Applications was cut $13 million. The first
three are discussed under Space Science; the last is discussed under Earth Science.
Senate Action
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2004 VA-
HUD-IA appropriations bill on September 5 (S.Rept. 108-143). The committee
recommended a net cut of $130 million from NASA’s request, comprising a
reduction of $200 million for the space station program, and $70 million in net
increases for congressionally directed spending in the Science, Aeronautics, and
Exploration (SAE) account. (The committee’s report specifies that the SAE account
is to be funded at $7.730 billion, an increase of $69.6 million over the request. The
detailed list of changes within the various subaccounts total $174 million in
increases, and $46 million in cuts, yielding a net increase of $128 million rather than
the $69.6 million, however. The report does not specify where the additional cuts
should be made to reduce the overall level of the SAE account to its recommended
level.) The specified cuts are $20 million from the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter, part
of Project Prometheus (see Space Science), and $15 million from Earth Science
Applications and $11 million from the Global Change Climate Research Initiative
(see Earth Science). Among the major additions are $50 million for aeronautics
research (see Aeronautics), and $11 million for EOS Follow-on mission planning
and $25 million for EOSDIS (see Earth Science).
Agency-Wide Issues
Space Shuttle Columbia Accident
On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart as it returned to
Earth following a 16-day scientific mission in Earth orbit. All seven astronauts—six
Americans and one Israeli—were killed. The shuttle fleet is grounded. The
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), headed by retired Admiral Harold
Gehman, released the results of its investigation on August 26, 2003, attributing the
accident to technical and organizational failures. CRS Report RS21408 provides
more information about the Columbia tragedy; CRS Report RS21606 provides a
synopsis of the Board’s findings and recommendations. The full CAIB report is
available at [http://www.caib.us]. NASA officials use March/April 2004 as a
“preliminary planning window” for returning the shuttle to flight. They stress,
however, that they cannot fix a date for return to flight until they have a better
understanding of what must be done, and how to do it, in response the Board’s 29
recommendations, of which 15 must be accomplished before return to flight. For
more on the shuttle program, see “Space Shuttle” under Space Flight Capabilities
below.
What impact the Columbia tragedy will have on NASA, and the space program
as whole, is unclear. The resumption of shuttle launches is a critical component of
answering questions such as what strategy to follow in staffing the International
Space Station (ISS). In the two other cases of U.S. spaceflight-related fatalities (the
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1967 Apollo 204 fire, which killed three astronauts; and the 1986 space shuttle
Challenger tragedy, which killed seven astronauts), the programs were suspended for
21 months and 32 months, respectively.
In the wake of the Columbia accident, some are questioning whether human
space flight is worth its risks and costs. Following the Apollo 204 and Challenger
tragedies, the country ultimately rallied behind NASA, and human space flight
resumed after technical and managerial issues were resolved. Many expect the public
will respond similarly this time. Assuming that it does, and NASA continues its
human space flight program, some near-term decisions are needed.
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Should Crews Remain Aboard the Space Station While the Shuttle
Is Grounded? Chief among the issues is whether to keep crews aboard the
International Space Station (ISS) while the shuttle is grounded. (See CRS Issue Brief
IB93017 for more on ISS). The space station is being built as a partnership among
the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and Europe. Construction began in 1998,
and “Expedition” crews, rotating on 4-6 month shifts, have continuously occupied
ISS since November 2000.
In late February, NASA and its partners agreed upon an approach to staffing the
space station in 2003 without the space shuttle. The usual three-person crew size was
reduced to two in order to reduce resupply requirements. The ISS program will rely
on Russian Soyuz spacecraft to rotate the crews, and another Russian spacecraft,
Progress, to resupply the space station with food, water, fuel, and other consumables.
The Russians have three decades of experience in operating space stations using only
Soyuz and Progress spacecraft. Russia provides Soyuz and Progress spacecraft for
the ISS program already, but additional Progress spacecraft will be required without
the shuttle, raising funding issues (discussed below).
The “Expedition 7" crew—one American and one Russian—is now aboard ISS.
They are scheduled to be replaced by the Expedition 8 crew in October 2003. They
may return to Earth at any time, however, using the Soyuz spacecraft that took them
to ISS. Soyuzes are used as “lifeboats” for the space station, and one is always
attached so the crew can evacuate in an emergency. Each Soyuz can only remain in
orbit for 6 months, so they are routinely replaced at 6-month intervals.
The ISS can be operated using Soyuz and Progress indefinitely, if sufficient
funds are available to build them. However, if the shuttle is grounded for an
extended period of time, questions may arise as to whether there is sufficient reason
for a crew to be there. The shuttle is needed to bring additional segments of the
space station into orbit to continue construction, and also to bring the scientific
experiments that form the research program. Thus, there may be little for the crew
to accomplish other than maintaining and operating the station. Whether that is
sufficient reason to keep crews in orbit, with the attendant risks of space travel, may
be questioned. One concern, though, is what would happen if the space station
suffered a malfunction that could only be repaired by an on-orbit crew. If no one was
aboard, the facility, which already has cost U.S. taxpayers $30 billion, could be
imperiled.
Who Will Pay For Additional Cargo Flights to the Space Station?
The space shuttle has a much greater cargo capacity than the Russian Progress
spacecraft, so even just to resupply a two-person crew, the number of annual Progress
flights must be increased from the current rate of three or four per year. Russian
space agency officials have indicated for quite some time, however, that they are
having difficulty funding the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft to which they are already
committed. They want the other partners in the program to provide $100 million for
accelerating the production of two Progress spacecraft needed in the near term.
Under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA, P.L. 106-178), however, NASA is not
allowed to transfer money to Russia in connection with the space station program
unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain technologies to
Iran (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017). Representative Lampson has introduced H.R.
CRS-15
1001 to amend the INA to allow payments to Russia for the space station any time
the U.S. space shuttle is grounded. NASA Administrator O’Keefe told the House
Science Committee on February 27, 2003 that no changes to the INA are needed at
this time, and he had not asked the White House for a waiver from the INA
requirements.4 At the moment, the Russian government has agreed to accelerate
payments to the Russian Space Agency that ordinarily would not have been provided
until later in the year. Russian space officials remain publicly concerned about the
availability of funds in the future. The House Science Committee’s Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics held a heading on U.S.-Russian space cooperation on June
11, 2003 where these issues were explored.
Should the Orbital Space Plane Program be Accelerated? Another
near-term decision is whether to accelerate development of NASA’s Orbital Space
Plane (OSP), a program announced in November 2002, or build another spacecraft
that would be simpler and less expensive, but potentially less versatile.
The OSP is a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV). It is the successor to NASA’s
plans to build a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). A Crew Transfer Vehicle can take
crews to and from the space station; a Crew Return Vehicle can only bring them back
to Earth. The purpose of a Crew Return Vehicle is to act as a lifeboat in the event of
a life-threatening emergency on the space station. Under the international
agreements that govern the space station program, the United States is obligated to
provide a Crew Return Vehicle to accommodate four people. Once available, it
would allow the space station crew size to grow (space station crew size is a
controversial issue that is discussed later in this report under “Space Station,” and in
CRS Issue Brief IB93017). A Crew Transfer Vehicle could fulfill that mission, as
well as complement the space shuttle’s ability to take crews to the space station. The
evolution of the CRV into a CTV is discussed in more detail later in this report (see
Crosscutting Technologies), but essentially NASA is now embarked upon a course
to build a CTV instead of a CRV. A CTV is expected to be more expensive and take
longer to develop than a CRV. From the standpoint of recovering from the Columbia
accident, one question is whether OSP should be accelerated now that there are only
three space shuttle orbiters. NASA notified its OSP contractors in July 2003 that it
wants to accelerate the program by two years. Space News reported on September
1, 2003 that accelerating the OSP program by two years could significantly increase
its cost. According to that publication, the cost through FY2009 could be $14 billion,
compared with the $3.7 billion NASA included in its 5-year (FY2004-2008) budget
estimate.
What Are the Impacts on the FY2004 Budget? How much it will cost
to return the shuttle to flight status is not yet known. What is known is that the
grounding of the shuttle will impact the schedule for construction of the station, and
almost certainly will increase its costs. It could alter the funding profile for the
Orbital Space Plane. It also is likely to affect funding for the Office of Biological and
Physical Research (OBPR), which uses the space shuttle and space station to conduct
some of its research activities. OBPR was the sponsor of many of the experiments
4 Mr. O’Keefe was responding to a question from Representative Lampson. Transcript of
hearing provided by Federal Document Clearing House.
CRS-16
on Columbia’s ill-fated STS-107 mission. Although some of the scientific data from
that mission was transmitted to ground-based scientists while the shuttle was in orbit,
much was lost with Columbia. Decisions will be needed on whether any of that
research needs to be redone and at what cost. Thus, the impact on the FY2004
NASA budget and future budgets could be significant.
Is Human Space Flight Worth the Risks and Costs? While it seems
unlikely, it is nevertheless possible that the public and policy makers could choose
to discontinue or sharply limit human space flight in response to the Columbia
accident. The debate over the value of human space flight has been waged since the
earliest days of the space program.
Human exploration of space appeals to what many believe is an innate desire
to push the frontiers of human experience. Supporters of human space flight view
the space station as the next step in America’s—and humanity’s—inexorable desire
to explore new worlds. As a visible symbol of America’s technological prowess,
human spaceflight is often perceived as a centerpiece of an image of American
preeminence.
This somewhat romantic view is in stark contrast to those who view human
exploration of space as, at best, a waste of money, and at worst, an unnecessary
exposure of humans to the hazards of space travel. These observers argue that there
is much yet to explore here on Earth, and robotic spacecraft should be used to explore
the heavens for safety and cost-effectiveness reasons. They see the Apollo, space
shuttle, and space station programs as successive drains on resources that could be
better used for robotic space activities, or non-space related activities.
Since 1959, when the first American astronauts were selected, the majority of
the American public has supported NASA’s human space flight program, within
limits. (There has not been sufficient support to mount a human mission to Mars, for
example, a goal of some space enthusiasts.) The Columbia tragedy is the latest test
to determine if the public remains committed to the goal of human exploration of
space or if it would prefer a shift in emphasis to robotic missions that do not risk
human life.
One factor in such a decision would be the fate of the International Space
Station if the United States terminates its human exploration program. The United
States is the leader of the multinational space station program and, since 1984
(FY1985), over $30 billion U.S. tax dollars have been spent on it (not including the
costs of the associated shuttle flights). Presumably, if the United States chose not
to use the facility, the other partners would continue to do so using the Russian Soyuz
and Progress spacecraft. Public reaction to the concept of turning the space station
over to others, when so much money has been spent already, might be a significant
influence on the decision whether to continue launching humans into space.
Press reports and discussion at a September 10, 2003 hearing before the House
Science Committee indicate that the Bush Administration may articulate a new vision
for the space program in coming months. NASA Administrator O’Keefe confirmed
that an interagency process is underway to assess the space program, although details
CRS-17
were not provided. Separately, Representative Lampson introduced H.R. 3057 on
September 10, the Space Exploration Act, to set goals for the space program.
Vision, Mission, and Performance Based Budgeting
NASA’s FY2004 budget reflects the agency’s moves to implement the
President’s Management Agenda,5 to sculpt the agency to match Administrator
O’Keefe’s vision, and to move to “performance based budgeting.” The budget
documents include not only the budget estimate, called the “FY2004 Integrated
Planning and Budget Document,” but NASA’s new Strategic Plan and a FY2002
Performance and Accountability Report. Administrator O’Keefe emphasizes that
releasing the Strategic Plan and budget together —
represents our new commitment to the integration of budget and
performance reporting. In this way, we will ensure that strategic priorities
are aligned with and influence budget priorities. Our new Integrated
Budget and Performance Document...expands on the goals and objectives
presented here and identifies the specific long-term and annual
performance measures for which we will be held accountable.6
By using these tools and its new approach, NASA asserts that it has developed
a FY2004 budget estimate that is “responsible, credible, and compelling.” In its
report on the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.Rept. 108-235), the House
Appropriations Committee applauded NASA’s new full cost initiative, noting that
it is consistent with the CFOs Act of 1990, the Government Performance and Results
Act, and the National Performance Review.
Mr. O’Keefe developed his vision for the agency soon after his arrival as
Administrator in December 2001. In an April 12, 2002 speech at Syracuse
University,7 he expounded on that vision and NASA’s mission. NASA’s vision and
mission statements appear at the beginning of virtually every NASA headquarters
document and briefing presentation to underscore the agency’s commitment to them.
Vision:
To improve life here,
To extend life to there,
To find life beyond.
Mission:
To understand and protect our home planet,
To explore the universe and search for life,
To inspire the next generation of explorers,
...as only NASA can.
5 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/pma_index.html]
6 NASA 2003 Strategic Plan, p. iii
7 [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codez/plans.html]
CRS-18
According to Mr. O’Keefe, the phrase “as only NASA can” means that NASA “will
pursue activities unique to our Mission—if NASA does not do them, they will not
get done—if others are doing them, we should question why NASA is involved.”8
As NASA formulated its vision and mission and related performance measures,
it decided to reorganize its budget structure to emphasize that NASA’s mission is
science, aeronautics, and exploration, and that mission is supported by capabilities
such as a space station, space shuttle, and investing in new technologies. This
restructuring led to the new appropriations accounts shown in the FY2004 budget.
Mr. O’Keefe commented in February 2003 testimony to the House Science
Committee that the new structure “recognize[s] the reality that there is no arbitrary
separation between human and science activities...”9
At the same time, NASA moved to “full cost accounting” in FY2004, as
discussed previously. While the goal of full cost accounting may be laudable, one
issue is that funding shown in the FY2004 budget estimate for at least one
program—the space station—still does not reflect its total cost. Looking at the
FY2004 budget, one could easily conclude that the request for the space station
program is $1.707 billion, as shown in the line titled “Space Station” under “Space
Flight” in the Space Flight Capabilities account. However, that figure does not
include space station research funding, which is held in the Office of Biological and
Physical Research. That amount is $578 million in FY2004. Furthermore, some
would add the costs for the Orbital Space Plane, which NASA plans to build to take
crews to and from the space station. That funding, $550 million in FY2004, is under
Crosscutting Technologies. Traditionally NASA has included the costs for space
station research, and for a “crew return vehicle,” the predecessor of the Orbital Space
Plane, in the space station budget. To compare the space station request for FY2004
with previous years, those three figures—$1.707 billion, $578 million, and $550
million—should be added together, yielding a total of $2.835 billion. Yet the budget
information from NASA does not make that clear, despite its efforts to illustrate full
cost accounting. Some might also add most of the funding for the space shuttle
program because the primary job for the space shuttle is taking crews and cargo to
the space station. NASA traditionally has not included the cost of the shuttle flights
in the space station cost estimates. However, in a full cost accounting environment,
it is difficult to argue that shuttle costs should not be included.
Another issue is the complexity of tracing a program’s budget over time to
determine if it is staying within planned funding parameters. Since personnel and
facilities have not been included in program costs until now, determining whether a
program is “over budget” is difficult to determine. Again using the space station as
an example, Congress imposed a cap of $25 billion on development of the space
station, and $17.4 billion on the costs of shuttle flights to assemble it. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in 2002 that it could not determine whether
NASA was complying with the cap because NASA could not provide the requisite
data (GAO-02-504R). Now, with full cost accounting, it will be even more difficult
8 Testimony to the House Science Committee, February 27, 2003, p. 5. Available at
[http://www.house.gov/science].
9 Ibid., p. 6-7.
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to determine if the cap is being enforced because the program’s cost will grow with
the addition of the personnel and facilities costs. This is true for other NASA
programs as well.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), an independent group that
oversees safety in NASA’s programs, pointed out another potential drawback to full
cost accounting in its Annual Report for 2002 (released in March 2003). The ASAP
report points out that some agency overhead functions (such as safety), efforts that
span several NASA programs (such as orbital debris), and infrastructure that is not
dedicated to a specific program, could be inadequately funded in a full cost
environment because their costs no longer can be amortized across many activities.
Because the costs will be charged to specific programs at direct labor rates, they may
become too expensive for program budgets. ASAP found that the shift to full cost
accounting “could negatively impact the ability to sustain safe and reliable
operation.”10 The panel recommended that the impacts be identified, and that NASA
adequately fund programs, personnel, infrastructure and contractor services that are
essential to safety.
Human Capital
Human capital is the first of the five government-wide initiatives identified in
the President’s Management Agenda.11 Like many other federal agencies, NASA
has an aging workforce. At a February 27, 2003 hearing before the House Science
Committee, Mr. O’Keefe noted that “today, we have three times as many personnel
over 60 years of age as under 30 years of age.” He also commented that within the
next five years, 25% of the agency’s workforce is eligible to retire. “The potential
loss of this intellectual capital is particularly significant for this cutting-edge Agency
that has skills imbalances.”12
NASA proposed legislation in 2002 that Mr. O’Keefe explained would give the
agency new authorities to recruit and retain a highly skilled workforce. A summary
of the proposals was contained in Mr. O’Keefe’s testimony to the House Science
Committee’s Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics on July 18, 2002.13 In
addition to Mr. O’Keefe, the Comptroller General of the United States, and the
General Counsel of the American Federation of Government Employees testified
about the pros and cons of such legislation. That legislation was never introduced,
but, according to Mr. O’Keefe, some of the changes were enacted as part of the
Homeland Security Act.14
10 [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/asap/index.htm] p. 24-25.
11 Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/pma_index.html].
12 Prepared statement. P. 9. Available at [http://www.house.gov/science].
13 Available at [http://www.house.gov/science.]
14 See CRS Report RL31500, Homeland Security: Human Resources Management, by
Barbara L. Schwemle for general information on civil service changes made by that Act.
CRS-20
In its January 2003 report on Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks for NASA, GAO identified strengthening strategic human capital management
as one of major four challenges facing NASA.15 Three bills are pending that
address NASA’s human capital situation. H.R. 1085 (Boehlert) would provide
incentives for hiring and retaining personnel at NASA. It was reported, amended, on
August 4, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-244, Part I). It also had been referred to the House
Government Reform Committee, from which it was discharged on August 4. H.R.
1836 (Davis) covers workforce issues at NASA, the Department of Defense, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. It was reported, amended, from the House
Government Reform Committee on May 19 (H.Rept. 108-116, Part 1). The bill also
was referred to, and later discharged from, the Armed Services, Science, and Ways
and Means committees. In the Senate, S. 610 (Voinovich) addresses NASA
workforce issues. It was reported, amended, from the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee (S.Rept. 108-113). CRS Report RL31991 discusses these bills in more
detail.
Detailed FY2004 Budget Issues
This section follows the new format of the NASA budget as shown in the
agency’s FY2004 budget estimate. Thus, the categories are different from those in
previous CRS reports on the NASA budget.
Science, Aeronautics & Exploration
The Science, Aeronautics & Exploration (SAE) account funds the bulk of
NASA’s research and development (R&D) activities. Included are the Offices of
Space Science, Earth Science, Biological and Physical Research, and Education, as
well as aeronautics programs, which are part of the Office of Aerospace Technology.
The Offices of Space Science and Earth Science focus on increasing human
understanding of space and Earth, and make use of satellites, space probes, and
robotic spacecraft to gather and transmit data. The Office of Biological and Physical
Research funds research conducted in microgravity environments to study
fundamental principles of chemistry, biology, and physics, and that support human
exploration of space. Aeronautics R&D contributes to increasing air traffic capacity,
reducing the impact of aircraft noise and emissions, improving aviation safety and
security, and meeting other needs such as national defense and commercial
competitiveness. The Office of Education funds programs aimed at educating
children in elementary and secondary school, as well as university students, in
science, mathematics, engineering, and technology.
For FY2004, NASA is requesting $7.661 billion for SAE. See Table 2 for a
break-out of how the request is allocated to the different offices within this account.
Because of the change in the structure of the FY2004 budget versus the FY2003
appropriations, a comparable number for FY2003 is difficult to determine. In
15 General Accounting Office. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. January 2003. GAO-03-114. Available at
[http://www.gao.gov].
CRS-21
previous years, aeronautics was included in figures for the Office of Aero-Space
Technology.16 Now it is separated from the rest of OAT and placed in the SAE
appropriations account rather than the SFC account where the rest of Aerospace
Technology activities reside. In the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-7), Congress included a number of congressionally directed spending items in
the Aero-Space Technology account, and it is not immediately clear which are related
to aeronautics versus other activities in that account. Unless NASA shows that
division, and adjusts the figures for full cost accounting, a comparison between
FY2003 and FY2004 for aeronautics is not possible. However, FY2003
appropriations levels are comparable with the FY2004 request at the aggregate level
for the Offices of Space Science, Earth Science, Biological and Physical Research,
and Education, and are shown herein.
Space Science. The Office of Space Science (OSS) is responsible for
NASA’s Space Science Enterprise. OSS has five themes: Solar System Exploration,
Mars Exploration, Astronomical Search for Origins, Structure and Evolution of the
Universe, and Sun-Earth Connections. Using primarily space-based telescopes and
other sensing probes, OSS programs study the nature of stellar objects to determine
their formation, evolution, and fate. Robotic probes are sent to other bodies in the
solar system, searching for information about their composition and whether
conditions for life exist. To accomplish these tasks, NASA supports a number of
activities: a series of large, focused missions such as the Space Infrared Telescope
Facility (SIRTF), Gravity Probe-B, and the Hubble Space Telescope (HST); the
Explorer program to provide low-cost access to space with small, single purpose
satellites; the Discovery program to support small solar system exploration missions;
the New Frontiers program for planetary exploration probes in the $650 million
category; and a Mars Exploration program.
OSS also funds an extensive research and technology effort. The research
component focuses on research and analysis, data analysis, and theoretical studies to
interpret and understand space-based observations and provide scientific justification
for future missions. This component also supports complementary ground-based and
laboratory research and instrumentation activities. Universities and NASA field
centers are the principal performers of supporting research. The technology effort is
designed to provide enabling technologies for the next generation of space science
missions, crosscutting technology development that can be used on a number of
NASA missions, and flight testing of new technologies that can be used on future
NASA science missions. The technology program includes a core component
directed at broad-based technology development; and a focused component
supporting technology development for the astronomical search for origins, the
advanced deep space missions, the Sun-Earth connection, and the structure and
evolution of the universe programs.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For FY2004,
NASA is requesting $4.007 billion for the Office of Space Science, compared with
a FY2003 appropriations level of $3.501 billion. The $4.007 billion request is
16 In the FY2004 budget, NASA identifies it as the Office of Aerospace Technology instead
of Aero-Space Technology, as it had previously,
CRS-22
allocated to each theme as follows: Solar System Exploration, $1.359 billion; Mars
Exploration, $570 million; Astronomical Search for Origins, $877 million; Structure
and Evolution of the Universe, $432 million; and Sun-Earth Connections, $770
million. The request includes three new initiatives (see Table 6).
Table 6: FY2004 Space Science New Initiatives
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Project Prometheus
$279
$3,000.0
Combination of Nuclear Systems Initiative,
begun in FY03, and new Jupiter Icy Moons
Orbiter (JIMO) project. See text for more
information.
Optical
$31
$233
To develop communications technologies to
Communications
allow more data to be sent back to Earth from
planetary spacecraft using much higher (laser)
frequencies, which have greater bandwidth.
NASA plans to demonstrate this technology
on a 2009 mission to Mars.
Beyond Einstein
$59
$765
Offers potential to answer three questions
unanswered by Albert Einstein’s
theories—what powered the Big Bang; what
happens to space, time, and matter at the edge
of a black hole; and what is the mysterious
dark energy expanding the universe.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate (see note to Table 5 regarding Project Prometheus).
Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House cut funding for three
programs in the Office of Space Science: $20 million from the James Webb Space
Telescope, $8.15 million from the Space Interferometry Mission, and $55 million
from New Frontiers (to send a probe to Pluto). The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended a $20 million cut for the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter
(JIMO), part of Project Prometheus.
Key Issues. Three of the projects being pursued by the Office of Space
Science are receiving close attention during the FY2004 budget cycle: Project
Prometheus; New Frontiers; and space telescopes, including the James Webb Space
Telescope (formerly the Next Generation Space Telescope).
Project Prometheus (Nuclear Systems Initiative and JIMO). NASA
is proposing in FY2004 an expansion of the Nuclear Systems Initiative (NSI), which
was approved in the FY2003 budget (although Congress cut $19 million of the
$125.5 million requested). Through NSI, NASA is developing new radioisotope
thermoelectric generators (RTGs) that provide electrical power for spacecraft, and
nuclear propulsion to propel spacecraft from Earth orbit to other destinations. In the
FY2004 budget, NASA requests permission to build a spacecraft, the Jupiter Icy
Moons Orbiter (JIMO), that would make use of the new nuclear systems. JIMO’s
mission would be to search for evidence of oceans on three moons of Jupiter: Europa,
CRS-23
Ganymede, and Callisto. The spacecraft would successively orbit each of the moons
for extended data-gathering.
NASA combined NSI and JIMO into Project Prometheus. The cost estimate for
Project Prometheus over the next 5 years (FY2004-2008) is $3 billion ($1 billion for
NSI, plus $2 billion for JIMO). JIMO would be launched in 2012-2013. The head
of NASA’s space science program, Dr. Edward Weiler, is quoted in Science
magazine (March 28, 2003, p. 1970) as saying the estimate through 2012 is $8-9
billion, but cautions that the cost estimate is very preliminary because the program
is so early in its formulation. JIMO is a new request in the FY2004 budget, but
Congress included $20 million for it in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(P.L. 108-7) on which action was not completed until after NASA’s FY2004 budget
request was submitted to Congress, and hence the FY2004 request for JIMO was
announced.
The project may raise several questions. First is whether the agency can afford
such an expensive program at this time. Second is whether the mission is consistent
with NASA Administrator O’Keefe’s insistence that NASA be a “science-driven”
agency. In this case, some may argue that this is a “technology-driven” program,
since the intent is to develop nuclear technology, and it appears to some that a
science mission was conceived to justify development of the technology, rather than
the reverse. There is strong scientific interest in detailed studies of Europa, and
Congress approved a Europa mission in the FY2002 budget, capping its cost at $1
billion. In the FY2003 budget request, NASA terminated that mission because it was
too expensive. Initiating an even more expensive mission, which was selected
without competition (as OSS does with many of its other planetary exploration
programs), may spark debate about the choice of mission. At NASA’s request, the
Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council developed a “decadal”
planetary exploration plan in 2002, which recommended investigations of Jupiter and
its moons, but not JIMO specifically.17 In a June 5, 2003 letter to Dr. Weiler, the
SSB said that it did not have sufficient information about the science capabilities of
JIMO to determine whether it would meet the Jupiter-system objectives it had
presented. Third is public reaction to the use of nuclear power in space. NASA’s
launches of nuclear-powered spacecraft since the late 1980s have generated protests
by some public interest groups concerned about the environment or other issues.
Attempts by those groups to prevent the launches have failed, however.
The House approved full funding for Project Prometheus in the FY2004 VA-
HUD-IA appropriations bill after defeating (309-114) a Markey amendment that
would have shifted $114 million from Project Prometheus into the Superfund cleanup
program at the Environmental Protection Agency. The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended a $20 million cut from JIMO because it received the
unrequested $20 million in FY2003.
17 National Academies. National Research Council. Space Studies Board. New Frontiers
in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy. Washington, National Academies
Press, 2002.
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New Frontiers (Pluto Probe). For FY2004, NASA is requesting $130
million for “New Frontiers,” a new category of mid-sized planetary exploration
projects costing approximately $650 million each. NASA hopes to begin a new
project within this category every three years. The first in the series is a probe to
explore Pluto, the only planet not yet visited by a NASA spacecraft.
Proposals to send a probe to Pluto have been controversial. NASA selected one
Pluto mission, but after the projected cost doubled (from approximately $300 million
to about $600 million), notified Congress it wanted to cancel the program. Congress
disagreed, and directed NASA to proceed with a Pluto probe. NASA issued a new
call for proposals that would cost less than $500 million, and selected the Pluto-
Kuiper Belt (PKB) mission for continued study. NASA then determined that it could
not afford that project, either, and did not include any funds for a Pluto probe in its
FY2003 budget request. A National Research Council study on planetary exploration
priorities, prepared at NASA’s request and released in 2002, identified a mission to
Pluto and the Kuiper Belt (thought to be the home of some comets) as the top priority
for the mid-sized class of missions, however. Scientists are anxious to launch a
probe to Pluto soon because they want to reach that planet before 2020 when Pluto
will move further from the Sun and its atmosphere may collapse. To reach Pluto
before then using today’s propulsion technology, the probe must be launched in the
2006 time frame so that it can obtain a “gravity-assist” from Jupiter before Jupiter
moves out of position. In the FY2003 budget, Congress directed NASA to fund the
Pluto probe as the first in the New Frontiers series. NASA is proceeding with the
program, and included funding for it in the FY2004 budget request. In the FY2004
VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, however, the House cut New Frontiers by $55
million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended full funding.
Space Telescopes. The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST, formerly
known as the Next Generation Space Telescope) is currently expected to be launched
in 2011. Its requested full cost budget for FY2004 is $254.6 million. In the FY2004
VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House provided $20 million less than this
amount, and also reduced funding for the Space Interferometer Mission (a space
telescope system scheduled for launch in 2009) by $8.15 million. The Senate
Appropriations Committee recommended an additional $2.5 million for a space
telescope-related project at a university, but otherwise made no changes to the
requested amount.
In March 2003, it became apparent that JWST was in danger of overrunning its
$1.6 billion total budget by $300 million. More than half of that shortfall will be
made up by the European Space Agency’s commitment to launch the telescope,
which will save NASA about $165 million in launch costs. Other savings will result
from reducing the diameter of the main mirror from 6.5 meters to 6 meters, making
certain other design changes, and cutting contractor costs. The smaller mirror
diameter will somewhat reduce the telescope’s sensitivity but still falls within
NASA’s guidelines for the project. A shortfall of $60 to $70 million remains to be
CRS-25
resolved. Some experts have suggested that the design changes may increase
operating costs once JWST is launched.18
JWST is seen by some as a replacement for the Hubble Space Telescope, which
was launched in 1990. Others consider it simply as the next in NASA’s series of
orbiting observatories, but not necessarily a replacement for Hubble. Current plans
call for Hubble to be retired at about the same time as JWST is launched, and NASA
plans to fund JWST from the “funding wedge” created by the reduction in Hubble
funding requirements. NASA estimates that it costs approximately $100 million per
year for the periodic Hubble servicing missions by space shuttle crews. This linkage
between funding for Hubble and funding for JWST is raising concern. Some
supporters of Hubble, who apparently would like to see its mission extended, are
concerned about the cost and schedule of JWST. For example, the conference report
on the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 108-10) notes that current
plans call for Hubble servicing missions to end in 2004 to free up funding for JWST.
The conferees directed NASA to study the possibility of an additional Hubble
servicing mission in 2007.
A related concern is whether there will be a gap between the end of Hubble
operations and the beginning of JWST operations. For example, the conference
report on the FY2002 VA-HUD-IA Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 107-272) directed
NASA to outline a “transition plan to guarantee uninterrupted continuity” between
the two missions. Although NASA refers to JWST as a follow-on to Hubble that will
build upon Hubble’s discoveries, it does not consider JWST a Hubble “replacement”
in the sense that data gathering from Hubble must immediately be followed by
JWST. NASA points out that JWST will operate at infrared wavelengths, whereas
Hubble observes mainly visible light. Consequently, according to NASA, the
scientists who will use JWST are a different subset of the astronomy community
from those who now use Hubble. Others expect there to be a substantial overlap
between the two groups and note that extending Hubble’s discoveries to greater
distances and earlier stages in the history of the universe is only possible through the
type of infrared observations that JWST will make possible. This is because light
from objects further away, emitted at earlier times, is shifted in wavelength in the red
direction, eventually becoming infrared even if it was originally emitted at visible
wavelengths. On the continuity question, some argue that enough Hubble data will
have been collected but not yet analyzed to keep astronomers busy for several years,
even if no new data were collected during a gap between Hubble and JWST, but
others counter that large space-based telescopes now represent such a large share of
astronomy capability and funding that an extended gap would have systemic
consequences for the astronomy community as a whole.
A related question is what to do with the Hubble when it is retired. NASA does
not want the telescope to make an uncontrolled reentry into Earth’s atmosphere
where pieces might impact populated areas. NASA currently plans to retrieve
Hubble using the space shuttle and return it to Earth in 2010. The space shuttle
Columbia tragedy, and the resultant loss of one of the four space shuttle orbiters, may
require a reassessment of those plans. The conference report (H Rept. 108-10) on
18 Space News, June 3, 2003.
CRS-26
the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs NASA to study the means for
disposing of Hubble “following the deployment of the Webb Telescope in the 2010
timeframe.”
Earth Science. The Office of Earth Science (OES) is responsible for NASA’s
Earth Science Enterprise. It has two themes: Earth Systems Science, and Earth
Science Applications. OES supports programs that focus on the effects of natural
and human-induced changes on the global environment. It seeks to answer the
questions: How is the Earth changing, and what are the consequences for life on
Earth?
NASA’s OES program constitutes the largest (in terms of funding) federally-
supported activity studying the Earth and its environment. OES uses space-based,
airborne, and ground-based instruments to acquire long-term data on the Earth
system, and supports research and analysis programs that assist scientists in
converting these data into knowledge. It also operates a data and information
management system to capture, process, archive, and distribute data to the scientific
community and the public. Another objective is development of remote sensing
technologies that can be used to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of future
Earth-monitoring missions.
The centerpiece of the Earth Science program is the Earth Observing System
(EOS), a series of three spacecraft designed to monitor the Earth’s life-support
systems. Two EOS satellites, Terra and Aqua, are in orbit. NASA expects the third,
Aura, to be launched in January 2004. OES describes the EOS system as
concurrently observing the major interactions of the land, oceans, atmosphere, ice,
and life that comprise the Earth system. The EOS Data Information System
(EOSDIS) collects, stores, processes, and transmits to researchers data from EOS
spacecraft. NASA also launches smaller, more focused satellite missions called
Earth Explorers that investigate particular phenomena. One example is Cloudsat,
which is designed to improve cloud modeling, contribute to better predictions of
cloud formation and distribution, and to lead to a better understanding of the role of
clouds in Earth’s climate system. Within the Earth Science Applications program,
NASA works with other agencies in applying the results of its earth science research
to national priorities.
Over the past two years, NASA has reformulated its Earth Science program to
align with President Bush’s Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and NASA’s
new strategic vision and mission. Among the changes is a new focus on factors that
may affect climate change other than carbon dioxide (CO ), such as methane,
2
aerosols, black carbon, and tropospheric ozone. NASA plans to build an Advanced
Polarimeter Instrument to study the non-CO factors. NASA was planning an EOS
2
Follow-on series of satellites that would continue to collect data similar to that
provided by the original EOS series in order to create a 15-year data set for scientists
studying global change. They need long term observations using instruments
gathering comparable data. The EOS Follow-on satellites are no longer part of
OES’s plans, however. Instead, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is now OES’
focus for obtaining continuity of Earth system science measurements (discussed
below). OES also is working with industry on a Landsat Data Continuity Mission
(LDCM) to provide continuity of data from the Landsat series of satellites. NASA
CRS-27
hopes that the private sector, rather than the government, will build the satellite. The
government would purchase the data it needed. Landsat 7, built and launched by
NASA, is currently in orbit, although a component in its sensor malfunctioned on
May 31 and the data currently being returned is not usable. (For more on Landsat,
see CRS Issue Brief IB92011.)
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. NASA is
requesting $1.552 billion for Earth Science. The FY2003 appropriation was $1.708
billion. The $1.552 billion is allocated to the two themes as follows: Earth System
Science, $1.477 billion; Earth Science Applications, $75 million. The Earth Science
Enterprise has one new initiative in FY2004: the Climate Change Research
Acceleration (see Table 7).
Table 7: FY2004 Earth Science New Initiative
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Climate Change
$26
$72
To build the Advanced Polarimeter
Research Acceleration
Instrument that will accelerate
research into non-CO factors
2
affecting global climate change.
Source: NASA FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations, the House cut Earth Science
Applications by $13 million from its requested level of $75 million. The requested
level is an 8.5% decrease from its FY2003 appropriation (in full cost accounting).
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of $15 million from Earth
Science Applications.
Key Issue: NASA’s Reformulated Global Climate Change Research
Program. NASA’s program to acquire systematic data to study global climate
change began in the 1980s and has been reformulated many times in response to
concerns about cost, and changing political views about the need for such data. In
the FY2004 budget, it is reformulated once again to reflect President Bush’s
approach. Shortly after taking office, President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol
regarding reduction of CO emissions (see CRS Issue Brief IB89005), and directed
2
the Secretary of Commerce to develop a new Climate Change Research Initiative
(CCRI) as the focus of U.S. efforts to study global climate change.
NASA’s revised program reflects this new approach with the initiation of the
Advanced Polarimeter Instrument, and the termination of plans for follow-on
satellites in the EOS series. One issue that arises from the termination of the EOS
Follow-on missions is how NASA will fulfill its commitment to the scientific
community to provide a 15-year data set of global change observations based on
instruments providing comparable data. NASA’s response is that it will do so
through the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), a
joint program among the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Oceanic and
CRS-28
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, in the Department of Commerce), and NASA.
DOD and NOAA are developing new weather satellites that meet both their needs,
while NASA develops new technologies to achieve that objective.19
NASA is developing new sensors for the NPOESS satellites through the
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which NASA describes as a “bridge” between
EOS and NPOESS. NPP is in the formulation phase; it has not been approved for
development yet. The FY2004 NASA request for NPP is $96 million; the estimate
for FY2004-2008 is $289 million. Although maintaining long-term continuity of
environmental monitoring and assessment is one of the missions for NPOESS, some
scientists may worry that obtaining scientific data for the long term study of climate
change may not be a high priority for DOD and NOAA, both of whose primary
responsibility in this area is weather forecasting. Budget constraints already are
arising in the NPOESS program, and choices may need to be made between sensors
for weather forecasting versus scientific research.20 The concern is that the latter may
not be included and data continuity could be lost.
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of $11 million from
the CCRI program, but an addition of $11 million for mission evaluation studies for
EOS follow-on missions. It also recommended an additional $25 million for
EOSDIS.
Biological and Physical Research. The Office of Biological and Physical
Research (OBPR) is responsible for NASA’s Biological and Physical Research
Enterprise. It has responsibility for three themes: Biological Sciences Research,
Physical Sciences Research, and Research Partnerships and Flight Support. OBPR’s
goals include determining ways to make human habitation of space safe, and to use
space as a laboratory to test fundamental principles of chemistry, biology, and
physics. OBPR supports a number of programs that investigate the biomedical
effects of space flight and the effects of gravity on biological processes, develop
technologies to support humans living in space, and enhance space crew health and
safety. Research activities sponsored by OBPR are carried out on the space shuttle,
on the International Space Station, as well as on aircraft and suborbital vehicles, and
in ground-based laboratories.
OBPR’s budgeting and planning are likely to be significantly affected, at least
in the short term, by the space shuttle Columbia tragedy. Columbia’s 16-day
scientific research mission (STS-107) hosted experiments sponsored in large part by
OBPR. Other OBPR research is conducted on the International Space Station, whose
schedule and utilization is being affected by the accident as well. How OBPR will
19 DOD and NOAA currently operate separate polar orbiting weather satellite systems. See
[http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/] for more on NPOESS.
20 NPOESS will succeed NOAA’s existing Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite series.
The last satellite in that series, NOAA N Prime, is under construction by Lockheed Martin.
A September 2003 accident at the contractor’s facility has jeopardized the launch date for
that satellite, which fell to the floor as it was being moved. What impact this incident may
have on the NPOESS program is not clear.
CRS-29
cope with the aftermath of the Columbia accident is the major issue facing the office
in FY2004 (see below).
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For OBPR,
NASA is requesting $972.7 million. For FY2003, Congress appropriated $862.3
million. The $972.7 million request is allocated to the three themes as follows:
Biological Sciences Research, $359 million; Physics Sciences Research, $353
million; and Commercial Research and Support, $261 million. OBPR has one new
initiative in FY2004: the Human Research Initiative.
Table 8: FY2004 Biological and Physical Research New Initiative
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Human Research
$39
$347
To accelerate the acquisition of
Initiative
knowledge and technology needed
for decisions on human exploration
missions beyond Earth orbit.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
The House-passed version of the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, and
the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill, do not make any major
changes to the request for OBPR.
Key Issue: Impact of the Columbia Accident. As discussed earlier, the
major issue confronting OBPR is how to recoup from the space shuttle Columbia
accident. Most of the research aboard Columbia’s STS-107 mission was sponsored
by OBPR, and a great deal of OBPR’s research is intended to be conducted aboard
the International Space Station (ISS). With the space shuttle fleet grounded,
construction of the space station is suspended. Also, the usual three-person ISS crew
complement has been temporarily reduced to two. Allocating crew time for
conducting scientific research on ISS has been an ongoing issue because NASA
states that “2 ½” people are needed to maintain and operate the station. That means
that with a three-person crew, only half of one person’s time can be devoted to
research. With only two crew members aboard, it is not clear how much research can
be accomplished.
Assuming that the shuttle returns to flight at some time, and construction of the
space station continues, the schedule for scientific research presumably could pick
up from where it was prior to the Columbia accident. However, prior to the
Columbia accident, many questions were unanswered about how much research
could be conducted on ISS. The partners in the ISS program agreed at the beginning
that after construction of the space station was completed, the space station would be
staffed by seven people (rotating on 4-6 month shifts). Several crew members would
be able to devote their entire time to scientific research, often cited as one of the main
reasons for building a space station. In 2001, however, the Bush Administration
took several steps to deal with the revelation of $4.8 billion in cost growth on the
CRS-30
space station program. Among them, it directed NASA to truncate construction of
the space station at a phase it calls “core complete” where the space station crew size
would remain at three instead of growing to seven. It also cut $1 billion from
OBPR’s research budget for the space station, and reduced the annual shuttle flight
rate to ISS to four (from six) for budgetary reasons. This meant less “upmass” (mass
being taken up to the space station) available for scientists to send experiments to
ISS.
Just before the Columbia accident, NASA was taking steps that suggested a
relaxation of some of these decisions. For example, it announced that the shuttle
flight rate to the station would increase to five per year, added funds to OBPR’s
FY2004 budget request for space station research, and initiated a program to build
an Orbital Space Plane to take crews to and from the space station. The Orbital
Space Plane (discussed under “Crosscutting Technologies” below) could offer the
capability by 2010 to increase the space station’s crew size to seven as originally
planned. Officially, however, the Bush Administration remains committed only to
building the truncated version of the space station.
Thus, the Columbia accident has complicated an already complex situation for
OBPR. How OBPR adjusts to these complexities, and how much its FY2004 budget
will be affected, is unclear at this time. The FY2004 request for OBPR’s space
station-related activities is $578 million.
Aeronautics Technology. The Aeronautics Technology theme, within the
Office of Aerospace Technology, is responsible for the agency’s R&D on
aeronautics. Aeronautics R&D has a long history of government involvement,
starting in 1915 with the creation of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA). NASA was established in 1958 using NACA as its nucleus,
and NACA’s research centers were transferred to the new agency. Although NASA
is better known for its space programs, supporters note that aeronautics is “the first
A in NASA.” The aeronautics theme consists of programs in vehicle systems,
airspace systems, and aviation safety and security. In FY2003, NASA called this
theme “Revolutionize Aviation.” In FY2001 and FY2002, aeronautics R&D was
integrated with space transportation activities in combined Technology Base and
Focused aerospace programs.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For FY2004,
NASA requested $959.1 million for Aeronautics Technology. A comparable figure
(in full-cost accounting) is not available for FY2003 appropriations. The shift to full-
cost accounting is particularly significant for the Aeronautics Technology theme,
because it is a major user of facilities such as wind tunnels, which were previously
budgeted under a separate account.
The FY2004 budget request for Aeronautics Technology includes three
initiatives (see Table 9), one in each of the theme’s three programs: an increased
emphasis on aircraft noise reduction in the Vehicle Systems program, accelerated
work on the National Airspace System in the Airspace Systems program, and a new
effort on aviation security in the Aviation Safety and Security program (formerly
known as the Aviation Safety program).
CRS-31
The requested budget for Vehicle Systems is $573.5 million. The noise
reduction initiative would be part of this program. Other changes in FY2004 would
include the conclusion of work on ERAST (a remotely piloted aircraft for
demonstrating long-duration flight at high altitudes) and Hyper-X (a pilotless aircraft,
called X-43, for demonstrating flight at hypersonic velocities), although work on
Hyper-X would continue as part of the Next Generation Launch Technology
program (part of the Space Launch Initiative). The ERAST program’s Helios aircraft
was destroyed on June 26, 2003, when it crashed into the Pacific near Hawaii during
a shakedown flight. A mishap investigation board has been appointed. The first
Hyper-X test flight ended in failure in June 2001 and one of the three X-43A craft
w a s d e s t r o y e d . T h e X - 4 3 A m i s h a p i n v e s t i g a t i o n b o a r d
[http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2003/03-43.html] released its
findings in July 2003. A second Hyper-X test flight, using another X-43A, is planned
for Fall 2003.
The requested budget for Airspace Systems is $217.1 million. This sum includes
$27 million for the NASA Exploratory Technologies for the National Airspace
System (NExTNAS) initiative. NASA plans to expand the NExTNAS initiative
significantly in future years, to $176 million in FY2008.
The requested budget for Aviation Safety and Security is $168.5 million. This
total includes $21 million for the new Aviation Security initiative, whose largest
component will be in the area of aircraft and systems hardening. NASA plans to
expand its efforts in aviation security further in future years, to a peak of $58 million
in FY2007.
Table 9: FY2004 Aeronautics New Initiatives
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Aviation Security
21
196
Addresses critical aviation security needs
that NASA is uniquely qualified to provide,
and develops technology for commercial
aircraft and airspace protection.
National Airspace
27
100
Enables technology, in cooperation with
System Transition
FAA, to transition to a next-generation
Augmentation
National Airspace system to increase
capacity, efficiency, and security of the
system.
Quiet Aircraft
15
100
Accelerates development and transfer of
Technology
technologies that will reduce perceived
Acceleration
noise in half by 2007 compared to the 1997
state-of-the-art.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate. Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House provided funding
increases for Aeronautics Technology in several areas. These include $1 million for
aircraft engine research, $1 million for small aircraft transportation systems (SATS),
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$1.5 million for intelligent flight control systems, $500,000 for development of a
navigation aid (ARGUS), $2 million for research on an aircraft surveillance system
(ADS-B), and $5 million for ground-based turbulence detection (Project
SOCRATES). The House also directed NASA to report on efforts to establish an
interagency National Program Office for coordination of air traffic management
activities and to report by March 31, 2004, on how NASA’s National Airspace
System initiative is being integrated with the National Program Office. The House
report did not specify the total funding increase for Aeronautics Technology or
allocate the increases noted above to particular program areas within the theme.
The Senate Appropriations Committee report expressed concern about “the
steady decline in recent years” in NASA’s requested funding for aeronautics R&D.
It recommended increases of $15 million in each of three areas: future aircraft,
especially supersonic flight; future aviation systems, especially aviation security and
air traffic management; and technologies with direct application to military aircraft.
The Senate report also recommended an increase of $5 million to fund development
of a five-year aeronautics research budget, to be prepared by March 1, 2004. The
Senate report recommended several other increases for individual aerospace projects,
but did not specify which of these are specifically related to aeronautics.
Key Issue: Funding. The main issue for the Aeronautics Technology theme
is its overall funding level. Funding for aeronautics R&D has been reduced
significantly since its FY1998 peak of $920 million (not expressed in full-cost
accounting terms). The level of the FY2004 request and NASA’s plans for further
reductions in future years have proved contentious among congressional supporters
of the program. Supporters argue that more R&D in this area is needed to maintain
the health of the U.S. aviation industry and the international competitiveness of U.S.
aircraft manufacturers. NASA states that future funding levels may increase from
current plans as the result of collaborative efforts now being discussed among NASA,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and other agencies with interests in aviation.
The FY2004 policy debate over aeronautics R&D is likely to make frequent
reference to the November 2002 Report of the Commission on the Future of the
United States Aerospace Industry.21 The recommendations of this congressionally
established commission included specific goals for improved aviation system
capacity, safety, speed, noise, and emissions, as well as a significant increase in
federal support for basic aerospace research. Other key recent reports include the
January 2001 European Union document European Aeronautics: A Vision for 2020,22
whose recommendations for increased aeronautics R&D funding in Europe have
contributed to U.S. concerns about international competitiveness, and The NASA
2 1 T h e a e r o s p a c e c o mmi s s i o n r e p o r t i s avai l abl e onl i ne a t
[http://www.aerospacecommission.gov]. See also CRS Report RS21455, The Aerospace
Commission Report: A Synopsis, and Commission Recommendations for Congressional
Action, by Amanda Jacobs and Marcia S. Smith.
2 2 T he European Vision 2020 r eport is available online at
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/ growth/aeronautics2020/en/index.html].
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Aeronautics Blueprint,23 issued in February 2002, in which NASA presented its
technology vision for aviation. The National Academy of Sciences is conducting an
external review of the Aeronautics Technology theme, but the report of that review
is not expected until after the completion of FY2004 appropriations action.
Education. The Office of Education is responsible for the Education
Enterprise. It has one theme: Education Programs. In previous budgets, the activities
in the Office of Education appeared under the budget heading “Academic Programs.”
These activities have been reorganized, consolidating programs that had been in
NASA’s Office of Human Resources & Education, and the Office of Equal
Opportunity Programs. The other five NASA enterprises also fund and manage
educational activities as part of specific space flight projects they sponsor. The
educational activities of the other enterprises are coordinated by the Office of
Education. NASA’s education programs include a broad array of activities designed
to improve science education at all levels — kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12)
and higher education. They include programs that directly support student
involvement in NASA research, train educators and faculty, develop new educational
technologies, provide NASA resources and materials in support of educational
curriculum development, and involve higher education resources and personnel in
NASA research efforts. The National Space Grant and Fellowship Program, which
funds research, education, and public service projects through university-based Space
G r a n t c o n s o r t i a , i s a d m i n i s t e r e d t h r o u g h t h i s o f f i c e
[http://www.education.nasa.gov/spacegrant/index.html].
Programs devoted to minority education (the Minority University Research and
Education Program—MUREP) focus on expanding participation of historically
minority-dominant universities in NASA research efforts. These programs develop
opportunities for participation by researchers and students from those institutions in
NASA activities. The objective is to expand NASA’s research base through
continued investment in minority institutions’ research and academic infrastructure
to contribute to the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics pipeline.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. NASA is
requesting $169.8 million for the Office of Education. Congress appropriated $202.2
million in FY2003. The Education Enterprise has one new initiative in FY2004 (see
Table 10).
23 The NASA Aeronautics Blueprint is available online at [http://www.aerospace.nasa.gov/
aero_blueprint].
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Table 10: FY2004 Education New Initiative
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Education Initiative
26
130
Includes funds for the Educator Astronaut
program, the NASA Explorers Schools
Program, a Scholarship for Service program,
and Explorer Institutes.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House added $6.225 million
for the National Space Grant and Fellowship program, which would bring the
program to a level of $25.325 million for FY2004. The committee stated that this
would fund the current core program in 52 Space Grant Consortia, including 35 states
at $465,000 each, 17 states at $300,000 each, and $3.6 million for Workforce
Supplement Awards. Some of the other congressionally directed funding additions
in the bill may also come under this office, although it is not specified in the report
on the bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee did not make any major changes
to this account, but included a number of congressionally directed spending items.
Key Issue: “Educator Astronauts”. Mr. O’Keefe has made education one
of his priorities as NASA Administrator, elevating it to “enterprise” status within the
agency and consolidating many of NASA’s education activities into a single office.
Mr. O’Keefe also is expanding an effort initiated by his predecessor, Mr. Daniel
Goldin, to resume launching educators into space. NASA’s earlier program to launch
teachers into space ended after the 1986 space shuttle Challenger accident that
claimed the life of “teacher in space” Christa McAuliffe. She was part of a
“spaceflight participant” program begun by NASA to launch teachers, journalists,
and other private citizens into space. NASA was confident that the space shuttle,
while risky, was sufficiently safe for private citizens as long as they were adequately
trained and understood and accepted the risks. Mrs. McAuliffe was selected for
flight after a nationwide competition. Barbara Morgan was selected as her backup,
and both went through an approximately 4-month training program together. After
the accident, NASA was criticized for allowing a private citizen on the shuttle
because it was too risky. Mrs. Morgan returned to teaching third grade in Idaho, but
remained committed to the concept of launching educators into space and worked
closely with NASA’s education programs. In 1998, Mr. Goldin announced that Mrs.
Morgan would get her chance to fly on the shuttle, but as a career astronaut, after
receiving full training.24 Mrs. Morgan joined the astronaut corps later that year as
NASA’s first “educator astronaut.” Prior to the Columbia accident, she was
24 The announcement was made at the same time that NASA decided to send then-Senator
John Glenn into space aboard a space shuttle. Senator Glenn was one of the original
astronauts chosen in 1959, and, in 1962, was the first American to orbit Earth. He flew on
the shuttle in October 1998.
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scheduled on the crew of a shuttle mission in November 2003. With the shuttle fleet
now grounded, it is not clear when that flight will take place.
In 2002, Mr. O’Keefe announced that he would open opportunities for other
educators to become astronauts. In January 2003, NASA opened the nomination
process for the “Educator Astronaut Program” and more than 1,600 applications were
received. Educators were nominated by their students, families, or friends.
According to NASA, the purpose of the program is to generate renewed interest in
science and mathematics and cultivate a new generation of scientists and engineers
by nominating and recruiting educators for NASA’s astronaut corps. NASA expects
to select three to six educator astronauts through this process.
In the wake of the Columbia accident, some may question whether to proceed
with the Educator Astronaut Program. One difference from the previous Teacher in
Space program is that now the educators would be fully trained as NASA astronauts
rather than undergoing an abbreviated training regimen like Mrs. McAuliffe’s.
Nonetheless, some may question the concept of launching anyone on the shuttle
whose presence is not essential to completing a specific mission.
Space Flight Capabilities
Activities in this account blend those that previously were part of the Human
Space Flight account with most of the activities in the Office of Aerospace
Technology (everything except aeronautics, as discussed earlier). The latter
activities are located under the heading “Crosscutting Technologies.” NASA is
requesting $7.782 billion for Space Flight Capabilities in FY2004, of which $6.110
billion is for Space Flight, and $1.673 billion is for Crosscutting Technologies.
Space Flight. The Office of Space Flight supports the Space Flight Enterprise
(formerly the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise). Space
Flight has three themes: International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and Space and
Flight Support. The last theme merges the previous categories of Payload and
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Support, and Space Communications and Data
Systems, together with a few other NASA activities. The $6.110 billion request for
this category is allocated as follows: $1.707 billion for the space station; $3.968
billion for the space shuttle; and $434 million for Space Flight Support.
Space Station. The International Space Station (ISS) is designed to serve as
a scientific research facility for conducting a range of research activities in biology,
physics, and materials science, as well as for Earth and astronomical observations.
NASA expects that research performed in the near-zero gravity environment of the
space station will result in new discoveries in life sciences, biomedicine, and
materials sciences.
As noted earlier, ISS is being built as a partnership among the United States,
Russia, Japan, Canada, and ten European countries. An Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA) among the various governments, and Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its counterpart agencies, govern the
program. Construction of ISS began in 1998 and is now suspended pending the
space shuttle’s return to flight.
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FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 budget
request for the space station program can be viewed in different ways. The amount
requested under this budget category is $1.707 billion, but funding in other parts of
the budget are also part of the space station program, so the figure could be $2.285
billion or $2.835 billion. The House took no action on the space station program in
the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, pending release of the report on the
Columbia accident. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a $200
million cut to the ISS program.
The funding requested in this budget line is for construction and operation of the
space station. Customarily, NASA agrees that the costs for research aboard the
station, currently carried in the OBPR budget, also are part of the space station
request. (Over time, these costs variously have been placed in OBPR, or in the
International Space Station account. In FY2003, they were included in the OBPR
budget.) If those costs are added for FY2004, the request would be $2.285 billion.
As with the rest of the NASA budget, however, that request is expressed in full cost
terms and therefore is not directly comparable to the amount appropriated for
FY2003.
Two other costs arguably should be included in space station costs. First are the
costs for the Orbital Space Plane located under “Crosscutting Technologies” in the
Space Flight Capabilities account. The FY2004 request for OSP is $550 million,
which would yield a total FY2004 request for the space station of $2.835 billion.
The Orbital Space Plane is the follow-on to the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) once
planned by NASA to bring crews home from the space station in an emergency. The
CRV was included in the space station’s budget, and NASA “saved” $1 billion by
“indefinitely deferring” the CRV as one way of addressing the $4.8 billion cost
growth for ISS revealed in 2001 (see below). Despite NASA’s decision to account
for this program in a different part of NASA’s budget (and under a program called
Space Launch Initiative, even though the OSP is not a launch vehicle), it is difficult
to make the case that this program should not be included as part of space station
costs. Following NASA’s practice, CRS does not include the OSP request when
showing the FY2004 request for the space station, but notes that this cost probably
should be included.
Second are costs for the space shuttle flights that take crews and cargo to ISS.
Since 1993, when the current version of the space station program began, NASA has
not included shuttle costs in the space station cost estimate or annual budget. In the
era of full cost accounting, however, it is difficult to argue that they should be
excluded. Since all the shuttle flights scheduled for FY2004 are in support of the
space station, some may contend that the entire cost of the space shuttle program
should be attributed to the space station budget. Historically, CRS has followed
NASA’s practice of not including the shuttle costs with the space station budget, so
they will not be included here. But the shift to full cost accounting, designed to show
a program’s actual cost, implies that the shuttle costs should now be included. In
fact, since the space station itself primarily supports the mission of the Office of
Biological and Physical Research, some could suggest that all these costs should be
counted as part of OBPR. NASA has not yet taken that step, however.
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Key Issue: After the Shuttle Returns to Flight. Issues facing the space
station program while the space shuttle fleet is grounded are discussed above (see
“Agency-Wide” Issues). It is important to note, however, that the space station
program was the subject of considerable controversy prior to the Columbia accident
because of repeated cost overruns and cost growth, and is likely to be controversial
after the shuttle returns to flight as well.
The number of crew that can live aboard ISS is limited, in part, by the
availability of a “lifeboat” to bring them home in an emergency. The lifeboat
function is currently served by Russian Soyuz spacecraft (which must be replaced
every 6 months) that accommodate three people. Thus, ISS crew size has been
limited to a maximum of three (as noted, the size was reduced to two while the
shuttle is grounded so resupply requirements would not be as great). The
international agreements call for the United States to provide crew return for four
additional astronauts once assembly of the space station is completed. In 2001,
following the revelation of another $4.8 billion in cost growth (on top of a $7 billion
overrun) on the ISS program, the Bush Administration directed NASA to truncate
construction at a phase it calls “core complete.” As part of that decision, NASA’s
plan to build a crew return spacecraft was “indefinitely deferred,” meaning that space
station crew size would be limited to three crew members for the foreseeable future
instead of growing to seven. The reduction in crew size affects how much scientific
research can be conducted, and how many astronauts from the various countries
involved in the program have an opportunity to be part of ISS crews.
At the time of the Columbia accident, there were indications that the Bush
Administration was softening its position on the ISS program, announcing plans to
build an Orbital Space Plane that would allow the crew size to grow from three to
seven, as originally planned. However, the Administration remains publicly
committed only to building the truncated “core complete” version of the station.
How ISS will evolve in the wake of the Columbia accident is unclear at this
time. The partners are committed to keeping crews aboard ISS while the shuttle is
grounded. If the shuttle is grounded for an extended period, however, that decision
may need to be reassessed. The Russians operated seven space stations over three
decades without a space shuttle, so it is feasible to keep ISS operating without the
shuttle. But ISS was designed to take advantage of the crew- and cargo-carrying
capacity of the U.S. space shuttle. Most of the remaining ISS segments can only be
launched on the shuttle, and many of the scientific experiments also require the
shuttle for launch. If little science can be accomplished, some may question the
value of keeping a crew aboard, and the sagacity of asking astronauts and cosmonauts
to accept the risks inherent in human spaceflight simply to maintain ISS systems.
Conversely, some question how long ISS could continue to function with no one
aboard. Progress spacecraft can dock with ISS automatically to reboost it and keep
it at the proper altitude. However, a major system malfunction that could not be
remedied by sending commands from ground stations could imperil the station.
Assessing the likelihood of such a scenario is difficult.
Another issue is that although Russia is obligated under existing agreements to
provide two Soyuz and a certain number of Progress spacecraft each year, Russia has
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expressed concern for some time about its financial ability to provide those
spacecraft. Hence, questions may arise as to how to finance Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft if the Russian government is unable to fund them. Under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA), NASA is prohibited from paying Russia for such
spacecraft unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain
technologies to Iran. (See CRS Issue Brief IB93017 for more on the space station
program and the INA.)
Space Shuttle. On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart
as it returned to Earth from a 16-day scientific research mission. All seven astronauts
aboard were killed. An investigation is underway. The shuttle fleet is grounded.
The Columbia tragedy is discussed under Agency-Wide Issues (above) and in CRS
Report RS21408.
The space shuttle is a partially reusable launch vehicle capable of taking crews
and cargo into space. It is the only U.S. launch vehicle currently capable of placing
humans in space. The shuttle system consists of the airplane-like orbiter, two solid
rocket boosters (SRBs) on either side, and a large cylindrical “external tank” that
holds the fuel for the orbiter’s engine. The orbiters are reusable, and were built for
100 flights each. The SRBs provide additional thrust for the first 2 ½ minutes of
flight, then detach from the vehicle and fall into the ocean where they are recovered
and refurbished for reuse. The External Tank (ET) is not reusable. It contains liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen to fuel the orbiter’s engines. The fuel is depleted by the
time the orbiter reaches orbital altitude (approximately 8 minutes after launch), at
which time the ET is jettisoned. It breaks apart as it descends from orbit, and the
pieces fall into the Indian Ocean. Columbia was one of four remaining orbiters in
the shuttle fleet (Challenger was destroyed in the 1986 accident that took the lives
of seven astronauts). Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour remain.25
According to NASA, the primary goals of the space shuttle program are to fly
the shuttle safely, meet the flight schedule (the “manifest”), improve mission
supportability, and improve the system. NASA itself is the primary customer for the
shuttle, although industry, other government agencies, academia, and international
entities use shuttle services, usually on a reimbursable basis. In FY2001, NASA
planned an average of seven shuttle launches per year. For budgetary reasons, that
was cut to six per year in FY2002. For FY2003 and beyond, NASA planned to
reduce the annual flight rate to four for budgetary reasons, with the exception of
another servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope in late 2004. However, in
the FY2003 amended budget request (released in November 2002), NASA
announced plans to increase the flight rate to five per year beginning in FY2006.
Among the many issues NASA must assess in the wake of the Columbia tragedy is
how many annual shuttle flights can be accommodated with the remaining three
orbiters.
25 Another orbiter, Enterprise, was built for atmospheric tests in the 1970s. It was not
designed to be flown in space, and has been transferred by NASA to the Smithsonian
Institution.
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The United Space Alliance (USA), a joint venture between Lockheed Martin
and Boeing, conducts most of the ground operations associated with the shuttle
under contract to NASA. The space shuttle workforce consists of approximately
17,000 contractors and 1,800 civil servants.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For FY2004, NASA
is requesting $3.968 billion for the shuttle program. A comparable figure (in full cost
accounting) is not available for FY2003 appropriations. Congress did approve the
full amount requested for the shuttle in FY2003 ($3.2 billion, not in full cost
accounting), and added $50 million to cover the costs of the Columbia investigation
and resulting required remedial actions. Furthermore, it exempted the shuttle
program (both the funding in the shuttle budget line, and shuttle-related personnel
and facilities costs in the “Investments and Support” line, a combined total of $3.836
billion in full cost accounting). The House took no action on the space shuttle
program in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, pending release of the
report on the Columbia accident. The Senate Appropriations Committee
recommended full funding of the shuttle program
Key Issue: Return to Flight. The space shuttle Columbia tragedy already has
been discussed (see Agency-Wide Issues). Attention is focused on what is needed
to fix the shuttle system. After the 1986 Challenger accident, the shuttle fleet was
grounded for 32 months. However, NASA officials project that the shuttle may
return to flight in 2004, although they stress that a firm date cannot be set until they
fully understand what must be done to meet the 15 recommendations of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) that must be completed before
“Return to Flight.” CAIB’s chairman, Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, stated that he
does not believe it will take more than 6-9 months for NASA to comply with the
Board’s return to flight recommendations. Additional recommendations were made
if NASA expects to continue using the shuttle in the long term. For more on the
Columbia accident and issues for Congress, see CRS Report RS21408. For a
synopsis of the CAIB’s recommendations, see CRS Report RS21606.
As discussed earlier, the American public and policy makers first must decide
whether human space flight is worth its risks and costs. Based on past experience,
many expect that decision to be yes. The questions next are what can be done to
lower the risk, and how much Congress and the Administration are willing to spend
to do that.
NASA has been engaged in a series of “safety and supportability” upgrades to
the shuttle for several years. (“Supportability” refers to changes made to combat
obsolescence.) Debate over shuttle upgrades became intense during the FY2002
budget cycle after NASA decided to terminate what it earlier had described as its
highest priority safety upgrade, the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit, because of cost
increases and weight gain. Then, in the original FY2003 budget submission, NASA
reduced how much it planned to spend on both safety and supportability upgrades in
the FY2002-2006 time period by 34%—from $1.836 billion to $1.220 billion.
NASA Administrator O’Keefe insisted the proposed funding level would not
compromise safety. In September 2002, NASA canceled its highest priority
supportability upgrade, the Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) because
of cost overruns and schedule delays. Questions began to arise about NASA’s
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abilities to successfully upgrade the shuttle. In FY2004, NASA is requesting funding
to begin a “Shuttle Life Extension Program” (SLEP) to ensure the shuttle can safely
operate as long as it is needed. How much that program may change in light of the
Columbia accident is unclear. During consideration of the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA
appropriations bill, the House adopted a Hall amendment to use $15 million of the
$281 million requested for SLEP to develop concepts to increase crew survivability.
The shuttle program is facing many challenges in its 22nd year of service.
Columbia was the oldest of the shuttle orbiters—it was used for the very first shuttle
flight in 1981. The ill-fated Columbia mission was its 28th flight. Each orbiter is
designed to make 100 flights, but many now wonder if age was a contributing factor
to the accident. If so, this may raise questions about the health of the three remaining
orbiters. These questions come on the heels of NASA’s November 2002
announcement that it will continue to rely on the shuttle until at least 2015, and
perhaps 2020 or longer.
Some may ask why NASA does not procure new shuttle orbiters if aging is the
problem. The last orbiter, Endeavour, was built following the 1986 Challenger
accident. Endeavour made its first flight in 1992. It cost $1.8 billion (then-year
dollars), a cost that was lower than expected in part because “structural spares” (i.e.
major segments of the fuselage) were available since NASA earlier had considered
building an additional orbiter. There are no orbiter structural spares today, and the
company that built the orbiters (the space division of Rockwell International) was
bought by the Boeing Company in 1996. It is not expected that sufficient tooling
and skilled workers are available to build more orbiters without substantial cost and
time. However, lacking a replacement for the shuttle, and NASA’s intent to
continue operating the shuttle until 2015 or beyond, it is possible that a decision
could be made to rebuild that capability.
NASA, sometimes jointly with the Department of Defense (DOD), has been
trying to build a replacement for the shuttle, rather than acquiring more orbiters. Its
attempts to do so over the past 20 years have failed, however, in part because of
overly optimistic expectations about the availability of new technologies, and about
the market for such a new “2nd generation” reusable launch vehicle (RLV). NASA’s
November 2002 announcement that it would continue to rely on the shuttle was
based on the conclusion that an economic case cannot be made at this time for
building a 2nd generation RLV to replace the shuttle. Instead, NASA wants to build
an Orbital Space Plane to take crews to and from the space station, and invest in
technology for the next six years to enable a decision in 2009 on what new launch
vehicle to build (see Crosscutting Technologies below). In the aftermath of the
Columbia accident, some policy makers want NASA to reinvigorate its efforts to
build a replacement for the shuttle, and others want NASA to accelerate the OSP,
even though it would not have the crew or cargo capacity of the shuttle. (As currently
envisioned by NASA, the OSP would provide a capability for four crew members,
instead of the seven that can be accommodated on shuttle, and could only carry cargo
if the crew seats were removed from the vehicle. Also, OSP is not itself a launch
vehicle, as is the shuttle).
Yet another issue under discussion is the relationship between NASA and its
contractors on the shuttle program. As noted, there are approximately 17,000
CRS-41
contractors working on the shuttle program. United Space Alliance (USA) conducts
most of the operations for the shuttle under the Space Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC), a 6-year contract, with two 2-year options, that was signed in 1996. NASA
exercised the first of those 2-year options in 2002, extending the contract to
September 2004. Questions have been raised for many years by the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Committee (ASAP), Congress, and others about the safety implications of
transitioning so much of the shuttle work to a contractor because of budget
constraints, personnel reductions, and the loss of skills.26 In the aftermath of the loss
of Columbia, those concerns are being carefully revisited.
Space and Flight Support. This new budget category includes space
communications, space shuttle payload processing, expendable launch vehicles,
rocket propulsion systems testing, environmental activities (dismantling of the Plum
Brook nuclear facility and environmental compliance and restoration), and advanced
systems programs.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request
is $434.3 million. A comparable figure (in full cost accounting) for FY2003
appropriations is not available. The House made no major changes to this
subaccount in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill. Nor did the Senate
Appropriations Committee.
Crosscutting Technologies. This new budget category represents funding
for the activities of the Office of Aerospace Technology, except for aeronautics,
which is included in the Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account (discussed
earlier). Crosscutting Technologies has three themes: Space Launch Initiative,
Mission and Science Measurement Technology, and Innovative Technology Transfer
Partnerships. The total request for Crosscutting Technologies is $1.673 billion. That
is allocated as follows: Space Launch Initiative, $1.065 billion; Mission and Science
Measurement Technologies, $438 million; and Innovative Technology Transfer
Partnerships, $169 million.
Space Launch Initiative: OSP and NGLT. The Space Launch Initiative
(SLI) has undergone a metamorphosis since the FY2003 budget was originally
submitted. The changes were announced when NASA submitted an amended
FY2003 budget request to Congress in November 2002. The SLI program had been
focused on developing technologies to build a “2nd generation” reusable launch
vehicle (RLV) to replace the space shuttle (which is the 1st generation RLV), with a
decision expected in 2006 on what design to build. The new RLV was intended to
significantly reduce the cost of launching people and cargo into space. Now, SLI is
focused on (1) developing an Orbital Space Plane (OSP) to take crews to and from
the space station, and (2) a Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program
to develop expendable and reusable launch vehicle technologies to permit a decision
in 2009 on what new vehicle to build. The new vehicle would be for taking cargo
only, not crews, into space. Although it is included in the “Space Launch Initiative,”
the Orbital Space Plane is not a launch vehicle. It is a spacecraft to take crews to and
from the space station. It will be launched into space aboard an existing expendable
26 See CRS Report RS21419 for excerpts from reports and testimony about shuttle safety.
CRS-42
launch vehicle (such as an Atlas 5 or Delta 4), not a new reusable launch vehicle.
Hence, its inclusion in a budget category for developing space launch technologies,
instead of in the space station budget, may be controversial.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request
for the reformulated Space Launch Initiative is $1.065 billion, composed of $550
million for the Orbital Space Plane and $514.5 million for Next Generation Launch
Technology. Comparable figures (in full cost accounting) for FY2003 appropriations
are not available. The House took no action on the Orbital Space Plane or Next
Generation Launch Technology programs in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
bill, pending release of the report on the Columbia accident. The Senate
Appropriations Committee made a number of recommendations about these
programs, but did not change the funding. The OSP comments are discussed below.
Regarding NGLT, the committee expressed concern that NASA is not maintaining
control over its investment in NGLT, and directed NASA to report by January 31,
2004 on outyear costs for projects within the NGLT program, the criteria for
selecting technologies for investment, and the metrics used to determine whether or
not to continue particular projects (p. 122).
Key Issue: Orbital Space Plane—“Crew Return” versus “Crew
Transport”. As noted earlier, crew size aboard the International Space Station (ISS)
is limited in part by the number of people that could be returned to Earth in an
emergency, such as a catastrophic hull depressurization or a fire, via a “lifeboat.”
Today, one Russian Soyuz spacecraft, which can accommodate three people, is
always docked at ISS to provide this lifeboat function. Under international
agreements that govern the ISS program, Russia is required to provide that lifeboat
capability for three people throughout the duration of the space station program.
Those agreements also require NASA to provide a lifeboat, or “crew return vehicle,”
for four more crew members by the time assembly of the space station is completed.27
This would allow the size of the “Expedition” crews aboard ISS to grow to seven
people as stipulated in those agreements.
NASA indefinitely deferred its plans to build a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV),
however, in the wake of the $4.8 billion cost growth revealed in 2001. At the time,
NASA estimated the cost of the CRV as about $1.2 billion and expected it to be
ready in 2006. A CRV would be able only to return crews to Earth from the space
station (it would be taken into orbit, unoccupied, via the space shuttle). By contrast,
a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV) could take people both to and from the space station.
When Mr. O’Keefe became NASA Administrator, he decided that if a crew return
capability was to be built, a CTV would be preferable because of its additional
capabilities. In an amended FY2003 budget request, submitted to Congress in
November 2002, the Bush Administration proposed a program to design and build
a CTV, even though the Administration currently is committed only to building the
“core complete” version of the space station (discussed above), which does not
27 Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its counterpart agencies—the
European Space Agency, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos), the
Science and Technology Agency of Japan, and the Canadian Space Agency—specify the
crew return responsibilities of the United States and Russia.
CRS-43
include either a U.S. CRV or a CTV. Many viewed this as an indication that the
Bush Administration eventually would agree to building the space station as
originally planned, capable of supporting a crew of seven.
NASA calls the CTV an “Orbital Space Plane” (OSP). The agency proposed
$2.405 billion for the OSP program for FY2003-2007, some of which ($882 million)
would be shifted into OSP from funding that had been allocated for building a 2nd
generation RLV. For FY2003, the request was $296 million. Congress generally
approved this reformulation of the SLI program in the FY2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7), but neither approved nor rejected the specific
amount for OSP, giving NASA latitude to decide on the FY2003 funding level in its
operating plan. In its initial FY2003 operating plan, NASA shows $367.8 million
being allocated to OSP (not expressed in full cost accounting).
NASA’s plan is to conduct design studies for OSP through FY2004, after which
it will decide whether to proceed with development. NASA emphasizes that the
$2.405 billion figure for FY2003-2007 is preliminary, since it does not yet know
what design will be selected. NASA issued a set of “level 1" (basic) requirements
for the OSP in February 2003, and “level 2” (more detailed) requirements in
September 2003. As long as the design meets those requirements, the agency insists
that it does not have a preference for whether the OSP is reusable or expendable, has
wings, is a capsule, or any other specific feature. In fact, it does not have to be one
vehicle. It must support four crew members on the space station, but could be two
spacecraft, each for two people, for example. The point is that the agency wants to
give industry latitude on how to meet the requirements. The FY2004 request for OSP
is $550 million, with a 5-year (FY2004-2008) estimate of $3.7 billion.
NASA’s plan in early 2003 was for OSP to be available first in a CRV mode in
2010, and in 2012 as a CTV (plans to accelerate it are discussed below). That would
mean that Soyuz spacecraft would be needed until 2010 as lifeboats for ISS
Expedition crews. In the existing international agreements that govern the ISS
program, Russia is obligated to ensure that one Soyuz is docked to ISS through the
lifetime of the station (with each Soyuz spacecraft being replaced every 6 months).
A 1996 U.S.-Russia agreement stipulates that through completion of assembly of the
space station, Russia will provide crew return capability for three ISS Expedition
crew members who comprise crews that are composed of two Americans and one
Russian, or two Russians and one American. Eleven Soyuz spacecraft were specified
for this purpose. According to NASA, that commitment will be satisfied in the
spring of 2006. By 2006, the U.S. CRV was expected to be available, allowing crew
size to increase to seven. In the event the U.S. CRV were not yet available, the
agreement simply calls on the parties to “discuss appropriate action.” Thus, there
could be a several year gap when Americans might be limited to residency aboard
ISS only when the U.S. space shuttle is docked. (Russia is obligated to continue to
keep one Soyuz docked at the station at all times, but after 2006 would control who
could use it, with no guarantee that Americans would be included.) As noted in the
earlier discussion about the space station program, the Iran Nonproliferation Act
prevents NASA from paying Russia to use Soyuz unless Russia does not proliferate
certain technologies to Iran.
CRS-44
Even before the Columbia accident, some argued that NASA should focus on
building a simple vehicle that could be ready by 2006, rather than 2010, to ensure
that the space station can be fully utilized for scientific research. In the aftermath
of the Columbia accident, many argue that OSP should be accelerated because there
now are only three orbiters. NASA has indicated to its contractors that it would like
to have OSP available two years earlier (by 2008). Space News reported in its
September 1, 2003 issue that it could cost $14 billion through 2009 to build the OSP
on an accelerated schedule, compared with the $3.7 billion in NASA’s project budget
for FY2003-2008.
The Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 108-143) made a number of
comments and recommendations about OSP, including that it is skeptical that OSP
is the only approach for NASA to take astronauts to and from the space station (p.
121). The committee also expressed concern that the OSP program not experience
the same management problems and cost overruns of the space station program, and
directed the Administration to create an independent oversight committee to examine
the OSP’s design, technology readiness and cost estimate.
Mission and Science Measurement Technology. In the FY2003
budget, this was called “Pioneering Revolutionary Technology.” Its objectives are
to develop science-driven architectures and technology, create knowledge from
scientific data, and develop capability for assessing and managing mission risk. Its
three programs are: the Computing, Information, and Communications Technologies
Program, the Engineering for Complex Systems Program, and the Enabling Concepts
and Technologies Program.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request
is $438.4 million. A comparable figure (in full cost accounting) is not available for
FY2003 appropriations. The House made no major changes to this subaccount in
the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill. Nor did the Senate Appropriations
Committee.
Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships. In the FY2003 budget,
the proposed Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships effort was called
Commercial Technology Program. According to the FY2004 budget estimate, this
theme is responsible for technology transfer, and for awarding contracts under the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR) programs. Both SBIR and STTR were created by Congress and
apply to all government agencies that conduct a certain level of research and
development (R&D).28 They involve set-asides for small businesses of a percentage
of each agency’s extramural R&D funds. The FY2004 budget request for this
activity is a significant change from previous years. NASA proposes terminating
many of its technology transfer activities (discussed below).
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The Administration’s
FY2004 request is $169.3 million. A comparable figure (in full cost accounting) is
28 For more information on the SBIR and STTR programs see CRS Report 96-402, The
Small Business Innovation Research Program, by Wendy H. Schacht.
CRS-45
not available for FY2003 appropriations. The FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
bill, as passed by the House, provides an increase of $24 million to the President’s
budget request for continuation of the Commercial Technology Program targeted for
elimination. S. 1584, as reported to the Senate from the Committee on
Appropriations, would fund two of the technology transfer elements including the
Glenn Research Center at $2 million and the National Technology Transfer Center
at $2 million.
Key Issue: Termination of the Commercial Technology Program.
Responsibility for technology transfer is conferred upon NASA in the 1958 National
Aeronautics and Space Act (the “Space Act”) that created NASA. In pursuit of this
mission, NASA has established a series of programs and institutions designed to
promote cooperative R&D leading to the commercialization and application of
technology. The Commercial Technology Program, located in the Office of
Aerospace Technology, facilitates the creation of technology partnerships among
government, industry, and academia to promote the commercialization of R&D
developed within the NASA research endeavor. “Space Act Agreements” form the
legal construct under which these cooperative arrangements take place (similar to
“Cooperative Research and Development Agreements” created under the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act29). The movement of technology to the private
sector is expedited by technology transfer agents associated with the Offices of
Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) located at the agency’s ten field
centers (including JPL), six Regional Technology Transfer Centers, and the National
Technology Transfer Center. Ten business/technology incubators assist small
companies develop NASA technologies. Several publications, including
Innovations, Spin-off, and TechBriefs, as well as an agency-wide technology transfer
database, TechTracS, augment these efforts. The Small Business Innovation
Research Program is also considered an element of the technology transfer activity.
Licensing of NASA-owned patents is handled by the Office of the General Counsel.
Since its inception, NASA has approached technology transfer in various ways;
these efforts appear to have resulted in a fairly extensive amount of cooperative work
leading to the commercialization of new technologies for the marketplace. In the
FY2004 budget, NASA has proposed a reorganization of the technology transfer
endeavor to reflect NASA’s new mission and vision. According to the agency, this
mission is to “pursue activities unique to [NASA]” and includes a “shift in emphasis
from spin-out (non-aerospace) to spin-in (NASA applications).”30 The focus is on
cooperative R&D leading to the commercialization of technologies of value to
NASA. To accomplish this goal, the agency proposes a “re-formulation” of the
technology transfer program based on a new theme of “Innovative Technology
Transfer Partnerships.”
29 For more information see CRS Issue Brief IB85031, Technology Transfer: Use of
Federally Funded Research and Development, by Wendy H. Schacht.
30 NASA designates “spin-in” as the agency’s internal application of new technologies
developed by the private sector. This concept is in contrast to “spin-out” or “spin-off”
where NASA technologies are applied to industry needs.
CRS-46
As outlined in the FY2004 budget proposal, the major expenditure of funds in
pursuit of the establishment of innovative technology partnership will be through the
Small Business Innovation Research program. Funding for this activity is derived
from a 2.5% set-aside of each agency’s extramural R&D budget. Another
government-wide effort, the Small Business Technology Transfer program, also will
be a part of this new initiative. Currently financed by a 0.15% set-aside of the
agency’s extramural R&D budget, the set-aside will increase to 0.3% in FY2004 as
mandated by P.L. 107-50, the Small Business Technology Transfer Program
Reauthorization Act. These programs will focus on the development and support of
mechanisms to “accelerate and augment development of mission relevant SBIR
technology for NASA missions” as well as on efforts to move SBIR technology into
the marketplace. To this end, NASA intends to propose statutory changes to permit
the application of SBIR funds, matched by private sector money, for “post-phase II
dual use technology development.” Current law allows agencies to use government
funds, but not those dedicated to the SBIR activity, to commercialize SBIR
technologies necessary to achieve mission requirements.
An additional component of the new technology transfer initiative is what the
agency terms the “NASA Enterprise Engine.” The purpose of this activity, according
to NASA, is to facilitate “spin-in” by supporting the development of “innovative,
dual-use technologies” as well as to assist industry in the commercialization of these
technologies. While NASA notes that this will not be a “pure venture capital fund,”
the agency will invest federal funds in conjunction with private sector financing to
support those R&D activities needed to generate new technologies.31 From the
available information it is unclear what this approach entails, but indications are that
a mechanism “similar” to the private sector In-Q-Tel program funded by the Central
Intelligence Agency will be created as an “additional management tool that
complements existing programs.” The effort is to be managed by the NASA’s Office
of the Administrator, rather than the Office of Aerospace Technology.
The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance states that over 200,000 inquiries
were serviced by NASA technology transfer agents in the past year. However, the
new Innovative Technology Transfer Partnership Initiative requires termination of
the Commercial Technology Program, resulting in the discontinuation of many of
those organizations within which these transfer agents reside, including the Regional
Technology Transfer Centers and the business/technology incubators. Spin-off will
cease publication. The Commercial Technology Activity at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory would also end. The operation and responsibilities of the National
Technology Transfer Center would be altered to reflect the new priorities and the
work competed. However, H.R 2861, the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill
passed by the House, would provide an additional $24 million to the President’s
budget to continue the Commercial Technology Program. S. 1584, as reported to the
Senate from the Committee on Appropriations, would fund two of the technology
transfer elements including the Glenn Research Center at $2 million and the National
Technology Transfer Center at $2 million.
31 For a discussion of laws related to federal loan or federal loan guarantee programs see
CRS Report RL30346, Federal Credit Reform: Implementation of the Changed Budgetary
Treatment of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, by James M. Bickley.
CRS-47
The proposed reorientation of the NASA technology transfer program raises
several issues that Congress may wish to explore. Foremost among possible
concerns is the effect closing the Technology Transfer Centers and the incubators
may have on individual firms, cooperative R&D, and the NASA mission given the
extensive use of these facilities and/or expertise documented above. While the SBIR
and STTR programs have proven to be successful across the federal government,
issues remain regarding the operation of these activities that may raise questions as
to their contribution to technology transfer within the context of the NASA goal of
“spin-in.” Congress may want to address whether reliance on these specific
programs to the exclusion of other forms of technology transfer might compromise
the mission responsibilities of NASA. In addition, as the move toward a “modified”
federal venture capital program is proposed in the form of the “Enterprise Engine,”
Congress may find instructive a discussion of the legal, legislative, and political
concerns associated with such an initiative.
Out-Year Budget Projections
NASA’s FY2004 budget estimate contains the out-year budget projections
shown in Table 11. Such projections are always subject to change, but can be
indicative of the direction in which the Bush Administration wants NASA to head.
Recovery from the space shuttle Columbia accident could have a significant effect
on these out-year projections.
The projections in the FY2004 budget request are somewhat more generous than
in the FY2003 request. In the FY2003 request, NASA’s budget was anticipated to
rise 3.8% from FY2003 to FY2004, 1.9% from FY2004 to FY2005, 2.6% from
FY2005 to FY2006, and 3.2% from FY2006 to FY2007. In total, the budget was
forecast to rise 11.8% from FY2003 to FY2007. The new forecast is for the budget
to rise 15% from FY2004 to FY2008.
CRS-48
Table 11: NASA FY2004 and Out-Year Budget Estimate
(in $ millions)
Category
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Science, Aeronautics &
7,661
8,269
8,746
9,201
9,527
Exploration
Space Science
4,007
4,601
4,952
5,279
5,573
Earth Science
1,552
1,525
1,598
1,700
1,725
Bio. & Phys. Res.
973
1,042
1,087
1,118
1,143
Aeronautics
959
932
939
934
916
Education
170
169
169
170
170
Space Flight Capabilities
7,782
7,746
7,881
8,066
8,247
Space Flight
6,100
6,027
6,053
6,198
6,401
Space Station
1,707
1,587
1,586
1,606
1,603
Space Shuttle
3,968
4,020
4,065
4,186
4,369
Space Flight Support
434
419
402
407
429
Crosscutting Technologies
1,673
1,720
1,828
1,868
1,846
Space Launch Initiative
1,065
1,124
1,221
1,257
1,224
Mission & Sci. Msmt
438
435
439
439
444
Innovative Tech. Trans.
169
161
168
172
179
Inspector General
26
28
29
30
31
Total
15,469
16,043
16,656
17,297
17,806
Percentage Change from
.9*
3.7
3.8
3.8
2.9
Previous Year
Source: NASA FY2004 Budget Estimate (except for percentage change from previous year for FY2004, which
was calculated by CRS).
Prepared by CRS.
*Compared to NASA’s FY2003 appropriation level of $15.339 billion. If compared to the FY2003 request, the
FY2004 request is 3.1% higher.
Over the next five years (FY2004-2008), funding for Science, Exploration, and
Technology would increase 24%. The major driver in the increase for Science,
Exploration, and Technology is the Space Science Enterprise, which would receive
a 36% increase over that 5-year period (from $4.07 billion in FY2004 to $5.573
billion in FY2008). A large portion of that increase apparently would be devoted to
Project Prometheus. Funding for the Earth Science Enterprise would increase about
10%, from $1.552 billion to $1.725 billion. The Biological and Physical Research
Enterprise would rise 17%, from $973 million to $1.143 billion. That budget
estimate was developed prior to the Columbia accident, however, and is especially
subject to change. Aeronautics would decline by 4%, from $959 million to $916
million. Education would remain level at $170 million.
Funding for the Space Flight Capabilities would increase by 6% over the 5-year
period. Space flight—which includes the space station and space shuttle—would
increase approximately 5% from $6.110 billion to $6.401 billion. This profile could
change, of course, depending on the outcome of the space shuttle Columbia accident
investigation. As formulated prior to the accident, funding for the shuttle would
increase (from $3.968 billion to $4.369 billion), and space station construction and
operations would decline (from $1.707 billion to $1.603 billion). Funding for
CRS-49
Crosscutting Technologies would rise 10%, from $1.673 billion to $1.846 billion, as
funding for the Orbital Space Plane ramps up.
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2004 Budget Request:
Description, Analysis, and Issues for Congress
Updated September 23, 2003
Marcia S. Smith, Daniel Morgan, and Wendy H. Schacht
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s
FY2004 Budget Request: Description, Analysis, and
Issues for Congress
Summary
NASA’s budget request for FY2004 is $15.469 billion, approximately a 1%
increase over its FY2003 appropriations level of $15.339 billion, or a 3.1% increase
over its FY2003 request of $15.0 billion. The House-passed version of the FY2004
VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.R. 2861) adds $71 million to the request. The
Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a $130 million cut (S. 1584).
Debate over NASA’s FY2004 budget is taking place against the backdrop of the
space shuttle Columbia tragedy, which could have significant impacts on NASA’s
budget. There are immediate questions of how funding will change for the shuttle
program itself, the space station program (which uses the shuttle to take people and
cargo to and from the station), the Office of Biological and Physical Research (which
funds research on the shuttle and station), and plans to develop an Orbital Space
Plane. One aspect of that discussion is whether to continue permanent occupancy of
the space station if the shuttle is grounded for a long period of time. For the longer
term, Congress is expected to address more fundamentally whether human space
flight is worth its risks and costs, and what should be the balance between human and
robotic space flight activities.
The agency’s FY2004 budget was formulated prior to the Columbia tragedy,
but initial deliberations, at least, will focus on what is presented in that budget
estimate and two associated documents (a strategic plan, and a FY2002 performance
and accountability report) that herald NASA’s adoption of performance based
budgeting. Care should be taken in using the FY2004 budget materials. First, they
are presented in “full cost accounting” where all program costs, including personnel
and facilities, are included in individual program budgets instead of separately. It
may appear that programs are receiving funding increases; yet a higher figure in
FY2004 may be the result of full cost accounting, not program content, changes.
Second, NASA revised the organizational structure of its budget, making it difficult
in some cases to trace program budgets. Apart from Columbia, other major NASA
budget issues include:
!
International Space Station Program: Assuming construction and operation
of ISS continues, will the Bush Administration commit to building it so that it can
accommodate seven crew members, as originally planned, instead of three?
!
Project Prometheus: Can NASA afford this multi-billion dollar program to
build a nuclear powered, nuclear propelled spacecraft, and what are the policy
implications of expanding the use of nuclear power in space?
!
Aeronautics: Is NASA investing sufficiently in aeronautics R&D?
!
Technology Transfer: Should Congress approve NASA’s decision to terminate
several of its technology transfer activities?
This report will be updated as events warrant. An abbreviated version is
available as CRS Report RS21430.
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction to NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NASA’s Historical Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Key Issues in the FY2004 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Overview of NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Full Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
New Appropriations Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Comparing FY2003 and FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
NASA’s Six Enterprises and 18 “Themes” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
New Initiatives in FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Overview of Congressional Action on NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request . . . . . 11
House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Agency-Wide Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Space Shuttle Columbia Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Should Crews Remain Aboard the Space Station While the Shuttle
Is Grounded? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Who Will Pay For Additional Cargo Flights to the Space Station? . . 14
Should the Orbital Space Plane Program be Accelerated? . . . . . . . . . 15
What Are the Impacts on the FY2004 Budget? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Is Human Space Flight Worth the Risks and Costs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Vision, Mission, and Performance Based Budgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Detailed FY2004 Budget Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Science, Aeronautics & Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Space Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 21
Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Project Prometheus (Nuclear Systems Initiative and JIMO) 22
New Frontiers (Pluto Probe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Space Telescopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Earth Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 27
Key Issue: NASA’s Reformulated Global Climate Change
Research Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Biological and Physical Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 29
Key Issue: Impact of the Columbia Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Aeronautics Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 30
Key Issue: Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . 33
Key Issue: “Educator Astronauts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Space Flight Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Space Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Space Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 36
Key Issue: After the Shuttle Returns to Flight . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Space Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 39
Key Issue: Return to Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Space and Flight Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 41
Crosscutting Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Space Launch Initiative: OSP and NGLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 42
Key Issue: Orbital Space Plane—“Crew Return” versus
“Crew Transport” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Mission and Science Measurement Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 44
Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . 44
Key Issue: Termination of the Commercial Technology
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Out-Year Budget Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
List of Figures
Figure 1: NASA Funding FY1959-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1: NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 3. NASA’s FY2003 Request v. FY2003 Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 4: NASA’s 18 Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 5: NASA’s Nine New Initiatives in FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 6: FY2004 Space Science New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 7: FY2004 Earth Science New Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 8: FY2004 Biological and Physical Research New Initiative . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 9: FY2004 Aeronautics New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 10: FY2004 Education New Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Table 11: NASA FY2004 and Out-Year Budget Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2004 Budget Request:
Description, Analysis, and
Issues for Congress
Preface
Congress is debating the $15.469 billion FY2004 budget request of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This report discusses the major
issues, particularly the potential ramifications of the February 2003 space shuttle
Columbia accident. Several other CRS reports are available on NASA-related topics,
and are referenced herein. An abbreviated version of this report is available as CRS
Report RS21430.
Throughout this report, FY2003 funding levels are based on amounts contained
in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7), which included a
0.65% rescission for all NASA activities except the space shuttle. FY2004 request
figures are from NASA’s FY2004 budget estimate, available at
[http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/]. Program descriptions are condensed from
material provided by NASA in that or previous budget estimates.
This report continues the series of annual CRS analyses of NASA budget
requests initiated by former CRS Specialist David Radzanowski, and continued by
former CRS Senior Specialist Richard Rowberg. It draws upon some of the content
of the earlier reports.
Introduction to NASA
NASA was created by the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-
568). NASA’s charter is to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities.
Military space and aeronautics activities are conducted by the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the intelligence community. The organizations cooperate in some areas
of technology development and occasionally have joint programs. NASA opened its
doors on October 1, 1958, almost exactly one year after the Soviet Union ushered in
the Space Age with the launch of the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on October 4,
1957. In the 45 years that have elapsed, NASA has conducted far reaching programs
in human and robotic spaceflight, technology development, and scientific research.
The agency is managed from NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. It has
nine major field centers around the country: Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,
CA; Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA; Glenn Research Center,
CRS-2
Cleveland, OH; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD; Johnson Space
Center, Houston, TX; Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, FL: Langley
Research Center, Hampton, VA; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL;
and Stennis Space Center, near Slidell, MS. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Pasadena, CA (often counted as a 10th NASA center), is a federally funded research
and development center operated for NASA by the California Institute of
Technology. Goddard Space Flight Center manages the Goddard Institute of Space
Studies (New York, NY), the Independent Validation and Verification Facility
(Fairmont, WV); and the Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops, VA). Ames Research
Center manages Moffett Federal Airfield, Mountain View, CA. Johnson Space
Center manages NASA activities at the White Sands Test Facility, White Sands, NM.
Web links to all these can be found at [http://www.nasa.gov/nasaorgs/index.html].1
NASA employs approximately 19,000 civil servants (full time equivalents), and
40,000 on-site and near-site support contractors and grantees. For more details on
NASA’s workforce, see [http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm].
NASA is headed by an Administrator. The current Administrator is Mr. Sean
O’Keefe, who was confirmed by the Senate on December 20, 2001. Immediately
prior to his appointment, he was deputy director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Previously, he was staff director for the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense, the Comptroller of DOD, Secretary of the Navy, and a
professor at Pennsylvania State University and Syracuse University. Mr. O’Keefe
is the 10th NASA Administrator. His predecessor was Mr. Daniel Goldin, who held
the position for almost 10 years.
NASA’s Historical Budget
Since its creation, NASA has experienced periods of budget growth and decline,
some of which were dramatic. Figure 1 displays the agency’s budget history, both
in current year dollars (unadjusted for inflation) and in 2003 dollars. In the early
1960s, as the nation strived to put an American on the Moon by 1969, NASA’s
budget increased rapidly, peaking at $5.25 billion (current year dollars) in FY1965.
Then, as other national priorities gained precedence, NASA’s budget declined
sharply from the FY1965 peak to about $3 billion (current year dollars) by FY1974.
Subsequently, it increased steadily for almost two decades (the one-year spike in
1987 was to build a replacement space shuttle orbiter), but declined in the mid-1990s
as efforts to restrain federal funding took hold. Since 2000, it has been rising
gradually to its FY2003 level of $15.339 billion (current year dollars). For
information on NASA’s FY2003 budget, see CRS Report RL31347, The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s FY2003 Budget Request: Description,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress.
1 CRS Report RL30577, National Aeronautics and Space Administration: History and
Organization, by Erin Hatch, provides further information on NASA’s origin and structure.
CRS-3
Figure 1: NASA Funding FY1959-2003
Billions of Dollars
30
25
' ' ' '
20
'
'
'
'
' ' '
'
'
' '
15
'
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,
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'
0 , , , ,
1959
1964
1969
1974
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999 2003
, Current Year Dollars
' 2003 Dollars
Source: Data on NASA budget authority in current dollars through 2000 are from the Aeronautics and
Space Report of the President: FY 2000; for 2001-2002 are from the Historical Tables of the Budget
of the U.S. Government, FY2004; for 2003 are from P.L. 108-7, adjusted for the 0.65% across-the
board rescission for all NASA activities except the space shuttle. Constant dollars (adjusted for
inflation to reflect 2003 dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP (chained) price index.
Table 1: NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year
Current Dollars
2003 Dollars
(unadjusted for inflation)
1994
14,570
17,037
1995
13,854
15,856
1996
13,884
15,579
1997
13,709
15,088
1998
13,648
14,812
1999
13,653
14,623
2000
13,601
14,291
2001
14,257
14,620
2002
14,893
15,091
2003
15,339
15,339
Source: Current dollars for 1994-2000 are from the Aeronautics and Space Report of the President:
FY 2000; for 2001-2002 are from the Historical Tables of the Budget of the U.S. Government,
FY2004; for 2003 are from P.L. 108-7, adjusted for the 0.65% across-the board rescission for all
NASA activities except the space shuttle. Constant dollars (adjusted for inflation to reflect 2003
dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP (chained) price index.
CRS-4
Key Issues in the FY2004 Budget Request
This report examines issues that Congress may consider as it reviews NASA’s
activities in the context of the FY2004 budget request. Key questions are listed
below. More details can be found in the subsequent sections of the report.
•
What will be the impact of the space shuttle Columbia accident on NASA’s
budget, and on the space program as a whole? Should the United States remain
committed to human exploration of space, or should the agency shift more
resources into robotic exploration, which avoids the risks to human life?
•
While many consider the likelihood of the United States abandoning human
exploration to be extremely small, what would be the future of the International
Space Station program if it did? ISS is a cooperative program among the
United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia. Would the other countries
assume ownership and operation of the facility? The United States has spent
more than $30 billion on building a space station since 1985. How would the
American public react to a decision to walk away from the project at this point?
•
Assuming the United States continues its participation in the space station
program, will the Bush Administration commit to building it as agreed in 1993
so that it can accommodate a crew of seven? Or is the Administration still
willing to commit only to building the truncated version it announced in 2001,
which accommodates a crew of three? The number of crew members affects
how much scientific research can be conducted there, and the U.S. decision to
build a truncated version is a contentious issue with U.S. scientists who plan to
use the facility and with the other partners in the program.
•
Assuming the United States continues its participation in the space station
program, should NASA accelerate development of the Orbital Space Plane
(OSP) to take crews to and from the space station now that there are only three
space shuttle orbiters in the fleet? The OSP concept is early in its formulation
stage. How much could its schedule be accelerated if desired? How much
would it cost? Does NASA need to build a vehicle that can both take crews to
the space station as well as return them in an emergency, or should the agency
focus on a simpler, less expensive vehicle that performs only the crew return
(“lifeboat”) function, which is all that is required under the international
agreements that govern the program?
•
Can NASA afford Project Prometheus, a new multibillion initiative in the
Office of Space Science to build a spacecraft to study three moons of Jupiter?
It would use nuclear power and propulsion systems whose development was
approved in the FY2003 budget. NASA’s preliminary cost estimate is $3
billion over the next 5 years (FY2004-2008), or $8-9 billion through 2012 when
the spacecraft would be launched. Additionally, will the public accept an
expansion of the use of nuclear power in space?
•
What are the implications of NASA’s latest reformulation of its earth science
program on the long-term study of global climate change? NASA’s new plan
CRS-5
is to rely on instruments aboard weather satellites operated by two other
agencies (the Department of Defense and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration), instead of building additional satellites in its
Earth Observation Satellite series, to fulfill its commitment to provide a 15-year
set of climate data. Budget constraints already are arising in the DOD/NOAA
program. What guarantees are there that DOD and NOAA will include the
instruments needed for the scientific community, since their primary
responsibility is short term weather forecasting, not long term scientific
research?
•
How will the Office of Biological and Physical Research recoup from the space
shuttle Columbia accident in terms of the science experiments it sponsored
aboard Columbia, and the research it is hoping to conduct on the International
Space Station? The research program for the space station was reformulated
last year in the wake of funding cuts and the possibility that space station crews
would be limited to three, instead of seven, astronauts, thereby reducing the
amount of time available to conduct research. While the shuttle is grounded,
space station crews are being reduced to two. How will that affect the scientific
research that can be conducted there in the short term?
•
Is NASA investing sufficiently in aeronautics research and development
(R&D)? NASA funding for aeronautics R&D is down by about half from its
FY1998 peak and is projected to decline further in coming years. Aeronautics
R&D contributes to increasing air traffic capacity, reducing the impact of
aircraft noise and emissions, improving aviation safety and security, and
meeting other needs such as national defense and commercial competitiveness.
•
What are the implications of NASA’s decision to terminate many of its
technology transfer activities? NASA plans to close its six Regional
Technology Transfer Centers (RTTCs) in Los Angeles, CA; College Station,
TX; Cleveland, OH; Newport News, VA; Westborough, MA; and Atlanta, GA.
It also will discontinue its annual “Spinoff” books that provide examples of
successfully commercialized NASA technology. In the wake of the space
shuttle Columbia accident, questions are again arising as to what value
taxpayers receive from their investment in NASA. While some are comfortable
with intangible benefits such as gaining knowledge of the universe or satisfying
a desire to explore, others prefer tangible benefits, which these technology
transfer activities emphasize.
CRS-6
Overview of NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request
NASA’s FY2004 budget request is $15.469 billion (see Table 2), a 3.1%
increase over the agency’s FY2003 request, or an approximately 1% increase over
its FY2003 appropriation of $15.339 billion.2 Congressional action is summarized
in the Overview of Congressional Action on NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request
section below, and provided in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.
As described below, care must be taken when reviewing NASA’s FY2004
budget request figures because of two significant changes in the agency’s budget
structure: the shift to full cost accounting, and new appropriations accounts.
Full Cost Accounting
Users of NASA’s FY2004 budget material should bear in mind that it reflects
NASA’s shift to “full cost accounting.” In full cost accounting, funding for each
program (such as the Mars program) includes the costs for personnel and facilities.
Previously, those costs were accounted for separately. NASA began its Full Cost
Initiative in 1995, and asserts that today it is a key component in implementing the
President’s Management Agenda (discussed below). NASA began the transition to
full cost accounting in its FY2002 budget by assigning these costs to each enterprise
(e.g. the Space Science Enterprise). This year, NASA is taking the further step of
assigning the costs directly to each program.
The intent of full cost accounting is to show more accurately a program’s total
cost. A consequence of this approach during the transition period, however, is to
make it appear that funding for many programs has increased substantially. Looking
quickly at NASA’s FY2004 request, one might conclude, for example, that funding
for the space shuttle increased more than $700 million from a request of $3.2 billion
in FY2003, to a request of $3.9 billion FY2004. A closer look shows, however, that
the FY2004 request is only $182 million higher than the FY2003 request. The
remainder of the difference is due to inclusion of personnel and facilities costs that
were included in the “Investments and Support” line in NASA’s Human Space Flight
budget last year. Full cost accounting is discussed in more depth below (see Vision,
Mission, and Performance Based Budgeting).
New Appropriations Accounts
A second significant change in FY2004 is different appropriations accounts.
NASA has two accounts.3 Last year, the two accounts were Human Space Flight
2 NASA’s FY2003 appropriations are included in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-7). That Act includes a 0.65% rescission from all activities covered by the
Act, with a few exceptions. One of those exceptions is NASA’s space shuttle program in
the aftermath of the February 2003 space shuttle Columbia tragedy. The $15.339 billion
figure is adjusted for the rescission.
3 NASA refers to its “two account” budget structure. That terminology does not include
(continued...)
CRS-7
(HSF), and Science, Aeronautics, and Technology (SAT). The HSF account included
funding for: space station; space shuttle; payload and Expendable Launch Vehicle
support; space communications and data support; and safety, mission assurance, and
engineering. SAT funding included: space science, earth science, biological and
physical research, aerospace technology, and academic programs. This year, NASA
revamped the budget structure to better reflect its priorities and activities. NASA is
seeking to demonstrate that its mission is “Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration,”
and that mission is supported by “Space Flight Capabilities” such as a space station,
space transportation (the space shuttle and expendable launch vehicles), space
communications systems, and investing in new technologies. Everything that NASA
does is not a perfect fit for the new structure. For example, NASA’s investment in
nuclear propulsion technologies is included in the Space Science request, not in
Crosscutting Technologies with NASA’s other investments in space transportation
technologies.
Comparing FY2003 and FY2004
Thus, care should be exercised in making comparisons between FY2003 and
FY2004. Because of the change in the budget structure and the shift to full cost
accounting in FY2004, CRS cannot create a meaningful table comparing the FY2003
request, FY2003 appropriations, and the FY2004 request, as would normally be
provided in this report. Instead, two tables are presented. Table 2 shows the original
FY2003 request (without full cost accounting), the FY2003 request with full cost
accounting, and the FY2004 request in full cost accounting, all provided by NASA.
These are followed by columns showing congressional action. Special attention
should be paid to the column headings, which explain what the figures
represent. Table 3 shows what Congress appropriated for NASA for FY2003 using
the FY2003 appropriations categories, with no full cost accounting.
3 (...continued)
funding for the Inspector General, however, which is a separate (third) account.
CRS-8
Table 2: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional
Action
(In millions of dollars)
Category
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
House-
Senate-
Request
Request
Request
passed VA-
reported
(Nov. 2002)
Expressed
Expressed in
HUD-IA
VA-HUD-
Not in full
in Full Cost
Full Cost
appro-
IA appro-
cost
Accounting
Accounting
priations
priations
accounting
Science, Aeronautics &
7,015
7,101
7,661
7,708**
7,731**
Exploration
Space Science
3,414
3,468
4,007
Earth Science
1,628
1,610
1,552
Biological & Physical
842
913
973
Research
Aeronautics
986
949
959
Education
144
160
170
Space Flight Capabilities
7,960
7,875
7,782
7,806
7,582
Space Flight
6,131
6,107
6,110
6,110
5,910
Space Station*
(1,492)*
(1,851)*
(1,707)*
(1,707)
(1,507)
Space Shuttle
(3,208)
(3,786)
(3,968)
(3,968)
(3,968)
Other
(1,431)
(471)
(434)
(434)
(434)
Crosscutting Technologies
1,829
1,768
1,673
1,697
1,673
Space Launch Initiative
(879)
(1,150)
(1,065)
(1,065)
(1,065)
Other
(950)
(617)
(607)
(631)
(607)
Inspector General
25
25
26
26
26
Total
15,000
15,000
15,469
15,540
15,339
Source: NASA FY2003 and FY2004 budget documents, H.R. 2861 ( H.Rept. 108-235), and S. 1584 (S.Rept.
108-143). Column totals may not add due to rounding. NASA submitted an amended FY2003 budget request
in November 2002, which NASA used in developing the numbers in the second and third columns of this table.
The figures in the third (shaded) column adjust the FY2003 numbers as though they had been prepared
in full cost accounting. They are for comparison purposes only and do not reflect actual funding increases
or decreases.
*Does not include funding for space station research, embedded in the Biological and Physical Research line.
For FY2004, that amount is $578 million, making the total FY2004 space station request $2,285 million.
**It is not possible in all cases to determine from the committee reports what changes were made to which SAE
subaccounts, so only the total funding for the SAE account is shown here.
CRS-9
Table 3. NASA’s FY2003 Request v. FY2003 Appropriations
(in $ millions)
FY2003
Funding Category
FY2003 Request
Appropriations
Human Space Flight
6,130.9
6,058.6
International Space Station
1,492.1*
1,462.4*
Space Shuttle
3,208.0
3,252.8†
Payload and ELV Support
87.5
84.4
Investments and Support
1,178.2
1,094.9†
Space Comm. & Data Systems
117.5
115.3
Safety, Mission Assur., Engineering
47.6
48.8
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology
8,844.5
9,254.9
Space Science
3,414.3
3,529.2
Biological. & Physical Research
842.3*
896.0*
Earth Science
1,628.4
1,697.4
Aero-Space Technology
2,815.8
2,933.6
Academic Programs
143.7
198.6
Inspector General
24.6
25.4
TOTAL
15,000.0
15,338.9
Sources: NASA FY2003 budget estimate and initial FY2003 operating plan. Columns may not add
due to rounding.
*Total funding for the space station is the sum of the funding under Human Space Flight plus a portion
of the funding in Biological and Physical Research. The total FY2003 request for the space station
was $1.839 billion; Congress approved that amount and added $8 million for ISS plant and animal
habitats. With the rescission and adjustments NASA made in its FY2003 initial operating plan, the
amount available for the space station in FY2003 is $1.810 billion.
† Space shuttle is exempt from the rescission (both the amount in the” space shuttle” line, and
personnel and other related costs in the “investments and support” line). Congress added $50 million
for the investigation and remedial actions stemming from the space shuttle Columbia accident.
NASA’s Six Enterprises and 18 “Themes”
In the FY2004 budget estimate, NASA divides its activities into six
“enterprises.” Five of them—the Aerospace Technology Enterprise, the Biological
and Physical Research Enterprise, the Earth Science Enterprise, the Space Flight
Enterprise (formerly the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise),
and the Space Science Enterprise—correspond to NASA’s five major program
offices: the Office of Aerospace Technology (OAT), the Office of Biological and
Physical Research (OBPR), the Office of Earth Science (OES), the Office of Space
Flight (OSF), and the Office of Space Science (OSS). The sixth enterprise,
Education, cuts across the other five enterprises.
In the FY2004 budget request, NASA also introduced 18 “themes” it has
decided to use to organize the agency’s activities. According to NASA, theme
managers will have responsibility and accountability for the programs within those
themes. In some parts of NASA, it is difficult to ascertain the difference between a
“theme” manager and a division director or other official within an enterprise. These
distinctions may become clearer with experience. The 18 themes are:
CRS-10
Table 4: NASA’s 18 Themes
Space Science
1. Solar System Exploration
2. Mars Exploration
3. Astronomical Search for Origins
4. Structure & Evolution of the Universe
5. Sun-Earth Connections
Earth Science
6. Earth System Science
7. Earth Science Applications
Biological & Physical Research
8. Biological Sciences Research
9. Physical Sciences Research
10. Research Partnership and Flight Support
Aerospace Technology
11. Aeronautics Technology
12. Space Launch Initiative
13. Mission and Science Measurement
Technology
14. Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships
Education
15. Education
Space Flight
16. Space Station
17. Space Shuttle
18. Space Flight Support
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
New Initiatives in FY2004
NASA lists nine new initiatives in its FY2004 request. Traditionally, the term
“new initiative” was used to indicate initiation of a new program or project. In the
FY2004 request, however, NASA also uses it to represent new emphasis on an
existing program or project. Thus, not all of the nine initiatives are new programs
or projects. They are described under the appropriate enterprise later in this report.
The nine initiatives are:
CRS-11
Table 5: NASA’s Nine New Initiatives in FY2004
Initiative
FY2004
Projected
Request ($
Funding
millions)
FY2004-2008
($ millions)
To Understand and Protect Our Home Planet
Climate Change Research Acceleration
26
72
Aviation Security
21
196
National Airspace System Transition Augmentation
27
100
Quiet Aircraft Technology Acceleration
15
100
To Explore the Universe and Search for Life
Project Prometheus*
*279
*3,000
Optical Communications
31
233
Beyond Einstein Initiative
59
765
Human Research Initiative
39
347
To Inspire the Next Generation of Explorers
Education Initiative
26
130
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate, p. AS-10, AS-11, and SAE 2-21.
*Project Prometheus combines the Nuclear Systems Initiative begun in FY2003 to develop space
nuclear power and propulsion systems, with new plans to build a spacecraft, the Jupiter Icy Moons
Orbiter (JIMO), to use those systems. However, the NASA chart (p. AS-10) on which this table is
based shows a request of $93 million for Project Prometheus in FY2004, and a 5-year runout of $2.07
billion, which are the costs only for JIMO, not for the nuclear power and propulsion systems. On
p. SAE 2-21 of its budget estimate, NASA shows the total FY2004 request for Project Prometheus as
$279.2 million. On p. AS-11, NASA identifies the 5-year runout for Project Prometheus as $3 billion.
Hence, those are the figures used in this table.
Overview of Congressional Action on NASA’s
FY2004 Budget Request
This section provides an overview of actions taken by Congress on NASA’s
FY2004 budget request. More detail is provided in subsequent sections. Table 2
(above) shows the changes compared with the request.
House Action
As passed by the House on July 25, the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
bill (H.R. 2861, H.Rept. 108-235) includes a $71 million net increase above the
$15.469 billion request. The net increase comprises $96 million in cuts and $167
million in additions.
The House took no action on NASA’s space shuttle, International Space Station,
Orbital Space Plane, or Next Generation Launch Technology programs pending
release of the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The major
programmatic changes are the addition of $24 million to continue commercial
program initiatives proposed for termination (see Innovative Technology Transfer
Partnerships below), several additions for aeronautics (see Aeronautics
Technology), and cuts to four space and earth science programs—the New Frontiers
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program, which involves sending a probe to Pluto, was cut $55 million; the James
Webb Space Telescope was cut $20 million; the Space Interferometry Mission was
cut $8.15 million, and Earth Science Applications was cut $13 million. The first
three are discussed under Space Science; the last is discussed under Earth Science.
Senate Action
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2004 VA-
HUD-IA appropriations bill on September 5 (S.Rept. 108-143). The committee
recommended a net cut of $130 million from NASA’s request, comprising a
reduction of $200 million for the space station program, and $70 million in net
increases for congressionally directed spending in the Science, Aeronautics, and
Exploration (SAE) account. (The committee’s report specifies that the SAE account
is to be funded at $7.730 billion, an increase of $69.6 million over the request. The
detailed list of changes within the various subaccounts total $174 million in
increases, and $46 million in cuts, yielding a net increase of $128 million rather than
the $69.6 million, however. The report does not specify where the additional cuts
should be made to reduce the overall level of the SAE account to its recommended
level.) The specified cuts are $20 million from the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter, part
of Project Prometheus (see Space Science), and $15 million from Earth Science
Applications and $11 million from the Global Change Climate Research Initiative
(see Earth Science). Among the major additions are $50 million for aeronautics
research (see Aeronautics), and $11 million for EOS Follow-on mission planning
and $25 million for EOSDIS (see Earth Science).
Agency-Wide Issues
Space Shuttle Columbia Accident
On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart as it returned to
Earth following a 16-day scientific mission in Earth orbit. All seven astronauts—six
Americans and one Israeli—were killed. The shuttle fleet is grounded. The
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), headed by retired Admiral Harold
Gehman, released the results of its investigation on August 26, 2003, attributing the
accident to technical and organizational failures. CRS Report RS21408 provides
more information about the Columbia tragedy; CRS Report RS21606 provides a
synopsis of the Board’s findings and recommendations. The full CAIB report is
available at [http://www.caib.us]. NASA officials use March/April 2004 as a
“preliminary planning window” for returning the shuttle to flight. They stress,
however, that they cannot fix a date for return to flight until they have a better
understanding of what must be done, and how to do it, in response the Board’s 29
recommendations, of which 15 must be accomplished before return to flight. For
more on the shuttle program, see “Space Shuttle” under Space Flight Capabilities
below.
What impact the Columbia tragedy will have on NASA, and the space program
as whole, is unclear. The resumption of shuttle launches is a critical component of
answering questions such as what strategy to follow in staffing the International
Space Station (ISS). In the two other cases of U.S. spaceflight-related fatalities (the
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1967 Apollo 204 fire, which killed three astronauts; and the 1986 space shuttle
Challenger tragedy, which killed seven astronauts), the programs were suspended for
21 months and 32 months, respectively.
In the wake of the Columbia accident, some are questioning whether human
space flight is worth its risks and costs. Following the Apollo 204 and Challenger
tragedies, the country ultimately rallied behind NASA, and human space flight
resumed after technical and managerial issues were resolved. Many expect the public
will respond similarly this time. Assuming that it does, and NASA continues its
human space flight program, some near-term decisions are needed.
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Should Crews Remain Aboard the Space Station While the Shuttle
Is Grounded? Chief among the issues is whether to keep crews aboard the
International Space Station (ISS) while the shuttle is grounded. (See CRS Issue Brief
IB93017 for more on ISS). The space station is being built as a partnership among
the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and Europe. Construction began in 1998,
and “Expedition” crews, rotating on 4-6 month shifts, have continuously occupied
ISS since November 2000.
In late February, NASA and its partners agreed upon an approach to staffing the
space station in 2003 without the space shuttle. The usual three-person crew size was
reduced to two in order to reduce resupply requirements. The ISS program will rely
on Russian Soyuz spacecraft to rotate the crews, and another Russian spacecraft,
Progress, to resupply the space station with food, water, fuel, and other consumables.
The Russians have three decades of experience in operating space stations using only
Soyuz and Progress spacecraft. Russia provides Soyuz and Progress spacecraft for
the ISS program already, but additional Progress spacecraft will be required without
the shuttle, raising funding issues (discussed below).
The “Expedition 7" crew—one American and one Russian—is now aboard ISS.
They are scheduled to be replaced by the Expedition 8 crew in October 2003. They
may return to Earth at any time, however, using the Soyuz spacecraft that took them
to ISS. Soyuzes are used as “lifeboats” for the space station, and one is always
attached so the crew can evacuate in an emergency. Each Soyuz can only remain in
orbit for 6 months, so they are routinely replaced at 6-month intervals.
The ISS can be operated using Soyuz and Progress indefinitely, if sufficient
funds are available to build them. However, if the shuttle is grounded for an
extended period of time, questions may arise as to whether there is sufficient reason
for a crew to be there. The shuttle is needed to bring additional segments of the
space station into orbit to continue construction, and also to bring the scientific
experiments that form the research program. Thus, there may be little for the crew
to accomplish other than maintaining and operating the station. Whether that is
sufficient reason to keep crews in orbit, with the attendant risks of space travel, may
be questioned. One concern, though, is what would happen if the space station
suffered a malfunction that could only be repaired by an on-orbit crew. If no one was
aboard, the facility, which already has cost U.S. taxpayers $30 billion, could be
imperiled.
Who Will Pay For Additional Cargo Flights to the Space Station?
The space shuttle has a much greater cargo capacity than the Russian Progress
spacecraft, so even just to resupply a two-person crew, the number of annual Progress
flights must be increased from the current rate of three or four per year. Russian
space agency officials have indicated for quite some time, however, that they are
having difficulty funding the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft to which they are already
committed. They want the other partners in the program to provide $100 million for
accelerating the production of two Progress spacecraft needed in the near term.
Under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA, P.L. 106-178), however, NASA is not
allowed to transfer money to Russia in connection with the space station program
unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain technologies to
Iran (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017). Representative Lampson has introduced H.R.
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1001 to amend the INA to allow payments to Russia for the space station any time
the U.S. space shuttle is grounded. NASA Administrator O’Keefe told the House
Science Committee on February 27, 2003 that no changes to the INA are needed at
this time, and he had not asked the White House for a waiver from the INA
requirements.4 At the moment, the Russian government has agreed to accelerate
payments to the Russian Space Agency that ordinarily would not have been provided
until later in the year. Russian space officials remain publicly concerned about the
availability of funds in the future. The House Science Committee’s Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics held a heading on U.S.-Russian space cooperation on June
11, 2003 where these issues were explored.
Should the Orbital Space Plane Program be Accelerated? Another
near-term decision is whether to accelerate development of NASA’s Orbital Space
Plane (OSP), a program announced in November 2002, or build another spacecraft
that would be simpler and less expensive, but potentially less versatile.
The OSP is a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV). It is the successor to NASA’s
plans to build a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). A Crew Transfer Vehicle can take
crews to and from the space station; a Crew Return Vehicle can only bring them back
to Earth. The purpose of a Crew Return Vehicle is to act as a lifeboat in the event of
a life-threatening emergency on the space station. Under the international
agreements that govern the space station program, the United States is obligated to
provide a Crew Return Vehicle to accommodate four people. Once available, it
would allow the space station crew size to grow (space station crew size is a
controversial issue that is discussed later in this report under “Space Station,” and in
CRS Issue Brief IB93017). A Crew Transfer Vehicle could fulfill that mission, as
well as complement the space shuttle’s ability to take crews to the space station. The
evolution of the CRV into a CTV is discussed in more detail later in this report (see
Crosscutting Technologies), but essentially NASA is now embarked upon a course
to build a CTV instead of a CRV. A CTV is expected to be more expensive and take
longer to develop than a CRV. From the standpoint of recovering from the Columbia
accident, one question is whether OSP should be accelerated now that there are only
three space shuttle orbiters. NASA notified its OSP contractors in July 2003 that it
wants to accelerate the program by two years. Space News reported on September
1, 2003 that accelerating the OSP program by two years could significantly increase
its cost. According to that publication, the cost through FY2009 could be $14 billion,
compared with the $3.7 billion NASA included in its 5-year (FY2004-2008) budget
estimate.
What Are the Impacts on the FY2004 Budget? How much it will cost
to return the shuttle to flight status is not yet known. What is known is that the
grounding of the shuttle will impact the schedule for construction of the station, and
almost certainly will increase its costs. It could alter the funding profile for the
Orbital Space Plane. It also is likely to affect funding for the Office of Biological and
Physical Research (OBPR), which uses the space shuttle and space station to conduct
some of its research activities. OBPR was the sponsor of many of the experiments
4 Mr. O’Keefe was responding to a question from Representative Lampson. Transcript of
hearing provided by Federal Document Clearing House.
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on Columbia’s ill-fated STS-107 mission. Although some of the scientific data from
that mission was transmitted to ground-based scientists while the shuttle was in orbit,
much was lost with Columbia. Decisions will be needed on whether any of that
research needs to be redone and at what cost. Thus, the impact on the FY2004
NASA budget and future budgets could be significant.
Is Human Space Flight Worth the Risks and Costs? While it seems
unlikely, it is nevertheless possible that the public and policy makers could choose
to discontinue or sharply limit human space flight in response to the Columbia
accident. The debate over the value of human space flight has been waged since the
earliest days of the space program.
Human exploration of space appeals to what many believe is an innate desire
to push the frontiers of human experience. Supporters of human space flight view
the space station as the next step in America’s—and humanity’s—inexorable desire
to explore new worlds. As a visible symbol of America’s technological prowess,
human spaceflight is often perceived as a centerpiece of an image of American
preeminence.
This somewhat romantic view is in stark contrast to those who view human
exploration of space as, at best, a waste of money, and at worst, an unnecessary
exposure of humans to the hazards of space travel. These observers argue that there
is much yet to explore here on Earth, and robotic spacecraft should be used to explore
the heavens for safety and cost-effectiveness reasons. They see the Apollo, space
shuttle, and space station programs as successive drains on resources that could be
better used for robotic space activities, or non-space related activities.
Since 1959, when the first American astronauts were selected, the majority of
the American public has supported NASA’s human space flight program, within
limits. (There has not been sufficient support to mount a human mission to Mars, for
example, a goal of some space enthusiasts.) The Columbia tragedy is the latest test
to determine if the public remains committed to the goal of human exploration of
space or if it would prefer a shift in emphasis to robotic missions that do not risk
human life.
One factor in such a decision would be the fate of the International Space
Station if the United States terminates its human exploration program. The United
States is the leader of the multinational space station program and, since 1984
(FY1985), over $30 billion U.S. tax dollars have been spent on it (not including the
costs of the associated shuttle flights). Presumably, if the United States chose not
to use the facility, the other partners would continue to do so using the Russian Soyuz
and Progress spacecraft. Public reaction to the concept of turning the space station
over to others, when so much money has been spent already, might be a significant
influence on the decision whether to continue launching humans into space.
Press reports and discussion at a September 10, 2003 hearing before the House
Science Committee indicate that the Bush Administration may articulate a new vision
for the space program in coming months. NASA Administrator O’Keefe confirmed
that an interagency process is underway to assess the space program, although details
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were not provided. Separately, Representative Lampson introduced H.R. 3057 on
September 10, the Space Exploration Act, to set goals for the space program.
Vision, Mission, and Performance Based Budgeting
NASA’s FY2004 budget reflects the agency’s moves to implement the
President’s Management Agenda,5 to sculpt the agency to match Administrator
O’Keefe’s vision, and to move to “performance based budgeting.” The budget
documents include not only the budget estimate, called the “FY2004 Integrated
Planning and Budget Document,” but NASA’s new Strategic Plan and a FY2002
Performance and Accountability Report. Administrator O’Keefe emphasizes that
releasing the Strategic Plan and budget together —
represents our new commitment to the integration of budget and
performance reporting. In this way, we will ensure that strategic priorities
are aligned with and influence budget priorities. Our new Integrated
Budget and Performance Document...expands on the goals and objectives
presented here and identifies the specific long-term and annual
performance measures for which we will be held accountable.6
By using these tools and its new approach, NASA asserts that it has developed
a FY2004 budget estimate that is “responsible, credible, and compelling.” In its
report on the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.Rept. 108-235), the House
Appropriations Committee applauded NASA’s new full cost initiative, noting that
it is consistent with the CFOs Act of 1990, the Government Performance and Results
Act, and the National Performance Review.
Mr. O’Keefe developed his vision for the agency soon after his arrival as
Administrator in December 2001. In an April 12, 2002 speech at Syracuse
University,7 he expounded on that vision and NASA’s mission. NASA’s vision and
mission statements appear at the beginning of virtually every NASA headquarters
document and briefing presentation to underscore the agency’s commitment to them.
Vision:
To improve life here,
To extend life to there,
To find life beyond.
Mission:
To understand and protect our home planet,
To explore the universe and search for life,
To inspire the next generation of explorers,
...as only NASA can.
5 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/pma_index.html]
6 NASA 2003 Strategic Plan, p. iii
7 [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codez/plans.html]
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According to Mr. O’Keefe, the phrase “as only NASA can” means that NASA “will
pursue activities unique to our Mission—if NASA does not do them, they will not
get done—if others are doing them, we should question why NASA is involved.”8
As NASA formulated its vision and mission and related performance measures,
it decided to reorganize its budget structure to emphasize that NASA’s mission is
science, aeronautics, and exploration, and that mission is supported by capabilities
such as a space station, space shuttle, and investing in new technologies. This
restructuring led to the new appropriations accounts shown in the FY2004 budget.
Mr. O’Keefe commented in February 2003 testimony to the House Science
Committee that the new structure “recognize[s] the reality that there is no arbitrary
separation between human and science activities...”9
At the same time, NASA moved to “full cost accounting” in FY2004, as
discussed previously. While the goal of full cost accounting may be laudable, one
issue is that funding shown in the FY2004 budget estimate for at least one
program—the space station—still does not reflect its total cost. Looking at the
FY2004 budget, one could easily conclude that the request for the space station
program is $1.707 billion, as shown in the line titled “Space Station” under “Space
Flight” in the Space Flight Capabilities account. However, that figure does not
include space station research funding, which is held in the Office of Biological and
Physical Research. That amount is $578 million in FY2004. Furthermore, some
would add the costs for the Orbital Space Plane, which NASA plans to build to take
crews to and from the space station. That funding, $550 million in FY2004, is under
Crosscutting Technologies. Traditionally NASA has included the costs for space
station research, and for a “crew return vehicle,” the predecessor of the Orbital Space
Plane, in the space station budget. To compare the space station request for FY2004
with previous years, those three figures—$1.707 billion, $578 million, and $550
million—should be added together, yielding a total of $2.835 billion. Yet the budget
information from NASA does not make that clear, despite its efforts to illustrate full
cost accounting. Some might also add most of the funding for the space shuttle
program because the primary job for the space shuttle is taking crews and cargo to
the space station. NASA traditionally has not included the cost of the shuttle flights
in the space station cost estimates. However, in a full cost accounting environment,
it is difficult to argue that shuttle costs should not be included.
Another issue is the complexity of tracing a program’s budget over time to
determine if it is staying within planned funding parameters. Since personnel and
facilities have not been included in program costs until now, determining whether a
program is “over budget” is difficult to determine. Again using the space station as
an example, Congress imposed a cap of $25 billion on development of the space
station, and $17.4 billion on the costs of shuttle flights to assemble it. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in 2002 that it could not determine whether
NASA was complying with the cap because NASA could not provide the requisite
data (GAO-02-504R). Now, with full cost accounting, it will be even more difficult
8 Testimony to the House Science Committee, February 27, 2003, p. 5. Available at
[http://www.house.gov/science].
9 Ibid., p. 6-7.
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to determine if the cap is being enforced because the program’s cost will grow with
the addition of the personnel and facilities costs. This is true for other NASA
programs as well.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), an independent group that
oversees safety in NASA’s programs, pointed out another potential drawback to full
cost accounting in its Annual Report for 2002 (released in March 2003). The ASAP
report points out that some agency overhead functions (such as safety), efforts that
span several NASA programs (such as orbital debris), and infrastructure that is not
dedicated to a specific program, could be inadequately funded in a full cost
environment because their costs no longer can be amortized across many activities.
Because the costs will be charged to specific programs at direct labor rates, they may
become too expensive for program budgets. ASAP found that the shift to full cost
accounting “could negatively impact the ability to sustain safe and reliable
operation.”10 The panel recommended that the impacts be identified, and that NASA
adequately fund programs, personnel, infrastructure and contractor services that are
essential to safety.
Human Capital
Human capital is the first of the five government-wide initiatives identified in
the President’s Management Agenda.11 Like many other federal agencies, NASA
has an aging workforce. At a February 27, 2003 hearing before the House Science
Committee, Mr. O’Keefe noted that “today, we have three times as many personnel
over 60 years of age as under 30 years of age.” He also commented that within the
next five years, 25% of the agency’s workforce is eligible to retire. “The potential
loss of this intellectual capital is particularly significant for this cutting-edge Agency
that has skills imbalances.”12
NASA proposed legislation in 2002 that Mr. O’Keefe explained would give the
agency new authorities to recruit and retain a highly skilled workforce. A summary
of the proposals was contained in Mr. O’Keefe’s testimony to the House Science
Committee’s Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics on July 18, 2002.13 In
addition to Mr. O’Keefe, the Comptroller General of the United States, and the
General Counsel of the American Federation of Government Employees testified
about the pros and cons of such legislation. That legislation was never introduced,
but, according to Mr. O’Keefe, some of the changes were enacted as part of the
Homeland Security Act.14
10 [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/asap/index.htm] p. 24-25.
11 Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/pma_index.html].
12 Prepared statement. P. 9. Available at [http://www.house.gov/science].
13 Available at [http://www.house.gov/science.]
14 See CRS Report RL31500, Homeland Security: Human Resources Management, by
Barbara L. Schwemle for general information on civil service changes made by that Act.
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In its January 2003 report on Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks for NASA, GAO identified strengthening strategic human capital management
as one of major four challenges facing NASA.15 Three bills are pending that
address NASA’s human capital situation. H.R. 1085 (Boehlert) would provide
incentives for hiring and retaining personnel at NASA. It was reported, amended, on
August 4, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-244, Part I). It also had been referred to the House
Government Reform Committee, from which it was discharged on August 4. H.R.
1836 (Davis) covers workforce issues at NASA, the Department of Defense, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. It was reported, amended, from the House
Government Reform Committee on May 19 (H.Rept. 108-116, Part 1). The bill also
was referred to, and later discharged from, the Armed Services, Science, and Ways
and Means committees. In the Senate, S. 610 (Voinovich) addresses NASA
workforce issues. It was reported, amended, from the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee (S.Rept. 108-113). CRS Report RL31991 discusses these bills in more
detail.
Detailed FY2004 Budget Issues
This section follows the new format of the NASA budget as shown in the
agency’s FY2004 budget estimate. Thus, the categories are different from those in
previous CRS reports on the NASA budget.
Science, Aeronautics & Exploration
The Science, Aeronautics & Exploration (SAE) account funds the bulk of
NASA’s research and development (R&D) activities. Included are the Offices of
Space Science, Earth Science, Biological and Physical Research, and Education, as
well as aeronautics programs, which are part of the Office of Aerospace Technology.
The Offices of Space Science and Earth Science focus on increasing human
understanding of space and Earth, and make use of satellites, space probes, and
robotic spacecraft to gather and transmit data. The Office of Biological and Physical
Research funds research conducted in microgravity environments to study
fundamental principles of chemistry, biology, and physics, and that support human
exploration of space. Aeronautics R&D contributes to increasing air traffic capacity,
reducing the impact of aircraft noise and emissions, improving aviation safety and
security, and meeting other needs such as national defense and commercial
competitiveness. The Office of Education funds programs aimed at educating
children in elementary and secondary school, as well as university students, in
science, mathematics, engineering, and technology.
For FY2004, NASA is requesting $7.661 billion for SAE. See Table 2 for a
break-out of how the request is allocated to the different offices within this account.
Because of the change in the structure of the FY2004 budget versus the FY2003
appropriations, a comparable number for FY2003 is difficult to determine. In
15 General Accounting Office. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. January 2003. GAO-03-114. Available at
[http://www.gao.gov].
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previous years, aeronautics was included in figures for the Office of Aero-Space
Technology.16 Now it is separated from the rest of OAT and placed in the SAE
appropriations account rather than the SFC account where the rest of Aerospace
Technology activities reside. In the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-7), Congress included a number of congressionally directed spending items in
the Aero-Space Technology account, and it is not immediately clear which are related
to aeronautics versus other activities in that account. Unless NASA shows that
division, and adjusts the figures for full cost accounting, a comparison between
FY2003 and FY2004 for aeronautics is not possible. However, FY2003
appropriations levels are comparable with the FY2004 request at the aggregate level
for the Offices of Space Science, Earth Science, Biological and Physical Research,
and Education, and are shown herein.
Space Science. The Office of Space Science (OSS) is responsible for
NASA’s Space Science Enterprise. OSS has five themes: Solar System Exploration,
Mars Exploration, Astronomical Search for Origins, Structure and Evolution of the
Universe, and Sun-Earth Connections. Using primarily space-based telescopes and
other sensing probes, OSS programs study the nature of stellar objects to determine
their formation, evolution, and fate. Robotic probes are sent to other bodies in the
solar system, searching for information about their composition and whether
conditions for life exist. To accomplish these tasks, NASA supports a number of
activities: a series of large, focused missions such as the Space Infrared Telescope
Facility (SIRTF), Gravity Probe-B, and the Hubble Space Telescope (HST); the
Explorer program to provide low-cost access to space with small, single purpose
satellites; the Discovery program to support small solar system exploration missions;
the New Frontiers program for planetary exploration probes in the $650 million
category; and a Mars Exploration program.
OSS also funds an extensive research and technology effort. The research
component focuses on research and analysis, data analysis, and theoretical studies to
interpret and understand space-based observations and provide scientific justification
for future missions. This component also supports complementary ground-based and
laboratory research and instrumentation activities. Universities and NASA field
centers are the principal performers of supporting research. The technology effort is
designed to provide enabling technologies for the next generation of space science
missions, crosscutting technology development that can be used on a number of
NASA missions, and flight testing of new technologies that can be used on future
NASA science missions. The technology program includes a core component
directed at broad-based technology development; and a focused component
supporting technology development for the astronomical search for origins, the
advanced deep space missions, the Sun-Earth connection, and the structure and
evolution of the universe programs.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For FY2004,
NASA is requesting $4.007 billion for the Office of Space Science, compared with
a FY2003 appropriations level of $3.501 billion. The $4.007 billion request is
16 In the FY2004 budget, NASA identifies it as the Office of Aerospace Technology instead
of Aero-Space Technology, as it had previously,
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allocated to each theme as follows: Solar System Exploration, $1.359 billion; Mars
Exploration, $570 million; Astronomical Search for Origins, $877 million; Structure
and Evolution of the Universe, $432 million; and Sun-Earth Connections, $770
million. The request includes three new initiatives (see Table 6).
Table 6: FY2004 Space Science New Initiatives
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Project Prometheus
$279
$3,000.0
Combination of Nuclear Systems Initiative,
begun in FY03, and new Jupiter Icy Moons
Orbiter (JIMO) project. See text for more
information.
Optical
$31
$233
To develop communications technologies to
Communications
allow more data to be sent back to Earth from
planetary spacecraft using much higher (laser)
frequencies, which have greater bandwidth.
NASA plans to demonstrate this technology
on a 2009 mission to Mars.
Beyond Einstein
$59
$765
Offers potential to answer three questions
unanswered by Albert Einstein’s
theories—what powered the Big Bang; what
happens to space, time, and matter at the edge
of a black hole; and what is the mysterious
dark energy expanding the universe.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate (see note to Table 5 regarding Project Prometheus).
Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House cut funding for three
programs in the Office of Space Science: $20 million from the James Webb Space
Telescope, $8.15 million from the Space Interferometry Mission, and $55 million
from New Frontiers (to send a probe to Pluto). The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended a $20 million cut for the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter
(JIMO), part of Project Prometheus.
Key Issues. Three of the projects being pursued by the Office of Space
Science are receiving close attention during the FY2004 budget cycle: Project
Prometheus; New Frontiers; and space telescopes, including the James Webb Space
Telescope (formerly the Next Generation Space Telescope).
Project Prometheus (Nuclear Systems Initiative and JIMO). NASA
is proposing in FY2004 an expansion of the Nuclear Systems Initiative (NSI), which
was approved in the FY2003 budget (although Congress cut $19 million of the
$125.5 million requested). Through NSI, NASA is developing new radioisotope
thermoelectric generators (RTGs) that provide electrical power for spacecraft, and
nuclear propulsion to propel spacecraft from Earth orbit to other destinations. In the
FY2004 budget, NASA requests permission to build a spacecraft, the Jupiter Icy
Moons Orbiter (JIMO), that would make use of the new nuclear systems. JIMO’s
mission would be to search for evidence of oceans on three moons of Jupiter: Europa,
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Ganymede, and Callisto. The spacecraft would successively orbit each of the moons
for extended data-gathering.
NASA combined NSI and JIMO into Project Prometheus. The cost estimate for
Project Prometheus over the next 5 years (FY2004-2008) is $3 billion ($1 billion for
NSI, plus $2 billion for JIMO). JIMO would be launched in 2012-2013. The head
of NASA’s space science program, Dr. Edward Weiler, is quoted in Science
magazine (March 28, 2003, p. 1970) as saying the estimate through 2012 is $8-9
billion, but cautions that the cost estimate is very preliminary because the program
is so early in its formulation. JIMO is a new request in the FY2004 budget, but
Congress included $20 million for it in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(P.L. 108-7) on which action was not completed until after NASA’s FY2004 budget
request was submitted to Congress, and hence the FY2004 request for JIMO was
announced.
The project may raise several questions. First is whether the agency can afford
such an expensive program at this time. Second is whether the mission is consistent
with NASA Administrator O’Keefe’s insistence that NASA be a “science-driven”
agency. In this case, some may argue that this is a “technology-driven” program,
since the intent is to develop nuclear technology, and it appears to some that a
science mission was conceived to justify development of the technology, rather than
the reverse. There is strong scientific interest in detailed studies of Europa, and
Congress approved a Europa mission in the FY2002 budget, capping its cost at $1
billion. In the FY2003 budget request, NASA terminated that mission because it was
too expensive. Initiating an even more expensive mission, which was selected
without competition (as OSS does with many of its other planetary exploration
programs), may spark debate about the choice of mission. At NASA’s request, the
Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council developed a “decadal”
planetary exploration plan in 2002, which recommended investigations of Jupiter and
its moons, but not JIMO specifically.17 In a June 5, 2003 letter to Dr. Weiler, the
SSB said that it did not have sufficient information about the science capabilities of
JIMO to determine whether it would meet the Jupiter-system objectives it had
presented. Third is public reaction to the use of nuclear power in space. NASA’s
launches of nuclear-powered spacecraft since the late 1980s have generated protests
by some public interest groups concerned about the environment or other issues.
Attempts by those groups to prevent the launches have failed, however.
The House approved full funding for Project Prometheus in the FY2004 VA-
HUD-IA appropriations bill after defeating (309-114) a Markey amendment that
would have shifted $114 million from Project Prometheus into the Superfund cleanup
program at the Environmental Protection Agency. The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended a $20 million cut from JIMO because it received the
unrequested $20 million in FY2003.
17 National Academies. National Research Council. Space Studies Board. New Frontiers
in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy. Washington, National Academies
Press, 2002.
CRS-24
New Frontiers (Pluto Probe). For FY2004, NASA is requesting $130
million for “New Frontiers,” a new category of mid-sized planetary exploration
projects costing approximately $650 million each. NASA hopes to begin a new
project within this category every three years. The first in the series is a probe to
explore Pluto, the only planet not yet visited by a NASA spacecraft.
Proposals to send a probe to Pluto have been controversial. NASA selected one
Pluto mission, but after the projected cost doubled (from approximately $300 million
to about $600 million), notified Congress it wanted to cancel the program. Congress
disagreed, and directed NASA to proceed with a Pluto probe. NASA issued a new
call for proposals that would cost less than $500 million, and selected the Pluto-
Kuiper Belt (PKB) mission for continued study. NASA then determined that it could
not afford that project, either, and did not include any funds for a Pluto probe in its
FY2003 budget request. A National Research Council study on planetary exploration
priorities, prepared at NASA’s request and released in 2002, identified a mission to
Pluto and the Kuiper Belt (thought to be the home of some comets) as the top priority
for the mid-sized class of missions, however. Scientists are anxious to launch a
probe to Pluto soon because they want to reach that planet before 2020 when Pluto
will move further from the Sun and its atmosphere may collapse. To reach Pluto
before then using today’s propulsion technology, the probe must be launched in the
2006 time frame so that it can obtain a “gravity-assist” from Jupiter before Jupiter
moves out of position. In the FY2003 budget, Congress directed NASA to fund the
Pluto probe as the first in the New Frontiers series. NASA is proceeding with the
program, and included funding for it in the FY2004 budget request. In the FY2004
VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, however, the House cut New Frontiers by $55
million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended full funding.
Space Telescopes. The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST, formerly
known as the Next Generation Space Telescope) is currently expected to be launched
in 2011. Its requested full cost budget for FY2004 is $254.6 million. In the FY2004
VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House provided $20 million less than this
amount, and also reduced funding for the Space Interferometer Mission (a space
telescope system scheduled for launch in 2009) by $8.15 million. The Senate
Appropriations Committee recommended an additional $2.5 million for a space
telescope-related project at a university, but otherwise made no changes to the
requested amount.
In March 2003, it became apparent that JWST was in danger of overrunning its
$1.6 billion total budget by $300 million. More than half of that shortfall will be
made up by the European Space Agency’s commitment to launch the telescope,
which will save NASA about $165 million in launch costs. Other savings will result
from reducing the diameter of the main mirror from 6.5 meters to 6 meters, making
certain other design changes, and cutting contractor costs. The smaller mirror
diameter will somewhat reduce the telescope’s sensitivity but still falls within
NASA’s guidelines for the project. A shortfall of $60 to $70 million remains to be
CRS-25
resolved. Some experts have suggested that the design changes may increase
operating costs once JWST is launched.18
JWST is seen by some as a replacement for the Hubble Space Telescope, which
was launched in 1990. Others consider it simply as the next in NASA’s series of
orbiting observatories, but not necessarily a replacement for Hubble. Current plans
call for Hubble to be retired at about the same time as JWST is launched, and NASA
plans to fund JWST from the “funding wedge” created by the reduction in Hubble
funding requirements. NASA estimates that it costs approximately $100 million per
year for the periodic Hubble servicing missions by space shuttle crews. This linkage
between funding for Hubble and funding for JWST is raising concern. Some
supporters of Hubble, who apparently would like to see its mission extended, are
concerned about the cost and schedule of JWST. For example, the conference report
on the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 108-10) notes that current
plans call for Hubble servicing missions to end in 2004 to free up funding for JWST.
The conferees directed NASA to study the possibility of an additional Hubble
servicing mission in 2007.
A related concern is whether there will be a gap between the end of Hubble
operations and the beginning of JWST operations. For example, the conference
report on the FY2002 VA-HUD-IA Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 107-272) directed
NASA to outline a “transition plan to guarantee uninterrupted continuity” between
the two missions. Although NASA refers to JWST as a follow-on to Hubble that will
build upon Hubble’s discoveries, it does not consider JWST a Hubble “replacement”
in the sense that data gathering from Hubble must immediately be followed by
JWST. NASA points out that JWST will operate at infrared wavelengths, whereas
Hubble observes mainly visible light. Consequently, according to NASA, the
scientists who will use JWST are a different subset of the astronomy community
from those who now use Hubble. Others expect there to be a substantial overlap
between the two groups and note that extending Hubble’s discoveries to greater
distances and earlier stages in the history of the universe is only possible through the
type of infrared observations that JWST will make possible. This is because light
from objects further away, emitted at earlier times, is shifted in wavelength in the red
direction, eventually becoming infrared even if it was originally emitted at visible
wavelengths. On the continuity question, some argue that enough Hubble data will
have been collected but not yet analyzed to keep astronomers busy for several years,
even if no new data were collected during a gap between Hubble and JWST, but
others counter that large space-based telescopes now represent such a large share of
astronomy capability and funding that an extended gap would have systemic
consequences for the astronomy community as a whole.
A related question is what to do with the Hubble when it is retired. NASA does
not want the telescope to make an uncontrolled reentry into Earth’s atmosphere
where pieces might impact populated areas. NASA currently plans to retrieve
Hubble using the space shuttle and return it to Earth in 2010. The space shuttle
Columbia tragedy, and the resultant loss of one of the four space shuttle orbiters, may
require a reassessment of those plans. The conference report (H Rept. 108-10) on
18 Space News, June 3, 2003.
CRS-26
the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs NASA to study the means for
disposing of Hubble “following the deployment of the Webb Telescope in the 2010
timeframe.”
Earth Science. The Office of Earth Science (OES) is responsible for NASA’s
Earth Science Enterprise. It has two themes: Earth Systems Science, and Earth
Science Applications. OES supports programs that focus on the effects of natural
and human-induced changes on the global environment. It seeks to answer the
questions: How is the Earth changing, and what are the consequences for life on
Earth?
NASA’s OES program constitutes the largest (in terms of funding) federally-
supported activity studying the Earth and its environment. OES uses space-based,
airborne, and ground-based instruments to acquire long-term data on the Earth
system, and supports research and analysis programs that assist scientists in
converting these data into knowledge. It also operates a data and information
management system to capture, process, archive, and distribute data to the scientific
community and the public. Another objective is development of remote sensing
technologies that can be used to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of future
Earth-monitoring missions.
The centerpiece of the Earth Science program is the Earth Observing System
(EOS), a series of three spacecraft designed to monitor the Earth’s life-support
systems. Two EOS satellites, Terra and Aqua, are in orbit. NASA expects the third,
Aura, to be launched in January 2004. OES describes the EOS system as
concurrently observing the major interactions of the land, oceans, atmosphere, ice,
and life that comprise the Earth system. The EOS Data Information System
(EOSDIS) collects, stores, processes, and transmits to researchers data from EOS
spacecraft. NASA also launches smaller, more focused satellite missions called
Earth Explorers that investigate particular phenomena. One example is Cloudsat,
which is designed to improve cloud modeling, contribute to better predictions of
cloud formation and distribution, and to lead to a better understanding of the role of
clouds in Earth’s climate system. Within the Earth Science Applications program,
NASA works with other agencies in applying the results of its earth science research
to national priorities.
Over the past two years, NASA has reformulated its Earth Science program to
align with President Bush’s Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and NASA’s
new strategic vision and mission. Among the changes is a new focus on factors that
may affect climate change other than carbon dioxide (CO ), such as methane,
2
aerosols, black carbon, and tropospheric ozone. NASA plans to build an Advanced
Polarimeter Instrument to study the non-CO factors. NASA was planning an EOS
2
Follow-on series of satellites that would continue to collect data similar to that
provided by the original EOS series in order to create a 15-year data set for scientists
studying global change. They need long term observations using instruments
gathering comparable data. The EOS Follow-on satellites are no longer part of
OES’s plans, however. Instead, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is now OES’
focus for obtaining continuity of Earth system science measurements (discussed
below). OES also is working with industry on a Landsat Data Continuity Mission
(LDCM) to provide continuity of data from the Landsat series of satellites. NASA
CRS-27
hopes that the private sector, rather than the government, will build the satellite. The
government would purchase the data it needed. Landsat 7, built and launched by
NASA, is currently in orbit, although a component in its sensor malfunctioned on
May 31 and the data currently being returned is not usable. (For more on Landsat,
see CRS Issue Brief IB92011.)
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. NASA is
requesting $1.552 billion for Earth Science. The FY2003 appropriation was $1.708
billion. The $1.552 billion is allocated to the two themes as follows: Earth System
Science, $1.477 billion; Earth Science Applications, $75 million. The Earth Science
Enterprise has one new initiative in FY2004: the Climate Change Research
Acceleration (see Table 7).
Table 7: FY2004 Earth Science New Initiative
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Climate Change
$26
$72
To build the Advanced Polarimeter
Research Acceleration
Instrument that will accelerate
research into non-CO factors
2
affecting global climate change.
Source: NASA FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations, the House cut Earth Science
Applications by $13 million from its requested level of $75 million. The requested
level is an 8.5% decrease from its FY2003 appropriation (in full cost accounting).
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of $15 million from Earth
Science Applications.
Key Issue: NASA’s Reformulated Global Climate Change Research
Program. NASA’s program to acquire systematic data to study global climate
change began in the 1980s and has been reformulated many times in response to
concerns about cost, and changing political views about the need for such data. In
the FY2004 budget, it is reformulated once again to reflect President Bush’s
approach. Shortly after taking office, President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol
regarding reduction of CO emissions (see CRS Issue Brief IB89005), and directed
2
the Secretary of Commerce to develop a new Climate Change Research Initiative
(CCRI) as the focus of U.S. efforts to study global climate change.
NASA’s revised program reflects this new approach with the initiation of the
Advanced Polarimeter Instrument, and the termination of plans for follow-on
satellites in the EOS series. One issue that arises from the termination of the EOS
Follow-on missions is how NASA will fulfill its commitment to the scientific
community to provide a 15-year data set of global change observations based on
instruments providing comparable data. NASA’s response is that it will do so
through the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), a
joint program among the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Oceanic and
CRS-28
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, in the Department of Commerce), and NASA.
DOD and NOAA are developing new weather satellites that meet both their needs,
while NASA develops new technologies to achieve that objective.19
NASA is developing new sensors for the NPOESS satellites through the
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which NASA describes as a “bridge” between
EOS and NPOESS. NPP is in the formulation phase; it has not been approved for
development yet. The FY2004 NASA request for NPP is $96 million; the estimate
for FY2004-2008 is $289 million. Although maintaining long-term continuity of
environmental monitoring and assessment is one of the missions for NPOESS, some
scientists may worry that obtaining scientific data for the long term study of climate
change may not be a high priority for DOD and NOAA, both of whose primary
responsibility in this area is weather forecasting. Budget constraints already are
arising in the NPOESS program, and choices may need to be made between sensors
for weather forecasting versus scientific research.20 The concern is that the latter may
not be included and data continuity could be lost.
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of $11 million from
the CCRI program, but an addition of $11 million for mission evaluation studies for
EOS follow-on missions. It also recommended an additional $25 million for
EOSDIS.
Biological and Physical Research. The Office of Biological and Physical
Research (OBPR) is responsible for NASA’s Biological and Physical Research
Enterprise. It has responsibility for three themes: Biological Sciences Research,
Physical Sciences Research, and Research Partnerships and Flight Support. OBPR’s
goals include determining ways to make human habitation of space safe, and to use
space as a laboratory to test fundamental principles of chemistry, biology, and
physics. OBPR supports a number of programs that investigate the biomedical
effects of space flight and the effects of gravity on biological processes, develop
technologies to support humans living in space, and enhance space crew health and
safety. Research activities sponsored by OBPR are carried out on the space shuttle,
on the International Space Station, as well as on aircraft and suborbital vehicles, and
in ground-based laboratories.
OBPR’s budgeting and planning are likely to be significantly affected, at least
in the short term, by the space shuttle Columbia tragedy. Columbia’s 16-day
scientific research mission (STS-107) hosted experiments sponsored in large part by
OBPR. Other OBPR research is conducted on the International Space Station, whose
schedule and utilization is being affected by the accident as well. How OBPR will
19 DOD and NOAA currently operate separate polar orbiting weather satellite systems. See
[http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/] for more on NPOESS.
20 NPOESS will succeed NOAA’s existing Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite series.
The last satellite in that series, NOAA N Prime, is under construction by Lockheed Martin.
A September 2003 accident at the contractor’s facility has jeopardized the launch date for
that satellite, which fell to the floor as it was being moved. What impact this incident may
have on the NPOESS program is not clear.
CRS-29
cope with the aftermath of the Columbia accident is the major issue facing the office
in FY2004 (see below).
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For OBPR,
NASA is requesting $972.7 million. For FY2003, Congress appropriated $862.3
million. The $972.7 million request is allocated to the three themes as follows:
Biological Sciences Research, $359 million; Physics Sciences Research, $353
million; and Commercial Research and Support, $261 million. OBPR has one new
initiative in FY2004: the Human Research Initiative.
Table 8: FY2004 Biological and Physical Research New Initiative
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Human Research
$39
$347
To accelerate the acquisition of
Initiative
knowledge and technology needed
for decisions on human exploration
missions beyond Earth orbit.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
The House-passed version of the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, and
the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill, do not make any major
changes to the request for OBPR.
Key Issue: Impact of the Columbia Accident. As discussed earlier, the
major issue confronting OBPR is how to recoup from the space shuttle Columbia
accident. Most of the research aboard Columbia’s STS-107 mission was sponsored
by OBPR, and a great deal of OBPR’s research is intended to be conducted aboard
the International Space Station (ISS). With the space shuttle fleet grounded,
construction of the space station is suspended. Also, the usual three-person ISS crew
complement has been temporarily reduced to two. Allocating crew time for
conducting scientific research on ISS has been an ongoing issue because NASA
states that “2 ½” people are needed to maintain and operate the station. That means
that with a three-person crew, only half of one person’s time can be devoted to
research. With only two crew members aboard, it is not clear how much research can
be accomplished.
Assuming that the shuttle returns to flight at some time, and construction of the
space station continues, the schedule for scientific research presumably could pick
up from where it was prior to the Columbia accident. However, prior to the
Columbia accident, many questions were unanswered about how much research
could be conducted on ISS. The partners in the ISS program agreed at the beginning
that after construction of the space station was completed, the space station would be
staffed by seven people (rotating on 4-6 month shifts). Several crew members would
be able to devote their entire time to scientific research, often cited as one of the main
reasons for building a space station. In 2001, however, the Bush Administration
took several steps to deal with the revelation of $4.8 billion in cost growth on the
CRS-30
space station program. Among them, it directed NASA to truncate construction of
the space station at a phase it calls “core complete” where the space station crew size
would remain at three instead of growing to seven. It also cut $1 billion from
OBPR’s research budget for the space station, and reduced the annual shuttle flight
rate to ISS to four (from six) for budgetary reasons. This meant less “upmass” (mass
being taken up to the space station) available for scientists to send experiments to
ISS.
Just before the Columbia accident, NASA was taking steps that suggested a
relaxation of some of these decisions. For example, it announced that the shuttle
flight rate to the station would increase to five per year, added funds to OBPR’s
FY2004 budget request for space station research, and initiated a program to build
an Orbital Space Plane to take crews to and from the space station. The Orbital
Space Plane (discussed under “Crosscutting Technologies” below) could offer the
capability by 2010 to increase the space station’s crew size to seven as originally
planned. Officially, however, the Bush Administration remains committed only to
building the truncated version of the space station.
Thus, the Columbia accident has complicated an already complex situation for
OBPR. How OBPR adjusts to these complexities, and how much its FY2004 budget
will be affected, is unclear at this time. The FY2004 request for OBPR’s space
station-related activities is $578 million.
Aeronautics Technology. The Aeronautics Technology theme, within the
Office of Aerospace Technology, is responsible for the agency’s R&D on
aeronautics. Aeronautics R&D has a long history of government involvement,
starting in 1915 with the creation of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA). NASA was established in 1958 using NACA as its nucleus,
and NACA’s research centers were transferred to the new agency. Although NASA
is better known for its space programs, supporters note that aeronautics is “the first
A in NASA.” The aeronautics theme consists of programs in vehicle systems,
airspace systems, and aviation safety and security. In FY2003, NASA called this
theme “Revolutionize Aviation.” In FY2001 and FY2002, aeronautics R&D was
integrated with space transportation activities in combined Technology Base and
Focused aerospace programs.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For FY2004,
NASA requested $959.1 million for Aeronautics Technology. A comparable figure
(in full-cost accounting) is not available for FY2003 appropriations. The shift to full-
cost accounting is particularly significant for the Aeronautics Technology theme,
because it is a major user of facilities such as wind tunnels, which were previously
budgeted under a separate account.
The FY2004 budget request for Aeronautics Technology includes three
initiatives (see Table 9), one in each of the theme’s three programs: an increased
emphasis on aircraft noise reduction in the Vehicle Systems program, accelerated
work on the National Airspace System in the Airspace Systems program, and a new
effort on aviation security in the Aviation Safety and Security program (formerly
known as the Aviation Safety program).
CRS-31
The requested budget for Vehicle Systems is $573.5 million. The noise
reduction initiative would be part of this program. Other changes in FY2004 would
include the conclusion of work on ERAST (a remotely piloted aircraft for
demonstrating long-duration flight at high altitudes) and Hyper-X (a pilotless aircraft,
called X-43, for demonstrating flight at hypersonic velocities), although work on
Hyper-X would continue as part of the Next Generation Launch Technology
program (part of the Space Launch Initiative). The ERAST program’s Helios aircraft
was destroyed on June 26, 2003, when it crashed into the Pacific near Hawaii during
a shakedown flight. A mishap investigation board has been appointed. The first
Hyper-X test flight ended in failure in June 2001 and one of the three X-43A craft
w a s d e s t r o y e d . T h e X - 4 3 A m i s h a p i n v e s t i g a t i o n b o a r d
[http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2003/03-43.html] released its
findings in July 2003. A second Hyper-X test flight, using another X-43A, is planned
for Fall 2003.
The requested budget for Airspace Systems is $217.1 million. This sum includes
$27 million for the NASA Exploratory Technologies for the National Airspace
System (NExTNAS) initiative. NASA plans to expand the NExTNAS initiative
significantly in future years, to $176 million in FY2008.
The requested budget for Aviation Safety and Security is $168.5 million. This
total includes $21 million for the new Aviation Security initiative, whose largest
component will be in the area of aircraft and systems hardening. NASA plans to
expand its efforts in aviation security further in future years, to a peak of $58 million
in FY2007.
Table 9: FY2004 Aeronautics New Initiatives
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Aviation Security
21
196
Addresses critical aviation security needs
that NASA is uniquely qualified to provide,
and develops technology for commercial
aircraft and airspace protection.
National Airspace
27
100
Enables technology, in cooperation with
System Transition
FAA, to transition to a next-generation
Augmentation
National Airspace system to increase
capacity, efficiency, and security of the
system.
Quiet Aircraft
15
100
Accelerates development and transfer of
Technology
technologies that will reduce perceived
Acceleration
noise in half by 2007 compared to the 1997
state-of-the-art.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate. Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House provided funding
increases for Aeronautics Technology in several areas. These include $1 million for
aircraft engine research, $1 million for small aircraft transportation systems (SATS),
CRS-32
$1.5 million for intelligent flight control systems, $500,000 for development of a
navigation aid (ARGUS), $2 million for research on an aircraft surveillance system
(ADS-B), and $5 million for ground-based turbulence detection (Project
SOCRATES). The House also directed NASA to report on efforts to establish an
interagency National Program Office for coordination of air traffic management
activities and to report by March 31, 2004, on how NASA’s National Airspace
System initiative is being integrated with the National Program Office. The House
report did not specify the total funding increase for Aeronautics Technology or
allocate the increases noted above to particular program areas within the theme.
The Senate Appropriations Committee report expressed concern about “the
steady decline in recent years” in NASA’s requested funding for aeronautics R&D.
It recommended increases of $15 million in each of three areas: future aircraft,
especially supersonic flight; future aviation systems, especially aviation security and
air traffic management; and technologies with direct application to military aircraft.
The Senate report also recommended an increase of $5 million to fund development
of a five-year aeronautics research budget, to be prepared by March 1, 2004. The
Senate report recommended several other increases for individual aerospace projects,
but did not specify which of these are specifically related to aeronautics.
Key Issue: Funding. The main issue for the Aeronautics Technology theme
is its overall funding level. Funding for aeronautics R&D has been reduced
significantly since its FY1998 peak of $920 million (not expressed in full-cost
accounting terms). The level of the FY2004 request and NASA’s plans for further
reductions in future years have proved contentious among congressional supporters
of the program. Supporters argue that more R&D in this area is needed to maintain
the health of the U.S. aviation industry and the international competitiveness of U.S.
aircraft manufacturers. NASA states that future funding levels may increase from
current plans as the result of collaborative efforts now being discussed among NASA,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and other agencies with interests in aviation.
The FY2004 policy debate over aeronautics R&D is likely to make frequent
reference to the November 2002 Report of the Commission on the Future of the
United States Aerospace Industry.21 The recommendations of this congressionally
established commission included specific goals for improved aviation system
capacity, safety, speed, noise, and emissions, as well as a significant increase in
federal support for basic aerospace research. Other key recent reports include the
January 2001 European Union document European Aeronautics: A Vision for 2020,22
whose recommendations for increased aeronautics R&D funding in Europe have
contributed to U.S. concerns about international competitiveness, and The NASA
2 1 T h e a e r o s p a c e c o mmi s s i o n r e p o r t i s avai l abl e onl i ne a t
[http://www.aerospacecommission.gov]. See also CRS Report RS21455, The Aerospace
Commission Report: A Synopsis, and Commission Recommendations for Congressional
Action, by Amanda Jacobs and Marcia S. Smith.
2 2 T he European Vision 2020 r eport is available online at
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/ growth/aeronautics2020/en/index.html].
CRS-33
Aeronautics Blueprint,23 issued in February 2002, in which NASA presented its
technology vision for aviation. The National Academy of Sciences is conducting an
external review of the Aeronautics Technology theme, but the report of that review
is not expected until after the completion of FY2004 appropriations action.
Education. The Office of Education is responsible for the Education
Enterprise. It has one theme: Education Programs. In previous budgets, the activities
in the Office of Education appeared under the budget heading “Academic Programs.”
These activities have been reorganized, consolidating programs that had been in
NASA’s Office of Human Resources & Education, and the Office of Equal
Opportunity Programs. The other five NASA enterprises also fund and manage
educational activities as part of specific space flight projects they sponsor. The
educational activities of the other enterprises are coordinated by the Office of
Education. NASA’s education programs include a broad array of activities designed
to improve science education at all levels — kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12)
and higher education. They include programs that directly support student
involvement in NASA research, train educators and faculty, develop new educational
technologies, provide NASA resources and materials in support of educational
curriculum development, and involve higher education resources and personnel in
NASA research efforts. The National Space Grant and Fellowship Program, which
funds research, education, and public service projects through university-based Space
G r a n t c o n s o r t i a , i s a d m i n i s t e r e d t h r o u g h t h i s o f f i c e
[http://www.education.nasa.gov/spacegrant/index.html].
Programs devoted to minority education (the Minority University Research and
Education Program—MUREP) focus on expanding participation of historically
minority-dominant universities in NASA research efforts. These programs develop
opportunities for participation by researchers and students from those institutions in
NASA activities. The objective is to expand NASA’s research base through
continued investment in minority institutions’ research and academic infrastructure
to contribute to the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics pipeline.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. NASA is
requesting $169.8 million for the Office of Education. Congress appropriated $202.2
million in FY2003. The Education Enterprise has one new initiative in FY2004 (see
Table 10).
23 The NASA Aeronautics Blueprint is available online at [http://www.aerospace.nasa.gov/
aero_blueprint].
CRS-34
Table 10: FY2004 Education New Initiative
(in $ millions)
Initiative
FY04
FY04-08
Comments
Request
Estimate
Education Initiative
26
130
Includes funds for the Educator Astronaut
program, the NASA Explorers Schools
Program, a Scholarship for Service program,
and Explorer Institutes.
Source: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Estimate.
Prepared by CRS.
In the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the House added $6.225 million
for the National Space Grant and Fellowship program, which would bring the
program to a level of $25.325 million for FY2004. The committee stated that this
would fund the current core program in 52 Space Grant Consortia, including 35 states
at $465,000 each, 17 states at $300,000 each, and $3.6 million for Workforce
Supplement Awards. Some of the other congressionally directed funding additions
in the bill may also come under this office, although it is not specified in the report
on the bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee did not make any major changes
to this account, but included a number of congressionally directed spending items.
Key Issue: “Educator Astronauts”. Mr. O’Keefe has made education one
of his priorities as NASA Administrator, elevating it to “enterprise” status within the
agency and consolidating many of NASA’s education activities into a single office.
Mr. O’Keefe also is expanding an effort initiated by his predecessor, Mr. Daniel
Goldin, to resume launching educators into space. NASA’s earlier program to launch
teachers into space ended after the 1986 space shuttle Challenger accident that
claimed the life of “teacher in space” Christa McAuliffe. She was part of a
“spaceflight participant” program begun by NASA to launch teachers, journalists,
and other private citizens into space. NASA was confident that the space shuttle,
while risky, was sufficiently safe for private citizens as long as they were adequately
trained and understood and accepted the risks. Mrs. McAuliffe was selected for
flight after a nationwide competition. Barbara Morgan was selected as her backup,
and both went through an approximately 4-month training program together. After
the accident, NASA was criticized for allowing a private citizen on the shuttle
because it was too risky. Mrs. Morgan returned to teaching third grade in Idaho, but
remained committed to the concept of launching educators into space and worked
closely with NASA’s education programs. In 1998, Mr. Goldin announced that Mrs.
Morgan would get her chance to fly on the shuttle, but as a career astronaut, after
receiving full training.24 Mrs. Morgan joined the astronaut corps later that year as
NASA’s first “educator astronaut.” Prior to the Columbia accident, she was
24 The announcement was made at the same time that NASA decided to send then-Senator
John Glenn into space aboard a space shuttle. Senator Glenn was one of the original
astronauts chosen in 1959, and, in 1962, was the first American to orbit Earth. He flew on
the shuttle in October 1998.
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scheduled on the crew of a shuttle mission in November 2003. With the shuttle fleet
now grounded, it is not clear when that flight will take place.
In 2002, Mr. O’Keefe announced that he would open opportunities for other
educators to become astronauts. In January 2003, NASA opened the nomination
process for the “Educator Astronaut Program” and more than 1,600 applications were
received. Educators were nominated by their students, families, or friends.
According to NASA, the purpose of the program is to generate renewed interest in
science and mathematics and cultivate a new generation of scientists and engineers
by nominating and recruiting educators for NASA’s astronaut corps. NASA expects
to select three to six educator astronauts through this process.
In the wake of the Columbia accident, some may question whether to proceed
with the Educator Astronaut Program. One difference from the previous Teacher in
Space program is that now the educators would be fully trained as NASA astronauts
rather than undergoing an abbreviated training regimen like Mrs. McAuliffe’s.
Nonetheless, some may question the concept of launching anyone on the shuttle
whose presence is not essential to completing a specific mission.
Space Flight Capabilities
Activities in this account blend those that previously were part of the Human
Space Flight account with most of the activities in the Office of Aerospace
Technology (everything except aeronautics, as discussed earlier). The latter
activities are located under the heading “Crosscutting Technologies.” NASA is
requesting $7.782 billion for Space Flight Capabilities in FY2004, of which $6.110
billion is for Space Flight, and $1.673 billion is for Crosscutting Technologies.
Space Flight. The Office of Space Flight supports the Space Flight Enterprise
(formerly the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise). Space
Flight has three themes: International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and Space and
Flight Support. The last theme merges the previous categories of Payload and
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Support, and Space Communications and Data
Systems, together with a few other NASA activities. The $6.110 billion request for
this category is allocated as follows: $1.707 billion for the space station; $3.968
billion for the space shuttle; and $434 million for Space Flight Support.
Space Station. The International Space Station (ISS) is designed to serve as
a scientific research facility for conducting a range of research activities in biology,
physics, and materials science, as well as for Earth and astronomical observations.
NASA expects that research performed in the near-zero gravity environment of the
space station will result in new discoveries in life sciences, biomedicine, and
materials sciences.
As noted earlier, ISS is being built as a partnership among the United States,
Russia, Japan, Canada, and ten European countries. An Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA) among the various governments, and Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its counterpart agencies, govern the
program. Construction of ISS began in 1998 and is now suspended pending the
space shuttle’s return to flight.
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FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 budget
request for the space station program can be viewed in different ways. The amount
requested under this budget category is $1.707 billion, but funding in other parts of
the budget are also part of the space station program, so the figure could be $2.285
billion or $2.835 billion. The House took no action on the space station program in
the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, pending release of the report on the
Columbia accident. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a $200
million cut to the ISS program.
The funding requested in this budget line is for construction and operation of the
space station. Customarily, NASA agrees that the costs for research aboard the
station, currently carried in the OBPR budget, also are part of the space station
request. (Over time, these costs variously have been placed in OBPR, or in the
International Space Station account. In FY2003, they were included in the OBPR
budget.) If those costs are added for FY2004, the request would be $2.285 billion.
As with the rest of the NASA budget, however, that request is expressed in full cost
terms and therefore is not directly comparable to the amount appropriated for
FY2003.
Two other costs arguably should be included in space station costs. First are the
costs for the Orbital Space Plane located under “Crosscutting Technologies” in the
Space Flight Capabilities account. The FY2004 request for OSP is $550 million,
which would yield a total FY2004 request for the space station of $2.835 billion.
The Orbital Space Plane is the follow-on to the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) once
planned by NASA to bring crews home from the space station in an emergency. The
CRV was included in the space station’s budget, and NASA “saved” $1 billion by
“indefinitely deferring” the CRV as one way of addressing the $4.8 billion cost
growth for ISS revealed in 2001 (see below). Despite NASA’s decision to account
for this program in a different part of NASA’s budget (and under a program called
Space Launch Initiative, even though the OSP is not a launch vehicle), it is difficult
to make the case that this program should not be included as part of space station
costs. Following NASA’s practice, CRS does not include the OSP request when
showing the FY2004 request for the space station, but notes that this cost probably
should be included.
Second are costs for the space shuttle flights that take crews and cargo to ISS.
Since 1993, when the current version of the space station program began, NASA has
not included shuttle costs in the space station cost estimate or annual budget. In the
era of full cost accounting, however, it is difficult to argue that they should be
excluded. Since all the shuttle flights scheduled for FY2004 are in support of the
space station, some may contend that the entire cost of the space shuttle program
should be attributed to the space station budget. Historically, CRS has followed
NASA’s practice of not including the shuttle costs with the space station budget, so
they will not be included here. But the shift to full cost accounting, designed to show
a program’s actual cost, implies that the shuttle costs should now be included. In
fact, since the space station itself primarily supports the mission of the Office of
Biological and Physical Research, some could suggest that all these costs should be
counted as part of OBPR. NASA has not yet taken that step, however.
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Key Issue: After the Shuttle Returns to Flight. Issues facing the space
station program while the space shuttle fleet is grounded are discussed above (see
“Agency-Wide” Issues). It is important to note, however, that the space station
program was the subject of considerable controversy prior to the Columbia accident
because of repeated cost overruns and cost growth, and is likely to be controversial
after the shuttle returns to flight as well.
The number of crew that can live aboard ISS is limited, in part, by the
availability of a “lifeboat” to bring them home in an emergency. The lifeboat
function is currently served by Russian Soyuz spacecraft (which must be replaced
every 6 months) that accommodate three people. Thus, ISS crew size has been
limited to a maximum of three (as noted, the size was reduced to two while the
shuttle is grounded so resupply requirements would not be as great). The
international agreements call for the United States to provide crew return for four
additional astronauts once assembly of the space station is completed. In 2001,
following the revelation of another $4.8 billion in cost growth (on top of a $7 billion
overrun) on the ISS program, the Bush Administration directed NASA to truncate
construction at a phase it calls “core complete.” As part of that decision, NASA’s
plan to build a crew return spacecraft was “indefinitely deferred,” meaning that space
station crew size would be limited to three crew members for the foreseeable future
instead of growing to seven. The reduction in crew size affects how much scientific
research can be conducted, and how many astronauts from the various countries
involved in the program have an opportunity to be part of ISS crews.
At the time of the Columbia accident, there were indications that the Bush
Administration was softening its position on the ISS program, announcing plans to
build an Orbital Space Plane that would allow the crew size to grow from three to
seven, as originally planned. However, the Administration remains publicly
committed only to building the truncated “core complete” version of the station.
How ISS will evolve in the wake of the Columbia accident is unclear at this
time. The partners are committed to keeping crews aboard ISS while the shuttle is
grounded. If the shuttle is grounded for an extended period, however, that decision
may need to be reassessed. The Russians operated seven space stations over three
decades without a space shuttle, so it is feasible to keep ISS operating without the
shuttle. But ISS was designed to take advantage of the crew- and cargo-carrying
capacity of the U.S. space shuttle. Most of the remaining ISS segments can only be
launched on the shuttle, and many of the scientific experiments also require the
shuttle for launch. If little science can be accomplished, some may question the
value of keeping a crew aboard, and the sagacity of asking astronauts and cosmonauts
to accept the risks inherent in human spaceflight simply to maintain ISS systems.
Conversely, some question how long ISS could continue to function with no one
aboard. Progress spacecraft can dock with ISS automatically to reboost it and keep
it at the proper altitude. However, a major system malfunction that could not be
remedied by sending commands from ground stations could imperil the station.
Assessing the likelihood of such a scenario is difficult.
Another issue is that although Russia is obligated under existing agreements to
provide two Soyuz and a certain number of Progress spacecraft each year, Russia has
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expressed concern for some time about its financial ability to provide those
spacecraft. Hence, questions may arise as to how to finance Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft if the Russian government is unable to fund them. Under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA), NASA is prohibited from paying Russia for such
spacecraft unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain
technologies to Iran. (See CRS Issue Brief IB93017 for more on the space station
program and the INA.)
Space Shuttle. On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart
as it returned to Earth from a 16-day scientific research mission. All seven astronauts
aboard were killed. An investigation is underway. The shuttle fleet is grounded.
The Columbia tragedy is discussed under Agency-Wide Issues (above) and in CRS
Report RS21408.
The space shuttle is a partially reusable launch vehicle capable of taking crews
and cargo into space. It is the only U.S. launch vehicle currently capable of placing
humans in space. The shuttle system consists of the airplane-like orbiter, two solid
rocket boosters (SRBs) on either side, and a large cylindrical “external tank” that
holds the fuel for the orbiter’s engine. The orbiters are reusable, and were built for
100 flights each. The SRBs provide additional thrust for the first 2 ½ minutes of
flight, then detach from the vehicle and fall into the ocean where they are recovered
and refurbished for reuse. The External Tank (ET) is not reusable. It contains liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen to fuel the orbiter’s engines. The fuel is depleted by the
time the orbiter reaches orbital altitude (approximately 8 minutes after launch), at
which time the ET is jettisoned. It breaks apart as it descends from orbit, and the
pieces fall into the Indian Ocean. Columbia was one of four remaining orbiters in
the shuttle fleet (Challenger was destroyed in the 1986 accident that took the lives
of seven astronauts). Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour remain.25
According to NASA, the primary goals of the space shuttle program are to fly
the shuttle safely, meet the flight schedule (the “manifest”), improve mission
supportability, and improve the system. NASA itself is the primary customer for the
shuttle, although industry, other government agencies, academia, and international
entities use shuttle services, usually on a reimbursable basis. In FY2001, NASA
planned an average of seven shuttle launches per year. For budgetary reasons, that
was cut to six per year in FY2002. For FY2003 and beyond, NASA planned to
reduce the annual flight rate to four for budgetary reasons, with the exception of
another servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope in late 2004. However, in
the FY2003 amended budget request (released in November 2002), NASA
announced plans to increase the flight rate to five per year beginning in FY2006.
Among the many issues NASA must assess in the wake of the Columbia tragedy is
how many annual shuttle flights can be accommodated with the remaining three
orbiters.
25 Another orbiter, Enterprise, was built for atmospheric tests in the 1970s. It was not
designed to be flown in space, and has been transferred by NASA to the Smithsonian
Institution.
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The United Space Alliance (USA), a joint venture between Lockheed Martin
and Boeing, conducts most of the ground operations associated with the shuttle
under contract to NASA. The space shuttle workforce consists of approximately
17,000 contractors and 1,800 civil servants.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. For FY2004, NASA
is requesting $3.968 billion for the shuttle program. A comparable figure (in full cost
accounting) is not available for FY2003 appropriations. Congress did approve the
full amount requested for the shuttle in FY2003 ($3.2 billion, not in full cost
accounting), and added $50 million to cover the costs of the Columbia investigation
and resulting required remedial actions. Furthermore, it exempted the shuttle
program (both the funding in the shuttle budget line, and shuttle-related personnel
and facilities costs in the “Investments and Support” line, a combined total of $3.836
billion in full cost accounting). The House took no action on the space shuttle
program in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, pending release of the
report on the Columbia accident. The Senate Appropriations Committee
recommended full funding of the shuttle program
Key Issue: Return to Flight. The space shuttle Columbia tragedy already has
been discussed (see Agency-Wide Issues). Attention is focused on what is needed
to fix the shuttle system. After the 1986 Challenger accident, the shuttle fleet was
grounded for 32 months. However, NASA officials project that the shuttle may
return to flight in 2004, although they stress that a firm date cannot be set until they
fully understand what must be done to meet the 15 recommendations of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) that must be completed before
“Return to Flight.” CAIB’s chairman, Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, stated that he
does not believe it will take more than 6-9 months for NASA to comply with the
Board’s return to flight recommendations. Additional recommendations were made
if NASA expects to continue using the shuttle in the long term. For more on the
Columbia accident and issues for Congress, see CRS Report RS21408. For a
synopsis of the CAIB’s recommendations, see CRS Report RS21606.
As discussed earlier, the American public and policy makers first must decide
whether human space flight is worth its risks and costs. Based on past experience,
many expect that decision to be yes. The questions next are what can be done to
lower the risk, and how much Congress and the Administration are willing to spend
to do that.
NASA has been engaged in a series of “safety and supportability” upgrades to
the shuttle for several years. (“Supportability” refers to changes made to combat
obsolescence.) Debate over shuttle upgrades became intense during the FY2002
budget cycle after NASA decided to terminate what it earlier had described as its
highest priority safety upgrade, the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit, because of cost
increases and weight gain. Then, in the original FY2003 budget submission, NASA
reduced how much it planned to spend on both safety and supportability upgrades in
the FY2002-2006 time period by 34%—from $1.836 billion to $1.220 billion.
NASA Administrator O’Keefe insisted the proposed funding level would not
compromise safety. In September 2002, NASA canceled its highest priority
supportability upgrade, the Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) because
of cost overruns and schedule delays. Questions began to arise about NASA’s
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abilities to successfully upgrade the shuttle. In FY2004, NASA is requesting funding
to begin a “Shuttle Life Extension Program” (SLEP) to ensure the shuttle can safely
operate as long as it is needed. How much that program may change in light of the
Columbia accident is unclear. During consideration of the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA
appropriations bill, the House adopted a Hall amendment to use $15 million of the
$281 million requested for SLEP to develop concepts to increase crew survivability.
The shuttle program is facing many challenges in its 22nd year of service.
Columbia was the oldest of the shuttle orbiters—it was used for the very first shuttle
flight in 1981. The ill-fated Columbia mission was its 28th flight. Each orbiter is
designed to make 100 flights, but many now wonder if age was a contributing factor
to the accident. If so, this may raise questions about the health of the three remaining
orbiters. These questions come on the heels of NASA’s November 2002
announcement that it will continue to rely on the shuttle until at least 2015, and
perhaps 2020 or longer.
Some may ask why NASA does not procure new shuttle orbiters if aging is the
problem. The last orbiter, Endeavour, was built following the 1986 Challenger
accident. Endeavour made its first flight in 1992. It cost $1.8 billion (then-year
dollars), a cost that was lower than expected in part because “structural spares” (i.e.
major segments of the fuselage) were available since NASA earlier had considered
building an additional orbiter. There are no orbiter structural spares today, and the
company that built the orbiters (the space division of Rockwell International) was
bought by the Boeing Company in 1996. It is not expected that sufficient tooling
and skilled workers are available to build more orbiters without substantial cost and
time. However, lacking a replacement for the shuttle, and NASA’s intent to
continue operating the shuttle until 2015 or beyond, it is possible that a decision
could be made to rebuild that capability.
NASA, sometimes jointly with the Department of Defense (DOD), has been
trying to build a replacement for the shuttle, rather than acquiring more orbiters. Its
attempts to do so over the past 20 years have failed, however, in part because of
overly optimistic expectations about the availability of new technologies, and about
the market for such a new “2nd generation” reusable launch vehicle (RLV). NASA’s
November 2002 announcement that it would continue to rely on the shuttle was
based on the conclusion that an economic case cannot be made at this time for
building a 2nd generation RLV to replace the shuttle. Instead, NASA wants to build
an Orbital Space Plane to take crews to and from the space station, and invest in
technology for the next six years to enable a decision in 2009 on what new launch
vehicle to build (see Crosscutting Technologies below). In the aftermath of the
Columbia accident, some policy makers want NASA to reinvigorate its efforts to
build a replacement for the shuttle, and others want NASA to accelerate the OSP,
even though it would not have the crew or cargo capacity of the shuttle. (As currently
envisioned by NASA, the OSP would provide a capability for four crew members,
instead of the seven that can be accommodated on shuttle, and could only carry cargo
if the crew seats were removed from the vehicle. Also, OSP is not itself a launch
vehicle, as is the shuttle).
Yet another issue under discussion is the relationship between NASA and its
contractors on the shuttle program. As noted, there are approximately 17,000
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contractors working on the shuttle program. United Space Alliance (USA) conducts
most of the operations for the shuttle under the Space Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC), a 6-year contract, with two 2-year options, that was signed in 1996. NASA
exercised the first of those 2-year options in 2002, extending the contract to
September 2004. Questions have been raised for many years by the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Committee (ASAP), Congress, and others about the safety implications of
transitioning so much of the shuttle work to a contractor because of budget
constraints, personnel reductions, and the loss of skills.26 In the aftermath of the loss
of Columbia, those concerns are being carefully revisited.
Space and Flight Support. This new budget category includes space
communications, space shuttle payload processing, expendable launch vehicles,
rocket propulsion systems testing, environmental activities (dismantling of the Plum
Brook nuclear facility and environmental compliance and restoration), and advanced
systems programs.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request
is $434.3 million. A comparable figure (in full cost accounting) for FY2003
appropriations is not available. The House made no major changes to this
subaccount in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill. Nor did the Senate
Appropriations Committee.
Crosscutting Technologies. This new budget category represents funding
for the activities of the Office of Aerospace Technology, except for aeronautics,
which is included in the Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account (discussed
earlier). Crosscutting Technologies has three themes: Space Launch Initiative,
Mission and Science Measurement Technology, and Innovative Technology Transfer
Partnerships. The total request for Crosscutting Technologies is $1.673 billion. That
is allocated as follows: Space Launch Initiative, $1.065 billion; Mission and Science
Measurement Technologies, $438 million; and Innovative Technology Transfer
Partnerships, $169 million.
Space Launch Initiative: OSP and NGLT. The Space Launch Initiative
(SLI) has undergone a metamorphosis since the FY2003 budget was originally
submitted. The changes were announced when NASA submitted an amended
FY2003 budget request to Congress in November 2002. The SLI program had been
focused on developing technologies to build a “2nd generation” reusable launch
vehicle (RLV) to replace the space shuttle (which is the 1st generation RLV), with a
decision expected in 2006 on what design to build. The new RLV was intended to
significantly reduce the cost of launching people and cargo into space. Now, SLI is
focused on (1) developing an Orbital Space Plane (OSP) to take crews to and from
the space station, and (2) a Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program
to develop expendable and reusable launch vehicle technologies to permit a decision
in 2009 on what new vehicle to build. The new vehicle would be for taking cargo
only, not crews, into space. Although it is included in the “Space Launch Initiative,”
the Orbital Space Plane is not a launch vehicle. It is a spacecraft to take crews to and
from the space station. It will be launched into space aboard an existing expendable
26 See CRS Report RS21419 for excerpts from reports and testimony about shuttle safety.
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launch vehicle (such as an Atlas 5 or Delta 4), not a new reusable launch vehicle.
Hence, its inclusion in a budget category for developing space launch technologies,
instead of in the space station budget, may be controversial.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request
for the reformulated Space Launch Initiative is $1.065 billion, composed of $550
million for the Orbital Space Plane and $514.5 million for Next Generation Launch
Technology. Comparable figures (in full cost accounting) for FY2003 appropriations
are not available. The House took no action on the Orbital Space Plane or Next
Generation Launch Technology programs in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
bill, pending release of the report on the Columbia accident. The Senate
Appropriations Committee made a number of recommendations about these
programs, but did not change the funding. The OSP comments are discussed below.
Regarding NGLT, the committee expressed concern that NASA is not maintaining
control over its investment in NGLT, and directed NASA to report by January 31,
2004 on outyear costs for projects within the NGLT program, the criteria for
selecting technologies for investment, and the metrics used to determine whether or
not to continue particular projects (p. 122).
Key Issue: Orbital Space Plane—“Crew Return” versus “Crew
Transport”. As noted earlier, crew size aboard the International Space Station (ISS)
is limited in part by the number of people that could be returned to Earth in an
emergency, such as a catastrophic hull depressurization or a fire, via a “lifeboat.”
Today, one Russian Soyuz spacecraft, which can accommodate three people, is
always docked at ISS to provide this lifeboat function. Under international
agreements that govern the ISS program, Russia is required to provide that lifeboat
capability for three people throughout the duration of the space station program.
Those agreements also require NASA to provide a lifeboat, or “crew return vehicle,”
for four more crew members by the time assembly of the space station is completed.27
This would allow the size of the “Expedition” crews aboard ISS to grow to seven
people as stipulated in those agreements.
NASA indefinitely deferred its plans to build a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV),
however, in the wake of the $4.8 billion cost growth revealed in 2001. At the time,
NASA estimated the cost of the CRV as about $1.2 billion and expected it to be
ready in 2006. A CRV would be able only to return crews to Earth from the space
station (it would be taken into orbit, unoccupied, via the space shuttle). By contrast,
a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV) could take people both to and from the space station.
When Mr. O’Keefe became NASA Administrator, he decided that if a crew return
capability was to be built, a CTV would be preferable because of its additional
capabilities. In an amended FY2003 budget request, submitted to Congress in
November 2002, the Bush Administration proposed a program to design and build
a CTV, even though the Administration currently is committed only to building the
“core complete” version of the space station (discussed above), which does not
27 Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its counterpart agencies—the
European Space Agency, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos), the
Science and Technology Agency of Japan, and the Canadian Space Agency—specify the
crew return responsibilities of the United States and Russia.
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include either a U.S. CRV or a CTV. Many viewed this as an indication that the
Bush Administration eventually would agree to building the space station as
originally planned, capable of supporting a crew of seven.
NASA calls the CTV an “Orbital Space Plane” (OSP). The agency proposed
$2.405 billion for the OSP program for FY2003-2007, some of which ($882 million)
would be shifted into OSP from funding that had been allocated for building a 2nd
generation RLV. For FY2003, the request was $296 million. Congress generally
approved this reformulation of the SLI program in the FY2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7), but neither approved nor rejected the specific
amount for OSP, giving NASA latitude to decide on the FY2003 funding level in its
operating plan. In its initial FY2003 operating plan, NASA shows $367.8 million
being allocated to OSP (not expressed in full cost accounting).
NASA’s plan is to conduct design studies for OSP through FY2004, after which
it will decide whether to proceed with development. NASA emphasizes that the
$2.405 billion figure for FY2003-2007 is preliminary, since it does not yet know
what design will be selected. NASA issued a set of “level 1" (basic) requirements
for the OSP in February 2003, and “level 2” (more detailed) requirements in
September 2003. As long as the design meets those requirements, the agency insists
that it does not have a preference for whether the OSP is reusable or expendable, has
wings, is a capsule, or any other specific feature. In fact, it does not have to be one
vehicle. It must support four crew members on the space station, but could be two
spacecraft, each for two people, for example. The point is that the agency wants to
give industry latitude on how to meet the requirements. The FY2004 request for OSP
is $550 million, with a 5-year (FY2004-2008) estimate of $3.7 billion.
NASA’s plan in early 2003 was for OSP to be available first in a CRV mode in
2010, and in 2012 as a CTV (plans to accelerate it are discussed below). That would
mean that Soyuz spacecraft would be needed until 2010 as lifeboats for ISS
Expedition crews. In the existing international agreements that govern the ISS
program, Russia is obligated to ensure that one Soyuz is docked to ISS through the
lifetime of the station (with each Soyuz spacecraft being replaced every 6 months).
A 1996 U.S.-Russia agreement stipulates that through completion of assembly of the
space station, Russia will provide crew return capability for three ISS Expedition
crew members who comprise crews that are composed of two Americans and one
Russian, or two Russians and one American. Eleven Soyuz spacecraft were specified
for this purpose. According to NASA, that commitment will be satisfied in the
spring of 2006. By 2006, the U.S. CRV was expected to be available, allowing crew
size to increase to seven. In the event the U.S. CRV were not yet available, the
agreement simply calls on the parties to “discuss appropriate action.” Thus, there
could be a several year gap when Americans might be limited to residency aboard
ISS only when the U.S. space shuttle is docked. (Russia is obligated to continue to
keep one Soyuz docked at the station at all times, but after 2006 would control who
could use it, with no guarantee that Americans would be included.) As noted in the
earlier discussion about the space station program, the Iran Nonproliferation Act
prevents NASA from paying Russia to use Soyuz unless Russia does not proliferate
certain technologies to Iran.
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Even before the Columbia accident, some argued that NASA should focus on
building a simple vehicle that could be ready by 2006, rather than 2010, to ensure
that the space station can be fully utilized for scientific research. In the aftermath
of the Columbia accident, many argue that OSP should be accelerated because there
now are only three orbiters. NASA has indicated to its contractors that it would like
to have OSP available two years earlier (by 2008). Space News reported in its
September 1, 2003 issue that it could cost $14 billion through 2009 to build the OSP
on an accelerated schedule, compared with the $3.7 billion in NASA’s project budget
for FY2003-2008.
The Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 108-143) made a number of
comments and recommendations about OSP, including that it is skeptical that OSP
is the only approach for NASA to take astronauts to and from the space station (p.
121). The committee also expressed concern that the OSP program not experience
the same management problems and cost overruns of the space station program, and
directed the Administration to create an independent oversight committee to examine
the OSP’s design, technology readiness and cost estimate.
Mission and Science Measurement Technology. In the FY2003
budget, this was called “Pioneering Revolutionary Technology.” Its objectives are
to develop science-driven architectures and technology, create knowledge from
scientific data, and develop capability for assessing and managing mission risk. Its
three programs are: the Computing, Information, and Communications Technologies
Program, the Engineering for Complex Systems Program, and the Enabling Concepts
and Technologies Program.
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request
is $438.4 million. A comparable figure (in full cost accounting) is not available for
FY2003 appropriations. The House made no major changes to this subaccount in
the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill. Nor did the Senate Appropriations
Committee.
Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships. In the FY2003 budget,
the proposed Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships effort was called
Commercial Technology Program. According to the FY2004 budget estimate, this
theme is responsible for technology transfer, and for awarding contracts under the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR) programs. Both SBIR and STTR were created by Congress and
apply to all government agencies that conduct a certain level of research and
development (R&D).28 They involve set-asides for small businesses of a percentage
of each agency’s extramural R&D funds. The FY2004 budget request for this
activity is a significant change from previous years. NASA proposes terminating
many of its technology transfer activities (discussed below).
FY2004 Budget Request and Congressional Action. The Administration’s
FY2004 request is $169.3 million. A comparable figure (in full cost accounting) is
28 For more information on the SBIR and STTR programs see CRS Report 96-402, The
Small Business Innovation Research Program, by Wendy H. Schacht.
CRS-45
not available for FY2003 appropriations. The FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
bill, as passed by the House, provides an increase of $24 million to the President’s
budget request for continuation of the Commercial Technology Program targeted for
elimination. S. 1584, as reported to the Senate from the Committee on
Appropriations, would fund two of the technology transfer elements including the
Glenn Research Center at $2 million and the National Technology Transfer Center
at $2 million.
Key Issue: Termination of the Commercial Technology Program.
Responsibility for technology transfer is conferred upon NASA in the 1958 National
Aeronautics and Space Act (the “Space Act”) that created NASA. In pursuit of this
mission, NASA has established a series of programs and institutions designed to
promote cooperative R&D leading to the commercialization and application of
technology. The Commercial Technology Program, located in the Office of
Aerospace Technology, facilitates the creation of technology partnerships among
government, industry, and academia to promote the commercialization of R&D
developed within the NASA research endeavor. “Space Act Agreements” form the
legal construct under which these cooperative arrangements take place (similar to
“Cooperative Research and Development Agreements” created under the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act29). The movement of technology to the private
sector is expedited by technology transfer agents associated with the Offices of
Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) located at the agency’s ten field
centers (including JPL), six Regional Technology Transfer Centers, and the National
Technology Transfer Center. Ten business/technology incubators assist small
companies develop NASA technologies. Several publications, including
Innovations, Spin-off, and TechBriefs, as well as an agency-wide technology transfer
database, TechTracS, augment these efforts. The Small Business Innovation
Research Program is also considered an element of the technology transfer activity.
Licensing of NASA-owned patents is handled by the Office of the General Counsel.
Since its inception, NASA has approached technology transfer in various ways;
these efforts appear to have resulted in a fairly extensive amount of cooperative work
leading to the commercialization of new technologies for the marketplace. In the
FY2004 budget, NASA has proposed a reorganization of the technology transfer
endeavor to reflect NASA’s new mission and vision. According to the agency, this
mission is to “pursue activities unique to [NASA]” and includes a “shift in emphasis
from spin-out (non-aerospace) to spin-in (NASA applications).”30 The focus is on
cooperative R&D leading to the commercialization of technologies of value to
NASA. To accomplish this goal, the agency proposes a “re-formulation” of the
technology transfer program based on a new theme of “Innovative Technology
Transfer Partnerships.”
29 For more information see CRS Issue Brief IB85031, Technology Transfer: Use of
Federally Funded Research and Development, by Wendy H. Schacht.
30 NASA designates “spin-in” as the agency’s internal application of new technologies
developed by the private sector. This concept is in contrast to “spin-out” or “spin-off”
where NASA technologies are applied to industry needs.
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As outlined in the FY2004 budget proposal, the major expenditure of funds in
pursuit of the establishment of innovative technology partnership will be through the
Small Business Innovation Research program. Funding for this activity is derived
from a 2.5% set-aside of each agency’s extramural R&D budget. Another
government-wide effort, the Small Business Technology Transfer program, also will
be a part of this new initiative. Currently financed by a 0.15% set-aside of the
agency’s extramural R&D budget, the set-aside will increase to 0.3% in FY2004 as
mandated by P.L. 107-50, the Small Business Technology Transfer Program
Reauthorization Act. These programs will focus on the development and support of
mechanisms to “accelerate and augment development of mission relevant SBIR
technology for NASA missions” as well as on efforts to move SBIR technology into
the marketplace. To this end, NASA intends to propose statutory changes to permit
the application of SBIR funds, matched by private sector money, for “post-phase II
dual use technology development.” Current law allows agencies to use government
funds, but not those dedicated to the SBIR activity, to commercialize SBIR
technologies necessary to achieve mission requirements.
An additional component of the new technology transfer initiative is what the
agency terms the “NASA Enterprise Engine.” The purpose of this activity, according
to NASA, is to facilitate “spin-in” by supporting the development of “innovative,
dual-use technologies” as well as to assist industry in the commercialization of these
technologies. While NASA notes that this will not be a “pure venture capital fund,”
the agency will invest federal funds in conjunction with private sector financing to
support those R&D activities needed to generate new technologies.31 From the
available information it is unclear what this approach entails, but indications are that
a mechanism “similar” to the private sector In-Q-Tel program funded by the Central
Intelligence Agency will be created as an “additional management tool that
complements existing programs.” The effort is to be managed by the NASA’s Office
of the Administrator, rather than the Office of Aerospace Technology.
The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance states that over 200,000 inquiries
were serviced by NASA technology transfer agents in the past year. However, the
new Innovative Technology Transfer Partnership Initiative requires termination of
the Commercial Technology Program, resulting in the discontinuation of many of
those organizations within which these transfer agents reside, including the Regional
Technology Transfer Centers and the business/technology incubators. Spin-off will
cease publication. The Commercial Technology Activity at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory would also end. The operation and responsibilities of the National
Technology Transfer Center would be altered to reflect the new priorities and the
work competed. However, H.R 2861, the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill
passed by the House, would provide an additional $24 million to the President’s
budget to continue the Commercial Technology Program. S. 1584, as reported to the
Senate from the Committee on Appropriations, would fund two of the technology
transfer elements including the Glenn Research Center at $2 million and the National
Technology Transfer Center at $2 million.
31 For a discussion of laws related to federal loan or federal loan guarantee programs see
CRS Report RL30346, Federal Credit Reform: Implementation of the Changed Budgetary
Treatment of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, by James M. Bickley.
CRS-47
The proposed reorientation of the NASA technology transfer program raises
several issues that Congress may wish to explore. Foremost among possible
concerns is the effect closing the Technology Transfer Centers and the incubators
may have on individual firms, cooperative R&D, and the NASA mission given the
extensive use of these facilities and/or expertise documented above. While the SBIR
and STTR programs have proven to be successful across the federal government,
issues remain regarding the operation of these activities that may raise questions as
to their contribution to technology transfer within the context of the NASA goal of
“spin-in.” Congress may want to address whether reliance on these specific
programs to the exclusion of other forms of technology transfer might compromise
the mission responsibilities of NASA. In addition, as the move toward a “modified”
federal venture capital program is proposed in the form of the “Enterprise Engine,”
Congress may find instructive a discussion of the legal, legislative, and political
concerns associated with such an initiative.
Out-Year Budget Projections
NASA’s FY2004 budget estimate contains the out-year budget projections
shown in Table 11. Such projections are always subject to change, but can be
indicative of the direction in which the Bush Administration wants NASA to head.
Recovery from the space shuttle Columbia accident could have a significant effect
on these out-year projections.
The projections in the FY2004 budget request are somewhat more generous than
in the FY2003 request. In the FY2003 request, NASA’s budget was anticipated to
rise 3.8% from FY2003 to FY2004, 1.9% from FY2004 to FY2005, 2.6% from
FY2005 to FY2006, and 3.2% from FY2006 to FY2007. In total, the budget was
forecast to rise 11.8% from FY2003 to FY2007. The new forecast is for the budget
to rise 15% from FY2004 to FY2008.
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Table 11: NASA FY2004 and Out-Year Budget Estimate
(in $ millions)
Category
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Science, Aeronautics &
7,661
8,269
8,746
9,201
9,527
Exploration
Space Science
4,007
4,601
4,952
5,279
5,573
Earth Science
1,552
1,525
1,598
1,700
1,725
Bio. & Phys. Res.
973
1,042
1,087
1,118
1,143
Aeronautics
959
932
939
934
916
Education
170
169
169
170
170
Space Flight Capabilities
7,782
7,746
7,881
8,066
8,247
Space Flight
6,100
6,027
6,053
6,198
6,401
Space Station
1,707
1,587
1,586
1,606
1,603
Space Shuttle
3,968
4,020
4,065
4,186
4,369
Space Flight Support
434
419
402
407
429
Crosscutting Technologies
1,673
1,720
1,828
1,868
1,846
Space Launch Initiative
1,065
1,124
1,221
1,257
1,224
Mission & Sci. Msmt
438
435
439
439
444
Innovative Tech. Trans.
169
161
168
172
179
Inspector General
26
28
29
30
31
Total
15,469
16,043
16,656
17,297
17,806
Percentage Change from
.9*
3.7
3.8
3.8
2.9
Previous Year
Source: NASA FY2004 Budget Estimate (except for percentage change from previous year for FY2004, which
was calculated by CRS).
Prepared by CRS.
*Compared to NASA’s FY2003 appropriation level of $15.339 billion. If compared to the FY2003 request, the
FY2004 request is 3.1% higher.
Over the next five years (FY2004-2008), funding for Science, Exploration, and
Technology would increase 24%. The major driver in the increase for Science,
Exploration, and Technology is the Space Science Enterprise, which would receive
a 36% increase over that 5-year period (from $4.07 billion in FY2004 to $5.573
billion in FY2008). A large portion of that increase apparently would be devoted to
Project Prometheus. Funding for the Earth Science Enterprise would increase about
10%, from $1.552 billion to $1.725 billion. The Biological and Physical Research
Enterprise would rise 17%, from $973 million to $1.143 billion. That budget
estimate was developed prior to the Columbia accident, however, and is especially
subject to change. Aeronautics would decline by 4%, from $959 million to $916
million. Education would remain level at $170 million.
Funding for the Space Flight Capabilities would increase by 6% over the 5-year
period. Space flight—which includes the space station and space shuttle—would
increase approximately 5% from $6.110 billion to $6.401 billion. This profile could
change, of course, depending on the outcome of the space shuttle Columbia accident
investigation. As formulated prior to the accident, funding for the shuttle would
increase (from $3.968 billion to $4.369 billion), and space station construction and
operations would decline (from $1.707 billion to $1.603 billion). Funding for
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Crosscutting Technologies would rise 10%, from $1.673 billion to $1.846 billion, as
funding for the Orbital Space Plane ramps up.