Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

August 7, 2023 R47648

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication
August 7, 2023
Cables: Issues for Congress
Jill C. Gallagher,
Commercial undersea telecommunication cables carry about 99% of transoceanic digital
Coordinator
communications (e.g., voice, data, internet), including financial transactions. Individual private
Analyst in
companies and consortia of companies own and operate a network of more than 500 commercial
Telecommunications
undersea cables that form the backbone of the global internet. Many of these commercial
Policy
undersea telecommunication cables land in the United States and its territories, supporting

communications for consumers, businesses, and the government, including military, diplomatic,
Nicole T. Carter,
and national security agencies. Recent attacks on undersea infrastructure, including the Nord
Coordinator
Stream pipelines, has heightened concerns for cables, and spurred calls for increased protection
Specialist in Natural
of undersea telecommunication cables and the global cable network.
Resources Policy

Intentional and Unintentional Damage to Undersea Cables. Recent intentional and
unintentional acts and natural events have damaged undersea telecommunication cables, and

disrupted communications. In April 2022, vandals damaged several cable landing sites in France,
cutting multiple cables, disrupting and degrading services in several parts of France. French telecom industry representatives
described the attacks as “coordinated” and “unprecedented” in scale. In October 2022, another intentional cable cut in France
affected communications across Europe and globally. Unintentional acts have also damaged cables and disrupted
communications. In October 2022, a cable serving the Shetland Islands was damaged by a fishing vessel, disrupting
communications on the islands. In January 2022, an underwater volcano erupted in Tonga severing an undersea cable,
affecting communications and internet services on the main island for several weeks, and on the outer islands for 18 months.
In June 2023, an undersea cable serving the North Slope of Alaska was severed by naturally shifting ice, affecting internet
and cell service for residents in this Arctic area. These events have heightened awareness of the importance of cables, their
vulnerabilities, and protection needs.
Telecommunication Cable Protection in the United States. The U.S. government has taken some action to
protect subsea cables, adopting penalties for those causing cable damage; restricting vessels from anchoring close to an
undersea cable in designated anchoring areas; and creating a Cable Security Fleet to assist with repairs and protect U.S.
national security. Yet, vulnerabilities remain. In 2021, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), citing a lack of
visibility into the operational status of undersea cables, created a cable outage reporting system to inform and aid
government-wide response. Several public-private working groups studied undersea cable vulnerabilities and provided
recommendations for protecting cables from physical damage. The Communications Security, Reliability, and
Interoperability Council (CSRIC), a federal advisory committee to the FCC, and a public-private expert team organized under
the Analytic Exchange Program (AEP), a program coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), on behalf of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), identified challenges to protecting cables from physical damage.
Some challenges include that cables are privately owned and cross multiple jurisdictions; the federal review and permitting
process for marine infrastructure may not always consider cable protection; and the United States lacks both a robust
protection strategy and federal agency leading on cable protection (e.g., endorsing industry standards, disseminating best
practices, promoting protection policies). The CSRIC recommended the FCC serve as the lead agency, although other agency
structures are possible. The AEP Team also noted gaps in leadership for reporting and investigating unusual activity, and
facilitating cable issue resolution. They recommended public-private cooperation to identify and mitigate risks and develop
contingency plans.
Issues for Congress. The U.S. government has adopted some protection policies for undersea cables, but has not adopted
a strategy or formal framework for protecting cables landing in the United States. Instead, it relies primarily on private sector
owners to protect their undersea telecommunication cables from physical damage. Given the recent attacks on undersea
cables and damage from natural events that disrupted and degraded communications, Congress may consider policies to
strengthen protection of commercial undersea cables landing in the United States (e.g., cables within U.S. waters and with
landing stations in the United States). Such policies could fortify the U.S. telecommunications network, protect U.S.-landing
cables from damage, and try to ensure continuity of communications in the United States.
Congressional Research Service

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Introduction
Commercial undersea telecommunication cables carry about 99% of transoceanic digital
communications, including international voice, data, and internet communications, and financial
transactions. Individual private companies and consortia of companies own and operate a network
of over 500 commercial undersea telecommunication cables that form the backbone of the global
internet. Many of these cables land in the United States and its territories, providing
telecommunication and internet services for consumers, businesses, and government agencies,
including military, national security, and diplomatic agencies.
Damage to undersea cables can disrupt and degrade communications. TeleGeography, a U.S.-
based telecommunication market research firm that tracks and maps undersea cables, estimates
there are globally, on average, 100 cable breaks a year.1 The majority of incidents (about 75%) are
caused by human activities, mainly fishing and anchoring. About 14% of cable breaks are caused
by natural events (e.g., earthquakes), and 6% by equipment failure. Of the remaining incidents of
damage, some are intentional. TeleGeography notes that intentional damage to cables is rare, but
says the actual number of incidents is unknown.
Recent attacks on undersea infrastructure, including the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea
and several undersea telecommunication cables in Europe, have heightened awareness of the
importance of undersea infrastructure, and spurred calls for increased protection of undersea
cables. In June 2022, the European Parliament published a report outlining efforts by several
European Union (EU) countries to bolster cable protection, and called for increased awareness of
cable importance and information sharing, and an update of the EU marine strategy to protect
cables and strengthen network resiliency.2 In June 2023, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) agreed to create the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure
to, among other things, share best practices for cable protection, and facilitate information sharing
among NATO nations.3 Congress may consider similar policies to strengthen protection of
undersea cables landing in the United States, fortify the U.S. telecommunication network, and
support continuity of communications, to safeguard the U.S. economy and national security.
This report focuses on policies to protect cables landing in the United States and cables within
U.S. waters from physical damage. It provides background on cable technologies, intentional and
unintentional damage to cables, and challenges and recommendations of public-private working
groups for protecting undersea telecommunication cables from damage. Next, it discusses U.S.
government actions to protect subsea cables, and policy options for Congress should it consider
greater protection of cables. This report does not discuss protection of cables in international
waters—an issue that has been the subject of ongoing legal debate.4 In addition, this report does
not address all types of threats, such as cyberattacks on cable management systems and tapping of
cables for the purpose of espionage. While these threats exist, they present unique risks to cables
which extend beyond the scope of this report.

1 Alan Mauldin, “Cable Breakage: When and How Cables Go Down,” TeleGeography, May 3, 2017,
https://blog.telegeography.com/what-happens-when-submarine-cables-break.
2 Christian Bueger, Tobias Liebetrau, and Jonas Franken, Security Threat to Undersea Communications Cables and
Infrastructure—Consequences for the EU (hereinafter referred to as the 2022 Report to the European Parliament) June
2022, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557.
3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Press Conference, June 16, 2023, transcript available at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_215694.htm?selectedLocale=en.
4 James Kraska, “The Law of Maritime Neutrality and Submarine Cables,” Journal of International Law (blog), July
29, 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-law-of-maritime-neutrality-and-submarine-cables/.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 6

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Undersea Cable Technologies and Global Network
A complete undersea telecommunication cable system includes fiber-optic cable encased in layers
of material (e.g., plastic, steel, aluminum) for protection from water damage and for insulation.5
As shown in Figure 1, the cable is laid on the ocean floor and connects two or more onshore
cable landing stations. The cable landing station typically contains transmission, reception,
power, and network management equipment.6
Figure 1. Undersea Telecommunication Cable System

Source: CRS.
Note: Graphic shows an undersea telecommunication cable system running from beach manhole to beach
manhole; and fiber-optic lines from the cable landing station to a point-of-presence or POP (e.g., data center)
that connects via fiber-optic lines to inland terrestrial networks. POP = point-of-presence.
Cable damage can occur intentionally or unintentionally in the water or at cable landing stations.
In 2017, the Analytic Exchange Program (AEP), a public-private working group of cable and
national security experts, sponsored by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on behalf
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), issued a report, Threats to
Undersea Cable Communications (hereinafter called the 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report).7
According to the AEP Team, cables close to shore are typically buried, “offering a layer of
protection” from damage, and cables that lay directly on the seabed are somewhat protected,

5 For more information on the technology, see CRS Report R47237, Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Technology
Overview and Issues for Congress, by Jill C. Gallagher.
6 Dan Swinhoe, “What Is a Submarine Cable? Subsea Fiber Explained,” DCD, August 26, 2021,
https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/what-is-a-submarine-cable-subsea-fiber-explained/.
7 Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program (AEP), Threats to Undersea Cable Communications, September 28, 2017,
p. 6 (hereinafter 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=870379. (AEP facilitates
collaborative partnerships between members of the intelligence community and private sector industry experts.)
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 7

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

because of their deep sea location and because their exact location is not publicly disclosed.8 The
AEP Team found there were limited reports of undersea attacks on cables, but cable landing
stations, which are more vulnerable, have been actively targeted.9 TeleGeography estimates that
there are 552 planned and active commercial undersea telecommunication cable systems globally
(domestic and international),10 connecting every continent except Antarctica.11 Figure 2 shows
the global distribution of cables as of May 2023.
Figure 2. Commercial Undersea Telecommunication Cables

Source: TeleGeography, Submarine Cable Map, May 16, 2023, https://www.submarinecablemap.com.
Notes: Cable colors are for visual clarity of the figure and do not have another significance. Cable landing
stations are shown as circles. The map includes commercial undersea cables. It does not include all government-
owned cables (e.g., military cables).
Cables can interconnect with each other and with terrestrial networks, forming the backbone of
the global internet. This interconnection provides owners with alternate paths to reroute traffic if a

8 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, pp. 19-20.
9 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 6.
10 TeleGeography, “Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-
cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions. Domestic undersea telecommunication cables lay point to point within a
country. They can improve connectivity between regions within a country, provide connectivity to the global internet,
and connect the mainland to nearby islands; some domestic cables cross into international waters when connecting two
domestic points. International undersea telecommunication cables connect two or more countries and enable connection
between the countries and sometimes with other countries along the route.
11 International Trade Administration, “Chile Telecommunications Subsea Fiber-Optic Cables,” Market Intelligence,
September 20, 2022, https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/chile-telecommunications-subsea-fiber-optic-cables.
(A cable to Antarctica is planned for 2023.)
Congressional Research Service

3

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

cable is damaged. It also means that damage to a cable in one location could affect service to
other cables serving other locations.
The United States has high network redundancy. The number of licensed undersea
telecommunications cable landing stations rose from 52 in 2004, to 74 in 2019, to 85 in operation
or planning to enter service as of May 2023.12 The AEP Team asserts that in the United States,
owners have access to a relatively large number of cables, providing opportunities to reroute
traffic to alternate paths in case of cable damage. They also note that there is a concentration of
cable landing sites in a few physical locations, creating the potential for a single attack or natural
event (e.g., hurricane) to affect multiple cables at once, which could cause long-term
communication disruptions for many.13
Ownership
Commercial undersea cables can be owned by a single company or a consortium of companies.
Cable owners include telecommunication providers, undersea cable companies, content providers
(e.g., Facebook), and cloud computing service providers (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Amazon).
Owners are investing in new undersea telecommunication cables to: increase capacity to meet an
expected increase in demand for mobile data, internet services, and cloud services; expand
coverage to serve new regions and customers; and, generate new revenue. Thus, this critical
communications infrastructure on which consumers, businesses, and governments rely for
everyday connection and communication is owned and expanded primarily by private sector
companies.14 Private sector owners have an economic interest in protecting cables from damage,
mainly to preserve their customer base—whose payments for cable use are the primary source of
their revenue.
Cross-Jurisdictional Nature of Cables15
International commercial undersea cables cross international boundaries and land in two or more
sovereign states. Domestic cables connect to jurisdictions within the same country, sometimes
crossing international waters to connect domestic landing sites. Most cables cross multiple
jurisdictions (e.g., international, national, state, local).
The geographic extent of U.S. jurisdiction over international undersea telecommunications cables
is generally based on international agreements. These include, but are not limited to, the 1884
International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables and the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).16 UNCLOS establishes national

12 DHS Protective Security Division, Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Infrastructure Category: Cable
Landing Stations, January 15, 2004, https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-UCL-CV.pdf; Submarine Cable Networks,
“Cable Landing Stations in North America,” accessed July 20, 2022, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/stations/
north-america; FCC, “Submarine Cable Landing Licenses,” accessed May 17, 2023, https://www.fcc.gov/research-
reports/guides/submarine-cable-landing-licenses.
13 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 8.
14 Some governments have invested in cables. For example, Tonga-Fiji Submarine Cable System is owned and operated
by TCL, which developed and manages the cable with financing support from the Asian Development Bank and World
Bank. TCL is a public enterprise 80% owned by the government. In China, three state-owned companies in China—
China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom—invested in undersea cables. In the United States, the U.S. Navy
owns over 40,000 nautical miles of various subsea cables.
15 This discussion of UNCLOS and maritime zones was written by Jill Gallagher, Analyst in Telecommunications
Policy, and Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy.
16 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, March 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989, U.S. Congress, Senate, Treaties,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 9

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

boundaries for party nations that extend up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of the coast of
the nation, and include the “exclusive economic zone” or EEZ, which extends up to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline.17 While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it has generally
abided by its terms, as dictated by Presidential Proclamation 5030.18 Figure 3 depicts UNCLOS
maritime zones and coastal nation rights. UNCLOS grants all nations the freedom to lay and
operate undersea cables beneath the “high seas” and on the continental shelf, within a coastal
nation’s EEZ, subject to a coastal nation’s rights “to take reasonable measures for the exploration
of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from pipelines.”19 Thus, commercial undersea telecommunications cable
segments crossing into U.S. territorial waters and landing in the United States, its territories and
possessions are subject to oversight and regulation by the U.S. government.
Figure 3. Maritime Zones
Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Source: Ulrich Bähr, Ocean Atlas: Facts and Figures on the Threats to Our Marine Ecosystems, Heinrich Böl
Foundation Schleswig-Holstein, 1st Edition, May 2017, p. 32, https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/
web_170607_ocean_atlas_vektor_us_v102.pdf.
Notes: UNCLOS Part VII, Article 86, related to the “high seas,” applies to “all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a [nation], or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic [nation].” In UNCLOS Part XI, Article 133, “the Area” is at or beneath the
seabed extending beyond the continental slope.
Commercial undersea telecommunication cables often cross into state and local jurisdictions as
well. In accordance with the federal Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (SLA),20 coastal states are
generally entitled to an area extending three geographical miles from their officially recognized

Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Doc. 61-357 (Washington: GPO,
1910), p. 1949; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), December 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. To date, the United States has not ratified and become party to the convention, but the United States
recognizes UNCLOS as part of international customary law.
17 According to UNCLOS, “the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water
water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.” UNCLOS,
Articles 3, 5, and 57.
19 UNCLOS, Article 79.
20 43 U.S.C. §1301 et seq.
Congressional Research Service

5

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

coast (or baseline).21 In order to accommodate the claims of certain states, the SLA provides for
an extended boundary in the Gulf of Mexico if a state can show such a boundary was provided for
by the state’s “constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a member of the
Union, or if it has been heretofore approved by Congress.”22
Within their offshore boundaries, coastal states have “(1) title to and ownership of the lands
beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective states, and (2) the right and
power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said lands and natural resources.”23 Thus,
with cables, there are often multiple and overlapping jurisdictions. The discussion of U.S.
authorities to protect cables in international waters has been the subject of legal debate.24 This
report does not focus on U.S. authorities to protect cables in international waters. It focuses on
cables landing in the United States, where U.S. local, state, and federal governments have
authority to implement protection policies.
Threats to Undersea Telecommunication Cables
Damage to cables may be caused by intentional acts (e.g., cutting of cables) and unintentional
damage (e.g., fishing, anchoring, or natural disasters), discussed in more detail below.
Intentional Damage
Intentional acts of damage to cables occur, but are rare, according to TeleGeography. While some
intentional incidents (e.g., cutting of cables, vandalism) are publicly reported, the actual number
of incidents globally or in the United States is unknown.25
Intentional damage to undersea telecommunication cable systems may include physical damage
to cables, such as cutting cables at sea or on land, or attacking cable landing stations. In 2022, two
separate attacks on undersea telecommunication cables in France consisted of individuals cutting
cables after breaking into cement casings at several cable landing sites; these attacks were
described as “coordinated” and “unprecedented” in scale by telecommunication industry
representatives.26 The cable cuts disrupted communications in several parts of France, and slowed
traffic globally.
In the 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, the AEP Team notes that there have been limited reports
of underwater attacks on cables because they are difficult to access on the sea floor.27 Instead,
“landing stations are the most accessible and impact-rich targets as they are concentrated in a

21 43 U.S.C. §1301(b). A geographical or nautical mile is equal to 6,080.20 feet, as opposed to a statute mile, which is
equal to 5,280 feet.
22 43 U.S.C. §§1301(b), 1312. After enactment of the SLA, the Supreme Court held that the Gulf coast boundaries of
Florida and Texas extend to three marine leagues, or nine nautical miles; other Gulf coast states were unsuccessful in
extending their boundaries (U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 66 (1960); U.S. v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 129 (1960)).
23 43 U.S.C. §1311.
24 Garrett Hinck, “Cutting the Cord: The Legal Regine Protecting Undersea Cables,” LawFare, November 21, 2017,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cutting-cord-legal-regime-protecting-undersea-cables.
25 In 2021, the FCC required cable owners to report certain outage information, which they assert will provide more
data on cable outages. FCC, “Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable
Outage Data,” 85 Federal Register 15733-15741, March 19, 2021.
26 Thomas Brent, “Mass Attack on Internet Cables in France ‘Almost Professional,’” The Connexion, April 28, 2022,
https://www.connexionfrance.com/article/French-news/Mass-attack-on-internet-cables-in-France-almost-professional.
27 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 6.
Congressional Research Service

6

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

handful of coastal locations.”28 Intentional damage to terrestrial portions of heavily used undersea
telecommunication networks is therefore an area of potentially greater risk. For example, in
November 2022, a dual cut to the terrestrial portion of the South East Asia–Middle East–Western
Europe 5 cable in Egypt disrupted internet services in multiple countries.29 Companies that track
network traffic reported traffic dropping in countries in East Africa, the Middle East, and South
Asia,30 and regional impacts to cloud service companies, including Google, Amazon, and
Microsoft Cloud.31
Risks to subsea cables also may be greater if foreign nations are involved. In 2018, the Associated
Press cited a Russian publication stating that Russia has the capability to cut cables, connect to
top-secret cables, and jam underwater sensors that detect intrusions.32 This capability raised
concerns among some Members of Congress,33 a British parliamentarian,34 and NATO officials.35
The sabotage of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022 has
also heightened concerns about the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure, including
telecommunication cables.36 In the wake of this attack, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
is increasing protection of undersea pipelines and telecommunication cables, and conducting a
threat assessment of cables landing in Ireland—a major hub for cables connecting the United
States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe.37
Bad actors may also leverage information technologies to harm undersea telecommunication
cable operations. Improvements to cable systems, including software to monitor cable network
integrity and traffic, may help cable companies detect bad actors. According to a report from one
policy think tank, “More companies are using remote management systems for submarine cable
networks—tools to remotely monitor and control cable systems over the Internet—which are
cost-compelling because they virtualize and possibly automate the monitoring of cable

28 Ibid, pp. 19-20.
29 Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (@PTAofficialpk), “Dual cut in the terrestrial segment of SEAMEWE-5,”
November 29, 2022, https://www.kentik.com/blog/outage-in-egypt-impacted-aws-gcp-and-azure-interregional-
connectivity/; see also Simon Sharwood, “Submarine Cable Damage Brings Internet Pain to Asia, Africa,” The
Register, November 30, 2022, https://www.theregister.com/2022/11/30/seamewe5_cut_outage_apac_africa/.
30 Sebastian Moss, “AAE-1 Cable Cut Cause Widespread Outages in Europe, East Africa, Middle East, and South
Asia,” DCD, June 8, 2022, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/aae-1-cable-cut-causes-widespread-outages-
in-europe-east-africa-middle-east-and-south-asia/.
31 Doug Madory, “Outage in Egypt Impacted AWS, GCP, and Azure Interregional Connectivity,” Kentik (blog) June
14, 2022, https://www.kentik.com/blog/outage-in-egypt-impacted-aws-gcp-and-azure-interregional-connectivity/.
(Reporting packet loss and increased latency for Google, and increased latency for AWS and Microsoft Azure.)
32 Deb Reichmann, “Could Enemies Target Undersea Cables That Link the World?” AP News, March 30, 2018,
https://apnews.com/article/moscow-north-america-ap-top-news-politics-russia-c2e7621bda224e2db2f8c654c9203a09.
33 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities meeting jointly with House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Securing the Nation’s Internet Architecture, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019, H.A.S.C. No. 116-43.
34 Rishi Sunak, MP, Undersea Cables: Indispensable, Insecure, Policy Exchange, 2017, pp. 28-33,
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables.pdf.
35 Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the 66th Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, November 23, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_179665.htm.
36 Christopher Woody, “Suspected Nord Stream Sabotage Shows ‘Vulnerability’ of Everything We Build on the
Seabed, Top British Admiral Says,” Insider, September 30, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.nl/suspected-nord-
stream-sabotage-shows-vulnerability-of-everything-we-build-on-the-seabed-top-british-admiral-says/.
37 John Mooney, “Defence Forces Assess Risk to Subsea Cables amid Fears of Russian Attack,” The Times, October
16, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/defence-forces-assess-risk-to-subsea-cables-amid-fears-of-russian-attack-
cjld8bf3b.
Congressional Research Service

7

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

functionality.”38 However, they may also create new risks and opportunities for cyberattack.
While threats from cyberattacks and acts of espionage (e.g., tapping of cables) exist, they differ
from physical attacks on cables. In most cases, these attacks seek to access the data the cable is
carrying, and may not cause physical damage to the cable. As such, these threats, which pose
unique challenges, extend beyond the scope of this report.
Unintentional Damage
Unintentional damage to undersea telecommunications cables can be caused by human activities
such as anchoring (most commonly related to shipping) and commercial fishing; natural hazards
such as submarine landslides, volcanos, earthquakes, tsunamis, and strong waves and currents;
and animal threats (e.g., sharks or barracuda that may bite cables), although rare. As stated earlier,
TeleGeography estimates there are, on average, 100 cable breaks a year globally.39 The majority
of incidents (about 75%) are caused by human activities, mainly fishing, anchoring, and other
activities. About 14% of cable breaks are caused by natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes), and 6%
by equipment failure.
Examples of Unintentional Damage from Human Activities
On October 14, 2022, Faroese Telecom officials reported a cable fault (i.e., failure) on its cable
connecting the Shetland and Faroe islands, two archipelagoes that sit between Scotland, Iceland,
and Norway.40 On October 20, 2022, Faroese Telecom reported a second break in a cable
connecting Shetland and mainland Scotland, which disrupted mobile phone and internet services
to residents and businesses.41 According to a Scottish government official, Scotland’s Maritime
Coastguard Agency confirmed that a UK-registered fishing vessel damaged the cable, affecting
communications on Shetland.42
Fishing vessels are also suspected in the damage to another cable, in Norway, supporting the
Svalbard satellite ground station (known as SvalSat). SvalSat downloads data from satellites in
polar orbit, and transmits the data via undersea cable to a variety of customers, including the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA).43 The cables, owned by Space Norway, contain sensors which, among
other things, “measure environmental conditions and fish migration, recording images and sound,
and sending the information back to shore.”44 In January 2022, one of two Svalbard cables lost
signal due a break in the undersea power supply. In January 2023, the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs stated that while there was speculation of sabotage by Russia, “human
sabotage has not been proven,” nor has any connection between the attacks on the Nord Stream

38 Ibid.
39 Alan Mauldin, “Cable Breakage: When and How Cables Go Down,” TeleGeography, May 3, 2017,
https://blog.telegeography.com/what-happens-when-submarine-cables-break.
40 Chris Cope, “Cable Fault the Third Reported in Waters Around Shetland Since Mid-September,” Shetland News,
October 21, 2022, https://www.shetnews.co.uk/2022/10/21/cable-fault-the-third-reported-in-waters-around-shetland-
since-mid-september/.
41 “Damaged Cable Leaves Shetland Cut off from Mainland,” BBC News, October 20, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-63326102.
42 “UK-Registered Fishing Vessel Damaged Shetland Subsea Cable,” The Fishing Daily, December 8, 2022,
https://thefishingdaily.com/latest-news/uk-registered-fishing-vessels-damaged-shetland-subsea-cable.
43 Space Norway, “The Svalbard Fibre Optic Cable Connection,” June 15, 2022, https://spacenorway.no/en/what-we-
do/operational-infrastructure/the-svalbard-fibre-optic-cable-connection/.
44 Lisbeth Kirk, “Mysterious Atlantic Cable Cuts Linked to Russian Fishing Vessels,” euobserver, October 26, 2022,
https://euobserver.com/nordics/156342.
Congressional Research Service

8

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

pipelines and this cable.45 The institute called for increased redundancies and protection of
communication networks to provide for continued communications if damage occurs. According
to some reports, the severed Svalbard cable “is to cost €5.6 million (about $6 million USD) to
repair and be fully operational in 2024, amounting to years of lost scientific data.”46
Examples of Damage from Natural Events
A January 15, 2022, underwater volcanic eruption in Tonga (which caused tsunami waves and a
volcanic ash cloud)47 severed an undersea telecommunication cable, the country’s primary
connection to the internet. The cable is owned and operated by the state-owned Tonga Cable
Limited (TCL), and connects Tonga to Fiji, where it connects to other international networks.48
Five weeks after the disaster, the cable to Fiji was repaired and service restored. Tongan officials
announced in March 2022 that repairs to its domestic cable, connecting the main island to its
outer islands, could take a year. In April 2023, the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, a
telecommunications response team under the United Nations World Food Programme, reported
the timeline for repair had been extended to July 2023 by TCL.49 In mid-July 2023, TCL
announced the domestic cable to the outer islands was repaired. The repair effort lasted 18
months; it required a survey of the ocean floor, and it took time to obtain the amount and type of
cable needed, which ultimately had to be manufactured and shipped to the islands.50
In mid-June 2023, an undersea cable serving Alaska’s North Slope was severed, likely by
naturally shifting ice, initially leaving residents in this Arctic region without internet or cell phone
service. The cable company reported that “a full restoration of service by repair ships could take
up to two months.”51 Telecommunication providers that rely on the cable reportedly transferred
some service to satellite communications and terrestrial fiber and microwave networks to provide
some connection for customers, but expected service to be slower than usual.52
Because undersea cables can be damaged, most commercial undersea telecommunication cable
owners incorporate redundant features into their cable systems. They use alternative routes to
redirect traffic to another undersea cable, a terrestrial line, or over satellite networks to provide
some service until repairs are complete. In some cases, cable damage can be so severe, as in
Tonga, that it can cause widespread and long-term service disruptions (i.e., no service),

45 Niels Nagelhus Schia, Lars Gjesvik, and Ida Rødningen, The Subsea Cable Cut at Svalbard January 2022: What
Happened, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Policy Brief, January 2023, p. 2, https://www.nupi.no/en/
publications/cristin-pub/the-subsea-cable-cut-at-svalbard-january-2022-what-happened-what-were-the-consequences-
and-how-were-they-managed.
46 Lisbeth Kirk, “Mysterious Atlantic Cable Cuts Linked to Russian Fishing Vessels,” euobserver, October 26, 2022,
https://euobserver.com/nordics/156342.
47 NASA, Tonga Volcanic Eruption and Tsunami 2022, Disasters, February 17, 2022, https://appliedsciences.nasa.gov/
what-we-do/disasters/disasters-activations/tonga-volcanic-eruption-tsunami-2022.
48 Kingdom of Tonga, “Tonga Cable Limited,” accessed January 25, 2023, http://www.pacificsoe.org/tonga/state-
owned-enterprises/tonga-cable-limited/.
49 Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, Tonga: Hunga Tonga–Hunga Ha’apai Volcano [FINAL], April 2023,
https://www.etcluster.org/document/final-etc-tonga-final-situation-report-18-04-april-2023.
50 Paul Lipscombe, “Tonga’s Domestic Submarine Cable Fixed 18 Months After Volcanic Eruption,” DCD, July 14,
2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/tongas-domestic-submarine-cable-fixed-18-months-on-from-
volcanic-eruption/.
51 Greg Knight, KNOM-Nome and Chris Klint, Alaska Pubic Media, Anchorage, “Cut Cable Causes Internet and
Cellphone Outages in Arctic Alaska,” Alaska Public Media, June 12, 2023, https://alaskapublic.org/2023/06/12/cut-
cable-causes-weeks-long-north-slope-northwest-alaska-internet-and-cellphone-outages/.
52 Alena Naiden, “Internet and Cell Outages in Northwest Alaska, North Slope Caused by Offshore Fiber Optic Cut,”
Anchorage Daily News, June 12, 2023 (updated June 14, 2023).
Congressional Research Service

9

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

particularly where there are no redundant cables or other means to reroute traffic. In other cases,
damage to a cable can be repaired quickly, resulting in a short period of service disruption or
degradation. Thus, redundancies play a critical role in service restoration.
Challenges in Protecting Cables
Several public-private working groups of telecommunication experts, organized under U.S.
agencies, have studied subsea cables and cable vulnerabilities, and identified challenges to
protecting cables.
CSRIC Working Groups. Several working groups of the Communications Security, Reliability,
and Interoperability Council (CSRIC), a federal advisory body to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) examined cable vulnerabilities and offered recommendations for protecting
cables from physical damage. In 2014, the CSRIC formed Working Group 8 to study commercial
undersea cables, in response to spatial conflicts between installed and planned undersea cables,
and between cables and other marine activities (e.g., beach replenishment, offshore wind farms).
The working group’s focus was on developing policies and standards to protect cables from
physical damage, to strengthen the resilience of the U.S. undersea cable network, and to ensure
continuity of communications.53 In 2016, the CSRIC expanded its study of cables, creating
another working group (Working Group 4A) to examine how proximity to other marine activities,
governmental permitting processes, and clustering of cable routes and landings can increase the
risk of cable damage and threaten the resiliency of the U.S. undersea cable network.54 The
working group focused on governmental coordination and coordination problems in offshore
permitting that could exacerbate risks to undersea cables. A second report by Working Group 4A
focused on physical risks related to clustering of cable routes and cable landing stations.55
AEP Team. The AEP Team, in the 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, focused on vulnerabilities,
national security risks (e.g., insider threat, terrorist attack), and disruption indicators for the
submarine cable network and supporting infrastructure. The intent was to identify vulnerabilities
and risks associated with undersea cables, and to inform companies reliant on cable
communications and law enforcement agencies of risks and mitigation strategies to ensure
continuity of communications. Like, the CSRIC working groups, the experts on the AEP Team
identified challenges to protecting commercial undersea cables landing in the United States, and
made recommendations for hardening cable infrastructure—enhancing protection of cable
systems to strengthen the resiliency of U.S. telecommunications networks and ensure continuity
of communications in the United States.
While the emphasis of these studies differed, both groups identified similar challenges to
protecting commercial undersea cables from damage, discussed below.

53 CSRIC IV, Working Group 8, Submarine Cable Routing and Landing, Final Report—Protection of Submarine
Cables through Spatial Separation (hereinafter referred to as CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report), December
2014, p. 1, https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric4/CSRIC_IV_WG8_Report1_3Dec2014.pdf.
54 CSRIC V, Working Group 4A, Submarine Cable Resiliency, Final Report—Interagency and Interjurisdictional
Coordination (hereinafter referred to as CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report), June 2016, Executive Summary,
https://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/advisory/csric5/WG4A_Report-Intergovernmental-Interjurisdictional-
Coordination_June2016.pdf.
55 CSRIC V, Working Group 4A, Submarine Cable Resiliency, Final Report—Clustering of Cables and Cable
Landings (hereinafter referred to as CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report), August 2016, pp. 2, 31-32,
https://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/advisory/csric5/WG4A_Final_091416.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

10

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Private Sector and Multinational Ownership
As noted earlier, undersea telecommunication cables are primarily privately owned—either by a
single owner or a consortium of cable owners. Private owners design and operate cables with
protection in mind (e.g., burying cables, fortifying landing stations). They are often able to
reroute traffic to alternative paths in the event of a cable failure and report they have experienced
few extended communication outages from cable damage. However, given the heavy U.S.
reliance on undersea telecommunication cables, and recent damage to cables (e.g., multiple cable
cuts, catastrophic damage from natural events) that disrupted communications for many
international users over a wide area, the U.S. government may seek to support additional private
sector efforts to protect cables.
The 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report found that one of the current models of ownership, wherein
a consortium of companies, often from different countries, purchases, operates, and maintains a
cable may “present vulnerabilities, which could be exploited and affect the United States.”56
Foreign service providers may be involved in decisions concerning the placement of cables in the
United States; employees from foreign companies may have access to a cable, cable network, and
landing stations; and, where cables connect to a foreign nation, attacks on international cables
could affect U.S. communications.57 The AEP Team noted that cable ownership can also affect
maintenance, responsiveness to repairs, development, and operational transparency. Also, security
standards may vary across companies and countries, and a lack of awareness of the various
owners and varying policies could create vulnerabilities for cable owners and for cables serving
the United States.58
The CSRIC working groups stated that the complexity of multinational ownership may present
risks to cables. The working groups discussed FCC processes for protecting cables from foreign
threats, reviewing cable applications that propose to connect the United States to a foreign nation
and those having a 10% foreign ownership interest. The process involves FCC consultation with
U.S. national security agencies to review the cable application for national security concerns, and
development of national security agreements imposing conditions on owners to protect cables
(e.g., restricting access to cable landing stations and network operation centers, imposing physical
protections on cables, and cybersecurity requirements). The conditions are meant to safeguard
U.S. national security, but are not applied to all cables landing in the United States. The CSRIC
working groups noted the lack of generally accepted cable protection standards across companies
and nations, and encouraged U.S. government adoption and dissemination of industry-based
protection policies, standards, and best practices to U.S. permitting agencies and cable owners to
protect cables serving the United States.59

56 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 27.
57 Zscaler, “European Cable Cut May Impact Transoceanic Routes,” October 19, 2022, https://trust.zscaler.com/
zscloud.net/posts/12256. Zscaler noted that the cable cut in France impacted major cables with connectivity to Asia,
Europe, and the U.S., and may have resulted in disruption or degradation of service for consumers.
58 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 17.
59 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, p. 13. The CSRIC Working Group 8 cites a need for governments to
endorse, adopt, or encourage use of industry standards and best practices regarding submarine cable protection,
development of new standards, and public dissemination of standards.
Congressional Research Service

11

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Cross-Jurisdictional and Cross-Cutting Nature of Cables
A challenge in protecting undersea cables is that cables span many miles and cross multiple
jurisdictions, including local, state, federal, and international areas. Each jurisdiction may have
different laws, policies, and review processes for undersea telecommunication cables.
The CSRIC Working Group 4A studied jurisdictional challenges. The working group concluded
that, while the federal government “retains the power to regulate commerce, navigation, power
generation, national defense, and international affairs throughout state waters,” U.S. states and
territories retain authority within their territorial seas to manage, develop, and lease resources,”
including subsea leases for undersea cables.60 The working group found that the “array of federal
and state regulations and tribal requirements can create a complex set of processes and
requirements for pursuing or tracking a project proposal.”61 Further, each jurisdiction may impose
varying requirements that could strengthen or weaken protection of cables from damage.
As an example, the working group stated that Florida prohibits the landing of cables in the Keys,
which could lead to the routing and clustering of cables along certain routes, away from such
protected areas.62 California and Oregon have, as a condition of their subsea lease, policies in
place to re-inspect cables to ensure they have stayed buried, to protect cables from physical
damage.63 Thus, policies vary by jurisdiction, and could lead to varying levels of protection for
undersea cables landing in the United States.
For U.S. landing sites where there is overlapping jurisdiction, the AEP Team asserts there can be
“heavy reliance on the private sector” to ensure security of cables since jurisdictions “may be
under the erroneous assumption that other agencies are engaging with the private sector around
security concerns.”64
An oversight challenge in cable protection policies arising from their cross-cutting nature is the
interest and engagement of potentially multiple agencies and congressional committees. Cables
relate to environmental, foreign affairs, homeland security, commerce, military, and other issues,
and may fall within the responsibilities and interests of multiple federal agencies, which are
authorized, appropriated, and overseen by various congressional committees.65 The cross-cutting
interest in cables may complicate development of comprehensive federal protection proposals.
For example, cable spatial separation policies (e.g., requiring separation distances between cables
and other marine infrastructure) could potentially affect placement of other marine infrastructure,
such as offshore wind farms which is a priority in the Biden Administration. A further
complication in achieving a comprehensive approach may be the differing approaches, interests,
and concerns of state and local governments hosting cable landing sites. For example, federal
policies to protect cable landing sites (e.g., welding manhole covers) could be prohibited or
different than policies adopted by state and local governments.

60 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 5.
61 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, pp. 5-6.
62 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, p. 6.
63 CSRIC V WG 4A Interagency Report, p. 33.
64 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 15.
65 For example, in a Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act, for Fiscal Year 2024
(S.Rept. 118-58), the Committee recognized that military installations rely on critical infrastructure (e.g., power, water,
telecommunications) not controlled by Department of Defense (DOD). The Committee wrote that it appreciated the
DOD’s establishment of a Critical Infrastructure Dense Analysis Center (CIDAC) during fiscal year 2023, which is to
engage in information sharing about threats and vulnerabilities with private critical infrastructure owners
Congressional Research Service

12

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Emerging Risks from Other Offshore Activities
The CSRIC Working Group 8 recognized that there are competing demands for U.S. waters that
may present challenges to protecting cables from physical damage. The increased use of U.S.
coastal and marine areas for resource and infrastructure development activities, such as
deployment of offshore wind facilities, deep-sea mining, and oil and gas exploration, creates risks
for existing undersea telecommunication cables in terms of installation, operations, and access.66
The 2016 report by CSRIC Working Group 4A emphasized the same point, noting a lack of
awareness of existing cables and cable protection needs among project planners and permitting
agencies. The working group noted that “there is a lack of awareness and/or focus on foreclosure
of particular submarine cable routes and landings, and on reductions in geographic diversity of
cables through authorization of other marine activities.”67 If decisions are made which limit or
foreclose certain cable routes or landing sites, and cause cable owners to cluster cables along
existing routes and at the same cable landing sites, any damage to those routes or landing sites
could have widespread impacts to the U.S. telecommunications.
As investment in diverse marine infrastructure increases,68 existing cables may face increased risk
of damage from installation of new infrastructure, and new cables may face challenges in
achieving route and landing site diversification, which could create a single point of failure—a
location in the U.S. telecommunication network where infrastructure is concentrated, and where
damage at that location could cause the entire system or network to stop working.
Lack of a Robust Strategy to Protect Cables
The CSRIC working groups, and some scholars, have cited efforts by other nations to protect
cables and the lack of a robust protection strategy in the United States.69
The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the lead U.S. agency for
critical infrastructure protection. CISA is responsible for understanding, managing, and reducing
the risk to critical infrastructure, including the U.S. communications infrastructure. CISA works
with public and private partners to identify risks, defend against threats to U.S. infrastructure, and
develop mitigation strategies.70 CISA hosts both the Communications Sector Coordinating
Council (SCC), a group of telecommunication industry representatives that share information and
develop tools, guidelines, and products to address risks, vulnerabilities, and emerging issues to
the communications sector, and the Communications Sector Government Coordinating Council

66 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, p. 36.
67 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, p. 11.
68 The White House, “FACT SHEET: Bidenomics is Boosting Clean Energy Manufacturing for Offshore Wind and
Creating Good-Paying American Union Jobs,” press release, July 20, 2023. Noting increasing investment in offshore
wind farms.
69 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 33. See also, Lane Burdette, “Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political
Gain: U.S. Responses to Chinese Strategy,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, May 5, 2021,
https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/leveraging-submarine-cables-political-gain-us-responses-chinese-strategy. Discusses
Chinese strategic plan for cables, and lack of U.S. strategy; see also Colin Wall and Pierre Morcos, “Invisible and
Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 11, 2021,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security. Discusses the lack of
action to protect undersea cables, need for national assessments of cable risks, and collective effort among U.S. allies to
protect the global network.
70 CISA, “Communications Sector,” https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-
infrastructure-sectors/communications-sector.
Congressional Research Service

13

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

(GCC), a group of agencies with missions related to communications. The GCC and SCC
coordinate to develop plans, policies, and activities to protect critical infrastructure.71
To date, the GCC and SCC have not addressed the protection of commercial undersea
telecommunication cables. In 2015, DHS developed a Communications Sector-Specific Plan to
identify risks to communication networks and establish goals and guidance for the sector agencies
and industries to reduce risks and strengthen security and resiliency of those networks. While the
plan mentions undersea telecommunication cables, it does not identify specific risks, policies, or a
strategy to mitigate those risks.72 Similarly, in the 2022 Communications SCC annual report,
there is no mention of commercial undersea cables, or emerging threats to undersea cables.73
Other nations are facing the same challenges. The European Parliament published a report in
2022 discussing challenges with cable protection, highlighting efforts by several EU countries to
bolster cable protection, and citing a need for increased awareness of cable importance and
information sharing. The authors found that in past marine security strategy documents, cable
protection “is only vaguely included in the core strategic interests, and no direct action is devoted
to implementation.”74 The report recommends an update of the EU marine security strategy to
protect cables and strengthen network resiliency.75
Lack of a Lead Federal Agency on Cable Protection
The CRSIC Working Group 4A describes an “urgent need” for a single federal point of contact—
a lead agency—for undersea telecommunication cables to raise awareness of cables and to
promote protection policies.76 It urged the designation of a lead agency to provide guidance and
best practices to cable owners and agencies making permitting decisions to protect existing and
new cable systems, enhance the resiliency of the undersea cable network, and ensure continuity of
communications. The working group states the following regarding cable protection, “Without
increased awareness of submarine telecommunication cables and improved coordination between
agencies, the existing regulatory requirements may not be effective.”77 The 2017 AEP Team found
“no single or group of federal agencies is dedicated to fielding company questions around vendor,
supplier, contractor, and manufacturer resources; investigating flagged issues (e.g., unusual
observed maritime activity); and/or facilitating issue resolution.”78
Thus, both the CSRIC working groups and the AEP Team identified as a challenge the lack of a
single federal agency to serve as a point of contact for cable owners, lead on cable protection
policy, coordinate on permitting decisions, report unusual activity, and investigate issues.
Multiple Entities Involved in Review and Permitting
The CSRIC Working Group 4A studied interagency challenges, and found that the permitting and
review process is complex and arguably disjointed. The working group and industry stakeholders

71 CISA, “Government Coordinating Councils,” https://www.cisa.gov/government-coordinating-councils.
72 DHS, Communications Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP 2013, 2015, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/nipp-ssp-communications-2015-508.pdf.
73 DHS, Communications Sector Coordinating Council 2022, 2022, http://www.comms-scc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2022/05/CSCC20Annual20Report_2022-compressed.pdf.
74 2022 Report to the European Parliament, p. 51.
75 Ibid.
76 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, Executive Summary.
77 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 36.
78 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 16.
Congressional Research Service

14

link to page 21 link to page 40 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

found that there are multiple federal agencies involved in the review and permitting of cable
projects, “each with different mandates and responsibilities, and operating under different
statutes,” and that the U.S. permitting process may inadequately consider cable protection.79
Along with multiple federal entities involved in the review and permitting of cables, state and
local agencies are also involved in cable permitting. Decisions from permitting agencies could
strengthen protection of cables or exacerbate risks; in some instances permitting agencies may not
be aware of or consider threats to cables.
Federal Entities Involved in Cable Review and Permitting
Table 1 provides an overview of selected federal entities that may be engaged in the permitting
and review of commercial undersea telecommunication cables, and others that have technical
expertise and protection roles.80 Depending on the specifics of a cable project and the natural
resources affected, multiple federal entities acting under different statutes, regulations, and
presidential directives may be involved in the review and approval of a commercial undersea
telecommunication cable landing in the United States. Two of the agencies with more prominent
roles are the FCC and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
• The FCC licenses cable landing stations for cables connecting the United States
to a foreign nation and domestic cables crossing into international waters. The
FCC coordinates with other executive branch agencies on initial review of
undersea telecommunication cable landing license applications. The FCC
requires license applicants to provide information on entities that will own or
control the U.S. cable landing station and entities that own or control a 5% or
greater interest in the cable system. Generally, for applications from a foreign
citizen or foreign entity, including a foreign government, holding 10% or more
direct or indirect interest in the proposed cable, the FCC refers the application for
a national security, law enforcement, and foreign policy review by the Committee
for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services Sector (referred to as “the Committee”). The
Committee is a group of executive branch agencies and offices formalized in a
2020 executive order.81
• USACE has permit and review responsibilities that apply to certain activities in
regulated waters, including the installation of undersea cables. Undersea
telecommunication cable project developers generally must obtain USACE
approval for work related to the portion of a cable in regulated waters. In these
instances, USACE is not regulating the cable per se; it is regulating navigation
impacts from the mean high water line at the shore out to three nautical miles and
the seabed over the outer continental shelf, and dredging and filling impacts of
the cable segment out to three nautical miles of the territorial sea.
As part of the federal permitting and review of a cable, federal agencies such as USACE or the
cable permit applicant may be required to consult with or obtain a permit or approval from other
federal agencies in NOAA, such as the National Ocean Service (NOS) or its National Marine

79 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, pp. 6, 36; see also Justin Sherman, “The U.S. Should Get Serious About
Submarine Cable Security,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), September 13, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-
should-get-serious-about-submarine-cable-security.
80 See the Appendix for detailed information on agency roles in federal permitting and review.
81 Executive Office of the President, “Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the
United States Telecommunications Services Sector,” 85 Federal Register 19643-19650, April 4, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

15

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Fisheries Service (NMFS), and agencies in the Department of the Interior (DOI), including the
National Park Service (NPS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM), depending on the specific impacts and location of the cable
project. Other agencies, such as the DHS, Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) may also support protection of cables.

Congressional Research Service

16

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Table 1. Selected Federal Entities with Roles in Commercial Undersea
Telecommunication Cables Landing in the United States
Relevant Agencies and
Principal Role
Their Departments
Related to Cables
Description
Federal Entities with Permitting and Review Responsibilities That Apply to Commercial Undersea
Cables
Federal Communications
Licensing cable landings
The FCC reviews cable landing license applications to
Commission (FCC)
and operation of
ensure they are in the public interest. Before granting or
commercial
revoking a license, the FCC must obtain approval from
telecommunication cables the Secretary of State and from any federal agency or
connecting the United
department that the FCC may deem necessary
States to a foreign nation
(typically, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and
and domestic cables that
Defense). The FCC also refers certain applications with
cross into international
10% or more foreign direct or indirect interest in the
waters
cable for review to the Committee for the Assessment
of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services Sector (see next entry).
Committee for the
Reviewing certain FCC
The Committee assists the FCC in identifying and
Assessment of Foreign
applications related to
mitigating risks to U.S. national security. It reviews cable
Participation in the
cables for national
license applications with 10% or greater direct or
United States
security, law
indirect foreign interest. Committee members include
Telecommunications
enforcement, and foreign
the Attorney General, Secretaries of Defense and
Services Sector
policy concerns
Homeland Security, other executive branch
(Committee)
departments or agencies, or assistant to the President
as determined by the President. Advisors include the
Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Commerce;
Director of the Office of Management and Budget; U.S.
Trade Representative; Director of National Intelligence;
Administrator of the General Services Administration;
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
and certain Assistants to the President.
Department of the Army,
Permitting activities that
Undersea cable owners must obtain USACE approval
U.S. Army Corps of
may obstruct navigation
(e.g., permits) related to cable projects’ impacts on
Engineers (USACE)
and certain activities
navigation and impacts of dredge and fil material before
subject to the Clean
laying cables in regulated waters. USACE also conducts
Water Act
environmental reviews required under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that inform its
permitting decisions.
Other Agencies That May Be Engaged in Permitting and Review Depending on Specific Impacts or
Locations of Cable Project
Department of
Consulting with
NOAA is responsible for conserving and managing
Commerce, National
regulatory agency (e.g.,
certain coastal and marine ecosystems and resources,
Oceanic and Atmospheric USACE) or applicant on
including areas of the ocean and specific species that
Administration (NOAA)
actions that may have an
may be affected by undersea cable projects. Federal
adverse impact on marine agencies and cable applicants may be required to consult
wildlife and ecosystems,
or obtain a permit from NOAA’s National Ocean
and in some cases, issuing
Service or its National Marine Fisheries Service.
permits or approvals
related to these
protected coastal and
marine resources
Congressional Research Service

17

link to page 40 link to page 21 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Relevant Agencies and
Principal Role
Their Departments
Related to Cables
Description
Department of the
Approving right-of-ways,
If an undersea telecommunication cable project requires
Interior, National Park
and actions related to
a right-of-way to use land in a national park or marine
Service (NPS), U.S. Fish
certain protected species
refuge, the NPS or FWS may potentially become
and Wildlife Service
and related to protecting
involved. FWS may also have a role in implementing the
(FWS), and Bureau of
undersea power cables
Endangered Species Act. DOI’s BOEM may coordinate
Ocean Energy
with other agencies to ensure that undersea power
Management (BOEM)
transmission cables authorized by BOEM do not affect
telecommunication cables.
Other Technical Expertise and Protection Roles Related to Commercial Undersea Cables
Department of the Navy,
Participating in
The NSCPO represents the interest of the Navy and
Naval Seafloor Cable
discussions of commercial Navy cable owners in policy discussions with U.S.
Protection Office
undersea cables based on
agencies, presenting a coordinated response on cable
(NSCPO)
its technical expertise
protection and policy issues.
Department of
Administering the Cable
The program enables the U.S. government to contract
Transportation (DOT),
Security Fleet program, in to maintain a fleet of active, commercially viable,
Maritime Administration
coordination with
privately owned United States-flag cable vessels to meet
Department of Defense
national security requirements (including for the laying,
maintenance, and repair of submarine cables), provide
the U.S. government access to participating vessels in
times of national emergency, and maintain a U.S.
presence in the international submarine cable service
market.
Department of Homeland Enforcing all applicable
DHS leads critical infrastructure protection, including
Security (DHS), U.S.
federal laws on, under,
for the communications sector. By law, the DHS
Coast Guard (USCG)
and over the high seas
Secretary is required to take cables into account when
and U.S territorial waters setting ship anchorage areas. USCG can set temporary
protection zones in and around harbors that can
preclude or protect cable laying, and enable cable
maintenance and repair. USCG licenses and certifies
U.S.-flag cable laying vessels and crews.
Source: CRS.
Notes: Details on agency roles, including authorizing statutes, permitting, licensing, and environmental review
processes are included in the Appendix. One agency’s responsibilities may require or necessitate that it consult
with another agency.
Each entity engaged in permitting or review is limited to the jurisdictional scope of its authorities
and the specific statutes it is responsible for implementing. An agency’s review may focus on
certain segments of commercial undersea telecommunication cables (e.g., segments transecting a
national park) or certain aspects of a cable project (e.g., foreign ownership). Given the differing
locations of commercial undersea telecommunication cables and owners and operators involved,
the agencies and entities that may need to review a cable project will also vary.
Review by the entities shown in Table 1 may lead to specific requirements or modifications to
cable projects for cable landing sites or for physical protection of cable landing stations, national
security or natural resources (i.e., construction disturbance limitations or requirements on a right-
of-way through a federally protect marine area). In some cases, the review process may prevent
projects from moving forward unless certain concerns or potential impacts are addressed.82 These
requirements can sometimes affect the cable’s operation, vulnerabilities, and economic viability.

82 In 2000, the Southern Cross Cable Network was rerouted from a proposed landing site in Monterey Bay, CA, to
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

18

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

State and Local Government Involvement in Cable Review and Permitting
Along with federal permitting and review process, commercial undersea telecommunication
cables may also be subject to oversight and regulation by state and local governments. Each state
government has a different permitting process for cables that often includes an environmental
review of the project associated with the grant of a seabed lease, which owners need to lay cables
in state-controlled waters. Local permitting processes may involve acquisition of easements,
access to locally-owned beaches, land, and roads, and compliance with requirements related to
abatement of noise, water, and air pollution.83
Ease of permitting in certain areas can attract cable landings, increase the number of cables
available in an area, and strengthen redundancies. It could also lead to clustering of cable landing
stations in a few locations, reducing geographic diversity, and creating single points of failure for
the U.S. cable network. In the United States, the CSRIC working groups note that cable landing
sites are concentrated in a few areas:
On the U.S. East Coast, existing landing sites are clustered in the Northeast including
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and in the Southeast along the
Florida coast in three primary locations. On the U.S. West Coast, existing landing sites are
located in Northwest in Washington and Oregon and in the Southwest in Northern, Central,
and Southern California. Landing sites connect Alaska and Hawaii to the U.S. mainland.84
The working group encouraged coordination among federal, state, local agencies and industry to
promote geographic diversity in cable routes and landing sites and promote cable and network
resiliency.
Lack of Coordination During Review and Permitting
The CSRIC working groups found that while many agencies are involved in review and
permitting of cables and undersea infrastructure, there is generally, a lack of coordination
between agencies and a lack of awareness of cable protection needs.
The working groups cited lack of coordination as a challenge during permitting of undersea
cables and during permitting of other marine infrastructure (e.g., wind farms). The lack of
coordination could, according to the working groups, exacerbate risk to cables and the cable
network serving the United States.
The first study of the CSRIC in 2014 originated out of concerns related to spatial conflicts
between installed and planned undersea cables and other marine activities (e.g., offshore
dredging, beach replenishment, and offshore wind farms). The FCC tasked the CSRIC with
examining risks to submarine cables and the submarine cable infrastructure, and “how proximity
to other marine activities, governmental permitting processes, and clustering of cable routes and
landing can increase the risk of cable damage and harm U.S. network resilience.” 85

Nedonna Beach, OR, after experiencing delays in securing permission to land at the California site given the proposed
California marine route would have passed through a marine protected area (Nicole Starosielski, The Undersea
Network (Duke University Press, 2015), p. 147). See also DOJ, “Team Telecom Recommends FCC Grant Google and
Meta Licenses for Undersea Cable,” press release, December 17, 2021. Discussing security requirements on Google
and Meta related to the Pacific Light Cable and recommendations to reroute the cable away from Hong Kong.
83 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 33.
84 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, p. 6.
85 CSRIC IV, Working Group 8, Submarine Cable Routing and Landing, Final Report—Protection of Submarine
Cables through Spatial Separation, December 2014, pp. 14-15.
Congressional Research Service

19

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

The CSRIC working groups found that the installation of a submarine cable system and other
marine infrastructure often involves many agencies (e.g., federal, state, local), each with its own
mandates, priorities, and permitting processes, “most of which are not coordinated at all with the
FCC—or with each other.”86 While many agencies may review cable projects, the FCC—the
nation’s expert agency in telecommunications—and other U.S. agencies responsible for critical
infrastructure security (e.g., DHS) do not have direct input into other agencies’ permitting
decisions, including decisions that may affect the placement or protection of cables.87 The 2016
report studying interagency coordination states:
This fragmented system of regulation and planning has resulted in a number of particular
coordination problems that exacerbate risks to submarine cables, including gaps in actual
or perceived legal authorities, gaps in how existing legal authority is exercised, lack of
familiarity with submarine cable technologies and installation and repair operations, and
lack of clarity in procedures for consultation between relevant agencies when other marine
activities are proposed for permitting in proximity to submarine cables.88
The working groups found that agencies making decisions about cables or other marine activities
may not always be aware of existing cables, cable protections needs, and may not always take
cable protection and repair needs into account, which could leave individual cables and the
telecommunication cable network vulnerable to damage.89 Challenges to coordinating include the
increasingly crowded marine environment, competing stakeholder interests, differing agency
interests and mandates, and complex jurisdictional authorities. Competing interests may also
present some challenges, as some cable stakeholders may assert that permitting decisions and
policies may introduce risks to cables,90 while some marine and maritime stakeholders assert that
installation of cables could adversely affect navigation, maritime, environmental, and fishery
interests.91
Lack of Awareness of Cable Protection Needs
Cable industry stakeholders and experts indicate that agencies involved in the planning and
permitting of cables and other undersea infrastructure, such as wind farms, may not always be
aware of the existence of undersea cables in the proposed project area, and so may not take
existing cables or cable protection needs into account.92
The CSRIC working group found that agencies and companies proposing offshore projects do not
always consider the impact a planned project may have on undersea telecommunication cables,
that consideration of cables is often not integrated into agency permitting and review processes,
and that agencies and offshore project developers are not always aware of best practices for
protecting cables.93 The CSRIC working group asserts that marine infrastructure, including

86 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, p. 22.
87 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, pp. 33-34.
88 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, pp. 33-34.
89 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 36.
90 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, pp. 5-7.
91 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 30; see also Coffen-Smout, Scott & Herbert, Glen J., 2000. “Submarine
Cables: A Challenge for Ocean Management,” Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 441-448, November. While
cable and environmental interests may conflict, a full discussion of U.S. stakeholder environmental and natural
resource protection concerns is beyond the scope of this report.
92 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 35.
93 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, pp. 36-37; see also CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, pp. 56-57.
Congressional Research Service

20

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

undersea cables, needs protections and procedures similar to “call before you dig” initiatives
established to prevent damage to pipelines and electrical lines.94
In addition to recommending that the FCC serve as the point of contact for cables, the working
group also recommended that FCC create a clearinghouse of information on cables, including the
identification of existing and planned cables, spatial requirements for installation, repair, and
protection of cables, activities that can damage cables, and penalties for damaging cables.95 This
approach is similar to that used in Australia, where the communications regulatory agency serves
as a clearinghouse and point of contact on cable issues for cable companies and other marine
activities (e.g., fishing, offshore development companies).96
U.S. Government Actions to Protect Cables
The U.S. government has taken various actions to protect cables landing in the United States from
physical damage, as discussed below.
Cable Protection Consideration in Establishing Anchorages
On December 23, 2022, Congress enacted the Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022
(Division K of P.L. 117-263).97 It requires the Secretary of the department in which the USCG is
operating98 to define and establish anchorage grounds in the navigable waters of the United
States, and to take into account protection of the marine environment, proximity to undersea
cables, and the safe and efficient use of the marine transportation system, and national security.
The act also would prohibit vessels from anchoring in “near proximity” to an undersea pipeline or
cable, unless authorized by the Captain of the Port (who is a USCG officer). It also would require
the Secretary responsible for the USCG to review and identify anchorage regulations that may
need modification, “in the interest of marine safety, security, and environmental concerns, taking
into account undersea pipelines, cables, or other infrastructure.”99 In targeting anchoring,
Congress addressed a significant threat to cables. Industry reports indicate that anchoring
accounts for about 25% of cable damage incidents.100

94 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 37.
95 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 44.
96 Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), “Submarine Cables,” https://www.acma.gov.au/
submarine-cables.
97 The provision amends 46 U.S.C. §70006.
98 U.S. law (14 U.S.C. §103) states that the Coast Guard “shall be a service in the Department of Homeland Security,
except when operating as a service in the Navy upon the declaration of war if Congress so directs in the declaration or
when the President directs.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10484, Defense Primer: Department of the
Navy, by Ronald O'Rourke.
99 The act reflects concerns the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee raised in a report (H.Rept. 117-282)
concerning the San Pedro Bay Pipeline oil spill on the coastline near Long Beach, CA, in the fall of 2021. The
committee wrote, “Although still under investigation, the crack is believed to have been caused by a vessel anchor
strike during a heavy weather event….” In its report, the Committee reiterated its interest in safeguarding shorelines
from oil spills, and hence, amended anchoring laws to prohibit anchoring within certain distances of undersea pipelines
or cables unless permitted by the Captain of the Port.
100 Alan Mauldin, “Cable Breakage: When and How Cables Go Down,” TeleGeography BLOG, May 3, 2017,
https://blog.telegeography.com/what-happens-when-submarine-cables-break.
Congressional Research Service

21

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Enhanced Access to Repair Vessels
In the National Defense and Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92),
Congress authorized funding for a Cable Security Program for two privately-owned U.S.-flagged
ships,101 each subsidized at $5 million per year, to meet national security requirements related to
undersea cables.102 The program’s authorization allows for maintaining a fleet of active,
commercially viable, privately owned United States-flag cable vessels to meet national security
requirements and to maintain a U.S. presence in the international submarine cable services
market. Program participants enter into operating agreements with DOT’s Maritime
Administration that require the vessel to continuously and actively operate in the commercial
submarine cable services market (including the laying, maintenance, and repair of submarine
cables), provide the U.S. government access to participating vessels in times of national
emergency, and maintain a U.S. presence in the international submarine cable service market.103
The U.S. government also has a ship—the U.S. Navy’s USNS Zeus—capable of laying and
repairing cable.
Penalties for Damages
Pursuant to the 1884 Convention on the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, the U.S.
government adopted laws making damage to cables a punishable offense.104 For willful injury to
cables, the offense is a misdemeanor. Offenders may be subject to imprisonment for up to two
years, or to a fine not to exceed $5,000, or both (47 U.S.C. Chapter 2, §21). For negligent injury
to a cable, the offense is also a misdemeanor. Offenders may be subject to imprisonment for three
months or to a fine not to exceed $500 or both (47 U.S.C. Chapter 2, §22). U.S. laws on penalties
for cable damage were adopted in 1888. Many groups, including the International Cable
Protection Committee (ICPC), the CSRIC, the AEP Team, and the European Parliament have
recommended countries review penalties to ensure that the penalties are substantial enough to
deter damage.
Cable Outage Reporting System
The U.S. government has taken some action to identify outages in cables. Starting on October 28,
2021, the FCC requires undersea telecommunication cable owners to report to the FCC specified
unplanned service outages.105 The FCC uses this outage reporting system for other
telecommunication networks (e.g., wireline, wireless), and has extended it to undersea cables to
better track and understand cable outages, to assist cable owners and customers, and to inform
national response efforts.

101 U.S.-flagged vessel means any vessel documented (registered) under the laws of the United States (26 U.S.C.
§1355).
102 For more information, see CRS Report R46654, U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding
Support Programs, by Ben Goldman. See also “C.S. Decisive Reflagged for U.S. Cable Security Fleet,” American
Maritime Officer, vol. 52, no. 2, February 2022. Noting that SubCom’s cable ship, C.S. Dependable, was reflagged into
U.S. registry in December 2021 and SubCom’s cable ship, C.S. Decisive, was reflagged into U.S. registry in January
2022 for service in the two-ship U.S. Cable Security Fleet.
103 Maritime Administration, DOT, “Request for Applications To Be Considered for Enrollment in the Cable Security
Fleet,” 86 Federal Register 355, January 5, 2021.
104 47 U.S.C. Chapter 2, §§21-25.
105 FCC, “Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage Data,” 86
Federal Register 22360, April 28, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/04/28/2021-08651/
improving-outage-reporting-for-submarine-cables-and-enhanced-submarine-cable-outage-data.
Congressional Research Service

22

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Congressional Hearings and Legislative Activity
Congress has discussed cable protection issues in hearings, but has not adopted a comprehensive
protection framework. Such a framework could potentially include, for example, designating an
agency to lead subsea cable protection efforts, developing a cable protection strategy, adopting
protection policies, or mandating coordination in permitting processes to protect commercial
undersea telecommunication cables landing in the United States. Congress has supported
proposals to fund undersea cables, to limit the use of untrusted equipment (i.e., equipment
identified by the U.S. government as posing a national security risk) in undersea cables, and to
restrict the sale of U.S.-made cable equipment to foreign adversaries.
Congressional Hearings
Congressional hearings illustrate sustained congressional interest in the reliability and protection
of commercial undersea telecommunication cables. From January 3, 2019 (116th Congress)
through August 8, 2023 (118th Congress), 11 congressional committees held at least 26 hearings
that referenced undersea telecommunication cables.106 Hearings covered a range of topics
including funding for undersea telecommunication cables to expand internet access in the United
States;107 protection of cables landing in the United States and its territories to increase their
resiliency and redundancy of the U.S. and global network, and to avoid service disruptions;108
military use of commercial undersea cables and security concerns;109 security of cables, including
physical security, cybersecurity, and security of data transmitted via cable;110 and foreign
investment in the global undersea telecommunication cable networks.111 Members questioned
federal agencies on their role in assuring the security of undersea telecommunication cables,112
recognizing the challenges given the number of departments and agencies involved, their
overlapping jurisdictions, and individual mandates.113

106 Based on a search in ProQuest Congressional by CRS research librarians, conducted on August 8, 2023. Committees
that held hearings referencing undersea cables included House and Senate Appropriations, House and Senate Armed
Services, House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate
Finance, House Natural Resources, House Transportation and Infrastructure, and House Agriculture.
107 For example, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Setting New Foundations: Implementing the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act for Native Communities, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 4, 2022, S. Hrg. 117-505.
108 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Agriculture Committee, Rural Broadband: Examining Internet Connectivity
Needs and Opportunities in Rural America, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 20, 2021, H. Hrg. 117-4.
109 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Emerging Threats and Capabilities meeting jointly with House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on
National Security, Securing the Nation’s Internet Architecture, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019, H.A.S.C.
No. 116-43.
110 For example, see U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, Posture of the Navy in Review of the Defense
Authorization Request for FY2021 and the Future Years Defense Program, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., March 5, 2020.
111 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and
Nonproliferation, Digital Economic Engagement in the Indo-Pacific, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., January 19, 2022, p. 45.
112 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities meeting jointly with House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Securing the Nation’s Internet Architecture, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2019, H.A.S.C. No. 116-43.
113 Ibid, p. 2.
Congressional Research Service

23

link to page 40 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Legislative Activity
CRS conducted a search of congress.gov to identify legislative proposals that referenced undersea
telecommunication cables.114 In the 118th Congress, CRS identified four bills pertaining to
submarine cables. CRS identified legislative proposals that would, if enacted, alter the review of
cable applications for law enforcement and national security purposes. CRS identified legislation
and legislative proposals that would fund new cable infrastructure in the United States. Funding
new cables could increase redundancies and enhance the resiliency of the U.S. telecommunication
network. CRS also found legislation that would restrict the availability of U.S. cable equipment to
foreign adversaries. This could limit the ability of foreign adversaries to control the global cable
network, and the flow of traffic across that network, potentially improving the security of the
global cable network and the data it carries.115
• Codifying the Committee Reviewing Cables for National Security Concerns.
In the 118th Congress, H.R. 4506, TEAM TELECOM Act would establish an
interagency national security review process, codifying elements of the
Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee). The bill proposes some
changes to the process, requiring that the FCC submit applications (including
applications pertaining to submarine cable landing licenses and the transfer of
control of a submarine cable landing license) to the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Communications and Information, National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA) in the Department of Commerce; the
current process requires the FCC to refer applications to the Committee, currently
chaired by the Attorney General (DOJ). For more information on the Committee,
see the Appendix. H.R. 4510, the NTIA Reauthorization Act of 2023
incorporates text from H.R. 4506, and through amendments, would terminate the
Committee after the NTIA establishes such an interagency review process.
• New Cable Infrastructure. Congress has considered legislation to expand cable
networks to improve access to broadband services, including undersea cable
infrastructure. In the 116th Congress, some Members introduced legislation to
incentivize states to build internet exchange centers and cable landing stations to
expand access to broadband services, as in S. 1166. In the 117th Congress, the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) includes undersea
telecommunications cables and landing stations as an allowable expense under
Middle Mile Grant Program funded under the act. In the 118th Congress, a bill
introduced in the House in (H.R. 3385) proposes the study of a new transatlantic
cable connecting the continental United States, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Africa to
expand digital commerce and improve national security.
• Cable Technologies and Global Network Security. In the 118th Congress, the
House passed legislation (H.R. 1189) on March 27, 2023, related to preventing
foreign adversaries from acquiring goods and technologies capable of supporting

114 The search, conducted on August 8, 2023, used terms specific to undersea telecommunications cables. That is, the
search identified bills that specifically referenced undersea telecommunications cables, rather than capturing all
legislation that would alter how federal agencies review, license, or permit under various statutes.
115 Dale Aluf, China’s Subsea Cable Power Play in the Middle East and North Africa, The Atlantic Council, Issue
Paper, May 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ChinasGrowingInfluence_052423-
1.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

24

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

the construction, maintenance, or operation of undersea cable projects.116 The bill
would require the President, acting through the Secretary of State and in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, to develop a strategy to eliminate
the availability of such goods and technologies to foreign adversaries, among
other actions.117 The bill would also require congressional committee notification
on related actions. The intent, according to one of its sponsors, is “to limit foreign
adversaries like China from accessing goods and technologies capable of
supporting undersea cables and establishing agreements with allies and partners
to do the same.”118
Undersea Cable Protection: Issues for Congress
Undersea cables are vital to the national security and economic interests of the United States.
While industry stakeholders state that there have been few reported communication outages from
undersea cable damage in the United States, outages have occurred. 119 Given recent damage to
undersea cables that disrupted and degraded communications, and given continuing concerns for
global undersea infrastructure, heightened by the war in Ukraine120 and tensions with China,121
Congress may consider policies to enhance protection of commercial undersea cables landing in
in the United States from physical damage. While damage to cables outside of the United States
can affect communications in the United States, by focusing on protection of undersea cables
landing in the United States and encouraging redundancies, some stakeholders assert that
Congress could strengthen resiliency of the U.S. telecommunication network, ensure continuity of
communications, and safeguard U.S. national and economic security.
As previously discussed, Congress has taken some actions to enhance protection of subsea cables.
A policy consideration for Congress is whether those actions are sufficient or whether additional
action is needed to protect commercial undersea telecommunication cables Other policy questions
include whether, or how to, address other cable concerns and recommendations identified by

116 The U.S. government has taken similar actions to restrict the availability of certain telecommunication technologies
for entities that pose a threat to U.S. national security. This bill would eliminate the availability of those goods and
technologies capable of supporting the construction of undersea cables, specifically. For more information on U.S.
restrictions on telecommunication technologies, see CRS Report R47012, U.S. Restrictions on Huawei Technologies:
National Security, Foreign Policy, and Economic Interests, by Jill C. Gallagher.
117 The strategy would include identification of goods and technologies capable of supporting undersea cables; U.S. and
multilateral export controls and licensing policies for such goods and technologies; U.S. allies and partners that have a
share of the market with respect to such goods and technologies; entities under the control, ownership, or influence of
foreign adversaries; efforts to promote U.S. leadership at international standards-setting bodies; and, presence and
activities of foreign adversaries at international standards-setting bodies.
118 Representative Brian Mast, “Mast, Kim Introduce Bill to Limit China’s Ability to Develop Critical Undersea
Cables,” press release, February 24, 2023, https://mast.house.gov/press-releases?ID=3A27FEF8-8C2C-465F-A3AC-
B349611752D8. Such legislation could limit expansion of foreign adversary involvement in the global cable network,
reducing potential risks (e.g., controlling interconnection points, forming chokepoints, accessing data transmitted on
interconnected cables, espionage).
119 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, pp. 6, 8,13. See also FCC, “Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables
and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage Data,” 85 Federal Register 15734, March 19, 2021. Statements from the North
American Submarine Cable Coalition (NASCA) noting that “the passage of time has shown few reportable outages in
general,” asking for the FCC to rescind its new cable outage reporting rules.
120 Sabine Siebold, “NATO Says Moscow May Sabotage Undersea Cables as Part of War on Ukraine,” Reuters, May 3,
2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/moscow-may-sabotage-undersea-cables-part-its-war-ukraine-nato-2023-05-03/.
121 Paul Lipscombe, “China Flexes Muscles over Internet Subsea Cables Across South China Sea,” DCD, March 15,
2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/china-flexes-muscles-over-internet-subsea-cables-across-south-
china-sea/.
Congressional Research Service

25

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

cable industry stakeholders and experts. A discussion of policy recommendations from
stakeholders and other options for reducing damage to cables is presented below.
Cable Protection Strategy
Congress may consider the development of a cable protection strategy to enhance protection of
cables landing in the United States. The strategy may include designation of agencies and agency
roles in protection, policies to protect cables, assessment of risks, and public-private coordination
on cable protection.122
The European Parliament, in its 2022 report recognizes efforts by individual EU countries to
protect cables, but notes a lack of a protection strategy and calls for development of a national
strategy and action items to enhance cable protection. Congress could consider directing an
existing agency (e.g., FCC, DHS) or a set of agencies (e.g., interagency working group) to
develop a comprehensive cable protection strategy for the United States that strengthens the
resiliency of the U.S. cable network, could direct a public-private working group to develop a
protection strategy for cables and the U.S. cable network, or could continue to rely primarily on
private sector owners to secure their cables.
Lead Federal Agency
Congress may consider designating a single agency as the lead agency on cable protection, or
giving multiple agencies responsibilities for cable protection. Congress may consider designating
such an agency (or agencies) with responsibilities for identifying and adopting policies to protect
cables, develop and disseminate policies, standards, and best practices to permitting agencies, and
coordinating interagency cable protection efforts. Congress could task an existing agency with
cable protection responsibilities or assign these responsibilities to a new agency.
Cable stakeholders have argued that, under such an approach, the lead agency best positioned
could be the FCC, in consultation with DHS. The FCC is the lead agency on commercial
telecommunications, has engineering staff, and has studied the protection of cables to promote the
security, resiliency, and redundancies of commercial undersea telecommunication cables and the
U.S. telecommunication network. The FCC is already the lead federal agency for regulating
communications in the United States, including by cable, and the agency that grants commercial
undersea telecommunication cable landing licenses to private sector applicants. For initial
installation of cables, the FCC is responsible for issuing licenses for international and some
domestic commercial undersea telecommunication cables,123 consulting national security
agencies, and coordinating protections for these cables through national security agreements.
However, its current involvement with other agencies (e.g., USACE, natural resource agencies)
that may review cable installations or impose requirements on their installation, operations, or
repair is limited. Stakeholders have suggested the FCC could work collaboratively with industry
to identify or develop standards and policies to protect undersea cables and issue guidance for
permitting agencies and others to raise awareness of cable protection needs, offer best practices in

122 While the CSRIC Working Group 4A in 2016 stopped short of calling for a national protection strategy, it pressed
for a single agency to lead protection of cables, endorsement of industry standards and best practices for cable
protection, interagency coordination, and public-private coordination to enhance cable protection. Further, the working
group noted that other countries such as Australia and New Zealand have robust governance regimes, and also
concluded that the United States lacks a robust submarine cable protection regime that acknowledges the importance of
undersea telecommunication cable to U.S. economic and national security interests (CSRIC V WG4A Interagency
Report, p. 33).
123 Domestic cables that cross international waters.
Congressional Research Service

26

link to page 40 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

cable protection, and identify the FCC as a resource on cable questions.124 On the other hand, the
FCC is an independent commission, funded from regulatory fee offsetting collections (e.g.,
licensing fees and fines) and from spectrum auction revenues. To take on additional cable
protection responsibilities, the FCC may need authorities and resources from Congress. For more
on the current FCC roles, see the Appendix.
Congress may also consider DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as
the lead agency. CISA is the lead federal agency for understanding, managing, and reducing the
risk to critical infrastructure, including the U.S. communications infrastructure. CISA works with
public and private partners to identify risks, defend against threats to U.S. infrastructure, and
develop mitigation strategies.125 CISA hosts the Communications Sector Coordinating Council
(SCC), a group of telecommunication industry representatives that share information and develop
tools, guidelines, and products to address risks, vulnerabilities, and emerging issues to the
communications sector, and the Communications Sector Government Coordinating Council
(GCC), a group of agencies with missions related to communications. The GCC and SCC
coordinate to develop plans, policies, and activities to protect critical infrastructure.126 Congress
could consider designating DHS as the lead agency for undersea telecommunication cable
protection through its efforts to protect critical infrastructure. While DHS has these structures
(e.g., GCC, SCC) in place, it has not developed a strategy for protecting commercial undersea
cables. Congress may consider tasking DHS alone to lead this effort, or mandate DHS work in
coordination with others (e.g., FCC, DOJ, ODNI, state and local government representatives,
cable owners, and cable organizations) to develop such a strategy.
Potential Lead Agency Responsibilities
If Congress considers designating a single agency to lead cable protection efforts, it may evaluate
which agency would be best equipped to lead, activities the agency should perform, whether
coordination with other agencies should be required, and resources needed to carry out these new
coordination efforts. Congress may consider naming one agency or multiple agencies with
protection responsibilities. For example, Congress could consider tasking DHS with updating the
CSCC Annual Report to include risks to cables, or directing DHS to develop a protection strategy,
or to work with the FCC and USACE to develop an assessment of cable risks and guidance to
mitigate risks.
Raising Public Awareness of Cable Protection Needs and Policies
Congress may consider funding new federal programs or websites to raise awareness of cable
protection needs. Industry working groups have cited a need for increased awareness of cable
importance and use in U.S. telecommunications and financial systems. The CSRIC working
recommended that the FCC serve as the point of contact for cables, and that it create a
clearinghouse of information on cables and guidance on cable installations, including existing and
planned cables, optimal spatial requirements for installation, repair, and protection of cables,
activities that can damage cables, and penalties for damaging cables.127 Similarly, the AEP Report
called for designation of a single agency to field industry questions or regional private-public
information sharing groups (including cable owners, repair companies, and federal, state, local

124 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 45.
125 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Communications Sector,” https://www.cisa.gov/
communications-sector.
126 CISA, “Government Coordinating Councils,” https://www.cisa.gov/government-coordinating-councils.
127 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 44.
Congressional Research Service

27

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

law enforcement) to proactively review risks, coordinate mitigation strategies, and share
actionable intelligence.128
Resource for Informing Permitting and Review
Congress may assess how cable protection is addressed in federal and state permitting and review
of cables and other marine projects, how these activities interact with the marine environment and
species, whether there is need for greater information, guidance, and coordination among
permitting agencies to protect both cables and natural resources. If Congress were to task a
federal agency to lead on cable protection, that agency may become a resource on cable
protection considerations for federal and state agencies tasked with permitting and review of
cable and other marine projects.
Identifying Cable Protection Policies and Standards
Both CSRIC working groups and AEP report authors have recognized that policies and standards
vary across jurisdictions and recommend public-private cooperation to develop and promote
adoption of best practices, policies, and standards to protect cables landing in the United States.129
Both the CSRIC working groups and AEP report authors noted that there were industry policies
and standards to protect cables, and encouraged industry to adopt best practices. The AEP Team
stated that service providers and customers should “ensure they conduct due diligence into the
various parties involved in the placement, maintenance, and repair of submarine cable as security
best practices are not standardized throughout the industry, in the United States or
internationally.”130 These include ICPC’s 2022 Government Best Practices for Protecting and
Promoting Resilience of Submarine Telecommunications Cables.131 It recommends actions
governments can take to foster the deployment and protection of undersea telecommunications
cables and to maintain continuity of communications in the event of damage. The CSRIC
working groups urge the U.S. government to recognize of industry standards and best practices
for protecting cables, and to encourage use of these standards and best practices in the United
States and globally.
Policies to Protect Cables from Physical Damage
As companies and governments lay more undersea telecommunication cables and develop other
marine infrastructure (e.g., pipelines, power cables, offshore wind facilities), Congress may
consider policies to protect cables from physical damage. This section discusses select policies
and standards identified by the CSRIC working groups, the AEP report authors, and the ICPC that
Congress may consider if it addresses the physical vulnerabilities and protection of commercial
undersea telecommunication cables.
The CSRIC working groups recommended adoption or promotion of industry standards and best
practices for protecting cables from physical damage (e.g., protection of landing sites). The

128 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 9.
129 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, pp. 8-9. See also CSRIC V WG4A, p. 9. Stating “Elsewhere in the
world submarine cables and other marine infrastructure coexist quite well in close proximity due to a well-established
working relationship between industries, as well as the application of established industry recommendations and
guidelines, such as those of the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) and the European Subsea Cables
Association (formerly Subsea Cables UK).”; and 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, pp. 17-18.
130 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 17.
131 ICPC, “ICPC Best Practices,” (hereinafter referred to as ICPC Best Practices), November 18, 2022,
https://iscpc.org/publications/icpc-best-practices/.
Congressional Research Service

28

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

CSRIC working groups and AEP Team also discussed broader policies for protection, including
cable protection zones, minimum separation policies, and policies to ensure route diversification.
Policies to Protect Cable Landing Sites
In its 2016 report Clustering of Cables and Cable Landings, the CSRIC working group
recommended improving the physical protection of the undersea telecommunication cable
system. The group recommended limiting the number of cables per manhole to limit risks due to
proximity. It recommended hardening cable landing stations to protect against natural hazards and
man-made attacks and increasing surveillance to detect intrusions.132 The AEP report
recommended protecting manholes (e.g., welding manholes shut), burying cables, and securing
all structures housing network cabling.133 The report notes the difficulty in ensuring protection
policies in place in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, and recommends federal agency
coordination with the private sector in areas of jurisdictional overlap (e.g., landing stations and
where cables arrive on land).134
In cases where the FCC refers cable applications to the Committee, the Committee may impose
requirements to physically protect the cable and cable landing station from attacks or damage,
cybersecurity requirements, and reporting requirements. The FCC may reiterate some of those
requirements in its licensing agreement (e.g., location of specific infrastructure, system
interconnection documentation, access rights, equipment used in the cable system) to reduce the
risk of physical damage to cables.135 Thus, some cables landing in the United States are
scrutinized for physical and other security risks, but not all applications are referred or reviewed
in such detail—only those that pose a risk to U.S. national security. Thus, cables landing in the
United States may have varying security requirements and levels of protection.
Congress could direct an agency or interagency working group in consultation with industry, to
assess risks, develop standards and best practices, and require or encourage private sector owners
to adopt certain protection policies.136
Cable Protection Zones
In its 2016 report, Clustering of Cables and Cable Landings, the CSRIC working group
recommended that the FCC encourage development of cable protection zones around existing
undersea cables to protect communications infrastructure from other maritime activities.137
Australia and New Zealand, for example, use cable protection zones. In Australia, the government
designated the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), its communications
regulator, to serve as the single point of contact on cable issues, and authorized it to declare
protection zones for cables, and to prohibit or restrict activities within those zones that may

132 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, pp. 4-5.
133 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, p. 24.
134 2017 AEP Cable Threats Report, pp. 17-18.
135 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), “National Security Agreement,” December 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/
press-release/file/1457286/download. This is national security agreement between Edge Cable Holdings USA, LLC,
Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly known as Facebook, Inc.), on the one hand, and the DOJ, DHS, and DOD, collectively,
on the other.
136 As an example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), through a public-private collaborative approach,
developed guidance for pipeline owners and operators to enhance security of pipelines. See TSA, Pipeline Security
Guidelines, April 2021, https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/pipeline_security_guidelines.pdf.
137 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, p. 12.
Congressional Research Service

29

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

damage cables.138 The ACMA has declared three protection zones. Protection zones run through
state-controlled coastal waters, Australian-controlled territorial waters, and through its EEZ; the
protection zones are about two nautical miles wide, and run from the shore to 200 nautical miles
out or to the edge of the continental shelf, and are monitored.139 Further, certain Australian state
and territory laws do not apply in protection zones. Cable operators may deploy in protection
zones or in other areas that are not in protection zones.
In New Zealand, the Ministry of Transport is the administering agency for its Submarine Cables
and Pipelines Protection Act 1996.140 The act and pursuant regulations establish a framework for
cable protection and delineate agency roles in setting protection areas, patrolling protected areas,
investigating offenses, and prosecuting offenders.141 The protection zones can include an area in
the internal waters, territorial sea, or EEZ of New Zealand (with additional approvals from the
Ministry of Foreign Trade).142 Protection zones can be declared by the Governor-General, by
Order in Council,143 at the recommendation of the Transport Minister, who must consult with
persons or entities which the Minister considers would be affected by the order (no agencies are
named specifically). New Zealand has declared 10 protection zones. All anchoring and fishing are
banned in those areas.144 Commercial fishing and anchoring in a protected area are subject to a
fine of up to $100,000 (NZD) or about $60,000 (USD); non-commercial operators fishing or
anchoring in a protected area may be subject to a fine up to $20,000 (NZD) or about $12,000
(USD).145 Any person who damages a submarine cable or pipeline, “whether willfully or
negligently,” can be fined up to $250,000 (NZD) or about $150,000 (USD). Protection is the
responsibility of cable owners, but is also supported by government-designated protection officers
and maritime police.146 Thus, the New Zealand government creates protection areas, assists
private cable owners and operators by monitoring and appointing people (protection officers) to
monitor the security and enforcing protection laws, and imposes fines and penalties on offenders.
New Zealand also engages in education, integrating its information on cable protection zones into

138 Commonwealth Consolidated Acts (Australia), Telecommunications Act of 1997—Schedule 3A,
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ta1997214/sch3a.html; Parliament of Australia,
“Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Protection of Submarine Cables and Other Measures) Bill
2005,” August 23, 2005 (last recorded update), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/
Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r2323.
139 Motion by Mr. Entsch, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry, Tourism, and Resources,
“Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Protection of Submarine Cables and Other Measures) Bill
2005,” Second Reading, June 23, 2005, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/
Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r2323.
140 New Zealand Legislation, “Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1996,” https://www.legislation.govt.nz/
act/public/1996/0022/latest/DLM375803.html#DLM375855.
141 Ibid. See also, Ministry of Economic Development, “The Framework for Submarine Cable Protection in New
Zealand,” presentation to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Workshop and Information Sharing on Submarine
Cable Protection, Singapore, April 13, 2009, Agenda Item: 1, slides 5-7, http://mddb.apec.org/documents/2009/TEL/
TEL39-SPSG-WKSP/09_tel39_spsg_wksp_007rev3.pdf.
142 New Zealand Legislation, “Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1996,” Section 12,
https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0022/latest/DLM375803.html#DLM375855.
143 New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office, “New Zealand Legislation: Glossary,” https://www.legislation.govt.nz/
glossary.aspx.
144 New Zealand Legislation, “Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Order 2009,”
https://www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/public/2009/0041/latest/DLM1847701.html.
145 For more information on U.S. penalties, see “Penalties” section below.
146 New Zealand Ministry of Transport, “Protecting New Zealand’s Undersea Cables,” https://www.transport.govt.nz/
about-us/what-we-do/queries/protecting-new-zealands-undersea-cables/.
Congressional Research Service

30

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

maritime guidance, educational materials, and government websites—providing information on
protected areas, prohibited activities, and penalties.147
While protections limit activities that could damage cables, they may also limit other productive
activities in coastal waters and create added government responsibilities and costs.148 They may
also lead to clustering of cables, which could create security risks.149 Their implementation may
be challenging in some geographies where there is extensive maritime traffic, existing
infrastructure (e.g., power cables, wind farms), and other activities (e.g., fishing).150
Spatial Separation
With increased competition for ocean space, undersea telecommunication cable owners, as well
as other maritime industry actors, are interested in policies that protect their activities and
infrastructure and increased coordination between industries, agencies, and stakeholder groups.151
In its guidance Government Best Practices for Protecting and Promoting Resilience of Submarine
Telecommunications Cables, the ICPC writes,
Spatial separation of submarine cables from other marine activities is one of the effective
means of cable protection. It minimizes the risk of damage from other marine activities and
ensures that submarine cable operators have ready and unfettered access to their cables for
installation and maintenance needs and to minimize outage time in connection with a
repair. The oceans, however, are increasingly crowded spaces where ideal spatial
separation might not be possible, and where marine industries make compromises
regarding proximity while seeking to reduce risk through closer coordination and
communication.152
In its report Protection of Submarine Cables through Spatial Separation, a CSRIC working group
recommended the FCC endorse ICPC recommendations on spatial separation distances, share
spatial separation recommendations with other agencies, and urge agencies to adopt spatial
separation distances.153 The working group encouraged the FCC and cable owners to engage with
permitting agencies early in the cable planning process to increase awareness among all agencies
involved, and to discuss spatial distance requirements.

147 Stuart Kaye, “The Protection of Platforms, Pipelines and Submarine Cables Under Australian and New Zealand
Law,” in Maritime Security, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2009), p. 201. See also Maritime New Zealand, “Submarine Power and
Phone Cables—Boat Safety in NZ—Maritime New Zealand,” March 27, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
_6d-gdXnP-M. Example of information distributed by the government (Maritime New Zealand) and redistributed
through industry groups (Safer Boating NZ).
148 Commonwealth Consolidated Acts (Australia), Telecommunications Act of 1997—Schedule 3A,
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ta1997214/sch3a.html; Parliament of Australia,
“Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Protection of Submarine Cables and Other Measures) Bill
2005,” August 23, 2005 (last recorded update), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/
bd1314a/14bd046.
148 ACMA, “Submarine Cables,” https://www.acma.gov.au/submarine-cables.
149 ICPC Best Practices, p. 1.
150 Christian Bueger and Tobias Liebetrau, “Beyond Triple Invisibility: Do Submarine Data Cables Require Better
Security?” IPI Global Observatory (blog), September 15, 2021.
151 Letter from Merrick J. Burden, Executive Director, Pacific Fishery Management Council, to Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, January 7, 2022, https://www.pcouncil.org/documents/2022/01/january-2022-letter-to-boem-on-
offshore-wind-fisheries-mitigation-guidance.pdf/. The Pacific Fishery Management Council recommended
collaboration (or required coordination) between marine industries, agencies, and stakeholder groups to assess and
avoid any adverse impacts from energy projects on marine activities and habitats.
152 ICPC Best Practices, p. 3.
153 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, pp. 8-9.
Congressional Research Service

31

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Norwegian-based risk assessment and analytics firm DNV forecasts that there will be a nine-fold
increase in global demand for ocean space by the middle of the century, with offshore wind
installations expected to account for 82% of demand.154 DNV asserts that shallow, near-shore
waters will generally face more demand, and space requirements will need to be carefully
managed to allow for new uses (e.g., offshore energy, food production), while also protecting
existing infrastructure, industries, and marine ecosystems.155 DNV’s Director of Energy Transition
Outlook has asserted there is a role for government in marine spatial planning; the firm argues
that through “careful regulation” and “collaboration between agencies, industries, and countries,”
existing uses and habitats can be protected, while new uses, and potentially shared uses, can
emerge.156
While the ICPC identifies separation policies as an effective means to protect cables, other cable
stakeholders support industries are forging their own protection agreements which could be more
stringent than ICPC recommendations. A CSRIC working group, in its report on spatial
separation, urged the FCC and industry to promote the development and implementation of new
and innovative protection measures for undersea telecommunication cables, stating, “cable
protection is a complex undertaking that requires more than just a default separation distance
from other marine activities.”157 The report maintained that coordination and collaboration
between agencies and industries are essential to protecting cables at installation and after.
Route Redundancy and Diversification
Cable concentration may lead to “choke points” and increase the risk that a single attack,
accident, or natural hazard could affect multiple telecommunication providers simultaneously,
potentially disrupting or degrading communications for many users, including government users,
increasing national security risks.158 In its 2016, Final Report—Clustering of Cables and Cable
Landings, the CSRIC working group recommended interagency and inter-jurisdictional
cooperation to promote the diversification of undersea telecommunication cable routes, increase
redundancy, and avoid landing cables in only a few areas of the United States.
In a 2004 report, DHS found that the U.S. undersea telecommunication cable network had
diversification of routes and operators had built redundancies into their networks.159 In the United
States, where there are many cables and extended terrestrial networks, cable owners have many
choices of alternative or backup systems if their primary cables sustain damage, allowing for
traffic to be rerouted. Cable companies may design their cable systems to ensure that each node
on the network (i.e., each connection point) connects to at least two other nodes on the network,
offering opportunities to reroute traffic when necessary, and implement agreements with other
cable owners to transfer traffic between networks during outages.
This approach is said to have enhanced global resilience of the commercial undersea
telecommunication network, even though vulnerabilities persist. For example, service disruption

154 DNV, Ocean’s Future to 2050, December 16, 2021, Foreword, https://www.dnv.com/oceansfuture/.
155 Ibid, p. 6.
156 Sverre Alvik, “Offshore Wind Will Define the Race for Ocean Space,” Forbes, June 7, 2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sverrealvik/2022/06/07/offshore-wind-will-define-the-race-for-ocean-space/?sh=
3e36b4e57481. Sverre Alvik is DNV’s Director of Energy Transition Outlook.
157 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, p. 57.
158 CSRIC V WG4A Cable Clustering Report, p. 11.
159 DHS Protective Security Division, Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Infrastructure Category: Cable
Landing Stations, January 15, 2004, p. 2, https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-UCL-CV.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

32

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

due to the cable outage in Svalbard was avoided due to traffic being rerouted to a parallel cable,160
while the Tonga cable outage disrupted service for five weeks due to a lack of network
redundancy. There may be local vulnerabilities due to geographic clustering even where there is
network redundancy—the deliberate attack off the southern coast of France affected three
undersea cables systems and disrupted and degraded service for several hours.161
The ICPC says that operators design routes with redundancies in mind, but also notes that
operators design routes to follow the shortest viable route between landing points exhibiting the
lowest cost and risk to the cable, adjusting for technical, economic, and regulatory factors, as they
find necessary.162 It recommends that governments adopt and implement regulatory frameworks
to optimize routes and landings, and ensure routes and landings are geographically diverse.
The Maritime Awareness Project identifies challenges in routing that may affect geographic
diversity. They assert that the “lack of diversity is dictated by a variety of limitations, including
the cost and ease of permitting requirements, the topographic makeup of the seabed, the cost and
ease of laying cables, and protections for marine environments.”163 Others note that
diversification of routes and wide geographic distribution of cables may make monitoring and
repair difficult.164
If Congress is interested in increasing the geographic diversity of commercial undersea
telecommunication landing sites in the United States to improve network resilience and
redundancy it may consider assigning a federal agency the responsibility of conducting a risk
assessment to identify the most vulnerable areas or most vulnerable undersea telecommunication
cables. It may also consider whether an agency or agencies should support the development of
undersea telecommunication cable resiliency plans to ensure continuity of communications.
Anchoring and Fishing
Reportedly, the most frequent cause of cable damage is fishing and anchoring activities.165 While
fishing activities are associated with a higher incidence of cable damage, individual fishing
incidents often affect only a single cable, while less-frequent anchor damage due to dragging may
impact multiple cables and affect multiple telecommunication providers.166
Coordination between undersea telecommunication cable owners and the commercial fishing
industry does sometimes occur formally, and sometimes on an informal and ad hoc basis.167 Some
entities, such as the New England Fishery Management Council, have developed submarine cable
policies—best practices for protecting marine habitats, species, and fisheries from impacts of

160 Jason Rainbow, “Space Norway Plots Recovery Mission for Failed Subsea Cable,” Space News, January 13, 2022,
https://spacenews.com/space-norway-plots-recovery-mission-for-failed-subsea-cable/.
161 Zscaler, “European Cable Cut May Impact Transoceanic Routes,” posted October 19, 2022,
https://trust.zscaler.com/zscloud.net/posts/12256.
162 ICPC Best Practices, p. 7.
163 National Bureau of Asian Research, Maritime Awareness Project, “Submarine Cables: Background,”
https://www.nbr.org/publication/submarine-cables/.
164 Lieutenant Commander Peter Barker, “Undersea Cables and the Challenges of Protecting Seabed Lines of
Communication,” Center for International Maritime Security (blog), March 15, 2018, https://cimsec.org/undersea-
cables-challenges-protecting-seabed-lines-communication/
165 ICPC Best Practices, p. 1.
166 Mick Green et al., “Submarine Cable Network Security,” Presentation at Submarine Cable Protection Information
Sharing Workshop, Singapore, April 13, 2009, https://www.iscpc.org/documents/?id=138.
167 CSRIC V WG4A Interagency Report, p. 31. Discussing Fisherman/Cable Coordination Committees and
Agreements.
Congressional Research Service

33

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

cable installations.168 Others, such as the Oregon Fishermen’s Cable Committee developed an
agreement between Oregon commercial fishermen and fiber optic cable companies whereby the
fishermen agree to report any snags or damage to cables to the cable owner; in turn, cable owners
agree to release them from potential civil liability for any damage to cables for ordinary
negligence and compensate them for any gear lost in the process.169
Congress has taken action to protect cables from damage from anchors. In P.L. 117-263, Division
K, Congress authorized the Secretary of the federal agency in which the Coast Guard is operating
to create anchorage areas and required the protection of undersea cables be taken into account
when doing so. It prohibited vessels from anchoring in “near proximity” to an undersea pipeline
or cable, unless authorized by the Captain of the Port (a USCG officer).
Penalties
The authority and amount of current U.S. penalties for damaging an undersea telecommunication
cable were established in 1888.170 The law states that any person who “willfully and wrongfully”
breaks or injures a cable, or attempts to break a cable shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to imprisonment for up to two years or a fine not to exceed $5,000, or both (47 U.S.C.
§21). Those who, by “culpable negligence” break or damage an undersea telecommunication
cable in such a manner as to interrupt communications shall be liable to imprisonment for a term
not to exceed three months, or a fine not to exceed $500, or both (47 U.S.C. §22).171 There are
other rules and penalties adopted in 47 U.S.C. Chapter 2, pertaining to undersea cables, including
laws stipulating that these penalties shall not bar a suit for damages for breaking or injuring a
cable (47 U.S.C. §28), and that the master of an offending vessel is also liable to punishment (47
U.S.C. §29).172
Other countries have similar penalties in place as the 1884 convention encourages countries to
adopt in law penalties for damaging cables; some countries have further developed their penalties
for damaging cables and related enforcement. In Australia, damage to cables (willful or in
negligent conduct) is a criminal offense subject to a 10-year prison term and a fine.173 In 2021, the
Australian Federal Police charged the master of a container ship with dragging its cable and
damaging the Australia Singapore Cable, causing over $1 million (USD) in damages. In what is
reported to be the first prosecution of this offense, the captain was arrested and faced up to three

168 New England Fishery Management Council, Submarine Cables Policy, December 1, 2020,
https://d23h0vhsm26o6d.cloudfront.net/NEFMC-Submarine-Cables-Policy-1-Dec-2020_201221_095243.pdf.
169 Oregon Fishermen’s Cable Committee, “About OFCC,” http://www.ofcc.com/about_ofcc.htm.
170 47 U.S.C. Chapter 2.
171 In 47 U.S.C. §23, there is an exception, in that the penalties at 47 U.S.C. §21 and 47 U.S.C. §22 do not apply to a
person who breaks or injures a cable “in an effort to save the life or limb of himself or of any other person, or to save
his own or any other vessel” if reasonable precautions to avoid such cable breaking or injury.
172 47 U.S.C. §24 states that the master of any vessel laying cables and the master of any vessel interacting with a
cable-laying ship must adhere to certain requirements, including communication and distance requirements to avoid
collisions and disruption of cable-laying activities, and requirements to avoid buoys marking undersea cables; 47
U.S.C. §25 requires the master of any fishing vessel to keep implements and nets a certain distance from a vessel
engaged in laying or repairing a cable, and from buoys marking undersea cables; 47 U.S.C. §26 states that commanders
of warships may require exhibition of documents evidencing the nationality of offending vessels and make reports of
infractions imposed by the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, and 47 U.S.C. §27
imposes penalties on any person who has custody of such documents and refuses to exhibit them to an officer or a
vessel of war or other commissioned vessel.
173 ACMA, “Zone to Protect Perth Submarine Cables,” https://www.acma.gov.au/zone-protect-perth-submarine-cables.
Congressional Research Service

34

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

years in prison and a $40,000 (AU) or roughly a $29,000 (USD) fine.174 According to media
reports, prosecutors discontinued the case; the cable owner is pursuing recovery of costs due to
the damage.175 Some countries, including Sweden, require that if the owner of an undersea cable
or pipeline causes damage to another undersea cable or pipeline, the owner shall pay the cost of
repairing the damage.176
CSRIC asserts that the 135-year-old penalties for damaging undersea telecommunication cables
should be updated.177 The working group recommend steeper penalties to increase awareness and
attention to cables, deter damage, and support cooperative agreements with the fishing industry
for reporting, addressing damage, and compensating ship owners for any losses (e.g., cutting
away trawl gear to prevent further damage to cables).178
If Congress considers increasing penalties, it could weigh the benefit of increased fines as a
potential deterrent, and the impact of such penalties on the maritime and fishing industries, which
account for nearly 75% of the incidents of damage to cables. Further, it may consider whether to
distinguish intentional attacks on cables, like the incidents in France or potential cyberattacks,
from other incidents (e.g., fishing, anchoring) and how such offenses might be identified and
penalties enforced.
Conclusion
Commercial undersea cables are vital to U.S. communications (e.g., voice, data, internet), and
financial transactions. Increased data use by consumers, businesses, and government agencies,
has increased everyday reliance on undersea cables. Damage to cables could disrupt or degrade
communications, and threaten U.S. national security and economic interests. Recent incidents
have heightened awareness of cable importance and spurred calls for their increased protection.
Congress may seek to examine U.S. cable outages, and consider whether additional protection is
needed from the U.S. government, private sector owners, or through public-private coordination.

174 Australian Federal Police, “Ship Captain Charged Over Underwater Cable Damage off Perth,” press release, August
21, 2021, https://www.afp.gov.au/news-media/media-releases/ship-captain-charged-over-underwater-cable-damage-
perth.
175 Ry Crozier, “Ship Captain’s Case over Vocus Subsea Cable Cut ‘Discontinued,’” iTnews, May 17, 2023,
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/ship-captains-case-over-vocus-subsea-cable-cut-discontinued-595914.
176 ICPC Best Practices, p. 5.
177 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, pp. 45, 53.
178 CSRIC IV WG8 Spatial Separation Report, pp. 8, 54. (The report cited the Oregon Fisherman’s Cable Committee
Agreement among potential models for cable protection.)
Congressional Research Service

35

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Appendix. Federal Entities’ Roles in Permitting and
Review of Commercial Undersea Cables
This appendix discusses federal entities that are or may be involved in the permitting and review
of undersea telecommunication cable projects. It focuses on current federal entities’ roles and
U.S. laws and regulations pertaining to the installation of international commercial undersea
telecommunication cables landing in the United States (i.e., on U.S. land and within U.S.
territorial waters).
Depending on the specifics of the cable project and natural resources affected, multiple federal
agencies, acting under different statutes, and an executive branch committee may be involved in
the review and approval of an international commercial undersea cable landing in the United
States. There are the entities with permitting and review responsibilities that apply to undersea
telecommunication cable projects, which are the FCC and USACE; and those entities that may be
engaged in permitting and review depending on the specific impacts or location of the cable
project, which include NOAA and the Department of the Interior.
• Federal Entities with Permitting and Review Responsibilities that Apply to
Commercial Undersea Cables. Two agencies with relevant regulatory authority
are the FCC and USACE. Pursuant to a 2020 executive order, the FCC refers
certain FCC applications (e.g., FCC cable landing license applications) involving
foreign investment to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation
in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (referred to hereinafter
as “the Committee”). The Committee reviews undersea cable landing license
application for national security, law enforcement, and foreign policy concerns.
• Other Agencies That May Be Engaged Depending on Specific Impacts or
Location of the Cable Project. Other federal agencies may also be responsible
for implementing statutes addressing the impacts of activities, including undersea
telecommunication cables construction and operation, on sensitive environmental
areas. For example, NOAA may review the effects of proposed cables on marine
ecosystems and species in federally protected coastal areas. Other agencies may
be responsible for permitting projects on federal land. For example, the National
Park Service reviews projects, including undersea cable projects, seeking a right-
of-way to use land in a national park.
This appendix provides a brief introduction to the cross-cutting environmental documentation
required for federal agency actions pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42
U.S.C. §§4321-4335) before discussing the cable-relevant roles and authorities of the FCC, the
role of and the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services Sector in review of certain FCC applications and second, the
regulatory role of USACE for activities relevant to undersea cables. The third and fourth sections
discuss the roles of NOAA and Department of the Interior, respectively, as they may relate to
certain undersea cable activities are discussed. While a detailed discussion of state and local laws
and regulations that may relate to undersea cables is beyond the scope of this report and appendix
, the box titled “State and Local Regulation of Undersea Cables” provides an introduction to the
topic.
Congressional Research Service

36

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

National Environmental Policy Act
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, which was enacted in 1970 (P.L. 91-190), federal
agencies may be required to conduct an environmental review for actions they authorize. NEPA
requires agencies to consider the significant environmental consequences of their proposed
actions and inform the public about their decision-making. Under NEPA and its implementing
regulations, federal agencies must perform an environmental review for each proposed “major
federal action” over which a federal agency has some control or responsibility, such as when
issuing a license, permit, or other regulatory authorization, or providing funding. For more on
NEPA, see the box “Environmental Review Requirements and Agency Permitting.” This
appendix is focused primarily on the roles of the various federal entities, and does not provide
detailed descriptions of how the agencies comply with crosscutting federal requirements like
NEPA.179
Environmental Review Requirements and Agency Permitting
NEPA requires federal agencies to identify and consider the potential impacts of their proposed actions before
making a final decision about whether to proceed with the action or an alternative to it. During this identification
and consideration process, the agency is to consult with and obtain comment from other federal agencies that
have jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to the involved environmental impacts. Examples of laws
that may require consultation with other agencies or entities include the Endangered Species Act and the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, among others.
Federal agencies are required to develop procedures for their environmental review. In their NEPA regulations,
agencies may classify for the agency’s purpose certain types of projects as categorically excluded from requiring
either an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement. To make this classification, the agency
must determine that the activities associated with those types of projects are expected generally to have minimal
or no impact on the environment. Each federal agency is to integrate its procedures implementing NEPA into the
agency’s broader decision-making procedures. For more on how an agency may consult with other federal
agencies, see description of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Appendix.”
Federal Communications Commission180
Prior to 1954, entities interested in landing or operating an undersea cable in the United States
had to first obtain a license from the President of the United States. The Cable Landing License
Act of 1921 stipulated that “[no] person shall land or operate in the United States any submarine
cable directly or indirectly connecting the United States with any foreign country, or connecting
one portion of the United States with any other portion thereof, unless a written license to land or
operate such cable has been issued by the President of the United States.”181

179 This appendix also does not delve into the permitting and review effort for certain large, complex infrastructure
projects under Division D, Title XLI of P.L. 114-94, Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, which is referred to
as FAST-41. While certain broadband projects are eligible for participation in FAST-41, no “Offshore Broadband
Infrastructure” projects are listed among the FAST-41 covered projects (see Permitting Dashboard, FAST-41 Covered
Projects, at https://www.permits.performance.gov/projects/fast-41-covered). Participation in the FAST-41 program is
voluntary. FAST-41 does not alter any applicable statutory or regulatory requirement, environmental law, regulation, or
review process, or public involvement procedure. For more on implementation of FAST-41 and the associated Federal
Permitting Improvement Steering Council, see Permitting Dashboard, The Federal Permitting Improvement Steering
Council at https://www.permits.performance.gov/tools/federal-environmental-review-and-authorization-inventory.
180 This section was written by Patricia Moloney Figliola, Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy, and
Jill Gallagher, Analyst in Telecommunications Policy.
181 47 U.S.C. §34.
Congressional Research Service

37

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive Order (E.O.) 10530,182 which
delegated this authority to the FCC, among other things. Under E.O. 10530, the FCC has
authority to issue, withhold, or revoke licenses to land or operate commercial undersea
telecommunication cables in the United States, provided no such license shall be granted or
revoked by the FCC until obtaining approval of the Secretary of State and such advice from any
executive department the FCC deems necessary.183
Commercial undersea telecommunication cable owners may also need to obtain authority to
provide international telecommunication services, as required under Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (“Communications Act”).184 Further, cable owners
may need to report foreign ownership interests in undersea cables, as required under Section
310(b) of the act.185 Other FCC rules include notification and approval requirements for licensees
that are, or propose to become, affiliated with a foreign carrier.186 These requirements are
discussed in more detail below.
Cable Landing License Requirement
To land or operate a commercial undersea telecommunication cable in the United States, cable
owners must apply for and obtain an FCC cable landing license. The FCC adopted rules and
regulations related to the review of applications for cable landing licenses in 2001.187 The rules
specify—
• the information required to be in an application for a new license or the transfer
or assignment of an existing license;
• the entities that must be part of an application for a cable landing license;
• the procedures for processing applications, including eligibility for
“streamlined” processing;
• conditions imposed on each cable landing license; and
• reporting requirements that generally apply to licensees affiliated with a carrier
with market power in a country at the foreign end of the cable.
The Telecommunications and Analysis Division (TAD) of the FCC’s International Bureau issues
licenses to own and operate undersea telecommunication cables and landing stations in the United
States.188 The TAD also authorizes the modification or transfer of existing cable landing licenses.
Before granting an application, the FCC coordinates with the Department of State (DOS) and
other agencies, as needed.189 A license is required for an undersea telecommunication cable to
connect―
• the continental United States with any foreign country;

182 Executive Order 10530, “Providing for the Performance of Certain Functions Vested in or Subject to the Approval
of the President,” May 10, 1954, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10530.html.
183 Ibid.
184 47 U.S.C. §214.
185 47 U.S.C. §310(b).
186 47 C.F.R. §1.768.
187 47 C.F.R. §1.767.
188 FCC, “Submarine Cable Applications,” https://www.fcc.gov/submarine-cable-applications.
189 For an example of an FCC approval, see FCC, Public Notice (Report No. SCL-00266), March 27, 2020,
https://licensing.fcc.gov/ibfsweb/ib.page.FetchPN?report_key=2247086.
Congressional Research Service

38

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

• Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. territories or possessions with a foreign country, the
continental United States, or with each other; and
• points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession in
which the cable is laid within international waters.190
The requirements of the Cable Landing License Act of 1921 do not apply to cables (including
their terminals) lying wholly within the continental United States.191
Applicants must follow FCC requirements. Any entity that owns or controls a U.S. cable landing
station and all other entities owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and
using U.S. points of the cable system must be listed as applicants. Applicants must state whether
they plan to operate on a common carrier basis (e.g., carriers that provide public services or
services to all) or non-common carrier basis (e.g., carriers that provide private services to
businesses or government),192 which determines how the FCC regulates services and transfer of
licenses. Many commercial undersea telecommunication cable systems in the United States
operate on a non-common carrier basis, which allows them to sell capacity to private entities as
needed, and at varying prices.193 As of September 2021, there were 81 FCC-licensed undersea
cable systems.194
Section 214 Authorization to Provide International Service
If a licensee operates an undersea telecommunication cable system on a common carrier basis, it
must also obtain authority to provide international telecommunication services as required under
Section 214 of the Communications Act.195 To obtain this approval, the licensee must file an
International Section 214 Application with the FCC, as specified in the FCC’s rules.196 Further,
the licensee must obtain prior approval from the FCC before it can transfer control of or assign its
international Section 214 authorization or other regulated assets (such as customer accounts) to
another entity, including another authorized U.S.-international carrier.197
Applicants must include information demonstrating how the approval of the application would
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. They must also disclose ownership details,
including proposed changes in ownership and percentage of ownership, and affiliations with
foreign carriers, entities, or countries.198

190 47 U.S.C. §34.
191 Ibid.
192 Common carrier licensees provide public services, such as telephone services that connect with other telephone
networks; the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, requires, among other things, that telephone companies as
“common carriers” make their services available to the public at affordable rates. Non-common carrier services include
private services, or those intended for specific customers, such as businesses or police dispatch systems.
193 Andrew D. Lipman and Nguyen T. Vu, “Building a Submarine Cable: Navigating the Regulatory Waters of
Licensing and Permitting,” Submarine Telecoms Forum, March 2011.
194 FCC, “Submarine Cable Landing Licenses Granted,” https://www.fcc.gov/submarine-cable-landing-licenses-
granted.
195 47 U.S.C. §214.
196 47 C.F.R. §63.18.
197 47 C.F.R. §63.24.
198 47 C.F.R. §63.18.
Congressional Research Service

39

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Section 310(b) Foreign Ownership Reporting
Section 310(b) of the Communications Act requires the FCC to review foreign investment in
broadcast, common carrier, and aeronautical radio licensees.199 Section 310(b)(4) establishes a
25% benchmark for investment by foreign individuals, governments, and corporations in the
controlling U.S. parent of these licensees; Section 310(b)(3) limits foreign investment in the
licensee itself to 20%. Undersea cable licensees operating on a common carrier basis may file a
petition, pursuant to Section 310(b), requesting approval for increased indirect foreign ownership
of its licenses, which the FCC may grant, if it is in the public interest.
FCC Review Process
The FCC’s review and approval of cable landing license applications are shaped in part by a 1974
FCC determination. In 1974, the FCC determined that its action related to review and approval of
new undersea cable systems are categorically excluded from NEPA requirements to produce an
environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement.200 For more on NEPA, see the
text box in this report titled “Environmental Review Requirements and Agency Permitting.”
FCC does review license applications consistent with its statutes, and regulations adopted after a
public notice and comment period. The FCC’s rules for cable landing licenses provide for
“streamlined” processing for some applications; the rules require FCC action on an application to
be taken within 45 days of release of the public notice when the applicant can demonstrate
eligibility for streamlined processing.201 To qualify for the streamlined process, the applicant must
send copies of the application to the DOS,202 Department of Defense, and the Department of
Commerce (DOC). The FCC generally acts on applications ineligible for streamlining within 90
days of issuance of a public notice, granting approval, denial, or referral to executive agencies for
review.
The FCC consults with DOS as required for cable landing licenses, and with other relevant
executive branch agencies as necessary, to obtain their expertise in identifying and evaluating
issues of concern in landing station applications; Section 214 authorizations; and Section 310(d)
foreign ownership reporting documents.
Generally, when an applicant has a direct or indirect foreign investor with 10% or greater
ownership the FCC refers the applicant to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign
Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, previously referred to as
Team Telecom. For more about the Committee and its review, see the next section.

199 47 U.S.C. §310(b). Aeronautical Fixed Service is a radiocommunication service that enables communications and
transmittal of data between specified fixed points provided primarily for the safety of air navigation and for the regular,
efficient and economical operation of air transport. See 47 C.F.R. §2.1(c).
200 See 47 C.F.R. §§1.1301 et seq. The FCC’s NEPA regulations address “Actions which are categorically excluded
from environmental processing” (47 C.F.R. §1.1306) and “Actions that may have a significant environmental effect, for
which Environmental Assessments (EAs) must be prepared” (47 C.F.R. §1.1307). In a note at 47 C.F.R. §1.1306, the
FCC states that “[t]he provisions of §1.1307(a) and (b) of this part do not encompass the construction of new submarine
cable systems.”
201 47 C.F.R. §1.767(i).
202 DOS has authorized the FCC to act on applications when the FCC notifies it in writing of the filing of an application
and DOS does not object within 30 days of the notification. The FCC also coordinates with other executive branch
agencies on applications where a foreign citizen or foreign-organized entity, including a foreign government, would
hold a 10% or greater direct or indirect equity or voting interest in the licensee.
Congressional Research Service

40

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the
United States Telecommunications Services Sector
On April 4, 2020, President Trump issued E.O. 13913,203 which established the Committee for the
Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector,
formalizing and renaming the existing interagency Team Telecom review process, which had
operated in some form since 1997.204 The review process allows for review of applications that
have foreign ownership or investment interests before applicants are allowed to operate in the
United States. The FCC uses the recommendations from executive branch agencies to inform its
licensing decision, and to confirm its decisions are in the public interest—an FCC mandate under
the Communications Act.
E.O. 13913 defines the membership, retaining the existing executive branch agencies and
members (e.g., Attorney General, Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense), and allows
expansion of the Committee to include any executive branch agency head and an assistant to the
President, as the President may require. It designates national security, foreign policy, trade
policy, and economic agencies as “Advisors” to the Committee,205 which the DOJ asserts should
help the Committee’s recommendations reflect a balanced, coordinated review from executive
branch agencies.206 The Committee must conduct a review of new license applications referred to
it by the FCC. It may conduct a review of existing license applications, with the majority vote of
the Committee; if it conducts such a review, it must notify the Advisors. It requires the Committee
to review applications, and in most cases, make recommendations within 120 days, and no more
than 210 days, and stipulates the types of recommendations the Committee can make to the FCC
in response to referred applications.207
In September 2020, the FCC adopted rules codifying its review process and referral of
applications to the Committee, to align with E.O. 13913.208 In March 2021, the FCC proposed a
set of standardized national security and law enforcement questions related to reportable foreign
ownership that applicants would be required to answer as part of the application review process to
facilitate and expedite FCC and Executive Branch review of applicant documents.209
To protect U.S. interests, the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United
States Telecommunications Services Sector may recommend the applicant enter into a National
Security Agreement (NSA) with the U.S. government as a condition of licensing. NSAs define

203 Executive Office of the President, “Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the
United States Telecommunications Services Sector,” 85 Federal Register 19643-19650, April 4, 2020.
204 FCC, “Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market,” 62 Federal Register 64741-64759, December
9, 1997.
205 Advisors include the Secretaries of Commerce, State, and Treasury; Directors of National Intelligence, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the U.S. Trade Representative; the
Administrator of General Services; Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and for Economic Policy; and any other Assistant as determined by the President.
206 DOJ, “The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications
Services Sector,” December 30, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/committee-assessment-foreign-participation-united-
states-telecommunications-services-sector-0.
207 DOJ, “The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications
Services Sector—Frequently Asked Questions,” updated December 7, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/committee-
assessment-foreign-participation-united-states-telecommunications-services-sector-0.
208 FCC, “Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign
Ownership,” 85 Federal Register 76360-76387.
209 FCC, “International Bureau Seeks Comment on Standard Questions for Applicants Whose Applications Will Be
Referred to the Executive Branch for Review Due to Foreign Ownership,” 86 Federal Register 12312, March 3, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

41

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

terms and conditions of network operations (e.g., they may require a carrier to house customer
data within the United States, prohibit foreign government access to networks, and safeguard
network information). NSAs also provide the U.S. government with “robust rights of audit and
oversight, site visits, and the ability to demand documents.”210
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers211
Project developers, such as those proposing commercial undersea telecommunication cables,
generally must obtain a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) approval for such work in
regulated waters. USACE is not regulating the cable per se; it is regulating certain navigation
impacts, and dredging and filling impacts of the portion of the cable that fall within its permitting
authorities.
Installing undersea cables may require digging or drilling offshore to feed and guide the cable
underground, typically through a manhole or other conduit, underground, and into the ocean,
where cable companies bury the cables several feet below the seabed. Cable companies use ships
with trenching machines to dig a trench, lay the cable in the trench, and backfill the trench with
the displaced materials (e.g., fill materials). Federal statutes related to navigation and dredge and
fill materials require that USACE approve projects for constructing structures and performing
work in certain waters of the United States. The related USACE regulatory authorities are:
• Section 10 Obstruction to Navigation: USACE has regulatory responsibilities
pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. §403),
under which the agency authorizes structures and work in or affecting the course,
condition, or capacity of navigable waters; these waters extend from the mean
high-water line to three nautical miles from the shore.
• Limited Extension of Section 10 Obstruction to Navigation: USACE also has
responsibility for an extension of its Section 10 authority on the seabed of the
outer continental shelf (43 U.S.C. §1333(e)) for certain activities―artificial
islands, installations, and other devices.212 This extension results in the agency
regulating the navigation impacts of submerged telecommunication cables on the
seafloor of the outer continental shelf.
• Section 404 Dredge and Fill: USACE also has regulatory responsibilities
pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §1344), under which
the agency authorizes activities that may discharge dredge or fill material into
waters of the United States, including wetlands; this authority extends seaward to
the Clean Water Act’s three-nautical-mile limit of the territorial seas.213

210 Megan L. Brown, Nova Daly, Brandon Moss, “Companies Will Feel the Weight of Team Telecom,” Law360, June
4, 2018, https://www.law360.com/articles/1049718.
211 This section was written by Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, and Laura Gatz, Analyst in
Environmental Policy.
212 Examples of activities that may be subject to the extended Section 10 authority include submerged
telecommunication cables, submerged electric cables, offshore wind installations, offshore oil and gas platforms,
aquaculture, and artificial reefs. Beyond 12 nautical miles, the installation of undersea telecommunication cables by a
foreign entity on the outer continental shelf does not require a permit under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899 (email from USACE staff to CRS, January 10, 2022).
213 In addition to the bulleted authorities, USACE has other regulatory and approval authorities that in selected
circumstances may be relevant to undersea cables. USACE, with concurrence from the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, has regulatory responsibilities pursuant to the Section 103 of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act (33 U.S.C. §1413) to issue permits for the transportation of dredged material for ocean disposal. USACE also is
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

42

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

USACE Permits
If a proposed project falls under both Section 10 and Section 404, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) generally processes its regulatory responsibilities through a single action—one permit
that covers both authorities. A proposed project’s potential impacts determine whether a standard
individual permit or general permit from USACE is required.
• Standard individual permits are required when projects are expected to have
more than minimal individual or cumulative impacts; such projects require a
more comprehensive review.214
• General permits are “streamlined” authorizations issued on a national, regional,
or state basis to authorize categories of activities that are similar in nature and
will cause only minimal individual and cumulative impacts.215
While installation of some undersea cables may require a USACE standard individual permit,
other fiber-optic undersea cable projects may be able to proceed pursuant to a general permit.
Projects requiring standard individual permits are subject to public notice, public hearing, public
interest review, activity-specific environmental review, and case-by-case evaluation (including an
evaluation of alternatives).216 USACE develops a decision document, which may include
applicable evaluations and documents required for compliance with NEPA.217 The public interest
review involves an analysis of impacts (both benefits and detriments) on public interest factors,
such as economics, energy needs, general environmental concerns, water quality, wetlands, fish
and wildlife values, land use, floodplain values, and the “needs and welfare of the people.”218
USACE public interest review is limited to “navigation and national security” for installations on
the regulated seabed that are within land under a Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)
mineral lease.219 CRS did not locate additional documentation on how USACE evaluates national
security (e.g., what characteristics and components of an undersea cable would be considered in
the context of national security) during the agency’s public interest review specifically or in
implementing its permitting authorities more broadly.
For general permits, USACE completes the public notice and comments, public interest review
and activity-specific environmental reviews during the general permit decisionmaking process.
The general permits, once issued, essentially pre-authorize categories of activities. Some general

required by Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, as amended, to grant permission if a nonfederal entity is
interested in altering a USACE civil works project; this authority is also known as Section 408 based on its codification
at 33 U.S.C. §408. These additional authorities are not discussed further in this report due to the focus of the report on
the typical regulatory context for undersea telecommunication cables.
214 33 C.F.R. §323.2 (e)-(f); 33 C.F.R. §325.5.
215 33 U.S.C. §1344(e).
216 33 C.F.R. §325.2.
217 Ibid.
218 33 C.F.R. §320.4.
219 For installation on the regulated seabed that is within lands under a mineral lease from the Department of the
Interior (DOI)’s BOEM, USACE has established in its implementing regulations a special policy. The regulation (33
C.F.R. §322.5(f)) states that USACE’s decision will be made based on a more limited evaluation due to BOEM
conducting a more complete evaluation; in this circumstance, USACE will evaluate the impact of the proposed work on
“navigation and national security.” 33 C.F.R. §322.5 refers to the Minerals Management Service; the regulation was
published prior to the reorganization of that agency. BOEM is now the relevant agency for USACE special condition at
33 C.F.R. §322.5(f). USACE published the special policy in 1970 (35 Federal Register 79-81, January 3, 1970); a
similar limitation on USACE reviews for mineral-leased areas has been included in subsequent revisions to USACE
implementing regulations.
Congressional Research Service

43

link to page 49 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

permits require the project applicant to submit a pre-construction notification to give USACE the
opportunity to confirm that the activity will cause no more than minimal adverse environmental
effects. Examples of general permits that may be used for undersea cables include Nationwide
Permit 3 and Nationwide Permit 57. Nationwide Permit 3 authorizes certain maintenance
activities.220 Nationwide Permit 57 authorizes activities required for the construction,
maintenance, repair, and removal of electric utility lines, telecommunication lines, and associated
facilities in waters of the United States as long as the activity does not result in the loss of greater
than one-half acre of waters of the United States for each single and complete project.221
Selected Aspects of Permit Process and Applicable Requirements
In carrying out its regulatory authorities, USACE complies with applicable federal requirements.
USACE may establish special conditions to its permit or approval for a proposed activity to
ensure that the activity complies with federal law, including requirements under USACE’s
Section 10 and Section 404 permitting authorities. USACE conducts environmental reviews
required under the National Environmental Policy Act that inform its decisions on permitting.
(For more on NEPA, see the box titled “Environmental Review Requirements and Agency
Permitting.”) Special conditions may also correspond to federal environmental review and
consultation requirements established under other laws. For example, in addition to NEPA,222
prior to issuing a permit, USACE must ensure compliance with applicable requirements in
various other laws such as state water quality certification requirements under the Clean Water
Act (33 U.S.C. §1341), and the following acts (which are described in more detail under
“National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration”):
• Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544);
• Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C.
§§1801 et seq.); and
• Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA, 16 U.S.C. §§1451 et seq.).
The nature of USACE’s review for developing its permit decision may be in part shaped by the
specific area that is involved.223 For example, compliance with Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act is a function of the effects of the proposed project’s discharges into Section 404 regulated
waters (e.g., discharges into regulated waters from installation disturbances in the on-shore
landing portion of an undersea cable).

220 USACE reissued Nationwide Permit 3 in December 2021. See Department of the Army, USACE, “Reissuance and
Modification of Nationwide Permits,” 86 Federal Register 73522, December 27, 2021. See also USACE, Decision
Document: Nationwide Permit 3, December 2021, https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll7/
id/19768.
221 USACE promulgated Nationwide Permit 57 in January 2021. See Department of the Army, USACE, “Reissuance
and Modification of Nationwide Permits,” 86 Federal Register 2744, January 13, 2021. See also USACE, Decision
Document: Nationwide Permit 57, January 2021, https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll7/
id/16848.
222 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.
223 USACE does not generally require the government of a foreign nation or a corporation incorporated in a foreign
nation that is not incorporated in the United States to obtain a Section 10 permit for those portions of an undersea
telecommunication cable laid on the OCS seabed seaward of 12 nautical miles.
Congressional Research Service

44

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration224
Part of the mission of NOAA, an agency within the Department of Commerce, focuses on
conserving and managing coastal and marine ecosystems and resources. NOAA may become
engaged in aspects of undersea telecommunication cable installation and operation through a
number of laws administered primarily by two agency line offices―the National Ocean Service
(NOS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). NOAA may support the installation
and maintenance of undersea cables in other ways not discussed below as well, such as through
its navigational charting responsibilities.225
National Ocean Service
The National Ocean Service (NOS) provides data, tools, and services to support coastal
economies.226 NOS administers two laws that address aspects of commercial undersea
telecommunication installations and operations:
• National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA),227 and
• Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).228
The Secretary of Commerce has delegated most of the responsibilities under these two acts to
NOS. NMSA authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate and protect areas of marine
environments due to their “conservation, recreational, ecological, historical, scientific, cultural,
archeological, educational, or esthetic qualities” through a process described in statute and
regulations; these areas are typically referred to as marine sanctuaries.229 Under NMSA, a federal
agency proposing an action, including permits, licenses, or leases for private activities, that is
likely to “destroy, cause the loss of, or injure any sanctuary resource” must consult with the
Secretary of Commerce and provide the Secretary with a written statement about the action and
its potential effects.230
The Secretary of Commerce must recommend alternatives for the federal agency to take if the
Secretary finds that agency action is likely to destroy, cause the loss of, or injure a sanctuary
resource.231 The federal agency must then consult with the Secretary of Commerce on the
alternatives and may decide to implement them. If the federal agency does not implement the
alternatives and in turn causes the destruction of, loss of, or injury to a sanctuary resource, the
agency is required to prevent and mitigate further damage and restore and replace the sanctuary
resource. In addition, the Secretary of Commerce may issue special use permits to authorize
activities compatible with the sanctuary purposes and may assess and collect fees for the conduct

224 This section was written by Eva Lipiec, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy and Anthony Marshak, Analyst in
Natural Resources Policy.
225 NOAA, Office of Coast Survey, “Chart Source Data,” available at https://nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/learn/chart-
source-data.html.
226 NOAA, National Ocean Service, “About the National Ocean Service,” https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/about/.
227 16 U.S.C. §§1431–1445c.
228 16 U.S.C. §§1451–1466.
229 16 U.S.C. §1431(a)(2). Regulations implementing the National Marine Sanctuaries Act were promulgated in 15
C.F.R. §922. The NOAA Office of National Marine Sanctuaries manages a network of 15 national marine sanctuaries
and, in conjunction with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Papahānaumokuākea and Rose Atoll marine national
monuments. For more information, see https://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/ and the section “Marine National Monuments.”
230 16 U.S.C. §1434(d).
231 16 U.S.C. §1434(d)(2).
Congressional Research Service

45

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

of any activity under a special use permit,232 such as the continued presence of commercial
undersea cables in sanctuaries.233
CZMA establishes a national framework for coastal states and territories to manage coastal
resources under a coastal zone management program submitted to and approved by the Secretary
of Commerce.234 Once the Secretary approves a state’s management program, federal agencies
must ensure that their activities or issuance of licenses or permits for certain nonfederal activities,
within or affecting the coastal zone resources, are consistent with the management program’s
enforceable policies “to the maximum extent practicable.”235
For commercial undersea telecommunication cables, entities filing a cable landing license
application with FCC must certify whether the state in which the cable is to land requires that the
project comply with the approved state management program.236 If it does, the applicant is
required to coordinate with the state to affirm the project is consistent with the state’s program.
Upon documentation from the applicant or notification from the state that the license application
is consistent with the program, FCC can take action on the application. Federal statutes and
regulations also specify the ways the Secretary may in some cases mediate appeals and
disagreements between the state, federal agencies, and applicants.237
National Marine Fisheries Service
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is responsible for the stewardship of the nation’s
biological ocean resources.238 The Endangered Species Act (ESA),239 the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA),240 and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (MSA)241 may require federal agencies authorizing or funding the installation of commercial
undersea telecommunication cables to seek review by, consultation with, or permits from the
Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary has delegated these responsibilities to NMFS. That is, if
an agency, such as USACE, is considering issuing a permit that would allow cable laying, it
generally reviews the specifics of the portion of the cable project relevant to the permit to
determine whether its action requires review by or consultation with NMFS under these laws.
More information about ESA, MMPA, and MSA and their application and requirements is
provided below.

232 16 U.S.C. §1441.
233 16 U.S.C. §1434(d)(4).
234 16 U.S.C. §§1454-1455. The act defines “coastal state” to include states bordering on “the Atlantic, Pacific, or
Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or more of the Great Lakes.” 16 U.S.C. §1453(4). The
definition also explicitly includes as coastal states Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, and American Samoa. 16 U.S.C. §1453(4). The
discussion of CZMA in this report uses “state” as a term inclusive of these states and territories.
235 16 U.S.C. §1456(c).
236 47 C.F.R. §1.767(a)(10) See Note specifying compliance with CZMA.
237 16 U.S.C. §§1456(h) and 1465, and 15 C.F.R. Part 930.
238 NMFS is also known as NOAA Fisheries. NOAA Fisheries, “About Us,” https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/about-us.
239 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq. The requirement to consult with NMFS or the FWS is found at 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2). For
more about the Endangered Species Act, see CRS Report R46677, The Endangered Species Act: Overview and
Implementation, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and Erin H. Ward.
240 16 U.S.C. §§1361 et seq.
241 16 U.S.C. §§1801 et seq.
Congressional Research Service

46

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Endangered Species Act242
Federal agencies generally must consult with NMFS for marine and anadromous species and
FWS for terrestrial, catadromous, and freshwater species if their activities or projects may affect
threatened or endangered species listed under ESA or their designated critical habitat.243
Specifically, Section 7 of ESA requires certain federal agencies (referred to as “action agencies”)
to ensure actions they undertake, authorize, or fund are not likely to jeopardize threatened or
endangered species (i.e., listed species) or adversely modify designated critical habitat for listed
species.244
To satisfy this mandate, Section 7 generally requires action agencies to consult with either FWS
or NMFS (together, the Services), as applicable, when the action agencies’ proposed actions may
affect listed species or critical habitat.245 Section 7 and its implementing regulations outline
procedures for this consultation process.246 This multistep process, referred to as Section 7
consultation, is generally used to evaluate the effects of agency actions on listed species and
critical habitat and to consider reasonable and prudent alternatives to minimize those effects, as
needed.247 Unless the Services and action agency determine that the action is not likely to
adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, the process generally concludes with the
Services’ opinion on the effects of the action (referred to as a biological opinion or BiOp).248 If
the BiOp concludes that the action is not likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify
critical habitat, or the Services identify reasonable and prudent alternatives that would avoid such
harm, the BiOp includes an incidental take statement.249 The incidental take statement allows the
action agency and any associated nonfederal entities to take certain actions that affect listed
species without violating the prohibitions of ESA.
Actions subject to Section 7 may include infrastructure projects, such as the installation of
undersea telecommunication cables, undertaken by action agencies or by nonfederal entities with
federal authorization (e.g., permits, contracts) or funding. Agencies may be required to consult
with NMFS if the installation of a cable that they are carrying out, authorizing, or funding would
likely affect listed marine species. For example, USACE consults with NMFS to inform its final
permitting decision.
In the event a nonfederal entity seeking to install and maintain a commercial undersea cable does
not require any federal authorization or funding for the project, the entity may have to obtain an
incidental take permit (ITP) under Section 10 of ESA if the installation or maintenance of the

242 This section is adapted from CRS Report R46867, Endangered Species Act (ESA) Section 7 Consultation and
Infrastructure Projects, by Erin H. Ward and Pervaze A. Sheikh; and CRS Report R46677, The Endangered Species
Act: Overview and Implementation, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and Erin H. Ward. See also 16 U.S.C. §1536.
243 Fish are catadromous if they are born in salt water, migrate to fresh water to mature, and then migrate back to salt
water to spawn. For example, the American eel (Anguilla rostrate) can be catadromous, though the species also can
remain in marine or brackish water during maturation. Fish are anadromous if they spend most of their lives in salt
water and then swim up a river to spawn. Young anadromous fish hatch and then swim downstream to grow to
adulthood in the ocean. For example, most salmon and some sturgeon species are anadromous.
244 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
245 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
246 See generally 16 U.S.C. §1536 and 50 C.F.R. Part 402.
247 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)-(c).
248 16 U.S.C. §1536(b).
249 16 U.S.C. §1536(b)(4). For ESA, the term take is broadly defined as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct” (16 U.S.C. §1532(19)).
Congressional Research Service

47

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

undersea cable may result in the incidental take of listed species.250 To obtain an ITP, the
nonfederal entity must submit a permit application and a habitat conservation plan (HCP).251 HCP
describes the anticipated effects of the nonfederal applicant’s action on listed species, as well as
the steps to be taken to minimize and mitigate that impact, funding for the mitigation, alternatives
that were considered and rejected, and any other measures the Services may require.252 HCPs also
must comply with other policies by including biological goals and outcomes for the species
covered by HCP, adaptive management provisions, monitoring protocols, permit duration, and
public participation in the process.253
Once the permit application and draft HCP are completed, they generally are submitted to the
Services along with an implementation agreement. The Services evaluate the permit application
(including HCP) and determines if it meets and abides by the criteria specified under ESA. Since
the Services consider the issuance of an ITP a federal action, FWS or NMFS must complete an
intra-Service consultation subject to Section 7 and issue a BiOp assessing the effects of an ITP on
the listed species and critical habitat before they may issue an ITP.254
Marine Mammal Protection Act
MMPA prohibits the take of all species of marine mammals by any person unless exempted by
MMPA or authorized under a permit issued by NMFS or FWS.255 MMPA allows the Secretary of
Commerce to permit, for periods of up to five years, the incidental take of certain marine
mammals that occurs during otherwise lawful activities (e.g., approved laying of undersea cables)
if it finds that the total take during that time is expected to have a negligible impact on the
affected species (or stock), and the total take is expected to not have an unmitigable adverse
impact on the availability of the species (or stock) for subsistence purposes.256 After receiving an
application for a permit, the Secretary of Commerce publishes a notice in the Federal Register
and can either issue a permit with terms and conditions or deny issuance.257 A permit issuance or
denial are both eligible for judicial review. For actions that may result in the take of marine
mammals listed as endangered or threatened species, the applicant must obtain permits under both
ESA and MMPA.

250 16 U.S.C. §1539.
251 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2).
252 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2).
253 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2).
254 FWS and NOAA, Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing, FWS and NOAA
Handbook, December 21, 2016, pp. 3-27, https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCP_Handbook.pdf.
255 Marine mammal is defined as “any mammal which (A) is morphologically adapted to the marine environment
(including sea otters and members of the orders Sirenia, Pinnipedia, and Cetacea), or (B) primarily inhabits the marine
environment (such as the polar bear); and, for the purposes of this chapter, includes any part of any such marine
mammal, including its raw, dressed, or dyed fur or skin” (16 U.S.C. §1362(6)). For the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, the term take is broadly defined as “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill” (16
U.S.C. §1362(13)). NMFS is responsible for regulating whales, dolphins, porpoises, seals, and sea lions under the
MMPA. FWS is responsible for regulating walruses, manatees, sea otters, and polar bears. For an example of a take
related to undersea cables, see National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Takes of Marine Mammals
Incidental to Specified Activities; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Conducting Subsea Cable Operations and
Maintenance Activities in the Arctic Ocean,” 82 Federal Register 22099-22117, May 12, 2017.
256 16 U.S.C. §§1371(a)(5) and 1374, and 50 C.F.R. Part 216.
257 16 U.S.C. §1373(d).
Congressional Research Service

48

link to page 54 link to page 54 link to page 54 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Under MSA, federal agencies must assess and consult with the Secretary of Commerce on any
action or proposed action that a federal agency authorizes, funds, or undertakes to determine
whether it may adversely affect essential fish habitat,258 such as laying and maintaining undersea
cables.259 Essential fish habitat areas are identified and refined by regional fishery management
councils in coordination with NOAA. During consultation, the Secretary works with the federal
agency, or in some cases a state agency, to identify ways to avoid, minimize, mitigate, and offset
any impacts from the proposed action through essential fish habitat conservation
recommendations.260 The federal agency must respond to the recommendations, and explain its
actions if it decides to not implement the recommendations.261
Marine National Monuments
NOAA, together with FWS, administers marine national monuments.262 The proclamation
creating each monument, as well as any implementing federal regulations or monument
management plan, govern which activities are prohibited, permitted, and exempted from
permitting.263 The agencies may issue permits for permissible uses within the marine national
monument. The installation and maintenance of undersea cables within a particular marine
national monument may be prohibited, permitted, or exempt from permitting requirements. To the
extent a permit is required for such activities, the responsible party would have to obtain a permit
from the agencies and comply with its terms. For more about permitting in national monuments,
see the “U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service” section below.
In some cases, a refuge in the National Wildlife Refuge System (see “U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service”) may overlap with or fall within the boundaries of a marine national monument and be
subject to additional restrictions or regulations. For marine national monuments, the proclamation
may limit or preclude FWS and other federal agencies from permitting activities they could
otherwise authorize. For example, two of the three units of the Marianas Trench Marine National
Monument (MTMNM)—the Trench Unit and Volcanic Unit—have also been designated as
national wildlife refuges and are managed as components of the National Wildlife Refuge
System.264 Pursuant to the proclamation that created the MTMNM, the Secretaries of the Interior
and Commerce “shall not allow or permit any appropriation, injury, destruction or removal of any
feature of this monument except as provided for by this proclamation or as otherwise provided by

258 The term essential fish habitat is defined as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding,
feeding, or growth to maturity” (16 U.S.C. §1802(10)).
259 16 U.S.C. §1855(b) and 50 C.F.R. Part 600, Subpart K.
260 16 U.S.C. §1855(b)(4)(A) and 50 C.F.R. Part 600, Subpart K.
261 16 U.S.C. §1855(b)(4)(B) and 50 C.F.R. §600.920(k).
262 The Antiquities Act (54 U.S.C. 320301-320303) authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal
lands that contain historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, or other objects of historic or scientific
interest. For more about national monuments, see CRS Report R41330, National Monuments and the Antiquities Act,
by Carol Hardy Vincent. For more about the existing marine monuments, see FWS, “Marine National Monument,” at
https://www.fws.gov/glossary/marine-national-monument.
263 Presidential Proclamation 9496, September 15, 2021; Presidential Proclamation 8335, January 6, 2009; Presidential
Proclamation 8336, January 6, 2009; Presidential Proclamation 8337, January 6, 2009; 50 C.F.R. Part 404; 50 C.F.R.
Part 665, Subparts G, H, I.
264 The Trench Unit is also the Mariana Trench National Wildlife Refuge and the Volcanic Unit is also the Mariana Arc
of Fire National Wildlife Refuge. For more information, see https://www.fws.gov/national-monument/marianas-trench-
marine.
Congressional Research Service

49

link to page 51 link to page 51 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

law.”265 Further, the Secretaries are to provide “monitoring and enforcement necessary to ensure
that scientific exploration and research, tourism, and recreational and commercial activities do not
degrade the monument’s coral reef ecosystem or related marine resources or species or diminish
the monument’s natural character.”266
Department of the Interior
Agencies within the Department of the Interior (DOI) have authority to grant certain rights-of-
way and permits for activities on the federal lands they manage, including submerged lands. In
particular, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service (NPS), both within
DOI, manage coastal and ocean protected areas within the National Wildlife Refuge System and
the National Park System, respectively. FWS also administers ESA, together with NMFS, as
described above. BOEM, also within DOI, regulates undersea power transmission cables. BOEM
may coordinate with other agencies and undersea telecommunication cable owners—for example,
to avoid siting conflicts between energy and telecommunication cables—or may direct offshore
wind developers to do so.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service267
FWS is dedicated to the conservation, protection, and enhancement of fish, wildlife, and plants,
and their habitats. FWS is involved with undersea cables through the ESA (see “Endangered
Species Act” above) and when cables traverse marine national wildlife refuges.268 FWS manages
the National Wildlife Refuge System in accordance with its statutory mission “to administer a
national network of lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate,
restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for
the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.”269 Of approximately 560 national
wildlife refuges in the System, 180 are ocean or coastal refuges.270
Entities may lay undersea cables within these refuges provided they receive a permit from FWS.
The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act gives FWS two sources of authority to
issue such permits. First, FWS may “permit the use of any area within the System for any
purpose, including but not limited to hunting, fishing, public recreation and accommodation, and
access whenever he determines that such uses are compatible with the major purposes for which

265 U.S. President (George W. Bush), Proclamation 8335 of January 12, 2009, “Establishment of the Marianas Trench
Marine National Monument,” 74 Federal Register 1557-1563, January 12, 2009. Hereinafter, Proclamation 8335.
266 Proclamation 8335.
267 This section was written by Pervaze A. Sheikh, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy and Erin H. Ward,
Legislative Attorney.
268 FWS also administers the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA; 16 U.S.C. §3501 et seq.), which restricts federal
financial support in some coastal locations. These restrictions could potentially influence cable owners’ siting of some
new undersea telecommunication cables infrastructure such as cables funded through federal grants, such as the Middle
Mile Grant Program, funded under Title IV, Section 60401 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).
Under CBRA, “no new expenditures or new financial assistance may be made available under authority of any Federal
law for any purpose” within coastal areas designated as System Units, with few statutory exceptions. System Units
encompass nearly 1.4 million acres of land and associated aquatic habitat. For more information, see FWS, “Coastal
Barrier Resources Act,” https://www.fws.gov/program/coastal-barrier-resources-act; for System Unit maps, see FWS
“Coastal Barrier Resources Act: Overview,” https://www.fws.gov/program/coastal-barrier-resources-act/maps-and-
data.
269 16 U.S.C. §668dd(a).
270 FWS, “Marine Areas, Islands, and Coasts,” https://www.fws.gov/story/marine-areas-islands-and-coasts. See also
map of Wildlife Refuge Systems, available at https://www.fws.gov/media/map-national-wildlife-refuge-system.
Congressional Research Service

50

link to page 53 Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

such areas were established.”271 Second, FWS may allow the use of or grant easements in, over,
across, upon, through or under any areas within the System for purposes such as laying power
lines and telephone lines, among others, provided such uses are compatible with the refuge’s
purpose.272
A criterion for issuing a permit under either authority is that that activity be compatible with the
purposes of refuge; this criterion is assessed through a compatibility determination. Regulations
state that a compatible use is any use that, “based on sound professional judgment, will not
materially interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of the National Wildlife Refuge System
mission” or contradict the purposes for which the individual refuge was created.273 Typically, each
refuge manager is responsible for determining compatible uses within individual refuges. If the
relevant refuge manager determines that undersea cables are compatible with the refuge’s
purpose, they may issue a right-of-way permit to allow the cable to be laid.274
In some cases, a refuge in the National Wildlife Refuge System (see “U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS)”) may overlap with or fall within the boundaries of a marine national monument
and be subject to additional restrictions or regulations. If any undersea cables were proposed to be
laid within these national refuges, FWS would have to consider not only each refuge’s purpose
but also whether the cables might degrade the monument’s ecosystem or related resources, or
otherwise diminish its character, before issuing any right-of-way permit. For more on the overlap
with marine national monuments, see “Marine National Monuments.”
National Park Service (NPS)275
NPS manages more than 80 National Park System units that include ocean, coastal, or Great
Lakes areas within their boundaries.276 In some instances, undersea telecommunication cables
could potentially cross through NPS-administered areas.277 Provisions of law at 54 U.S.C.
§100902 authorize the Secretary of the Interior to grant rights-of-way through NPS units for
public utilities and power and communication facilities, including “poles and lines for
communication purposes.”278 A right-of-way granted under this section must be found to be “not
incompatible with the public interest.”279 NPS policies further state that, before granting a
telecommunication right-of-way, the agency must find that the proposed use “will not cause
unacceptable impacts on park resources, values, or purposes.”280 In addition to a right-of-way for

271 16 U.S.C. §668dd(d)(1)(A).
272 16 U.S.C. §668dd(d)(1)(B).
273 50 C.F.R. §29.21. To the extent there are any conflicts between the mission of the System and the purpose of the
refuge, priority is given to activities consistent with the refuge’s purpose. 16 U.S.C. §688dd(a)(4)(D).
274 Before a right-of-way permit is issued, FWS may conduct an environmental assessment that evaluates the effects of
FWS issuing a right-of-way permit for a proposed undersea cable under NEPA (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.).
275 This section was written by Laura B. Comay, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy.
276 NPS, “Ocean and Coastal Resources,” https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1439/oceans.htm. (According to the agency, some
2.5 million acres of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes areas lie within national park boundaries.)
277 For example, see URS Alaska, LLC, TERRA Southwest Broadband Telecommunications Project, April 2011, p. I-
13, https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/alaska-eis.pdf.
278 54 U.S.C. §100902(b)(1).
279 54 U.S.C. §100902(b)(3).
280 NPS, Management Policies 2006, Section 8.6.4.2, https://www.nps.gov/subjects/policy/upload/MP_2006.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

51

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

passage through NPS areas, an undersea cable might require a special use permit from NPS to
authorize construction and installation activities.281
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management282
BOEM administers offshore energy development on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS), under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.283 BOEM regulates energy-related infrastructure
on the OCS, including undersea power transmission cables (e.g., for electricity generated from
offshore wind), but does not have a permitting role for undersea telecommunication cables.284
BOEM may coordinate with other agencies, or direct offshore energy developers to coordinate
with agencies or telecommunication cable owners, to avoid siting conflicts between energy

Author Information

Jill C. Gallagher, Coordinator
Caitlin Keating-Bitonti
Analyst in Telecommunications Policy
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy

Nicole T. Carter, Coordinator
Eva Lipiec
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy

Laura B. Comay
Pervaze A. Sheikh
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Patricia Moloney Figliola
Erin H. Ward
Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications
Legislative Attorney
Policy

Laura Gatz

Specialist in Environmental Policy

281 CRS communication with NPS Office of Legislative and Congressional Affairs, December 22, 2021. NPS policies
on special use permits are contained in NPS Director’s Order 53, “Special Park Uses,” https://www.nps.gov/policy/
DOrders/DO53.htm; and related reference manuals are available at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/policy/upload/RM-
53_amended.pdf and https://www.nps.gov/subjects/policy/upload/RM-53B.pdf. The latter reference manual, NPS
Reference Manual 53B, states on p. 21: “If any new infrastructure is to be built, it is usually appropriate in any of these
cases to simultaneously issue two separate permits: a short-term SUP [special use permit] for construction and
installation and a ROW permit for operation and maintenance. The construction SUP (36 C.F.R. 5.7) includes any
terms and conditions specific to construction, and may authorize the use of additional park lands only needed during
the construction phase. The construction permit may have a term of several years to include enough time to fully
restore and revegetate the area.”
282 This section was written by Laura B. Comay, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy.
283 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356b. The federal submerged lands of the outer continental shelf in most cases extend from 3
nautical miles (nm) to 200 nm offshore; submerged lands within 3 nm are state-owned.
284 CRS communication with BOEM Office of Congressional Affairs, December 22, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

52

Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R47648 · VERSION 2 · NEW
53