Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

September 22, 2022 – December 28, 2022 R47246

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress
December 28, 2022
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human
rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959
Mark P. Sullivan
Cuban revolution. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
Specialist in Latin
2018 and as head of Cuba’s Communist Party in 2021. Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019
American Affairs
that introduced some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the economy and the

Communist Party’s predominant political role. In July 2021, anti-government demonstrations
broke out throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans protesting poor economic conditions

(e.g., food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and long-standing repression of freedom of
expression and other basic rights. The government responded with harsh measures that led to the prosecution of hundreds of
protesters. The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, reduced support
from Venezuela, and increased U.S. economic sanctions.
U.S. Policy
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban
government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation
strengthening—and at times easing—U.S. economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
away from sanctions and toward engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic relations; the rescission of the
Cuban government’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; and an increase in travel, commerce, and the
flow of information to Cuba. The Trump Administration began to reverse course in 2017, introducing new sanctions,
including restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump Administration
had largely abandoned engagement and significantly increased sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
In its initial months in office, the Biden Administration announced it was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
human rights as a core pillar, and would examine policy decisions made by the prior Administration. After the Cuban
government’s harsh response to the July 2021 protests, the Biden Administration imposed a series of targeted financial
sanctions and visa restrictions on those involved. In May 2022, the Administration announced several policy changes aimed
at increasing support for the Cuban people. The Administration increased immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in
Havana and announced it would reinstate an immigration parole program for Cuban families. It eased travel restrictions by
reauthorizing flights to cities beyond Havana and reinstating group people-to-people travel. It also eased restrictions on
sending cash remittances by eliminating dollar and frequency limits for family remittances and by reauthorizing donative
remittances to Cuban nationals.
Driven by Cuba’s difficult economic conditions and political repression, among other factors, irregular Cuban migration to
the United States surged over the past year. U.S. and Cuban officials held semiannual migration talks in April and November
2022 on the implementation of bilateral migration accords. The Administration announced in September 2022 that the U.S.
Embassy in Havana would resume full immigrant visa services in early January 2023.
Legislative Action in the 117th Congress
The 117th Congress has continued to support funding for Cuba democracy programs and broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2022,
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), and its explanatory statement, Congress allocated
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting, fully funding the Administration’s request. The law did not specify an amount for
Cuba democracy programs, but an estimated $20 million (the amount requested) is to be provided. For FY2023, Congress
again provided $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division
K), and its explanatory statement and again did not specify an amount for democracy programs. The explanatory statement
also contained several Cuba-related reporting requirements. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263) also contained several Cuba-related provisions, including two reporting requirements.
In other significant action, in July 2022, the House rejected H.Amdt. 300 to H.R. 8294 (a six-bill FY2023 appropriations
measure), which would have prevented funding to enforce a prohibition on private financing for U.S. agricultural exports.
The House and the Senate also approved several human rights resolutions: H.Res. 760 (November 2021); S.Res. 37 (April
2021); S.Res. 81 (May 2021); S.Res. 310 (August 2021), and S.Res. 489 (January 2022). In addition, the Senate approved S.
2045 in July 2021, which would rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a democracy activist.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 39 link to page 49 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Appendix A provides comprehensive information on legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 117th Congress. Appendix B
provides links to U.S. government information and reports on Cuba. Also see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy
Overview, and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
Congressional Research Service

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment
Brief Historical Background1
Cuba became an independent nation in 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492 until the
Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, Cuba became a
major sugar producer, with slaves from Africa brought in to work the sugar plantations. The drive
for independence from Spain grew stronger in the second half of the 19th century, but
independence came about only after the United States entered the conflict, when the USS Maine
sank in Havana Harbor after an explosion of undetermined origin. In the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War, the United States ruled Cuba for four years until Cuba became an
independent country in 1902. Nevertheless, the United States retained the right to intervene in
Cuba to preserve Cuban independence and maintain stability in accordance with the Platt
Amendment,2 which became part of the Cuban Constitution of 1901 and was incorporated into a
1903 bilateral treaty; the United States established a naval station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in
1903, which remains in operation today.3 The United States intervened militarily three times
between 1906 and 1921 to restore order. In 1934, as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good
Neighbor Policy toward Latin America, the United States and Cuba negotiated a new bilateral
relations treaty that abrogated the 1903 treaty with the Platt Amendment language.4
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation often was dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952,
and his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship that fueled popular unrest and set the stage for
Fidel Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. After
a brief jail term, he went into exile in Mexico, where he formed the 26th of July Movement.
Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista dictatorship. His
revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra Mountains in eastern Cuba, and it
joined with other resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the country on
January 1, 1959, ushering in 47 years of rule under Fidel Castro, who stepped down from power
in 2006 due to poor health.

1 Sources for this background section include U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” November 7, 2011,
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/cuba/191090.htm; Rex A. Hudson, ed., Cuba, A Country Study, Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002), at https://www.loc.gov/item/2002018893/;
Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: Cuba,” September 2006, at https://www.loc.gov/
item/copr/6711798/; Leslie Bethell, ed., Cuba, A Short History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriations bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.
3 For background on the naval station, see CRS Report R44137, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal
Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements.
4 National Archives, Milestone Documents, “Platt Amendment (1903),” February 8, 2022, at https://www.archives.gov/
milestone-documents/platt-amendment.
Congressional Research Service

1

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Although Fidel Castro promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took
power, he instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute
thousands of opponents. Under the revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually
displaced members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet
Union, and relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government
expropriated U.S. properties. In April 1961, Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was
socialist; in December 1961, he proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist. Over the next 30 years,
Cuba was a close ally of the Soviet Union, depending on it for significant assistance until the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Castro ruled by decree until 1976, when he became the country’s president (technically, president
of the Council of State) under a new constitution that set forth the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC), which Castro headed, as the leading force in state and society. When Fidel stepped down
in July 2006, his brother Raúl—Cuba’s longtime defense minister and first vice president—
became provisional president. In 2008, after Fidel announced he would not be returning to
government, Cuba’s National Assembly chose Raúl as president. He went on to serve two five-
year terms until April 2018. More than 10 years after stepping down from power, Fidel Castro
died in November 2016 at 90 years of age.
Raúl Castro’s government (2006-2018) stands out for two significant policy developments. First,
the government implemented a series of gradual market-oriented economic policy changes,
including authorization for limited private-sector activity, the legalization of private property
rights, and an opening to further foreign investment. Critics, however, maintain that the
government did not go far enough toward enacting deeper reforms needed to stimulate the Cuban
economy and foster sustainable economic growth. The second notable policy development was
Congressional Research Service

2

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

the rapprochement in bilateral relations with the United States during the Obama Administration,
which led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and government-to-government
engagement and to cooperation on a wide range of issues.
Political Conditions
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state
Cuba at a Glance
with a government that has sharply restricted
basic human rights since the early years of
Population: 11.1 mil ion (2021, ONEI)
the 1959 revolution.5 The government does
Area: 42,426 square miles (ONEI), slightly smaller than
Pennsylvania
not have direct elections for president;
instead, pursuant to Cuba’s Constitution, the
Real GDP Growth: -0.2% (2019); -10.9% (2020);
1.3% (2021 est.); 3.2% (2022 est.) (EIU)
national legislature—the National Assembly
Key Trading Partners: Exports (2020): Canada, 27.0%;
of People’ s Power—elects the president from
China, 21.8%; Netherlands,11.5%; Spain, 8.4%;
among its representatives for a five-year
Venezuela, 7.3%; Imports (2020): Venezuela, 14.7%;
term. Although National Assembly
China, 13.3%; Spain, 11.7% (ONEI)
representatives are elected by direct vote,
Life Expectancy: 79 years (2020, WB)
only one candidate is offered for each seat
Literacy (adult): 99.8% (2018, UNDP)
and candidates are chosen by candidacy
Legislature: National Assembly of People’s Power,
commissions controlled by the PCC, the only
currently 605 members (five-year term, elected in
recognized party.
March 2018; next due in 2023).
Sources: National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI),
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as
Republic of Cuba; U.N. Development Programme (UNDP);
president in April 2018 and as head of the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); and World Bank (WB).
PCC at its eighth party congress in April
2021. The departure of Castro and other older
leaders from the PCC’s Politburo, the party’s highest decisionmaking body, reflects a
generational change in Cuban leadership that began during Raúl Castro’s rule. Even with his
retirement as head of government and head of the PCC, Raúl Castro has remained an important
figure and continues to advise President Díaz-Canel. When countrywide protests broke out in July
2021, Raúl Castro attended an emergency meeting of the Politburo and subsequently participated
in a mass rally held to show support for the government.6
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019. The constitution introduced some reforms, including a
limitation on the president’s age (60 years, beginning first term) and tenure (two five-year terms),
the addition of a presidentially appointed prime minister, and some market-oriented economic
reforms, such as the right to private property and the promotion of foreign investment.
Nevertheless, the new constitution—the nation’s second under PCC rule—maintained the state’s
dominance over the economy and the PCC’s predominant political role. In October 2019, the
National Assembly reelected Díaz-Canel as president, pursuant to the new constitution. In
December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed then-Tourism Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as Cuba’s
prime minister, essentially serving as the president’s top administrator in implementing
government policy.

5 See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2021, February 2022, which classifies the Cuban
government as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, March
2021, which classifies Cuba as not free based on the government’s poor records on political rights and civil liberties, at
https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-world/2022.
6 Mauricio Vicent, “Raúl Castro’s Last Mission: Ensuring Cuban Socialism Outlives Its Founders,” El País, May 9,
2022.
Congressional Research Service

3

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

After more than four years in office, President Díaz-Canel’s most notable challenges have
included the health and economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic, a shift in U.S. policy away from bilateral engagement toward increased economic
sanctions, and increased social unrest emanating from poor economic conditions and repression
against those advocating for freedom of expression. Amid these challenges, the Díaz-Canel
government has continued to implement some market-oriented economic reforms, including long-
awaited currency reform, and developed its own COVID-19 vaccines to combat the pandemic
(see textbox on COVID-19 in Cuba below). The government also cracked down severely on
artists and civil society activists pressing for freedom of expression and responded harshly to
countrywide protests that erupted in July 2021, with hundreds of protesters arrested and
prosecuted. Although Díaz-Canel has received criticism internationally for his government’s
increased use of repressive policies, Cuba’s one-party rule does not appear to be in jeopardy, in
large part due to the state’s domestic security apparatus and control of virtually all media.
Human Rights
The Cuban government has sharply restricted freedom of expression and other basic rights since
the early years of the Cuban revolution. Over the years, it has harassed members of human rights
and other civil society organizations. These organizations currently include the Ladies in White
(Las Damas de Blanco), formed in 2003 by the female relatives of the “group of 75” dissidents
arrested that year; the Patriotic Union of Cuba (Unión Patriótico de Cuba, or UNPACU),
established in 2011 with the goal of working peacefully for civil liberties and human rights; and
the San Isidro Movement (Movimiento San Isidro, or MSI), formed in 2018 by independent
artists, musicians, writers, and scholars in response to the government’s efforts through Decree-
law 349 to restrict artistic expression not authorized by the state.7 The Cuban government also
regularly harasses and restricts the activities of independent journalists critical of the government
through arbitrary detentions, threats, and censorship. According to Reporters Without Borders’
2022 World Press Freedom Index, Cuba ranked near the bottom, 173rd out of 180 countries
worldwide.8
Amid Cuba’s repressive media environment, various independent Cuban blogs and media outlets
have been established over the past 15 years. These outlets have benefited from the government’s
expansion of internet connectivity since 2015. The increase in social media use in Cuba (through
foreign platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp) has opened up a new avenue for
freedom of expression. In response, the government has cracked down on those using social
media to express critical dissent. The government has interrogated and fined journalists and
government critics using social media, citing Decree-law 370, in force since July 2019, which
prohibits the dissemination of information “contrary to the social interest, morals, good manners,
and integrity of people.”9
Increased Repression. Since late 2020, the human rights situation in Cuba has deteriorated
considerably. As described below, the government cracked down on artists and others advocating
for freedom of expression beginning in November 2020, harshly responded to countrywide

7 “Decree 349: What Does It Say and What Does It Imply?” Diario de Cuba, December 10, 2018; “Cuba: Harassment
of San Isidro Movement Exemplifies Ongoing Assault on Freedom of Expression,” Amnesty International, November
20, 2020.
8 Reports Without Borders, “Cuba,” in 2022 World Press Freedom Index, May 3, 2022, at https://rsf.org/en/country/
cuba.
9 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022, January 2022.
Congressional Research Service

4

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

protests that erupted in July 2021, and suppressed an opposition civic march planned for
November 2021.
The November 2020 crackdown occurred after Cuban rapper and MSI member Denis Solís
González was arrested on November 9, 2020. He was charged with “contempt for public
authority” and sentenced to eight months in prison. In response, MSI members conducted a
peaceful protest, which authorities disrupted.10 Several MSI members subsequently began a
hunger strike at the home of MSI leader Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara. Cuban authorities broke
into the home on November 26, alleging violations of COVID-19 protocols, and detained over a
dozen people. As word spread by social media, including videos of the government’s repression,
several hundred Cubans—many young artists—gathered in protest at the Ministry of Culture
overnight on November 27. Several observers dubbed the protest an awakening of civil society
energized by social media.11 The November protest also spurred the creation of 27N, a collective
of artists and journalists supportive of MSI. Motivated by the repression of the MSI, in February
2021, a group of well-known Cuban hip-hop artists released a song and music video, Patria y
Vida, critical of the government. The song became an instant hit and energized Cuban youth to
such an extent that the government reacted with a campaign attempting to discredit it.12
On July 11, 2021, widespread and largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations broke out in
Havana and throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans protesting shortages of food and
medicine, daily blackouts, slow progress on COVID-19 vaccinations, and long-standing
repression of freedom of expression and other basic rights. The protests were the largest since
1994, when Cuba was in the midst of an economic crisis following the loss of financial support
from the collapsed Soviet Union. As with the MSI protest in November 2020, social media
proved instrumental in bringing out Cubans to demonstrate.
The Cuban government responded to the July 2021 protests with harsh measures, including
widespread arrests and detentions of more than 1,000 protesters, civil society activists, journalists,
and bystanders. In a televised address, President Díaz-Canel denounced U.S. sanctions for
causing shortages of food, medicines, raw materials, and fuel. He acknowledged that some
Cubans who were protesting were experiencing shortages but asserted that a core group of
manipulators planned the demonstrations. Díaz-Canel called “for all revolutionaries in our
country, all communists, to take to the streets.”13 Human Rights Watch issued a report in October
2021 documenting “human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, ill-treatment in
detention, and abusive criminal proceedings” against 130 of the July 2021 protesters.14
In November 2021, the Cuban government denied permission and disrupted plans for a new civic
group, Archipiélago (organized through a Facebook forum), to conduct a countrywide “civic
march for change” on November 15. The government used police, state security, and civilian pro-
government mobs to thwart the planned protests. Cuban officials also threatened opposition

10 Solís was released on July 11, 2021. See “Sale de Prisión el Rapero Contestatario Denis Solís,” 14ymedio, July 12,
2021.
11 Economist, “The Movimiento San Isidro Challenges Cuba’s Regime,” December 5, 2020; and Ed Augustin, Natalie
Kitroeff, and Frances Robles, “‘An Awakening’: Cubans’ Access to the Internet Fosters Dissent,” New York Times,
December 10, 2020.
12 Osmel Ramirez Alvarez, “Patria y Vida Has Touched Cuban Youth in Particular,” Havana Times, March 27, 2021;
and Nora Gámez Torres, “A Song Asks Cubans to Drop Castro’s Chant ‘Homeland or Death.’ The Government Is on
Edge,” Miami Herald, February 23, 2021.
13 Gladys Leydis Ramos López, “We Defend the Revolution, Above All Else,” Granma, July 12, 2021.
14 Human Rights Watch, “Cuba: Peaceful Protesters Systematically Detained, Abused,” October 19, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

5

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

leaders with prosecution, and President Díaz-Canel accused the United States of playing a role in
trying to foment protest.15
Hundreds of the July 11, 2021, protesters have been tried and convicted, including more than 25
minors. As of the end of November 2022, the human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders
reported that Cuba had 1,034 political prisoners (up from 152 on July 1, 2021). Of these
prisoners, 751 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of conscience, 253 were under some
form of conditional release, and 30 were imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.16 Those
imprisoned include MSI leader Otero Alcántara (sentenced to five years), Maykel Castillo Pérez
(also known as Maykel Osorbo, a musician and hip-hop artist who participated in the Patria y
Vida video, sentenced to nine years), and UNPACU leader José Daniel Ferrer (home detention
revoked in August 2021, ordered to serve remaining four years in prison).
Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Below is a selection of organizations and publications that regularly report on human rights condition in Cuba.
Amnesty International (AI), Cuba, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/central-america-and-the-
caribbean/cuba/.
Cuban Prisoners Defenders, https://www.prisonersdefenders.org.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), https://www.hrw.org/americas/cuba.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2021, May 26, 2022, Chapter IV has a
section on Cuba, at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2021/Chapters/IA2021cap4B.Cuba-en.pdf.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
Annual Report 2021, Trends on the right to freedom of expression in the Western Hemisphere, May 26, 2022,
Cuba section, pp. 130-139, at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2021ENG.pdf.
U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2021, April 12, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cuba/.
U.S. Department of State, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report:, July 2022, Cuba section, pp. 193-195, at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/22-00757-TIP-REPORT_072822-inaccessible.pdf
Selected Cuban Independent Media: 14ymedio.com, independent digital newspaper, based in Havana, at
http://www.14ymedio.com/; El Toque, an independent multimedia platform focused on diverse topics, at
https://eltoque.com/; Periodismo del Barrio, focusing especial y on environmental issues, at
https://www.periodismodebarrio.org/; and TremendaNota, focusing on the LGBT+ community, at
https://www.tremendanota.com/.
Economic Conditions
Although the Cuban government has permitted an expansion of the private sector over the past
decade, the state still controls most means of production and employs a majority of the
workforce. Key sectors of the economy that generate foreign exchange include the export of
professional services (largely medical personnel); tourism, which has grown significantly since
the mid-1990s; nickel mining, with the Canadian mining company Sherritt International involved

15 Frances Robles, “Government Forces Disrupt Planned Protests in Cuba,” New York Times, November 16, 2021;
Mary Beth Sheridan and Alejandra Ibarra Chaoul, “Cuban Security Forces Throttle Planned Day of Nationwide
Demonstrations,” Washington Post, November 16, 2021; Marc Frank and Nelson Acosta, “With Cuban Dissidents
Wary or in Jail, Call for Fresh Protests Falls Flat,” Reuters News, November 15, 2021; and Nora Gámez Torres,
“Government’s Crackdown Intensifies in Cuba Weeks Ahead of a Planned Opposition March,” Miami Herald, October
26, 2021.
16 Cuban Prisoners Defenders, “Informe Mensual de Prisioneros Políticos” y “Lista de Presos Políticos,” December 8,
2022.
Congressional Research Service

6

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

in a joint investment project; and biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, which supply the domestic
health care system and has fostered a significant export industry.
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the
COVID-19 in Cuba
economic shutdown associated with the
Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19
COVID-19 pandemic (see text box), reduced
pandemic initially kept cases and deaths low, but both
support from Venezuela due to that country’s
increased in late 2020 and surged until August 2021. The
economic crisis over the past several years,
country experienced another surge in cases in January
2022 due to the Omicron variant, but deaths remained
and U.S. economic sanctions. The Cuban
low, partly because of high vaccination rates. As of
government reports the economy contracted
December 2022, Cuba reported over 8,500 deaths since
by 10.9% in 2020 and grew by 1.3% in 2021;
the pandemic began, with a mortality rate of 75 per
in November 2022, the government cut its
100,000 (lower than many countries in the Americas)
2022 growth forecast from 4% to 2%, and in
and had ful y vaccinated 88% of its population, one of the
highest vaccination rates worldwide.
December 2022 projected 3% growth in
Cuba has produced its own COVID-19 vaccines—
2023.17 The Economist Intelligence Unit
Abdala, Soberana 2, and Soberana Plus (to be used in
(EIU) estimates 3.2% growth in 2022 and
combination with Soberana 2)—which it has used (along
forecasts an average growth rate of 3.7% in
with the Sinopharm vaccine from China) to vaccinate its
2023-2024.18 Cuba’s growth forecast has
population. Cuba has two other vaccines in clinical trials.
been affected by a slower recovery of the
Although the Cuban vaccines have not yet received
World Health Organization authorization, several
tourism sector, the impact of Russia’s
countries (e.g., Iran, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and
invasion of Ukraine on the global economy
Vietnam) have authorized their emergency use.
(including food and fuel prices), an August
Sources: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine,
2022 fire that severely damaged Cuba’s main
Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” December
oil storage facility, and Hurricane Ian, which
15, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality; Josh
Holder, “Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the
caused severe damage to western Cuba in
World,” New York Times, December 12, 2022; Sara Reardon,
late September 2022 and a power outage
“Cuba’s Bet on Home-Grown COVID Vaccines Is Paying Off,”
across the country.
Nature, November 22, 2021; EFE News Service, “Cuba to Send

to WHO Information on Abdala Anti-COVID Vaccine in
Cash remittances from relatives living
March,” February 15, 2022; and Nelson Acosta, “Cuba Lifts
Mask Mandate as Vaccination Rate Soars and Deaths Plummet,”
abroad, especially in the United States,
Reuters News, May 31, 2022.
remain an important source of hard currency,
amounting to $3.7 billion in 2019.19 In 2020 and 2021, the amount of remittances sent to Cuba
declined significantly due to the disruption of flights during the pandemic and increased U.S.
sanctions, which caused Western Union to terminate its services to Cuba in November 2020. A
Canadian-based remittance-forwarding company estimates that cash remittances to Cuba fell to
$3 billion in 2020 and $1.9 billion in 2021.20
Cuba’s tourism sector has been especially affected by the pandemic. Due to pandemic-related
travel restrictions, the number of international visitors to Cuba fell sharply, from almost 4.3
million in 2019 to almost 1.1 million in 2020 and fewer than 400,000 in 2021.21 In the first 11

17 Agencia EFE, “Cuba Creció un 1,3% en 2021, Según Cifras Oficiales,” July 21, 2022; “Cuba Slashes Growth
Forecast as Economic Crisis Grinds On,” Reuters News, November 14, 2022; and “Cuba Forecasts Only Slight Growth
as Crisis Grips Island,” Reuters News, December 12, 2022.
18 EIU, Cuba Country Report, 4th quarter 2022, p. 8.
19 Havana Consulting Group and Tech, “COVID-19 puede hacer declinar las remesas a Cuba entre un 30 y 40% en
2020,” March 20, 2020.
20 RevoluGROUP Canada Inc., “RevoluSEND Remittances Adds Cuba and Morocco Topping 116 Countries,” news
release, February 18, 2022.
21 República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (ONEI), “Arribo de viajeros. Visitantes
internacionales. Al cierre de diciembre 2021,” February 4, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 22 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

months of 2022, Cuba received almost 1.4 million visitors, a large increase over 2021 but far
below the level in 2019.22 Increased U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba also contributed to a
reduction of visitors (see “U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances,” below). These
restrictions included changes eliminating people-to-people educational travel, prohibiting cruise
ships and private and corporate aircraft from going to Cuba, suspending commercial flights to
cities other than Havana, and prohibiting U.S. travelers from staying at over 400 hotels and
private residences identified by the State Department as owned or controlled by the Cuban
government.
Until 2021, the Díaz-Canel government largely continued a gradualist, cautious approach to
economic reform, mainly due to concern about the potential effects on political stability. In
December 2020, however, President Díaz-Canel announced in a televised address the elimination
of Cuba’s dual currency system; on January 1, 2021, the Cuban peso was fixed to a single
exchange rate of 24 pesos per U.S. dollar, and the Cuban convertible peso was phased out over
several months. Over the medium- to long-term, the currency unification is expected to eliminate
economic distortions. The policy moved had had significant costs, including high inflation, with
estimates ranging from 150%-500% by the end of 2021; inflation has spurred the growth of an
informal market for dollars and other convertible currencies. The EIU estimates that inflation
averaged 60% in 2022 and forecast an average rate of almost 37% in 2023, but that projection
may be jeopardized if the government is unable to resolve shortages.23
In early August 2022, the government announced the state banking system would begin
purchasing (but not selling) dollars and other convertible currencies at nearly five times the
current rate with the goal of undercutting the informal market and acquiring foreign currency. The
new rate for buying dollars was set at 120 pesos to the dollar (but reportedly would float),
compared with the official rate of 24 pesos and the informal market rate of 115 pesos.24 In late
August 2022, the Cuban government began selling dollars and other foreign currency with some
restrictions.25
Among other reforms, the Cuban government partially liberalized the labor market in February
2021 to allow private-sector participation in more than 2,000 professions. In August 2021, the
government legalized the establishment of small- and medium-sized businesses with fewer than
100 employees; by November 2022, the government reportedly had approved over 5,500 such
businesses.26 In another incremental measure announced in August 2022, the Cuban government

22 República de Cuba, ONEI, “Arribo de Viajeros. Visitantes internacionales. Información preliminar, Noviembre
2022,” December 20, 2022.
23 EIU, Cuba Country Report, 4th quarter 2022, pp. 8 and 9; Marc Frank, “Cuban Peso in Free Fall Against the Dollar,”
Reuters News, January 26, 2022; Pavel Vidal, “Economic Trend Report, Fourth Quarter, 2021,” Cuba Standard,
Economic Reports, March 2022.
24 Marc Frank, “Cuba More Than Quadruples Dollar/Peso Exchange Rate,” Reuters News, August 3, 2022. The
informal market rate continued to climb and, as of December 22, 2022, was 175 pesos to the dollar. For the most recent
rate, see El Toque, “Tasas de Cambio de Moneda en Cuba Hoy,” at https://eltoque.com/tasas-de-cambio-de-moneda-
en-cuba-hoy.
25 Marc Frank, “Cuba to Exchange Some Foreign Currency for Pesos After Two-Year Hiatus,” Reuters News, August
23, 2022.
26 BBC News, “Cuba Allows Small- and Medium-Sized Private Businesses,” August 7, 2021; Pavel Vidal, “Economic
Trend Report, First Quarter, 2022,” Cuba Standard, Economic Reports, June 2022; and “Cuba Seeks to Drum Up
Foreign Investment Despite Crisis,” Reuters News, November 15, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

8

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

said it plans to allow certain foreign investment in local wholesale and retail trade, although some
economists doubt whether this limited step will relieve shortages.27
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Historical Background28
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuba relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuba relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government, culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis, in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and in Panama; and the 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American
group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba—long a significant congressional concern—has
consisted largely of seeking to isolate the island nation through comprehensive economic
sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. Especially since the end of
the Cold War, Congress has actively shaped U.S. policy toward Cuba. Much of the congressional
debate has focused on economic sanctions, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 (LIBERTAD Act; P.L. 104-114). Both measures tightened U.S. economic
sanctions on Cuba that were first imposed in the early 1960s; however, both measures also
provided road maps for the normalization of relations, dependent on significant political and
economic changes in Cuba. Congress partially modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba
when it enacted the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L.
106-387, Title IX), allowing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with severely restrictive
financing options. Congress also has funded U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba
since the 1980s and Cuba democracy and human rights programs since the 1990s.
Policy Shifts Under the Obama and Trump Administrations29
President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba in December 2014 that
moved away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba toward a policy of
engagement and a normalization of relations. At the time, President Obama said his

27 Marc Frank, “Cuba Cracks Open Door to Foreign Investment in Domestic Trade, Reuters News, August 16, 2022;
and Nora Gámez Torres, “As Food Crisis Deepens, Cuba to Allow Some Foreign Investment in Wholesaling and
Retail,” Miami Herald, August 16, 2022.
28 For additional background, see CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999.
For an extensive review of the history of bilateral relations, see Ada Ferrer, Cuba: An American History (New York:
Scribner, 2021).
29 For more on Obama Administration policy, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th
Congress, and for more on Trump Administration policy, see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th
Congress and Through the Trump Administration.
Congressional Research Service

9

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Administration would “end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our
interests.” He maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about
democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated, “we can do more to support the Cuban people
and promote our values through engagement.”30
The policy shift led in July 2015 to the
Anomalous Health Incidents
restoration of diplomatic relations, which had
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
been severed in January 1961 by the
Havana community members suffered a series of
Eisenhower Administration. It also led to the
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
May 2015 rescission of the Cuban
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
government’s designation as a state sponsor
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source
of international terrorism, a designation that
of the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio
dated to 1982, and to the easing of some
frequency energy. U.S. officials maintain that
restrictions on travel and commerce with
investigations into the cause or source of these
Cuba in 2015 and 2016. The restoration of
anomalous health incidents have not reached a
conclusion. A number of U.S. government and military
relations resulted in increased government-
officials worldwide have reported these symptoms since
to-government engagement, with over 20
2016.
bilateral agreements on issues such as
In January 2022, press reports maintained that an interim
counternarcotics cooperation, oil spill
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report concluded that
preparedness and response, civil aviation,
a majority of cases worldwide are unlikely to have been
health cooperation, maritime issues, and
caused by a foreign adversary, although it noted that
some two dozen cases remain unexplained. In early
environmental cooperation. It also led to a
February 2022, a panel of experts convened by the
broad economic dialogue and numerous
Director of National Intelligence and the CIA Deputy
dialogues on regulatory issues, law
Director reported that pulsed radio frequency energy
enforcement, counterterrorism issues,
could plausibly explain the health symptoms but
property claims, and human rights, among
maintained that information gaps remain.
other topics.
Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 117-46) in September

2021 authorizing payment to CIA and State Department
President Trump unveiled his
personnel who experience certain brain injuries. The
Administration’s Cuba policy in June 2017,
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2022 (P.L.
117-81), approved in December 2021, has provisions to
introducing new sanctions and rolling back
address health care and treatment, national security
the Obama Administration’s efforts to
challenges, and U.S. government coordination of the
normalize relations. President Trump signed
response to the incidents.
a national security presidential memorandum
Sources: Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
(NSPM) replacing President Obama’s
“Complementary Efforts on Anomalous Health Incidents,”
February 2, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, “Most ‘Havana Syndrome’
October 2016 presidential policy directive
Cases Unlikely Caused by Foreign Power, CIA Says,” New York
laying out objectives for the normalization
Times, January 20, 2022; David A. Relman and Julie A. Pavlin,
process.
eds., An Assessment of Il ness in U.S. Government Employees and
31 New sanctions included a
Their Families at Overseas Embassies, National Academies of
prohibition on certain financial transactions
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2020.
with companies controlled by the Cuban
military, intelligence, or security services. In September 2017, the State Department reduced the
staff of the U.S. Embassy in Havana by about two-thirds in response to unexplained health

30 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” December 17, 2014, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes.
31 U.S. Department of State, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” 82 Federal Register 48875-
48878, October 20, 2017 (consists of the text of National Security Presidential Memorandum, NSPM-5, issued by the
President on June 16, 2017), at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/20/2017-22928/strengthening-the-
policy-of-the-united-states-toward-cuba; White House, “Presidential Policy Directive–United States-Cuba
Normalization,” October 14, 2016, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/14/presidential-
policy-directive-united-states-cuba-normalization.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 16 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana (see text box below). The
embassy staff reduction led to the suspension of most visa processing at the embassy and made it
difficult to carry out other embassy functions, including on-the-ground reporting on significant
economic and political developments in Cuba and outreach to civil society and human rights
activists.
Beginning in 2019, the Trump Administration significantly expanded U.S. sanctions on Cuba. It
reimposed some restrictions eased under the Obama Administration and imposed a series of new
sanctions designed to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights record and over its
support of the Nicolás Maduro government in Venezuela. The Trump Administration also allowed
lawsuits against those trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government; tightened
restrictions on U.S. travel and remittances to Cuba; and, in January 2021, again designated the
Cuban government as state sponsor of international terrorism.
Biden Administration Policy
In its initial months in office, the Biden Administration announced it was conducting a review of
policy toward Cuba, with human rights a core pillar, and would review policy decisions made by
the prior Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of
terrorism.32
In the aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the July 2021 protests, the Biden
Administration expressed solidarity with the Cuban protesters and criticized the Cuban
government for its repression. President Biden issued a statement asserting, “We stand with the
Cuban people and their clarion call for freedom and relief from the tragic grip of the pandemic
and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by
Cuba’s authoritarian regime.”33 Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared, “We join partners
across the hemisphere and around the world in urging the Cuban regime to respect the rights of
the Cuban people to determine their own future, something they have been denied for far too
long.”34
The Administration imposed targeted sanctions on Cuban officials involved in the repression. In
July and August 2021, the Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on three Cuban
security entities and eight officials. Between November 2021 and July 2022, the State
Department announced four rounds of visa restrictions against 50 individuals involved in
repressing protesters. (For more details, see “Key U.S. Sanctions,” below.)
In May 2022, the Administration announced several Cuba policy changes aimed at increasing
support for the Cuban people. The changes, which emanated from a policy review begun in 2021,
fall into four broad areas—facilitating family reunification, expanding authorized travel, easing
restrictions on remittances, and supporting Cuba’s private sector. According to a State
Department spokesperson, the changes are to provide Cubans with “additional tools to pursue life
free from Cuban government oppression and to seek greater economic opportunities.”35

32 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National
Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021.
33 White House, “Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Protests in Cuba,” July 12, 2021.
34 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press on Release of the 2021 Congressional
Report Pursuant to the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act,” July 12, 2021.
35 U.S. Department of State, “Biden Administration Expands Support to the Cuban People,” press statement, May 16,
2022.
Congressional Research Service

11

link to page 29 link to page 22 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

The Biden Administration implemented the policy changes through various steps and regulatory
changes undertaken by relevant U.S. departments and agencies. The Administration began
increasing immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana in May 2022 and said it
would reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, which was suspended in 2017
amid the drawdown of staff at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. In September 2022, the
Administration announced it would resume full immigration visa processing at the embassy in
early 2023, the first time since 2017, and subsequently announced a date of January 4, 2023, to
resume such full processing.36 Driven by Cuba’s difficult economic conditions and political
repression, among other factors, irregular Cuban migration to the United States has surged over
the past year (see “Migration Issues,” below).
With regard to travel and remittances, the Biden Administration partially eased restrictions,
although it kept some Trump Administration restrictions in place. Among the changes, the Biden
Administration reauthorized scheduled and charter flights to locations beyond Havana, reinstated
group people-to-people educational travel, eliminated dollar and frequency limits for family
remittances, and restored the category of donative remittances (sometimes referred to as non-
family remittances) to any Cuban national (see “U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances”).
The Administration also announced it would increase support for independent Cuban
entrepreneurs by authorizing greater access to U.S. internet services, applications, and e-
commerce platforms and by expanding access to microfinance and training.37
At the same time, the Administration has continued to speak out about human rights abuses in
Cuba and officials maintain that human rights issues will remain at the center of U.S. policy
toward Cuba.38 On the first anniversary of the July 11, 2021, protests, Secretary of State Blinken
issued a press statement asserting, “the United States recognizes the determination and courage of
the Cuban people as they continue to fight for respect for human rights” and that “it is
unacceptable that today, one year after these demonstrations, over 700 protesters remain behind
bars.”39
Key U.S. Sanctions
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece
of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban
government and influencing its behavior. President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade
between the United States and Cuba in February 1962,40 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA; P.L. 87-195), which authorizes the President “to establish and
maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.”41 At the same time,

36 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “U.S. Embassy in Havana Prepares for Full Resumption of
Immigrant Visa Services in Cuba, Will Accelerate Processing of Cuban Family Reunification,” September 21, 2022;
and U.S. Department of State, “Full Resumption of Interviews for all Immigrant Visa Categories in Havana in January
2023,” November 10, 2022.
37 U.S. Department of State, “Biden Administration Measures to Support the Cuban People,” fact sheet, May 16, 2022.
38 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on New Cuba Policy,” press briefing via
teleconference, May 16, 2022.
39 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “The First Anniversary of July 11, 2021, Protests,”
press statement, July 11, 2022.
40 Presidential Documents, “Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba,” 27 Federal Register 1085,
February 7, 1962.
41 In October 1960, under the Eisenhower Administration, exports to Cuba were strictly controlled under the authority
of the Export Control Act of 1949 in response to the expropriation of U.S. properties. This action in effect amounted to
Congressional Research Service

12

link to page 22 link to page 24 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

the Treasury Department issued the Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the
United States of all goods imported from or through Cuba.42 The authority for the embargo was
expanded in March 1962 to include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA, P.L. 65-91, as
amended).43 In July 1963, the Treasury Department revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and
replaced them with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)—31
C.F.R. Part 515—under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA.44
The CACR remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations and have been amended
repeatedly over the years to reflect changes in U.S. policy. The regulations, administered by the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, prohibit most financial transactions with
Cuba, including transactions related to trade, travel, and remittances, and they block Cuban
government assets in the United States. The CACR also require all exports to Cuba to be licensed
or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, under
the terms of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), at 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-744.45 (For
more details on certain sanctions, see sections on “U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances”
and “U.S. Exports and Sanctions,” below.)
Congress strengthened sanctions on Cuba with enactment of the CDA, LIBERTAD Act, and
TSRA. In addition to these acts, Congress enacted numerous other provisions of law over the
years that imposed sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support
from the international financial institutions.46
 Among its provisions, the CDA prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging
in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any seaborne
vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within
the previous 180 days unless licensed by the Treasury Department.47
 The LIBERTAD Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down two U.S.
civilian planes in February 1996, combines various measures to increase pressure
on Cuba and provides a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to
democracy. Most significantly, the act codifies the Cuban embargo as permanent
law, including all restrictions imposed by the executive branch under the CACR.
This provision is noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy

an embargo on exports of all products with the exception of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
42 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 27 Federal Register 1116, February 7, 1962.
43 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 27 Federal Register 2765-2766, March 24, 1962.
44 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Control of Financial and Commercial Transactions Involving Cuba or Nationals
Thereof,” 28 Federal Register 6974-6985, July 9, 1963.
45 31 C.F.R. §515.533. In the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), see especially 15 C.F.R. §746.2 on Cuba. The
EAR are authorized, in large part, by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, Subtitle B) and
the three retained sections of the otherwise repealed Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72).
46 These include several other provisions restricting assistance to Cuba in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA;
P.L. 87-195), as well as sanctions provisions in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, the International Development
Association Act, the Inter-American Development Bank Act, the Breton Woods Agreements Act, 1978, the Tariff
Classification Act of 1962, the Trade Act of 1974, the Food Security Act of 1985, and the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (Division A, Title II, Section 211, P.L. 105-277). See CRS Report
R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations.
47 Pursuant to an October 2016 regulatory change, the Obama Administration eased the 180-day rule by issuing a
general license waiving the restriction if the items carried to Cuba would, if subject to the EAR, be designated as EAR
99, meaning the items are not on the Commerce Control List. According to the Commerce Department, EAR items
generally consist of low-technology consumer goods. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control
Regulations,” 81 Federal Register 71372-71378, October 17, 2016.
Congressional Research Service

13

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

options toward Cuba. The provision prohibits the executive branch from lifting
the economic embargo without congressional concurrence through legislation
until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law are met, although the
President retains broad authority to amend the regulations therein. Title III of the
law holds any person or government that traffics in property confiscated by the
Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court.48 Title IV
denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in the trafficking of
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba.
 TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba (with
prohibitions on U.S. assistance and private financing) and requires “payment of
cash in advance” or third-country financing for the exports. The act also prohibits
tourist travel to Cuba.
Under the Trump Administration, the United States introduced additional sanctions, discussed
below, that have continued under the Biden Administration. These sanctions include restrictions
on transactions with entities identified as controlled by the Cuban military, a prohibition on
staying at accommodations in Cuba identified as controlled by the Cuban government or by
certain prohibited government or PCC officials or their close relatives, and two terrorism-related
designations. In addition, both the Trump and Biden Administrations imposed targeted sanctions
on Cuban officials and entities, including financial sanctions and visa restrictions, for
involvement in human rights abuses.
Cuba Restricted List. Pursuant to President Trump’s NSPM, the State Department in 2017
identified entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel
and published a list of entities with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in
Cuba. The State Department has updated this “Cuba Restricted List” several times, most recently
on January 8, 2021. The CACR, as amended by the Treasury Department, prohibits financial
transactions with entities on the list, with certain exceptions, including transactions related to air
or sea operations supporting permissible travel, cargo, or trade; the sale of agricultural and
medical commodities; and direct telecommunications or internet access for the Cuban people.49
The list currently includes 231 entities and sub-entities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding
companies and 55 of their sub-entities (including the Mariel Special Development Zone), 111
hotels, 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41 entities serving defense and
security sectors.50

48 Effective May 2, 2019, the Trump Administration allowed the right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
confiscated property in Cuba pursuant to Title III. Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, including those who
were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation. For background, see section on “Property Claims and Title III
and IV of the LIBERTAD Act,” in CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the
Trump Administration. Some 44 lawsuits have been filed, including 15 involving claimants certified by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (out of 5,913 claims) and 29 noncertified claims against U.S. and foreign companies.
Several of the lawsuits have been dismissed. See U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. “LIBERTAD Act Filing
Statistics,” accessed August 29, 2022, at https://www.cubatrade.org/s/Libertad-Act-Filing-Statistics-bh8j.pdf.
49 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury, Commerce, and State Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions
Rules,” fact sheet, November 8, 2017; and U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 82
Federal Register 51998-52004, November 9, 2017.
50 U.S. Department of State, “Updating the State Department’s List of Entities and Sub-entities Associated with Cuba
(Cuba Restricted List),” 86 Federal Register 1561-1564, January 8, 2021. The list is also available on the State
Department’s website at https://www.state.gov/cuba-restricted-list/list-of-restricted-entities-and-subentities-associated-
with-cuba-effective-january-8-2021/.
Congressional Research Service

14

link to page 33 link to page 33 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List. In September 2020, the Treasury Department amended
the CACR to prohibit most categories of authorized travelers to Cuba from lodging, paying for
lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge at any property in
Cuba that the Secretary of State has identified as a property owned or controlled by the Cuban
government, a prohibited Cuban government official, a prohibited member of the Communist
Party, or a close relative of either.51 The State Department subsequently issued a “Cuba Prohibited
Accommodations List” that included over 400 hotels as well as privately owned residences for
rent (casas particulares).52
Terrorism Designations. Since 2020, pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act
(P.L. 90-629, as amended), Cuba has been on the annual list of countries certified by the Secretary
of State as not cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, a status that prohibits U.S.
exports of defense articles and services to the designated foreign government. In May 2020, then-
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo added Cuba to the annual list for the first time since 2015.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken has continued to include Cuba on the list, most recently in
May 2022.53
The Cuban government also is designated as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism
pursuant to provisions in several laws, with sanctions that restrict foreign assistance and non-
emergency food aid, ban defense exports and sales, and impose certain controls over exports of
dual-use items and other miscellaneous financial restrictions.54 Under the Trump Administration,
then-Secretary of State Pompeo designated the government of Cuba as a state sponsor of
international terrorism, effective January 12, 2021. The State Department cited Cuba’s harboring
from justice of 10 leaders of Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN; a U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organization), who had traveled to Cuba in 2017 to engage in peace talks with the
Colombian government, and several U.S. fugitives since the 1970s (see “U.S. Fugitives from
Justice” section, below).55 In August 2022, new Colombian President Gustavo Petro said he was
suspending extradition requests for ELN members in Colombia as part of an effort to restart
peace talks, which collapsed in 2019.56

51 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 85 Federal Register 60068-60072,
September 24, 2020.
52 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List Initial Publication,” September 28, 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/cuba-prohibited-accommodations-list/cuba-prohibited-accommodations-list-
initial-publication/.
53 U.S. Department of State, “Determination and Certification of Countries Not Cooperating Fully with Anti-terrorism
Efforts,” 85 Federal Register 33772, June 2, 2020; and U.S. Department of State, “Determination and Certification of
Countries Not Cooperating Fully with Anti-terrorism Efforts,” 87 Federal Register 31051, May 20, 2022.
54 The provision of laws is Section 620A of the FAA, Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629, as
amended), and Section 1754(c) of the Exports Controls Act of 2018 (in P.L. 117-232, the John S. McCain National
Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2019). See CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—
Legislative Parameters: In Brief; and U.S. Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” at
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/.
55 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism,” January 11, 2021. Previously, the State Department designated Cuba as a state sponsor in 1982
because of the country’s alleged ties to international terrorism; this designation was rescinded under the Obama
Administration in 2015. For background on Cuba’s initial designation, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State
Sponsors of Terrorism List, August 22, 2006. For background on the rescission of Cuba’s state sponsor designation, see
“State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation,” in CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress.
56 Julia Symmes Cobb, “Colombia Suspends ELN Rebel Arrest Warrants, Extradition Orders to Restart Peace Talks,”
Reuters News, August 20, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

15

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Targeted Human Rights Sanctions. Since 2019, the United States has imposed targeted
sanctions on Cuban officials and entities linked to or responsible for human rights abuses. These
sanctions include visa restrictions and financial sanctions blocking assets and property, as well as
a prohibition against U.S. persons dealing with the blocked individuals or entities.
In 2019 and 2020, under the Trump Administration, the State Department imposed visa
restrictions on three high-ranking Cuban officials and their immediate family members for
credible information of their involvement in gross violation of human rights, barring them from
entry into the United States, pursuant to a long-standing and annually renewed provision in the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOPS;
currently in Section 7031(c) of P.L. 117-103, Division K). The officials were Raúl Castro, then-
Minister of the Interior Julio Cesar Gandarilla Bermejo (who died in 2020), and then-Cuban
Defense Minister Leopoldo Cintra Frias (who was replaced in 2021).57 In September 2020, the
Treasury Department imposed, pursuant to the CACR, financial sanctions on Luis Alberto
Rodríguez López-Calleja, Raúl Castro’s former son-in-law, who headed a holding company of the
Cuban military (López-Calleja died in July 2022).58 In January 2021, Treasury designated for
sanctions Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and its minister, General Lazaro Alberto
Álvarez Casas, pursuant to authorities to deter human rights abuses and public corruption enacted
in the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F)
and implemented by Executive Order 13818.59
In the aftermath of Cuba’s harsh repression of protests in July 2021, the Biden Administration has
imposed targeted visa restrictions, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 5377, on 50 Cuban
officials and financial sanctions, pursuant to Executive Order 13818, on three Cuban security
entities and eight officials involved in the repression. Although the Cuban officials whose visas
were restricted are unnamed, according to the State Department, they include high-ranking
officials of MININT, the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), and the PCC.
They also include officials connected to unfair trials, unjust sentencing, and imprisonment of
peaceful protesters and officials who work in the state communications and media sectors.60 The
three security entities sanctioned by the Treasury Department are MINFAR’s Tropas de
Prevención, MININT’s Brigada Especial Nacional (Special National Brigade), and the Policia
Nacional Revolucionaria (PNR). Cuban officials sanctioned by Treasury include Minister of
Defense Álvaro López Miera and officials of MININT, MINFAR, and the PNR.61
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have

57 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Public Designation of Raúl Castro, Due to
Involvement in Gross Violations of Human Rights,” press statement, September 26, 2019, “Public Designation of Julio
Cesar Gandarilla Bermjeo Under Section 7031(c) of the FY2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations List,” press
statement, November 16, 2019; and “Public Designation of Leopoldo Cintra Frias Due to Involvement in Gross
Violations of Human Rights,” press statement, January 2, 2020.
58 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Notice of OFAC Sanctions Action,” 85 Federal Register, October 5, 2020.
59 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions the Cuban Ministry of the Interior and Its Leader for Serious
Human Rights Abuse,” press release, January 15, 2021.
60 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Visa Restrictions Against Cuban
Officials,” press statement, November 30, 2021; “Visa Restrictions Against Cuban Officials,” press statement, January
6, 2022; “State Department Takes Steps to Impose Visa Restrictions Against Cuban Officials,” press statement, June
16, 2022; and “Announcement of Visa Restrictions Against Cuban Officials,” press statement, July 9, 2022.
61 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Sanctions,” at https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/.
Congressional Research Service

16

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

been different schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a
policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until it reforms while continuing
U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others have argued for an approach, sometimes referred
to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that hurt the Cuban people and
move toward engaging the Cuban government in dialogue in key areas of U.S. interest. Still
others have called for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting U.S. economic
sanctions.
The Obama Administration’s December 2014 change of U.S. policy—moving from isolation
toward engagement and the normalization of relations—highlighted divisions in Congress over
Cuba policy. Some Members of Congress lauded the Administration’s actions as being in the best
interests of the United States and a better way to influence change in Cuba; other Members
criticized the Administration for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance human rights.
Some Members vowed to oppose the Administration’s efforts toward normalization, whereas
others introduced legislation to normalize relations with Cuba by lifting the embargo in its
entirety or in part by easing some aspects of it. Several legislative provisions of House
appropriations bills would have blocked some of the Administration’s policy changes toward
Cuba, and several provisions of Senate appropriations bills would have further eased sanctions on
Cuba; ultimately, none of these provisions (or other legislative initiatives on either side of the
policy divide) were enacted.62
The Trump Administration’s approach of rolling back some Obama-era policy changes and
introducing new sanctions on Cuba also highlighted divisions in Congress over Cuba policy.
Some Members supported the President’s action because of Cuba’s lack of progress on human
rights; others opposed it due to its negative effects on the Cuban people and U.S. business
interests. Aside from congressional enactment of a provision in the 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334)
authorizing funding for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba, Congress did
not approve legislative initiatives to ease or further tighten U.S. sanctions. Congress did,
however, reject the Administration’s attempts to cut democracy funding for Cuba, instead
appropriating $20 million each fiscal year (the same amount appropriated annually since
FY2014).63
The Biden Administration’s partial lifting of the Trump-era Cuba policy tightening restrictions on
travel and remittances has elicited mixed reactions from Congress. Those Members advocating
sustained pressure on Cuba have criticized the Administration’s actions as providing support for
the Cuban government, and those advocating engagement or support for the Cuban people have
lauded the policy change as a step forward. Cuba’s increased repression over the past year,
including its harsh response to the July 2021 countrywide protests, appears to have eroded
congressional support for measures easing economic sanctions on Cuba in the near term.
Illustrative of this shift was the House’s July 20, 2022, rejection of an amendment to a six-bill
FY2023 appropriations measure (H.Amdt. 300 to H.R. 8294) that would have prohibited funding
to enforce a sanction in U.S. law prohibiting private financing for U.S. agricultural exports to
Cuba. Both houses also have approved human rights resolutions on Cuba, and, as in past
Congresses, funding for democracy programs and U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to
Cuba has continued.

62 For background on legislative initiatives after the Obama Administration announced its change of policy toward
Cuba, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress.
63 For background on legislative initiatives on Cuba during the Trump Administration, see CRS Report R44822, Cuba:
U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress and CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the
Trump Administration.
Congressional Research Service

17

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances64
Travel Restrictions. Restrictions on travel to
Current Permissible Cuba Travel:
Cuba have been a key and often contentious
12 Categories
component of U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba’s
communist government. The embargo

Family Visits
regulations set forth in the CACR do not ban

Official Government Business
travel itself but restrict financial transactions

Journalistic Activities
related to Cuba. Numerous changes to the

Professional Research and Professional Meetings
restrictions have occurred over time. For five

Educational Activities (currently includes group
years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no
people-to-people travel)
restrictions on travel. In 2000, Congress

Religious Activities
prohibited the authorization of transactions

Public Performances, Clinics, Workshops, Athletic
related to U.S. travel to Cuba solely for
and Other Competitions, and Exhibitions
tourist activities when it enacted TSRA; a

Support for the Cuban People
provision in the law defined “tourist

Humanitarian Projects
activities” as any activity not expressly

Activities of Private Foundations or Research or
authorized in the 12 categories of travel in the
Educational Institutes
CACR (see text box). The George W. Bush

Exportation, Importation, or Transmission of
Administration (2001-2009) tightened U.S.
Information or Informational Materials
restrictions on Cuba travel and the

Authorized Export Transactions
enforcement of travel restrictions. Congress
Source: 31 C.F.R. §515.560, at https://www.ecfr.gov/
took legislative action in March 2009 to ease
current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-515/subpart-E/
restrictions on family travel and on travel
section-515.560.
related to U.S. agricultural and medical sales
to Cuba (P.L. 111-8, Sections 620 and 621 of Division D).
The Obama Administration (2009-2017) significantly eased restrictions on travel to Cuba. In
2009, the Administration lifted restrictions on family travel. In 2011, it eased restrictions on
certain other categories of travel, including group people-to-people educational travel, and
allowed all U.S. international airports to become eligible for licensed charter flights to and from
Cuba (previously, charter flights were limited to international airports in Miami, Los Angeles, and
New York). In 2016, the Obama Administration eased restrictions by authorizing general licenses
for the existing 12 categories of travel to Cuba (before the change, travelers under several of these
categories had to apply for a specific license) and by authorizing individual people-to-people
educational travel.65 In 2016, the Administration increased transportation opportunities to Cuba
with regular commercial air service (as opposed to charter flights) and cruise ship service to Cuba
from the United States.
The Trump Administration (2017-2021) reimposed certain restrictions on travel and limited
transportation to Cuba from the United States. In 2017, it eliminated an authorization for
individual people-to-people education travel (under the travel category of educational activities),
and in 2019, it eliminated group people-to-people travel. Also in 2019, the Administration

64 For more information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
65 A general license provides the authority to engage in a transaction without the need to apply to the U.S. Department
of the Treasury for a license. In contrast, a specific license is a written document issued by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury to a person or entity authorizing a particular transaction in response to a written license application.
Congressional Research Service

18

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

prohibited cruise ships, sailboats, fishing boats, and private and corporate aircraft from going to
Cuba from the United States. That same year, the Administration restricted regularly scheduled
flights to Havana (prohibiting flights to other Cuban cities); in 2020, the Administration also
restricted charter flights to Havana. Also in 2020, the Administration eliminated general licenses
for attending or organizing professional meetings or conferences in Cuba and for participating in
public performances, clinics, workshops, certain athletic or nonathletic competitions, and
exhibitions. In addition, as noted above, the Administration’s introduction of a “Cuba Restricted
List” in 2017 prohibited most categories of authorized travelers from direct financial transaction
with certain hotels, tourist agencies, marinas, and stores. The Administration’s subsequent
introduction of a “Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List” in 2020 prohibited most authorized
travelers from lodging at over 400 hotels and privately owned residences for rent.
The Biden Administration rolled back some of the travel restrictions imposed by the Trump
Administration. In June 2022, the Biden Administration reauthorized regularly scheduled and
charter flights to Cuban cities other than Havana. It also reinstated group (but not individual)
people-to-people educational travel and a general license authorization for attending or organizing
professional meetings or conferences in Cuba.
According to Cuban government statistics, the number of travelers from the United States to
Cuba reached almost 1.2 million in 2018 but fell slightly to 1.1 million in 2019. Travel declined
significantly in 2020 and 2021 to around 188,000 and 36,000 travelers, respectively, largely due
to COVID-19-related travel restrictions but also because of U.S. travel restrictions imposed in
2019 and 2020. In the first nine months of 2022, as pandemic-related travel restrictions eased,
travel to Cuba from the United States began to pick up, with over 228,000 travelers.66
Restrictions on Remittances. Much like restrictions on travel, restrictions on sending cash
remittances to Cuba have been part of the U.S. sanctions regime and have changed over time. The
Obama Administration significantly eased restrictions on remittances. In 2009, it lifted limitations
on the amount and frequency of family remittances. It authorized remittances to any Cuban
national (up to $500 per quarter) in 2011 and lifted the dollar limit for such donative remittances
in 2015. It also authorized by general license remittances to individuals and independent
nongovernmental organizations to support humanitarian projects; a rapid peaceful transition to
democracy; the strengthening of civil society; and the development of private businesses,
including small farms.
In contrast, the Trump Administration imposed restrictions on remittances. In 2019, it capped
family remittances to any one Cuban national to $1,000 per quarter, eliminated the category of
donative remittances to Cuban nationals, and prohibited family remittances to close family
members of prohibited Cuban government officials and Cuban Communist Party officials. In
2020, it added to the “Cuba Restricted List” two Cuban financial services companies—
Financiera Cimex (FINCIMEX) and American International Services—involved in facilitating
the processing of foreign remittances to Cuba. In the same year, it amended the CACR to prohibit
the processing of remittances through any entities on the “Cuba Restricted List.” These actions
led Western Union, which had partnered with FINCIMEX since 2016, to announce termination of
its remittances services to Cuba in November 2020.67 Western Union had been the major financial

66 República de Cuba, ONEI, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2020, Capítulo 15: Turismo (Edición 2021); ONEI, Turismo
Internacional Indicadores Seleccionados, Enero- Diciembre 2019 (Edición Marzo 2020), Enero-Diciembre 2020
(Edición May 2021), and Enero-Diciembre 2021 (Edición Marzo 2022), and Enero-Septiembre 2022 (Edición
Diciembre 2022).
67 Western Union, “Cuba: A Letter to Our Customers,” November 13, 2020, at https://www.westernunion.com/blog/a-
letter-to-our-cuba-customers/.
Congressional Research Service

19

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

services company used for transmitting remittances to Cuba, with more than 400 offices on the
island.
The Biden Administration has partially lifted restrictions on remittances. In June 2022, by
amending the CACR, it eliminated the dollar and frequency limits for family remittances and
restored the category of donative remittances. The Administration maintained that it would not
remove entities from the “Cuba Restricted List,” so that remittances through FINCIMEX remain
prohibited.68 In November 2022, however, a U.S. company based in Miami, VaCuba, announced
that it had received a Treasury Department license to work with a Cuban company, Orbit S.A., to
send remittances to Cuba. Orbit is not affiliated with the Cuban military and is not on the State
Department’s restricted list. In February 2022, the Cuban government had authorized Orbit to
manage and process international transfers from abroad. The Biden Administration’s action could
make it easier for those subject to U.S. jurisdiction to send remittances to Cuba.69
Legislative Initiatives. In the 117th Congress, two introduced bills would have lifted economic
sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on travel and remittances: S. 249 (Wyden), the United
States-Cuba Trade Act of 2021, introduced in February 2021, and H.R. 3625 (Rush), the United
States-Cuba Relations Normalization Act, introduced in May 2021.
U.S. Exports and Sanctions70
U.S. commercial medical exports to Cuba have been authorized since the early 1990s pursuant to
the CDA (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), and commercial agricultural exports have been authorized
since 2001 pursuant to TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX), albeit with numerous restrictions and
licensing requirements. For medical exports to Cuba, the CDA requires on-site verification that
the exported item is to be used for the purpose for which it was intended and only for the use and
benefit of the Cuban people. TSRA allows for one-year export licenses to sell agricultural
commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export
assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies
exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be
conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. The 2018 farm bill (P.L.
115-334) permits funding for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs—the Market
Access Program and the Foreign Market Development Cooperation Program—for U.S.
agricultural products in Cuba.
Regulatory changes made to CACR and EAR provisions in 2015-2016 under the Obama
Administration included several actions designed to facilitate commercial exports to Cuba (some
of these provisions were subsequently further amended during the Trump Administration). The
regulatory changes in 2015-2016
 Permitted U.S. financial institutions to open correspondent accounts at Cuban
financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions (31
C.F.R. §515.584).

68 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on New Cuba Policy,” press
briefing via teleconference, May 16, 2022.
69 “Sending Remittances to Cuba Made More Flexible,” OnCuba, November 17, 2022; “VaCuba consigue licencia y
anuncia una reducción de la comisión sobre remesas,” 14ymedio, November 16, 2022; and Mario J. Pentón,
“Exclusiva: Administración Biden flexibiliza requisitos para el envío de remesas a Cuba desde Miami,” Américatevé,
November 15, 2022.
70 For additional background on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, see CRS Report R46791, U.S. Agricultural Trade
with Cuba: Current Limitations and Future Prospects.
Congressional Research Service

20

link to page 26 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

 Permitted U.S. private export financing for all authorized export trade to Cuba,
except for agricultural goods exported pursuant to TSRA (31 C.F.R. §515.584).
 Revised the definition of the term cash in advance for payment for U.S. exports
to Cuba to specify that it means cash before transfer of title. The change meant
that payment may occur before an export shipment is offloaded in Cuba rather
than before the shipment leaves a U.S. port (31 C.F.R. §515.533).
 Authorized commercial exports to Cuba of certain goods and services to support
the Cuban people by improving their living conditions and supporting
independent economic activity; strengthening civil society; and improving the
free flow of information to, for, and among the Cuban people (15 C.F.R.
§740.21).
 Included licenses for certain categories of exports under a “general policy of
approval.” These categories include exports for civil aviation and commercial
aircraft safety; telecommunications; U.S. news bureaus; human rights
organizations and nongovernmental organizations; environmental protection of
U.S. and international air quality, waters, and coastlines; and agricultural inputs
(e.g., insecticides, pesticides, herbicides) that fall outside the scope of those
exports already allowed under TSRA (15 C.F.R. §746.2). In 2019, the Commerce
Department amended the EAR to exclude the export or reexport of aircraft leased
to state-owned airlines from its general policy of approval.71
 Considered licenses for exports on a case-by-case basis, including certain items
exported to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other organizations of the
Cuban government that provide goods and services for the use and benefit of the
Cuban people (15 C.F.R. §746.2). In 2017, the Commerce Department amended
the EAR to stipulate that export licenses for exports to state-owned enterprises
generally would be denied for use by entities on the State Department’s “Cuba
Restricted List” associated with the Cuban military, police, intelligence, or
security services.72
Cuba purchased over $6.8 billion in U.S. products, largely agricultural, from 2001 through 2021.
U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to a high of $718 million in 2008, far
higher than in previous years. This increase was due in part to the rise in food prices and in part to
Cuba’s increased food needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms that
severely damaged the country’s agricultural sector. U.S. exports to Cuba have declined from that
highpoint and fluctuated over the years, reaching a low of $177 million in 2020 as the Cuban
economy deteriorated amid the COVID-19 pandemic. U.S. exports to Cuba rose to $327 million
in 2021, however, increasing 85% over the previous year (see Figure 2). In the first nine months
of 2022, U.S. exports to Cuba were valued at $259 million, about 10% higher than the same
period in 2021. Looking at the composition of U.S. exports to Cuba, the leading products in 2021
were poultry (86%), soybeans (3.9%), and articles and medicines donated for relief or charity by
individuals or private agencies (3.4%).73
Legislative Initiatives. In legislative action in the 117th Congress, on July 20, 2022, the House
rejected (163-260) an amendment (H.Amdt. 300, Tlaib) to H.R. 8294, a six-bill FY2023

71 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Restricting Additional Exports and Reexports to Cuba,” 84 Federal Register
56117-56121, October 21, 2019.
72 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Amendments to Implement United States Policy Toward Cuba,” 82 Federal
Register 51983-51986, November 9, 2017.
73 Trade statistics in this section are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, as presented by Trade Data Monitor.
Congressional Research Service

21

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

appropriations measure, which would have prevented any funds from being used to enforce a
provision in TSRA (Section 908(b)) prohibiting private financing for U.S. agricultural exports.
Other legislative initiatives introduced in the 117th Congress would have lifted restrictions on
trade with Cuba. Two broad bills, S. 249 (Wyden), the United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2021,
introduced in February 2021, and H.R. 3625 (Rush), the United States-Cuba Relations
Normalization Act, introduced in May 2021, would have repealed or amended provisions of law
restricting trade and other relations with Cuba and would have extended nondiscriminatory trade
treatment to the products of Cuba. S. 1694 (Klobuchar), the Freedom to Export to Cuba Act of
2021, introduced in May 2021, would have repealed or amend provisions of law restricting trade
and other relations with Cuba, including certain restrictions in the CDA, LIBERTAD Act, and
TSRA.
Figure 2. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2007-2021

Source: Created by CRS using Commerce Department statistics as presented by Trade Data Monitor.
Democracy and Human Rights Funding
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to
Cuba. USAID and State Department efforts are funded largely through Economic Support Funds
(ESF) in the annual SFOPS bill.
From FY2014 through FY2022, this funding included $20 million in each fiscal year. The Trump
Administration, as part of its efforts to reduce U.S. foreign assistance worldwide, attempted to cut
assistance for Cuba democracy and human rights programs. The Administration did not request
any funding for Cuba programs for FY2018 and requested $10 million for FY2019, $6 million for
FY2020, and $10 million for FY2021. Congress continued to appropriate $20 million for each of
those years.
Since FY2015, the State Department has administered a little over two-thirds of the Cuba
democracy and human rights funding, a portion of which is implemented by NED, and USAID
has administered the balance. For example, in the State Department’s May 2021 notification to
Congress for the obligation of FY2020 assistance for Cuba programs, the State Department was
to administer $13.75 million (including $6.25 million implemented by NED) and USAID was to
Congressional Research Service

22

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

administer $6.25 million. The assistance funds three program areas to strengthen independent
Cuban civil society; promote the flow of independent media and the free flow of information; and
promote the realization and protection of human rights, including the provision of basic assistance
(food and medicine) to political prisoners and their families.74
NED is not a U.S. government agency but an independent nongovernmental organization and has
received about one-third of Cuba democracy and human rights funding in recent years. NED
provides funding to a wide variety of human rights and pro-democracy civil society groups
worldwide and in Cuba.75
FY2022 Appropriations. For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $20 million in ESF to
support independent civil society organizations in Cuba that promote democratic values, human
rights, and fundamental freedoms. According to the budget request, the programs provide basic
needs assistance to political prisoners and their families; strengthen the capacity of civil society
groups; and promote the free flow of uncensored information to, from, and within Cuba.76
Congress completed final action on FY2022 SFOPS appropriations in March 2022 in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K). Although the measure did not
specify an amount for Cuba democracy programming, the Administration estimates an allocation
of $20 million, the amount originally requested by the Administration.
The House-passed version of the FY2022 SFOPS bill, H.R. 4373, would have provided not more
than $20 million in ESF for democracy programs for Cuba (the amount requested by the
Administration) in Section 7045(c); of these funds, not less than $5 million would have been
made available for programs to support free enterprise, private business organizations, and
people-to-people educational and cultural activities. In contrast, Section 7045(c) of the Senate
version of the FY2022 SFOPS bill, S. 3075, would have provided for $5 million for such
activities in addition to $20 million in democracy funding.
FY2023 Appropriations. For FY2023, the Biden Administration again requested $20 million to
support democracy programs that align with Administration’s goal of supporting the Cuban
people, including their economic and political well-being and human rights. According to the
request, programs will support independent groups and civil society organizations that promote
democratic values, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The programs include basic needs
assistance for persecuted activists, political prisoners, and their families. Support also will seek to
enhance internet freedom and promote the flow of uncensored information to, from, and within
the island.77
The House Appropriations Committee’s reported FY2023 SFOPS bill, H.R. 8282 (H.Rept. 117-
401), would have provided $20 million for democracy programs, with not less than $5 million to
support private enterprise, private business organizations, and people-to-people educational and
cultural activities. The introduced Senate SFOPS bill, S. 4662, and its explanatory statement did
not specify an amount for Cuba democracy programs.

74 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 21-133: Cuba,” May 21, 2021. Also see USAID’s website for
information on its Cuba program, at https://www.usaid.gov/cuba.
75 See the National Endowment for Democracy’s website for a listing of its Cuba grants in 2021, at
https://www.ned.org/region/latin-america-and-caribbean/cuba-2021/, published February 12, 2022.
76 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
p. 264.
77 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2023, Appendix 2,
p. 296.
Congressional Research Service

23

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Congress completed action on FY2023 SFOPS appropriations in December 2022 in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division K). As with the FY2022 SFOPS
measure, the FY2023 measure did not specify an amount for Cuba democracy programming.
Radio and TV Martí78
U.S.-government-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990, respectively.79 Until October 1999, U.S.-government-funded
international broadcasting programs were a primary function of the United States Information
Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions merged into the Department of
State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of Governors became an independent
agency that included such entities as the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). In 2018, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors officially changed its name to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).80
OCB, which has been headquartered in Miami, FL, since 1998, manages Radio and TV Martí’s
multimedia services, which include radio (shortwave and AM), social media platforms (YouTube,
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter), and an online platform with streaming audio and video.81
OCB provides 24-hour daily broadcasts to Cuba via its medium-wave transmitting station in
Marathon, FL, and 18-hour daily broadcasts via USAGM’s shortwave transmitting station in
Greenville, NC. OCB content is also provided through flash drives, emails, DVDs, and SMS texts
to help reach its Cuban audience.82 According to USAGM’s 2023 Congressional Budget
Justification, the OCB had a weekly audience of 1 million Cubans in FY2021. During the July 11,
2021, protests in Cuba, USAGM maintains that despite the government’s disruption to social
media platforms, circumvention tools helped 3.2 million people consume OCB content on
Facebook.83
FY2022 Appropriations. For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $12.973 million for
OCB funding. USAGM stated in its budget request that OCB would “continue to rigorously
follow its fiscal, technological, and editorial reforms” and noted that as OCB continues its reform
efforts, a primary focus is to deliver accurate news coverage in Cuba and provide a platform for
diverse voices throughout the island. USAGM maintained that OCB would work closely with
USAGM and the independent nonprofit Open Technology Fund to increase circumvention of
Cuban government censorship.84

78 For background on U.S. international broadcasting, including Radio and TV Martí, see CRS Report R46968, U.S.
Agency for Global Media: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress.
79 The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (P.L. 98-111) was signed into law in October 1983. The Television
Broadcasting to Cuba Act (P.L. 101-246, Title II, Part D) was signed into law in February 1990.
80 With the new name, the agency also changed its website to https://www.usagm.gov/.
81 The Radio and TV Martí website is at https://www.radiotelevisionmarti.com/.
82 U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), at https://www.usagm.gov/
networks/ocb/.
83 USAGM, FY2023 Congressional Budget Justification, May 28, 2021, pp. 30, 93.
84 USAGM, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, May 28, 2021, p. 30. OCB’s reform efforts, begun in 2019,
emanated from a review by an outside panel of experts and an internal USAGM review of OCB’s journalistic
standards, editorial processes, and personnel practices. The reviews were prompted by media reports in 2018 of a TV
Martí program with anti-Semitic content. For background, see section on “Radio and TV Martí” in CRS Report
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration.
Congressional Research Service

24

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), and its explanatory
statement, Congress fully funded the Administration’s OCB request. (Both the report to the
House-passed FY2022 SFOPS bill (H.Rept. 117-84 to H.R. 4373) and the explanatory statement
to the Senate-introduced bill, S. 3075, recommended fully funding the request.) The joint
explanatory statement accompanying the law required the State Department to update a Cuba
internet access report required by Section 7045 of S.Rept. 115-282. In addition, the joint
explanatory statement directed federal departments and agencies to comply with reporting
requirements in H.Rept. 117-84. One such requirement was that USAGM, in consultation with
OCB, produce a report within 90 days of enactment that outlined
 reforms taken to address deficiencies identified in the USAGM-commissioned
internal and external reviews of OCB’s editorial policies and oversight
procedures,
 implementation of recommendations identified in the State Department Office of
the Inspector General’s report in December 2020,85 and
 plans for aligning OCB’s personnel and activities with the budget request level.
FY2023 Appropriations. For FY2023, the Administration requested $13.432 million for OCB.
According to the request, OCB will target digitally connected Cubans where circumvention of the
regime’s censorship proves possible and will continue to align its content production, workforce
structure, and skillsets with ongoing reforms aimed at improving content quality, strengthening
journalist integrity, and reaching Cuban audiences more effectively. USAGM maintains that OCB
will enhance circumvention tools to more effectively reach a larger audience and continue to
work with the Open Technology Fund to explore emerging circumvention technologies and
alternative methods for content distribution.86
In the explanatory statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division
K), Congress allocated $12.973 million for the OCB, the same as provided for FY2022. This was
the same amount in the House Appropriations Committee’s reported FY2023 SFOPS bill, H.R.
8282, H.Rept. 117-401; an explanatory statement to the Senate FY2023 SFOPSA bill, S. 4662,
would have recommended $13.891 million.87
The explanatory statement to Division K of H.R. 2617 also directed federal departments and
agencies to comply with reporting requirements and directives contained in H.Rept. 117-401
accompanying H.R. 8282. This included a reporting requirement, within 90 days of enactment
(similar to that required for FY2022), on reforms taken to address deficiencies identified in the
USAGM-commissioned internal and external reviews of OCB’s editorial policies and oversight
procedures, implementation of State Department Inspector General recommendations, and plans
for aligning OCB’s personnel and activities with the budget request level.
Migration Issues
Irregular Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the past year, driven by Cuba’s
difficult economic conditions and political repression, as well as by the drawdown of staffing at
the U.S. Embassy in Havana since 2017 (which reduced access to legal immigration avenues).

85 U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Targeted Inspection of the U.S. Agency for Global Media:
Journalistic Standards and Principles, December 2020, at https://www.stateoig.gov/reports/10801.
86 USAGM, FY2023 Congressional Budget Justification, March 28, 2022, pp. 29-33.
87 The explanatory statement to S. 4662 is available from the Senate Appropriations Committee at
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/download/sfopsfy23rpt.
Congressional Research Service

25

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Congressional concerns have included the status of consular services provided at the U.S.
Embassy in Havana and the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) Program, which was
suspended in 2017. U.S. and Cuban officials held semiannual migration talks in April 2022 (the
first since 2018), and again in November 2022, on the implementation of bilateral migration
accords. In September 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard held technical talks
in Havana on operational cooperation to confront the illegal trafficking of migrants and illicit
drug trafficking.88 In September 2022, the Administration announced that it would resume full
immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana in early 2023, the first time since 2017,
and subsequently announced a date of January 4, 2023, to resume such full processing.89
Background on U.S.-Cuban Migration Accords. Since 1984, the United States has entered into
four bilateral migration agreements with Cuba that are collectively known as the Migration
Accords. In 1984—in the aftermath of the 1980 Mariel boatlift, in which 125,000 Cubans fled to
the United States with the approval of Cuban officials—the United States negotiated an
agreement to resume normal immigration procedures. The United States agreed to grant
immigrant visas for up to 20,000 immigrants per year in addition to immigrant visas for parents,
spouses, and unmarried children of U.S. citizens.90
In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United States reached two additional migration agreements
designed to stem another mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. In
August 1994, amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, President Clinton abruptly changed
U.S. immigration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed
into the United States; he announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans
rescued at sea to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In September 1994, Cuba and
the United States reached a second bilateral migration agreement in which both countries agreed
to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with the
earlier 1984 migration accord. The United States agreed to ensure total legal Cuban migration to
the United States would be a minimum of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens.91 In May 1995, the two countries reached a third migration agreement in which the
United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantánamo into the United
States but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and
return them to Cuba.92
In January 2017, the United States entered into a fourth migration agreement with Cuba. This
agreement ended the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy under which thousands of unauthorized
Cuban migrants had entered the United States since the mid-1990s. Under that policy, Cuban
migrants interdicted at sea—even in U.S. coastal waters—generally were returned to Cuba,
whereas those who reached U.S. land were allowed entrance into the United States and generally
were permitted to stay. Cubans who reached the U.S. shore and were admitted or granted
immigration parole were allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to

88 CE NoticiasFinancieras, “U.S. and Cuban Authorities Discuss Migrant Smuggling in Havana,” September 10, 2022.
89 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “U.S. Embassy in Havana Prepares for Full Resumption of Immigrant Visa Services in Cuba,
Will Accelerate Processing of Cuban Family Reunification,” September 21, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “Full
Resumption of Interviews for all Immigrant Visa Categories in Havana in January 2023,” November 10, 2022.
90 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Immigration, Joint Communique on Immigration Matters, with Minute on
Implementation,” TIAS 11057, December 14, 1984.
91 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba, Normalizing Migration Procedures; Joint Communique Concerning Normalizing
Migration Procedures,” Temp. State Dept. No. 94-232, September 9, 1994.
92 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba, Normalizing Migration Procedures, Joint Statement Regarding Normalization of
Migration Procedures,” May 2, 1995.
Congressional Research Service

26

link to page 31 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). Some criticized this policy as encouraging
Cubans to risk their lives to make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. The
January 2017 migration agreement that ended the wet foot/dry foot policy specified that Cuban
nationals who attempted to enter the United States illegally and did not qualify for humanitarian
relief were subject to removal. The Cuban government agreed to begin accepting the return of
Cuban migrants who had been ordered removed.93
Table 1. Maritime Interdictions of Cubans by the U.S. Coast Guard
(FY2016-FY2022)

FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Migrants
5,396
1,468
259
313
49
838
6,182
Source: United States Coast Guard, 7th District Southeast, news releases.
Maritime Interdictions. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted
thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba. The number of Cubans interdicted at sea
by the U.S. Coast Guard has fluctuated annually, influenced by several factors, including the
economic situations in both Cuba and the United States. Interdictions reached over 5,000 in
FY2016, driven by concerns among Cubans that the favorable treatment granted to Cuban
migrants would end. With the change in U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba in January 2017,
the number of Cubans interdicted by the Coast Guard dropped significantly. Since Cuba’s
economic and political situation began to deteriorate in 2021, interdictions have grown
significantly, with over 800 Cubans interdicted and returned to Cuba in FY2021, and over 6,000
in FY2022 (see Table 1). In the first three months of FY2023, as of December 27, 2022, the
Coast Guard reported the interdiction of 3,839 Cubans, more than 62% of those interdicted in all
of FY2022.94
Unauthorized Cuban Migration by Land. Beginning around FY2013, Cuban migrants without
valid entry documentation began to favor land-based routes to enter the United States, especially
via Southwest border ports of entry. With the January 2017 change in U.S. immigration policy
toward Cubans, the number of Cuban migrants entering the United States by land declined. It
began to increase again in FY2021.
According to data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, nationwide encounters of Cuban
migrants rose from over 14,000 in FY2020 to over 39,000 in FY2021 to over 224,000 in FY2022,
with the overwhelming majority at the Southwest land border. For the first two months of
FY2023, CBP reported over 65,000 encounters of Cuban migrants.95 The surge is caused by
several factors. Notable factors include Cuba’s difficult economic conditions, marked by
shortages of food and medicine, high inflation, and electricity outages; increased political

93 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuban Immigration Policy,” January 12, 2017; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, “Statement by Secretary Johnson on the Continued Normalization of Our Migration Relationship
with Cuba,” January 12, 2017; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Changes to Parole and Expedited
Removal Policies Affecting Cuban Nationals,” January 12, 2017; and U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement
Between the United States of America and Cuba,” TIAS 17-112, January 12, 2017.
94 U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Repatriates 143 People to Cuba,” Seventh District Southeast News, December 27,
2022.
95 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” at
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters. Enforcement encounters include Title 8 apprehensions
(the temporary detainment of a person who is not lawfully in the United States), Title 8 inadmissibles (foreign nationals
encountered at a port of entry who seek lawful admission into the United States but who U.S. authorities determine to
be inadmissible), and Title 42 expulsions (public health-related expulsions).
Congressional Research Service

27

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

repression; and the 2017 suspension of immigration interviews and processing at the U.S.
Embassy in Havana (these only recently resumed on a limited basis). Another factor that has
facilitated irregular Cuban migration by land is that Nicaragua lifted visa requirements for
Cubans in November 2021, spurring thousands of Cubans to use that country as the first stop on
their journey to the U.S. border.
Consular Services at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. As noted, the Biden Administration
restarted limited immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana in May 2022 and said
it would reinstate the CFRP Program, which was suspended in 2017; in September 2022, it
announced that the U.S. Embassy in Havana would resume full immigrant visa services in Cuba
in early 2023.
The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
which established the CFRP Program in 2007, began conducting interviews at the U.S. Embassy
in Havana in August 2022, focusing on pending CFRP Program applications.96 When the CFRP
Program was established, it aimed to help the United States meet its annual obligation of 20,000
travel documents under the 1994 bilateral migration agreement. The program allows certain U.S.
citizens and permanent residents with approved petitions for family members in Cuba to apply for
immigration parole for those individuals. If a CFRP application is approved, family members in
Cuba are issued documentation to enable them to travel to the United States. Until its suspension,
around 75% of the immigrant travel documents issued annually for Cuban nationals were issued
under the CFRP Program.97 Because of the suspension of immigrant visa services at the U.S.
Embassy in Havana, the United States has not met its annual commitment of 20,000 travel
documents under the accord since FY2017.
Limited immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana began in May 2022, and the
embassy maintains it will resume full immigrant visa services on January 4, 2023.98 Currently, the
U.S. Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana, remains the primary processing location for the majority
of Cuban immigrant visa applications.99 When the Biden Administration announced the
resumption of limited immigration visa processing and the reinstatement of the CFRP Program,
U.S. officials indicated they wanted “to staff up so that that we can begin processing the full
20,000 immigrant visas out of Havana as quickly as possible.”100 When the Administration
announced in September 2022 that it was preparing to fully resume immigrant visa services at the
U.S. Embassy in Havana in early 2023, it noted that the change will “eliminate the need for
Cubans applying for immigrant visas in family preference categories to travel outside of Cuba to
Georgetown, Guyana for their interviews.”101

96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), “USCIS Resumes
Cuban Family Reunification Parole Operations,” September 1, 2022.
97 For background on the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, see USCIS, “The Cuban Family Reunification
Parole Program,” at https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/cuban-family-reunification-parole-
program.
98 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “U.S. Embassy in Havana Prepares for Full Resumption of
Immigrant Visa Services in Cuba, Will Accelerate Processing of Cuban Family Reunification,” September 21, 2022;
and U.S. Department of State, “Full Resumption of Interviews for all Immigrant Visa Categories in Havana in January
2023,” November 10, 2022.
99 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “Visas,” accessed December 23, 2022, at https://cu.usembassy.gov/visas/.
100 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on New Cuba Policy,” press
briefing via teleconference, May 16, 20222.
101 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “U.S. Embassy in Havana Prepares for Full Resumption of Immigrant Visa Services in
Cuba, Will Accelerate Processing of Cuban Family Reunification,” September 21, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

28

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Most temporary nonimmigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana remains
suspended, except for diplomatic or official visas and for medical emergencies.102 Cubans
applying for other categories of nonimmigrant visas must go to a U.S. embassy or consulate in
another country. In March 2019, the State Department announced it would no longer issue
multiple-entry five-year B-2 visas (for tourism, family visits, medical treatment, and similar
travel purposes) for Cuban nationals; instead, it would issue only single-entry B-2 visas for a stay
of two months, with the possibility of a 30-day extension.103 That change has made family travel
from Cuba more difficult and has made it harder for those traveling from Cuba to buy supplies for
their private-sector businesses.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 117th Congress, the joint explanatory statement to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), required an updated State Department
report on consular services at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, originally required in S.Rept. 116-
126. For FY2023, the explanatory statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R.
2617, Division K), again requires an updated State Department report on consular services at the
U.S. Embassy in Havana.
The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263;
hereinafter the FY2023 NDAA) requires a report (Section 6805) from the Director of National
Intelligence on mass migration in the Western Hemisphere, including on the use of, or the threat
of using, mass migration by “the regime of Miguel Díaz-Canel and Raúl Castro in Cuba” to
diminish dissent in Cuba and increase remittances from migrants residing in the United States.
Three other introduced bills touched on Cuban immigration issues. H.R. 2684 (Diaz-Balart),
introduced in April 2021, would have amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (P.L. 82-414,
as amended) to establish a Cuban family reunification parole program. H.R. 6907 (Wasserman
Schultz), introduced in March 2022, would have directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to
reinstate the processing of applications for parole under the CFRP Program. S. 2138 (Menendez),
introduced in June 2021, would have required the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, to reinstate the Cuban Medical Professional Parole
Program to authorize the admission into the United States of Cuban medical personnel
conscripted to study or work in a third country under the Cuban government’s direction.104
U.S. Fugitives from Justice
Cuba has provided safe haven to several U.S. fugitives from justice, including convicted
murderers and hijackers. Most of these fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s and early 1980s. For
example, Joanne Chesimard, also known as Assata Shakur, was added to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI’s) Most Wanted Terrorist list in May 2013. Chesimard was part of militant
group known as the Black Liberation Army. In 1977, she was convicted for the 1973 murder of a
New Jersey State Police officer and sentenced to life in prison. Chesimard escaped from prison in
1979 and, according to the FBI, lived underground before fleeing to Cuba in 1984.105 Another

102 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “Nonimmigrant Visas,” at https://cu.usembassy.gov/visas/nonimmigrant-visas/.
103 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “Decreasing B2 Visa Validity for Cuban Nationals,” media note, March 15, 2019.
104 Established in 2006 and administered by the Department of Homeland Security, the Cuban Medical Professional
Parole Program allowed Cuban medical professionals in third countries to be approved for entry into the United States.
The program was terminated in January 2017. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, “Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) Program,” January 19, 2017, at
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/cuban-medical-professional-parole-cmpp-program.
105 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Most Wanted Terrorists: Joanne Deborah Chesimard,” poster, at
Congressional Research Service

29

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

fugitive, William “Guillermo” Morales, who was a member of the Puerto Rican militant group
known as the Armed Forces of National Liberation, reportedly has been in Cuba since 1988, after
being imprisoned in Mexico for several years. He was convicted in New York on weapons
charges in 1979 and sentenced to 10 years in prison and 5 years’ probation, but he escaped from
prison the same year.106
In addition to Chesimard and Morales, several other U.S. fugitives in Cuba are named in the State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2020 (issued in December 2021).107 Ishmael Muslim
Ali (Ronald LaBeet) is wanted for the 1984 hijacking of a flight to Cuba from the U.S. Virgin
Islands, where he had received eight life sentences after being convicted of killing eight tourists
in 1972.108 Charles Lee Hill is wanted for his alleged involvement in several violent crimes in
1971, including the shooting death of a New Mexico State Police officer and the hijacking of a
plane to avoid prosecution.109 Ambrose Henry Montfort is wanted for the hijacking of a passenger
aircraft to Cuba in 1983.110 Victor Manuel Gerena, a member of a Puerto Rican militant separatist
group, is wanted for the 1983 armed robbery of a security company in West Hartford, CT.
With the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 2015, the United States held several law
enforcement dialogues that reportedly included discussion of the issue of U.S. fugitives from
justice; the most recent such dialogue was in July 2018.111 As noted, in January 2021, then-
Secretary of State Pompeo designated the government of Cuba as a state sponsor of international
terrorism, citing Cuba’s harboring of several U.S. fugitives from justice among the reasons for
designation.112
Although the United States and Cuba signed an extradition treaty in 1904 (which entered into
force in 1905 and was amended by an additional extradition treaty in 1926), the treaty has not
been used under the current Cuban government. Instead, Cuba has returned fugitives to the
United States on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 2018, Cuba returned a New Jersey man
wanted on murder charges and a long-sought U.S. fugitive from justice wanted in connection with
ecoterrorism who had stopped in Cuba on his way to Russia.113 Generally, however, Cuba has
refused to render to U.S. justice any fugitive judged by Cuba to be “political,” such as Chesimard,
who Cuba contends could not receive a fair trial in the United States.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 117th Congress, S. 4715, introduced in August 2022, would have
called for the immediate extradition and return to the United States of U.S. fugitives receiving

http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/joanne-deborah-chesimard/view.
106 James Anderson, “Living in Exile, Maimed Guerrilla Maintains Low-Key Profile in Cuba,” Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, January 16, 2000; Vanessa Bauza, “FBI’s Fugitive Is Cuba’s Political Refugee,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel,
May 26, 2002; Mary Jordan, “Fugitives Sought by U.S. Find a Protector in Cuba,” Washington Post, September 2,
2002.
107 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2020: Cuba, December 16, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/cuba/.
108 FBI, “Most Wanted: Ishmail Muslim Ali,” poster, at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt/ishmail-muslim-ali; and Azam
Ahmed, “Convicted of Murder and Now Swept Up in U.S.-Cuba Shift,” New York Times, July 8, 2017.
109 FBI, “Most Wanted: Charles Lee Hill,” poster, at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/murders/charles-lee-hill.
110 FBI, “Most Wanted: Ambrose Henry Montfort,” poster, at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt/ambrose-henry-montfort.
111 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Fourth Law Enforcement Dialogue in Washington, DC,”
media note, July 10, 2018.
112 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism,” January 11, 2021.
113 CBS News, “Suspected Eco-Terrorist Arrested in Cuba After 20 Years as a Fugitive,” August 11, 2018; and Mimi
Whitefield, “Cuba Extradites a 55-Year-Old American Lawyer to Face Murder Changes in N.J.,” Miami Herald,
November 7, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

30

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

safe haven in Cuba. It also would have required a State Department report identifying steps taken
to secure the extradition or return to the United States of U.S. fugitives residing in Cuba and, to
the extent feasible, include an estimate of the number of U.S. fugitives receiving safe haven in
Cuba. In addition, the bill would have prohibited the use of International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement assistance for programs or initiatives in Cuba until Cuba fulfilled certain
conditions regarding its extradition obligations and other broad political and other conditions set
forth in the LIBERTAD Act of 1996.
Two other bills were introduced in the 117th Congress related to fugitives from Cuba. S. 689,
introduced in March 2021, would have, among other provisions, required the President to submit
a report to certain committees that identifies terrorists and fugitives being provided safe haven in
Cuba. H.R. 8651, introduced in August 2022, would have required the President to submit an
annual report to Congress on fugitives currently residing in other countries whose extradition is
sought by the United States. The bill also would have expressed the sense of Congress that in
meeting foreign officials, U.S. officials should prioritize advocacy in fulfilling U.S. extradition
requests, including that for Joanne Chesimard.
Trafficking in Persons and Cuba’s Foreign Medical Missions
In 2022, for the fourth consecutive year, the State Department placed Cuba on Tier 3 in its annual
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP report), a status that refers to countries whose governments do
not fully comply with the minimum standards for combatting trafficking and are not making
significant efforts to do so.114 According to the State Department’s 2022 TIP report, issued in July
2022, “there was a government policy or pattern to profit from labor export programs with strong
indications of forced labor, particularly in its foreign medical missions’ program.”115 As noted in
the report, Cuba has over 30,000 medical workers involved in missions in more than 60 countries
and overseas territories worldwide. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Cuba’s emergency medical
contingent of nearly 5,000 medical workers has provided assistance to more than 40 countries.
Cuba’s foreign medical diplomacy has long been a source of national pride and an example of
Cuba’s soft power worldwide to promote humanitarianism and generate political goodwill. The
diplomacy has included short-term initiatives for disaster relief and epidemic control as well as
longer-term initiatives, such as providing primary health care, staffing hospitals, and establishing
health care facilities.116
Cuba’s foreign medical mission program is not a solely humanitarian-based grant but a program
in which the Cuban government benefits economically from countries that can pay for the
medical services. Cuban government statistics show that in 2020 (latest year available), the export
of health services accounted for 58% of Cuba’s services exports, making it a major foreign

114 From 2015 through 2018, Cuba was on the Tier 2 Watch List, a status that refers to countries whose governments,
despite making significant efforts, do not fully comply with the minimum standards and still have some specific
problems or whose governments have made commitments to take additional anti-trafficking steps over the next year.
115 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2022, pp. 193-195.
116 For further background on the development of Cuba’s foreign medical missions, see Julie M. Feinsilver, “Fifty
Years of Cuba’s Medical Diplomacy: From Idealism to Pragmatism,” Cuban Studies, vol. 41 (2010), pp. 85-104; John
M. Kirk, “Cuba’s Medical Internationalism: Development and Rationale,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol.
28, no. 4, 2009, pp. 497-511; Sarah A. Blue, “Cuban Medical Internationalism: Domestic and International Impacts,”
Journal of Latin American Geography, vol. 9, no. 1, 2010, pp. 31-49; Pascal Fletcher, “Cuban Medics a Big Force on
Haiti Cholera Frontline,” Reuters News, December 10, 2010; and Monica Mark, “Cuba Leads Fights Against Ebola in
Africa as West Frets About Border Security,” Guardian, October 11, 2014.
Congressional Research Service

31

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

exchange earner. The U.S. State Department maintains that the Cuban government collects
between $6 billion and $8 billion annually from its foreign medical missions.117
Cuba’s medical missions program has received growing criticism in recent years for its labor
practices and alleged exploitation of medical personnel.118 The State Department’s 2022 TIP
report alleges that the Cuban government continued to deploy medical workers to foreign
countries using deceptive and coercive tactics and failed to address labor violations and
trafficking crimes, despite an increasing number of allegations about abuses from credible
nongovernmental organizations, former participants, and foreign governments. According to the
report, the Cuban government failed to inform participants of the terms of their contracts, only
paid them a portion of their salaries, and threatened medical professionals and their family
members with retaliation if participants left the program.119
The Cuban government has spoken out against criticism of its foreign medical missions, alleging
that U.S. influence and actions led to the termination of missions in some countries, such as
Brazil and Ecuador. The Cuban government maintains that its “technicians and professionals who
participate in these programs do so absolutely of their own free will.” The government asserts that
Cuban medical professionals on foreign missions “continue to receive their full salary in Cuba,
and also a stipend in the country of destination, along with other benefits.” It also maintains that
when Cuba receives compensation from host countries, the funding contributes to the
sustainability of Cuba’s health care system and covers the costs for its foreign medical missions,
which provide health care services at no cost to many countries worldwide.120 Cuba’s foreign
minister has denounced what he characterizes as U.S. lies about Cuba’s medical missions.121
Many countries view Cuban doctors as a key resource for their overwhelmed health care systems,
although hiring Cuban medical personnel can lead to criticisms due to concerns over Cuba’s labor
practices. In August 2022, the regional government of Calabria in Italy announced that it hired
almost 500 doctors from Cuba.122 In May 2022, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López
Obrador announced that Mexico would hire 500 Cuban doctors to help fill shortages; the first
contingent of these doctors arrived in Mexico in July. Some in Mexico’s medical community
have criticized the hiring of Cuban doctors, maintaining there are unemployed Mexican doctors
who could do the job and questioning the qualifications of the Cuban medical personnel.123
Legislative Initiatives. In the 117th Congress, the joint explanatory statement to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), required State Department compliance with
a directive in H.Rept. 117-84 related to Cuba’s foreign medical missions. H.Rept. 117-84 directed
the State Department to assess the Pan American Health Organization’s (PAHO’s) involvement in
Cuba’s foreign medical missions program and to update the Committees on Appropriations on its

117 ONEI, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2021, Sector Externo, Edición 2022, p. 47; and U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2022, p. 195.
118 For example, see “Cuba: Repressive Rules for Doctors Working Abroad,” Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2020.
119 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2022, p. 195.
120 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “The U.S. Crusade Against Cuba’s International Medical Cooperation,
Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba,” December 5, 2019.
121 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Cuban FM Denounces the United States’ Lies About Medical Missions,”
April 29, 2020; and CE NoticiasFinancieras, “Cuba Says U.S. ‘Deliberately Lies’ in Accusing It of Trafficking,” July
19, 2022.
122 Reuters News, “Cuba to Send Hundreds of Doctor’s to Italy’s Calabria Region,” August 19, 2022.
123 Latin News Weekly Report, “Mexico: Cuban Medical Assistance Prompts Pushback,” May 19, 2022; and Paloma
Duran, “Cuban Doctors Arrive in Mexico to Address Medical Deficit,” Mexico Business News, July 26, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

32

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

findings, as well as on steps taken to improve PAHO’s transparency, internal oversight, and risk
management.124 (In the 116th Congress, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 [P.L.
116-94] and the explanatory statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 [P.L. 116-
260], referenced S.Rept. 116-126 and required State Department reports on PAHO’s role in
facilitating agreements between foreign medical professionals from the Cuban government and
other countries.)
In addition, S. 2138 (Menendez), introduced in June 2021, would have required an annual State
Department report identifying countries hosting Cuba’s foreign medical missions and a
determination as to whether such personnel are subject to conditions that qualify as severe forms
of trafficking in persons. The bill also would have provided for the reinstatement of the Cuban
Medical Professional Parole Program, and required a joint State Department and Health and
Human Services Department report reviewing the findings of the role of PAHO in Brazil’s Mais
Médicos program from 2013 to 2019, a summary of corrective actions to be taken by PAHO, and
recommendations for further corrective actions.
Outlook
Cuba is experiencing one of its most difficult economic and political periods since the end of the
Cold War and the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The
country’s massive oil storage fire in August 2022 and severe damage to western Cuba in
September 2022 from Hurricane Ian further increased electricity outages and shortages of basic
commodities; these conditions prompted protests, although not to the level of the July 2021
protests. The difficult economic situation and continued political repression also have spurred a
migration exodus to the United States via the U.S. Southwest border.
Looking ahead, Cuba’s frail, oil-dependent, electric power system likely will constrain the
country’s post-pandemic economic recovery. The state’s continued domination of the economy,
along with continued U.S. economic sanctions, also dims prospects for major economic
improvement. Although additional social unrest is possible, it appears the country’s one-party rule
is strongly buoyed by its domestic security apparatus and control of most media.
When President Biden took office, many observers expected an early reversal of sanctions
imposed on Cuba during the previous Administration and a return to a U.S. policy focused on
engagement. Early on, the Biden Administration said it was reviewing policy decisions made by
the prior Administration and announced that human rights would be a pillar of U.S. policy toward
Cuba. As the human rights situation deteriorated and Cuba harshly repressed the July 2021
protests, the Biden Administration condemned Cuba’s action and responded with targeted
sanctions against those Cuban officials and security entities involved in the repression. The
Administration ultimately unveiled several Cuba policy changes in May 2022, with the goal of
increasing support to the Cuban people. These changes included efforts to facilitate family
reunification and to ease some restrictions on travel and remittances, although many sanctions
remain in place.
The 117th Congress supported continued funding for Cuban democracy programs and U.S.
broadcasting to Cuba. It also has expressed heightened concern about the human rights situation
in Cuba through the approval of several resolutions. As in the past, Members of Congress
maintain diverse opinions regarding the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba.
Numerous legislative initiatives were introduced to either increase or ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba

124 The Pan American Health Organization is the specialized international health agency for the Americas and serves as
the regional office for the Americas of the World Health Organization.
Congressional Research Service

33

link to page 39 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

(Appendix A). In July 2022, the House rejected a sanctions-easing amendment to an
appropriations measure that would have prohibited funding to enforce a prohibition on private
financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The vote appears to demonstrate the effect of
Cuba’s harsh repression on congressional consideration of legislative initiatives on Cuba
sanctions.
Congressional Research Service

34

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Appendix A. Legislative Initiatives in the 117th
Congress
This appendix provides a listing of Cuba-related legislation and legislative initiatives in the 117th
Congress, including enacted measures and resolutions, bills that received some congressional
action, and bills and resolutions that were introduced. This report does not discuss the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, with the exception of including in this appendix legislative
provisions to prohibit funding from being used for the closure or relinquishment of control of the
naval station. For information on the naval base, see CRS Report R44137, Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions
P.L. 117-46 (S. 1828). Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks Act of 2021,
or the Havana Act of 2021. Introduced May 25, 2021, and referred to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. (In the House, a similar bill, H.R. 3356, was
introduced May 19, 2021, and referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.) Senate passed S. 1828 by Unanimous Consent
June 7, 2021; House passed S. 1828 September 21, 2021, by a vote of 427-0. Signed into law
October 8, 2021. The measure provided additional authority to the Central Intelligence Agency
and the State Department to provide financial support to those serving abroad who experience
traumatic brain injuries.
P.L. 117-81 (S. 1605). National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022.
Originally approved by the Senate in June 2021 as a bill to designate the National Pulse Memorial
Orlando, FL, S. 1605 became the vehicle for the FY2022 NDAA in December 2021. House
passed (363-70), amended, December 7, 2021; Senate agreed (88-11) to the House amendment
December 15, 2021. Signed into law December 27, 2021. Section 1035 extended a prohibition
through FY2022 on the use of funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station,
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Section 1338 required a report by the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, on efforts by China to expand its presence and influence in Latin
America and the Caribbean, including, among its various requirements, a detailed description of
the relationship between the governments of China and Cuba.
The measure included four provisions related to anomalous health incidents:
 Section 732, providing U.S. government employees and family members access
to certain Department of Defense medical facilities for assessment and treatment;
 Section 910, requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish a cross-functional
team to address national security challenges posed by such incidents and ensure
individuals affected by such incidents receive timely, comprehensive care and
treatment;
 Section 4501, authorizing $30 million for anomalous health incidents health care;
and
 Section 6603, requiring the President to designate a senior official as Anomalous
Health Incidents Interagency Coordinator to coordinate the response of the U.S.
government to such incidents, including equitable and timely access to
assessment and care for those affected, adequate training and education for U.S.
government personnel, U.S. government technological and research efforts, and
Congressional Research Service

35

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

the development of options to prevent, mitigate, and deter suspected attacks
presenting as such incident.
P.L. 117-103 (H.R. 2471). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022. Originally introduced in April
2021 as the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, the
bill became the vehicle for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, approved in March 2022.
It included 12 regular appropriations bills funding federal agencies for FY2022.
Division C (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022), in Section 8148, prohibited the
use of funds in the act from being used to carry out the closure or realignment of the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Division J (Military Construction, Veteran Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2022), in Section 140, prohibited the use of funds in the act to close or realign the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Division K (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations,
2022) continued two long-standing provisions: Section 7007 prohibited direct funding for the
government of Cuba, including direct loans, credits, insurance, and guarantees of the Export-
Import Bank or its agents; and Section 7015(f) prohibited the obligation or expenditure of
assistance for Cuba except through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations. The explanatory statement to the bill allocated, as requested by the
Administration, $12.973 million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting.
The joint explanatory statement to Division K included several State Department reporting
requirements on Cuba: an update of a report on the condition of the U.S. Embassy in Havana,
Cuba, originally required by S.Rept. 116-126; updated reports on consular services (including
nonimmigrant visas) and on the causes and responsibility of health illnesses suffered by U.S.
government personnel originally required in Section 7035 of S.Rept. 116-126; and an update of a
Cuba internet access report required by Section 7045 of S.Rept. 115-282. The explanatory
statement also required the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on Appropriations
on implementation of the Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks Act of
2021 (P.L. 117-46).
In addition, the joint explanatory statement directed federal departments and agencies to comply
with reporting requirements and directives contained in H.Rept. 117-84 accompanying H.R.
4373, the FY2022 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act (SFOPS) bill passed by the House in July 2021, including
 a directive for the State Department to assess the Pan American Health
Organization’s (PAHO’s) involvement in Cuba’s foreign medical missions
program and to update the Committees on Appropriations on its findings and on
steps taken to improve PAHO’s transparency, internal oversight, and risk
management;
 a required U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) report, in consultation with
the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), within 90 days of enactment, outlining
reforms taken to address deficiencies identified in USAGM-commissioned
internal and external reviews of OCB’s editorial policies and procedures,
implementation of recommendations identified in a December 2020 State
Department Office of Inspector General report, and plans for aligning OCB’s
personnel and activities with the budget request level; and
 a required report within 45 days of enactment detailing the results of the
Administration’s Cuba policy review that is to address the steps necessary to
Congressional Research Service

36

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

advance the normalization of bilateral relations, recommendations for supporting
the growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control, the
extent to which the government of Cuba has cooperated over the previous fiscal
year on anti-terrorism efforts, and a timeline for safely restoring staffing levels at
the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
P.L. 117-263 (H.R. 7776 ). James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023. Originally introduced as the Water Resources Development Act of 2022, the bill became
the legislative vehicle for the compromise FY2023 NDAA in December 2022. Signed into law
December 23, 2022. The bill contains several Cuba-related provisions.
 Section 1034 extended a prohibition through FY2022 on the use of funds to close
or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
 Section 6805 required a report from the Director of National Intelligence on mass
migration in the Western Hemisphere, including on use of or the threat of using
mass migration by “the regime of Miguel Díaz-Canel and Raúl Castro in Cuba”
to diminish dissent in Cuba and increase remittances from migrants residing in
the United States.
 Section 11203 requires the Commandant of the Coast Guard to conduct a study
and issue a report within two years of enactment on threats to national security,
drug trafficking, and other relevant threats in the Florida Straits and Caribbean
region, including Cuba.
H.R. 2617. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023. Originally introduced as the Performance
Enhancement Reform Act, the bill became the vehicle for the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2022, enacted in December 2022, which included 12 regular appropriations bills funding federal
agencies for FY2023.
Division C (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023), in Section 8142, prohibited the
use of funds to carry out the closure or realignment of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba.
Division J (Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2023), in Section 136, prohibited the use of funds to carry out the closure or realignment of the
U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Division K (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations,
2023) continued two long-standing provisions: Section 7007 prohibited direct funding for the
government of Cuba, including direct loans, credits, insurance, and guarantees of the Export-
Import Bank or its agents; and Section 7015(f) prohibited the obligation or expenditure of
assistance for Cuba except through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations. The explanatory statement to the bill allocated $12.973 million for the Office of
Cuba Broadcasting.
The explanatory statement to Division K included several requirements for the State Department
to update several reports on Cuba originally required by S.Rept. 116-126 on the condition of the
U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba; consular services (including nonimmigrant visas); and the causes
and responsibility of health illnesses suffered by U.S. government personnel. The explanatory
statement also required a State Department report on its “ongoing support for impacted personnel,
consistent with the Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks Act of 2021
(P.L. 117-46).
In addition, the explanatory statement to Division K directed federal departments and agencies to
comply with reporting requirements and directives contained in H.Rept. 117-401 accompanying
Congressional Research Service

37

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

H.R. 8282, the FY2023 bill reported by the House Appropriations Committee in July 2022. This
included a reporting requirement, within 90 days of enactment (similar to that required for
FY2022), on reforms taken to address deficiencies identified in the USAGM-commissioned
internal and external reviews of OCB’s editorial policies and oversight procedures,
implementation of State Department Inspector General recommendations, and plans for aligning
OCB’s personnel and activities with the budget request level.
S.Res. 37 (Menendez). The resolution expressed solidarity with the San Isidro Movement,
condemned escalated attacks against artistic freedoms in Cuba, and called for the repeal of laws
that violate freedom of expression and the immediate release of arbitrarily detained artists,
journalists, and activists. Introduced February 8, 2021, and reported by Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations with an amendment in the nature of a substitute March 24. Senate passed,
amended, by unanimous consent April 15, 2021.
S.Res. 81 (Rubio). The resolution honored Las Damas de Blanco, a women-led nonviolent
movement in support of freedom and human rights in Cuba, and called for the release of all
political prisoners in Cuba. Introduced March 1, 2021, and reported by Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations March 24. Senate passed by unanimous consent May 12, 2021.
S.Res. 310 (Menendez). The resolution expressed solidarity with Cuban citizens demonstrating
peacefully for fundamental freedoms, condemned the Cuban regime’s acts of repression, and
called for the immediate release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. Introduced July 21, 2021,
and reported by Senate Committee on Foreign Relations July 28. Senate passed, amended, by
unanimous consent August 3, 2021.
S.Res. 489 (Scott, Rick)/H.Res. 867 (Diaz-Balart). The resolution commended the actions of
Cuban human rights and democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer Garcia and all pro-democracy and
human rights activists in demanding fundamental civil liberties in Cuba and speaking out against
Cuba’s brutal, totalitarian communist regime. S.Res. 489 introduced January 12, 2022; Senate
agreed to without amendment by unanimous consent January 12, 2022. H.Res. 867 introduced
January 12, 2022; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 760 (Wasserman Schultz). The resolution expressed solidarity with the Cuban people
participating in peaceful protests, condemned Cuba’s repression of peaceful protesters and
journalists, called on Cuba to end efforts to block internet access or restrict access to certain
websites or applications, called on Cuban military and security forces not to arrest or detain
peaceful protesters and to release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained individuals, and
urged certain U.S. government actions to support the Cuban people. Introduced and referred to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs November 1, 2021; House considered under suspension
of rules and passed (382-40, 4 present) November 3, 2021.
S.Con.Res. 14. Concurrent resolution setting forth the congressional budget for the U.S.
government for FY2022 and setting forth budgetary levels for FY2023 through FY2031.
Introduced August 9, 2021; Senate passed (50-49), amended, August 11, 2021. House passed
August 24, 2021, pursuant to the provisions of H.Res. 601 (approved by a vote of 220-212). As
approved, Section 3010 provided for a deficit-neutral reserve fund relating to facilitating
improved internet service for Cuban citizens; the provision was added by S.Amdt. 3097 (Rubio),
which the Senate approved by voice vote on August 10, 2021.
Other Bills with Legislative Action
H.R. 4373 (Lee, Barbara)/S. 3075 (Coons). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022. H.R. 4373 introduced and reported by House
Congressional Research Service

38

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 117-84) July 6, 2021. House passed (217-212) July 28,
2021. S. 3075 introduced October 26, 2021.
Both bills would have continued two long-standing Cuba provisions: Section 7007 would have
prohibited direct funding for the government of Cuba, including direct loans, credits, insurance,
and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents, and Section 7015(f) would have
prohibited obligating or expending assistance for Cuba except through the regular notification
procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
With regard to democracy funding, both bills would have fully funded the Administration’s $20
million request. However, Section 7045(c) of the House bill would have provided that of the $20
million, not less than $5 million would be made available for programs to support free enterprise,
private business organizations, and people-to-people educational and cultural activities. In
contrast, Section 7045(c) of the Senate bill would have provided for $5 million for such activities
in addition to the $20 million in democracy funding. In both bills, Section 7045(c) also would
have provided that funds under Title I of the act be made available for the operation of, and
infrastructure and security improvements to, U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba and for costs
associated with additional U.S. diplomatic personnel in Cuba.
With regard to U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, the report to the House bill,
H.Rept. 117-84, and the explanatory statement to the Senate bill recommended $12.973 million
for OCB, the same as the Administration’s request.
For final action on FY2022 foreign operations appropriations, see Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), which included several reporting requirements that
originated in H.Rept. 117-84 to H.R. 4373 and the explanatory statement to S. 3075.
H.R. 4350 (Smith, Adam)/S. 2792 (Reed). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022. H.R. 4350 introduced July 2, 2021; reported (H.Rept. 117-118) by the House Committee on
Armed Services September 17, 2021; House passed (316-113) September 23, 2021. S. 2792
introduced and reported (S.Rept. 117-39) by the Senate Armed Services Committee September
22, 2021. In November 2021, the Senate began consideration of H.R. 4350, substituting its own
version of the bill, but did not complete action when lawmakers could not agree on which
amendments to consider for floor action. As approved by the House, H.R. 4350 had a provision
(Section 1246) that would require a report on efforts by China to expand its presence and
influence, including on the relationship between China and the governments of Venezuela and
Cuba. As reported, S. 2792 had a provision (Section 1034) that would extend a prohibition on the
use of funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
For final action on the FY2022 NDAA, see P.L. 117-81 (S. 1605), above.
H.R. 7900 (Smith, Adam)/S. 4543(Reed). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023. H.R. 7900 introduced May 27, 2022; reported (H.Rept. 117-397) by the House Committee
on Armed Services July 1, 2022. House passed (329-101) July 14, 2022. S. 4543 introduced and
reported (S.Rept. 117-130) by the Senate Armed Services Committee. As passed, H.R. 7900
included a provision (Section 1235) requiring a report on efforts by Russia to expand its presence
and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, including on the relationship between the
Russian government and the governments of Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). As
reported, S. 4543 had a provision (Section 1034) that would extend a prohibition on the use of
funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. For final
action, see P.L. 117-263, above.
H.R. 8282 (Lee, Barbara)/S. 4662 (Coons). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023. H.R. 8282 introduced and reported by House
Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 117-401) July 1, 2022. S. 4662 introduced July 28, 2022;
Congressional Research Service

39

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

referred to Senate Committee on Appropriations. The House bill would have provided $20
million for Cuba democracy programs, with not less than $5 million to support private enterprise,
private business organizations, and people-to-people educational and cultural activities; the bill
also would provide for the operation of, and improvements to, U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba
and for costs associated with additional U.S. diplomatic personnel.
With regard to Cuba broadcasting, H.Rept. 117-401 recommended $12.973 million for the OCB
and the explanatory statement to the Senate bill recommended $13.891 million. H.Rept. 117-401
also would require a report, within 90 days of enactment, similar to that required for FY2022 on
reforms taken by USAGM, implementation of State Department Inspector General
recommendations, and plans for aligning OCB’s personnel and activities with the budget request
level. The explanatory statement to the Senate bill maintained that the Senate Appropriations
Committee would continue to support the reform of broadcasting standards at OCB, as outlined in
USAGM’s Embarking on Reform of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting from May 2019, and calls
for the USAGM, in consultation with OCB, to continue to provide quarterly updates to the
Committees on Appropriations on implementation of OCB reforms.
The explanatory statement to the Senate bill also would require an update of a State Department
report on the condition of the U.S. Embassy in Havana originally required in S.Rept. 116-126 and
a State Department report, within 60 days of enactment, on consular personnel at the U.S.
Embassy in Havana and statistics on visas granted Cubans by type.
For final action, see H.R. 2617, above.
H.Amdt. 300 (Tlaib) to H.R. 8294. Amendment to prevent funds made available by this act from
being made available to implement, administer, or enforce Section 908(b) of the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; 22 U.S.C. §7207(b)), a prohibition on
financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. Amendment failed (163-260) July 20, 2022.
S. 2045 (Cruz)/H.R. 6867 (Diaz-Balart). The bills would have designated the area between the
intersections of 16th Street Northwest and Fuller Street Northwest and 16th Street Northwest and
Euclid Street Northwest in Washington, DC, as “Oswaldo Payá Way.” S. 2045 introduced June
14, 2021, and discharged by Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
by unanimous consent July 30, 2021. Senate passed by unanimous consent July 30, 2021. H.R.
6867 introduced February 28, 2022; referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform.
Other Introduced Resolutions and Bills
H.Res. 440 (Malliotakis). The resolution would have commended Lithuania for refusing to ratify
the European Union’s Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba. Introduced May
25, 2021; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 527 (Diaz-Balart). The resolution would have expressed solidarity with the Cuban people
in their demands for freedom and respect for human rights. Introduced July 13, 2021; referred to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 529 (Malliotakis). The resolution would have expressed that the House of
Representatives stands in solidarity with the people of Cuba and their fight to achieve freedom,
democracy, and human rights. Introduced July 13, 2021; referred to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 534 (Wasserman Schultz). The resolution would have expressed solidarity with Cuban
citizens demonstrating peacefully for fundamental freedoms, condemned the Cuban regime’s acts
Congressional Research Service

40

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

of repression, and called for the immediate release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens.
Introduced July 16, 2021; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
S.Res. 116 (Rubio)/H.Res. 278 (Diaz-Balart). Similar resolutions would have commemorated
the 60th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs operation and remembered the members of Assault
Brigade 2506. S.Res. 116 introduced March 16, 2021; referred to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. H.Res. 278 introduced March 26, 2021; referred to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
S.Res. 173 (Scott, Rick). The resolution would have commended the actions of Cuban
democracy and human rights activist José Daniel Ferrer García and the pro-democracy and
human rights group the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU) to uphold fundamental freedoms and
would have condemned Cuba’s brutal communist regime. Introduced April 22, 2021; referred to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
S.Res. 303 (Rubio). The resolution would have expressed support for the people of Cuba in their
demands for freedom and the fulfillment of basic needs and condemned the communist regime in
Cuba. Introduced July 15, 2021; referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
S.Res. 717 (Rubio). The resolution would have honored the life and legacy of Oswaldo Payá
Sardiñas and his contributions to promote democracy and human rights in Cuba on the 10th
anniversary of his death. Introduced July 21, 2022; referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.
S.Res. 728 (Scott, Rick)/H.Res. 1304 (Diaz-Balart). Identical resolutions would have
commended the bravery, courage, and resolve of human rights and pro-democracy activists in
Cuba one year after the historic march of July 11, 2021. S.Res. 728 introduced July 28, 2022;
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. H.Res. 1304 introduced July 29, 2022;
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 198 (Cohen). Baseball Diplomacy Act. The bill would have waived certain prohibitions
with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional
baseball. Introduced January 5, 2021; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in
addition to the Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 287 (Salazar)/S. 689 (Rubio). Fighting Oppression Until the Reign of Castro Ends Act, or
the FORCE Act. Both bills would have prohibited the removal of Cuba from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism until the President makes a determination (subject to certain requirements
and factors) described in Section 205 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
(LIBERTAD Act; P.L. 104-114) that a transitional government in Cuba is in place. S. 689 also
would have required the President to submit a report to certain committees that identified
terrorists and fugitives being provided safe haven in Cuba. H.R. 287 introduced January 13, 2021,
and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 689 introduced March 10, 2021, and
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 2684 (Diaz-Balart). Cuban Family Reunification Modernization Act of 2021. The bill
would have amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (P.L. 82-414, as amended) to establish
a Cuban family reunification parole program. Introduced April 20, 2021; referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 3625 (Rush). United State-Cuba Relations Normalization Act. The bill would have removed
provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; authorized common carriers to
install and repair telecommunications equipment and facilities in Cuba and to otherwise provide
telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba; prohibited restrictions on
travel to and from Cuba and on transactions incident to such travel; called on the President to
Congressional Research Service

41

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

conduct negotiations with Cuba for the purpose of settling claims of U.S. nationals for the taking
of property by the Cuban government and to engage in bilateral dialogue with the Cuban
government to secure the protection of internationally recognized human rights; extended
nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba; and prohibited limits on remittances to
Cuba. Introduced May 28, 2021; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in addition to
the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Agriculture, and
Financial Services.
H.R. 3455 (Wasserman Schultz)/S. 1748 (Menendez). No Stolen Trademarks Honored in
America Act. Identical bills would have modified a 1998 prohibition (Section 211 of Division A,
Tile II, P.L. 105-277) on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights to certain marks, trade
names, or commercial names. The bills would have applied a fix so the sanction would apply to
all nationals and would bring the sanction into compliance with a 2002 World Trade Organization
dispute settlement ruling. H.R. 3455 introduced May 20, 2021; referred to House Committee on
the Judiciary. S. 1748 introduced May 20, 2021; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 5069 (Tenney). Championing Uncensored Bandwidths Access Act of 2021, or CUBA Act of
2021. The bill would have directed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Commissioner of the Federal
Communications Commission, to develop and implement a strategy to establish internet
resiliency and deliver internet access in Cuba. Introduced August 20, 2021; referred to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 5557 (Donalds)/S. 2990 (Scott, Rick). Denying Earnings to the Military Oligarchy in Cuba
and Restricting Activities of the Cuban Intelligence Apparatus Act, or the DEMOCRACIA Act.
H.R. 5557 introduced October 12, 2021; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in
addition to the Committees on the Judiciary and Rules. S. 2990 introduced October 18, 2021;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Among the bills’ provisions, Section 4 would have required the President to impose sanctions
(asset blocking and visa restrictions) on foreign persons determined to be providing financial,
material, or technological support or engaging in transactions related to the defense, security, and
intelligence sectors of Cuba or any sector certified by the President as involved in carrying out
human rights abuses or providing support for international terrorism. Section 5 would have
required the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons determined to be responsible for or
complicit in, or directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuses or corruption in
Cuba or who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological
support or goods in services in support of any such activity. Section 5 also would have required
sanctions on a wide range of Cuban government officials and employees and members of the
Cuban Communist Party. Section 6 would have required, for the termination of sanctions set forth
in Sections 4 and 5, a presidential determination and certification of numerous Cuban government
actions and the enactment into law of a joint resolution approving the President’s determination
and certification. Section 7 would have required the President to take actions to provide
unrestricted internet service to Cuba, including the establishment of an interagency task force to
develop a long-term solution.
H.R. 6907 (Wasserman Schultz). Cuban Family Reunification Parole Act of 2022. The bill
would have directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to reinstate the processing of
applications for parole under the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Introduced March
2, 2022; referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 7579 (Green, Mark). Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act. Among its provisions, the bill
would have provided for the use of U.S. International Development Finance Corporation funds to
Congressional Research Service

42

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

finance moving expenses and necessary workforce development costs incurred by companies
moving from China to Latin America or the Caribbean and would have provided authority for the
President to extend duty-free treatment for goods and services of companies moving from China
to Latin America or the Caribbean. As defined in the bill, the term Latin American or Caribbean
country shall include Cuba (or Venezuela) only if the Secretary of State determines and certifies
that the prior authorities of such country have renounced their illegitimate claim to power and if
the government of such country has fulfilled certain conditions. Introduced April 26, 2022;
referred to House Committee on Ways and Means and in addition to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 8651 (Smith, Christopher). Walter Patterson and Werner Foerster Justice and Extradition
Act. The bill would have directed the President to submit to Congress a report, not later than 270
days after enactment (and each 12-month period thereafter), on fugitives currently residing in
other countries whose extradition is sought by the United States and related matters. The bill also
would have expressed the sense of Congress that in meetings with foreign officials from which
the United States seeks the extradition of fugitives, U.S. ambassadors and other senior officials
should prioritize advocacy on fulfilling U.S. extradition requests, including for Joanne
Chesimard, an escaped convict and the murderer of New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster.
Introduced August 2, 2022; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
S. 249 (Wyden). United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2021. The bill, among its provisions, would
have repealed or amended provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba;
authorized common carriers to install, maintain, and repair telecommunications equipment and
facilities in Cuba and provide telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba;
prohibited restrictions on travel to Cuba; called for the President to take all necessary steps to
advance negotiations with the Cuban government for settling property claims of U.S. nationals
and for securing the protection of internationally recognized human rights; extended
nondiscriminatory trade treatment to Cuba; prohibited restrictions on remittances to Cuba; and
required a presidential determination reported to Congress prior to the denial of foreign tax credit
with respect to certain foreign countries. Introduced February 4, 2021; referred to the Senate
Committee on Finance.
S. 1694 (Klobuchar). Freedom to Export to Cuba Act of 2021. The bill would have repealed or
amended provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including certain
restrictions in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the LIBERTAD Act of 1996, and the TSRA.
Introduced May 19, 2021; referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.
S. 2138 (Menendez). Combating Trafficking of Cuban Doctors Act of 2021. The bill would have
required the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress identifying countries
hosting Cuban medical personnel who are participating in Cuban government foreign medical
missions and determining whether such personnel in each country are subjected to conditions that
qualify as severe forms of trafficking in persons. It also would have required the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to reinstate the Cuban Medical
Professional Parole Program and the Secretaries of State and Health and Human Services to
submit a report to Congress that included a review and findings of the role of PAHO in Brazil’s
Mais Médicos program between 2013 and 2019, corrective actions taken by PAHO, and
recommendations for further corrective actions. In addition, it would have required the
Secretaries of State and Health and Human Services to take all necessary steps to ensure PAHO
undertakes governance reforms that strengthen internal oversight and risk management for future
programs. Introduced June 17, 2021; referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
Congressional Research Service

43

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

S. 3468 (Risch). The bill would have limited the removal of the Cuban government from the state
sponsors of terrorism list until the President submits to Congress a determination and certification
regarding certain actions by the Cuban government and until a joint resolution approving the
determination and certification is enacted into law. The actions required by the determination and
certification are that the Cuban government is cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts;
has ceased to provide support to international terrorist groups; has ceased to provide support for
acts of international terrorism; has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United States all
persons sought by the U.S. Department of Justice for crimes committed in the United States; and
has ceased to provide support, including defense, intelligence, and security assistance, to the
illegitimate regime of former President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Introduced January 10,
2022; placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
S. 4715 (Menendez). Trooper Werner Foerster and Frank Connor Justice Act. Section 3 of the bill
would have expressed the sense of Congress that Joanne Chesimard, William “Guillermo”
Morales, and all other fugitives receiving safe haven in Cuba must be extradited or returned
immediately to the United States and that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General should
leverage all appropriate diplomatic tools to secure the timely extradition or return of all U.S.
fugitives from justice residing in Cuba. Section 4 would have required a State Department report,
within 180 days of enactment, that identifies steps taken to advance efforts to secure the
extradition or return of U.S. fugitives residing in Cuba; included a determination as to whether
Cuba is fulfilling its obligations under bilateral extradition treaties; and, to the extent feasible,
included an estimate of the number of U.S. fugitives from justice receiving safe haven in Cuba.
Section 5 would have prohibited the use of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
assistance for programs or initiatives in Cuba until Cuba was actively fulfilling its extradition
obligations, returning U.S. fugitives from justice residing in Cuba, and complying with conditions
set for the resumption of economic activity between the United States and Cuba pursuant to law,
including the LIBERTAD Act of 1996. Introduced August 2, 2022; referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 4285 (Menendez). Upholding the Inter-American Democratic Charter Act of 2022. Among its
provisions, Section 8 of the bill would have required the Secretary of State to develop a plan for
addressing threats to democratic governance posed by corruption and criminality and the malign
activities of nondemocratic states, including Cuba (as well as the People’s Republic of China,
Russia, and Iran). Introduced May 19, 2022; referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.

Congressional Research Service

44

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Appendix B. Links to U.S. Government Reports
U.S. Relations with Cuba, Fact Sheet, Department of State
Date: November 22, 2019
Link: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2022, Appendix 2, Department
of State
Date: July 6, 2021
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FY-2022-C-J-Appendix-2-FINAL-6-25-
2021.pdf
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2023, Appendix 2, Department
of State
Date: May 13, 2022
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-
Justifcation-Appendix-2-final-5-9-2022.pdf
Congressional Budget Justification FY2022, U.S. Agency for Global Media
Date: May 28, 2021
Link: https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/USAGM-FY-2022-CBJ-Final-
05.26.2021.pdf
Congressional Budget Justification FY2023, U.S. Agency for Global Media
Date: March 28, 2022
Link: https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/USAGMBudget_FY23_CBJ_03-25-
22-FINAL.pdf
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Cuba, Department of State
Date: April 12, 2022
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cuba/
Country Reports on Terrorism 2020, Cuba, Department of State
Date: December 16, 2021
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/cuba/
Cuba web page, Department of State
Link: https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/cuba/
Cuba web page, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security
Link: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-
destinations/cuba
Cuba web page, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service
Link: https://www.fas.usda.gov/regions/cuba
Cuba Sanctions web page, Department of State
Link: https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/
Cuba Sanctions web page, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
Congressional Research Service

45

Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress

Link: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-
country-information/cuba-sanctions
International Religious Freedom Report for 2021, Cuba, Department of State
Date: June 2, 2022
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/cuba/
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2022, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control,
p. 110, Department of State
Date: March 1, 2022
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00767-INCSR-2022-Vol-1.pdf
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2022, Volume II, Money Laundering, pp. 78-
80, Department of State
Date: March 1, 2022
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00768-INCSR-2022-Vol-2.pdf
Trafficking in Persons Report 2022, Cuba, pp. 193-195, Department of State
Date: July 2022
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/22-00757-TIP-REPORT_072822-
inaccessible.pdf

Author Information

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R47246 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
46