Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Order Code RL30408
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
January 14, 2000
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this report is to describe the nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons (weapons of mass destruction or WMD) and missile programs of the countries and
terrorist groups in the Middle East. An introductory section puts these weapons programs into
the context of the region’s strategic environment and U.S. national interests. The concluding
section discusses briefly the policy options that are available to the U.S. government and to
Congress, in particular, to counter the growing threat. The report does not attempt to evaluate
the efficacy of current or future policies. As major changes occur in the status of WMD
programs, this report will be updated.

---

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
Summary
The numerous wars and constant tensions among the states of the Middle East
have made the region fertile ground for the development of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Some Middle Eastern countries are trying to acquire WMD to
compensate for conventional weapons imbalances or to match WMD programs
undertaken by neighboring states. Many observers believe that deterrence against
WMD is crucial in the Middle East because such weapons have been used there in
combat on several occasions, most notably by Iraq during its eight year war against
Iran. The Middle East is also home to some of the most active terrorist groups in the
world; five of the seven countries named by the United States as sponsors of terrorism
are located in the region. There is some concern that WMD capabilities might be
transferred from the proliferant states to terrorist groups.
A survey of WMD programs in the Middle East indicates that many of the
countries of the region have at least some WMD development efforts under way.
Some countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, have well developed programs in
virtually all categories of WMD (chemical, biological, and nuclear) as well as
missiles. Other countries in the region, such as Algeria or Egypt, have pursued WMD
capabilities sporadically. Others, such as the Persian Gulf monarchy states, have
generally refrained from developing WMD, apparently preferring instead to place
themselves under a U.S. security umbrella.
Possibly because of the longstanding suspicions among many Middle Eastern
countries, there has been little intra-regional cooperation on WMD development.
Iraq, although its own WMD programs are banned under post-Gulf war U.N.
resolutions, has supplied some expertise in chemical weapons to Sudan. Iran has
brokered missile sales by North Korea to Syria. However, most of the Middle
Eastern countries have preferred to forge individual ties to WMD technology
suppliers. The primary suppliers have been Russia, China, and North Korea, three
countries that have been willing to risk international criticism to further their political
or economic objectives in the Middle East.
The United States has tried numerous mechanisms to control Middle Eastern
proliferation or blunt its effects. The United States has worked with its allies and
other countries to strengthen global non-proliferation regimes, although several
Middle Eastern countries have refused to join such regimes. The United States,
sometimes in concert with its allies, has tried to impose sanctions on Middle Eastern
proliferants or their suppliers. In some cases, such as that of Libya’s chemical
weapons program, the United States has threatened to undertake military action
against a suspected WMD facility. More recently, the United States has placed
greater faith in regional or sub-regional missile defense systems, such as the U.S.-
Israeli Arrow ballistic missile interception system. The United States also has
proposed that the Persian Gulf monarchies acquire an integrated missile defense
system to protect them against Iran’s growing ballistic missile program and any
retained or rebuilt Iraqi missiles.

---

Contents
The Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
WMD Capabilities By Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

---

Additional Countries with Missile Programs
But No WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Options for Pursuing U.S. Nonproliferation Interests in the Middle East . . . . . 31
State-to-State Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Multilateral Diplomacy: Nonproliferation Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Military Options: Counterproliferation, Intelligence, and Deterrence . . . . 32
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
List of Figures
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles in the
Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Ranges of Iran’s Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Ranges of Missiles in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. State of Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. Commitments to International Regimes by
Middle Eastern Countries with Some Reported WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 3. Commitments to International Regimes by
Other Middle Eastern Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Contributors
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Robert Shuey, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy and National Defense
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Helit Barel, Research Associate
Merav Zafary, Research Associate
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Zachary Davis, Specialist in International Nuclear Affairs

---

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
The Strategic Environment
The Middle East has long been one of the most heavily armed regions of the
world. It now has achieved one of the highest concentrations of countries with
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction, or WMD)
and missile delivery systems.1 As the following pages will show, most countries in the
region now have some form of WMD as well as missiles. If current trends continue,
in the coming decade additional countries in the region will obtain WMD and missiles,
they will expand their WMD arsenals, and will increase the lethality of their WMD.
Terrorist groups, some of which are allied with countries discussed in this paper, are
also reportedly attempting to acquire chemical, biological, or even radiological
weapons.
Motivations
There are many motivations for nations in the Middle East to acquire WMD and
means for their delivery. Of particular concern are countries that may seek WMD to
intimidate, coerce, conquer, or destroy neighboring countries, or to interfere with
U.S. ability to project force in the region. Some nations seek the prestige and status
of a great power, often in an effort to satisfy nationalist domestic sentiment or to
emerge as leader of a regional grouping. Other countries primarily want to ensure
their security against regional rivals or against major world powers. Security
considerations might include efforts to develop systems equivalent to those possessed
by rivals, or perhaps to compensate for conventional military weakness. Some
countries might try to develop WMD in an effort to obtain financial or political
concessions.
Security concerns seem paramount in the Middle East. There have been five
major wars between Israel and its neighbors since Israel was founded in May 1948.
Although no WMD were used in any of those wars, Israel and most of its erstwhile
adversaries have increased their WMD capabilities. Egypt used chemical weapons
during its intervention in Yemen in 1963-67 and Libya used them against Chadian
troops in 1987. In the eastern half of the region, Iraq has started two wars since
1980; it invaded Iran that year, touching off an eight year war in which Iraq and, to
a lesser extent, Iran employed chemical weapons. In 1988, Iraq also used nerve
agents against the Kurdish town of Halabja and other Kurdish villages in Iraq.2 Two
1South Asia and Northeast Asia also have high concentrations.
2Carus, W. Seth. The Genie Unleashed: Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Program,
Policy Papers, Number 14, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989, pp. 3 and 21,
(continued...)

---

CRS-2
years later, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the coalition partners and Israel were greatly
concerned that Iraq might again use CW or BW. Some analysts speculated that such
an attack might bring nuclear retaliation from the United States or perhaps even from
Israel, and Iraq does not appear to have used such agents in the Gulf War. The
frequent wars, the past uses of CW, and threats of nuclear attacks have probably been
primary factors leading to WMD proliferation in the Middle East.
The Middle East is also a region in which ballistic missiles have been used in
combat with conventional (high-explosive) warheads. Egypt and Syria used missiles
and rockets against Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.3 Iran and Iraq fired missiles
at the armed forces and cities of each other during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, causing
especially heavy damage to Iran. During the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq fired ballistic
missiles against Israel and U.S. and allied troops in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The
Communist regime in Afghanistan fired Scud missiles against its Islamic opponents
(the "mujahedin") in a losing battle to preserve its grip on power after the 1989 Soviet
pullout from that country, and captured missiles were later deployed by the Taliban
and opposition contingents. Scuds also were fired by the secessionist South during
the civil war in Yemen in 1994.
Certain countries of the Near East have shown a strong appetite for large armed
forces and new conventional weapons, which could be heightening security fears
among many states of the region.4 According to most experts, a perceived imbalance
in conventional forces is one of the most important motivations for any country to
develop WMD. Iraq's development during the 1980s of one of the world's largest
chemical weapons programs was almost certainly prompted by Iran's ability to
mobilize large "human wave" offensives against it during the Iran-Iraq war. During
1991-94, the Near East region accounted for 60.8% of the total value of all
developing nations' arms transfer agreements. During 1995-98, the region accounted
for 44.2% of all such agreements. Among the major conventional acquisitions, Iran
acquired three diesel Kilo-class submarines from Russia in the early 1990s. Israel
bought three submarines from Germany and numerous fighter aircraft from the United
States. Iran also acquired fast patrol craft from China equipped with sea-skimming
Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles. Iran is developing medium and long range
ballistic missiles, possibly in an effort to deter Israel's highly capable Air Force from
striking Iran's nuclear reactor project at Bushehr or other high-value targets in Iran.
Iran might also be attempting to counter Iraqi aggression or a future U.S. attack, or
to intimidate the Gulf states. These acquisitions by Iran might help explain why Iraq
has been reluctant to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors charged by the U.N.
Security Council with eliminating Iraq's WMD. Although Iran's acquisitions have not
prompted the Persian Gulf monarchies to acquire WMD, that potential exists if Iran's
2(...continued)
see also his note 7.
3Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr. “Egypt’s Missile Development,” in The International Missile
Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network, William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.),
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994, p. 28.
4The information in this section is derived from CRS Report for Congress RL30275.
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1991-1998. August 4, 1999, by
Richard F. Grimmett.

---

CRS-3
acquisitions continue, if Iraq rebuilds its WMD, or if the United States scales back its
security commitments in the Gulf. Israel's conventional superiority and its WMD
might have prompted Syria to acquire missiles from North Korea and to develop VX
nerve agent.
The sense of insecurity among the countries of the Middle East is magnified by
the presence in the region of five out of the seven countries identified by the Secretary
of State as sponsors of international terrorism. The five are: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria,
and Sudan. Each hosts terrorist groups that are working against countries in the
region, and often against the United States as well. One of the other designated state
sponsors, North Korea, has supplied missile technology to several countries in the
Middle East region, including Iran, Libya, Syria, and Egypt. Another country covered
in this paper, Afghanistan, hosts the exiled terrorist leader Usama bin Ladin, who is
believed to have acquired at least a rudimentary chemical weapons capability.
Afghanistan is not designated a state sponsor of terrorism, but it has been named by
the Administration as a country that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts.
The strategic environment of the Near East is affected to some extent by the
neighboring region of South Asia. During 1998, both India and Pakistan confirmed
that they have nuclear weapons by conducting nuclear tests. Pakistan is an Islamic
state, as are most of the countries in the Near East, and some have long believed that
other Islamic countries might look to a nuclear Pakistan to provide them with nuclear
technology. Others express concern about growing military ties between Israel and
India. Pakistan, as well as India, are discussed in this paper as potential suppliers.
However, the WMD programs of these two countries are not discussed in this paper
because their arms race and years of conflict are outside the Near East region itself.
(See CRS Report 98-570F, IB93097, and IB94041.)

The Risks
Not all U.S. policy makers agree on the extent to which Middle East WMDs
threaten vital U.S. interests. The leaders of some Middle East countries, as well as
those of Russia, China, and France, tend to be less concerned with this threat than
have been the last few U.S. Presidents. The following pages will attempt to provide
a fairly detailed and objective accounting of the WMD capabilities and aspirations of
the various states in the Middle East. It seems clear that strong policies are needed
to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMD, that Iran must be watched closely and
dissuaded from acquiring and using WMD, that the region needs continued or
expanded nonproliferation measures, and that regional stability may be enhanced by
allied WMD defensive capabilities. There are some important unresolved questions:
How intent are Iran’s leaders on building nuclear weapons, and could they be
dissuaded? How likely is Iraq to build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons if
inspectors remain absent and how quickly could it do so if UN sanctions are eased?
Which countries in the region can now produce effective biological weapons? Which
terrorist groups can now wield effective WMD weapons? What external sources are
supplying WMD, technology, and materials for their production? What measures
other than the acquisition of WMD could ameliorate the security concerns of regional
states and groups?

---

CRS-4
Another disputed variable in the risk equation is the likelihood that one or more
actors in the Middle East will use WMD and with what effect. There is not a clear
understanding of the conditions and purposes that might lead a Middle East country
or terrorist group to launch a WMD attack, against whom it might be launched, what
type and scale of weapons might be used, and how effective would U.S. conventional
and nuclear forces, or regional forces and defenses, be in deterring such an attack.

In particular it might be asked, what might be the effect of such an attack on vital
U.S. national interests? It can probably be agreed that the effect would be crucial if
U.S. troops, installations, or territory were attacked with WMD. The effect would
probably also be considered crucial if the U.S. ability to maintain or project force into
the region were compromised; if a U.S. ally or close friend were attacked; if the attack
established regional hegemony; or if the attack caused or threatened a major
disruption in the supply of oil to Europe and Asia (even if U.S. oil sources were not
directly affected).
The importance to the United States of a WMD attack in the Middle East is less
clear if it were to involve two or more states that are not closely aligned with the
United States, or if an ally attacked an adversary of the United States. The United
States government did little in direct response to the use of CW by Iran and Iraq
against each other during the Iran-Iraq War and the use of CW by the Iraqi
government against Kurds within its borders in 1988. (Since 1984, the U.S. has
worked with other industrialized countries to stem the proliferation of CW and BW.)
What the United States stands to lose in such attacks is less tangible. Even if vital
U.S. interests are not a stake, these uses of WMD might threaten the international
stigma against using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and might reduce
international support for nonproliferation policies, thereby diminishing world peace
and stability. These, and a number of other U.S. policy objectives, may not be worth
fighting for if intervening U.S. troops would be exposed to a likely WMD attack.
A labyrinth of multilateral, regional, bilateral, and unilateral policies exist to
counter the growing WMD threat in the Middle East. The adequacy of these policies
and the urgency of doing more depend on one’s view of the current and developing
threat, the likelihood of WMD use, and the effectiveness of various policy
components. This report does not evaluate existing policies or options for change,
but briefly outlines the measures that might be employed to address this threat.

---

CRS-5
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons and Ballistic Missiles
in the Middle East
Turkmenistan
Turkey
SRBM
Syria
Cyprus
Iraq
Israel
Iran
SRBM
BW
CW
Afganistan
KC
BW
SRBM
SRBM CW
MRBM
Jordan
BW
CW
MRBM
WDP BW
Pak.
Kuwait
Egypt
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
CW
BW
SRBM
SRBM
U.A.E.
MRBM
Oman
Sudan CW
Eritrea
SRBM
Yemen
Ethiopia
Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix. Used with permission.
LEGEND
KC = Known Nuclear Capacity
WDP = Nuclear Weapon Development
Program
Reported Chemical Weapon Program
CW
Reported Biological Weapon Program
BW
ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IRBM = Intermediate Range
MRBM = Medium Range
SRBM = Short Range
SLBM = Submarine Launched

---

CRS-6
Table 1. State of Proliferation
Nuclear
Chemical
Biological
Ballistic
Country
Weapons
Weapons
Weapons
Missiles
Algeria
—— a
——
——
——
Egypt
——
Likely
Likely
SRBM
Iran
Seeking
Known b
Likely
MRBM
Iraq
Seeking
Known c
Known
SRBM
Israel
Known d
Suspected
Likely
MRBM
Libya
Seeking
Known e
Seeking
SRBM
Saudi Arabia
—— f
Suspected?g
——
MRBM
Sudan
——
Likely h
Seeking? i
——
Syria
——
Known
Seeking
SRBM
In the table above, these terms are used as follows:
Known: The nation has either admitted the possession or use of the weapon,
possession/use has been corroborated by the United States government, or possession
has been widely reported by credible sources.
Likely: The nation is thought to have produced or acquired the weapon, but no
definitive information is openly available in government statements, press reports, or
the academic community.
Seeking: The nation is attempting to acquire or develop a weapon program, but it is
not clear that it has acquired or produced the weapon.
Suspected: There are reports that the nation has or is developing the weapon, but
there is not enough evidence to confirm or deny the reports.
Ended: The nation has terminated the weapon program or weapons were destroyed
or returned to another country.
—— : There is no publicly reported credible information available that points to the
existence of a weapons program.
Missiles: The table indicates the range group of the longest range ballistic missile in
the possession of each country that also has nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are developing, but do not yet possess, longer
range ballistic missiles.
SRBM:
Short Range Ballistic Missile, 70-1000 km (43-621 mi.)
MRBM:
Medium Range Ballistic Missile, 1001-3500 km (622-2175 mi.)
IRBM:
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, 3501-5000 km (2176-3107 mi.)
ICBM:
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 5001+ km (3108+ mi.)
SLBM:
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

---

CRS-7
Sources: Primary sources used in the production of the table were:
Proliferation Threat and Response. Office of the Secretary of Defense: April 1996, and
November 1997.
The Arms Control Reporter. Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies.
Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency: 1996 Annual Report.
The Nonproliferation Review. Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies. Vol 4.
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,
Executive Summary, July 15, 1998.
Footnotes:
a A few indicators suggest a possible military use of Algeria’s 15 MW Es Salam reactor at Ain
Oussera, and evoked suspicion that Algeria is developing nuclear weapons. Rodney W. Jones, Mark
G. McDonough with Toby Dalton and Gregory Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1998, p.163. In addition Algeria renewed its nuclear ties with
China in 1996 when it signed a “second stage” agreement for nuclear cooperation.
b Iran used chemical weapons in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran also supplied Libya with
chemical weapons which were later used in Chad. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1996, pp.
15-16.
c Iraq claims its CW and BW stockpiles have been destroyed, but U.N. inspection officials still
suspect small stockpiles, possibly including missile warheads, remain.
d Although press reports and the academic community generally report that Israel has nuclear
weapons, many of which could be deployed with its missile force, neither the Israeli nor U.S.
government has acknowledged their existence.
e Libya used Iranian supplied chemical weapons in Chad, however, Proliferation: Threat and
Response, 1996, states that Libya has begun domestic production of chemical weapons.
f Saudi Arabia has reportedly shown interest in funding the Iraqi and Pakistani nuclear programs and
may be seeking to acquire a nuclear capacity. See: Shahram Chubin, “Eliminating Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1997, p. 20; “Saudi
Arabia: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs,” Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies; Jane Perlez, “Saudi’s Visit To Arms Site In
Pakistan Worries U.S.,” New York Times, July 10, 1999; Paul Taylor, “West Concerned at
Saudi-Pakistan Nuclear Link,” Reuters, August 3, 1999; Paul Lewis, "Defector Says Saudis Sought
Nuclear Arms," New York Times, August 7, 1994.
g There are unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia may have developed chemical warheads for is
CSS-2 missiles. NBC Capabilities, Saudi Arabia, “ Jane’s NBC Defense Systems 1998-1999. Also,
Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, April 1991, reports Chinese assistance to Saudi in developing
chemical warheads. Also, in the Arms Control Reporter “may possess” as of 3.13.91, 704.E-0.10,
5-92.
h In a Report to Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that: “Sudan has been
developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years...has obtained help from
many countries including Iraq”. Director of Central Intelligence, Report to Congress on the
Acquisitions of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions, July 1999.
i The same DCI Report to Congress states that “Given its history of developing chemical weapons
and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a Biological weapons program as
well”.

---

CRS-8
Table 2. Commitments to International Regimes by
Middle Eastern Countries with Some Reported WMD
Country
NPT
CWC
BWC
CTBT
IAEA
Algeria
Party
Ratified
Signed
Member
Egypt
Party
Signed
Signed
Member
Iran
Party
Ratified
Party
Signed
Member
Iraq
Party
Party
Member
Israel
Signed
Signed
Member
Libya
Party
Party
Member
Saudi
Party
Party
Party
Member
Arabia
Sudan
Party
Party
Member
Syria
Party
Signed
Member
Table 3. Commitments to International Regimes by
Other Middle Eastern Countries
Country
NPT
CWC
BWC
CTBT
IAEA
Afghanistan
Party
Signed
Party
--
Member
Bahrain
Party
Party
Party
Signed
Member
Jordan
Party
Party
Party
Signed &
Member
Ratified
Kuwait
Party
Party
Party
Signed
Member
Lebanon
Party
–
Party
–
Member
Oman
Party
Party
Party
Signed
Member
Qatar
Party
Party
Party
Signed &
Member
Ratified
Turkey
Party
Party
Party
Signed
Member
U.A.E.
Party
Signed
Signed
Signed
Member
Yemen
Party
Signed
Party
Signed
Member
NPT - Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention
BWC - Biological Weapons Convention
CTBT - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
NSG - Nuclear Supply Group

---

CRS-9
MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
Note:
Most countries in the Middle East are not formal members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, Zangger Committee, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, or
Wassenaar Arrangement. However, Turkey is a member of MTCR and the Wassenaar
Arrangement and Israel is considered an adherent to the MTCR.
Sources:
U.S. Department of State<http://www.state.gov>
International Atomic Energy Agency <http://www.iaea.or.at>
“Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes,” Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies:
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/9707inve.pdf>
WMD Capabilities By Country
The following is an assessment of nuclear, chemical, and biological programs
reported in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria.
A few regional countries have missiles but apparently no WMD programs
(Afghanistan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) and are discussed briefly
in a later section. Other countries in the Middle East apparently have no WMD or
missile programs (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, and Qatar).
Algeria
Nuclear Weapons. Algeria has two nuclear reactors: 1 Megawatt (MW)
research reactor at Draria and the 15 MW Es Salam reactor at Ain Oussera. The
smaller one has no direct military significance and has been subject to IAEA
monitoring since it began operating in 1989. But some aspects of the larger one,
which was built secretly with assistance from China, evoked suspicion that Algeria
was interested in developing nuclear weapons capability. In particular, a 15 MW
heavy water reactor of this type is theoretically cable of producing about 2-3 kg of
plutonium per year.5 In addition, Algeria has hot cell facilities, used to produce
radioactive isotopes that could extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
In May 1991 Algeria agreed to place The Ain Oussera reactor under IAEA
safeguards. The reactor was built secretly until U.S. intelligence agencies discovered
its construction in 1991, raising suspicion about Algeria’s intentions. Although its
entire nuclear program is subject to inspection, separation of plutonium from spent
reactor fuel would raise questions about Algeria’s nuclear intentions, though there is
no evidence of this to date.
Chemical Weapons. There is no confirmed evidence that Algeria is pursuing
the development of CW capabilities.
5David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium
1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, SIPRI, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), p. 364.

---

CRS-10
Biological Weapons. There is no evidence that Algeria is pursuing the
development of offensive BW capabilities.
Egypt
Nuclear Weapons. Egypt has two research reactors located at Inshas: 2 MW
and 22 MW. Both are under IAEA safeguards, and there is no evidence of a nuclear
weapons program. For many years Egypt expressed interest in developing civilian
nuclear power but did not purchase the large reactors and infrastructure needed to
produce nuclear energy. Egypt has not expressed interest in developing nuclear
weapons, but remains highly critical of Israel’s nuclear stance, and routinely sponsors
resolutions at the United Nations condemning Israel’s nuclear program. In 1998
President Mubarak said that Egypt would only develop nuclear weapons if it is
threatened by Israel.6
Chemical Weapons. Egypt produced and used mustard gas in the Yemeni
civil war in the 1960's, and maintains stockpiles of mustard and nerve gas. Egypt
supplied Syria with CW in the 1970's and Iraq with chemical agents and technologies
in the 1980's, while Iraq was at war with Iran. According to Western experts, Egypt
has several mustard and nerve gas production facilities,7 and some experts have
reported that two Egyptian pesticide plants, Kafr El Dawar and Kafr El Zayat, may
be involved in CW agent production8 and in efforts to obtain feedstock for the
production of nerve gas.9
Biological Weapons. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACTA), Egypt had developed BW agents by 1972 and there is no evidence
indicating that the BW program has been eliminated. Therefore “it remains likely that
the Egyptian capability to conduct BW still exists.”10
Ballistic Missiles. Egypt has been developing ballistic missiles since the
1950s, with the assistance of German scientists and others, and had partially tested
370km and 600km missiles by 1965.11 In further tests in the early 1970s and in
combat use, these missiles traveled only a few kilometers and were very inaccurate.
In 1973, the Soviet Union transferred Scud-B missiles and FROG-7A rockets to
Egypt which were used against Israel in the 1973 war. In the early 1980s, Egypt
began cooperating with North Korea, transferring Scud-B missiles in exchange for
6“Mubarak: Egypt to Go Nuclear if Threatened,” Xinhua News Agency - Ceis Woodside, October 5,
1998; “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute for International Studies, at www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/egypt.htm.
7Cordesman, p. 24.
8Dany, Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The Nonproliferation Review,
Spring-Summer 1998, p. 53.
9Cordesman, p. 17.
10U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence and Compliance with Arms Control
Agreements, 1997 Annual Report , 1997.
11Cordesman, p.18.

---

CRS-11
North Korean missile production technology.12 North Korea later provided
technology for the production of Scud-C missiles. The “Condor 2" was an Argentine
program, that was joined by Egypt and Iraq, for the development of a missile with
a range of 800km-1,200 km with a 500 kg warhead. The program was terminated in
199013, with pressure from the U.S. and other MTCR parties. Currently, Egypt is
believed to have:
C
Over 100 Scud-B missiles with a range of 300km and 1000kg payload14
C
Approximately 90 “Project T” missiles. Project T is a program that is
developing the Scud-B missile to bring it nearly to Scud-C capabilities,
extending the range to 450 km. Development probably began in 1990.15
C
Scud-C missiles with a range of 550km and 500kg payload.
The CIA determined that, during the second half of 1998, Egypt continued to
obtain ballistic missile components and associated equipment from North Korea, as
part of the two countries’ long standing cooperation.16 In addition, three companies
in Egypt - Arab British Dynamics, Helwan Machinery and Equipment Company, and
the Kader Factory for Developed Industries- were sanctioned in 1999 under the Arms
Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, for missile
technology proliferation activities.17
Iran
Nuclear Weapons. Iran has two partially completed, German-supplied, 1,300
MW power reactors at Bushehr which were damaged by Iraqi bombing raids during
the Iran-Iraq war. Russia agreed to complete Unit 1 at Bushehr, and is currently
working to fit a Russian-designed VVER-1000 light-water power reactor to the
existing German infrastructure, despite U.S. efforts to block the project. The U.S.
opposes the project because it could be used by Iran to build the infrastructure needed
for a weapons program or as a conduit for illicit acquisition of nuclear equipment or
materials. The project has experienced serious construction delays due to financial and
technical problems. However, work on the Bushehr reactor is proceeding with about
1000 Russian technicians at the site. The reactor is scheduled for completion in 2003.
The Russia-Iran agreement also included a side protocol, under which Iran was to
receive a 30-50 MW research reactor, 2000 tons of natural uranium, training of 10-20
graduate students per year at Russian academic institutions, and a gas-centrifuge
12Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr. “Egypt’s Missile Development,” in The International Missile Bazaar,
William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 27-30.
13“Military - Egypt,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa - Update 4, 1999.
14Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East - Egypt, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute for International Studies, at www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/egypt.htm
15Ibid; “Military, Egypt”, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa - Update 4, 1999.
16Director of Central Intelligence, Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999, p.8.
17Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 73, April 16, 1999, p. 18957.

---

CRS-12
enrichment plant. The enrichment plant was canceled in response to U.S. pressure.
However, Russia refused to abandon other aspects of the protocol.18
Iran possesses five research reactors: a small U.S.-supplied 5MW reactor
located at Teheran, a small Chinese-supplied neutron-source reactor, a small Chinese-
supplied zero-power reactor, and two Chinese-supplied sub-critical reactors, all
located at Esfahan.19 China also supplied the Karaj nuclear research facility with an
electromagnetic isotope separator (Calutron) that can be used to enrich small
quantities of uranium. In 1997, after pressure from the United States, China agreed
to provide no new nuclear assistance to Iran, although two small ongoing projects
would be completed.20
Iran has uranium deposits in Yazd province and an inoperable uranium-ore
concentration plant near Teheran. Most experts believe that its enrichment program
concentrates on developing gas centrifuges. In 1996, then CIA Director John M.
Deutch said: “Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium
and highly enriched uranium. In an attempt to shorten the time line to a weapon, Iran
has launched a parallel effort to purchase fissile material mainly from sources in the
former Soviet Union.”21
Iran denies having any intention to develop nuclear weapons and has allowed
the IAEA to conduct special visits to Iran since 1992. The visits found no evidence
of activities that are inconsistent with peaceful uses. However, Iran has not yet
allowed the IAEA to deploy new inspection methods, developed after the discovery
of covert programs in Iraq and North Korea. One U.S. academic said Iran “may well
be the next nuclear power in the Middle East.”22
Chemical Weapons. Iran began production of CW early in the mid 1980s in
response to several instances of Iraqi use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran also
made limited use of CW in the war against Iraq.
Since the early 1990s, Iran has put forward a concerted effort to develop its
chemical warfare capabilities, due in part to the lessons of the war in Iraq, and
information on Iraqi attempts to develop the nerve agent VX. Iran is known to have
18Russian Nuclear and Missile Exports to Iran, CNS Issue Brief on WMD in the Middle East, Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies; Russian--Iranian Nuclear
Cooperation, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies;
Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, p. 354.
19Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1999, p. 259; Andrew Koch
and Jeanette Wolf, “Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1998.
20Shahram Chubin, “Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case,” The Henry
L. Stimson Center, March 1997, p. 6; Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions,” by Kenneth
Katzman, CRS Report 97-474 F, March 15, 1999, p. 5; Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium
and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, p. 360.
21Testimony of John M. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, March 20, 1996.
22Eisenstadt, Michael. “Living with a Nuclear Iran?” Survival, London, Autumn 1999.

---

CRS-13
produced and stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents, as well as artillery shells
and bombs to deliver them, specifically:23
! Iran began stockpiling cyanide, phosgene, and mustard gas weapons after
1985. According to CIA testimony, production capacity may have reached
1,000 tons per year.
! By 1994 production of nerve gas weapons had commenced.
! Iranian means of delivery include 155 mm artillery shells, mortar rounds,
bombs, and possibly chemical warheads for its Scuds.
Iran aims at developing indigenous CW capabilities and is continuously
attempting to upgrade its CW infrastructure and munitions arsenal.24 To this end Iran
seeks foreign assistance, upon which it is reliant for much of its CW and related
technologies:
! 500 tons of phosphorous pentasulphide, which is a primary precursor of the
nerve agent VX and controlled by the Australia Group, were reportedly
delivered to Iran by the Chinese corporation SinoChem in 1996.25 In May
1997, the U.S. imposed sanctions on seven Chinese firms for selling precursors
for nerve gas and equipment for the production of nerve gas.26
! German intelligence recently reported on Iranian efforts to acquire production
equipment for tabun and sarin, using three different Indian companies as
fronts.27
! A July 1999 DCI report to Congress stated that during the second half of
1998, Iran obtained foreign material and equipment that could be used to
create a self-sufficient CW infrastructure.28
The Department of Defense determined that China is a key supplier of CW
technologies and equipment to Iran, and therefore Chinese export policy will have a
significant effect on Iranian ability to obtain indigenous CW capabilities.29
Biological Weapons. Iran’s biological warfare program began during the
1980s, but it is probable that development was accelerated following the 1995
23“Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, The
Monterey Institute of International Studies, www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.html
24U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Nov. 1997, p. 27.
25Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current policy Issues,
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, IB92056.
26The Arms Control Reporter, 707.E-2.175, 10-98.
27Ibid.
28Director of Central Intelligence, Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999.
29U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 27.

---

CRS-14
revelations about the scope of the Iraqi BW effort.30 According to the former United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Iranian BW program is
concealed within Iran’s biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to obscure its
activities. To this end, the Iranian military has used medical, educational, and research
organizations to research, produce, and procure BW agents. Thus, ACDA maintains
that “The United States reiterates its previous findings that Iran probably has
produced BW agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of agents.”31
There are unconfirmed reports that Iran is conducting BW research in a plant
in Damghan.32 Other reports claim that Iran keeps stocks of anthrax and botulism in
Tabriz. Some experts believe Iran is developing the capability to deliver BW by Scud
missiles, aircraft, or aerosol.33
Iran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other
countries, supposedly for civilian purposes. There have been unconfirmed reports that
Iran previously purchased growth cultures for the production of mycotoxins, and had
obtained some bio-weapon technology from Swiss and German companies.34
According to the Director of Central Intelligence, foreign assistance is important for
Iran’s BW capabilities and is difficult to prevent due to the legitimate uses of much
of the equipment and materials.35
Ballistic Missiles. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, Iran acquired
Soviet-made Scud-B missiles from Libya and North Korea and began reverse-
engineering Scuds. After the war, Iran bought additional missiles and production
technology for the Scud-B and C from North Korea and reportedly helped fund the
development of the Nodong missile and possibly longer range missiles. Iran also
received a variety of materials and technology from several Russian companies and
institutes.36 China has also been a primary source of technical assistance for
developing and testing missiles, perhaps providing M-9 and M-11 technology.37 In
30Ibid.
31U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence and Compliance with Arms Control
Agreements, 1997 Annual Report, 1997.
32“ Special Report-Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs” Jane’s Intelligence Review-Special
Report, June 1, 1995. Also, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Weapons destruction in the Middle
E a s t - I r a n , M o n t e r e y I n s t i t u t e f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s ,
www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.html
33“Biological Warfare: the Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb-Iran” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1,
1999; Cordesman, p. 37.
34“Special Report-Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs,” Jane’s Intelligence Review-Special
Report, June 1, 1995.
35Director of Central Intelligence, Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 7/98-12/98, July 1999.
36For further discussion of the Iranian program and Russian assistance see, CRS Report 98-299F,
Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran.
37Dir. of Central Intelligence, Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions July - Dec. 1996, July 1997,
(continued...)

---

CRS-15
1998, Iran had over 300 Scud-B missiles and about 60 Scud-C missiles according to
an Israeli official.38 Iran produces a number of liquid-fuel missiles, including the Scud-
B and Scud-C (also called the Iran 7000).
Using technology acquired from North Korea, Russia, and China, Iran
produced and flight tested the Shahab 3 on July 22, 1998. In the test it traveled about
100 seconds before malfunctioning. This liquid-fuel, single stage, 1300-1500 km (800
-940 mile), mobile missile with a 1000 kg warhead is said to be nearly identical to the
Nodong. The missile is now reported to be operational and in limited production. It
could reach Iraq, Israel, most of Saudi Arabia, and part of Turkey. Iran is also
developing the Shahab 4, a ballistic missile with a range estimated to be from 2000 km
(1240 miles) to 4000 km (2489 miles). This missile is reportedly based on the Soviet
SS-4, liquid-fuel MRBM, that was ordered destroyed under the INF Treaty.39
Russian engineers and institutes have passed missile technology to Iran, and some of
it was said to have been SS-4 technology, including the RD-214 engine design.
The country is also reportedly working on two intercontinental range ballistic
missiles (with ranges of 5,500 km and 10,000 km) that Israeli Prime Minister, recently
referred to as Shahab 5 and Shahab 6. He stated the Shahab 5 could reach much of
Europe and the longer range missile would be able to reach Northeastern United
States. He also said Iran is building hardened missile silos to protect against U.S. or
Israeli pre-emptive attacks.40 The 1998 report of The Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States estimated Iran has the ability to
"demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile ... within five years of a decision to
proceed...."41 In the meantime, Iran is said to have tested a ship-launched ballistic
missile that could greatly extend the country's ability to strike distant targets.42
The Zelzal missile series uses solid-fuel rockets based on technology
reportedly obtained from China, Russia, and Germany. Iran produces the Zelzal-1
(range 100-150 km) and the Zelzal-2 (range 350-400 km) and is developing the
Zelzal-3 (range 1,000-1,500 km).43 The Mushak series consists of shorter-range
missiles that also use solid-fuel motors. Iran has been the recipient of missile
37(...continued)
p 4; Dana Lennox, “Offensive Weapons Table” Jane’s Strategic Weapons System, #30.
38Landau, Uzi. Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset. Testimony
before the U.S. Congress Interparliamentary Commission on National Security, Sept. 14, 1998.
39Jane's Defence Weekly, February 17, 1999, p. 5.
40Washington Times, October 1, 1998, p. 13.
41Executive Summary, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States, Pursuant to Public Law 104-201, July 15, 1998, pp. 13-14.
42Defense News, March 15, 1999, p. 27.
43“Iran Brief,” Sept. 9, 1996, pp. 1-2, abstract in Center for Nonproliferation Studies Database,
Monterey Institute.

---

CRS-16

---

CRS-17
technology from several sources but is increasingly gaining the ability to serve as a
supplier of missiles and missile technology. There was some speculation that North
Korea might have received Iranian assistance with the solid-fuel third stage used in
its attempted satellite launch on August 31, 1998.
Iraq
Nuclear Weapons. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had an extensive nuclear
program, with 10,000 personnel, numerous facilities, and an approximate cost of $10
billion. It had three reactors located at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center: the
French-supplied Osiraq/Tammuz I 40 MW light-water reactor, destroyed by an Israeli
air attack in June 1981; the French-supplied Isis/Tammuz II 800 kW reactor; and the
Soviet-supplied IRT-5000 5 MW light-water reactor, both destroyed by coalition
attacks in 1991. Iraq also had an extensive uranium enrichment program, which
included multiple enrichment techniques, and a laboratory-scale project to produce
plutonium. Iraq possessed a nuclear weapons design facility that was also destroyed
by U.S. forces. Much of Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure, including the enrichment
facilities, violated its NPT and IAEA obligations.
Following the Gulf War, U.N. Resolution 687 established the U.N. Special
Commission (UNSCOM). Under this mandate, U.N. inspectors uncovered about 40
nuclear research facilities, including three clandestine uranium enrichment programs,
and the laboratory-scale plutonium separation program. Additionally, UNSCOM
removed Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel that Iraq reportedly planned to divert
for use in weapons.44 UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq in
December 1998 after Iraq refused to cooperate any further with the inspectors. In
February 1999 the IAEA said questions remained about Iraq’s nuclear disarmament,
including questions about extensive technical documentation, and about external
assistance to Iraq’s nuclear program.45 Iraq retains considerable nuclear know-how,
including a large number of experienced nuclear experts (about 7,000 scientists and
engineers), may have conducted some recent research on nuclear weapons, and
probably remains interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.
Chemical Weapons. Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq possessed several types of
chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and nerve agents (tabun and sarin), and
various means of delivery including rockets, mortars, artillery, aerial bombs, spray
tanks, and Scud-type missiles. Iraq has used chemical weapons, including blister and
nerve agents, on several occasions during the Iran-Iraq war in attacks on Iranians,
causing up to 10,000 casualties at a time.46
Coalition air attacks during the Gulf War and UNSCOM activities in Iraq after
it, led to the destruction of many chemical weapons, agents, production equipment,
44Kenneth Katzman, Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements, CRS Issue Brief 92117, July
6, 1999, p. 4.
45“Iraq’s Compliance with the U.N. Security Council,” Communication from the President of the
United States, March 4, 1999, pp. 6-7.
46 United States Information Agency, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” U.S.
Government White Paper, February 13, 199.

---

CRS-18
and delivery systems.47 However, because Iraq has systematically attempted to
deceive UNSCOM as to the scope of its prior programs, the current state of its
chemical warfare program is uncertain. As a result of the defection of Sadam’s son-in-
law and WMD czar Hussein Kamel in August of 1995, facts about covert Iraqi
warfare capabilities were revealed, including48:
C
Iraq had a program for the development of VX nerve agent beginning in
1985, and was able to produce a quantity of precursors that would suffice for
the production of 400 tons of VX annually.
C
Iraq had weaponized VX.
C
Iraq tested an Al-Hussein variant of the Scud missile with a chemical warhead
and a range of 600-650 km.
Despite Iraqi claims to the contrary, UNSCOM contends that large quantities
of agents and delivery systems remain unaccounted for, including:49
C
200 tons of VX nerve gas, 200 tons of G agent (sarin), and 200 tons of
mustard gas.
C
15,000 artillery shells, 2,000 aerial bombs, and an unknown number of aerial
spray tanks.
C
15,000-25,000 rockets.
Iraq retains its ability to reconstitute its CW program quietly, and it might
retain some CW capabilities. In a July 1999 report to Congress, the Director of
Central Intelligence stated: “ Iraq would exploit any opportunity to reconstitute its
pre-Gulf war capabilities as rapidly as possible once sanctions are lifted. Iraq retains
the expertise to resume chemical agent production within a few weeks or months,
depending on the type of agent and the decision to do so.”50
Biological Weapons. Prior to the Gulf war Iraq had the largest biological
weapon program in the Middle East, despite it being a party to the Biological and
Toxins Weapons Convention. By the time postwar U.N. inspection began, Iraq had
developed a variety of biological agents such as bacteria, viruses and fungal toxins,
and had weaponized anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin.51 For years, Iraq had denied
offensive BW capabilities and admitted only to conducting defensive research, but the
47For a discussion on UNSCOM’s activity, see Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)
Capabilities, by Steve Bowman, CRS Report 98-129 F, September 1998.
48Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 31.
49“Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” U.S. Government White Paper, February 13,
1998, United States Information Agency.
50Director of Central Intelligence, Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999.
51Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 32.

---

CRS-19
defection of Sadam’s son-in-law and WMD czar Hussein Kamil in 1995 revealed the
scope of the Iraqi biological warfare program. Iraq then admitted the production of
BW agents and munitions for offensive purposes, but UNSCOM believes that it
greatly understated its production levels and may have concealed BW agents.52
Agent production and delivery systems attributed to Iraq:53
! Anthrax. Iraq declared a production total of 85,000 liters. UNSCOM
estimates that the actual quantity produced was likely three to four times
higher, but can not confirm this.
! Botulinum toxin. Iraq declared a production total of 380,000 liters. UNSCOM
estimates that the actual quantity produced was double that amount, but can
not confirm this.
! Gas-Gangrene. Iraq declared a production total of 3,400 liters. The actual
quantity might be higher, but UNSCOM can not confirm.
! Aflatoxin. Iraq declared a total of 2,200 liters. In UNSCOM’s view, the time
frame claimed by Iraq does not correlate with the quantity declared to have
been produced.
! Ricin. Iraq declared a production total of 10 liters. The actual quantity may be
higher, but UNSCOM is not able to confirm actual production levels.
! Iraq claims to have destroyed 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads with anthrax (5),
botulinum (16), and aflatoxin (4). UNSCOM can not confirm the unilateral
destruction due to conflicting accounts by Iraq.
! Iraq claims to have destroyed 157 R-400 aerial bombs filled with anthrax (50),
botulinum toxin (100), and aflatoxin (7). UNSCOM can not confirm this
number, but has found the remains of at least 23 of the bombs.
! Iraq claims to have produced 4 aircraft aerosol spray tanks, but it is possible
that more than 4 were manufactured.
! Iraq reportedly imported 31,000 kg of BW agent growth media, of which
3,500 kg remain unaccounted for.
Coalition air strikes damaged many Iraqi BW facilities, but Iraq had relocated
most of its agent production equipment to the Al Hakam and other facilities, that were
unknown at the time of the Gulf War. The equipment in the Al Hakam facility was
destroyed by UNSCOM in June of 1996 along with some equipment in another
52Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Appendix A, pp. 9-13.
53Ibid. Media refers to substances used to provide nutrients for the growth and multiplication of
micro-organisms.

---

CRS-20
facility (Daura), but Iraq had also buried biological agent stockpiles and BW-filled
munitions in areas likely to escape bombing.54
According to a National Security Council paper, Iraq has vast experience in
biological warfare that would allow it to resume a small-scale BW program rapidly
at facilities that currently produce legitimate pharmaceuticals. Iraq “could quickly and
covertly switch production of legitimate biological products to anthrax by changing
seed material”.55 According to the Director of Central Intelligence, Iraq’s lack of
cooperation indicates its intent to reconstitute its BW capabilities when the
opportunity arises.56 However, there is no evidence to date that Iraq has reconstituted
its BW program.
Ballistic Missiles. The Soviet Union sold over 818 Scud-B missiles to Iraq
beginning in the early 1970's and continuing through the Iran-Iraq War. With the help
of a team of international engineers, Iraq improved many of these Scud missiles,
increasing the fuel and oxidizer tanks and reducing the size of the warhead to produce
Al-Hussein missiles with double the range (600 km rather than the 300 km of the
Scud). The Al-Abbas was the second upgrade of the Scud and had a range of about
900 km. It had more fuel and an even smaller warhead than the Al-Hussein and was
apparently unreliable and unstable in flight. Simultaneously, Iraq acquired the
technology, materials, and many of the components to design and produce its own
missiles. It worked on liquid fuel and solid fuel rockets, clustered rockets and multi-
stage rockets.
In 1998, the Department of Defense estimated that Iraq still had several dozen
Al-Hussein missiles and a few Al-Abbas missiles, while UNSCOM estimated that Iraq
may still have had warheads filled with CW or BW material.57 By the time it left Iraq
in December 1998, UNSCOM had accounted for about 70 of 75 CW/BW-capable
missile warheads, some of which were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.
Under the UN Security Council Resolution that ended the Gulf War, Iraq can
develop and produce missiles with a range of 150 km or less. It has developed and
tested the Al-Samoud (150 km range) which uses a liquid fuel rocket based on the
Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile and it is developing the Ababil (130-140 km) which
will have a solid fuel rocket. If export sanctions were lifted, it is estimated Iraq could
begin producing Scud missiles within a year based on retained technology and
production capacity for Al-Samoud and Ababil, and its probable ability to obtain
missile components (gyroscopes, accelerometers, etc.), machine tools, fuel production
facilities, and materials.
54Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997, p. 32.
55U.S. National Security Council, Fact Sheet: Iraq’s Program of Mass Destruction, November 14,
1997. Www.usia.gov/reagional/nea/gulgsec/nsc1119.htm
56Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 7/98 - 12/98, July 1999.
57Washington Times, February 11, 1998, p. 1.

---

CRS-21

---

CRS-22
Israel
Nuclear Weapons. Israel maintains a policy of “nuclear ambiguity” and has
never officially acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons. Israel has consistently
stated that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the
Middle East. Nevertheless, it is widely considered to be a de facto nuclear-weapon
state due to a large body of evidence indicating a sophisticated nuclear weapon
program. The evidence includes descriptions of Israel’s weapons from a former
worker in Israel’s main nuclear weapons facility.58 It is not known to have tested
nuclear weapons, but is thought to maintain between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons
as a deterrent against regional threats to its national survival.59.
Israel has two reactors. The first is the French supplied 40-150 MW heavy
water, natural uranium-fueled, research reactor at Dimona. It is thought to be used
to produce plutonium for weapons. The Dimona facility is also thought to house a
plutonium extraction plant and other weapons-related infrastructure.60 The second
reactor is a 5 MW HEU research reactor at Soreq, which is covered by a partial
IAEA safeguards agreement.
Chemical Weapons. Although Israel denies it has chemical weapons and it
signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, several non-government sources
report Israel produces mustard and nerve gas, probably maintains stockpiles, and
probably has chemical weapon delivery systems. Supporting this allegation, are
reports that an Israeli aircraft crashed near Amsterdam on October 4, 1992 carrying
190 liters of the chemical DMMP which is used in the manufacture of sarin nerve
agent. Chemical agents are said to be produced at the Institute for Biological
Research in Nez Ziona.61
Biological Weapons. There are numerous reports in newspapers and
academic and defense journals that Israel has an offensive biological weapons
program although there is little to indicate it produces or stockpiles biological
weapons.62 It is not a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention and has
58Peter Hounam, “The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal,” London Sunday Times, October
5, 1986.
59 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999);
Seymour Hersh, The Sampson Option (New York: Random Books, 1991); Harold Hough,
“Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November, 1994.
60 Rodney Jones, et al. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 213.
61Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Eastern Mediterranean, Armed Forces, Israel, section
3.10.10; Rosenblum, Mort. "'Poor Man's Bomb' is a Biological Nightmare in Waiting," The
San Diego-Union Tribune, Dec. 26, 1998, p. A36; Al-Hawadith, May 7-13, 1999, pp. 16-20,
in FBIS, FTS 19990529000083.
62Leitenberg, Milton. "Biological Weapons, International Sanctions and Proliferation," Asian
Perspective, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1997, p. 11; U.S. Congress. Office of Technology
Assessment. "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks," August
(continued...)

---

CRS-23
reportedly done extensive research that has led to the capability to produce weapons
such as, according to one unsubstantiated report, "anthrax, botulinum toxin or other
pathogens."63 A Wall Street Journal article included Israel as one of several countries
that have a verifiable biological weapon capability.64
Ballistic Missiles. Israel has a mature missile development and production
program dating back to the early 1960s. France helped Israel develop the Jericho 1
missile, which has two solid propellant stages, carries a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb.) warhead
and has a range of 500 km (300 miles). It is reported that 50 Jericho 1 missiles are
deployed on mobile launchers in Hirbat Zachariah, southwest of Jerusalem. From the
mid-1970s to the late-1980s, Israel developed and tested the two-stage Jericho 2 with
a payload of 1,000 kg and a range of more than 1,500 km (900+ miles). One hundred
of these are reportedly deployed underground in the same area on wheeled
transporter-erector-launchers or railroad flat cars. For several years, Israel has
reportedly been developing the Jericho 3 that may have a range of 4,800 km (almost
3,000 miles) that would enable it to reach all of the Middle East and areas beyond.
It was scheduled for deployment in 1999 or 2000. Israel also has two space launch
vehicles that are reportedly associated with its ballistic missiles. The Shavit booster
is said to be based on the Jericho 2 with a liquid fuel third stage. Israel markets the
Next space launch vehicle that has a liquid upper stage atop three solid propellant
stages and may be based on the Jericho 3. Jericho 1 missiles reportedly can carry a
conventional high explosive (HE) , or chemical, or 20 kiloton nuclear warhead. The
Jericho 2 reportedly is capable of carrying an HE or a one megaton nuclear warhead.65
Libya
Nuclear Weapons. Libya has long been interested in acquiring or developing
nuclear weapons. It has actively sought assistance in developing an indigenous nuclear
infrastructure, including attempts to persuade India to share sensitive nuclear
technology in the 1970s as part of their nuclear-cooperation agreement.66 Libya has
a Soviet-supplied 10 MW nuclear research reactor located at Tajura, that is subject
to IAEA safeguards, but its nuclear program is still in its embryonic stage due to
economic problems, mismanagement and reluctance of foreign suppliers to provide
62(...continued)
1993, p. 65.
63Rosenblum, Mort. "'Poor Man's Bomb' is a Biological Nightmare in Waiting," The San
Diego-Union Tribune, Dec. 26, 1998, p. A36.
64King, Neil Jr. "Iraq is One Of Many With A Doomsday Arsenal," Wall Street Journal, Feb.
18, 1998, p. 14.
65Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Offensive Weapons, Israel, Sept. 1999; Blanche, Ed.
"Israel Addresses the threats of the New Millennium--Part One", Jane's Intelligence Review,
February 1999, p. 25; Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Armed Forces, Israel, section
3.10.7, online; "Jane's: Photos show Israel's nuclear missile base vulnerable to attack," AP,
July 30, 1997, 12:41 PET; "Israel's Shavit booster suffers a second failure," Flight
International, February 4-10, 1998, p. 22; Peterson, Scott. "New Shield for More-Vulnerable
Israel: US," Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 5, 1998, p. 1.
66Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), p. 147.

---

CRS-24
assistance.67 Recent discussions between Libya and Russia indicate possible renewed
Russian support for Libya’s nuclear effort at Tajura, although significant new
construction has not been reported.68
Chemical Weapons. Following tests in 1988, it is estimated Libya produced
100 tons or more of blister and nerve agents in its facility in Rabta. The Rabta facility
was reportedly capable of an annual production of 100 tons of chemical agents, as
well as bombs and warheads to contain them, but the production rate has reportedly
been very low.69 Libya also began constructing another CW facility in Tarhunah,
southeast of Tripoli.70 This underground facility is reported to have two or three 200-
450 feet long tunnels, with 100 feet of sandstone and reinforced concrete above to
protect it from bombing.71 Work on the plant appeared to have slowed following
U.S. pressure on foreign governments to stop supplying equipment and materials for
the plant, an Egyptian visit to the plant, and implied U.S. threats of striking the
plant.72 However, Libya is reportedly continuing its pursuit of indigenous CW
production capabilities, and there are reports that it is being assisted by Chinese,
North Korean, German, and Swiss technical support and advisors.
Biological Weapons. Libya has been seeking BW capabilities for many years
now, with little apparent success. The Libyan program remains in early research and
development stages, despite reports of attempts to recruit BW scientists from the
former Soviet Union, South Africa, Iran, and Iraq.73 The Department of Defense
determined that while Libya may be able to produce laboratory quantities of agents,
given the limitations of its biotechnical infrastructure, it is “unlikely that Libya will be
able to transition to production of militarily useful quantities of biological warfare
agent until well after the turn of the century.”74
Ballistic Missiles. Libya has long been trying to improve its missile
capabilities. Currently, Libya has an aging Scud B (SRBM) force of about 240
missiles and 80 launchers. In 1987 Libya fired Scud missiles at a military base on the
Italian island of Lampedusa in response to the U.S. air attack against terrorist and
military infrastructure. In addition, Libya has been developing the Al-Fatah, a longer
range ballistic missile (950km), using Scud-B technology, and has reportedly engaged
Iran to purchase technological know-how and material.75 Libya has also been seeking
to acquire longer range missiles such as the North Korean Nodong, but according to
67Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997, pp. 34-35.
68Ibid.
69Cordesman, p.14.
70Proliferation: Threat and Response p. 36
71Robert, Waller, “Libyan CW Raises the Issue of Preemption,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
November 1, 1996.
72Clyde Mark, Libya: Suspected Chemical Weapons Facility at Tarhunah, CRS Report 96-849, p.
4.
73“Libya” Jane’s US Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, November 7, 1997
74Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997, p. 37.
75“Military, Libya”, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa - Update 2, 1998.

---

CRS-25
the Department of Defense this effort has been unsuccessful, mainly due to U.N.
sanctions.76 In 1999, the CIA reported that “Libya continued to obtain ballistic
missile-related equipment, materials, and technology during the second half of
1998.”77 In January 2000, British officials intercepted a shipment of missile
components on its way from a Chinese company called Hontex on its way to Libya.78
Saudi Arabia
Nuclear Weapons. Saudi Arabia does not possess significant nuclear
infrastructure, however, it reportedly may have been involved in funding nuclear
programs in Iraq (prior to the Gulf war), and Pakistan.79 Other Gulf states such as
U.A.E. and Dubai may have served as transfer points for smuggling nuclear
technology.80
Chemical Weapons. There is no clear evidence but there have been some
unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia has developed chemical warheads for its CSS-
2 missiles.81 Some experts believe Saudi Arabia has motivation to seek chemical
warheads, since its missiles have such low lethality with conventional high-explosive
warheads, that they can not serve as a deterrent.82 Saudi Arabia possesses anti-riot
irritants and other non-persistent chemical agents.
Biological Weapons. There is no evidence that Saudi Arabia is seeking the
development of BW capabilities.
Ballistic Missiles. In 1988, the United States learned that Saudi Arabia had
purchased about 60 CSS-2 (DF-3) medium range ballistic missiles from China. The
nuclear warheads of the Chinese missiles were replaced with a large conventional
warhead, reducing the range from about 3,500 km to about 2,800 km (1,736 miles).
The missiles are difficult to fuel and maintain and may not be operational. In the late
76 Proliferation Threat and Response, 1997. p. 37.
77Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999, p.5.
78“Britain Catches Libya Trying to Skirt Arms Ban,” Washington Post, Jan.10, 2000, p. 14.
79Lewis, Paul. “Defector Says Saudis Sought Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, August 7, 1994;
Shahram Chubin, “Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case,” The Henry
L. Stimson Center, March 1997, p. 20; Jane Perlez, “Saudi’s Visit To Arms Site In Pakistan Worries
U.S.,” New York Times, July 10, 1999; Paul Taylor, “West Concerned at Saudi-Pakistan Nuclear
Link,” Reuters, August 3, 1999.
80“Nuclear Plot Is Foiled,” London Sunday Express, July 25, 1999; “British Customs Seize Nuclear
Material Bound for Pakistan,” The Indian Express Update, g2i-digest, Vol. 1, No. 2494, July 25,
1999; “Dubai: The Commercial Gateway to Iran,” The Risk Report, Vol. 2, No. 2, March 1996.
81“NBC Capabilities, Saudi Arabia, “ Jane’s NBC Defense Systems 1998-1999. Also, Defense and
Foreign Affairs Weekly, April 1991, reports Chinese assistance to Saudi in developing chemical
warheads. Also, in the Arms Control Reporter “may possess” as of 3.13.91, 704.E-0.10, 5-92.
82Dany Shoham, “Does Saudi Arabia Have or Seek Chemical or Biological Weapons?” The
Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1999, p. 124.

---

CRS-26
1990s the Saudis were shopping for replacement missiles but apparently have not
purchased any yet.
Sudan
Nuclear weapons. Sudan does not possess nuclear facilities or materials.
While Sudan does not possess indigenous nuclear capability, it may have served as a
transfer point for smuggling nuclear technology.83
Chemical weapons. According to a 1999 DCI report, Sudan has been
developing the capability to produce CW for many years. In August 1998, the Al-
Shifa pharmaceutical plant in northeast Khartoum was attacked and destroyed by
Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from U.S. naval vessels in the Red Sea. U.S.
officials stated that the Al-Shifa facility was linked to Osama bin Ladin’s international
terrorist network, and was producing a precursor unique to the production of VX.84.
Sudan claimed that the facility was a pharmaceutical plant manufacturing antibiotics,
anti-malaria drugs, and veterinary pharmaceuticals.
Other experts and individuals in the international community questioned both
the CW involvement evidence and the connection of Al-Shifa to bin-Ladin.85 Despite
this criticism, U.S. officials maintain their position that Al-Shifa was involved in CW
activity. In a press conference in February 1999, National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger stated that prior to the attack “We knew that bin Ladin was seeking chemical
weapons,” and “we know that he worked with the Sudanese government to acquire
chemical weapons.”86 In August 1999, the United Nations declared that it was
investigating Sudan’s use of CW in a bombing raid on Laniya, a relief center in rebel-
held Southern Sudan.87 The investigation came after the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army claimed residents in the bombed areas were turning ill,88 and three UN relief
workers fell sick as well. Regardless of the controversy over the attack on Al-Shifa,
there is evidence that Sudan has acquired CW capabilities.89 Sudan has obtained
assistance from other countries, primarily Iraq.90 Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs at the State Department, stated “we see evidence that is quite
83“Sudan: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs,” Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies Database.
84The Arms Control Reporter, 10-98, 704.E-2.179.
85French Foreign Minster Vedrine and Italian Foreign Minister Dini expressed doubts. “Countering
Dual Use Facilities,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1 1999. Experts disputed the physical
evidence. Arms Control Reporter, 10-98, 704.E-2.179.
86“Osama Bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1, 1999.
87“UN Inquiry on Sudan Germ Weapon Scare,” New York Times, August 3, 1999, p. A3.
88“Sudanese Rebels Accuse Government of Using Chemical Weapons,” Dow Jones Newswire, July
30, 1999.
89Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999; Cordesman, p.57.
90Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999.

---

CRS-27
clear on contacts between Sudan and Iraq. In fact, Al-Shifa officials, early on in the
company’s history were in touch with Iraqi officials associated with Iraq’s VX
program.”91 There were also reports that Iraq was involved in another facility in
Khartoum suspected of producing CW. Some of these reports claim that, according
to unnamed diplomats and a former Sudanese government official, hundreds of Iraqi
experts in different fields have worked in Sudan.
Biological Weapons. According to the Director of Central Intelligence,
Sudan’s history of CW development and its close relationship with Iraq indicates that
it may also be interested in acquiring BW capabilities.92 In August 1999, the United
Nations declared that it was investigating possible Sudanese use of CW or BW in a
bombing raid on Laniya, a relief center in rebel-held Southern Sudan.93
Syria
Nuclear Weapons. Syria has a small Chinese-supplied 30 KW neutron-
source reactor in Damascus. Syria is a party to the NPT, and the reactor is subject to
IAEA safeguards. In 1998, a Syrian-Russian joint commission reportedly discussed
bilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, involving possible
construction of two power reactors.94 Despite some concern that Syria might acquire
nuclear technology that could provide the basis for a weapons program, it is still
constrained by financial and technical problems.
Chemical Weapons. Syria first developed chemical weapons in the 1970s
using Soviet exports and assistance, and is currently believed to have stockpiled
hundreds of tons of CW including sarin, VX, and mustard gas. One major facility is
located near Homs and reportedly produces several hundred tons of nerve gas
annually.95
Syria has weaponized sarin into aerial munitions and Scud-C warheads,96 and
appears to have begun production of warheads using VX in 1997. Some experts
believe that Syria “may also have VX and sarin in modified Soviet ZAB - incendiary
91Arms Control Reporter, October 1998, 704.E-2.180.
92 Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 7/98-12/98, July 1999.
93“UN Inquiry on Sudan Germ Weapon Scare,” New York Times, August 3, 1999, p. A-3.
94Issam Hamza, “Russia to Help Syria in Nuclear Energy,” Reuters, February 21, 1998; ”Syria Signs
Agreement With Russia to Build Two Nuclear Reactors,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, London,
May 30, 1999 (Text of report by Dubai newspaper Al-Bayan).
95“Syria’s SCUDs and Chemical Weapons,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
for International Studies.
96Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 38.

---

CRS-28
bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs.”97 There are also reports that a new facility is
being built near Aleppo.98
Though trying to develop indigenous production capabilities, Syria remains
dependent on foreign sources for chemical precursors and production equipment.
According to the DCI, it sought CW-related precursors from several countries in the
later part of 1998.99
Biological Weapons. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, (ACDA) “it is probable that Syria is developing an offensive BW
capability.”100 Syria appears to be engaged in an extensive research effort and there
are reports that it has production capability of anthrax and botulism,101 and has also
experimented with typhoid germs, poisonous mushrooms, and bacterial viruses.102
Syria is also reportedly seeking assistance from Western and Chinese firms in
developing biological missile warheads.103 Syria signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, but has not ratified it.
Ballistic Missiles. Syria has large and growing ballistic missile forces in the
region. It first acquired Scud-B missiles in 1974 from the Soviet Union, and currently
has up to 200 Scud-B missiles, with a range of 300km and a payload of 1000kg. In
the 1980s, Syria obtained shorter range SS-21s (Scarab) with a 70km range and a
480kg payload.104
In 1991, Syria first received Scud-C missiles from North Korea; the sale was
brokered by Iran. Syria is currently believed to have between 50-80 of these missiles
with a range of up to 600km. Moreover, Syria has underground missile production
and assembly facilities that have been built with Iranian, Chinese, and North Korean
assistance, and is now capable of building both Scud-C and B missiles. Syria has up
to 36 launchers for its Scud missiles. 105 In addition, Syria may be developing an
97Cordesman, p.23.
98“Syria’s SCUDs and Chemical Weapons,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
for International Studies
99Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999.
100Adherence and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1997 Annual Report, 1997.
101Cordesman, p. 25.
102“Syria Said Producing Chemical Weapons,” FBIS Doc. ID: FTS19981914000591. Istanbul Sabah
(internet version), October 14, 1998.
103 Eisenstadt, Michael. “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1993.
104Proliferation: Threat and Response p. 40; Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” ibid;
“Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East - Syria,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute for International Studies, at www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/Syria.htm
105Cordesman, p. 23; Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” ibid..

---

CRS-29
indigenous capability to produce copies of the Chinese M-9 missile with 600km range
and 500kg payload.106
According to the office of the Secretary of Defense, Syria has probably
produced chemical warheads for some of its Scud missiles, and according to other
sources, may be producing biological warheads for the Scuds.107
Additional Countries with Missile Programs
But No WMD
Afghanistan
There is no evidence that Afghanistan, either the ruling Taliban or its opponents,
have a nuclear, chemical, or biological program.
There are indications that both major contending factions in Afghanistan have
Scud missiles, inherited from the Soviet occupation period (1979-1989).
Commander Ahmad Shah Masud's forces controlled Kabul during 1992-97, and he
reportedly took an undetermined number of Scuds in the Afghan arsenal with him
when he retreated from Kabul in September 1996. In 1997, he apparently set up two
to four Scud missile launch bases in his base in the Panjshir Valley.108
Russian news sources indicate that the Taliban might have seized some Scuds
during their campaign to capture Kabul. In October 1995, when the militia was still
on the outskirts of Kabul, the Taliban claimed to have captured a former Scud missile
base near the Darulaman district of Kabul.109 Another report says the Taliban, along
with its seizure of the capital in September 1996, captured 15 Scuds in Kabul, as well
as an unknown number of short-range tactical missiles.110
Turkey
Nuclear Weapons. Turkey has two nuclear research reactors: 5 MW and
250 KW. Both are under IAEA safeguards. Turkey may plan to build two nuclear
power reactors by the year 2006.111 However, such a decision would be controversial
106Blanche, Ed and Duncan Lennox. “Shifting Balance; Briefing, Ballistic Missile Forces,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly” March 10, 1999, p. 69.
107Proliferation: Threat and Response pp. 38-40; “Syria’s SCUDs and Chemical Weapons,” Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, at
www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/Syria/scud.htm; Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” ibid;
Cordesman, p. 23.
108“Massoud Sets Up Scud Bases in Panjshir,” Jane's Defence Weekly, May 21, 1997, p. 12.
109“Taliban Reportedly Launches New Attacks Near Kabul,” FBIS-NES-95-199, October 14, 1995.
110“Pakistan May Get Scuds From Taliban,” Indian Express, October 3, 1996, p. 3.
111“Turkey: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs,” Center for Nonproliferation
(continued...)

---

CRS-30
and would require significant foreign supply and financing. There is no evidence
Turkey is attempting to develop nuclear weapons.
Chemical Weapons. Turkey does not seem to be pursuing the development
of CW capabilities.
Biological Weapons. Turkey does not seem to be seeking the development
of BW capabilities.
Ballistic Missiles. Turkey has ordered 120 MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMS) from the United States. The block 1 version has a 560 kg (1230
lbs.) warhead and a range of 165 km (100+ miles).112
United Arab Emirates
Nuclear Weapons. The U.A.E. does not possess significant nuclear
infrastructure, however, it may have served as a transfer point for smuggling nuclear
technology.113
Chemical Weapons. There is no clear evidence that the U.A.E. is pursuing
CW programs.
Biological Weapons. The U.A.E. does not seem to be seeking the
development of BW capabilities.
Ballistic Missiles. The U.A.E. has acquired a number of Scud-B missiles but
apparently does not have WMD warheads.
Yemen
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons. Yemen does not possess
nuclear facilities, nor is it known to be seeking the development of chemical or
biological weapons.
Ballistic Missiles. The Soviet Union supplied its client state, South Yemen
with Scud-B (300 km range, 1,000 kg warhead) and SS-21 Scarab (70 km, 482 kg)
missiles. South Yemen merged with North Yemen in 1990. Southern rebels fired
some of these missiles during a civil war in 1994, but the North won the civil war and
111(...continued)
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
112Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Offensive Weapons, USA, Jan. 1999.
113“Nuclear Plot Is Foiled,” London Sunday Express, July 25, 1999; “British Customs Seize Nuclear
Material Bound for Pakistan,” The Indian Express Update, g2i-digest, Vol. 1, No. 2494, July 25,
1999; “Dubai: The Commercial Gateway to Iran,” The Risk Report, Vol. 2, No. 2, March 1996.

---

CRS-31
took possession of all remaining missiles. It is not known how many remain in
Yemen’s inventory.114
Options for Pursuing U.S. Nonproliferation Interests in
the Middle East
The United States combines cooperative and coercive measures to achieve its
nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives in the Middle East. These
measures include: maintaining strong bilateral relationships with key allies, multilateral
diplomacy, and preparations for military options should they become necessary.
Major components of these U.S. policies are outlined below. Congress supports these
efforts primarily by providing statutory authority and funding.
State-to-State Relations
Close political and military relationships with key allies such as Egypt, Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and other countries are very important for U.S. efforts to counter the
spread of WMD or their use in the region. Many of these relationships are strongly
influenced by the Middle East peace process, which is a top priority for U.S. foreign
policy that sometimes takes precedence over proliferation concerns. Nevertheless,
U.S. allies in the region have supported U.S. diplomatic and military efforts to counter
the spread of WMD to countries opposed to U.S. interests. For example, allied
support was critical to U.S. political and military operations against Iraq throughout
the 1990 Gulf War and the ongoing embargo. On the other hand, some key U.S.
allies in the region, including Israel and Egypt, have sought WMD and missiles of
their own and do not always support U.S. nonproliferation policies. Sometimes, U.S.
allies may interpret continued economic and political support as a “green light” to
develop WMD and missiles without risk of consequences from the United States.
While nonproliferation sometimes takes a back seat to other priorities, such as
maintaining good relations with countries that are important to the Middle East peace
process, a breakthrough in the peace process might ease some of the underlying
security concerns that motivate countries to acquire WMD.
Sanctions are another tool the U.S. uses to support its nonproliferation
objectives. Various laws authorize the President to impose unilateral sanctions on
countries that acquire, use, or help other countries to get WMD or missiles. Such
sanctions can cut U.S. assistance/cooperation and impose restrictions on U.S.
technology exports. The effectiveness of sanctions often depends on persuading other
countries to support or respect U.S. sanctions. Even without multilateral support,
sanctions can still highlight strong U.S. opposition to WMD proliferation. However,
strong sanctions are rarely imposed on U.S. friends or allies that acquire WMD.
114"The Nonproliferation Review," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies, Winter 1997, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 167; Washington Post, May 12, 1994,
p. A 18.

---

CRS-32
Multilateral Diplomacy: Nonproliferation Regimes
Global treaties such as the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
and the Biological Weapons Convention are another important part of U.S.
nonproliferation efforts. The NPT’s near universal membership provides a useful tool
to rally international support for U.S. nonproliferation efforts. (Israel, however, is one
of the four remaining non-members of the Treaty.) The NPT’s global inspection
system provides assurances that civil nuclear technology has not been diverted to
military uses. The NPT inspection system was upgraded after it failed to detect Iraq’s
nuclear weapons program. Many view Iran as the next test of the system’s ability to
detect covert weapons programs. The CWC and the BWC also have inspections, but
face even bigger difficulties detecting covert weapons-related activities. Membership
in the regimes -- as well as compliance -- is problematic in the Middle East. (See
Tables 2 and 3.)
In addition to formal treaties, some countries cooperate to control exports of
materials and equipment that can be used to make WMD or missiles. The main
supplier groups are: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group (for chemical
and biological materials), the Missile Technology Control Regime (for missile
technology), and the Wassenaar agreement (for conventional arms and dual use
goods). The U.S. supports these groups and tries to persuade other countries to
adopt responsible controls on exports of dual-use technologies that can be used for
WMD. While the supplier regimes can be useful, they are voluntary and, without
verification or enforcement, depend on their members to police their own exports.
The United States also promotes its nonproliferation policies at the United
Nations and at other international organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons. The
United Nations Security Council supported U.S. policies toward Iraq and established
a Special Commission to eliminate Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missiles, although
support for the U.N. Special Commission has waned and Russia, China, and France
have opposed U.S. efforts to install a new inspection system. Support from the
United Nations, especially in the Security Council, can lend legitimacy to U.S.
nonproliferation efforts and expand international support for them. On the other
hand, the U.S. is often criticized at the UN for its own WMD capabilities and for its
silence on Israel’s WMD.
Military Options: Counterproliferation, Intelligence, and Deterrence
Because some potential adversaries (in the Middle East and elsewhere)
currently have WMD and missile delivery systems, and because diplomacy may fail
to prevent further WMD proliferation, the U.S. Armed Forces have developed
programs to help prevent the spread of WMD, to deter or prevent their use, and to
protect against their effects. Defense cooperation and arms transfers to U.S. allies can
ease concerns about security that can lead them to consider acquiring WMD, and also
signal potential adversaries that acquisition or use of WMD may evoke a strong
military response. U.S. conventional and nuclear defense capabilities and the threat

---

CRS-33
of retaliation help deter WMD attacks against U.S. forces, territory, or allies.
Counterproliferation capabilities have been expanded in recent years to include more
advanced “passive” and “active” defense measures. Passive counterproliferation tools
include protective gear such as gas masks and detectors to warn of the presence of
WMD. Active measures include missile defenses to protect U.S. territory, forces and
allies, precision-guided penetrating munitions and special operation forces to attack
WMD installations, and intelligence gathering and processing capabilities. Intelligence
is a particularly critical element of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, without which many
policy options would not be possible. Intelligence agencies track foreign WMD
programs, monitor treaty compliance, and attempt to detect transfers of WMD goods
and technology. The U.S. cooperates with certain allies to prepare for possible
counterproliferation actions. Although U.S. forces successfully attacked some WMD
facilities in Iraq during the Gulf War, political and technical hurdles (hidden
underground bunkers, locations near civilians, etc.) make counterproliferation a last
resort if other options have failed.
Congress. Congress supports nonproliferation and counterproliferation
through legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for diplomacy and for military
options. Sanctions legislation gives the President authority to punish proliferators and
countries that assist them; export control legislation gives the executive branch
authority to restrict transfers of sensitive technology to countries of concern.
Congress also conducts oversight of the executive branch nonproliferation and Middle
East policies.

---