Cabo Verde: In Brief
Cabo Verde in Brief
July 15, 2024
Cabo Verde, a small island nation of about 611,000 people located off the west coast of
Africa, is described by the State Department as “one of Africa’s success stories.” The
Nicolas Cook
country has long-standing people-to-people ties with the United States rooted in
Specialist in African Affairs
historical patterns of migration from Cabo Verde to the United States.
Cabo Verde’s strategic significance to the United States derives from its geographic
location: the country is a transshipment point for Latin American cocaine bound for
Europe and a refueling stopover for transatlantic air traffic between Africa and the United States.
The country is also a long-standing U.S. partner in Africa that the State Department has cited as a model of
democratic governance in West Africa since its transition from single party rule to a multi-party political system in
1991. U.S. bilateral aid to Cabo Verde is limited, and centers on military professionalization, counternarcotics
efforts, past development projects supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and a planned
new regional MCC compact, currently under development.
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background and Historical U.S. Relations ...................................................................................... 1
Politics and Governance .................................................................................................................. 1
Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................................. 4
Europe ....................................................................................................................................... 4
China ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Economy .......................................................................................................................................... 5
Climate Change and Environment Issues ........................................................................................ 6
Narcotics Trafficking ....................................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Relations and Assistance ......................................................................................................... 7
Congressional Role ................................................................................................................... 9
U.S. Assistance .......................................................................................................................... 9
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compacts ........................................................... 10
Contacts
Author Information ......................................................................................................................... 11
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Overview
Cabo Verde, an island archipelago of approximately 611,000 people located off West Africa’s
Atlantic coast, stands out as a stable democracy in a sub-region where several countries have
undergone military seizures of power.1 It routinely ranks among the strongest democracies in
Africa, according to various indices of governance conditions. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
has described the country as “a model of democratic governance and human rights in Africa” and
as “one of our strongest partners on the continent.”2 Its per-capita gross domestic product (GDP)
is among the ten highest in sub-Saharan Africa, though it is not self-sufficient in food production;
it imports most of its food, fuel, and consumer goods.3
U.S.-Cabo Verde relations are warm and underpinned by people-to-people ties in large part
centering on a sizable U.S.-based Cabo Verdean diaspora community concentrated primarily in
New England. U.S. assistance for Cabo Verde focuses on military training and counternarcotics-
centered maritime security cooperation. An expanding U.S.-Cabo Verde defense partnership has
included multiple U.S. military port visits and trainings, as well as the launch of a National Guard
State Partnership Program with the New Hampshire National Guard in 2022. The country also
has participated in two Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compacts (2005-2010 and
2012-2017), and is developing a regional compact, with a projected but yet-to-be-determined goal
of boosting regional economic integration, trade, or other cross-border activity.4
Background and Historical U.S. Relations
Once uninhabited, Cabo Verde was colonized by Portugal in the 15th century, and later became a
transshipment hub for enslaved people. It remained a Portuguese colony until 1975, when it won
independence after more than a decade of anti-colonial armed struggle led by the African Party
for the Independence of Guinea [Guinea-Bissau] and Cape Verde (PAIGC), fought mainly in what
is today Guinea-Bissau on the West African mainland. Most Cabo Verdeans are of mixed
Portuguese and African descent and speak Crioulo, a Portuguese-African Creole. In the 1800s,
Cabo Verde was a whaling industry provisioning and sailor recruitment hub, which initiated a
continuing pattern of emigration to the United States, especially New England states. According
to the State Department, “Cabo Verde’s diaspora in the United States rivals the islands’ current
population.”5 Remittances are an important source of income for many Cabo Verdean households.
Politics and Governance
Cabo Verde held its first multiparty elections in 1991, after more than a decade and a half of one-
party rule under the African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV, the Cabo Verde-
based successor of the PAIGC). Elections since 1991 have been competitive; control of the
1 Some sources use the historical English language name of Cabo Verde, “Cape Verde.” In 2013, the country’s
government requested that foreign governments refer to the country as “Cabo Verde,” its name in Portuguese, a change
approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names and adopted by the U.S. Department of State.
2 Tweets on X account of Secretary of State Blinken (@SecBlinken), February 23, 2021 and January 22, 2024. For one
assessment of governance in Cabo Verde, see Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023, 2023 (latest).
3 Trading Economics, “Cape Verde Balance of Trade,” as of November 2023; Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), “Cabo Verde,” GIEWS Country Brief, June 16, 2022; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic
Outlook Database (WEO), April 2024 update.
4 MCC, “Congressional Notification,” May 14, 2024.
5 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
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presidency and parliament has shifted between the center-left PAICV and center-right Movement
for Democracy (MPD). In the most recent elections in 2021, the MPD and the PAICV won 30 and
38 of 72 National Assembly seats, respectively, and a minor party captured four. The next
legislative and presidential polls are due in 2026. Members of the Cabo Verdean diaspora may
vote in national elections, and are represented by six National Assembly members (two for the
Americas and four for Africa and Europe).6
Cabo Verde at a Glance
Comparative Size: Slightly larger than Rhode Island Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $2.5 bil ion
Population Total | Growth Rate: 611,000 | 1.2%
(2023)
(2024)
GDP per Capita: $4,368 (2023)
Population aged 34 or younger as share of
GDP Growth: 4.8% (2023)
total: 61% (2024)
Goods Exports: Total Value | Top Products:
Adult Literacy: 90.8% (Male 94.2%; Female 87.4%)
$855 mil ion | Fish, shellfish, garments, natural gas,
(2021)
scrap iron (2022)
Under-5 Mortality Rate: 12 deaths/1,000 live
Exports - Top Destinations: Spain 56%, Portugal
births (2022)
12%, Italy 9%, US 6%, India 5% (2022)
Fertility Rate (Births per woman): 2.1 (2024)
Goods Imports: Total Value | Top Products:
Life Expectancy, Years: Male, 72.0; Female, 76.7
$1.3 bil ion | Refined petroleum, fish, plastic products,
Languages: Portuguese (official); Kabuverdianu, also
milk, cars (2022)
known as Crioulo (Portuguese-African Creole)
Imports - Top Sources: Portugal 41%, Spain 12%,
Ethnic Groups: Creole 71%, African 28%, European
China 8%, Netherlands 7%, Togo 5% (2022)
1%
U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act
Religions: Roman Catholic 73%; Other Christian 9%; Tariff Preference Status: Eligible, including for
Muslim 1%,’ Other/none/unstated 17% (2021;
apparel benefits
rounded)
6 Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline database.
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Sources: Map created by CRS graphics team. Data from CIA, The World Factbook; International Monetary Fund
World Economic Outlook database, April 2024; and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
Cabo Verde has a semi-presidential political system, which divides executive powers between a
prime minister—who is elected by the parliament and holds most executive authority—and a
directly-elected president. The president signs or vetoes proposed laws, generally in consultation
with the government, per the constitution, but in practice the president typically plays a limited
role in policymaking. Policymaking is generally led by the government.
Prime Minister José Ulisses Correia e Silva (koh-RAY-ah ee SEEL-vah), of the MPD, took office
in 2016 when the MPD won a National Assembly majority after 15 years in opposition, and was
able to retain his post as a result of the MPD’s victory in the 2021 elections. President José Maria
Pereira Neves (NEH-vehsh) (PAICV), a former prime minister, won presidential elections held in
2021, leading to a situation of political “cohabitation,” in which the president and prime minister
hail from opposing parties. Observers assessed both elections as transparent and credible.7
Successive governments generally have upheld freedoms of expression, assembly, and
association, and Cabo Verde ranked highest among African countries in Freedom House’s 2023
Freedom in the World index. In 2022, however, local journalists voiced concern over threats to
press freedom after authorities investigated three reporters for “qualified disobedience” in relation
to their reporting on an internal inquiry into a police killing. The investigation does not appear to
have led to charges.8 In 2023, the State Department did not flag any press freedom concerns in its
annual human rights report, which stated that “an independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including
for media members.”9 Civilian authorities have taken steps to investigate and punish episodic
abuses by military and law enforcement personnel; the State Department has documented several
instances in which officers have been dismissed, suspended, or prosecuted in response to
misconduct.10 Corruption is reportedly not widespread and Cabo Verde ranks higher than any
other country in Africa apart from Seychelles on Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption
Perceptions Index. Cabo Verde nevertheless faces graft-related challenges. Freedom House
reports that “bribery and nepotism are problems at the municipal level” and that alleged
“clientelism and graft continue to surround costly infrastructure projects and other spending
measures, public procurements, public companies, and management of public lands.”11
Cabo Verde outperforms many of its regional peers in measures of gender equality.12 About 40%
of Cabo Verde’s national legislators are women—one of the highest rates in Africa, on par with
Switzerland and in line with the country’s electoral framework, which requires that women
comprise at least 40% of parties’ candidacy lists for National Assembly and sub-national elected
7 State Department, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde, 2022.
8 Nick Roll, “Cape Verde: Journalists united in pushback against investigations,” Al Jazeera, March 31, 2022;
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Authorities investigate 3 Cape Verde journalists after reporting on police killing,”
February 18, 2022.
9 State Department, 2023 Country Reports for Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde, 2024.
10 Ibid.; see also prior-year editions of this report.
11 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Cabo Verde, 2023.
12 For instance, Cabo Verde placed second in Africa (behind Mauritius) in the 2022 U.N. Gender Inequality Index, a
measure of gender equality as related to reproductive health, educational and political empowerment, and labor force
participation.
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body posts.13 The State Department nevertheless reported that in 2023 “[g]ender-based violence
and discrimination against women were significant problems” and that incidents of “[g]ender-
based discrimination in employment occurred,” often with respect to women’s wages.14
Foreign Policy
Europe
Former colonial power Portugal is a major lender and donor to Cabo Verde, and one of the
country’s top trade partners. Over the past decade, European countries have regularly imported
over 90% of Cabo Verde’s exports—led by fish products—and Europe is the main source of
tourists to the country. In June 2024, Cabo Verde’s President Neves stated that there is a need for
governments to discuss colonial reparations. His remarks came months after Portuguese President
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa sparked a political debate when Rebelo de Sousa reportedly indicated
that Portugal “was responsible for crimes committed during transatlantic slavery and the colonial
era, and suggested there was a need for reparations.” In May 2024, officials of São Tomé and
Príncipe, another former Portuguese colony in Africa, said that they would seek such reparations,
in a form yet to be determined.15
China
The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) is active in Cabo Verde, in part due to Cabo
Verde’s role as a central Atlantic Ocean maritime and air traffic hub. China “has a strong and
growing presence” in Cabo Verde, the State Department reports.16 The PRC has financed several
infrastructure projects in Cabo Verde, and helped to develop a special economic zone on the
island of São Vicente, where a PRC firm also refurbished a ship-repair facility intended to service
PRC-origin vessels on that island. The government has contracted PRC-based technology firm
Huawei to install information, communications, technology, and “safe city” infrastructure in
several urban zones.17 China also supports efforts to counter climate change impacts in Cabo
Verde under a PRC-financed joint PRC-Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) agriculture and
food security program.18
Russia
Cabo Verde voted in the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) to condemn Russia’s 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, and has since voted in favor of four of five U.S.-backed UNGA resolutions on the
Russia-Ukraine war. Like many countries in Africa, it abstained from one vote (UNGA
Resolution ES-11/3) to remove Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. In May 2024,
13 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Gender Quotas Database: Cabo Verde,”
available at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/89/35.
14 State Department, 2023 Country Reports for Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde, 2024.
15 Reuters, “Portugal must ‘pay costs’ of slavery and colonial crimes, president says,” April 24, 2024 (quote source),
“Cape Verde president says governments must discuss colonial reparations,” June 5, 2024, and “Island nation of Sao
Tome and Principe to ask Portugal for colonial reparations,” May 2, 2024.
16 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
17 Permanent Secretariat of Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking
Countries (Forum Macao), “Chinese-funded CCTV surveillance to cover more of Cabo Verde,” April 28, 2022.
18 FAO, FAO-China South-South Cooperation Programme - In brief, 2023; and U.N. News, “Cabo Verde beats back
climate change through South-South cooperation,” May 30, 2024.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was quoted as saying that “Cape Verde is the first
African country to confirm its participation in the peace summit.”19
Economy
Tourism is a mainstay of Cabo Verde’s economy, accounting for an estimated 35% of annual
GDP, 42% of jobs, and the vast majority of foreign direct investment (FDI). Tourists from Europe
account for the majority of arrivals (e.g., 69% in 2023).20 The agriculture sector’s contribution to
GDP (5% in 2022) has declined since the 1990s, but remains a notable source of employment
(10% in 2022).21 Sugarcane is a key crop, and is used in the production of a local alcoholic
beverage, grogue, that is widely consumed and popular among tourists. Other agricultural
commodities include citrus fruits, tomatoes, maize, legumes, cassava, and coconuts. Despite such
production, the country is highly dependent on imports of staple foods, given its predominately
arid or semi-arid climate, and as the roughly 10% of its territory that is considered arable is
inadequate to support local needs.22 Diaspora remittances are critical for many households;
remittance inflows to Cabo Verde were worth about 14% of the value of GDP in 2022, according
to the World Bank.23
In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Cabo Verde’s tourism-driven economy shrank by
20.8%, as measured by changes in GDP. It has since recovered; GDP grew by 5.6% in 2021 and
17.1% in 2022, before moderating to 4.8% in 2023.24 Cabo Verde’s economy is highly vulnerable
to disruptions to global tourism flows and weather-related shocks. The country has often faced
droughts, and faced a prolonged one between 2017 and 2023 that reduced food production. The
situation worsened as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered an increase in local food and fuel
prices.25 In 2022, the government declared a social and economic emergency in response to the
socioeconomic and food security crises. In response, the United States announced $100,000 to
help address Cabo Verde’s humanitarian needs, other donors committed additional funding, and
Cabo Verde’s government rolled out a series of measures—including subsidies for basic food
items and electricity—to support the most vulnerable.26
To advance economic growth and development, government plans to call for efforts to foster
inclusive, private sector-led economic expansion and end extreme poverty. Stated priorities
include supporting youth development and job training programs; increasing access to housing,
healthcare, and quality education; boosting agricultural growth and adapting to climate change;
and ensuring macroeconomic and fiscal stability. The government also is seeking private sector
and public-private partnership investments to develop the blue (ocean-focused) economy, and the
financial services and digital economy sectors; expand the tourism, maritime and air
19 Reuters, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy: Cape Verde first African state to agree to attend peace summit,” May 7, 2024.
20 World Bank, Creating Markets in Cabo Verde. An Archipelago of Opportunity: Pathways to Foster Sustainable
Private Sector–Led Growth, March 2024; and World Travel & Tourism Council, “Cabo Verde 2024 Annual Research:
Key Highlights,” April 19, 2024.
21 World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database; see also Filipa Monteiro et al., “Current Status and
Trends in Cabo Verde Agriculture,” in Agronomy(10:74), 2020.
22 Monteiro et al., “Current Status”; and FAO, “Climate-Smart Agriculture in Cabo Verde,” 2018.
23 World Bank, WDI.
24 IMF, WEO, April 2024 update.
25 IMF, Cabo Verde: First Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement—Press Release and Staff Report,
January 2023; and FAO, “Cabo Verde,” GIEWS Country Brief, September 25, 2023.
26 On U.S. support, see USAID, “The United States Provides Immediate Assistance to Respond to Widespread Food
Insecurity in Cabo Verde,” July 18, 2022.
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transportation, information and communications technology sectors; and expand renewable
energy and agribusiness. The government is pursuing these goals under a range of medium- and
long-term strategic plans and a private sector-labor-government policy accord.27 World Bank
programs support an array of these efforts, while a late 2023 International Monetary Fund (IMF)
$31.7 million Resilience and Sustainability Facility supports a program aiding climate adaptation
and a transition to cleaner energy sources. A separate three-year, $63 million IMF policy-
conditioned loan mainly supports macroeconomic, financial stability, and fiscal reform goals.28
Bilateral Economic Relations
According to the State Department, Cabo Verde “is eager to attract U.S. trade and investment,” which the
Department seeks to facilitate, notably with regard to solar and wind energy, in line with the Cabo Verdean
government’s goal of generating half of electricity supplies from renewable sources by 2030.29 Since 2019, the U.S.
Prosper Africa trade and investment promotion initiative has facilitated five transactions in Cabo Verde worth an
aggregate $17.4 mil ion.30 Cabo Verde is eligible for U.S. duty-free trade benefits under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I of P.L. 106-200, as amended), including special textile and apparel benefits. Trade
levels are variable but small relative to U.S. trade with other countries, in part due to Cabo Verde’s small size,
averaging nearly $15 mil ion annually from 2018-2022. Trade rose to nearly $68 mil ion in 2023, due to a spike in
aircraft, engines, and parts imports that year. Cabo Verdean exports to the United States are varied, but both
under AGOA and in general are dominated by fish products. The share of such exports enjoying AGOA benefits
fluctuates considerably, but averaged 45% from 2019 through 2023. U.S. exports to the country vary widely but
over the past five years have been dominated by vehicles, miscellaneous goods, and varied technical equipment.31
U.S. foreign direct investment in Cabo Verde is limited, ranging between zero and $2 mil ion over the past
decade.32
There are no bilateral trade agreements, but the United States and Cabo Verde have a bilateral Open Skies
aviation services agreement designed to bolster a market-based system of direct flights between the two
countries, as well as enhance flight safety and security.33
Climate Change and Environment Issues
The U.N. Development Program has identified increased water salinization and drought driven by
climate change as “the greatest constraint on the future prospects of economic development in
Cabo Verde.”34 The country faces a projected rapid rise in mean temperatures and coastal erosion
in some areas attributable to rising sea levels.35 The government’s climate adaptation plan aims to
improve water resource management, including by promoting more efficient irrigation, which is
critical to crop production in some areas; enhancing the resilience of agriculture and livestock
27 Cabo Verde Government, Programa de Governo e Moção de Confiança 2021-2026, Acordo de Concertação
Estratégica 2024-2026, and Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development (PEDS II– 2023-2030); and State Department,
“U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
28 IMF, “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Cabo Verde on Fourth Review under Extended Credit Facility and
First Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility,” May 10, 2024, among others.
29 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
30 Prosper Africa, prosperafrica.gov/results.
31 U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb.
32 Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA International Trade and Investment Country Facts database.
33 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), “Cabo Verde,” as of June 21, 2024; and State Department, Open
Skies Partners, state.gov/open-skies-partners, and “Civil Air Transport Agreements,” state.gov/civil-air-transport-
agreements.
34 U.N. Development Program, “Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in the Water Sector in
Cabo Verde,” as of July 15, 2024.
35 World Bank, Climate Knowledge Portal.
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systems; and protecting coastal areas against environmental degradation and erosion.36 Illicit and
unregulated fishing reportedly threatens the country’s marine stocks and biodiversity.37
Narcotics Trafficking
Cabo Verde is a transit point and its waters an ocean corridor for cocaine from Latin America
bound for Europe.38 National law enforcement agencies have intercepted and seized large cocaine
shipments, including some multi-ton loads, on multiple occasions.39 A notable high-profile
seizure occurred in 2022, when Cabo Verdean law enforcement—alongside U.S. military
personnel deployed as part of an African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership operation—
seized six tons of cocaine from a Brazilian-flagged vessel in international waters, leading to the
arrest of five Brazilians and two Montenegrins. That operation was facilitated by Centro de
Operações de Segurança Marítima (COSMAR), a Cabo Verdean inter-agency operations and
intelligence fusion center. COSMAR seeks to leverage joint national military, police, and
intelligence capacities to counter drug trafficking and protect maritime waters and fisheries, in
some instances in cooperation with U.S. counterpart agencies. Established in 2010, in part with
U.S. assistance, COSMAR supports maritime sensory and vessel-tracking systems, military and
law enforcement communications, a judicial police database, and analytical capacities.40
U.S. Relations and Assistance
The State Department describes Cabo Verde as “one of Africa’s success stories and an important
U.S. partner in West Africa” and defines top U.S. priorities in the country as “promoting broad-
based economic development, improving security sector capabilities, and strengthening Cabo
Verde’s resilience to environmental vulnerability and the impacts of climate change.”41 A U.S.-
Cabo Verde Partnership Dialogue addresses issues of mutual interest; the most recent session, in
2021, focused on economic, educational, and security cooperation.42 In early 2024, Secretary of
State Blinken met with Prime Minister Correia e Silva in Praia, Cabo Verde’s capital, to highlight
MCC investments in Cabo Verde’s economic growth; bilateral counternarcotics cooperation;
Cabo Verde’s “strong, principled voice” on international matters, including Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine; and its participation in the U.S. Partnership for Atlantic
Cooperation.43 He also welcomed “the shared values between the United States and Cabo Verde
36 Cabo Verde Government, Third National Communication Report to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 2017.
37 Annika Hammerschlag, “Cape Verde’s ‘fish detectives’ try to keep extinction at bay,” The Guardian, September 21,
2021.
38 Colin Freeman, “Cocaine highway: On the front line of Europe’s drug war,” Sunday Telegraph, November 3, 2019.
39 Deutsche Welle, “Cape Verde seizes 9.5 tons of cocaine, Russian sailors arrested,” February 2, 2019; Agencia
Tributaria (Spanish Government), “One tonne of cocaine seized on a fishing boat headed to Spain in waters near Cape
Verde,” September 28, 2023; and Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics), “Spanish Authorities Seize
157kg of Cocaine Near Cape Verde, With Support From MAOC-N,” March 18, 2024.
40 U.S. Africa Command, “U.S. Tri-maritime Services and Cabo Verde authorities interdict large trans-oceanic cocaine
shipment,” April 7, 2022; and Gustavo Plácido Dos Santos, “Cape Verde and Drug Trafficking: A Major Challenge to
the Rule of Law,” IPRIS Viewpoints, 2014, among others.
41 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
42 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Third United States-Cabo Verde Partnership Dialogue,” March 30, 2021.
43 State Department, “Secretary Blinken and Cabo Verdean Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva Before Their
Meeting,” January 22, 2024.
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in promoting democracy, good governance, and human rights.”44 In 2022, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited Cabo Verde and met with Prime
Minister Correia e Silva to discuss security, commerce, climate change, and U.S. support for
Cabo Verde’s responses to COVID-19 and food insecurity.45 U.S. officials often stop in Cabo
Verde to refuel during visits to Africa. Work is underway to build a new U.S. embassy in Praia.
Bilateral security cooperation has expanded in the past decade. Cabo Verde hosts periodic port
calls by U.S. Naval and Coast Guard vessels, and participates in U.S.-led regional maritime
security exercises. In 2023, Cabo Verde co-hosted with U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa the
first U.S.- African Maritime Forces Summit.46 U.S. military personnel aided Cabo Verdean
authorities in a drug seizure in 2022 (see above), while embarked aboard U.S. Navy
Expeditionary Sea Base USS Hershel “Woody” Williams. A U.S.-Cabo Verde Status of Forces
Agreement took effect in 2018, while a State Partnership Program between Cabo Verde and New
Hampshire’s National Guard was launched in 2022. In late 2022, the United States and Cabo
Verde signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation.47
In addition to counternarcotics cooperation, in 2020 and 2021, Cabo Verde played a central role
in a U.S.-Venezuelan diplomatic and legal dispute over its detention of Alex Saab—a Colombian
trade-focused businessman and alleged financier of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro—
which ended with Saab’s transfer to U.S. custody in late 2021 (see Text Box).
The Alex Saab Extradition Affair
In 2020, Cabo Verdean authorities arrested Alex Saab, a reported close associate of Venezuelan President
Maduro, when Saab’s private jet made a refueling stop in Cabo Verde en route to Iran. A year earlier, in 2019,
Saab had been indicted in the United States on federal money laundering charges and designated for U.S. financial
sanctions relating to Venezuela.48 His provisional arrest in Cabo Verde was made on the basis of a U.S.-issued
INTERPOL “red notice,” and the United States subsequently requested his extradition. A legal battle ensued, as
Saab’s lawyers disputed the legality of the arrest, arguing that Saab, a Venezuelan envoy, enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. They also contended that extradition would be il egal in the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty
between the United States and Cabo Verde. Cabo Verde’s Attorney General, José Landim, stated that Saab’s
transfer to U.S. custody would nevertheless be consistent with “reciprocity” between the United States and Cabo
Verde in law enforcement matters.49 In early 2021, an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
regional court—whose judgments are technically binding on member states (including Cabo Verde), but are often
flouted—ruled that the detention was unlawful, and ordered Saab’s release.50 Shortly after the ECOWAS court
ruling, Cabo Verde’s Supreme Court approved Saab’s transfer to the United States, and the Constitutional Court
later denied Saab’s appeal. Saab was transferred to the United States later in 2021 to face charges related to
44 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting With Cabo Verdean Prime Minister Correia E Silva,” January 22,
2024.
45 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Readout of Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s Meeting with Cabo
Verdean Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva,” August 7, 2022.
46 Defenceweb, “Cabo Verde hosting first African Maritime Forces Summit,” March 20, 2023, and “Leaders discuss
shared issues at first African Maritime Forces Summit,” April 11, 2023.
47 Department of Defense, “U.S. and Cabo Verde Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation,”
December 15, 2022.
48 On sanctions, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Disrupts Corruption Network Stealing from
Venezuela’s Food Distribution Plan, CLAP,” July 25, 2019, and “Treasury Increases Pressure on Alex Saab and His
Network in Venezuela,” September 17, 2019. According to press reports, Saab was at one time a U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration informant; see Joshua Goodman, “Businessman close to Maduro was DEA informant,
records show,” Associated Press, February 16, 2022.
49 Associated Press, “Cape Verde may send suspect to US without extradition treaty,” June 15, 2020.
50 ECOWAS Court of Justice, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/2021, March 15, 2021.
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money laundering.51 Saab—who allegedly played a key role in evading U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and other U.S.-
sanctioned governments and was reportedly a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and FBI informant—was
transferred to Venezuelan custody in late 2023 in a prisoner swap with the United States.52
Congressional Role
Since at least the mid-2010s, Cabo Verde has not featured as a principal focus of U.S. legislation
or publicly-reported congressional oversight, but Congress has consistently funded U.S.
development and security cooperation activities pertaining to Cabo Verde. The country also
regularly hosts congressional and other U.S. official delegations.53 H.Rept. 118-554,
accompanying H.R. 8771, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2025, states that the bill would encourage “the Director of the Peace Corps to
evaluate the merits of reestablishing operations in Cabo Verde” and direct “funding at not less
than the prior fiscal year level for Cabo Verde for improving economic resilience.”54 An
analogous Senate bill has not been introduced to date. The Peace Corps maintained a Cabo Verde
country program between 1988 and 2012 (FY2013), which it ended after undertaking a review
that found that Cabo Verde was among “countries that had reached a higher state of development
than other countries in… [Peace Corps’] overall portfolio.”55
U.S. Assistance
State Department-administered bilateral assistance for Cabo Verde totaled $400,000 in FY2023,
all under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, with the same
annual amount requested for IMET in FY2024 and FY2025.56 Over the past five years, Cabo
Verde also has received regional International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
advisory security assistance and Department of Defense (DOD)-administered maritime security
and counternarcotics assistance under DOD’s global train and equip authority (10 U.S.C. 333).
Law enforcement cooperation includes a 2019 bilateral law enforcement and criminal justice
sector support agreement; an INCLE-U.S. Customs and Border Protection interagency agreement
to help Cabo Verde increase its border security capacities, including regarding civil aviation
traffic flows; and a 2023 CBP-Cabo Verde Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement focused on
mutual efforts to counter illicit trafficking and customs offenses. In 2018 the State Department
also facilitated a cooperative partnership between Cabo Verde’s National Police and the police
department of Boston, a city which hosts a large Cabo Verdean diaspora community.57
51 U.S. Department of Justice, “Colombian Businessman Charged with Money Laundering Extradited to the United
States from Cabo Verde,” October 18, 2021.
52 PBS Frontline, “A Dangerous Assignment: Uncovering Corruption in Maduro’s Venezuela,” May 14, 2024; and AP,
“US, Venezuela swap prisoners: Maduro ally for 10 Americans, plus fugitive contractor ‘Fat Leonard’,” December 21,
2023.
53 U.S. Embassy- Praia, “Remarks by Ambassador Jeff Daigle Reception and Concert Celebrating the 247th
Anniversary of U.S. Independence,” July 10, 2023; and House Democracy Partnership, Quarterly Newsletter, July
2024.
54 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations report to accompany H.R. 8771, 118th
Cong., 2d Session, H.Rept. 118-554, June 14, 2024.
55 Peace Corps, Congressional Budget Justification FY2014; see also Peace Corps, Host Country Impact Study
Cape Verde, 2011.
56 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification, FY2024 and FY2025 editions.
57 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
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The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has provided assistance for sea turtle conservation in
Cabo Verde under its Marine Turtle Conservation Fund. There is no U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) country mission, but USAID has occasionally funded projects in the
country under regional or centrally-administered programs, with a focus on such goals as
renewable energy, agriculture, and economic growth. The State Department occasionally
administers small grants for local development projects, and occasional larger ones (e.g., an anti-
trafficking in persons project in FY2021). Cabo Verdeans also participate in the Young African
Leaders Initiative and other educational exchange and English language learning programs.58
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compacts
Cabo Verde’s first MCC Compact, implemented between 2005 and 2010, was valued at $108
million upon completion. The compact, the MCC’s third such effort globally, financed the
construction of several bridges and roads and many water reservoirs and dikes; expanded and
upgraded the “critical Port of Praia”; trained and/or provided credit to hundreds of small farmers
and agribusinesses; and “strengthened the capacity of microfinance institutions and laid the
groundwork for the country’s first private credit bureau.” Some 385,000 people benefitted from
the program, the MCC reports. Several core compact projects were significantly altered during
implementation. This affected financing allocations, spurred the Cabo Verdean government to
secure additional non-MCC financing (from Portugal) for some port upgrade work, and
complicated economic rate of return estimates at closeout, the MCC reported. The compact also
resulted in important lessons for the MCC relating to project design, preparation, revisions, and
implementation challenges, which the MCC since has applied to compacts elsewhere.59
The country’s second MCC compact, implemented between 2012 and 2017 and valued at $66
million, sought to improve water infrastructure, reform Cabo Verde’s institutional and regulatory
environment, and enhance the legal framework surrounding land and property rights. The MCC
reports that the compact “combined infrastructure improvements with ambitious policy and
institutional reforms to strengthen property rights and increase access to clean water and
sanitation, improving the lives of more than 600,000 people.” As part of the compact’s
implementation, Cabo Verde’s government “passed over 50 laws, closed ineffective institutions,
and created new agencies based on sustainable commercial principles, demonstrating their [sic]
commitment to undertake difficult policy and institutional reforms, try new approaches, and scale
effective interventions,” according to the MCC. The MCC also reports that the compact’s
implementation resulted in an array of development lessons. These related to factors necessary to
for effective policy and institutional reform; appropriate project staffing levels; the conditioning
of financing disbursements on the attainment of activity milestones; and a need to couple physical
infrastructure investments with legal and institutional reforms, among other issues.60
In late 2023, the MCC Board determined that Cabo Verde was eligible to develop a regional
compact—which it is currently doing—with a projected goal of boosting regional economic
integration, trade, or other cross-border activity, in a manner yet to be determined. The MCC is
financing the development of this compact with $10 million.61
58 Ibid.; FWS, “Marine Turtle Conservation Fund”; and USAID/State Department, foreignassistance.gov.
59 MCC, “Cabo Verde Compact,” linked from mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/cabo-verde, and Closed Compact
Report: Cabo Verde Compact, July 10, 2017, the source of direct quotes in this paragraph.
60 MCC, “Cabo Verde Compact II,” linked from mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/cabo-verde, and Star Report: Cabo
Verde II, May 2019, the source of direct quotes in this paragraph.
61 MCC, “Congressional Notification,” May 14, 2024; and “Cabo Verde Proposed Regional Compact” at
mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/cabo-verde.
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Author Information
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R48128 · VERSION 1 · NEW
11
July 15, 2024
Cabo Verde, a small island nation of about 611,000 people located off the west coast of
Africa, is described by the State Department as “one of Africa’s success stories.” The
Nicolas Cook
country has long-standing people-to-people ties with the United States rooted in
Specialist in African Affairs
historical patterns of migration from Cabo Verde to the United States.
Cabo Verde’s strategic significance to the United States derives from its geographic
location: the country is a transshipment point for Latin American cocaine bound for
Europe and a refueling stopover for transatlantic air traffic between Africa and the United States.
The country is also a long-standing U.S. partner in Africa that the State Department has cited as a model of
democratic governance in West Africa since its transition from single party rule to a multi-party political system in
1991. U.S. bilateral aid to Cabo Verde is limited, and centers on military professionalization, counternarcotics
efforts, past development projects supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and a planned
new regional MCC compact, currently under development.
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link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 Cabo Verde in Brief
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background and Historical U.S. Relations ...................................................................................... 1
Politics and Governance .................................................................................................................. 1
Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................................. 4
Europe ....................................................................................................................................... 4
China ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Economy .......................................................................................................................................... 5
Climate Change and Environment Issues ........................................................................................ 6
Narcotics Trafficking ....................................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Relations and Assistance ......................................................................................................... 7
Congressional Role ................................................................................................................... 9
U.S. Assistance .......................................................................................................................... 9
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compacts ........................................................... 10
Contacts
Author Information ......................................................................................................................... 11
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Cabo Verde in Brief
Overview
Cabo Verde, an island archipelago of approximately 611,000 people located off West Africa’s
Atlantic coast, stands out as a stable democracy in a sub-region where several countries have
undergone military seizures of power.1 It routinely ranks among the strongest democracies in
Africa, according to various indices of governance conditions. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
has described the country as “a model of democratic governance and human rights in Africa” and
as “one of our strongest partners on the continent.”2 Its per-capita gross domestic product (GDP)
is among the ten highest in sub-Saharan Africa, though it is not self-sufficient in food production;
it imports most of its food, fuel, and consumer goods.3
U.S.-Cabo Verde relations are warm and underpinned by people-to-people ties in large part
centering on a sizable U.S.-based Cabo Verdean diaspora community concentrated primarily in
New England. U.S. assistance for Cabo Verde focuses on military training and counternarcotics-
centered maritime security cooperation. An expanding U.S.-Cabo Verde defense partnership has
included multiple U.S. military port visits and trainings, as well as the launch of a National Guard
State Partnership Program with the New Hampshire National Guard in 2022. The country also
has participated in two Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compacts (2005-2010 and
2012-2017), and is developing a regional compact, with a projected but yet-to-be-determined goal
of boosting regional economic integration, trade, or other cross-border activity.4
Background and Historical U.S. Relations
Once uninhabited, Cabo Verde was colonized by Portugal in the 15th century, and later became a
transshipment hub for enslaved people. It remained a Portuguese colony until 1975, when it won
independence after more than a decade of anti-colonial armed struggle led by the African Party
for the Independence of Guinea [Guinea-Bissau] and Cape Verde (PAIGC), fought mainly in what
is today Guinea-Bissau on the West African mainland. Most Cabo Verdeans are of mixed
Portuguese and African descent and speak Crioulo, a Portuguese-African Creole. In the 1800s,
Cabo Verde was a whaling industry provisioning and sailor recruitment hub, which initiated a
continuing pattern of emigration to the United States, especially New England states. According
to the State Department, “Cabo Verde’s diaspora in the United States rivals the islands’ current
population.”5 Remittances are an important source of income for many Cabo Verdean households.
Politics and Governance
Cabo Verde held its first multiparty elections in 1991, after more than a decade and a half of one-
party rule under the African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV, the Cabo Verde-
based successor of the PAIGC). Elections since 1991 have been competitive; control of the
1 Some sources use the historical English language name of Cabo Verde, “Cape Verde.” In 2013, the country’s
government requested that foreign governments refer to the country as “Cabo Verde,” its name in Portuguese, a change
approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names and adopted by the U.S. Department of State.
2 Tweets on X account of Secretary of State Blinken (@SecBlinken), February 23, 2021 and January 22, 2024. For one
assessment of governance in Cabo Verde, see Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023, 2023 (latest).
3 Trading Economics, “Cape Verde Balance of Trade,” as of November 2023; Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), “Cabo Verde,” GIEWS Country Brief, June 16, 2022; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic
Outlook Database (WEO), April 2024 update.
4 MCC, “Congressional Notification,” May 14, 2024.
5 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
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presidency and parliament has shifted between the center-left PAICV and center-right Movement
for Democracy (MPD). In the most recent elections in 2021, the MPD and the PAICV won 30 and
38 of 72 National Assembly seats, respectively, and a minor party captured four. The next
legislative and presidential polls are due in 2026. Members of the Cabo Verdean diaspora may
vote in national elections, and are represented by six National Assembly members (two for the
Americas and four for Africa and Europe).6
Cabo Verde at a Glance
Comparative Size: Slightly larger than Rhode Island Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $2.5 bil ion
Population Total | Growth Rate: 611,000 | 1.2%
(2023)
(2024)
GDP per Capita: $4,368 (2023)
Population aged 34 or younger as share of
GDP Growth: 4.8% (2023)
total: 61% (2024)
Goods Exports: Total Value | Top Products:
Adult Literacy: 90.8% (Male 94.2%; Female 87.4%)
$855 mil ion | Fish, shellfish, garments, natural gas,
(2021)
scrap iron (2022)
Under-5 Mortality Rate: 12 deaths/1,000 live
Exports - Top Destinations: Spain 56%, Portugal
births (2022)
12%, Italy 9%, US 6%, India 5% (2022)
Fertility Rate (Births per woman): 2.1 (2024)
Goods Imports: Total Value | Top Products:
Life Expectancy, Years: Male, 72.0; Female, 76.7
$1.3 bil ion | Refined petroleum, fish, plastic products,
Languages: Portuguese (official); Kabuverdianu, also
milk, cars (2022)
known as Crioulo (Portuguese-African Creole)
Imports - Top Sources: Portugal 41%, Spain 12%,
Ethnic Groups: Creole 71%, African 28%, European
China 8%, Netherlands 7%, Togo 5% (2022)
1%
U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act
Religions: Roman Catholic 73%; Other Christian 9%; Tariff Preference Status: Eligible, including for
Muslim 1%,’ Other/none/unstated 17% (2021;
apparel benefits
rounded)
6 Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline database.
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Sources: Map created by CRS graphics team. Data from CIA, The World Factbook; International Monetary Fund
World Economic Outlook database, April 2024; and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
Cabo Verde has a semi-presidential political system, which divides executive powers between a
prime minister—who is elected by the parliament and holds most executive authority—and a
directly-elected president. The president signs or vetoes proposed laws, generally in consultation
with the government, per the constitution, but in practice the president typically plays a limited
role in policymaking. Policymaking is generally led by the government.
Prime Minister José Ulisses Correia e Silva (koh-RAY-ah ee SEEL-vah), of the MPD, took office
in 2016 when the MPD won a National Assembly majority after 15 years in opposition, and was
able to retain his post as a result of the MPD’s victory in the 2021 elections. President José Maria
Pereira Neves (NEH-vehsh) (PAICV), a former prime minister, won presidential elections held in
2021, leading to a situation of political “cohabitation,” in which the president and prime minister
hail from opposing parties. Observers assessed both elections as transparent and credible.7
Successive governments generally have upheld freedoms of expression, assembly, and
association, and Cabo Verde ranked highest among African countries in Freedom House’s 2023
Freedom in the World index. In 2022, however, local journalists voiced concern over threats to
press freedom after authorities investigated three reporters for “qualified disobedience” in relation
to their reporting on an internal inquiry into a police killing. The investigation does not appear to
have led to charges.8 In 2023, the State Department did not flag any press freedom concerns in its
annual human rights report, which stated that “an independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including
for media members.”9 Civilian authorities have taken steps to investigate and punish episodic
abuses by military and law enforcement personnel; the State Department has documented several
instances in which officers have been dismissed, suspended, or prosecuted in response to
misconduct.10 Corruption is reportedly not widespread and Cabo Verde ranks higher than any
other country in Africa apart from Seychelles on Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption
Perceptions Index. Cabo Verde nevertheless faces graft-related challenges. Freedom House
reports that “bribery and nepotism are problems at the municipal level” and that alleged
“clientelism and graft continue to surround costly infrastructure projects and other spending
measures, public procurements, public companies, and management of public lands.”11
Cabo Verde outperforms many of its regional peers in measures of gender equality.12 About 40%
of Cabo Verde’s national legislators are women—one of the highest rates in Africa, on par with
Switzerland and in line with the country’s electoral framework, which requires that women
comprise at least 40% of parties’ candidacy lists for National Assembly and sub-national elected
7 State Department, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde, 2022.
8 Nick Roll, “Cape Verde: Journalists united in pushback against investigations,” Al Jazeera, March 31, 2022;
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Authorities investigate 3 Cape Verde journalists after reporting on police killing,”
February 18, 2022.
9 State Department, 2023 Country Reports for Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde, 2024.
10 Ibid.; see also prior-year editions of this report.
11 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Cabo Verde, 2023.
12 For instance, Cabo Verde placed second in Africa (behind Mauritius) in the 2022 U.N. Gender Inequality Index, a
measure of gender equality as related to reproductive health, educational and political empowerment, and labor force
participation.
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body posts.13 The State Department nevertheless reported that in 2023 “[g]ender-based violence
and discrimination against women were significant problems” and that incidents of “[g]ender-
based discrimination in employment occurred,” often with respect to women’s wages.14
Foreign Policy
Europe
Former colonial power Portugal is a major lender and donor to Cabo Verde, and one of the
country’s top trade partners. Over the past decade, European countries have regularly imported
over 90% of Cabo Verde’s exports—led by fish products—and Europe is the main source of
tourists to the country. In June 2024, Cabo Verde’s President Neves stated that there is a need for
governments to discuss colonial reparations. His remarks came months after Portuguese President
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa sparked a political debate when Rebelo de Sousa reportedly indicated
that Portugal “was responsible for crimes committed during transatlantic slavery and the colonial
era, and suggested there was a need for reparations.” In May 2024, officials of São Tomé and
Príncipe, another former Portuguese colony in Africa, said that they would seek such reparations,
in a form yet to be determined.15
China
The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) is active in Cabo Verde, in part due to Cabo
Verde’s role as a central Atlantic Ocean maritime and air traffic hub. China “has a strong and
growing presence” in Cabo Verde, the State Department reports.16 The PRC has financed several
infrastructure projects in Cabo Verde, and helped to develop a special economic zone on the
island of São Vicente, where a PRC firm also refurbished a ship-repair facility intended to service
PRC-origin vessels on that island. The government has contracted PRC-based technology firm
Huawei to install information, communications, technology, and “safe city” infrastructure in
several urban zones.17 China also supports efforts to counter climate change impacts in Cabo
Verde under a PRC-financed joint PRC-Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) agriculture and
food security program.18
Russia
Cabo Verde voted in the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) to condemn Russia’s 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, and has since voted in favor of four of five U.S.-backed UNGA resolutions on the
Russia-Ukraine war. Like many countries in Africa, it abstained from one vote (UNGA
Resolution ES-11/3) to remove Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. In May 2024,
13 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Gender Quotas Database: Cabo Verde,”
available at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/89/35.
14 State Department, 2023 Country Reports for Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde, 2024.
15 Reuters, “Portugal must ‘pay costs’ of slavery and colonial crimes, president says,” April 24, 2024 (quote source),
“Cape Verde president says governments must discuss colonial reparations,” June 5, 2024, and “Island nation of Sao
Tome and Principe to ask Portugal for colonial reparations,” May 2, 2024.
16 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
17 Permanent Secretariat of Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking
Countries (Forum Macao), “Chinese-funded CCTV surveillance to cover more of Cabo Verde,” April 28, 2022.
18 FAO, FAO-China South-South Cooperation Programme - In brief, 2023; and U.N. News, “Cabo Verde beats back
climate change through South-South cooperation,” May 30, 2024.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was quoted as saying that “Cape Verde is the first
African country to confirm its participation in the peace summit.”19
Economy
Tourism is a mainstay of Cabo Verde’s economy, accounting for an estimated 35% of annual
GDP, 42% of jobs, and the vast majority of foreign direct investment (FDI). Tourists from Europe
account for the majority of arrivals (e.g., 69% in 2023).20 The agriculture sector’s contribution to
GDP (5% in 2022) has declined since the 1990s, but remains a notable source of employment
(10% in 2022).21 Sugarcane is a key crop, and is used in the production of a local alcoholic
beverage, grogue, that is widely consumed and popular among tourists. Other agricultural
commodities include citrus fruits, tomatoes, maize, legumes, cassava, and coconuts. Despite such
production, the country is highly dependent on imports of staple foods, given its predominately
arid or semi-arid climate, and as the roughly 10% of its territory that is considered arable is
inadequate to support local needs.22 Diaspora remittances are critical for many households;
remittance inflows to Cabo Verde were worth about 14% of the value of GDP in 2022, according
to the World Bank.23
In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Cabo Verde’s tourism-driven economy shrank by
20.8%, as measured by changes in GDP. It has since recovered; GDP grew by 5.6% in 2021 and
17.1% in 2022, before moderating to 4.8% in 2023.24 Cabo Verde’s economy is highly vulnerable
to disruptions to global tourism flows and weather-related shocks. The country has often faced
droughts, and faced a prolonged one between 2017 and 2023 that reduced food production. The
situation worsened as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered an increase in local food and fuel
prices.25 In 2022, the government declared a social and economic emergency in response to the
socioeconomic and food security crises. In response, the United States announced $100,000 to
help address Cabo Verde’s humanitarian needs, other donors committed additional funding, and
Cabo Verde’s government rolled out a series of measures—including subsidies for basic food
items and electricity—to support the most vulnerable.26
To advance economic growth and development, government plans to call for efforts to foster
inclusive, private sector-led economic expansion and end extreme poverty. Stated priorities
include supporting youth development and job training programs; increasing access to housing,
healthcare, and quality education; boosting agricultural growth and adapting to climate change;
and ensuring macroeconomic and fiscal stability. The government also is seeking private sector
and public-private partnership investments to develop the blue (ocean-focused) economy, and the
financial services and digital economy sectors; expand the tourism, maritime and air
19 Reuters, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy: Cape Verde first African state to agree to attend peace summit,” May 7, 2024.
20 World Bank, Creating Markets in Cabo Verde. An Archipelago of Opportunity: Pathways to Foster Sustainable
Private Sector–Led Growth, March 2024; and World Travel & Tourism Council, “Cabo Verde 2024 Annual Research:
Key Highlights,” April 19, 2024.
21 World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database; see also Filipa Monteiro et al., “Current Status and
Trends in Cabo Verde Agriculture,” in Agronomy(10:74), 2020.
22 Monteiro et al., “Current Status”; and FAO, “Climate-Smart Agriculture in Cabo Verde,” 2018.
23 World Bank, WDI.
24 IMF, WEO, April 2024 update.
25 IMF, Cabo Verde: First Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement—Press Release and Staff Report,
January 2023; and FAO, “Cabo Verde,” GIEWS Country Brief, September 25, 2023.
26 On U.S. support, see USAID, “The United States Provides Immediate Assistance to Respond to Widespread Food
Insecurity in Cabo Verde,” July 18, 2022.
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transportation, information and communications technology sectors; and expand renewable
energy and agribusiness. The government is pursuing these goals under a range of medium- and
long-term strategic plans and a private sector-labor-government policy accord.27 World Bank
programs support an array of these efforts, while a late 2023 International Monetary Fund (IMF)
$31.7 million Resilience and Sustainability Facility supports a program aiding climate adaptation
and a transition to cleaner energy sources. A separate three-year, $63 million IMF policy-
conditioned loan mainly supports macroeconomic, financial stability, and fiscal reform goals.28
Bilateral Economic Relations
According to the State Department, Cabo Verde “is eager to attract U.S. trade and investment,” which the
Department seeks to facilitate, notably with regard to solar and wind energy, in line with the Cabo Verdean
government’s goal of generating half of electricity supplies from renewable sources by 2030.29 Since 2019, the U.S.
Prosper Africa trade and investment promotion initiative has facilitated five transactions in Cabo Verde worth an
aggregate $17.4 mil ion.30 Cabo Verde is eligible for U.S. duty-free trade benefits under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I of P.L. 106-200, as amended), including special textile and apparel benefits. Trade
levels are variable but small relative to U.S. trade with other countries, in part due to Cabo Verde’s small size,
averaging nearly $15 mil ion annually from 2018-2022. Trade rose to nearly $68 mil ion in 2023, due to a spike in
aircraft, engines, and parts imports that year. Cabo Verdean exports to the United States are varied, but both
under AGOA and in general are dominated by fish products. The share of such exports enjoying AGOA benefits
fluctuates considerably, but averaged 45% from 2019 through 2023. U.S. exports to the country vary widely but
over the past five years have been dominated by vehicles, miscellaneous goods, and varied technical equipment.31
U.S. foreign direct investment in Cabo Verde is limited, ranging between zero and $2 mil ion over the past
decade.32
There are no bilateral trade agreements, but the United States and Cabo Verde have a bilateral Open Skies
aviation services agreement designed to bolster a market-based system of direct flights between the two
countries, as well as enhance flight safety and security.33
Climate Change and Environment Issues
The U.N. Development Program has identified increased water salinization and drought driven by
climate change as “the greatest constraint on the future prospects of economic development in
Cabo Verde.”34 The country faces a projected rapid rise in mean temperatures and coastal erosion
in some areas attributable to rising sea levels.35 The government’s climate adaptation plan aims to
improve water resource management, including by promoting more efficient irrigation, which is
critical to crop production in some areas; enhancing the resilience of agriculture and livestock
27 Cabo Verde Government, Programa de Governo e Moção de Confiança 2021-2026, Acordo de Concertação
Estratégica 2024-2026, and Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development (PEDS II– 2023-2030); and State Department,
“U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
28 IMF, “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Cabo Verde on Fourth Review under Extended Credit Facility and
First Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility,” May 10, 2024, among others.
29 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
30 Prosper Africa, prosperafrica.gov/results.
31 U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb.
32 Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA International Trade and Investment Country Facts database.
33 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), “Cabo Verde,” as of June 21, 2024; and State Department, Open
Skies Partners, state.gov/open-skies-partners, and “Civil Air Transport Agreements,” state.gov/civil-air-transport-
agreements.
34 U.N. Development Program, “Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in the Water Sector in
Cabo Verde,” as of July 15, 2024.
35 World Bank, Climate Knowledge Portal.
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systems; and protecting coastal areas against environmental degradation and erosion.36 Illicit and
unregulated fishing reportedly threatens the country’s marine stocks and biodiversity.37
Narcotics Trafficking
Cabo Verde is a transit point and its waters an ocean corridor for cocaine from Latin America
bound for Europe.38 National law enforcement agencies have intercepted and seized large cocaine
shipments, including some multi-ton loads, on multiple occasions.39 A notable high-profile
seizure occurred in 2022, when Cabo Verdean law enforcement—alongside U.S. military
personnel deployed as part of an African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership operation—
seized six tons of cocaine from a Brazilian-flagged vessel in international waters, leading to the
arrest of five Brazilians and two Montenegrins. That operation was facilitated by Centro de
Operações de Segurança Marítima (COSMAR), a Cabo Verdean inter-agency operations and
intelligence fusion center. COSMAR seeks to leverage joint national military, police, and
intelligence capacities to counter drug trafficking and protect maritime waters and fisheries, in
some instances in cooperation with U.S. counterpart agencies. Established in 2010, in part with
U.S. assistance, COSMAR supports maritime sensory and vessel-tracking systems, military and
law enforcement communications, a judicial police database, and analytical capacities.40
U.S. Relations and Assistance
The State Department describes Cabo Verde as “one of Africa’s success stories and an important
U.S. partner in West Africa” and defines top U.S. priorities in the country as “promoting broad-
based economic development, improving security sector capabilities, and strengthening Cabo
Verde’s resilience to environmental vulnerability and the impacts of climate change.”41 A U.S.-
Cabo Verde Partnership Dialogue addresses issues of mutual interest; the most recent session, in
2021, focused on economic, educational, and security cooperation.42 In early 2024, Secretary of
State Blinken met with Prime Minister Correia e Silva in Praia, Cabo Verde’s capital, to highlight
MCC investments in Cabo Verde’s economic growth; bilateral counternarcotics cooperation;
Cabo Verde’s “strong, principled voice” on international matters, including Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine; and its participation in the U.S. Partnership for Atlantic
Cooperation.43 He also welcomed “the shared values between the United States and Cabo Verde
36 Cabo Verde Government, Third National Communication Report to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 2017.
37 Annika Hammerschlag, “Cape Verde’s ‘fish detectives’ try to keep extinction at bay,” The Guardian, September 21,
2021.
38 Colin Freeman, “Cocaine highway: On the front line of Europe’s drug war,” Sunday Telegraph, November 3, 2019.
39 Deutsche Welle, “Cape Verde seizes 9.5 tons of cocaine, Russian sailors arrested,” February 2, 2019; Agencia
Tributaria (Spanish Government), “One tonne of cocaine seized on a fishing boat headed to Spain in waters near Cape
Verde,” September 28, 2023; and Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics), “Spanish Authorities Seize
157kg of Cocaine Near Cape Verde, With Support From MAOC-N,” March 18, 2024.
40 U.S. Africa Command, “U.S. Tri-maritime Services and Cabo Verde authorities interdict large trans-oceanic cocaine
shipment,” April 7, 2022; and Gustavo Plácido Dos Santos, “Cape Verde and Drug Trafficking: A Major Challenge to
the Rule of Law,” IPRIS Viewpoints, 2014, among others.
41 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
42 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Third United States-Cabo Verde Partnership Dialogue,” March 30, 2021.
43 State Department, “Secretary Blinken and Cabo Verdean Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva Before Their
Meeting,” January 22, 2024.
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in promoting democracy, good governance, and human rights.”44 In 2022, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited Cabo Verde and met with Prime
Minister Correia e Silva to discuss security, commerce, climate change, and U.S. support for
Cabo Verde’s responses to COVID-19 and food insecurity.45 U.S. officials often stop in Cabo
Verde to refuel during visits to Africa. Work is underway to build a new U.S. embassy in Praia.
Bilateral security cooperation has expanded in the past decade. Cabo Verde hosts periodic port
calls by U.S. Naval and Coast Guard vessels, and participates in U.S.-led regional maritime
security exercises. In 2023, Cabo Verde co-hosted with U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa the
first U.S.- African Maritime Forces Summit.46 U.S. military personnel aided Cabo Verdean
authorities in a drug seizure in 2022 (see above), while embarked aboard U.S. Navy
Expeditionary Sea Base USS Hershel “Woody” Williams. A U.S.-Cabo Verde Status of Forces
Agreement took effect in 2018, while a State Partnership Program between Cabo Verde and New
Hampshire’s National Guard was launched in 2022. In late 2022, the United States and Cabo
Verde signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation.47
In addition to counternarcotics cooperation, in 2020 and 2021, Cabo Verde played a central role
in a U.S.-Venezuelan diplomatic and legal dispute over its detention of Alex Saab—a Colombian
trade-focused businessman and alleged financier of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro—
which ended with Saab’s transfer to U.S. custody in late 2021 (see Text Box).
The Alex Saab Extradition Affair
In 2020, Cabo Verdean authorities arrested Alex Saab, a reported close associate of Venezuelan President
Maduro, when Saab’s private jet made a refueling stop in Cabo Verde en route to Iran. A year earlier, in 2019,
Saab had been indicted in the United States on federal money laundering charges and designated for U.S. financial
sanctions relating to Venezuela.48 His provisional arrest in Cabo Verde was made on the basis of a U.S.-issued
INTERPOL “red notice,” and the United States subsequently requested his extradition. A legal battle ensued, as
Saab’s lawyers disputed the legality of the arrest, arguing that Saab, a Venezuelan envoy, enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. They also contended that extradition would be il egal in the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty
between the United States and Cabo Verde. Cabo Verde’s Attorney General, José Landim, stated that Saab’s
transfer to U.S. custody would nevertheless be consistent with “reciprocity” between the United States and Cabo
Verde in law enforcement matters.49 In early 2021, an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
regional court—whose judgments are technically binding on member states (including Cabo Verde), but are often
flouted—ruled that the detention was unlawful, and ordered Saab’s release.50 Shortly after the ECOWAS court
ruling, Cabo Verde’s Supreme Court approved Saab’s transfer to the United States, and the Constitutional Court
later denied Saab’s appeal. Saab was transferred to the United States later in 2021 to face charges related to
44 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Meeting With Cabo Verdean Prime Minister Correia E Silva,” January 22,
2024.
45 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Readout of Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s Meeting with Cabo
Verdean Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva,” August 7, 2022.
46 Defenceweb, “Cabo Verde hosting first African Maritime Forces Summit,” March 20, 2023, and “Leaders discuss
shared issues at first African Maritime Forces Summit,” April 11, 2023.
47 Department of Defense, “U.S. and Cabo Verde Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation,”
December 15, 2022.
48 On sanctions, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Disrupts Corruption Network Stealing from
Venezuela’s Food Distribution Plan, CLAP,” July 25, 2019, and “Treasury Increases Pressure on Alex Saab and His
Network in Venezuela,” September 17, 2019. According to press reports, Saab was at one time a U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration informant; see Joshua Goodman, “Businessman close to Maduro was DEA informant,
records show,” Associated Press, February 16, 2022.
49 Associated Press, “Cape Verde may send suspect to US without extradition treaty,” June 15, 2020.
50 ECOWAS Court of Justice, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/2021, March 15, 2021.
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money laundering.51 Saab—who allegedly played a key role in evading U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and other U.S.-
sanctioned governments and was reportedly a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and FBI informant—was
transferred to Venezuelan custody in late 2023 in a prisoner swap with the United States.52
Congressional Role
Since at least the mid-2010s, Cabo Verde has not featured as a principal focus of U.S. legislation
or publicly-reported congressional oversight, but Congress has consistently funded U.S.
development and security cooperation activities pertaining to Cabo Verde. The country also
regularly hosts congressional and other U.S. official delegations.53 H.Rept. 118-554,
accompanying H.R. 8771, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2025, states that the bill would encourage “the Director of the Peace Corps to
evaluate the merits of reestablishing operations in Cabo Verde” and direct “funding at not less
than the prior fiscal year level for Cabo Verde for improving economic resilience.”54 An
analogous Senate bill has not been introduced to date. The Peace Corps maintained a Cabo Verde
country program between 1988 and 2012 (FY2013), which it ended after undertaking a review
that found that Cabo Verde was among “countries that had reached a higher state of development
than other countries in… [Peace Corps’] overall portfolio.”55
U.S. Assistance
State Department-administered bilateral assistance for Cabo Verde totaled $400,000 in FY2023,
all under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, with the same
annual amount requested for IMET in FY2024 and FY2025.56 Over the past five years, Cabo
Verde also has received regional International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
advisory security assistance and Department of Defense (DOD)-administered maritime security
and counternarcotics assistance under DOD’s global train and equip authority (10 U.S.C. 333).
Law enforcement cooperation includes a 2019 bilateral law enforcement and criminal justice
sector support agreement; an INCLE-U.S. Customs and Border Protection interagency agreement
to help Cabo Verde increase its border security capacities, including regarding civil aviation
traffic flows; and a 2023 CBP-Cabo Verde Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement focused on
mutual efforts to counter illicit trafficking and customs offenses. In 2018 the State Department
also facilitated a cooperative partnership between Cabo Verde’s National Police and the police
department of Boston, a city which hosts a large Cabo Verdean diaspora community.57
51 U.S. Department of Justice, “Colombian Businessman Charged with Money Laundering Extradited to the United
States from Cabo Verde,” October 18, 2021.
52 PBS Frontline, “A Dangerous Assignment: Uncovering Corruption in Maduro’s Venezuela,” May 14, 2024; and AP,
“US, Venezuela swap prisoners: Maduro ally for 10 Americans, plus fugitive contractor ‘Fat Leonard’,” December 21,
2023.
53 U.S. Embassy- Praia, “Remarks by Ambassador Jeff Daigle Reception and Concert Celebrating the 247th
Anniversary of U.S. Independence,” July 10, 2023; and House Democracy Partnership, Quarterly Newsletter, July
2024.
54 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations report to accompany H.R. 8771, 118th
Cong., 2d Session, H.Rept. 118-554, June 14, 2024.
55 Peace Corps, Congressional Budget Justification FY2014; see also Peace Corps, Host Country Impact Study
Cape Verde, 2011.
56 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification, FY2024 and FY2025 editions.
57 State Department, “U.S.-Cabo Verde Relations,” October 30, 2023.
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The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has provided assistance for sea turtle conservation in
Cabo Verde under its Marine Turtle Conservation Fund. There is no U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) country mission, but USAID has occasionally funded projects in the
country under regional or centrally-administered programs, with a focus on such goals as
renewable energy, agriculture, and economic growth. The State Department occasionally
administers small grants for local development projects, and occasional larger ones (e.g., an anti-
trafficking in persons project in FY2021). Cabo Verdeans also participate in the Young African
Leaders Initiative and other educational exchange and English language learning programs.58
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compacts
Cabo Verde’s first MCC Compact, implemented between 2005 and 2010, was valued at $108
million upon completion. The compact, the MCC’s third such effort globally, financed the
construction of several bridges and roads and many water reservoirs and dikes; expanded and
upgraded the “critical Port of Praia”; trained and/or provided credit to hundreds of small farmers
and agribusinesses; and “strengthened the capacity of microfinance institutions and laid the
groundwork for the country’s first private credit bureau.” Some 385,000 people benefitted from
the program, the MCC reports. Several core compact projects were significantly altered during
implementation. This affected financing allocations, spurred the Cabo Verdean government to
secure additional non-MCC financing (from Portugal) for some port upgrade work, and
complicated economic rate of return estimates at closeout, the MCC reported. The compact also
resulted in important lessons for the MCC relating to project design, preparation, revisions, and
implementation challenges, which the MCC since has applied to compacts elsewhere.59
The country’s second MCC compact, implemented between 2012 and 2017 and valued at $66
million, sought to improve water infrastructure, reform Cabo Verde’s institutional and regulatory
environment, and enhance the legal framework surrounding land and property rights. The MCC
reports that the compact “combined infrastructure improvements with ambitious policy and
institutional reforms to strengthen property rights and increase access to clean water and
sanitation, improving the lives of more than 600,000 people.” As part of the compact’s
implementation, Cabo Verde’s government “passed over 50 laws, closed ineffective institutions,
and created new agencies based on sustainable commercial principles, demonstrating their [sic]
commitment to undertake difficult policy and institutional reforms, try new approaches, and scale
effective interventions,” according to the MCC. The MCC also reports that the compact’s
implementation resulted in an array of development lessons. These related to factors necessary to
for effective policy and institutional reform; appropriate project staffing levels; the conditioning
of financing disbursements on the attainment of activity milestones; and a need to couple physical
infrastructure investments with legal and institutional reforms, among other issues.60
In late 2023, the MCC Board determined that Cabo Verde was eligible to develop a regional
compact—which it is currently doing—with a projected goal of boosting regional economic
integration, trade, or other cross-border activity, in a manner yet to be determined. The MCC is
financing the development of this compact with $10 million.61
58 Ibid.; FWS, “Marine Turtle Conservation Fund”; and USAID/State Department, foreignassistance.gov.
59 MCC, “Cabo Verde Compact,” linked from mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/cabo-verde, and Closed Compact
Report: Cabo Verde Compact, July 10, 2017, the source of direct quotes in this paragraph.
60 MCC, “Cabo Verde Compact II,” linked from mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/cabo-verde, and Star Report: Cabo
Verde II, May 2019, the source of direct quotes in this paragraph.
61 MCC, “Congressional Notification,” May 14, 2024; and “Cabo Verde Proposed Regional Compact” at
mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/cabo-verde.
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Author Information
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
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