Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: The Decline in Assistance Receipt Among Eligible Individuals

April 10, 2023 R47503

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families:
The Decline in Assistance Receipt Among
Eligible Individuals
April 10, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47503

TANF: Decline in Assistance Receipt Among Eligible Individuals

R47503
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: The April 10, 2023
Decline in Assistance Receipt Among Eligible
Gene Falk
Individuals
Specialist in Social Policy

The decline in the number of people receiving family cash assistance is a distinctive
characteristic of the period after enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, 1996 welfare reform law; P.L. 104-193). In 1994, before
PRWORA’s enactment, the number of cash assistance recipients reached its historical peak: an estimated 18.0 million people
(children, parents) received assistance at some point in that year. In 2018, an estimated 3.8 million people received assistance
during the year.
PRWORA ended Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and associated programs and folded the funding into a
new, broad-purpose Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. Created in the wake of historically high
levels of family cash assistance receipt, one of the statutory goals of TANF is to “end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits, through work, job preparation, and marriage.”
Figure S.1 shows estimates of the number of people eligible for family cash assistance, number of people who received it,
and receipt rate of the assistance among eligible people for 1994 through 2018, a time period that included three economic
expansions and two recessions. It shows fluctuations in the number of people eligible for family cash assistance associated
with the state of the economy over the years, and an almost continuous decline in the number of people receiving such
assistance. The receipt rate among eligible individuals declined from 79% in 1994 to 26% in 2018.
Figure S.1. Estimated Numbers of People Eligible for and Receiving Family Cash Assistance, and
Receipt Rate: 1994-2018

Source: CRS, based on data from the TRIM3 microsimulation model, primarily funded by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and maintained at the Urban Institute.

In the recessionary period associated with the 2008 global financial crisis, the estimated number of people eligible for
assistance almost reached pre-PRWORA levels. However, the number of people receiving assistance remained well below
pre-PRWORA levels. The increase in the number of people receiving assistance was about 30% of the increase in the number
of eligible individuals.
State level differences in the provision of family cash assistance have existed since the beginnings of these programs.
However, a series of federal administrative actions, legislation, and Supreme Court decisions resulted in AFDC family cash
assistance becoming an entitlement to individuals—persons eligible based on state rules had legal protections of an
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entitlement to a benefit. PRWORA ended that entitlement, and gave states additional flexibility to set the terms of cash
assistance receipt.
Figure S.2 shows estimates of the change in the receipt rate of family cash assistance among eligible individuals by state. (It
uses three-year averages to make state-level estimates more reliable.) It shows that the estimated receipt rate declined in all
50 states and the District of Columbia. Further, it shows that the decline in the receipt rate varied by state, and that the 2016-
2018 range of receipt rates was comparably larger than the 1994-1996 range. For 2016-2018, receipt rates were below 10% in
seven jurisdictions and above 50% in four jurisdictions.
Figure 1.S. 2. Receipt Rates Among Eligible Individuals by State:
Three-Year Average for 1994-1996 Compared with 2016-2018
(states ranked in order of 1994-1996 receipt rates)

Source: CRS, based on data from the TRIM3 microsimulation model, primarily funded by HHS and maintained at the Urban
Institute.

TANF gives states incentives to reduce the number of people receiving benefits and flexibilities to act on those incentives.
Lower levels of family cash assistance receipt was an objective of TANF’s designers, and it has been met. TANF also has a
statutory goal to “provide assistance to needy families so that children can live in their own homes or the homes of relatives,”
with the legislative history of PRWORA characterizing that assistance as “temporary and provisional.” However, many
people eligible for assistance—in many states, most eligible people—do not receive assistance at all, even on a temporary
basis.
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Introduction
The decline in the number of families and individuals receiving family cash assistance is a
distinctive characteristic of the period after enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193, PRWORA, also referred to as the 1996
welfare reform law). PRWORA ended Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a
program that provided dedicated funding for cash assistance to needy families with children. The
law folded funding for such assistance into a newly created, broad-purpose Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. The TANF block grant helps fund state-designed and
state-run family cash assistance programs for needy families with children, but states may also
use their funds for a wide range of benefits and services to address both the effects and root
causes of childhood economic disadvantage.1
Family cash assistance, sometimes called welfare, is generally a benefit of last resort and
provided only to families with very low or no cash income. Historically, family cash assistance
was most often provided to families headed by a single mother, though in the post-PRWORA
period an increased share of families receiving cash assistance represent those with nonparent
relatives (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles).
In 1994, before PRWORA’s enactment, the number of cash assistance recipients reached its
historical peak. An estimated 18.0 million people (including children, parents, and nonparent
caretakers) received assistance at some point in that year. In 2018, an estimated 3.8 million
received assistance during the year. Research has found that this reduction resulted from both
faster exits from state assistance programs and fewer entries into them.2
Previous CRS reports have examined the decline in the cash assistance caseload, putting it in the
context of the estimated number of people eligible for assistance both pre- and post-PRWORA.3
In 2018, the 3.8 million people who were estimated to receive benefits at some point in that year
represented 26% of the estimated 14.3 million who were eligible for family cash assistance in that
year. This report extends previous CRS analyses in two main ways. It examines
 the number of people eligible for and receiving assistance in each year from 1994
to 2018, highlighting the variation in the trends that are the result of cycles of
economic growth and recession during this period; and
 the variation by state in the rate at which eligible individuals received benefits,
and how this has changed from the mid-1990s.
This analysis is based on estimates from the Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic
Supplements (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Transfer Income Model
version 3 (TRIM3).4 TRIM3 is funded primarily by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and maintained at the Urban Institute. For more technical details, see the

1 For background on TANF, see CRS In Focus IF10036, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block
Grant.
2 For example, see Jeffrey J. Grogger, Steven J. Haider, and Jacob Klerman, “Why Did the Welfare Rolls Fall during
the 1990s?,” American Economic Review Paper and Proceedings, vol. 93, no. 2 (2003), pp. 288-292.
3 For the most recent analysis, see CRS Report R44724, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Size of the
Population Eligible for and Receiving Cash Assistance.
4 The ASEC is a survey of the noninstitutionalized population in the 50 states and District of Columbia. It does not
survey people in the territories. Hence, this report does not include estimates of family cash assistance eligibility or
receipt in the three territories that operate TANF programs (Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
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Appendix. The analysis shows eligibility and receipt through 2018. Comparable data are not
available for the recent period that included the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout.
Differing Rates of Receipt Among Need-Tested
Programs
All major need-tested programs have receipt rates of less than 100%. Benefit receipt among
eligible individuals is not automatic. Typically, an individual must apply for benefits and provide
a government agency with information about their finances, family structure, and sometimes
other circumstances. That information is taken in by the administering agency and then initial
eligibility is determined and benefits authorized. This process usually must be repeated
periodically as eligibility and benefits are recertified. Additionally, some programs might
condition eligibility on certain behaviors, such as work or participation in job preparation
activities. Recipients may be required to document such activity.
Economists have described an eligible individual’s decision to receive benefits as one that weighs
the costs versus the gains of that benefit receipt.5 That is, does the benefit provided by a program
outweigh the administrative burden (i.e., costs) of completing the application, certification, and
recertification processes and remaining in and proving compliance with program rules?
Additionally, lack of information, stigmas related to benefit receipt, and other factors may be
important for influencing program participation.
Different programs have different receipt rates.6 Medicaid and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP), as well as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),
tend to have comparatively high receipt rates: an estimated 75% of those eligible for
Medicaid/CHIP and 63% of those eligible for SNAP in 2018. Medicaid and SNAP are entitlement
programs, with those eligible for benefits being entitled to them, and have no explicit caps in
federal funding of them.
Other programs, such as child care subsidies from the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF)
and housing subsidies, tend to have comparably low receipt rates among those eligible: 15% and
22%, respectively, in 2018. In addition to eligible individuals’ choices in taking up benefits, the
nature of federal funding also affects receipt rates, as some programs (including CCDF and
housing subsidies) receive capped federal funding and sometimes have waiting lists for those
eligible to receive benefits.
The 26% receipt rate among those eligible for family cash assistance under TANF tends to be on
the low end of the range of rates for need-tested programs. It has also declined from the receipt
rate for family cash assistance from AFDC before the enactment of PRWORA. In 1994, the
receipt rate among eligible individuals for AFDC was 79%.

5 For example, see the discussion in Wonsik Ko and Robert A. Moffitt, “Take-Up of Social Benefits,” NBER Working
Paper 30148, June 2022.
6 The comparison of the family cash assistance receipt rate with that of other programs can be found in Suzanne
Macartney and Robin Ghertner, Participation in the U.S. Social Safety Net: Coverage of Low-Income Families, Office
of the Assistance Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, November
2021, https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/9e9000cb7b1e4e30c2e616e547ed9bd9/program-eligibility-
participation-brief-december-2021.pdf. That report also discusses some of the reasons for the differing receipt rates
among programs. The 28% receipt rate for TANF shown in that report is based on the average monthly number of
individuals eligible and receiving benefits. It differs from the 26% shown in this report, based on the number of
individuals ever eligible and ever receiving benefits during the year.
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PRWORA Ends AFDC and Creates TANF
The modern form of family cash assistance has its origins in the early 1900s, with state and
locally run mother’s pensions programs that provided aid to single mothers, usually widows. The
Social Security Act of 1935—enacted in the midst of the Great Depression—provided federal
funding for state family cash assistance by creating the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
program, later renamed AFDC. AFDC’s stated purpose was to provide aid to mothers of children
whose family had lost the support of the father because of death, disability, or absence, so that the
mother could stay at home and rear her children.7 Family cash assistance was seen at the time as a
way to keep children in their homes, and an alternative to placing children in institutional foster
care.
AFDC provided dedicated federal funding for cash assistance for needy families and was
eventually considered an entitlement to individuals who were eligible for benefits under state-
determined rules. The entitlement meant that those eligible had a legal right to AFDC benefits,
and that procedural due process was required to terminate them.8 Funding was provided on an
open-ended, unlimited basis. That is, the federal government reimbursed states for a share of their
expenditures on AFDC family cash assistance without limit.9
Support for the original view that single mothers should be permitted to stay home and out of the
workforce eroded by the 1960s.10 AFDC raised concerns that providing assistance without work
reduced work effort and led to more children raised outside of married couple families. Research
generally found that the pre-PRWORA system of need-tested aid did reduce work, but its impact
on family composition was less clear.11 Research also found that while many AFDC families
received benefits for a short period of time (e.g., less than one year), some who received
assistance did so for long periods of time.12

7 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security, which proposed the original social security
bill, said:
The very phrases “mothers’ aid” and “mothers’ pensions” place an emphasis equivalent to
misconstruction of the intention of these laws. These are not primarily aids to mothers but defense
measures for children. They are designed to release from the wage-earning role the person whose
natural function is to give her children the physical and affectionate guardianship necessary not
alone to keep them from falling into social misfortune, but more affirmatively to rear them into
citizens capable of contributing to society.
Report of the Committee on Economic Security to the President, transmitted to the President on January 15,
1935.
8 This was the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 62 U.S. (1970). The Court held that a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing was required before benefits could be terminated.
9 Prior to the enactment of PRWORA, states were reimbursed at the Medicaid matching rate (or Federal Medical
Assistance Percentage [FMAP]) for AFDC family cash assistance expenditures. Before the enactment of Medicaid in
1965, and prior to state implementation of Medicaid, there was no overall cap on expenditures but states were
reimbursed at a rate for each family receiving assistance; thus, there was a per-family cap on federal funding for AFDC
cash assistance.
10 For a discussion of views associated with AFDC, particularly from the 1960s to the early 1990s, see Steven M. Teles,
Whose Welfare? (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998).
11 Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 30
(March 1992), pp. 1-61.
12 The literature on how long AFDC was received is summarized in CRS Report 94-539 EPW, Welfare: A Review of
Studies About Time Spent on Welfare, December 16, 1994 (available to congressional clients from the author upon
request).
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Daniel Patrick Moynihan—a Department of Labor official during the Johnson Administration, an
advisor to President Nixon, and later a U.S. Senator—argued that family cash assistance was
about dependence, as distinguished from poverty.13 Throughout the four-decade debate, the issue
of dependence on assistance was raised and the term was used often—though it was rarely
precisely defined. Historically, the number of people and families receiving assistance was
viewed as the preeminent indicator of dependence, though mere receipt of benefits might not
capture all that is meant or implied by the term.14
Proposals to end AFDC and replace it with a new system of family support were debated over
four decades from the 1960s to the mid-1990s. A first set of proposals was presented in the 1960s
during the first large increase in the number of families receiving AFDC assistance in the late
1960s and into the early 1970s.15 These proposals were not enacted.
PWRORA was enacted in 1996 following then-candidate Bill Clinton’s promise during the 1992
presidential campaign to “end welfare as we know it.” That campaign occurred as the number of
families receiving AFDC was increasing again, eventually reaching its all-time high in 1994.16 It
was the record number of families receiving AFDC in 1994 that helped set the stage for the 1995
and 1996 debates that led to the enactment of PRWORA.
In creating TANF, PWRORA ended dedicated and open-ended funding for family cash assistance,
ended the entitlement of individuals to it, and time-limited family cash assistance from federal
funds to 60 months for families with a head of household receiving benefits. The law also revised

13 According to Moynihan:
The issue of welfare is the issue of dependency. It is different from poverty. To be poor is an
objective condition; to be dependent, a subjective one as well. That the two circumstances interact
is evident enough, and it is no secret that they are frequently combined. Yet a distinction must be
made. Being poor is often associated with considerable personal qualities; being dependent rarely
so. This is not to say that dependent people are not brave, resourceful, admirable, but simply that
their situation is never enviable and rarely admired. It is an incomplete state in life: normal in a
child, abnormal in an adult.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income. The Nixon Administration and the Family
Assistance Plan (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 17. Note that Moynihan goes on to say that if
American society valued child rearing as an economic activity, the receipt of welfare might not imply
dependency.
14 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Indicators of Welfare Dependence and Well-Being, Interim Report
to Congress, October 1996, pp. I-2. The Welfare Indicators Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-432) required HHS to develop
“indicators of the rate at which and, to the extent feasible, the degree to which, families depend on income from welfare
programs and the duration of welfare receipt.” The report cited above operationalized dependence as incorporating the
degree of reliance on means-tested benefits, the duration of receipt, and the behavior of the recipient.
15 For the trends in the number of families receiving cash assistance from July 1959 forward, see CRS Report
RL32760, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked
Questions.
16 The first rise in the number of families receiving assistance in the 1960s and early 1970s has been attributed, at least
partially, to an increase in the receipt rate among those eligible for AFDC. The estimate of this increase in AFDC
receipt rates comes from TRIM3’s predecessor, TRIM2. See Patricia Ruggles and Richard C. Michel, Participation
Rates in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program: Trends for 1967 through 1984, Urban Institute, April
1987. The increase in the number of families receiving assistance in the 1988-1994 period was not, in large part,
attributed to increases in the AFDC receipt, but to both demographic and economic factors. See Janice Peskin,
Forecasting AFDC Caseloads, With an Emphasis on Economic Factors, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), CBO
Staff Memorandum, July 1993, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/103rd-congress-1993-1994/reports/
1993_07_forecasting.pdf. See also CRS Report 93-7, Demographic Trends Affecting Aid to Families with Dependent
(AFDC) Caseload Growth, Thomas Gage, December 9, 1992 (available to congressional clients upon request); and
Rebecca M. Blank, “What Causes Public Assistance Caseloads to Grow?,” The Journal of Human Resources, vol. 36,
no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 96-118.
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the rules relating to work and participation in job preparation activities, altering requirements on
states with respect to work participation, including allowing states to either partially or fully meet
their work participation requirement through reducing the number of families receiving assistance
(a caseload reduction credit against the state’s work standard).17 PRWORA also altered work
participation requirements that apply to individuals, including allowing states to end benefits
entirely to a family (rather than reducing benefits) if an individual in it refused to comply with the
requirements.
A statutory goal of TANF is to “end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage.”18 Another of TANF’s statutory goals, though,
harkened back to the original goal of family cash assistance: “provide assistance to needy families
so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives.”19
Declines in the Receipt Rate Among Individuals
Eligible for Family Cash Assistance
The estimates of the number of people eligible for family cash assistance are based on those in
families
 that meet family composition requirements (i.e., having a child); and
 have their incomes fall below state-specified income eligibility thresholds, and if
applicable in their state, have estimated countable assets below a state-specified
threshold.20
Figure 2 shows the estimated numbers of people eligible for and receiving assistance (left panel),
as well as the receipt rate among those eligible (right panel), for each year from 1994 to 2018.
The span from 1994 to 2018 covers three periods of economic growth and two recessions. As
noted previously, the number of people receiving family cash assistance was at its all-time high in
1994.
The figure shows a general pattern of fluctuation in the number of people eligible for family cash
assistance, associated with the differences in the state of the national economy over the years. It
also shows an almost continuous decline in the number of people actually receiving benefits.
Thus, the receipt rate among those eligible generally declined since 1994.
Particularly notable is the period of recession associated with the 2008 global financial crisis (the
Great Recession). The number of people eligible for family cash assistance increased, almost
reaching pre-PRWORA levels. The number of people receiving family cash assistance also
increased, but that increase was a fraction (about 30%) of the increase in the number of eligible
people in this period. In 2009, the number of people eligible for assistance but not receiving it

17 The TANF caseload reduction credit provides a state with a 1 percentage point reduction of the work standard for
each percent decline in families receiving assistance since FY2005 that is not attributable to policy change.
18 Section 401(a)(2) of the Social Security Act.
19 Section 401(a)(1) of the Social Security Act.
20 Under TANF, the estimate of those eligible includes a downward adjustment for the number of families that
exceeded the time limit. It does not, however, make ineligible families that have been sanctioned off the assistance
program because of failure to comply with various TANF requirements, including its work and participation
requirements Such individuals would be considered eligible in these estimates because they met family compositional
and state-determined tests of financial need.
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was at its highest level for the 1994-2018 period. In that year, 14.7 million individuals were in
families estimated to be eligible for assistance but did not receive it.
During the long period of economic growth that began in 2009, the numbers of people eligible for
and receiving assistance declined. The receipt rate also declined during this period, albeit at a
slower rate than during the previous economic expansions. By 2018, the receipt rate had fallen to
26%—and the number of people eligible for assistance at some point in the year but not receiving
it totaled 10.5 million.21
Figure 2. Estimated Numbers of People Eligible For and Receiving Family Cash
Assistance, and Receipt Rate: 1994-2018

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the TRIM3 microsimulation model.
Comparable information is not available for the recent period that included the economic effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the number of people receiving cash assistance did not
increase during 2020 or 2021.
State Variations in Assistance Receipt Rates Among
Eligible Individuals
The only federal eligibility rules for TANF-funded family cash assistance are that there be a child
present in the family and that the state apply a test of financial need to the family to qualify it for
benefits. Other rules, including the specific test of financial need, are determined by the states.

21 A study that used similar methods and data as this report used methods to measure the relative contribution of
changes in (1) participation; (2) need; and (3) declining benefit levels to the total decline in receipt of family cash
assistance. It found that declining participation explained 52% of the total decline in receipt of family cash assistance,
with a reduction in need explaining 21% and declining benefit levels explaining 27%. See Zachary Parolin,
“Decomposing the Decline of Cash Assistance in the United States, 1993 to 2016,” Demography, vol. 58, no. 3 (April
21, 2021), pp. 1119-1141.
Earlier research on the decline in cash assistance focused on the relative contribution of the economy versus policy
changes. This is summarized in James P. Ziliak, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, University of Kentucky
Center for Poverty Research, Research Discussion Paper Series, 119, September 2015, https://uknowledge.uky.edu/
ukcpr_papers/119/.
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States also set additional conditions for receipt of benefits, such as the work requirements that
apply to individuals and the sanctions for failure to comply with them.
Figure 3 shows the receipt rate among those eligible for family cash assistance for the 50 states
and District of Columbia. The figure shows states ranked from the highest to the lowest
percentage of receipt among eligible individuals. It shows this percentage for the three-year
average from 2016 to 2018.
A three-year average is used to provide more reliable estimates of the TANF receipt rate at the
state level than is possible with a single year’s data. The sampling error associated with these
estimates is larger in small population jurisdictions than in states with larger populations even
with three years of data. Additionally, some of the simplifying assumptions needed to model
eligibility and receipt might affect some states more than others.
The figure shows that the estimated rate of receipt among eligible individuals was over 50% in
four jurisdictions: California, the District of Columbia, New York, and Oregon. The estimated
rate was below 10% in seven states: Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Wyoming.
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Figure 3. Estimated TANF Receipt Rates Among
Eligible Individuals by State: Three-Year Average, 2016-2018

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the TRIM3 microsimulation model.
Notes: Estimates for larger population states tends to be more reliable than those for the smaller states.
States’ Benefit Amounts Influence Assistance Receipt Rates
In addition to determining eligibility thresholds for family cash assistance, states also determine
the amount of benefits a family is eligible to receive. The benefit amounts vary by state.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the estimated receipt rate among people eligible for
family cash assistance and the TANF maximum benefit for a family of two. It is based on the
three-year average from 2016 to 2018. The dashed line in the figure summarizes the statistical
relationship between the receipt rate and maximum benefit. It shows, with a few exceptions, that
states with lower maximum benefits tend to have lower receipt rates, and those with higher
maximum benefits tend to have higher receipt rates. This suggests that in lower benefit states,
families are more likely to consider that the costs of applying for and continuing to receive
assistance outweighs the economic benefit of doing so. Conversely, in higher benefit states the
higher benefits counter-balance the costs of applying for and receiving benefits. However, at
higher benefit amounts there are larger differences among the states in receipt rates. The variation
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in benefit amounts is associated with some – but not all – of the variation in the rate at which
eligible individuals receive benefits.22
Figure 4. Relationship Between States’ Maximum Benefit Levels and the Rate at
Which Eligible Individuals Receive Assistance
Receipt Rates and Maximum Benefits Are Averages for 2016 to 2018

Source: CRS analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the TRIM3 microsimulation model.
Differences by State in Declining Receipt Rates Among Eligible
Individuals
The intent of the 1935 legislation to permit single mothers to stay out of the workforce to raise
their children clashed with the reality that many single mothers did work, even at that time. This
was particularly true for African-American women.23 That goal was met with resistance in some
states. Multiple states, particularly in the South, adopted policies barring aid to certain families:
those with children born out of wedlock and households where a man was present. Some states

22 The correlation coefficient between the family assistance receipt rate among eligible individuals and the maximum
TANF benefit for a family of two is 0.44. Little research has been conducted on the differences across states in the
reduction in families receiving assistance compared to the amount conducted on explaining the reduction over time
nationally. See Andrea Hetling, Jinwoo Kwon, and Correne Saunders, “The Relationship Between State Welfare Rules
and Economic Disconnection among Low-Income Single Mothers,” Social Services Review, December 2015, pp. 653-
685; and Julia Shu-Huah Wang, “State TANF Time Limit and Work Sanction Stringencies and Long-Term Trajectories
of Welfare Use, Labor Supply, and Income,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues, vol. 42 (2021), pp. 650-96.
23 Claudia Goldin, “Female Labor Force Participation: The Origin of Black and White Differences, 1870 and 1880,”
Journal of Economic History, vol. 37, no. 1 (1977).
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also adopted so-called “farm policies,” requiring able-bodied mothers and children over a certain
(state-defined) age to work in seasonal agricultural employment.24
A series of federal administrative, legislative, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions ended some of
the state practices that removed families from cash assistance.25 On the eve of PRWORA’s
enactment, family cash assistance was generally considered an entitlement to individuals—those
persons eligible based on state rules had legal protections of an entitlement to a benefit.
Figure 5 compares the family cash assistance receipt rates among eligible recipients pre- and
post-PRWORA by comparing three-year averages for 1994 to 1996 and 2016 to 2018. The receipt
rate declined in all jurisdictions. 26
Before PRWORA, there was variation in the AFDC receipt rates among the states. However, the
range of these rates was narrower under AFDC than under TANF. In the three years from 1994 to
1996, estimated receipt rates varied by 33 percentage points between the state with the highest
rate and the state with the lowest. This compares with the 2016-2018 range of 58 percentage
points between the state with the highest rate and the state with the lowest.
Some states that had relatively high receipt rates among eligible individuals in 1994-1996
experienced some of the largest declines in rates since then. Michigan’s receipt rate in 2016-2018
was 77 percentage points lower than it was in 1994-1996. In 1994-1996, it was ranked at the top,
with an estimated receipt rate among eligible individuals at 93%. In 2016, it had a receipt rate of
16%, dropping it to the middle of the receipt rate distribution among the states (see Figure 3).

24 See Winifred Bell, Aid to Dependent Children (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965) for a
discussion of these policies. The book focuses on the “suitable home” requirement that made ineligible for benefits
families with children born out-of-wedlock. In terms of the disproportionate impact on African-American families, Bell
reports that when Louisiana adopted a “suitable home” requirement barring families with children born out-of-wedlock
in 1960, 95% of the children affected were African American. This compares with 66% of all children in families
receiving assistance being African-American.
25 A summary of these changes can be found in Irene Lurie, “Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program
Since 1935,” Cornell Law Review, vol. 59, no. 5 (June 1974).
26 As discussed in a previous section of this report, three-year averages are used to provide more reliable estimates of
receipt rates at the state level than is possible with a single year’s data. The sampling error associated with these
estimates is larger in small population jurisdictions than in states with larger populations even with three years of data.
Additionally, some of the simplifying assumptions needed to model eligibility and receipt might affect some states
more than others and more than the national estimates.
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Figure 5. Receipt Rates Among Eligible Individuals by State:
Three-Year Average for 1994-1996 Compared with 2016-2018
(states ranked in the order of their 1994-1996 receipt rates)

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the TRIM3 microsimulation model.
Policy Implications
TANF policy currently gives states incentives to reduce the number of people receiving
assistance, whether or not they improve the financial circumstances of individuals who meet the
eligibility criteria for family cash assistance. TANF also affords states the flexibility to act on
these incentives.
TANF’s incentives to reduce the number of families receiving assistance include the following:
 The ability to use savings from fewer families receiving assistance to fund a
wide range of other activities. In FY2021, basic assistance accounted for 22.6%
of all TANF and MOE funds used; this was a decline from 70.7% of AFDC and
related spending used for basic assistance in FY1995. Much of the remainder of
TANF and MOE funding was spent on a wide range of activities, such as child
care, pre-Kindergarten services, and services for families where children are at
risk of removal from their homes because of neglect or abuse. These activities
also served a broader range of families than did family cash assistance.
 Permitting states to meet their work requirement through fewer families
receiving assistance. For FY2020, 26 states achieved their main work
requirement solely through reducing the number of families receiving
assistance.27 They did not need to engage a single work-eligible member of a

27 These 26 states had experienced a decline of 50% or more in the number of families receiving assistance, fully
reducing the statutory all-family participation standard from 50% to 0%. Note that the 26 states do not include those
that achieved the full 50% credit with the help of the excess MOE portion of the caseload reduction credit. Under a
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family receiving assistance in either work or job preparation to meet their
standard.
Is TANF Meeting Its Goals?
TANF’s statute explicitly defines its overall purpose as “increasing state flexibility” to meet four
goals. One of the goals is ending dependence on assistance; another is providing assistance so that
children may remain in their homes.28 The tension between these two goals has played out
differently in different states, though in all states the number of families receiving assistance and
the receipt rate among individuals eligible for TANF was lower in 2018 than in 1994.
The creators of TANF envisioned a reduced role for family cash assistance. As noted above, one
of TANF’s statutory goals is to “end dependence on government benefits.” Additionally, a
committee report that is part of TANF’s legislative history, supporting the idea that a state could
meet its work requirements through fewer people receiving family cash assistance, said:
This provision, in effect, provides States with the ability, and in fact the incentive, to do
away with the concept of measuring participation rates, (which is by and large a “process”
measurement), and move toward having their performance based on a true outcome—a
reduction in welfare dependency, a goal in which no one can argue.29
The decline in the number of families receiving assistance after PRWORA was used repeatedly as
an indicator of the success of that law.30 However, over time, there was an increase in receipt of
need-tested aid from programs other than family cash assistance. CRS estimates that in 2017,
57% of children were in families that received some form of need-tested aid (commonly, medical
care from Medicaid or the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, nutrition assistance from
SNAP, or refundable tax credits).31 Of children receiving benefits, 38 million out of 42 million
were in families with an adult worker. The high rate of receipt of need-tested benefits, though not
family cash assistance, by families with children raises questions about whether or not the goal of
ending dependence on government benefits is being achieved. It also points to the vague nature of
the term dependence, as much of the help received supplements earnings.
Another statutory goal of TANF is to provide assistance to needy families. The legislative history
of TANF includes the following statement:
Destroying the narcotic effect of welfare while preserving its function as a safety net for
families experiencing temporary financial problems is the major intent of the Committee

provision in regulation, states may count as caseload reduction those families who receive assistance funded by state
dollars above what states are required to spend under the TANF MOE requirement. Data separating caseload reduction
from the excess MOE portion of the credit were obtained by CRS from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS).
28 The third and fourth statutory goals are to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and to
encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families; §401(a) of the Social Security Act.
29 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, Welfare Reform Consolidation Act of
1995, Report together with Minority and Dissenting Views to Accompany H.R. 999, 104th Cong., 1st sess., March 10,
1995, H.Rept. 104-75, Part I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), p. 45.
30 See, for example, U.S. President (Clinton), “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1990, p. 112; U.S. President
(Clinton), “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, January 19,1999,” Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1999, p. 62; and U.S. President (Clinton), “Address Before a
Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 27, 2000,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: William J. Clinton, 2000, p. 129.
31 For more information, see CRS Report R46823, Need-Tested Benefits: Who Receives Assistance?
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bill. Based on the fact that it is precisely the permanent guarantee of benefits that induces
dependency, the Committee fundamentally alters the nature of the AFDC program by
making its benefits temporary and provisional.32
However, many people eligible for assistance—in many states, most eligible people—do not
receive assistance at all, even on a temporary basis.
The Broader Context Related to Child Poverty
There is a broader context for the diminished role of family cash assistance. In 1994, the child
poverty rate, when measured inclusive of taxes and noncash benefits and anchored to a fixed
standard of living, was 25%.33 In 2009, when the gap between the number of people eligible for
family cash assistance and those receiving it was at its greatest, the child poverty rate was
16.5%—still below the 1994 rate. In 2018 (the last year for which data are shown in this report),
the child poverty rate inclusive of noncash benefits and taxes was 13%—half the 1994 rate. The
decline in absolute child poverty may address one potential concern regarding the decline in
family cash assistance, though other concerns have also been raised.
The Shift Away from Ongoing Cash Assistance
Both before and after enactment of PRWORA, a series of legislative changes transformed need-
tested aid for families with children. These changes expanded benefits mostly for families with
children and working adults. Need-tested benefits have a comparatively large role in reducing
child poverty relative to other demographic groups, with much of that reduction occurring among
families with earnings.34 The biggest impacts come from noncash benefits (particularly nutrition
assistance) and the refundable tax credits. The refundable tax credits—the Earned Income Tax
Credit and the Child Tax Credit—are explicitly tied to earnings. Though they are cash benefits,
the tax credits are not paid on an ongoing basis during the year; instead, they are received the
following year in a lump sum when federal income tax returns are filed.
The 2018 child poverty rate of 13% is based on an income concept that counts—in a manner
equivalent to ongoing cash—the refundable tax credits (that would actually be paid in 2019) as
well as noncash benefits. These two forms of benefits play different roles in family budgets than
ongoing cash benefits. Families have less flexibility in the use of these benefits than they do in
the use of ongoing cash income. Because the refundable tax credits are paid in a lump sum once a
year, they may not be timed to maintain incomes when needs occur. Noncash benefits such as
SNAP might be available to address those needs, but only partially because they can only be used
to purchase certain items.

32 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Welfare Transformation Act of 1995, Report together with
Dissenting Views to accompany H.R. 1157, 104th Cong., 1st sess., March 15, 1195, p. 6.
33 The child poverty rates in this section use estimates of historical child poverty using the concepts of the
Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) from Chris Wimer, Liana Fox, Irwin Garfinkel, Neeraj Kaushal, Jennifer Laird,
Jaehyun Nam, Laura Nolan, Jessica Pac, and Jane Waldfogel, “Historical Supplemental Poverty Measure Data 1967-
2020,” Center on Poverty and Social Policy, Columbia University, 2022, https://www.povertycenter.columbia.edu.
They use the anchored SPM, which bases the poverty thresholds in 2012 and then adjusts them for inflation in prior
and subsequent years using the Consumer Price Index Retroactive Series (R-CPI-U-RS). For a discussion of the SPM,
see CRS Report R45031, The Supplemental Poverty Measure: Its Core Concepts, Development, and Use. While the
Official Poverty Measure takes into account several cash benefits, the SPM additionally takes into account a number of
tax and noncash benefits.
34 For more information, see CRS Report R46825, Need-Tested Benefits: Impact of Assistance on Poverty Experienced
by Low-Income Families and Individuals; and CRS Report R46922, Need-Tested Benefits: Children and Poverty.
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Responding to Recessions
Typically during economic recessions, income from work falls as unemployment increases. Some
programs usually respond to aggregate changes in earnings, as more people become eligible for
benefits and receive them. Examples of such programs include unemployment insurance and
SNAP.35 Trends in receipt of family cash assistance have not always tracked economic cycles,
even under AFDC, but the caseload rise that occurred from 1989 through 1994 was in part
attributable to the 1990-1991 recession.
As noted previously, during the Great Recession there was an increase in the number of people
receiving benefits, but that was only a fraction of the increase in the number of people who were
eligible for family cash assistance. This led to the peak of 14.7 million people eligible but not
receiving benefits in 2009, compared with 6.1 million people receiving family cash assistance at
some time during that year. Yet in 2009, the absolute child poverty rate (inclusive of noncash
benefits and taxes) was 16.5%—still below the 1994 rate.
Congress and the President responded to the Great Recession with temporary legislative
enhancements to existing programs, including changes targeted to the low-income population.
Provisions were added to unemployment insurance to give states incentives to expand eligibility
for benefits for workers who otherwise would not have been eligible for them.36 SNAP benefits
were increased by 15%.37 This approach offset, at least partially, the reduced role of TANF
assistance in maintaining incomes for families with children. TANF itself was provided extra
funding to respond to the recession. A temporary $5 billion fund was established that helped
finance the increase in family cash assistance, but it was also used to pay TANF emergency short-
term assistance as well as subsidized employment. The substantial ad-hoc legislative response to
the economic downturn raises the question of how families with children would fare, given the
lower post-PRWORA receipt rates of family cash assistance, should Congress’s response to a
future economic downturn not include similar temporary legislative changes.
The Federal Interest in Child Economic Well-Being
Family cash assistance originated with state and local programs (although these programs did not
serve all families or all single-parent families). Even when federal funding was provided, states
retained a great deal of discretion in the design of these programs. The brief history of family
cash assistance provided in this report notes how federal actions—administrative actions,
legislation, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions—ultimately created a federal entitlement to
benefits for eligible families. This was reversed by PRWORA, which ended the individual
entitlement to benefits and had an explicit purpose of increasing state flexibility.
PRWORA ushered in an era of greater state differences in family cash assistance than what
prevailed in the later years of AFDC. In addition to historical differences in eligibility levels and
benefit amounts, and new flexibility in terms of services provided, there was an increase in

35 For a discussion of automatic stabilizers, see Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Automatic Stabilizers in the
Federal Budget: 2022 to 2032, October 2022, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-10/58495-automatic-
stabilizers.pdf.
36 For discussion, see CRS Report R46472, Comparing the Congressional Response to the Great Recession and the
COVID-19-Related Recession: Unemployment Insurance (UI) Provisions. Note that report also discusses expansions to
the unemployment insurance program in response to the recession associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
37 For more information, see CRS Report R41374, Reducing SNAP (Food Stamp) Benefits Provided by the ARRA: P.L.
111-226 and P.L. 111-296. In response to the recession associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, a similar 15%
increase was enacted for SNAP, and SNAP emergency allotments further increased benefits. For more information, see
CRS Report R46681, USDA Nutrition Assistance Programs: Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
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differences among states in accessing family cash assistance. In the meantime, as discussed
above, federal policy had much to do with an overall decline in child poverty, attributable in part
to 100% federally financed SNAP benefits and 100% federally financed refundable tax credits.
For families with children, a large share of these benefits redistributed income to parents with low
earnings. However, the role of family cash assistance—dealing with earnings loss associated with
childbirth, as well as misfortunes associated with loss of earnings to a family through
unemployment, the onset of an illness or disability, an earner leaving the family, or an earner
never joining the family—is under the control of the states, and how they deal with it varies
considerably among them.

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Appendix. Methods
The estimates of family cash assistance eligibility in this report are from the TRIM3
microsimulation model based on data from the Census Bureau’s ASEC survey. Estimates of the
receipt of family cash assistance represent a combination of receipt reported by respondents of the
ASEC and estimates from TRIM3. Benefit receipt is under-reported on household surveys, and
the TRIM3 estimates impute benefit receipt for additional persons to address that under-reporting.
The TRIM3 estimates bring, as closely as possible, the total number of families and individuals
receiving family cash assistance up to totals as reported by administrative data. TRIM3 also
matches, as closely as possible, the characteristics of those in its estimates to those reported in the
administration data.
Estimates in recent years on TANF cash assistance receipt include those from federally funded
TANF, state dollars expended to meet the TANF MOE requirement, and solely state funded
programs (SSFs). SSFs are state-funded programs with expenditures that are not counted toward
the TANF MOE, but that serve TANF-related populations. States primarily use SSFs to fund
assistance for two-parent families so they do not have to meet the two-parent TANF work
participation standard. The estimates on family cash assistance receipt are for assistance under
traditional assistance programs and exclude those receiving TANF benefits that are technically
considered assistance but paid outside the traditional program only to those with earnings.
The estimates are subject to error. Two main categories of errors are modeling error (TRIM3
assigning eligibility or benefit receipt to the wrong people) and sampling error. Sampling error is
quantifiable.
The ASEC provides a sufficient sample to make reliable national-level estimates. However, it
does not have a big enough sample in all states to make reliable state-level inferences using a
single year of data. The Census Bureau recommends pooling three years of data to make state-
level estimates; thus, the state-level information uses such pooled three-year data. However, this
still produces estimates in smaller population states that have a comparatively larger sampling
margin of error than estimates in larger population states (larger population states have larger
samples than do smaller population states). Table A-1 shows the estimated average family
assistance receipt rate among eligible individuals for 2016-2018 and the margin of error (at the
90% confidence level) by state. While margins of error based on a comparable methodology are
not possible for the 1994-1996 estimates, the pattern (more precise estimates for larger states with
larger samples) is likely repeated for them as well.

Table A-1. Estimated Average Family Assistance Receipt Rate Among Eligible
Individuals and Sampling Error, by State
Three-Year Average, 2016-2018
Estimated Average
Family Cash
Assistance Receipt
Margin of Error
Rate Among Eligible
(+/- 90% confidence
Individuals
intervals; in
State
(2016-2018)
percentage points)
Alabama
10.3%
3.4
Alaska
19.1
6.7
Arizona
11.1
5.2
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Estimated Average
Family Cash
Assistance Receipt
Margin of Error
Rate Among Eligible
(+/- 90% confidence
Individuals
intervals; in
State
(2016-2018)
percentage points)
Arkansas
12.9
7.2
California
58.4
2.9
Colorado
30.7
10.8
Connecticut
28.4
10.8
Delaware
25.6
9.0
D.C.
65.2
7.5
Florida
15.9
4.0
Georgia
7.1
4.1
Hawaii
20.5
6.9
Idaho
8.6
4.8
Il inois
16.5
4.8
Indiana
9.5
4.7
Iowa
29.0
8.9
Kansas
16.8
7.8
Kentucky
25.4
8.6
Louisiana
8.1
4.4
Maine
28.1
11.6
Maryland
26.5
8.9
Massachusetts
45.4
8.8
Michigan
15.7
6.1
Minnesota
40.6
11.4
Mississippi
14.7
4.4
Missouri
17.8
7.6
Montana
32.2
8.4
Nebraska
25.0
7.5
Nevada
16.2
5.9
New Hampshire
29.7
11.8
New Jersey
21.3
7.4
New Mexico
23.6
5.8
New York
51.7
5.4
North Carolina
7.7
2.7
North Dakota
11.9
6.2
Ohio
22.9
5.2
Oklahoma
15.6
7.0
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Estimated Average
Family Cash
Assistance Receipt
Margin of Error
Rate Among Eligible
(+/- 90% confidence
Individuals
intervals; in
State
(2016-2018)
percentage points)
Oregon
58.8
9.1
Pennsylvania
30.0
6.5
Rhode Island
31.8
11.9
South Carolina
9.3
3.5
South Dakota
14.8
6.6
Tennessee
19.2
6.0
Texas
11.0
3.0
Utah
14.4
7.3
Vermont
41.4
12.1
Virginia
25.4
8.4
Washington
42.0
7.2
West Virginia
17.8
4.8
Wisconsin
23.3
8.1
Wyoming
8.6
5.8
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the TRIM3 microsimulation model.
Notes: Estimated sampling error computed using the Jackknife method using the replicate weights provided by
the Census Bureau, adjusted to account for TRIM3 methodologies.

Author Information

Gene Falk

Specialist in Social Policy

Acknowledgments
This report greatly benefitted from the comments of CRS analysts Patrick Landers, Jessica Tollestrup, and
Emilie Stoltzfus. Amber Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, produced the data visualizations in
the report.
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TANF: Decline in Assistance Receipt Among Eligible Individuals

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