Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

March 17, 2023 R47476

Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues March 17, 2023
and Options for Congress
Nathan J. Lucas,
Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, some defense analysts, U.S.
Coordinator
defense officials, and Members of Congress have debated whether or not to enable the transfer of
Section Research Manager
U.S. or NATO military aircraft, including fighter jets and unmanned aircraft, to Ukraine. In

general, the debate has centered around two broad questions: (1) Is providing advanced military
Patrick Parrish
fighter jets to the Ukrainian air force necessary to helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian
National Defense Fellow
aggression, and (2) if so, how much and what kinds of assistance, ranging from aircraft to

maintenance to training, should the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) provide?
Christina L. Arabia
Analyst in Security
On one side of the debate, some analysts note that combat aircraft have not yet played a decisive
Assistance, Security
role in the conflict and are unlikely to do so based on current Ukrainian and Russian capabilities.
Cooperation and the
Global Arms Trade
Both sides have employed advanced air defense systems that have limited the combat effects of

Russian and Ukrainian aircraft. As a result, the conflict in Ukraine has evolved into a ground-
centric, air denial conflict featuring precision strike capabilities, such as the U.S. M142 High

Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). On the other side of the debate, proponents of
transferring U.S. or NATO fighter jets to Ukraine claim that it may allow the Ukrainian military to address certain perceived
gaps in operational capabilities, such as air superiority; suppression of enemy air defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; and counter-land (air-to-ground) capabilities.
Congress may evaluate a proposed transfer of U.S. or NATO fighter aircraft to Ukraine applying an “air denial” (deny Russia
ability to use airpower) versus “air superiority” (help Ukraine overcome Russian air defenses and air power) comparison to
an analysis of selected military mission areas. From this perspective, the military operating environment of the conflict has
resulted in both sides adopting an air denial strategy rather than seeking air superiority. A central tactical purpose of using
advanced fighter aircraft, especially in U.S. military doctrine, has been to achieve air superiority. Congress may consider
whether it is best for U.S. security assistance seek to continue to provide air denial capability to Ukraine, or whether it would
further U.S. interests to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces seeking air superiority. The outcome of such decisions may
affect other mission areas, such as suppression of enemy air defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and
counter-land (air-to-ground) capabilities.
In evaluating whether it is in the U.S. interest to transfer U.S. or NATO military aircraft to Ukraine, Congress may consider
several issues:
 What are the hurdles and potential implications to Ukraine’s adaptation to fighting with advanced military
aircraft? How long would it take Ukraine to fully adapt its security institutions to effectively fight with
advanced military aircraft?
 How quickly can Ukrainian personnel be trained on new systems?
 Would Ukraine use a maintenance model where it trains its own personnel to do maintenance on advanced
fighter aircraft, or a model where it uses international contract maintenance personnel? If the latter, for how
long?
 What types of munitions would the United States likely provide? Would transferring munitions for
Ukrainian fighter aircraft impact the U.S. military’s ability to conduct air superiority operations elsewhere
in the world?
 Should the United States pay to transfer U.S.-manufactured fighter jets to Ukraine? Congress may consider
options for how to finance such aircraft and who should fund their purchase.
 If the United States or another NATO member chooses to transfer aircraft to Ukraine, should the aircraft be
used, new, or a mix of both?
 Should Congress support the provision of such aircraft by NATO allies, in addition to or as an alternative to
U.S. provision?

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link to page 27 Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

ussia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and took control of the Crimea region, which it continues
to control. Russia then renewed the invasion with a military offensive in February 2022.
R In response, Congress has authorized and appropriated funding, in particular for security
assistance and security cooperation, to support Ukraine economically and militarily. In this
context, some analysts, officials in the Biden Administration, and Members of Congress have
discussed whether to provide Ukraine with military aviation capabilities, including fighter jets. In
essence, such discussions start with a single military question: Are advanced military air
capabilities in the Ukrainian Air Force necessary for Ukraine to defend against Russian
aggression? If the answer is yes, a related policy question arises: What potential options are
available for bolstering the capabilities of the Ukrainian Air Force? As part of its debate over the
amount and types of assistance the United States should provide, Congress continues to consider
whether and how to support the transfer of aircraft and aviation-related components to Ukraine.
The debate endures even after Congress authorized the transfer of “Manned and unmanned aerial
capabilities, including tactical surveillance systems and fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, such as
attack, strike, airlift, and surveillance aircraft,” as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative in the FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).1
This report provides an overview of the positions the Administration and Congress have taken
regarding the provision of aircraft and aviation support to Ukraine, along with a description of the
current military operating environment. In this context, the report highlights five issues Congress
may consider and lays out three potential options for transferring military aircraft to Ukraine.
Appendix B provides a detailed description of potential aircraft in each of these options.
Background
This section summarizes the evolution of views in both the Administration and Congress
regarding whether to transfer fighter jets to Ukraine. It then describes the current operating
environment, highlighting four air warfare challenges for both Russia and Ukraine: (1) air
superiority; (2) suppression of enemy air defenses; (3) intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; and (4) counter-land.
Statements from the Administration: Evolving Views Regarding
Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine
The Biden Administration, after the renewed Russian invasion in 2022, initially did not support
transferring aircraft to Ukraine. In March 2022, then-Department of Defense (DOD) Press
Secretary John Kirby said, “We assess that adding aircraft to the Ukrainian inventory is not likely
to significantly change the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Air Force relative to Russian
capabilities. Therefore, we believe that the gain from transferring those MIG-29s is low. And
finally, the intelligence community has assessed the transfer of MIG-29s to Ukraine may be
mistaken as escalatory[,] and could result in significant Russian reaction that might increase the
prospects of a military escalation with NATO.”2 Similarly, Secretary of the Air Force Frank
Kendall and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Charles Q. Brown stated in March 2022 that
transferring retiring U.S. fighter jets—such as the A-10 Thunderbolt II and the F-16 Fighting

1 P.L. 116-283, §1236, P.L. 117-263 §1241(b).
2 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing, March 9,
2022,” transcript, March 9, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2961792/pentagon-
press-secretary-john-f-kirby-holds-a-press-briefing-march-9-2022/.
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Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

Falcon—was not feasible because the timelines required to train Ukrainian personnel were too
long, and because those aircraft are not likely “to significantly change the effectiveness of the
Ukrainian Air Force relative to Russian capabilities.”3
In light of changes in the military situation in Ukraine, the Administration’s initial position has
evolved to support increased assistance for military fighter capabilities in the Ukrainian Air
Force. The first steps in that evolution involved third-country transfer of spare parts and aircraft
to Ukraine. In April and May 2022, the United States facilitated the transfer of aircraft and spare
parts from other countries4 to support Ukraine’s current aircraft fleet. Then-DOD Press Secretary
Kirby said on April 19, 2022, that the Ukrainians had more operable fighter aircraft than they did
two weeks prior, and that they had received platforms and parts from other nations to be able to
increase their fleet size. 5
By summer 2022, the Administration’s position had evolved further and the United States started
to provide the Ukrainian Air Force with more advanced aircraft munitions. On August 8, 2022,
Colin Kahl, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said, “And then also, in recent PDA
[Presidential Drawdown Authority] packages, we've included a number of anti-radiation missiles
that can be fired off of Ukrainian aircraft that can have effects on Russia radars and other things.
So there are also things that we're doing to try to make their existing capabilities more effective.”6
Kahl later stated that the United States had transferred these missiles, versions of the AGM-88
High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), onto MiG-29 Fulcrums.7 These anti-radiation
missiles seek and destroy artillery and anti-aircraft radars. Kahl also discussed the United States’
assistance in continuing to provide spare parts for Ukraine’s air force.
In July 2022, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
General C. Q. Brown publicly discussed the possibility of transferring fighter jets to Ukraine.8
These officials said they were open to the possibility of transferring retiring U.S. fighter jets to
Ukraine and were assessing Ukraine’s long-term aviation needs.9 Their comments raised the
prospect that the United States might either sell or provide new aircraft, such as the F-16 Fighting
Falcon and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, to Ukraine. In addition, both Secretary Kendall and
General Brown said they were looking into potential options for aircraft that U.S. allies could

3 Ibid. and Valerie Insinna, “No, the US Air Force isn’t going to give Ukraine its A-10 Warthogs,” Breaking Defense,
March 3, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/no-the-us-air-force-isnt-going-to-give-ukraine-its-a-10-warthogs/.
4 The specific nation(s) that provided spare aircraft parts to Ukraine was not specified, nor the details of the United
States facilitating the transfer. It is reported that Poland may have been one provider. Clement Charpentreau, “Poland
Reportedly Delivered MiG-29 Fighters to Ukraine as ‘Spare Parts’,” Aerotime Hub, January 27, 2023,
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/poland-reportedly-delivered-mig-29-fighters-to-ukraine-as-spare-parts.
5 Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” press release, April 19,
2022, transcript, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3004347/pentagon-press-secretary-
john-f-kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/.
6 Department of Defense, “USD (Policy) Dr. Kahl Press Conference,” press release, August 8, 2022, transcript, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3120707/usd-policy-dr-kahl-press-conference/ .
7 These missiles are used to seek and destroy an adversary’s artillery and anti-aircraft radars, thus providing a
“Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses,” or SEAD, capability. Department of Defense, “Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds a Press Briefing on Security Assistance in Support of Ukraine,” press release, August 24,
2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3138872/undersecretary-of-defense-for-policy-
dr-colin-kahl-holds-a-press-briefing-on-se/.
8 Joseph Trevithick, “Giving A-10 Warthogs To Ukraine Isn’t Off The Table,” The War Zone, July 10, 2022, at
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/giving-a-10-warthogs-to-ukraine-isnt-off-the-table.
9 Stephen Losey, “Ukraine says air force needs western fighter jets, and the US is preparing to help,” Defense News,
July 21, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/07/21/ukraine-says-its-air-force-needs-western-fighter-jets-
and-the-us-is-preparing-to-help/.
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provide.10 Such options may include the French-made Rafale and the Swedish-made JAS 39
Gripen.11
Congressional Debates and Actions Related to Transferring Fighter
Aircraft to Ukraine
Congress first authorized the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) in the FY2016
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.12
This act authorized DOD to “provide appropriate security assistance and intelligence support,
including training, equipment, and logistics support, supplies and services, to military and other
security forces of the Government of Ukraine ... ”13 The act specifies three purposes for this
assistance: (1) to enhance Ukrainian military and security force capabilities to defend against
further aggression, (2) to assist Ukraine in developing the combat capability to defend its
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and (3) to support Ukraine in defending itself against Russia
and Russian-backed separatists.14 It also authorizes DOD to provide real-time intelligence; lethal
assistance;15 counter-artillery radars; tactical unmanned aerial systems; cyber, electronic warfare,
and counter-electronic warfare capabilities; training to maintain these capabilities; and training
for critical combat operations.16 Congress has modified USAI annually since FY2016, with
expansions in authorities to include improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.17 The William
M. (Mac) Thornberry FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required DOD to provide “an assessment of
the requirements of the Ukrainian air force to accomplish its assigned missions” by February
2022.18 DOD has not publicized that assessment.
In March 2022, some Members introduced resolutions in their respective chambers related to
transferring aircraft to Ukraine. For example, Representative Tom Cole introduced H.Res. 991,
which would have expressed the sense of the House that the President should take steps to
transfer requested fighter jets to Ukraine or other allies (and references a Polish fighter transfer
proposal).19 Senator Lindsey Graham introduced S.Res. 549, which would have encouraged the
President to facilitate the transfer of MiG-29s and air defense systems to Ukraine.20 Neither

10 Patrick Tucker and Jacqueline Feldscher, “Air Force Chief Hints Western Fighter Jets Could Go to Ukraine,”
Defense One, July 20, 2022, at https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/07/air-force-chief-hints-western-fighter-jets-
could-go-ukraine/374721/.
11 Although the JAS-39 Gripen is manufactured by Saab, this aircraft uses several U.S-developed subcomponents,
including the General Electric 401 engine. The Rafale uses the French developed M88 engines. See Janes, “Saab JAS
39 Gripen,” September 7, 2022, at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/DisplayFile/JAWA0989, and Janes, “Dassault
Rafale,” April 29, 2022, at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAWA0257-JAWA.
12 P.L. 114-92 §1250.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Section 1250 specifically mentions anti-armor weapons, mortars, crew-served weapons and ammunition, grenade
launchers, and small arms.
16 Section 1250 defines critical combat operations training as planning command and control, small unit tactics,
counter-artillery tactics, logistics, countering improvised explosive devices, battlefield first aid, post-combat treatment,
and medical evacuation.
17 P.L. 114-328, §1237; P.L. 115-91, §1234; P.L. 115-232, §1246; P.L. 116-92, §1244; P.L. 116-283, §1235; and P.L.
117-81, §1232.
18 P.L. 116-283, §1236.
19 117th Congress, H.Res. 991.
20 117th Congress, S.Res. 549.
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resolution was enacted before the 117th Congress adjourned, but the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-
263), enacted in December 2022, amends the USAI to authorize assistance for “manned and
unmanned aerial capabilities, including tactical surveillance systems and fixed and rotary-wing
aircraft, such as attack, strike, airlift, and surveillance aircraft.”21
Congressional debate regarding the dollar amount of military assistance the United States might
provide to Ukraine may have potential implications for the type of weapons to be supplied. While
some Members have expressed their commitment to sustaining military support for Ukraine,22
other Members have expressed concern about the cost of such assistance. 23 As discussed in the
“Financing” section of this report, the addition of military aviation to U.S. security assistance
packages for Ukraine would be a significant increase in U.S. financial commitment.
Selected Military Considerations Regarding Potential Transfer of
Combat Aircraft to Ukraine
One aspect of how Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of a potential transfer of fighter
aircraft to Ukraine, apart from the cost issue, is a look at how such aircraft may fit into the
conflict’s military operating environment in the zone of conflict. The operating environment for
military forces in Ukraine illustrates a contrast between the effectiveness of air and ground
operations. Russian and Ukrainian forces have relied on both ground-based offensive and
defensive operations to meet their military objectives. Both sides have contested air operations by
mounting strong air defenses, leading each to use its military air assets with restraint in order to
avoid the risk of losing aircraft.24 Both sides employ ground-based medium- and long-range
surface-to-air missile systems, capable of targeting both high-performance aircraft (e.g., fighter
aircraft such as Ukraine’s MiG-29) and slower aircraft (e.g., Mi-8 helicopters and Ukrainian TB-2
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs).
At the start of the conflict, Russia employed offensive air operations, and Ukrainian air forces
were able to impede Russian air operations through air defenses and fighter combat air patrols
(CAPs), despite suffering losses.25 Since then, air defenses have effectively deterred both sides
from conducting significant offensive air operations, and therefore neither side has been able to
leverage offensive air power.26 Some analysts argue that Russian air power failed to effectively
seize the offensive advantage, despite its technological superiority, because of high mechanical

21 P.L. 117-263, §1241.
22 Senator Roger Wicker, “Wicker Urges Continued Military Aid for Ukrainian Victory,” press release, at
https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2023/1/wicker-urges-continued-military-aid-for-ukrainian-victory For support of
overall aid to Ukraine, see Sam Mednick, “US senators in Ukraine promise continued aid ahead of winter,” AP News,
November 3, 2022, at https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-travel-ohio-
1ab7c7e32f4fbad58b0c71bde67ba66d.
23 Dan De Luce et al., “With GOP skeptics of Ukraine aid poised to gain seats in Congress, lawmakers look to lock in a
huge military assistance package,” NBC News, October 20, 2022, at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/gop-
ukraine-skeptics-poised-gain-congress-lawmakers-look-lock-billions-rcna53167.
24 Rachel S. Cohen and Joe Gould, “With a mix of donated weapons, Ukraine’s defenders adapt in war,” Air Force
Times, September 28, 2022, at https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2022/09/28/with-a-mix-of-donated-weapons-
ukraines-defenders-adapt-in-war/.
25 Steve Trimble, “Bloody Day In Ukraine Ends With Russian Advances, Setbacks,” Aviation Week, February 24, 2022,
at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/multi-mission-aircraft/bloody-day-ukraine-ends-russian-advances-setbacks.
26 Rachel S. Cohen and Joe Gould, “With a mix of donated weapons, Ukraine’s defenders adapt in war,” Air Force
Times, September 28, 2022, at https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2022/09/28/with-a-mix-of-donated-weapons-
ukraines-defenders-adapt-in-war/.
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failure rates, poor intelligence and targeting, and insufficient capacity for the operation’s scale.27
Some analysts also argue that although Ukraine has successfully countered Russia with its air
defenses, Ukrainian air forces are technologically and numerically unable to challenge Russia’s
air forces head-on.28 These analysts say this is because the Russians have a higher number of
fighter aircraft and because Russian air-to-air missiles can target Ukrainian aircraft at a much
greater range.29 The following discussion describes the mission areas that some analysts have
identified as operational weaknesses for Ukraine and Russia: air superiority; suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and counter-
land (air-to-ground).30
Air Superiority
The U.S. military defines air superiority as “that degree of control over the air by one force that
permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
from air and missile [air defense] threats.”31 This means having the freedom to attack from the air
while preventing enemy air attacks.32 Neither Russia nor Ukraine have established decisive
control of the air, but both maintain effective ground-based air defenses.33 From a U.S. Air Force
perspective, gaining air superiority is generally desired before attempting other types of combat
operations (e.g., ground operations); with air superiority in place, other types of missions can
benefit from greater maneuverability.34 Russia’s initial efforts to achieve air superiority were
unsuccessful. Based on Russia’s lack of air superiority up to this point, Ukrainian leaders and
some analysts argue that advanced fighter jets could allow Ukraine to close the technological gap
against Russian fighters, help them defend military and civilian infrastructure, and deter future
Russian air power aggression.35

27 Ian Williams, Russia Doubles Down on Its Failed Air Campaign, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
October 13, 2022, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-doubles-down-its-failed-air-campaign; CRS Insight IN11872,
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects, by Andrew S. Bowen.
28 U.S. Air Force Colonel Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground Truth in the Air
War over Ukraine,” Defense News, September 21, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/
09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/. Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack
Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, Royal United Services Institute, Special
Report, London, UK, November 7, 2022, pp. 1-2, p.9, at https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-
final.pdf.
29 Ibid.
30 Some studies point to a number of causes for the air stalemate in these mission areas. See, for example, Justin Bronk,
Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, Royal United
Services Institute, November 7, 2022, pp. 1-2, at https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf;
David Axe, “The Russian Air Force is Back in the Fight in Ukraine. But It’s Not Making Much of a Difference,”
Forbes, September 16, 2022, at https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/16/the-russian-air-force-is-back-in-the-
fight-in-ukraine-but-its-not-making-much-of-a-difference/?sh=474712c01235; CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian
Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.
31 DOD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-01: Countering Air and Missile Threats,” 2017, p.
I-4, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_01.pdf.
32 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0: Operations Planning,” 2016, p. 34, at
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-AFDP-OPERATIONS-PLANNING.pdf.
33 Rachel S. Cohen and Joe Gould, “With a mix of donated weapons, Ukraine’s defenders adapt in war” Air Force
Times, September 28, 2022, at https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2022/09/28/with-a-mix-of-donated-weapons-
ukraines-defenders-adapt-in-war/.
34 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0: Operations Planning,” 2016, p. 34, at
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-AFDP-OPERATIONS-PLANNING.pdf
35 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0: Operations Planning,” 2016, at
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Some DOD officials and analysts have argued, especially early in the 2022 conflict, that Ukraine
should avoid attempting to gain air superiority and focus on strengthening defensive
capabilities.36 In March, then-DOD Press Secretary Kirby said in responding negatively to a
question on the desirability of transferring fighter jets to Ukraine, “We believe the best way to
support Ukrainian defense is by providing them the weapons and the systems that they need most
to defeat Russian aggression ... in particular, anti-armor, and air defense.”37 Russian has a total
of 1,391 aircraft to Ukraine’s 132, and in February 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
reportedly stated that “Russia has substantial aircraft ... and a lot of capability left.”38 The crux of
these arguments against strengthening Ukraine’s air superiority capabilities are that Ukrainian air
defenses—not fighter jets—have deterred and limited Russian air attacks, particularly in and
around population centers like Kyiv.39 Analysts making this case also have argued that Russian
weakness (e.g., poor intelligence integration, lack of real-time targeting data and battle damage
assessment) is largely to blame for Russia’s lack of success in the air, and that Ukraine could
succeed by continuing to exploit these weaknesses, especially by improving and resupplying
Ukrainian air defense capabilities that can deny presence to Russia’s manned and unmanned ISR
aircraft.40 Up to now, in transferring air defense systems before aircraft, the Administration has
appeared to support a strategy of air denial for Ukraine.41
According to General James Hecker, Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ukraine has lost
60 aircraft to Russian air defenses, but Ukrainian forces have successfully downed over 70
Russian aircraft.42 U.S. defense officials have acknowledged Ukraine’s success using Russian-
made air defenses, while also noting that such air defense systems may experience maintenance
issues and parts shortages as the conflict continues.43 The United States and NATO allies have

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-AFDP-OPERATIONS-PLANNING.pdf. Michael
Starr, “Zelensky: Western Warplanes Will Help Ukraine Achieve Air Superiority,” November 1, 2022,
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-721185, and Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian
Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, Royal United Services Institute, Special Report, London, UK,
November 7, 2022, pp. 1-2, https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf.
36 U.S. Air Force Colonel Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground Truth in the Air
War over Ukraine,” Defense News, September 21, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/
09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/.
37 DOD, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing, March 9, 2022,” transcript, March 9, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2961792/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-holds-a-
press-briefing-march-9-2022/.
38 Angela Dewan, “Ukraine and Russia’s Militaries are David and Goliath. Here’s How They Compare,” CNN,
February 25, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/russia-ukraine-military-comparison-intl/index.html, and
David Axe, Felicia Schwartz and Henry Foy, “Western Intelligence Shows Russians Amassing Aircraft on Ukraine
Border,” Financial Times, February 14, 2023, at https://www.ft.com/content/3fd6e91f-71e4-4c02-9360-be20a2a78763.
39 U.S. Air Force Colonel Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground Truth in the Air
War over Ukraine,” Defense News, September 21, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/
09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/.
40 Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence,
Royal United Services Institute, November 7, 2022, pp. 1-2, at https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-
web-final.pdf, and U.S. Air Force Colonel Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground
Truth in the Air War over Ukraine,” Defense News, September 21, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/
commentary/2022/09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/.
41 CRS In Focus IF12230, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), by Andrew Feickert.
42 General Hecker’s comments were made in the context of describing the air defense environment in the conflict. It is
not specified what specific air defense systems downed these aircraft. Chris Gordon, “Ukraine Has Lost 60 Aircraft,
Taken Down 70 in Russian Invasion, Hecker Says,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, March 6, 2023, at
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ukraine-has-lost-60-aircraft-taken-down-70-in-russian-invasion-hecker-says/.
43 DOD, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” transcript, July 1, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/
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provided additional air defense systems to Ukraine to strengthen its air defense network. Some
analysts have credited Western systems (e.g., the German Gepard anti-aircraft system) with
bolstering Ukraine’s defenses, particularly in and around Ukrainian troop locations.44 The United
States has also provided National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) to help
combat Russian missile and aircraft threats.45
Fighter jets, while not the primary weapon system in an air denial strategy, may contribute to its
execution, especially to counter adversary uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ukrainian fighter jet
operations, primarily near population centers like Kyiv, continue to assist the air defense effort.46
In this role, Ukrainian fighters are conducting operations supporting an air denial strategy, rather
than seeking air superiority. Russian missiles threaten military and civilian targets and since fall
2022 have targeted critical infrastructure (e.g., power plants and water treatment facilities).
According to U.S. defense officials, Russia has used Iranian UAVs to target Ukrainian military
and civilian targets.47 Some analysts and U.S. military officials have argued that these UAVs offer
Russia a cheaper way to cause greater harm, relative to manned aircraft, with the potential to
overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses.48 Russia reportedly ordered 2,400 UAVs from Iran.49 During
the first months of the renewed invasion, Ukrainian fighter aircraft conducted air defense
missions to counter the increased cruise missile and UAV attacks launched on population
centers.50
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
Since both Ukraine and Russia have sophisticated air defenses, the ability to mitigate or defeat air
defense systems may give the side who first obtains it a military advantage. SEAD consists of
“activity to neutralize, destroy, or degrade enemy surface-based air defenses.”51 These effects can
be accomplished by kinetic weapons (i.e., missiles and bombs) or by electronic warfare (EW). 52
Despite early offensive air operations, Russia has largely failed to neutralize or destroy Ukrainian

News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3082215/senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.
44 David Axe, “The Russian Air Force is Back in the Fight in Ukraine. But It’s Not Making Much of a Difference,”
Forbes, September 16, 2022, pp. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/16/the-russian-air-force-is-back-in-
the-fight-in-ukraine-but-its-not-making-much-of-a-difference/?sh=474712c01235.
45See CRS In Focus IF12230, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), by Andrew Feickert.
46 “Western Air-Defense Systems Help Ukraine Shoot Down More Missiles,” The Economist, November 6, 2022,
https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/11/06/western-air-defence-systems-help-ukraine-shoot-down-more-missiles.
47 DOD, “Senior Military Official Holds a Background Briefing,” transcript, October 24, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3197746/senior-military-official-holds-a-background-
briefing/
48 Ibid.; Stephen Kalin and Michael R. Gordon, “Ukraine’s Patchwork Air Defense Faces New Threat From Cheap
Iranian Drones,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2022, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-patchwork-air-
defense-faces-new-threat-from-cheap-iranian-drones-11667122204.
49 Associated Press, “EXPLAINER: Killer Drones Vie for Supremacy Over Ukraine,” October 18, 2022, at
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-business-government-and-politics-
5a3e86a903ea5de028308f22f32a00c4. Also see CRS Insight IN12042, Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use
in Ukraine, by Andrew S. Bowen, Carla E. Humud, and Clayton Thomas.
50 Thomas Newdick, “Ukrainian MiG-29 Pilot’s Front-Line Account of the Air War Against Russia,” The Drive, April
2, 2022, at. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/45019/fighting-russia-in-the-sky-mig-29-pilots-in-depth-account-
of-the-air-war-over-ukraine .
51 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-01: Counterair Operations,” 2019, p.
8, at https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-01/3-01-AFDP-D02-AIR-Counterair-Operations.pdf
52 CRS Report R44572, U.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by John R.
Hoehn. For followup, congressional offices may contact Nathan J. Lucas.
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air defenses.53 Russia’s Su-35S fighter jets can carry anti-radiation missiles capable of targeting
artillery and anti-aircraft radars, but there is little evidence of their use or effectiveness in the
conflict. The majority of documented Ukrainian air defense losses have been attributed to attacks
that did not involve air power.54
At the start of the conflict, Ukraine had a limited inventory of Russian-made anti-radiation
missiles, but there is little evidence of their use. DOD Under Secretary Kahl confirmed U.S.
shipments of AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) to improve Ukraine’s radar-
targeting capabilities.55 Ukrainian aircraft do not carry the associated targeting and EW
capabilities that U.S. aircraft have, such as EW suppression and HARM targeting system (HTS)
pods. Due to a lack of system integration between the weapon and the aircraft, HARMs may not
be as effective when employed from Ukraine’s Russian-made MiG-29s and Su-27s as they would
be when used with U.S. fighter jets.56 However, General David Hecker, United States Air Forces
Europe Commander, argues that the presence of HARMs in Ukraine presents a threat to Russian
air defense operators that may cause them to turn off their radars and prevent them from targeting
Ukrainian aircraft.57
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
A mission area where air superiority may be preferable to air denial is in the effectiveness of ISR.
Air superiority enables information exploitation and can enhance freedom of movement on the
battlefield by enabling timely and precise targeting of relevant military targets.58 Battlefield
targets (e.g., troops and tanks) are generally time-sensitive; therefore, efficient data transfer (from
sensor to shooter) is often required to effectively engage targets. Both Russia and Ukraine have
relied on UAVs for ISR, but both countries have experienced heavy losses of UAVs due to air
defenses.59 Russia’s UAVs—such as the Orlan-10 UAV—have had high rates of attrition with
limited ability to provide timely ISR. In addition, analysts have argued that Russia’s space-based
ISR satellite coverage is insufficient to provide timely targeting data.60 These factors may have
influenced Russia’s decision to focus attacks on fixed infrastructure and civilian targets, for
which it can more easily obtain accurate targeting data.
Ukraine has used low-altitude UAVs to locate targets on the battlefield, but open sources suggest
that these UAVs have had limited success. According to U.S. defense officials, the United States

53 Justin Bronk, “Getting Serious About SEAD: European Air Forces Must Learn From the Failure of the Russian Air
Force over Ukraine,” RUSI Defence Systems, vol. 24 (April 6, 2022).
54 Ibid.
55 DOD, “USD (Policy) Dr. Kahl Press Conference,” transcript, August 8, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3120707/usd-policy-dr-kahl-press-conference/.
56 Rachel S. Cohen and Joe Gould, “With a mix of donated weapons, Ukraine’s defenders adapt in war,” Air Force
Times, September 28, 2022, at https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2022/09/28/with-a-mix-of-donated-weapons-
ukraines-defenders-adapt-in-war/.
57 Gen James B. Hecker, Lt. Gen James C. Slife, and Lt. Gen Alex Grynkewich, “Contering Russian Aggression,”
Panel at Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference, National Harbor, MD, September 19, 2022,
https://asc2022.us.chime.live/app/module?id=5&category=&filter=&quickFilterState=all
58 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0: Operations Planning,” 2016, pp. 23, 55, at
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-AFDP-OPERATIONS-PLANNING.pdf.
59 U.S. Air Force Colonel Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground Truth in the Air
War over Ukraine,” Defense News, September 21, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/
09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/.
60 Ibid.
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and other nations have shared battlefield intelligence with Ukraine that has enabled military
operations to defend against Russian military operations.61 The United States has also
collaborated with commercial satellite companies to provide imagery, detect GPS jamming, and
collect other forms of intelligence that Ukraine itself cannot gather or provide.62
Fighter jets can fill some ISR gaps by using their onboard sensors, such as radars and targeting
pods.63 Therefore, if either Ukraine or Russia had air superiority, their forces might be able to
identify, track, and engage enemy targets more effectively, thereby mitigating adversary
advantages in the ground domain.
Counter-land (Air-to-Ground)
DOD officials have characterized the operational environment in Ukraine in 2022 as air denial,
ground-centric warfare.64 Russia’s early offensive leveraged tanks and artillery to gain control of
territory.65 As Ukraine received more advanced military aid from the United States and other
NATO countries, its ground forces were able to successfully conduct offensive operations.
Artillery systems like the M777 howitzer and HIMARS enabled Ukraine to improve precision
and mobility in its counter-offensives against Russia.66 The United States and its allies have also
provided intelligence and planning support, allowing Ukraine to perform strikes on fixed targets.
Ukrainian forces also have demonstrated some ability to perform dynamic targeting (i.e., the
ability to quickly identify a target and then strike it). With timely information and coordination,
certain fighter and bomber aircraft can potentially provide effects on “targets of immediate
concern to [friendly] ground forces when those forces cannot produce the desired effect with
organic weapons alone.” 67
According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, counter-land operations support the ground war and “seek
to destroy the enemy’s fighting ability through focused attacks against key enemy targets.”68
Russia and Ukraine have executed limited counter-land strikes to assist ground forces, but air
defenses have reportedly forced pilots to fly at low-altitude and minimize their time in enemy

61 DOD, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” transcript, May 6, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3023614/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-holds-a-
press-briefing/; Olafimihan Oshin, “US has Helped Ukraine Target Russian Generals: Report,” The Hill, May 4, 2022,
at https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3477744-us-has-helped-ukraine-target-russian-generals-report/.
62 Theresa Hitchens, “How US Intel Worked with Commercial Satellite Firms to Reveal Ukraine Info,” Breaking
Defense, April 7, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/how-us-intel-worked-with-commercial-satellite-firms-
to-reveal-ukraine-info/.
63 Henry S. Kenyon, “Fighter Jets Provide Extra Eyes Over the Battlefield,” Signal (magazine published by the Armed
Forces Communications and Electronics Association, or AFCEA), February 2, 2010, at https://www.afcea.org/signal-
media/fighter-jets-provide-extra-eyes-over-battlefield.
64 U.S. Air Force General James B. Hecker, Lieutenant General James C. Slife, and Lieutenant General Alex
Grynkewich, “Countering Russian Aggression,” Panel at Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference,
National Harbor, MD, September 19, 2022, at https://asc2022.us.chime.live/app/module?id=5&category=&filter=&
quickFilterState=all.
65 CRS Report R47068, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects, by Andrew S. Bowen.
66 Stephen Kalin and Daniel Michaels, “Himars Transform the Battle for Ukraine—and Modern Warfare,” Wall Street
Journal, October 8, 2022, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/himars-transform-battle-for-ukraine-modern-warfare-
11665169716.
67 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-03: Counterland Operations,” 2020,
p. 37, at https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-03/3-03-AFDP-COUNTERLAND.pdf.
68 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-03: Counterland Operations,” 2020,
p. 3, at https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-03/3-03-AFDP-COUNTERLAND.pdf.
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airspace.69 These tactics effectively decrease the opportunities to identify dynamic or moving
targets, and prevent the use of most precision-guided munitions. Without the ability to gain a
degree of air superiority, counter-land strikes are difficult and present high risk to the limited
number of Ukrainian aircraft and pilots.
Potential Issues for Congress
In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of transferring U.S. and NATO military aircraft to
Ukraine, Congress may consider five potential issues: adapting Ukrainian security institutions,
training pilots, maintaining and sustaining aircraft, providing munitions, and financing. The
following section uses F-16s as an example to illustrate several points associated with these
issues. (The F-16 is useful as an example because of the availability of data; its use does not
represent an assumption that Ukraine would receive F-16s.)
Adapting Ukrainian Security Institutions
As Congress evaluates the issues associated with transferring U.S. military aircraft to Ukraine, it
may consider, as part of its oversight role, the extent to which the Ukrainian Armed Forces can
effectively incorporate and employ advanced aircraft. Doing so would likely require Ukraine to
change how it plans military operations and to increase its ability to leverage operational
intelligence.
The military in Ukraine (a former Soviet republic) has traditionally relied on Soviet-style doctrine
to plan and execute military operations.70 This doctrine relies heavily on centralized control—
meaning senior military officials exert a high level of detailed direction and approval for military
forces and missions. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the United States has
provided assistance to improve Ukraine’s security institutions, including a focus on transitioning
Ukraine to a Western-style doctrine that focuses on mission command—allowing greater
decision-making, within the parameters of the overall mission, at lower levels. USAI funding
prior to 2022 focused on institution building, which would organizationally and doctrinally
encourage greater decision-making freedom at lower levels.71 This includes reducing corruption
in the armed forces and improving programs like the State Partnership Program (SPP), which
focused on providing experiences to enable Ukraine’s military to transition to Western-style
military doctrine.72

69 David Axe, “The Russian Air Force is Back in the Fight in Ukraine. But It’s Not Making Much of a Difference,”
Forbes, September 16, 2022, at https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/16/the-russian-air-force-is-back-in-the-
fight-in-ukraine-but-its-not-making-much-of-a-difference/?sh=474712c01235, and Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and
Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, Royal United Services Institute,
November 7, 2022, p. 16, at https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf
70 CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Andrew S. Bowen and Alex Hollings. For examples of how
Russian air doctrine is not working in the Ukrainian context, see “How Russia’s Warfare Doctrine is Failing in
Ukraine,” Sandboxx News, March 23, 2022, at https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/how-russias-warfare-doctrine-is-failing-
in-ukraine/.
71 U.S Embassy Ukraine, “DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine,” press release, June 11, 2020, at
https://ua.usembassy.gov/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine-2/.
72 Stefano D’urso, “How California ANG Helped Ukrainian Air Force Improve And ‘Counter Punch’ Russian
Aerospace Forces Over Ukraine,” The Aviationist, May 24, 2022, at https://theaviationist.com/2022/05/24/california-
ang-ukrainian-air-force/.
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Some analysts have questioned whether Ukraine can shift from its prior Soviet-style doctrine73 to
Western-style doctrine that relies on decentralized control and flexibility in tactics, especially in a
relatively short time frame. Ukraine’s use of advanced munitions, such as HIMARS, transferred
from the United States and NATO, could be cited as an example of Ukraine’s overall successful
shift to Western-style flexibility in tactics.74 Using HIMARS, Ukraine has been able to collect
intelligence and use that information to effectively target Russian fixed positions such as
ammunition dumps and bridges. On the other hand, Ukraine has been unable to attack dynamic
targets like mobile air defenses or aircraft using HIMARS. Western air forces have come to rely
on decentralized control to be effective.75 This Western-style approach maintains centralized
command, but delegates mission control to lower echelons provided with real-time intelligence,
who are then empowered to respond to changes in the operational environment during
execution.76 F-16 technical capabilities, some argue, would provide little advantage if pilots/local
commanders do not have the authority and intelligence to quickly select and engage targets.
Ukraine has demonstrated a limited ability to develop and execute these types of air operations.77
In considering potential military fighter transfers to Ukraine, Members may consider a number of
oversight actions related to security institutions, including
 evaluate, as part of oversight, whether Title 10, Section 332 and 333 security
cooperation programs and USAI have prepared the Ukrainian Air Force to
effectively use advanced fighter jets in its war with Russia;78
 seek current assessments on whether or not the Ukrainian Air Force has shifted
from Soviet-style doctrine to decentralized control and flexibility; and
 seek information from Inspector General sources within DOD and the
Department of State on how well the Ukrainian Armed Forces have integrated
U.S-provided security assistance into their military planning and execution.
Training Pilots
The Ukrainian air force currently operates 1970s- and 1980s-era aircraft (e.g., Su-24, Su-25, Su-
27 and MiG-29). These aircraft primarily use less sophisticated air-to-air and air-to-ground

73 Prior to the 2022 renewal of the Russian invasion, the United States and military allies focused on facilitating
Ukraine’s move away from Soviet-era military doctrine, noting the periodic slow pace of those reforms. For example,
see Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Alina Frolova, Hans Petter Midtunn, and Oleksii Pavliuchyk, “Is Ukraine’s Reformed
Military Ready to Repel a New Russian Invasion?”, The Atlantic Council, December 23, 2021, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-ukraines-reformed-military-ready-to-repel-a-new-russian-
invasion/, andAndrew Salerno-Garthwaite, “Air denial over supremacy: lessons from Ukraine,” Airforce Technology,
September 8, 2022, at https://www.airforce-technology.com/analysis/air-enial-over-supremacy-lessons-from-ukraine/.
74 Stavros Atlamzoglou, “HIMARS: How an Advanced US Artillery System is Winning for Ukraine,” Sandboxx News,
July 20, 2022, at https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/himars-how-an-advanced-us-artillery-system-is-winning-for-ukraine/.
75 Clint Hinote, Centralize Control and Decentralized Execution (Montgomery, AL: Air University, 2009), at
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA550460.pdf.
76 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 1: The Air Force,” 2021, p. 13, at
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_1/AFDP-1.pdf.
77 Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence,
Royal United Services Institute, November 7, 2022, pp. 38, at https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-
final.pdf .Benjamin Brimelow, “Neither Moscow nor Kyiv can control Ukraine’s skies. These are the jets they’re using
to fight the air war,” Business Insider, July 24, 2022, at https://www.businessinsider.com/combat-jets-russia-and-
ukraine-are-using-in-ukraine-war-2022-7.
78 10 U.S.C.§332-333; P.L. 114-92 §1250, as amended.
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munitions than do aircraft in western militaries.79 The Military Balance notes that these aircraft
have seen limited upgrades and do not incorporate the latest advances in military aviation,80
including advanced radar technology, secure communications, and advanced munitions
technologies.
Congress may consider the potential training required for Ukrainian pilots to use new munitions
and aircraft. The transfer of new U.S. aircraft to Ukraine would require retraining the Ukrainian
pilots to operate these systems. It can take several years to train a new fighter pilot in the U.S.
military, but as little as several months to retrain an experienced pilot on a new aircraft. Some
observers have argued that such retraining could happen relatively quickly.81 In July 2022, Air
Force Chief of Staff General Brown said experienced U.S. pilots could learn to fly a new aircraft
within two to four months.82 General Brown added, however, that pilots transitioning from
Soviet-era aircraft to U.S. aircraft could face more difficulty and require more time.83
Congress, in its oversight role, may consider questions about the formal training necessary to
transition Ukrainian pilots to new aircraft, taking into account aircraft type, experience level, and
desired proficiency level. Potential oversight options might include, but are not limited to
 obtaining from DOD and the armed services plans for training Ukrainian pilots
on U.S.-manufactured fighter jets; and
 conducting, or directing, a time and cost comparison between training Ukrainian
pilots on advanced western fighter jets vis-a-vis former Soviet aircraft..
Maintaining and Sustaining Aircraft
Another issue Congress might consider regarding the transfer of U.S. military aircraft to Ukraine
is maintenance. The Ukrainian Air Force has only flown former Soviet fighter jets, which have
different engineering standards and system components than advanced Western aircraft. A
decision to transfer advanced Western fighter jets to Ukraine could further complicate Ukraine’s
ability to perform maintenance. Ukrainian air operations could use two potential sustainment
models: one in which Ukrainian personnel perform maintenance, or one in which Ukraine’s air
force contracts out maintenance work. Using Ukrainian personnel to maintain aircraft may cost
less over the long term and would reduce Ukraine’s reliance on foreign countries. However,
training maintenance personnel can take months or years, depending on the desired level of
proficiency.84
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a maintainer traditionally attends
technical school to become an apprentice—training that lasts between 23 and 133 academic days,
depending on the maintainer’s specialty. 85 The maintainer is then eligible to become fully

79 “Russia and Eurasia,” in The Military Balance 2022 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2022), p. 213.
80 Ibid.
81 Dave Deptula, “Provide the Airpower Ukraine Needs to Win Now,” Forbes, July 25, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/davedeptula/2022/07/25/provide-the-airpower-ukraine-needs-to-win-now/?sh=6190c9b53f72.
82 Phil Stewart, “U.S., allies discuss possible training for Ukrainian air force,” Reuters, July 20, 2022, at
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-allies-discuss-possible-training-ukrainian-air-force-2022-07-20/.
83 Ibid.
84 GAO, Strategy Needed to Improve Retention of Experienced Air Force Aircraft Maintainers, GAO-19-160, February
5, 2019, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-160.pdf.
85 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Strategy Needed to Improve Retention of Experienced Air Force
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qualified after at least 12 months of on-the-job experience.86 Because U.S. military maintenance
training is normally conducted in English, foreign military personnel typically require extensive
language training to gain sufficient language proficiency before they can start technical training.87
Maintenance schooling also may be limited by student capacity. According to GAO, in FY2017,
the Air Force trained 9,600 maintainers for all of its aircraft types.88 It may be possible to train a
smaller group of Ukrainian maintenance personnel that are proficient in English, and then allow
them to train the rest. However, this may extend the timeline required to develop a sufficient
maintenance cadre to support operations on the selected airframe. Some analysts have argued that
Ukraine would likely have a difficult time maintaining U.S.-manufactured fighter aircraft due to
both training and scale. They note that, for the U.S. Air Force, an F-16 requires about 16 man-
hours of maintenance for every one hour flying, and that once trained, aircraft maintenance
personnel rely on specialize equipment and a massive logistical enterprise to keep them supplied
with materiel.89
Contract maintainers, on the other hand, could be available relatively quickly to support air
operations. This maintenance model relies on previously trained personnel from other countries to
maintain and sustain aircraft. One potential drawback of this approach is that because they are
already trained and experienced, these maintainers can be expensive. As an example of how much
a U.S.-manufactured fighter jet can cost to maintain, the U.S. Navy released a contract in
September 2022 seeking proposals from companies to maintain a reported 26 F-16s for a value of
$152.3 million over eight years, at a cost of approximately $19 million per year.90 Another
potential downside is that relying on contract maintenance for the long term poses a risk by
relying on non-Ukrainian labor—most likely U.S. or European personnel, depending on the
aircraft type. Should the political environment in Ukraine change, participating governments
might decide to prevent this exchange of technical services.
As Congress evaluates the issues associated with transferring U.S. military aircraft to Ukraine, it
may consider questions regarding its authorization and oversight roles in relation to these two
potential maintenance approaches. For example, how long might Ukraine need to rely on contract
maintenance before its own maintainers gained sufficient proficiency? How much might it cost
either Ukraine or western aid donors to rely on contract maintenance until Ukrainian personnel
are trained?
In considering potential military fighter jet transfers to Ukraine, Members may consider whether
or not to pursue the following potential oversight and legislative actions with respect to
maintenance and sustainment:

Aircraft Maintainers, GAO-19-160, February 5, 2019, p. 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-160.pdf.
86 Ibid.
87 For example, as of November 2022, Bulgarian Air Force pilots were enrolled in an advanced English course before
beginning pilot training. Janes, “Bulgaria – Air Force,” August 23, 2022, at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/
jwafa038-JWAF.
88 GAO, Strategy Needed to Improve Retention of Experienced Air Force Aircraft Maintainers, GAO-19-160, February
5, 2019, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-160.pdf.
89 Alex Hollings, “Why Can’t NATO Give Ukraine F-15s or F-16s? It’s About More than Pilot Training,” Sandboxx,
April 4, 2022, at https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/why-cant-nato-give-ukraine-f-15s-or-f-16s-its-about-more-than-pilot-
training/.
90 Christine Thropp, “Navy Soliciting F-16 Aircraft Maintenance, Logistics Support Services,” GOVCON Wire,
September 9, 2022, at https://www.govconwire.com/2022/09/navy-soliciting-f-16-aircraft-maintenance-logistics-
support-services/. The Navy reportedly operates 26 F-16s. For more information see Jamie Hunter, “The Navy Just
Received Its First Surplus F-16s From The Air Force (Updated),” The Warzone, April 20, 2022, at
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/the-navy-will-receive-its-first-surplus-f-16s-from-the-air-force-today.
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 seek details on what DOD could provide Ukraine to maintain and sustain U.S.-
manufactured aircraft, including training for Ukrainian aircraft maintenance
personnel or contract maintenance;
 seek clarification from the Government of Ukraine on whether it intends to
follow a model of maintaining and sustaining U.S.-manufactured fighter jets with
their own personnel or follow a model of using contract maintenance providers;
and
 explore amending USAI (P.L. 114-92, §1250) to authorize funding for Ukrainian
aircraft maintenance training should U.S.-manufactured fighter jet transfers
occur, if the plan is for Ukraine to use its own personnel.
Providing Munitions
If Ukraine were to adopt a strategy of seeking air superiority with advanced western aircraft, it is
likely that the Ukrainian Air Force would attempt to obtain significant numbers of advanced
western-manufactured munitions. Currently most advanced western munitions require guidance
and communications found only in advanced western aircraft, and munitions for current
Ukrainian fighter jets that would put them in parity with Russian fighter jets would need to come
mainly from Russia. Therefore, the advantages of transferring advanced western fighter jets in
seeking air superiority are likely to be realized only if paired with large quantities of western-
manufactured munitions.91 Ukraine’s ability to military operations has been limited because it
does not have advanced munitions comparable to Russian aircraft.92 DOD decided to transfer
HARM missiles to Ukraine to improve its ability to conduct SEAD93 (although the HARM
missiles are not as fully capable on Ukrainian fighter jets as they would be on U.S. aircraft)94, and
to transfer Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) through the National
Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) to conduct air defense.95
If the Administration were to propose a transfer of fighter aircraft to Ukraine, Congress could
consider the cost, impact, and ability of munitions transfers on U.S. forces through its oversight
and appropriations functions. Some Members may oppose the transfer of advanced missiles such
as HARM and AMRAAM because they are relatively expensive and difficult to replace. For
example, a single AMRAAM is budgeted at $1.181 million in FY2023 and scheduled for delivery
in April 2025—approximately two years after the contract award.96 Other Members may opt to

91 See CRS Report R45996, Precision-Guided Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress. Almost all advanced
munitions for U.S. fighter jets have guidance systems that need links to the avionics in the aircraft itself, which makes
the munitions compatible only with specifically-designed aircraft.
92 “Ukraine Has Momentum. What It Needs Now Are Munitions,” The Economist, November 19, 2022, at
https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/11/17/ukraine-has-momentum-what-it-needs-now-are-munitions. According
to The Military Balance, Ukraine operates a series of Soviet-era anti-radiation and air-to-air missiles. See “Russia and
Eurasia,” in The Military Balance 2022 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022), p. 213.
93 DOD, “USD (Policy) Dr. Kahl Press Conference,” transcript, August 8, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3120707/usd-policy-dr-kahl-press-conference/.
94 Rachel S. Cohen and Joe Gould, “With a mix of donated weapons, Ukraine’s defenders adapt in war,” Air Force
Times, September 28, 2022, at https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2022/09/28/with-a-mix-of-donated-weapons-
ukraines-defenders-adapt-in-war/.
95 For more information on NASAMS, see CRS In Focus IF12230, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
(NASAMS), by Andrew Feickert.
96 U.S. Air Force FY2023 Missile Procurement Budget Justification, pp. 73-75, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/
84/documents/FY23/PROCUREMENT_/FY23%20Air%20Force%20Missile%20Procurement.pdf?ver=
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authorize DOD to buy the full complement of munitions if the United States transfers U.S.-
manufactured fighter jets to Ukraine, to authorize instead less expensive munitions for other
weapons systems, or to authorize purchase of a lesser number of fighter jet munitions and
munitions for other weapons systems.
In the event of fighter aircraft transfer, the required munitions will depend on the airframe
selected, but many NATO aircraft are capable of employing U.S.-made air and ground munitions.
Recent announcements through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative for advanced
munitions—for example, HIMARS, NASAMS air defenses, and GPS-guided artillery shells—
have cost at least several hundreds of millions of dollars and will take years to manufacture,
whether those munitions would go directly to Ukraine or replenish drawdowns from U.S.
stockpiles.97 However, supporters of transferring fighter jets to Ukraine may conclude that the
capabilities provided to Ukraine justify the cost of providing these munitions, given the potential
military advantages of Ukrainian air superiority.
In addition, some analysts have noted that the U.S. munitions industrial base is currently
producing munitions at the maximum capacity that DOD funding is supporting.98 These analysts
have argued that transferring munitions to Ukraine poses a risk to U.S. military training and
operations. The Administration has said it transferred older missiles to Ukraine and continues to
evaluate DOD’s inventory of munitions to ensure it can meet future requirements.99 This strategy
may apply to any future weapons transfers as well. The Administration has publicized the transfer
of one type of advanced air-to-surface munition, HARM. Should a decision be made to transfer
Western aircraft, it is unclear what impact transferring other advanced air combat munitions
might have on U.S. military training and readiness. To speed replenishment of munitions,
Congress authorized multi-year procurement contracts for both Army and Air Force munitions in
the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263).100 While authorizing multi-year procurement for AGM-179
Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
(AMRAAM), the FY2023 NDAA did not authorize multi-year procurement for HARM
missiles.101
Congress, through its oversight and authorization roles, may consider questions regarding the
impact of a potential jet transfer on munitions costs and supplies. For example, can the industrial
base sustain both U.S. and Ukrainian munition demands? What is the cost of continuing to
transfer advanced munitions to Ukraine? How has the transfer of munitions affected U.S. defense
stockpiles?

QeRLpOSY7vcLmsKbr3C-Qw%3d%3d.
97 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory
Welt.
98 For example, see Mislav Tolusic, “Ukraine makes it obvious DoD has to change how it buys weapons,” Defense
News, October 13, 2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/10/13/ukraine-makes-it-obvious-
dod-has-to-change-how-it-buys-weapons/; and Maiya Clark and Jacob Montoya, “The War in Ukraine Continues; Can
the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?,” The Heritage Institute, May 5, 2022, at https://www.heritage.org/defense/
commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep.
99 DOD, “Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds a Press Briefing on Security Assistance in
Support of Ukraine,” transcript, August 24, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/
3138872/undersecretary-of-defense-for-policy-dr-colin-kahl-holds-a-press-briefing-on-se/.
100 See CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
101 P.L. 117-263, §1244 (c).
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Members may consider the following potential oversight actions:
 seek to participate in war games, conducted by both DOD entities and think
tanks, which analyze the rates which U.S.-manufactured fighter jets expend air-
to-air and air-to-ground missiles in conflict; and
 obtain DOD plans to increase munitions production and evaluate them in light of
a potential aircraft transfer to Ukraine.
Financing
Ukraine would likely require U.S. security assistance grants to procure and sustain advanced
aircraft for the foreseeable future. In general, aircraft procurement and sustainment represent a
significant financial investment for militaries.102 According to Janes, Ukraine spent approximately
$1.1 billion, or approximately 30.2% of its defense budget, on its air force in 2021.103 Within this
budget, Ukraine dedicated approximately $228.6 million, or 21%, for procurement and $386.5
million, or 36%, for operations and maintenance.
Procuring advanced fighter aircraft can be costly, as demonstrated by recent foreign military sales
(FMS) cases for F-16s in Slovakia and Bulgaria. In April 2018, DOD’s Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced a proposed FMS case to sell Slovakia 14 F-16s—along
with training, munitions, and aircraft sustainment—for a proposed value of $2.91 billion.104
Similarly, DSCA announced a proposed FMS case in April 2022 to sell eight F-16s to Bulgaria—
again including training, munitions, and aircraft sustainment—for $1.673 billion.105 These FMS
cases, on average, cost approximately $195 million per aircraft (including the additional
munitions and support),106 which is about 85% of the entire procurement budget of the Ukrainian
air force.
Advanced aircraft like the F-15 and F-16 would likely cost more to operate than Ukraine’s
current aircraft inventory. DOD reports the reimbursement rate (the amount DOD charges a third
party to pay for non-DOD use, roughly equivalent to the cost of operating an aircraft) of a single
seat F-16 as $10,866 per hour.107 Assuming this aircraft flies 250 hours per year, the annual
operations and maintenance cost for a single aircraft would be $2.7 million. Replacing all of
Ukraine’s Su-27s and MiG-29s with 70 F-16s could increase annual O&M costs at least $190
million, or about half of Ukraine’s reported operations and maintenance budget.108 Other aircraft

102 The U.S. military, for example, reports that it allocates $56.5 billion on aviation development and procurement, or
approximately 20.5% of its total investment budget. For more information, see DOD, FY2023 Program Acquisition
Costs by Weapon System, April 2022, p. i, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
FY2023/FY2023_Weapons.pdf.
103 Janes, “Defence Budget Tool: Ukraine Defence Budget by Activity, Air Force,” accessed November 2, 2022,
https://customer.janes.com/DefenceBudgets/Guided?view=chart&f=
COUNTRY(Ukraine)%3Cand%3EFORCE(Air%20Force)&pg=1&template=.
104 DSCA, Major Arms Sales, “Slovakia - F-16 Block 70/72 V Configuration Aircraft,” press release, April 4, 2018,
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/slovakia-f-16-block-7072-v-configuration-aircraft.
105 DSCA, Major Arms Sales, “Bulgaria - F-16 C/D Block 80 Aircraft,” press release, April 4, 2022,
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-f-16-cd-block-70-aircraft.
106 The Bulgaria FMS case on average costs $209 million per aircraft. The Slovakian FMS case on average costs $181
million per aircraft.
107 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY2022 Reimbursable Rates – Tabs B and C,” at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2022/2022_b_c.pdf.
108 The Military Balance 2022 reports that Ukraine had 36 MiG-29s and 34 Su-27s before the start of the 2022
invasion. See “Russia and Eurasia,” in The Military Balance 2022 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic
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options, such as the F-15 or the Typhoon, would likely cost more than that to operate. Some
countries the United States has exported aircraft to have been unable to maintain them. For
example, the United States sold 34 F-16s to Iraq to rebuild its air force.109 Since the United States
withdrew from Iraq and ended its contract maintenance assistance, Iraqi F-16s have experienced
readiness issues.110
Congress may consider which legal authorities and funding streams would be the most
appropriate and efficient to support the costs associated with U.S. training of Ukrainian
personnel, the potential new procurement and transfer of significant military equipment such as
aircraft and munitions, as well as maintenance, sustainment, and other logistics costs associated
with the transfer of such equipment.
Potential Policy Options for Congress
As Congress evaluates whether to transfer military aircraft to Ukraine or not, it may consider
three potential legislative options: (1) maintaining the current policy (see below), (2) transferring
used aircraft, and (3) procuring new aircraft. These options are not mutually exclusive, and
Congress may choose none, any, or all of them. The options that involve transfer of aircraft do not
prescribe a specific platform, and each available platform may fill different capability gaps. For a
more detailed analysis of platforms and roles, see Appendix B, Overview of Selected Aircraft
Options. The following discussion outlines each option and describes their respective advantages
and disadvantages.
Maintain the Status Quo
Congress may choose to maintain the Administration’s current policy regarding the transfer of
aircraft to Ukraine, which would require no congressional action. This option entails providing
Ukraine with spare parts for its Soviet-era aircraft, along with systems engineering to integrate
U.S.-developed munitions. In August 2022, when asked to respond to a question on what work
the Administration had done to consider transferring western aircraft, DOD Under Secretary Kahl
noted that, among critics of the Administration’s preference at the time not to transfer fighter
aircraft, “[n]ot very much has been noticed about the sheer amounts of spare parts and other
things that ‘we’ve done to help them [the Ukrainian Air Force] actually put more of their own
MiG-29s in the air and keep those that are in the air flying for a longer period of time.”111 Under
Secretary Kahl stated that DOD had transferred HARMs to Ukraine,112 elaborating that these
missiles “were not designed to fly off Russian equipment—they were designed to fly off our
aircraft and the Ukrainians in recent weeks have been using the HARM missiles.”113

Studies, 2022), p. 213.
109 CRS Report R44984, Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
110 Thomas Newdick, “The Iraqi Air Force’s F-16 Fleet Is On The Brink Of Collapse Despite Showy Flybys,” The War
Zone, January 7, 2021, at https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38594/the-iraqi-air-forces-f-16-fleet-is-on-the-brink-
of-collapse-despite-showy-flybys.
111 DOD, “USD (Policy) Dr. Kahl Press Conference,” transcript, August 8, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3120707/usd-policy-dr-kahl-press-conference/.
112 Ibid. For more information about HARM, see CRS Report R45996, Precision-Guided Munitions: Background and
Issues for Congress, by John R. Hoehn. Nathan J. Lucas is the current point of contact for congressional offices seeking
any further information.
113 DOD, “Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds a Press Briefing on Security Assistance in
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This option would likely be the least expensive way to maintain the Ukrainian Air Force. It also
raises several potential issues. First, a finite number of spare parts for former Soviet-era aircraft
are available to sustain flight operations. News organizations have reported that Poland, the
United States, and Germany have transferred their respective MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine to be
used for spare parts.114 As other nations follow suit, fewer MiG-29 aircraft would be available to
fly missions. In addition, Russia is not exporting aircraft or parts to enable Ukraine to sustain air
operations. Second, munitions compatibility may limit the MiG-29 fighter’s effectiveness.
Although some U.S.-made munitions (e.g., a laser-guided bomb called the Paveway) could
continue to be integrated into these aircraft, other more sophisticated munitions would be difficult
to integrate. For example, the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) would likely be unable to receive data from MiG-29s, thereby preventing these
missiles from being used.115 Similarly, global positioning system-guided bombs such as the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) need to interact with the aircraft to work as intended.116
Transfer Used Aircraft
Another option would be to transfer used fighter jets to Ukraine, either by transferring U.S.-
owned aircraft, or by brokering the transfer of inventory aircraft from an interested NATO or
other partner nation.117 Transferring used aircraft may benefit the Ukrainian Air Force by
reducing the challenges of supporting Soviet-era aircraft (as described above) and by increasing
the number, type, and sophistication of munitions the Ukrainian air force might use.118 Congress
could choose to act on this option by expanding or restricting the President’s ability to transfer
fighter aircraft to Ukraine in his exercise of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), 22 U.S.C.
§2318. Similarly, Congress could also act upon this option by funding or restricting U.S. support
for transfer of foreign aircraft under the USAI or Foreign Military Funding (FMF).119
This approach has certain advantages. It would enable the United States (or its allies) to provide
aircraft to Ukraine most quickly. Providing either U.S.-manufactured or NATO member-
manufactured aircraft would improve the Ukrainian air force’s capabilities, including its ability to
perform air-to-air, air-to-ground, and suppression-of-air defense missions. Western aircraft, such
as the F-16, the F-18 Hornet, or the JAS 39 Gripen, would be able to serve as a so-called “multi-

Support of Ukraine,” transcript, August 24, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/
3138872/undersecretary-of-defense-for-policy-dr-colin-kahl-holds-a-press-briefing-on-se/.
114 Gaston Dubois, “U.S. to send MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine, but as a source of spare parts,” Aviacionline, April 19,
2022, at https://www.aviacionline.com/2022/04/u-s-to-send-mig-29-aircraft-to-ukraine-but-as-a-source-of-spare-parts/,
and David Axe, “Ukraine Gets More MiG Parts. But Kyiv’s Old Fighters Won’t Last Forever,” Forbes, June 22, 2022,
at https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/06/22/ukraine-gets-more-mig-parts-but-kyivs-old-fighters-wont-last-
forever/?sh=868ba3e6d8eb.
115 “AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM),” Air Force Technology, June 12, 2020, at
https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/aim-120-advanced-medium-range-air-to-air-missile-amraam/.
116 DOD, Department of the Air Force, “Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31/32/38,” press release, at
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munition-gbu-313238/.
117 Valerie Insinna, “The US military now seems open to gifting Ukraine new fighter jets, but what type?,” Breaking
Defense, July 22, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/the-us-military-now-seems-open-to-gifting-ukraine-
new-fighter-jets-but-what-type/.
118 Lara Seligman, “U.S. general calls on West to send fighter jets to Ukraine ‘as soon as possible,’” Politico, June 3,
2022, at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/03/u-s-general-west-should-send-jets-to-ukraine-asap-00037173.
119 See Appendix A.
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role” fighter capable of performing many or all mission-sets. In addition, these aircraft would be
able to use sophisticated munitions such as AMRAAM and JDAM.120
This approach has several limitations. Assuming the availability of these fighter jets, used or older
aircraft have a limited service life. For example, older F-16s retiring from the Air Force may have
a limited lifespan121 and therefore might need to be replaced sooner than a newer aircraft. In
addition, older aircraft tend to have higher operating costs,122 potentially requiring additional U.S.
financial assistance to maintain flight operations.
Provide New Aircraft
A third potential option for Congress would be to authorize and appropriate Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) for Ukraine to procure new aircraft under foreign military sales (FMS).123
Compared with the status quo and used aircraft options, providing Ukraine with new aircraft
could offer both a long-term sustainment option and an increase in capability due to technological
advances.124
Congress may support the provision of such aircraft by NATO allies, in addition to or as an
alternative to U.S. provision. Congress could support transferring allied fighter jets if the cost
were lower, if the aircraft could be delivered more quickly, or if U.S. fighter jet production lines
were filling U.S. military force structure. Should Congress choose to support the transfer of
NATO fighter jets to Ukraine, FMF/FMS would likely not be an option, since the FMF structure
under the Arms Export Control Act is intended for the transfer of U.S.-manufactured defense
articles.125
Providing Ukraine with new aircraft offers several advantages. First, new aircraft incorporate the
latest technological developments and use the most advanced munitions, thereby offering
improved survivability against adversary aircraft and air defenses.126 Second, because new
aircraft are in production, spare parts are usually readily available, which improves the ability to
maintain and sustain aircraft operations for the foreseeable future. Finally, new aircraft are
typically designed to fly between 8,000 and 10,000 hours during their lifespan, providing
capability for decades.127

120 According to 2022 Military Balance, Ukraine operates AA-8 and AA-11 air-to-air missiles, which it developed in
the 1980s. Ukraine does not operate GPS-guided bombs such as the JDAM. For more information, see “Russia and
Eurasia,” in The Military Balance 2022 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022), p. 213.
121 Fighter jets are normally designed to fly between 8,000 and 10,000 hours. If the United States were to give Ukraine
fighter jets with 7,000 hours (leaving only 1,000 left on the airframe), these aircraft would likely need to be replaced
after approximately four years—assuming 250 hours per year.
122 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY2022 Reimbursable Rates – Tabs B and C,” at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2022/2022_b_c.pdf.
123 For more information see Appendix A.
124 For example, see Stefano D’urso, “First F-16V Block 72 Fighters Delivered To Greece,” The Aviationist, September
14, 2022, at https://theaviationist.com/2022/09/14/first-f-16v-block-72-delivered-to-greece/.
125 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “”Foreign Military Sales FAQ,” at https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-
sales-faq.
126 Lockheed Martin, “F-16 Fighting Falcon,” press release, at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-
16.html.
127 Saab, “A future-proof fighter jet,” press release, May 1, 2020, at https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2019/
may/a-future-proof-fighter-jet.
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There are several disadvantages to providing Ukraine with new aircraft. First, manufacturing a
new aircraft can take several years—an issue that has been exacerbated by supply chain issues
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and continuing consolidation and shrinkage of the
defense supplier base.128 Second, providing Ukraine with new aircraft would be more expensive
than providing it with either spare parts or used aircraft. For example, in a recent FMS case, the
United States sold eight F-16 Block 70s to Bulgaria for approximately $209 million per aircraft
(which included a starting munitions and training package).129 By comparison, the United States,
through EDA authorities, transferred three used F-16s to Italy in 2015 for a total of $23.8
million.130
Each of the three general options warrants different mechanisms for the Administration to utilize.
As previously mentioned, a potential transfer could include one or multiple options, offering
various oversight considerations for Congress. More information on these options and the
associated considerations can be found in Appendix A.

128 Valerie Insinna, “COVID supply chain woes add yearlong delay to first F-16 rollout at new facility,” Breaking
Defense, November 17, 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/covid-supply-chain-woes-add-yearlong-delay-to-
first-f-16-rollout-at-new-facility/; Ilene Wolff, “Can the Defense Industry Unkink Supply Chains to Meet Demands?”
SME Media, November 21, 2022, at https://www.sme.org/technologies/articles/2022/november/can-the-defense-
industry-unkink-supply-chains-to-meet-demands/.
129 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Major Arms Sales, “Bulgaria – F-16 C/D Block 70 Aircraft,” press
release, April 4, 2022, at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-f-16-cd-block-70-aircraft.
130 The total value of FMS cases include equipment, sustainment, maintenance, and other logistics costs whereas the
value of EDA includes just the equipment. DSCA, “Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Database Tool,” accessed on
October 21, 2022, at https://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda.
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Appendix A. Overview of Foreign Assistance
Programs and Authorities for Ukraine
The United States has used a variety of security assistance programs and authorities to help build
the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise
efforts across multiple spending accounts. These programs and authorities may assist the transfer
of U.S.-manufactured fighter aircraft to Ukraine, should the United States decide to do so. Prior
to the 2022 war, the two primary accounts were the State Department’s Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).131
Congress funded FY2022 and FY2023 security assistance packages with more than $28 billion in
regular and supplemental appropriations, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2022,132 the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022,133 and the Continuing
Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023.134 In total, FY2022 and
FY2023 appropriations include $14.05 billion to replenish DOD equipment stocks sent to
Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority (PDA); $9.3 billion for DOD’s USAI; and $4.65
billion in FMF for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.”135 USAI
packages have included training, equipment, and advisory efforts to enhance Ukraine’s defensive
capabilities.136 FY2022 appropriations also directed that USAI funds be provided for logistics
support, supplies, and services; salaries and stipends; sustainment; weapons replacement; and
intelligence support. Prior to FY2022, a portion of annual USAI funds was contingent on DOD
and the State Department certifying Ukraine’s progress on key defense reforms. The United
States also has been providing defense items to Ukraine via PDA, by which the President can
authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks without congressional
approval in response to an “unforeseen emergency.”137 Since August 2021, the Biden
Administration has authorized 30 drawdowns valued at over $18.3 billion, through January 19,
2023.138
The United States has also assisted Ukraine pursuant to DOD’s security cooperation authorities,
notably Building Partner Capacity and Defense Institution Building,139 and International Military
Education and Training (IMET), which has provided professional military education at U.S.
defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded
security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law
enforcement training, and capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction.

131 State Department FMF authorities are codified in 22 U.S.C. §2763. DOD’s USAI was originally authorized in P.L.
114-92, §1250.
132 P.L. 117-103, Division N.
133 P.L. 117-128.
134 P.L. 117-180.
135 FY2022 supplemental appropriations also have included funds for additional U.S. troop deployments to Europe.
136 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory
Welt.
137 22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1).
138 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory
Welt.
139 Building Partner Capacity authorities are codified in 10 U.S.C. §333. Defense Institution Building authorities are
codified in 10 U.S.C. §332.
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Authorities for Transferring Military Equipment
The Biden Administration could potentially use one or more of the following authorities to
transfer fighter jets to Ukraine: Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), Excess Defense Articles
(EDA), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).140 Both EDA and PDA would allow the
Administration to transfer “used” or older aircraft to Ukraine, whereas FMS would allow for the
procurement of new aircraft.
The President can authorize the immediate transfer of defense articles and services from U.S.
stocks without congressional approval in response to an “unforeseen emergency” via PDA (22
U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)).141 Under PDA, the President directs DOD to provide on-stock defense
articles or military services to a foreign country or international organization. Prior to exercising
PDA, the President must notify Congress, in accordance with 22 U.S.C. §2411, that an emergency
exists which requires the immediate provision of U.S. military assistance, including a justification
for the scope and value of the approved drawdown. The State Department must determine
recipient country eligibility pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §2311 and obtain the necessary assurances
from the proposed recipient country pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §2314.
The aggregate value of all drawdowns authorized in any fiscal year under 22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)
may not exceed $100 million. Prior to and immediately following Russia’s renewed invasion of
Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Congress increased the PDA (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) funding cap
for FY2022 from $100 million up to $200 million via P.L. 117-70; up to $300 million via P.L.
117-86; up to $3 billion via P.L. 117-103; and up to $11 billion via P.L. 117-128. Since August
2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 26 drawdowns totaling more than $11.7 billion in
U.S. defense articles and services from DOD stocks.142
EDA refers to DOD and United States Coast Guard (USCG)-owned defense articles that are no
longer needed and, as a result, have been declared excess by the U.S. Armed Forces. This excess
equipment is offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an “as is, where is”
basis.143 As such, EDA is a hybrid between sales and grant transfer programs. EDA, however,
transfers equipment only and does not include support for sustainment, refurbishment,
transportation, or training.144 According to DOD, the EDA program works best in helping friends
and allies augment current inventories of like items with a support structure already in place.145 In
some cases, EDA-eligible countries may use FMF to open a transportation case that enables them
to receive the EDA.146 EDA grants or sales that contain significant military equipment or have an

140 CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities, by
Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti.
141 There are different types of drawdowns; however, this section only discusses the drawdown authorized by 22 U.S.C.
§2318(a)(1). This section does not include drawdowns authorized under 22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(2) or 22 U.S.C.
§2348a(c)(2).
142 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia,
Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
143 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM).” C11.3.1.
Definition and Purpose. In practice, this means a recipient must pay all refurbishment costs and transportation costs. In
some cases, recipients may use FMF to open a transportation case that enables them to receive the EDA. The cost of
refurbishment is often a deterrent to seeking EDA transfer.
144 DSCA, SAMM, C6.4. Case Execution - Logistics.
145 Ibid.
146 All FMS-eligible countries can request EDA. An EDA grant transfer to a country must be justified to Congress for
the fiscal year in which the transfer is proposed as part of the annual congressional justification documents for military
assistance programs. There is no guarantee that an EDA offer will be made on a grant basis; each EDA transfer is
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Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

original acquisition cost of $7 million or more require a 30-calendar day congressional
notification.147
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) refers to government-to-government sales between the United
States and eligible international purchasers, normally allies and international partners.148 FMS is a
Department of State program that is implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD) through
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).149 DSCA provides the rules and procedures
for FMS, including for coordination with State, in the Security Assistance Management
Manual.150 There are three stages in the FMS process, which begins once a partner formally
submits a Letter of Request (LOR) in the Pre-Case Development stage. In the Case Development
stage, the DOD evaluates and validates the LOR and develops a proposed Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) for response, which includes amendments and modifications. If the case value
reaches a certain dollar threshold, Congress is then formally notified and has the opportunity to
prohibit or modify the proposed sale. After the congressional review period, if applicable, is
complete, DOD may present the LOA to the partner for acceptance and signing. The final and
longest stage is Case Execution, in which the FMS case is implemented and eventually closed
out. DOD uses what it refers to as a Total Package Approach (TPA) to ensure that FMS customers
can operate and maintain their purchased items in the future and in a manner consistent with U.S.
intent.151 International purchasers must agree to pay in U.S. dollars, by converting their own
national currency or, under limited circumstances, though reciprocal arrangements.152 When the
purchase cannot be financed by other means, credit financing or credit guarantees can be
extended if allowed by U.S. law. FMS cases can also be directly funded by DOS using Foreign
Military Financing appropriations.153
The Biden Administration also could potentially use the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease
Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-118), which modified provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms
Export Control Act to bypass bureaucratic barriers for leasing or lending U.S. defense articles to
Ukraine and neighboring countries. Additionally, the U.S. could broker the transfer of U.S.-origin
aircraft from the inventories of NATO allies or other international partners to Ukraine through a
Third Party Transfer (TPT).154

considered on a case-by-case basis. C11.3.2.2. Eligibility for EDA Grants. See also 22 U.S.C. §2321j.
147 22 U.S.C. §2321j(f)(1).
148 See 22 U.S.C. §2753 regarding provisions for eligibility for transfer of U.S. defense articles or services.
149 FMS are authorized by Section 22 of the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. §2762(a)]. For more, see “Foreign
Military Sales Process” in CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to
Foreign Entities.
150 Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). See, for
example, Chapter 4 - Foreign Military Sales Program General Information; Chapter 5 - Foreign Military Sales Case
Development; Chapter 6 - Foreign Military Sales Case Implementation and Execution (links in Chapter #).
151 DSCA, SAMM, C4.3.2. Total Package Approach (TPA) and C15.2.4.6. Total Package Approach (TPA).
152 DOD, SAMM, C9.3.2. Payment in U.S. Dollars. See also, 22 U.S.C. §2761 and 22 U.S.C. §2762.
153 DOD, SAMM, C9.7. Methods Of Financing.
154 For more information on TPT see Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Third Party Transfer
Process and Documentation,” accessed December 7, 2022.
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Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

Appendix B. Overview of Selected Aircraft Options
This appendix summarizes Ukraine’s current air force capabilities (Table B-1) and selected
potential aircraft capabilities (Table B-2). The aircraft types listed in Table B-2 are based on
Ukrainian requests and prominent policy discussions. To standardize aircraft comparisons, the
tables are derived from Janes articles.
Table B-1. Summary of Ukrainian Air Force Fighter Jets
Manufacturer/
Performance
Type
Country
Role
Characteristics
Option(s)
Other Users
Su-24a
Aviatsionnyi
Air-to-Ground 9 hardpoints
Status Quo
Algeria, Iran,
Voyenno
17,000 lb. ordnance
Russia, Sudan,
Promyshlennyi
Syria, Libya,
Komplex
565 nautical miles
Uzbekistan,
Sukhoi/Russian
Kazakhstan
Federation

Su-25b
Aviatsionnyi
Air-to-Ground 8 harpoints
Status Quo
Armenia,
Voyenno
9,700 lb. ordnance
Azerbaijan,
Promyshlennyi
Belarus,
Komplex
radius not reported
Bulgaria, Chad,
Sukhoi/Russian
Democratic
Federation
Republic of

Congo,
Equatorial
Guinea,
Georgia, Iraq,
Kazakhstan,
North Korea,
Niger, Peru,
Russian
Federation,
Sudan,
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Su-27c
Aviatsionnyi
Air Superiority 6 hardpoints
Status Quo
Angola,
Voyenno
6,600 lb. ordnance
Belarus, China,
Promyshlennyi
Eritrea,
Komplex
810 nautical miles
Algeria,
Sukhoi/Russian
Ethiopia, India,
Federation
Indonesia,

Kazakhstan,
Malaysia,
Russian
Federation,
Uganda,
Venezuela,
Vietnam,
Armenia,
Uzbekistan,
Myanmar
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Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

Table B-2. Summary of Selected Potential Aircraft
Manufacturer/
Performance
Type
Country
Role
Characteristics
Option(s)
Other Users
A-10Ca
Northrop
Air-to-Ground 11 hardpoints,
Used aircraft
United States
Grumman/
16,000 lb. ordnance
United States
540 nautical miles

F-15C/Db
Boeing/United
Air Superiority 8 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Japan, United
States
2,680 lb. ordnance
States
radius not available

F-16A/B/C/Dc
Lockheed
Air Superiority 6 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Bahrain,
Martin/United
Air-to-Ground 12,000 lb. ordnance New aircraft
Belgium, Chile
States
Denmark,
Suppression of 500 nautical miles
Egypt, Greece,
Air Defenses
Indonesia, Iraq,
Israel, South

Korea,
Morocco,
Netherlands,
Norway,
Oman,
Pakistan,
Poland,
Portugal,
Singapore,
Taiwan,
Thailand,
Turkey, United
Arab Emirates,
United States,
Venezuela
F/A-18C/Dd
Boeing/United
Air Superiority 9 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Finland,
States
Air-to-Ground 15,500 lb. ordnance
Kuwait,
Malaysia, Spain,
Suppression of (est.)
Switzerland,
Air Defense
290 nautical miles
United States

F/A-18E/Fe
Boeing/United
Air Superiority 11 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Australia,
States
Air-to-Ground 17,700 lb.
New aircraft
Finland, United
States
Suppression of 795 nautical miles
Air Defenses

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Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress

Manufacturer/
Performance
Type
Country
Role
Characteristics
Option(s)
Other Users
JAS 39A/C/E Gripenf Saab/Sweden
Air Superiority 6 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Brazil, Czech
Air-to-Ground 11,840 lb. ordnance New aircraft
Republic,
Hungary,
432 nautical miles
South Africa,
Sweden,
Thailand

Rafaleg
Dassault/France
Air Superiority 14 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Egypt, France,
Air-to-Ground 20,900 lb. ordnance New aircraft
Greece, India
570 nautical miles

Typhoonh
Eurofighter
Air Superiority 13 hardpoints
Used aircraft
Austria,
Jagdflugzeug
Air-to-Ground 14,330 lb. ordnance New aircraft
Germany, Italy,
GmbH/Germany,
Kuwait, Oman,
Italy, Spain,
325 nautical miles
Qatar, Saudi
United Kingdom
Arabia, Spain,
United

Kingdom
Sources:
a. CRS analysis of Janes, “Northrup Grumman (Fairchild) A-10 Thunderbolt II,” September 28, 2022,
https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAU_1667-JAU_; photo credit: https://www.military.com/
equipment/a-10-thunderbolt-ii.
b. CRS analysis of Janes, “Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) F-15 Eagle,” October 25, 2022,
https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAU_1449-JAU_; photo credit: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104501/f-15-eagle/.
c. CRS analysis of Janes, “Lockheed Martin (General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon,” July 21, 2022,
https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAU_1617-JAU_; photo credit: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/
the-buzz/why-russia-china-stil -fear-the-f-16-fighting-falcon-21976.
d. CRS analysis of Janes, “Boeing F/A-18 Hornet,” November 4, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/
Display/JAU_9146-JAU_; photo credit: https://www.homestead.afrc.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/
2000645452/mediaid/982332/.
e. CRS analysis of Janes, “Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet,” February 23, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/
Display/JAWA1185-JAWA; photo credit: https://www.homestead.afrc.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/
2000645452/mediaid/9823320/.
f.
CRS analysis of Janes, “Saab JAS 39 Gripen,” September 7, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/
JAWA0989-JAWA; photo credit: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/pictures-the-jas-39-gripen-is-now-a-
nato-warbird/.
g. CRS analysis of Janes, “Dassault Rafale,” November 7, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/
JAWA0257-JAWA; photo credit: https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAWA0257-JAWA.
h. CRS analysis of Janes, “Eurofighter Typhoon,” August 31, 2022, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/
JAWA0478-JAWA; photo credit: https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/uk-to-retire-tranche-1-
typhoons-with-more-than-half-of-airframe-hours-remaining.
Note: This table includes the aircraft combat radius, if reported, to enable a comparison with the U.S. fighter
combat radius figures in Table B-1.
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Author Information

Nathan J. Lucas, Coordinator
Christina L. Arabia
Section Research Manager
Analyst in Security Assistance, Security

Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade

Patrick Parrish

National Defense Fellow

Acknowledgments
John R. Hoehn, former CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs, was the original lead author
and coordinator of this report

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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