The Constitution vests Congress with broad authority to discipline its Members. Only since 1964, however, have the Senate and House of Representatives established formal rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures to address allegations of illegal or unethical conduct by Senators, Representatives, officers, and staff. These rules and procedures also provide a framework for addressing allegations through investigations and potential punishments.
In 1964, the Senate established its first permanent ethics committee—the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, which was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics in 1977. In 1967, the House first established a permanent ethics committee—the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, which was renamed the Committee on Ethics in 2011. Previously, Congress had dealt case by case with allegations of misconduct, used ad hoc and select investigatory committees, and relied on election results as the ultimate arbiter in questions of wrongdoing.
This report examines the creation of House and Senate codes of conduct, the formation and evolution of the House and Senate ethics committees, and the House and Senate ethics processes.
For additional information, please refer to CRS Report 98-15, House Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus; CRS Report RL30650, Senate Select Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus; CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Conduct: History, Authority, and Procedures, by Jacob R. Straus; and CRS Report R45078, Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice, by Todd Garvey.
The Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."1 One legal scholar wrote that the power to discipline in this clause provides the House of Representatives and the Senate the ability to "maintain their own institutional integrity and the 'proper functioning of the legislative process' … [and] guarantee[s] Congress' existence as a separate but equal branch of government."2 Historically, the House and Senate have issued ethics sanctions for acts that have been interpreted as improper conduct and that have included support of rebellion, disloyalty, corruption, and financial wrongdoing.3
Public and congressional perceptions of wrongdoing or conflicts of interest by Members of Congress have changed over time. What might be viewed today as blatant impropriety could have been an accepted norm or simply ignored years ago. For example, when Daniel Webster was chair of the Senate Finance Committee (1833-1837), he was also on the payroll of the Bank of the United States. Very few colleagues, however, criticized him for being a bank official or for his practice of going from the Senate to the Supreme Court, which was then housed in the Capitol, to argue cases in which he had a legislative or financial interest. According to Dr. Richard Baker, former Senate historian, Webster made no effort to keep his business ties a secret.4
Historically, neither the House nor the Senate had a mechanism to consistently exercise disciplinary powers, if necessary, against Members. If allegations of misconduct were made, the House or Senate chose "to deal, on a case-by-case basis, only with the most obvious acts of wrongdoing, those clearly 'inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member.'"5 The choice of dealing with potential misconduct on a case-by-case basis often resulted in the House's or Senate's creation of an ad hoc or select committee to investigate and make potential disciplinary recommendations;6 the consideration of allegations, without prior committee action, by the whole House or Senate;7 or the reliance on publicity and having to stand for reelection as the potential major forms of redress for allegedly unethical behavior in Congress.8 As Dr. Baker observed, "for nearly two centuries, a simple and informal code of behavior existed. Prevailing norms of general decency served as the chief determinants of proper legislative conduct."9
Not until the 1940s were concerns raised over the lack of specific standards of conduct and requirements for financial disclosure for government officials,10 and about the potential impact outside income might have on Members' decision making and behavior.11 For example, in 1946, during the 79th Congress (1945-1946), Senator Wayne Morse introduced a resolution to require Senators to disclose sources of outside income.12 His resolution, which was not adopted, was predicated on the idea that Members' behavior should be above suspicion and that the disclosure of income would dispel rumors of impropriety.13
In 1951, criticism of congressional investigative procedures began to increase with some commentators claiming that Members were abdicating responsibility for their behavior by relying on voters to "punish" misbehavior. At least according to one observer, voters, however, might not possess adequate knowledge of their Member's behavior and were often quick to "forgive" Members disciplined by the House or Senate.14
The 85th Congress (1957-1958) adopted a general Code of Ethics for Government Service covering officials and employees in all three branches of government.15 Initially proposed in 1951 by Representative Charles Bennett, the Code of Ethics was adopted following a House investigation of presidential chief of staff Sherman Adams, who was alleged to have received valuable gifts from an industrialist being investigated by the Federal Trade Commission.16 The standards included in the Code of Ethics for Government Service are still recognized as continuing ethical guidance in the House and Senate.17
The reliance on unwritten norms of conduct existed in Congress until the 1960s. In 1966, political scientist Robert Getz observed that "the combination of historical precedent, the fear of partisan motivations, and the requirement of functioning in an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation has given rise to the view that Congress is not the forum before which the membership should be disciplined."18
In the 1960s, investigations of alleged misconduct by Bobby Baker, secretary to the Senate majority, and Representative Adam Clayton Powell drew further attention to the lack of specific congressional standards of conduct and a means of enforcing congressional self-discipline.19 Subsequently, the Senate (1964) and the House (1967) each established an ethics committee.20 Each committee was given the authority to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by Members, officers, and employees; to adjudicate evidence of misconduct; to recommend penalties, when appropriate; and to provide advice on actions permissible under congressional rules and law.21
In 1967, the House created the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct to serve as the internal ethics committee.22 In 1968, the House adopted its first Code of Conduct.23
House Rule XXIII contains the House Code of Official Conduct.24 First established in the 90th Congress (1967-1968),25 the Code of Official Conduct "requires that each Member, officer, or employee conduct himself so as to reflect creditably on the House and to adhere to the spirit and letter of the rules of the House and the rules of its committees. The code also contains provisions governing the receipt of compensation, gifts, and honorariums, as well as the use of campaign funds."26 In addition to the Code of Official Conduct, Rule XXIV (Limitations on Use of Official Funds) and Rule XXV (Limitations on Outside Earned Income and Acceptance of Gifts)27 "contain provisions governing the receipt of compensation, gifts, and honoraria. They also address the use of campaign funds, proscribe discrimination in employment, and bar certain 'non-House' uses of house stationery."28
The Committee on Ethics consists of 10 Members, 5 from each party.29 A substantial part of the committee's work is advisory and is performed by its Office of Advice and Education, which provides information and guidance to House Members, officers, and employees on House rules and standards of conduct applicable to their official capacities.30 The committee provides training for House staff, reviews privately sponsored travel, and evaluates and certifies all public financial disclosure reports filed by Members, candidates for the House, and senior House staff.31
The remaining committee work comprises investigations of Members, officers, and employees of the House and adjudication of cases against Members. The committee's investigative and adjudicative functions are found in House Rule X, clause 5(a)(3); Rule XI, clause 3; and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.32
Complaints alleging misconduct or House rules violations by House Members, officers, or staff can be filed with the Committee on Ethics by a Member, through the Ethics Committee's "File a Compliant" form on its website,33 through a referral from the Office of Congressional Conduct (OCC),34 or through direction by the House of Representatives.35 If the Committee on Ethics determines that an investigation is necessary, an ad-hoc investigative subcommittee can be formed. If an investigatory subcommittee is formed, it is populated by a group of Members who do not serve on the Committee on Ethics that were designated by the Speaker and the minority leader (at the beginning of each Congress), members of the Committee on Ethics, or both.36
If the investigative subcommittee finds that a violation of the House rules has occurred and transmits a Statement of Alleged Violations (formal charges) to the chair and ranking Member of the Committee on Ethics, the committee chair is then required to appoint an ad-hoc adjudicative subcommittee. The members of the adjudicative subcommittee are those members of the Committee on Ethics who were not members of the investigative subcommittee together with the chair and ranking Member of the committee. The subcommittee judges the evidence in the Statement of Alleged Violations and recommends sanctions, if the subcommittee concludes they are warranted.
In November 2010, in her opening remarks of an adjudicatory subcommittee hearing, then-chair of the Committee on Standards, Representative Zoe Lofgren, explained the adjudicatory process.
The role of an Adjudicatory Subcommittee is to determine, at a hearing, whether any count of the Statement of Alleged Violation has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. The purpose of this adjudicatory hearing is to do just that. However, it is important to bear in mind that this proceeding is a hearing, not a trial.
Attorneys from the Committee's non-partisan, professional staff are the moving party in these proceedings. Their role is to make a case for the Statement of Alleged Violation adopted by the Investigative Subcommittee.
At the adjudicatory hearing, the burden of proof rests with the Committee counsel to establish the facts alleged in each count of the Statement of Alleged Violation by clear and convincing evidence.
[The respondent] will have an opportunity to present his side of the story, should he wish to do so. A respondent is not required to present a case in his defense, and should [the respondent] chose not to present a case, the Subcommittee will not and may not draw a negative inference from that fact.
As members of the Adjudicatory Subcommittee, we are neither accusers nor are we defenders of our colleague…. Our job is to act impartially as finders of fact and law. We are honor bound to do so without regard to partisanship or bias of any sort. We are required to act honestly and fairly based on the evidence presented to us during the adjudicatory hearing.37
Following an adjudicatory subcommittee investigation, if determined to be necessary, the committee has historically recommended one of several punishments. These have included expulsion,38 censure,39 reprimand,40 and "Letters of Reproval" and "Letters of Admonition."41 Prior to the completion of House action, some 25 Members have left the House after court convictions, after inquiries were initiated, or after charges were brought by the committee.42 Departure from the House typically ends a case because the committee does not have jurisdiction over former Members.
The committee's first publicly announced action was in 1968 at the request of Speaker John McCormack.43 This was an inquiry into roll-call voting irregularities that resulted in some Members who were out of town being recorded as having voted. The committee concluded that the problem was not deliberate and was the result of an overworked tally clerk, and urged the House to install a modernized system of voting.44
On January 31, 2007, to address criticisms leveled against the closed nature of the Committee on Ethics, then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and then-Minority Leader John Boehner announced the creation of the Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement in the House of Representatives.45 Chaired by Representative Michael Capuano, the task force was charged with considering "whether the House should create an outside enforcement entity, based on examples in state legislatures and private entities."46
On December 19, 2007, Chairman Capuano released a report on behalf of several task force members and introduced H.Res. 895 to create an office of congressional ethics, composed of six board members jointly appointed by House leaders.47 On March 3, 2008, Chairman Capuano released proposed amendments to H.Res. 89548 and on March 11, the House adopted H.Res. 895.49 The first board members were appointed in July 2008.50 The Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE), now the Office of Congressional Conduct (OCC), has been reauthorized by the House as part of the rules package in each subsequent Congress.51 In the 119th Congress, the OCE was renamed the OCC.52
Regardless of the balance between the OCC and the Committee on Ethics, OCC only has jurisdiction over House Members, officers, and employees. To date, the Senate does not have a comparable entity.
In 1964, the Senate created the Select Committee on Ethics,53 which was made permanent in 1977 and renamed the Senate Committee on Standards and Conduct.54 In 1968, the Senate adopted its code of conduct.55
In 1968, the Senate first adopted its code of conduct.56 Senate Rules XXXIV through XLIII contain the Senate Code of Official Conduct.57 In 2007, pursuant to the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, several sections of the Senate Code of Official Conduct were amended.58 These amendments included placing restrictions on former Senators and senior staff who become federally registered lobbyists;59 requiring disclosure by Senators and staff of postemployment job negotiations; implementing protections against Senators influencing hiring decisions based on political affiliation; and amending the Senate gift rules.60 The rules are as follows:
Like its House counterpart, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics is bipartisan and consists of six members, three from each party.61 It has both a disciplinary and advisory function.62 Unlike the House committee, the Senate Ethics Committee does not separate its investigative and adjudicatory functions, and it has no "statute of limitations" for investigations of alleged past violations.63
In the Senate, no restrictions exist on who can file a complaint or allegation with the committee. Once a sworn complaint has been received or if the committee initiates an inquiry into possible wrongdoing by a Senator, Senate officer, or Senate employee, committee rules establish a multi-stage review and adjudication process.64 The committee first begins a preliminary inquiry. If there is substantial evidence of a violation, charges are brought, and the committee begins an adjudicative process to determine the merits of the charges and appropriate sanctions. As a consequence of committee action, Senators have been expelled,65 and censured,66 for their behavior. In addition, at least two Senators resigned prior to expected expulsion and multiple Senators have been admonished by the Select Committee for their actions.67
Since the creation of the House and Senate ethics committees, entities both inside and outside of Congress have periodically evaluated the committees' work.68 These evaluations have resulted in an episodic debate over whether Members of Congress are doing a good job in following the mandate of the Constitution for self-discipline.
Inevitably, congressional ethics enforcement is often linked to appearances of impropriety by Members69 and changing perceptions on "conflict of interest."70 Often the perception of wrongdoing or a conflict of interest is all that is needed for an investigation. Ethicist Michael Josephson summarized the importance of the perception of wrongdoing.
The core concept of this ... ethical consciousness is the demand that public servants perceive and avoid both actual and apparent wrongdoing ... it is no defense that an act is legal or that there is no actual impropriety. It is enough that the conduct creates an inference of wrongdoing in the mind of a reasonable observer. More than ever, the public demands that its elected officials avoid both actual and apparent wrongdoing.71
Evaluations often coincide with or follow periods when numerous or notorious ethics questions involving Members arise. Following these periods, Members, experts, and the public often seek to redefine standards and create new enforcement mechanisms. Sometimes the House or Senate or both chambers act; on other occasions, no action is taken, or there is prolonged discussion or delay. Since the 1960s, however, Congress has developed more elaborate ethical standards and more structured means of self-discipline.
In seeking to be fair to Members, and not to prejudice the consideration of an allegation, the House and Senate ethics committees have typically been viewed to have operated quietly over the years. At times, some have also perceived the committees to be slow or reluctant to investigate and discipline colleagues, and have offered criticisms on the basis of that perception.72 Subsequently, numerous proposals have been introduced in the Senate and the House to create an "independent" ethics organization. In partial response to those criticisms, in the 110th Congress (2007-2009), the House created the Office of Congressional Ethics, now renamed the Office of Congressional Conduct, an independent ethics review body.73 The Senate has not established a comparable office.
During the 82nd Congress (1951-1953), Senator J. William Fulbright introduced S.Con.Res. 21 to create an ethics commission of private citizens appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate.74 While not adopted by the Senate, S.Con.Res. 21 was favorably reported by a subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. In addition, the subcommittee, chaired by Senator Paul Douglas, recommended government-wide ethics changes including financial disclosure, restrictions on lobbying by former Members of Congress, regulation of campaign costs, restrictions on honoraria, and guidelines for representing constituent concerns before executive agencies.75
In the 96th Congress (1979-1981), Senator William Roth introduced S.J.Res. 144 to "establish an Independent Investigating Commission on Ethics to conduct investigations of allegations of improper conduct by Members of Congress arising out of the FBI investigation known as 'ABSCAM.'"76 The commission would have
establish[ed] a five-person independent commission of senior statesman to assist the Ethics Committees in both the Senate and the House by conducting investigations and making reports concerning the serious allegations of wrongdoing that have been made. These senior statesmen would have [had] the right to independently receive complaints and initiate investigations only of those matters directly related to the FBI investigation known as "ABSCAM." The Ethics Committees, would [have] retained the right to review any findings and to recommend any appropriate action to the full Senate and House.77
S.J.Res. 144 was referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs and did not receive further consideration.
The next discussion of a noncongressional ethics entity occurred during the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), when the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress held hearings on the congressional ethics process.78 Sitting and former Members of Congress, as well as congressional scholars, discussed the pros and cons of entities outside Congress assisting the ethics committees in the enforcement of congressional rules of conduct. Subsequently, the House Members on the committee recommended that "the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct should be authorized to use, on a discretionary basis, a panel of non-Members in ethics cases."79 No further action was taken.
During the 105th Congress (1997-1998), the House Ethics Reform Task Force, cochaired by Representatives Robert Livingston and Benjamin Cardin, considered the use of "distinguished private citizens" (including former Members of the House and judges) in the ethics process. Some witnesses before the task force had suggested the participation of "outsiders" would enhance public trust and confidence and minimize partisanship. Task force members, however, feared that the use of private citizens would interfere with the constitutional responsibility of each House to discipline its Members. A majority of the task force also believed that incumbent House Members better understand the practices of the House, and that Members accused of misconduct should be judged by their peers.80
Accordingly, the task force recommended, and the House adopted, a policy of appointing a bipartisan reserve "pool" of House Members to serve on any House Committee on Ethics investigative subcommittees if needed.81 This is still the practice in the House.
There was a high level of interest in an independent ethics authority in the 109th Congress (2005-2006) when numerous bills were introduced.82 Nonetheless, in March 2006, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs voted against a proposal to establish an independent office to enforce congressional ethics and lobbying laws. Subsequently, the Senate defeated a similar amendment to a pending gift and lobbying reform measure (S. 2349).83
In the 110th Congress, on January 18, 2007, during consideration of the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007 (S. 1), the Senate again rejected an amendment to establish a Senate Office of Public Integrity.84
Outside enforcement of conduct or anticorruption provisions against Members of the House and Senate is potentially complicated by Article I, Section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution, which provides Member protection from prosecution and questioning by outside law enforcement for certain official, legislative conduct. The Constitution states, "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place."85 The Constitution's "Speech or Debate" clause may provide a practical necessity for internal congressional investigations and punishment of Members who violate chamber rules, federal law, or state law.86
| 1. |
U.S. Congress, Senate, "Article I, Section 5, clause 2," The Constitution of the United States, https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/senate-and-constitution/constitution.htm#a1_sec5. |
| 2. |
Gerald T. McLaughlin, "Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power to Expel, to Exclude and to Punish," Fordham Law Review, vol. 41, no. 1 (October 1972), p. 43. |
| 3. |
U.S. Congress, Senate, "About Expulsion," https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/expulsion.htm; U.S. Congress, Senate, "About Censure," https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/censure.htm; and U.S. Congress, House, "List of Individuals Expelled, Censured, or Reprimanded in the U.S. House of Representatives," https://history.house.gov/Institution/Discipline/Expulsion-Censure-Reprimand/. |
| 4. |
Richard Baker, "The History of Congressional Ethics," in Bruce Jennings and Daniel Callahan, eds., Representation and Responsibility: Exploring Legislative Ethics (Plenum Press, 1985), p. 8 (hereinafter Baker, "The History of Congressional Ethics"). |
| 5. |
Baker, "The History of Congressional Ethics," p. 3. |
| 6. |
For example, see Clarence Cannon, Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, vol. VI (GPO, 1935), Ch. CLXXXVIII, §§396-398, pp. 551-560 (hereinafter Cannon's Precedents); and U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee for Contribution Investigation, Report of the Select Committee, pursuant to S.Res. 205, as extended by S.Res. 218 and S.Res. 227, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., April 7, 1956, S.Rept. 84-1724 (GPO, 1956). |
| 7. |
For example, see Cannon's Precedents, vol. VI, Ch. CLXXV, §236, pp. 402-405. |
| 8. |
James C. Kirby et al., Congress and the Public Trust (Atheneum, 1970), p. 203. See also "Qualifications and Conduct," in Guide to Congress, 5th ed., vol. II (CQ Press, 2000), p. 930. |
| 9. |
Baker, "The History of Congressional Ethics," p. 4. |
| 10. |
"Ethics," in Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1965), p. 1409. |
| 11. |
Sen. Wayne Morse, "Reports by Senators on Sources of Outside Income," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 92, part 8 (July 23, 1946), p. 9741. |
| 12. |
S.Res. 306 (79th Cong.). |
| 13. |
Sen. Morse, "Reports by Senators on Sources of Outside Income," p. 9741. Senator Morse continued to introduce his measure into the 1960s and expanded its scope to include all three branches of government. For more information, see Sen. Wayne Morse, "Disclosure of Assets by Members of Congress," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 109, part 19 (December 20, 1963), pp. 25275-25278. In 1951, President Harry S. Truman sent a message to Congress supporting public disclosure of personal finances by senior members of all three branches of government. "Financial Disclosure Law Recommended by President Harry S Truman on September 27, 1951," Congressional Record, vol. 123, part 24 (September 27, 1977), pp. 31313-31314. |
| 14. |
H.H. Wilson, Congress: Corruption and Compromise (Rinehart and Co., 1951), p. 116. Wilson recounts that in 1914 Representative James McDermott (IL) was censured by the House and subsequently reelected in 1916. |
| 15. |
72 Stat. B12, H.Con.Res. 175. See also "Code of Ethics For Government Service," House proceeding, Congressional Record, vol. 103, part 12 (August 28, 1957), p. 16297; and "Code of Ethics For Government Service," Senate proceeding, Congressional Record, vol. 104, part 10 (July 11, 1958), p. 13556. |
| 16. |
Rep. Charles Bennett, "Code of Ethics for Government Service," remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 97, part 5 (June 26, 1951), pp. 7176-7178; and Testimony of Rep. Charles Bennett, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Code of Ethics For Government Service, hearings, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1956 (GPO, 1956), pp. 3-5. |
| 17. |
For example, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ethics, "IX: Code of Ethics for Government Service," House Ethics Manual, December 2022 print, https://ethics.house.gov/manual/code-of-ethics-for-government-service. The Code of Ethics for Government Service is also included in at least one federal agency's regulations. For example, see 21 C.F.R. §19.6. The Code of Ethics for Government Service is cited by many House and Senate investigations, although it is not generally considered legally binding because the code was adopted by congressional resolution, not by public law. For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Investigation of Certain Allegations Related to Voting on the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, report, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 108-722 (GPO, 2004), p. 38; and U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Ethics, Korean Influence Investigation, report, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 95-1314 (GPO, 1975), pp. 5-6. |
| 18. |
Robert S. Getz, Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue (Van Nostrand & Co., 1966), p. 113. |
| 19. |
"Ethics and Criminal Prosecutions," in Guide to Congress, 5th ed., vol. II (CQ Press, 2000), pp. 943-988. |
| 20. |
Senate: "Proposed Amendment of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration," Congressional Record, vol. 110, part 13 (July 24, 1964), pp. 16929-16940. The Senate Committee was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics in 1977. See U.S. Congress, Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Committee System Reorganization Amendments of 1977, report to accompany S.Res. 4, 95th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 95-1 (GPO, 1977), pp. 4-5; and "Committee System Reorganization," Congressional Record, vol. 123, part 3 (February 1, 1977), pp. 3660-3699. For more information on the Senate Select Committee on Ethics see CRS Report RL30650, Senate Select Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus. House: "Committee on Standards of Official Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 113, part 7 (April 13, 1967), pp. 9426-9448. For more information on the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct see CRS Report 98-15, House Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus. |
| 21. |
U.S. Congress, Senate, "Standing Order 77," Senate Manual Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the United States Senate, S. Doc. 110-1, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (GPO, 2008), pp. 128-137; and U.S. Congress, House, "House Rule XI, cl. 3," Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, One Hundred Tenth Congress, H.Doc. 109-157, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. (GPO, 2007), pp. 568-593. |
| 22. |
H.Res. 418 (90th Congress). Rep. William Colmer, "Committee on Standards of Official Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 113, part 7 (April 13, 1967), pp. 9426-9448. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ethics, House Ethics Manual, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2022 print, pp. 4-7, https://ethics.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Dec-2022-House-Ethics-Manual-website-version.pdf#page=18. In 2011, the committee was renamed the Committee on Ethics. H.Res. 5 (112th Congress), agreed to January 5, 2011; "Rules of the House," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (January 5, 2011), p. H7. In 2008, the House created the Office of Congressional Ethics (renamed to the Office of Congressional Conduct [OCC] in the 119th Congress with the adoption of H.Res. 5 on January 3, 2025) to serve as an external review body for ethics complaints against Members, officers, and employees of the House. The relationship between the Committee on Ethics and the OCC is established in House and committee rules. For more information on the Office of Congressional Conduct, see "Office of Congressional Conduct" below, and CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Conduct: History, Authority, and Procedures, by Jacob R. Straus. |
| 23. |
H.Res. 1099 (90th Congress), agreed to April 1, 1968. For more information the history of the Code of Official Conduct, see U.S. Congress, House, Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, prepared by Jason A. Smith, parliamentarian, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Doc. 117-161 (GPO, 2023), §1095, p. 983. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/HMAN-118/pdf/HMAN-118.pdf#page=996 (hereinafter, Jefferson's Manual One Hundred Eighteenth Congress). |
| 24. |
U.S. Congress, House, "Rule XXIII, Code of Official Conduct," Rules of the House of Representatives One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, 119th Cong., 1st sess., January 16, 2025, pp. 40-42, https://rules.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/rules.house.gov/files/documents/houserules119thupdated.pdf (hereinafter Rules of the House of Representatives One Hundred Nineteenth Congress). |
| 25. |
H.Res. 1099 (90th Congress), agreed to April 1, 1968. For more information the history of the Code of Official Conduct, see U.S. Congress, House, Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, prepared by Jason A. Smith, parliamentarian, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Doc. 117-161 (GPO, 2023), §1095, p. 983. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/HMAN-118/pdf/HMAN-118.pdf#page=996 (hereinafter, Jefferson's Manual One Hundred Eighteenth Congress). |
| 26. |
U.S. Congress, House, Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, prepared by Lewis Deschler, Parliamentarian of the House, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Doc. 94-661, volume 3 (GPO, 1976), p. 1699, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-DESCHLERS-V3/pdf/GPO-HPREC-DESCHLERS-V3-3-2-1.pdf (hereinafter Deschler's Precedents). |
| 27. |
Rule XXIV, Limitation on the Use of Official Funds: Rules of the House of Representatives One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, p. 42; and Jefferson's Manual One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, §1096, pp. 1000-1004. Rule XXV, Limitations on Outside Earned Income and Acceptance of Gifts: Rules of the House of Representatives One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, p. 43, and Jefferson's Manual One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, §§1099-1103, pp. 1005-1032. |
| 28. |
U.S. Congress, House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House, 118th Cong., 2nd sess. (GPO, 2024), §7, p. 526, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-118/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-118.pdf#page=532. Additionally, House Rule XXVI applies Title I of the Ethics in Government Act, which requires Members of Congress and covered officers and staff to file financial disclosure statements with the Clerk of the House, to the House of Representatives. See Rules of the House of Representatives One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, p. 47, and Jefferson's Manual One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, §§1103, pp. 1034-1035. For more information on the Ethics and Government Act and financial disclosure, see CRS Report R47320, Financial Disclosure in the U.S. Government: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jacob R. Straus. House Rule XXVII requires disclosure by Members and staff of employment negotiations. See Rules of the House of Representatives One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, p. 47, and Jefferson's Manual One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, §1103a, pp. 1036-1037. |
| 29. |
For a list of historic members of the Committee on Ethics, see CRS Report 98-15, House Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus. For a current list of committee members, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ethics, "About Us: Members," https://ethics.house.gov/committee-members. |
| 30. |
P.L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1775-1776 (1989). |
| 31. |
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ethics, Summary of Activities, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, 118th Cong., 2nd sess. January 2, 2025, H.Rept. 118-973 (GPO, 2025), pp. 4-5, https://ethics.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Summary-of-Activities-118th.pdf#page=10. |
| 32. |
P.L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1774 (1989). |
| 33. |
The process and requirements to submit information relating to potential misconduct can be found on the Ethics Committee website at https://ethics.house.gov/file-a-complaint. H.Res. 5, §2(g)(2) (118th Congress), agreed to January 9, 2023. Between 1997 and 2022, only a Member of the House could file a complaint with the Committee on Ethics. During that time, a complaint from a non-House Member could only be made directly to the Ethics Committee if it was accompanied by written certification by a Member that the information is "submitted in good faith and warrants the review and consideration of the committee." |
| 34. |
For a discussion of the OCC, see CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Conduct: History, Authority, and Procedures, by Jacob R. Straus. In the 119th Congress (2025-2026), the House reauthorized the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) and renamed it the Office of Congressional Conduct (OCC) as part of the rules package (H.Res. 5, §4(d)(2)), adopted on January 3, 2025. |
| 35. |
The committee, under most circumstances, may not investigate alleged violations that occurred before the third previous Congress. U.S. Congress, House, "House Rule XI, cl. 3(b)(3)," Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Doc. 117-161 (GPO, 2023), §806, p. 612, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/HMAN-118/pdf/HMAN-118.pdf#page=625; U.S. Congress, "Acts Committed in Prior Congress or Before Becoming a Members," House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House (GPO, 2024), Chapter 25, §18, p. 535, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-118/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-118.pdf#page=541. |
| 36. |
For example, see "Appointment of Members to be Available to Serve on Investigative Subcommittees of the Committee on Ethics," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165 (April 10, 2019), p. H3249, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-165/issue-62/house-section/article/H3249-1. Twenty Members (10 from each party) have generally been designated for potential service on an investigative subcommittee. Rules for selecting subcommittee members can be found in Committee Rule 19 (a)(1). U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ethics, "Rule 19. Investigative Subcommittee." Rules, 119th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 2025, pp. 28-29, https://ethics.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Committee-Rules-for-the-119th-Congress.pdf#page=32. |
| 37. |
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Adjudicatory Subcommittee Hearing in the Matter of Representative Charles B. Rangel Opening Statement of Chair Zoe Lofgren, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., November 15, 2010, pp. 1-2, at http://docs.house.gov/ethics/RangelChairOpeningStatement.pdf. |
| 38. |
Pursuant to the Article I, Section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution, the House has the power to expel a Member, after the Member has taken the oath of office, by a two-thirds vote those present and voting. Although this power has been used sparingly, Members who have been expelled generally committed offenses related to official conduct as a Member, or because the Member was deemed "unfit to participate in the deliberations and decisions of the House and whose presence in it tends to bring that body into contempt and disgrace." For more information see Wm. Holmes Brown and Charles W. Johnson, House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House, (GPO, 2003), Ch. 25, §20, pp. 516-517 (hereinafter Brown and Johnson, House Practice); Deschler's Precedents, Ch. 12, §13.1, p. 177; Asher C. Hinds, Hind's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives (GPO, 1907), vol. 2, §1286, pp. 852-857. See also CRS Report R45078, Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice, by Todd Garvey. |
| 39. |
Censure, unlike expulsion, does not appear in the Constitution, although the House derives its authority from Article I, Section 5, clause 2. A censure is a formal vote by the majority of Members present and voting on a resolution disapproving a Member's conduct. Often, the resolution requires the Member to stand in the "well" of the House chamber to receive a verbal rebuke and reading of the censure resolution by the Speaker of the House. For more information see Brown and Johnson, House Practice, Ch. 25, §22, pp. 518-519; Deschler's Precedents, Ch. 12, §16, pp. 196-198. |
| 40. |
A reprimand is often considered by the House to be a lesser level of disapproval of the conduct of a Member than that of a censure. Prior to the 1970s, the terms reprimand and censure were often considered to be synonymous and were often used together in resolutions. While a censure resolution results in the reading of the resolution by the Speaker to a Member standing in the well, a reprimand is merely adopted by a vote of the House with the Member "standing in his place," or is merely implemented by the adoption of the committee's report. For more information see Deschler's Precedents, Ch. 12, §16, p. 196; and Cannon's Precedents, vol. VI, Ch. CLXXV, §263, pp. 402-405. |
| 41. |
A public Letter of Reproval is a sanction created by the committee and first used in 1987. It is an administrative action authorized under the rules of the House and issued as part of a public report from the committee after a formal investigation. The Committee on Ethics has resolved several complaints by means of a letter to a respondent without a formal investigation. According to the committee, "In the past such letters have not been formally termed 'letters of admonition,' but this term accurately describes the substance of these letters." Unlike a Letter of Reproval, a Letter of Admonition is not specifically authorized under House rules. Such a letter was sent to a Member of the House in 2004. For more information see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Summary of Activities One Hundred Eighth Congress, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 108-806 (GPO, 2005), pp. 62-68, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt806/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt806.pdf#page=68. |
| 42. |
These Members resigned from the House, chose not to run for reelection, or were defeated. |
| 43. |
"Communication from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 115, part 12 (June 19, 1969), p. 16629. |
| 44. |
"Communication from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 115, part 12 (June 19, 1969), p. 16629. |
| 45. |
U.S. Congress, Speaker of the House of Representatives, "Pelosi Announces Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement," press release, January 31, 2007. |
| 46. |
The other Members of the task force were Rep. Bobby Scott, Rep. Marty Meehan, Rep. Betty McCollum, Rep. Lamar Smith (ranking Member), Rep. Dave Camp, Rep. Dave Hobson, and Rep. Todd Tiahrt. Rep. David Price was appointed to the task force in July 2007 when Rep. Meehan resigned from Congress. |
| 47. |
U.S. Congress, House Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement, Report of the Democratic Members of the Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement, committee print, 110th Cong., 1st sess., H.Prt. 110-1 (GPO, 2007), pp. 4-5. Subsequently, on February 27, 2008, Ranking Member Lamar Smith and the other Republican Members of the task force introduced H.Res. 1003 to provide increased accountability and transparency in the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. |
| 48. |
Rep. Michael E. Capuano, "Amendments to the Proposed Reforms to the Ethics Process," Dear Colleague letter, March 3, 2008. |
| 49. |
"Establishing An Office of Congressional Ethics," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 154 (March 11, 2008), pp. H1515-H1536. |
| 50. |
U.S. Congress, Speaker of the House of Representatives, "Pelosi, Boehner Announce Appointments to New Office of Congressional Ethics," press release, July 24, 2008. For a list of current board members, see U.S. Congress, Office of Congressional Ethics, "Board & Staff," https://oce.house.gov/about/board-and-staff. |
| 51. |
For the most recent authorization, see H.Res. 5, §4(d) (119th Congress), agreed to January 3, 2025. |
| 52. |
H.Res. 5, §4(d) (119th Congress), agreed to January 3, 2025. For more information on the Office of Congressional Conduct, see CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Conduct: History, Authority, and Procedures, by Jacob R. Straus. |
| 53. |
"Proposed Amendment of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration," Congressional Record, vol. 110, part 13 (July 24, 1964), pp. 16929-16940. |
| 54. |
"Senate Committee Reorganization," Congressional Record, vol. 123, part 3, (February 1, 1977), p. 2886. See also "Committee System Reorganization," Congressional Record, vol. 123, part 3 (February 4, 1977), pp. 3660-3699; U.S. Congress, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, First Report with Recommendations, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 94-1395 (GPO, 1976), pp. 95-96; and U.S. Congress, Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Committee System Reorganization Amendments of 1977, report to accompany S.Res. 4, 95th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 95-1 (GPO, 1977), pp. 4-5. |
| 55. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, Standards of Conduct for Members of the Senate, Officers and Employees of the Senate, report to accompany S.Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 90-1015 (GPO, 1968); "Senatorial Standards of Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 114, part 6 (March 19, 1968), pp. 6941-6943 and 6948-6960; "Standards of Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 114, part 6 (March 20, 1968), pp. 7129-7134 and 7137-7154; "Standards of Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 114, part 6 (March 21, 1968), pp. 7249-7279; and "Standards of Conduct," Congressional Record, vol. 114, part 6 (March 22, 1968), pp. 7369-7383 and 7388-7408. |
| 56. |
S.Res. 266 (90th Congress), agreed to March 22, 1968, as amended by S.Res. 110 (95th Congress), agreed to April 1, 1977. |
| 57. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Ethics, The Senate Code of Official Conduct, 117th Cong., 1st sess., October 2021, https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/3507e6ae-2525-40ac-9ec8-7c6dbfe35933/2021---red-book---the-senate-code-of-official-conduct.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, "Rules of the Senate," https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate. |
| 58. |
P.L. 110-81, Title V, 121 Stat. 757 (2007). For example, §531 amended Senate Rule XXXVII to alter post-employment restrictions and requiring the disclosure of employment negotiations by Senators and staff; and §541 ended Senate Rule XXXV, the gift rule. |
| 59. |
For more information on post-employment restrictions, see CRS Report R44292, The Lobbying Disclosure Act at 20: Analysis and Issues for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus. |
| 60. |
For more information on Senate gift rules, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Ethics, "Gifts," https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/gifts. |
| 61. |
For a current list of Senators, see U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Ethics, "Committee Members," https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/committee-members. |
| 62. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Manual Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the United States Senate, prepared by Matthew McGowan, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Doc. 110-1 (GPO, 2008), §80, p. 137 (hereinafter Senate Manual). |
| 63. |
Senate Manual, §77, pp. 128-136. The Senate Select Committee on Ethics website http://ethics.senate.gov/ displays the most recent Senate Ethics Manual as well as financial disclosure and travel forms, press statements, and other Committee provided information. |
| 64. |
Senate Manual, §77 Section 2(d), pp. 131-132. |
| 65. |
Pursuant to the Article I, Section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution, the Senate has the power to expel a Member, after the Member has taken the oath of office, by a two-thirds vote those present and voting. Expulsion has been used sparingly by the Senate and has historically concerned cases of perceived disloyalty to the United States Government, or of a violation of criminal law which involved the abuse of one's official position. More recently, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics recommended the expulsion of a Member for conduct not subject to a criminal prosecution, but which involved allegations of abuse of the Senator's office, making unwanted sexual advances, enhancing personal finances, and obstructing and impeding a congressional investigation. For more information, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Riddick's Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, prepared by Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Doc. 101-28 (GPO, 1992), pp. 842-843 (hereinafter Riddick's Senate Procedure); U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Ethics, Investigation of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., report to accompany S.Res. 204, 97th Cong., 1st sess., September 3, 1981, S.Rept. 97-187 (GPO, 1981). Senator Williams was convicted of bribery, illegal gratuities, conflicts of interest and conspiracy in the so-called ABSCAM influence peddling probe; and U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Ethics, Resolution for Disciplinary Action, report to accompany S.Res. 168, 104th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 1995, S.Rept. 104-137 (GPO, 1995). Senator Packwood resigned from office prior to full Senate consideration. |
| 66. |
Censure, unlike expulsion, does not appear in the Constitution, although the Senate derives its authority from Article I, Section 5, clause 2. The Standing Orders of the Senate provide that the Select Committee on Ethics may recommend disciplinary action "including, but not but not limited to, in the case of a Member: censure, expulsion, or recommendation to the appropriate party conference regarding such Member's seniority or positions of responsibility." A censure by the Senate has traditionally been used to impose a punishment when the full body formally disapproves of the conduct or behavior of a Member. Censure is adopted by majority vote of a resolution expressing the condemnation or disapproval. Pursuant to Senate Rules, a censured Senator does not forfeit his or her rights or privileges. The individual party caucus or conferences, however, may implement rules on censured Members and party or committee leadership positions. For more information see Riddick's Senate Procedure, pp. 270-273; Senate Manual, §79; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Election, Expulsion, and Censure Cases from 1793-1972, prepared by Richard D. Hupman, Senate Library, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., March 19, 1971, S.Doc. 92-7 (GPO, 1972). In addition to expulsion and censure it is possible, and arguably within the authority of the Senate, to punish a Member by way of fine, imprisonment, suspension of privileges, or deprivation of seniority status. |
| 67. |
See, for example, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Ethics, "Public Letters to Members," https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/letterstomembers. |
| 68. |
For example, see Dennis Thompson, "Both Judge and Party, Why Congressional Ethics Committees are Unethical," The Brookings Review, vol. 13, no. 4 (Fall 1995), pp. 44-48; Dennis F. Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption (The Brookings Institution, 1995); Don Wolfensberger, Punishing Disorderly Behavior in Congress: The First Century, Woodrow Wilson International Center panel on "Congressional Ethics Enforcement," http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/ethics-essay-drw.pdf, January 16, 2007; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee to Study Senate Concurrent Resolution 21, Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government, hearings , 82nd Cong., 1st sess., June 19, 1951 (GPO, 1951); and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Special Subcommittee on the Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government, Ethical Standards in Government: Proposals for Improvement of Ethical Standards in the Federal Government Including Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government, committee print, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (GPO, 1951). |
| 69. |
See, for example U.S. Congress, House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Summary of Activities One Hundred Eighth Congress, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 108-806 (Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 62-68; and Peter W. Morgan, "The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes," Stanford Law Review, vol. 44, (February 1992), pp. 593-621. |
| 70. |
One practical characterization of the term "conflict of interest" has been the "gray area" between activities that are unmistakably appropriate and those that are obviously improper and illegal. See Ralph Eisenberg, "Conflict of Interest Situations and Remedies," Rutgers Law Review, vol. 13, 1958-1959, p. 666. |
| 71. |
Michael Josephson, "The Best of Times, the Worst of Times," Spectrum, The Journal of State Government, Fall 1992, vol. 65 (Council of State Governments), p. 36. |
| 72. |
Dennis F. Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption (The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 135. Both committees have throughout their existence been criticized by the media as "watchdogs without teeth." See, for example, Robert Sherrill, "We Can't Depend on Congress to Keep Congress Honest," The New York Times Magazine, July 19, 1970, pp. 5-7, 13-14; Jerry Landauer, "Senate Ethics: Hear No Evil, See No Evil," The Washington Star, September 19, 1976, p. E3; Editorial, "Got Ethics?" Roll Call, June 25, 2001, p. 4; Helen Dewar, "Ethics: Can the Senate Police Its Own?" The Washington Post, February 5, 2002, p. A2; Norman Ornstein, "The Senate Is Unable to Police Itself," Roll Call, March 8, 2006, p. 6; Editorial, "Weak Reforms," Roll Call, March 20, 2006, p. 4; and Wilson Abney, "Congressional Ethics: An Evolve or Die Proposition" Roll Call, September 17, 2007, p. 10. |
| 73. |
For additional discussion of OCC, see "Office of Congressional Conduct," above and CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Conduct: History, Authority, and Procedures, by Jacob R. Straus. |
| 74. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee to Study Senate Concurrent Resolution 21, Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government, hearing, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., June 19-22, June 25-29, July 2-3, July 5-6, and July 9-11, 1951 (GPO, 1951). |
| 75. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Ethical Standards in Government, committee print, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (GPO, 1951). |
| 76. |
"Introduction of Bills and Joint Resolutions," Congressional Record, vol. 126, part 2 (February 6, 1980), p. 2088. |
| 77. |
Sen. William Roth, "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 126, part 2 (February 6, 1980), p. 2099. |
| 78. |
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Ethics Process, hearings, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., February 16 and February 23, 1993 (GPO, 1993). |
| 79. |
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Organization of Congress, final report, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 103-413 (GPO, 1993), pp. 12-13. |
| 80. |
U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Ethics Reform Task Force on H. Res. 168, committee print, 105th Cong., 1st sess. (GPO, 1997), p. 6. |
| 81. |
"Implementing the Recommendations of the Bipartisan House Ethics Task Force," Congressional Record, vol. 143 (September 18, 1997), pp. 19302-19340. |
| 82. |
See for example, H.R. 4975, H.R. 4799, H.R. 4948, H.R. 5677, S. 2259, and S.Con.Res. 82. Some of the bills contained only an independent ethics authority; others contained an authority but additionally proposed wider changes, such as gift and lobbying reform. |
| 83. |
"Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 152 (March 28, 2006), pp. S2440-S2254 and S2459. |
| 84. |
"Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007," Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 153 (January 18, 2007), pp. S743-S744. |
| 85. |
U.S. Congress, House, "Article I, Section 6, clause 1," The Constitution of the United States, 108th Cong., 1st sess., H.Doc. 108-96 (GPO, 2003), p. 4. |
| 86. |
U.S. Congress, Senate, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, S.Doc. 108-17, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., prepared by the Congressional Research Service (GPO, 2004), p. 134. |