Contents

• Overview and Issues for Congress
• U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Relations
• Domestic Political Background
• Economy
• Relations with Russia
• Relations with China

Overview and Issues for Congress

The Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as Kyrgyzstan) is a mountainous country slightly smaller than South Dakota. Kyrgyzstan borders three other Central Asian states in addition to the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) (see Figure 1) and maintains close ties with Russia. The population of approximately 7.4 million is predominantly Kyrgyz (74%), with minority groups including Uzbeks (15%), Russians (5%), Dungans (1%), and Uyghurs (1%), among others.¹ Approximately 90% of the population is Muslim, primarily Sunni; a plurality of the Christian minority, which accounts for about 7% of the population, is Russian Orthodox.² For most of the 30 years since independence, Kyrgyzstan was considered by scholars and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as the most democratic country in Central Asia, with a vibrant civil society and a higher degree of press freedom than is found elsewhere in the region.³ Kyrgyzstan is one of 17 countries worldwide whose legislatures participate in the House Democracy Partnership, a bipartisan commission of the U.S. House of Representatives that aims to advance U.S. strategic interests by promoting good governance, legislative transparency, and institutional effectiveness.⁴

In light of political developments that began in 2020 (see "Domestic Political Background" below), the U.S.-based NGO Freedom House classified Kyrgyzstan as "not free" in 2021 and has since maintained that designation.⁵ Some Members of Congress, other U.S. officials, and outside observers have voiced concern about democratic backsliding (see Table 1) in Kyrgyz politics.⁶ Some Members have raised alarm about Kyrgyz government pressure on independent media outlets, including the congressionally funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).⁷ Kyrgyzstan, a lower-middle-income country that relies heavily on foreign remittances, has faced additional economic and geopolitical pressures as a result of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and related sanctions, but it has also benefitted from trade diversion, emerging as a major hub for reexport to Russia.⁸ According to the World Bank, Kyrgyzstan's economy experienced the fifth-fastest gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the world in 2025.⁹ In June 2026, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly elected Kyrgyzstan to serve as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council for a two-year term beginning in January 2027.¹⁰

Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in strengthening U.S. economic ties with Kyrgyzstan, countering Russian sanctions evasion via Kyrgyzstan, and the state of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, among other issues.¹¹ S.Res. 816, agreed to in the Senate in the 119^th Congress, affirms the strategic importance of the U.S. relationship with Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries. S.Res. 459, also agreed to by the Senate in the 119^th Congress, "honor[s] the strategic importance of the C5+1 diplomatic platform [see "U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Relations" below] and recogniz[es] the deepening partnership between the United States" and Central Asia countries, including Kyrgyzstan.

Figure 1. Map of the Kyrgyz Republic

Source: Graphic created by CRS based on data from the State Department and Esri.

U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Relations

The United States was among the first countries to recognize Kyrgyzstan's independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. From 2001 to 2014, the United States operated a Transit Center at Manas, near the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, in support of both Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Kyrgyzstan deteriorated under President Almazbek Atambayev (in office 2011-2017), reportedly in part due to Russian pressure, and the Kyrgyz parliament voted in 2013 not to extend the U.S. lease on Manas.¹² Russia leases the nearby Kant airbase. In 2023, the State Department described bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan as characterized by "ebbs and flows" and noted "wide swings in our political and security relationship."¹³ The Trump Administration describes priority areas of engagement with Kyrgyzstan as including "expanding economic cooperation, strengthening sanctions compliance, and enforcing national immigration laws" and identifies infrastructure, critical minerals, and investment cooperation as areas of opportunity for strengthening economic ties.¹⁴

U.S. bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan are complemented by the C5+1 diplomatic platform, which provides a forum for the governments of the United States and the five Central Asian countries to "advance regional solutions to global challenges" by engaging on economic, energy, and security issues.¹⁵ In November 2025, President Trump hosted a C5+1 presidential summit in Washington, DC, to mark the 10^th anniversary of the platform. According to the State Department, as part of the summit, "the United States celebrated commercial deals involving U.S. and Kyrgyz companies" that "are expected to generate billions of dollars in U.S. export content and support thousands of American jobs."¹⁶

Bilateral trade between the United States and Kyrgyzstan equaled $218 million in 2025. Of the $213 million in U.S. exports to Kyrgyzstan, cars and piston engines accounted for 44% and 10%, respectively. The largest category of U.S. imports from Kyrgyzstan, which equaled $5 million in 2025, was textile articles, accounting for about 19%.¹⁷ The United States was Kyrgyzstan's ninth-largest trade partner as of 2025.¹⁸ Under the second Trump Administration, the President has assessed Kyrgyzstan a 10% tariff rate under various authorities, most recently under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132).¹⁹ That tariff expired on July 24, 2026. Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country that Congress has exempted from Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2432), the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. Initially aimed at promoting free emigration from the Soviet Union, the amendment denies normal trade relations (NTR) status to some current and former nonmarket economy countries unless they adhere to certain freedom-of-emigration requirements.²⁰ Congress enacted legislation authorizing permanent NTR status for Kyrgyzstan in 2000 (P.L. 106-200) following Kyrgyzstan's 1998 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In January 2026, the State Department paused the issuance of immigrant visas to Kyrgyz nationals as part of a "full review of all screening and vetting policies to ensure that immigrants from high-risk countries do not unlawfully utilize welfare in the United States or become a public charge."²¹ As of August 21, 2026, the pause of immigrant visa issuance is no longer in effect, in accordance with a court order by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.²² Kyrgyz nationals are subject to the State Department's visa bond program, through which consular officers may require applicants for business and tourism visas to post bonds of up to $20,000.²³ Since 2025, as part of an agreement with the Uzbekistan's government, the United States has removed (deported) an unspecified number of Kyrgyz nationals to Uzbekistan for violating federal immigration laws.²⁴ S.Res. 631 would request that the Secretary of State submit to Congress a statement regarding Uzbekistan's human rights practices, including as they relate to people who are not citizens of Uzbekistan but have been removed to Uzbekistan by the U.S. government.

Domestic Political Background

Kyrgyzstan experienced political upheavals that ousted authoritarian-leaning presidents in 2005 and 2010.²⁵ A new constitution adopted in 2010 transitioned the country to a semi-parliamentary system in which the president shared executive power with the prime minister. Several Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers voiced support for Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary democracy, the only such political system in Central Asia at the time.²⁶ By 2020, however, Kyrgyzstan's legislature had, in the assessment of Freedom House, "de facto surrendered its constitutionally granted power to form and control the executive branch" and had become a rubber-stamp body "merely paying lip service to the declared goal of building a parliamentary democracy."²⁷ Kyrgyzstan experienced further political upheaval following October 2020 parliamentary elections in which opposition parties alleged widespread irregularities.²⁸ The country's Central Electoral Commission annulled the elections after mass protests broke out in Bishkek, and within ten days both the prime minister and the president had resigned.²⁹ Sadyr Japarov, a former member of parliament who had been serving an 11-year sentence on kidnapping charges that he maintains were politically motivated, quickly became both prime minister and acting president after protestors freed him from prison.³⁰

Upon taking power, Japarov—a nationalist politician with a large social media following—began to push for a constitutional referendum that would return the country to a presidential form of government.³¹ In January 2021, Japarov won 79% of the vote in a snap presidential election that coincided with a referendum in which 84% of voters supported reverting to a presidential system.³² A new constitution, endorsed by voters in a subsequent April 2021 referendum, significantly expanded presidential power at the expense of the legislature, transferring several key parliamentary competencies to the executive and reducing the number of seats in the unicameral parliament from 120 to 90.³³ Some local and international critics argued that the new constitution "undermines human rights norms and weakens checks and balances necessary to prevent abuses of power," and questioned the legitimacy of the manner in which it was adopted.³⁴

In the context of Japarov's rise to power, some analysts posited that Kyrgyz voters may have been drawn to a strong presidency due to long-standing frustrations with corruption and the ineffectiveness of parliament.³⁵ One observer, for example, noted Japarov's "deliberate anti-establishment appeal and nationalist populist rhetoric" in contrast to "people's rage against the political elites largely associated with a parliament marred by corruption and scandals."³⁶ Many analysts assess that, since taking power, Japarov has successfully stifled political opposition within Kyrgyzstan and increased government pressure on civil society and independent media.³⁷ One analyst has argued that November 2025 snap parliamentary elections provided Japarov "the opportunity to subjugate parliament once and for all" because they took place under a revised electoral framework, passed by parliament in April 2025 and signed into law by Japarov in June 2025, that reduced the power of political parties.³⁸ Another described the 2025 elections as potentially "the last nail in the coffin of the Kyrgyz parliamentary or mixed parliamentary-presidential system."³⁹ Only one political party fielded candidates, and over 80% of deputies in the new parliament are Japarov supporters who ran as independents.⁴⁰ In the lead-up to the elections, several prominent opposition figures were arrested for an alleged coup attempt.⁴¹ Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to hold its next presidential election in January 2027; Japarov intends to seek a second term.⁴²

Japarov has overseen a period of strong economic growth and progress on major development projects, and he enjoys widespread popularity.⁴³ One expert argues that, "even if the country is no longer as democratic [under Japarov] as it once was, it has been, arguably, more stable than at any time in its nearly 35-year history as an independent state."⁴⁴ According to Kyrgyzstan's ambassador to the United States, "since 2021, tax revenues have almost quadrupled and customs revenues have increased nearly sixfold" as a result of "restoring the capacity of the state and bringing much more of the economy into the legal and transparent sphere."⁴⁵ Following violent border clashes with Tajikistan in 2021 and 2022, the Japarov government and its Tajik counterpart finalized the delimitation and demarcation of the 600-mile border between the two countries, a site of recurrent tensions, in March 2025.⁴⁶ The Trump Administration praised the agreement as "reflect[ing] the commitment of [these] governments to diplomacy and regional stability."⁴⁷ Japarov's government also has resolved long-standing border issues with Uzbekistan.⁴⁸ Some analysts argue that Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to political instability sparked by intra-elite tensions or public discontent over standards of living, power shortages, and corruption.⁴⁹ Others contend that Japarov has successfully consolidated power in a manner that makes short-term political upheaval unlikely.⁵⁰

Economy

Kyrgyzstan is a lower-middle-income country whose economy is heavily dependent on remittances and mining. Gold, Kyrgyzstan's main export commodity, is primarily produced by the Kumtor mine, which accounted for 11% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP in 2020.⁵¹ In 2021, the government of Kyrgyzstan nationalized the mine, which previously had been operated by a Canadian company.⁵² Kyrgyzstan is one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world; remittances, which come predominantly from Russia, were equivalent to 17.6% of GDP in 2024.⁵³ China is Kyrgyzstan's largest trading partner, followed by Russia. Kyrgyzstan's 1998 accession to the WTO helped establish the country as a hub for the reexport of goods from China.⁵⁴ Kyrgyzstan has been a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union since 2015 and depends on Russia for over 90% of its gasoline. The ongoing fuel crisis in Russia resulting from Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure has constrained fuel supplies in Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁵

According to the World Bank, Kyrgyzstan's GDP grew by 9% in 2023, 11.5% in 2024, and 11.1% in 2025, with growth projected to moderate to 6.1% in 2026.⁵⁶ Experts ascribe Kyrgyzstan's rapid economic growth to factors including the increased trade volumes due to the war in Ukraine (see "Relations with Russia," below), improved tax and customs administration, increased gold exports, and strong growth in the construction sector.⁵⁷ Increased state revenues have translated to higher government spending on infrastructure and development projects.⁵⁸ According to official figures, the country's poverty rate fell from 33.2% in 2022 to 24% in 2025.⁵⁹ At the same time, Kyrgyzstan faces high inflation, and some observers argue that the benefits of economic growth have been unevenly distributed.⁶⁰ According to official figures, the consumer price index increased by 12.2% year-over-year in September 2026.⁶¹

Relations with Russia

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kyrgyzstan has maintained political, economic, and security ties with Russia but has not endorsed Russian aggression in Ukraine. While Russia remains the primary destination for Kyrgyz labor migration, some analysts observe that Kyrgyz labor migrants have increasingly sought alternative destinations in light of the war.⁶² Since 2022, overall imports to Kyrgyzstan have surged, and Kyrgyzstan has served as a "key conduit" for Western and Chinese goods into Russia.⁶³ Some observers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed concern that Kyrgyzstan is functioning as a "back door" for restricted goods, including dual-use technologies for Russia's defense sector.⁶⁴ According to press reporting, Kyrgyzstan has served as "a beachhead in the global financial system" for Russian sanctions evasions schemes.⁶⁵ The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned multiple Kyrgyz entities for exporting dual-use technologies to Russia and supporting Russia's military-industrial base.⁶⁶ In April 2026, the European Union restricted exports of some high-tech goods to Kyrgyzstan, citing "systematic and persistent failure" by the Kyrgyz government to prevent the transit to Russia of tools and equipment used in the manufacture of drones and missiles.⁶⁷ According to one expert, "Kyrgyzstan's experience underscores the limits of sanctions" and "highlights persistent loopholes."⁶⁸ In October 2026, the Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Economy and Commerce announced a range of actions intended to mitigate sanctions risks and stated, "our position is unequivocal: the territory, jurisdiction, and banking and payment infrastructure of the Kyrgyz Republic must not be used for transactions intended to circumvent sanctions."⁶⁹

Relations with China

The PRC has supported several large-scale infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan, financed primarily through China's state-owned financial institutions. China's Export-Import Bank owns about $1.4 billion of Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt, accounting for about 20% of the total.⁷⁰ The expanding PRC economic presence in Kyrgyzstan has sparked controversy and protests. In February 2020, for example, a joint PRC-Kyrgyz project to build a $280 million logistics center in Kyrgyzstan's Naryn province was cancelled after protests by local residents, who criticized the investment as a PRC land grab.⁷¹ A long-planned railroad connecting Uzbekistan to China via Kyrgyzstan began construction in 2025 and is slated for completion by 2030.⁷²

Footnotes