North Korea: September 2022 Update

September 15, 2022 R47242

North Korea: September 2022 Update
September 15, 2022
Summary
Mark E. Manyin,
For more than 30 years, 16 Congresses and 6 presidential administrations have struggled with
Coordinator
North Korea’s (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, or DPRK)
Specialist in Asian Affairs
advancing nuclear weapons and missile programs, human rights abuses, sponsorship of cyber-

attacks and cyber-crime, and threats to U.S. regional allies. As Members of Congress seek to
Emma Chanlett-Avery
shape and oversee U.S. policy toward North Korea, they may wish to consider a number of
Specialist in Asian Affairs
developments that have occurred since nuclear talks collapsed in 2019.

Mary Beth D. Nikitin
The Biden Administration says it is pursuing a “calibrated, practical approach” that “is open to
Specialist in
and will explore diplomacy with North Korea” to eventually achieve the “complete
Nonproliferation
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration appears to envision offering partial

sanctions relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization. Its approach appears to be
in alignment with that of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who assumed office in May
Dianne E. Rennack
2022 and has hardened Seoul’s stance toward the DPRK. Since Yoon’s inauguration,
Specialist in Foreign Policy
Washington and Seoul have shifted their emphasis from diplomacy to deterrence, for instance by
Legislation
expanding the size and scope of bilateral military exercises. They also have offered Pyongyang

unconditional humanitarian assistance, and Yoon has pledged to provide large-scale economic
Keigh E. Hammond
assistance if North Korea “embarks on a genuine and substantive process for denuclearization.”
Senior Research Librarian

Pyongyang largely has ignored attempts by the Biden and Yoon administrations, and their
predecessors, to resume dialogue and has rejected offers of humanitarian assistance, including

COVID-19 vaccines. Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly has continued to produce fissile
material for weapons. It also has continued to test missiles of various ranges and capabilities, including more than 30 ballistic
missiles since the start of 2022, in violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The tests appear to have
advanced the reliability and precision of its missile forces, and improved its ability to defeat regional missile defense systems.
In March 2022, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time since 2017. Many observers
see evidence that North Korea is preparing to conduct its seventh nuclear weapons test. It has not tested a nuclear device
since 2017.
The United States has responded to North Korea’s missile tests by introducing new unilateral sanctions designations,
dispatching U.S. military assets to Northeast Asia, and working with the Yoon Administration to expand U.S.-ROK deterrent
activities and to reinvigorate trilateral cooperation with Japan. In June 2022, the Senate passed the Otto Warmbier Countering
North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act of 2021 (S. 2129) that, among other steps, would require the State and
Treasury Departments to report annually to Congress on U.S. government sanctions-related activities and enforcement.
North Korea has undertaken these activities despite signs that its economy has contracted significantly since the start of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Since early 2020, the North Korean government has largely closed the country’s borders and imposed
restrictions on economic activities. Between January 2020 and January 2022, North Korea’s official trade, which already had
been reduced to a trickle due to sanctions, fell by nearly 90%. The difficulty of importing food and agricultural products
during the border shutdown, combined with poor weather, appears to have exacerbated North Korea’s chronic food shortages.
The U.N. estimates that over 10 million North Koreans, roughly 40% of the population, are undernourished. However, there
are few outward signs that North Korea’s economic difficulties are threatening the regime’s stability or are compelling North
Korea to pursue engagement with the United States.
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North Korea: September 2022 Update

Overview
Over the past six years, North Korea’s advances in nuclear weapons and missile capabilities
under its leader Kim Jong-un have catapulted Pyongyang from a threat to U.S. interests in East
Asia to a potential direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Efforts to halt North Korea’s (officially the
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, or DPRK) nuclear weapons program have been a
concern to at least the past 16 Congresses (and six presidential administrations), and North Korea
is the target of scores of U.S. and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. Although
the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have been the primary focus of U.S. policy toward
North Korea, other U.S. concerns include North Korea’s illicit activities, such as cyberattacks and
cyber-crime, as well as the potential resumption of small-scale conventional military attacks
against South Korea (officially known as the Republic of Korea, or ROK). Congress has
expressed particular concern about the state of human rights in North Korea, passing multiple
laws directing the State Department to prioritize pressuring the Pyongyang regime to improve
human rights conditions. Currently, egregious human rights violations by the North Korean state,
dire food insecurity, and the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
continue.
The Biden Administration’s North Korea Policy
The Biden Administration said in 2021 that it is pursuing a “calibrated, practical approach” that
“is open to and will explore diplomacy with North Korea” to eventually achieve the “complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”1 UNSC and U.S. sanctions bar nearly all of North
Korea’s exports and many of its imports, with exceptions for livelihood and humanitarian
purposes. The Biden Administration’s approach appears to envision offering partial sanctions
relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization in concert with allies in the region.
Incremental sanctions relief could be difficult to accomplish without congressional support, given
U.S. legal benchmarks for improved conditions and changed behavior.2 U.S. officials say they
have offered to meet with North Korean counterparts without preconditions, and that “the ball is
in [Pyongyang’s] court.”3 Some analysts criticize the Administration’s approach as offering little
substantive content that might provide sufficient incentives for North Korea to re-engage.4 Other
observers see merit in the return to an approach that emphasizes cooperation with allies and seeks
incremental progress on denuclearization.5 The Administration says that it supports providing
humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable North Koreans “regardless of denuclearization

1 The White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA,”
April 30, 2021.
2 For more, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack.
3 Jeongmin Kim, “Sung Kim: US Willing to Meet North Korea ‘Anytime, Anywhere,’” NKNews, June 21, 2021; State
Department, Department Press Briefing, June 21, 2021; State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken on ABC’s
This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” May 23, 2021.
4 See, for example, Jenny Town, “Restarting Diplomacy with Pyongyang,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2021.
5 See, for example, Bruce Klingner, “Biden and Yoon Aligned on Approach to North Korea,” The Heritage Foundation,
July 5, 2022; Peter Baker and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Rejecting ‘Love Letters’ to North Korea, Biden Offers Carrots
and Sticks Instead,” New York Times, May 21, 2021.
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progress.”6 In May 2022, Congress held a hearing reviewing the Biden Administration’s North
Korea policy.7
South Korea’s North Korea Policy Under Yoon Suk-yeol
Since the May 2022 inauguration of ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea has hardened its
stance toward North Korea compared to Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in. In multiple bilateral
meetings—including a summit between Biden and Yoon—the United States and South Korea
appeared to shift their emphasis from diplomacy to deterrence. The two sides expanded the size
and scope of their bilateral military exercises, which had been curtailed under Yoon’s
predecessor.8 Alongside these measures, Yoon also has offered to provide North Korea with large-
scale economic assistance if North Korea “embarks on a genuine and substantive process for
denuclearization.”9 North Korea has dismissed the plan as “absurd,” and many analysts in South
Korea and the United States argue that Yoon’s plan is unlikely to appeal to North Korea,
particularly in the short term.10
North Korea’s Actions
Since 2019, following the collapse of personal diplomacy between then-President Donald Trump
and Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang largely has ignored attempts by the Trump and Biden
Administrations to resume dialogue and has rejected offers of humanitarian assistance, including
COVID-19 vaccines. Kim has characterized U.S. offers of diplomacy as “no more than a petty
trick for deceiving the international community and hiding its hostile acts,” pointing specifically
to the continuation of U.S.-ROK military exercises and the maintenance of sanctions against
North Korea. Kim also has criticized South Korea’s acquisition of and advances in indigenous
production of sophisticated military equipment.11 In general, North Korea has ignored South
Korean offers of aid, cooperation, and diplomatic engagement. Kim’s reluctance to engage may
be partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since early 2020, the North Korean government has
largely closed the country’s borders and imposed restrictions on economic activities, further
damaging an economy already weakened by international sanctions.12
In the meantime, North Korea has continued to test missiles of various ranges and capabilities,
including more than 30 ballistic missiles since the start of 2022.13 On March 24, 2022, North

6 William Gallo, “US Says Open to N. Korea Aid, Regardless of Denuclearization Progress,” VOA, August 24, 2021.
7 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and
Nonproliferation, The Way Forward on U.S. North Korea Policy, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 2022.
8 The White House, “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2022; Scott Snyder,
“Evolution of U.S.-South Korean Coordination: Parsing Biden’s Joint Statements with Moon and Yoon,” Asia
Unbound blog, May 24, 2022.
9 South Korea’s Presidential Office, “Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol on Korea’s 77th Liberation Day,” August
15, 2022.
10 “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” Rodong Sinmun, August 19, 2022,
accessed on NKNews’ KCNA Watch website; James Fretwell, “Yoon Suk-yeol’s Plan to Denuclearize North Korea
Isn’t So ‘Audacious’ After All,” NK PRO, August 17, 2022.
11 Timothy Martin, “North Korea Sees U.S. as Ongoing Threat, Kim Jong Un Says in Speech,” Wall Street Journal,
September 30, 2021.
12 Bank of Korea, “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2021,” July 27, 2022; Ethan Jewell, “North
Korea’s Economy Contracts for Second Straight Year, ROK Central Bank Says,” NK News, July 28, 2022.
13 “U.S. Special Representative to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sung Kim on Recent DPRK Missile
Launches,” U.S. Department of State Special Briefing, June 7, 2022.
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Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its first ICBM launch since November
2017. That same month, press reports said South Korean government sources, as well as analysts
using publicly available satellite imagery, detected North Korean activities to restore the
Punggye-ri nuclear test site, which the regime had closed in 2018.14 These observations prompted
predictions that North Korea would carry out its seventh test of a nuclear weapon, and its first
since 2017.15 The United States responded to North Korea’s missile tests by introducing new
unilateral sanctions designations, attempting to expand UNSC sanctions, dispatching U.S.
military assets to Northeast Asia, and working with the new Yoon Administration to expand U.S.-
ROK deterrent activities and to reinvigorate trilateral cooperation with Japan.
The war in Ukraine may lead Kim Jong-un to conclude that he has greater freedom of action. In
the 1990s, Ukraine relinquished Soviet-legacy nuclear weapons in return for economic support
and security guarantees from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation.
Russia’s breach of this agreement by invading Ukraine may strengthen arguments inside North
Korea that denuclearization would increase the country’s vulnerability to larger foreign powers.16
Additionally, perceptions of a trend toward an international system of zero-sum competition
between two blocs—the United States and its allies and partners on one side, and China and
Russia on the other—could embolden North Korea. Kim may conclude that if he uses the
country’s nuclear weapons and missile programs to coerce concessions from Seoul, Washington,
and/or Tokyo, China and Russia would not take punitive actions against North Korea and may
even provide economic assistance to preserve the DPRK’s regime stability, similar to how they
supported North Korea during the Cold War.17 In May 2022, China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-led
UNSC resolution that would have imposed new sanctions on North Korea in response to its
ICBM tests.18 In the past, both countries had supported new UNSC sanctions resolutions
following a DPRK ICBM test.19
North Korea’s Internal Situation
Obtaining an accurate picture of North Korea’s internal economy presents a challenge. The
government publishes relatively little reliable data, leaving outside observers to rely on indirect
indicators to estimate trends inside the country. One of the few observable ways to measure
changes is to chart other countries’ reported trade with DPRK. Using these so-called “mirror
statistics,” during 2020 and 2021 North Korea’s official trade, which already had been reduced to
a trickle due to sanctions, plummeted further. (See Table 1.)

14 Katsuhisa Furukawa and Jaewoo Shin, “Update: Developments at the DPRK’s Punggye-Ri Nuclear Test Site
between 24 March and 6 April 2022,” Open Nuclear Network, April 6, 2022.
15 Bruce Klingner, “Waiting for the North-Korean-Nuclear-Test Godot,” Heritage Foundation commentary, August 29,
2022.
16 “Ukraine Conflict, a Cautionary Tale for Security-Wary N. Korea,” Yonhap News, February 24, 2022; “Putin’s
Invasion of Ukraine May Supercharge Nuclear Proliferation,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 25,
2022.
17 Andrei Lankov, “The War in Ukraine Changes Everything—Including the Future of North Korea,” NKNews, April 4,
2022.
18 United Nations Security Council, Written Record of 9048th Meeting, May 26, 2022, S/PV.9048.
19 Between 2006 and 2017, the UNSC adopted 10 resolutions sanctioning North Korea. Each was adopted unanimously
(15-0) in response to a North Korean ICBM and/or nuclear test. See United Nations, Security Council Official Records,
Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, various years, at research.un.org.
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Table 1. Estimated DPRK Trade, 2019-2021
Total Trade
Value
% Change from
Year
(USD, Mil.)
Previous Year
2019
2,957.4
14%
2020
663.0
-78%
2021
394.1
-41%
Source: Compiled from Trade Data Monitor of all reporting countries’ exports and imports with North Korea.
Notes: North Korea’s estimated total trade shrank by approximately 95% between 2016 and 2021. 2016, when
North Korea’s estimated trade was $6.4 bil ion, is the year the UNSC began to apply sectoral sanctions on
North Korea in response to its expanded missile and nuclear tests.
Data is an estimation of DPRK trade, based on ‘mirror statistics’ of all other countries’ reported trade with
DPRK. Customs data only account for legal trade of goods; il icit trade or trade in services is not represented in
these data. Along with standard data-entry errors, weak institutions and graft can diminish the reliability of
customs data. For example, South Korea’s Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency estimates an additional
$200-$500 mil ion in oil exports from China that is not reflected in official customs data.
Starting in the third quarter of 2021, the DPRK’s external trade began to gradually increase from
its lowest point. Trade with China, which has accounted for over 85% of North Korea’s total trade
for nearly a decade, began to return to early pandemic levels (i.e., before and around the time
restrictions were first imposed), reportedly due to North Korea’s slight relaxation of border
controls.20 In May 2022, however, trade severely contracted again after Pyongyang re-imposed
border restrictions following its first-ever public acknowledgement of a domestic COVID-19
outbreak in May.21 (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1. DPRK-China Trade
January 2021–June 2022

Source: China Customs, via Trade Data Monitor.

20 Ethan Jewell, “North Korea-China Trade Climbs to Highest Level Since Early 2020: Customs Data,” NK News, April
18, 2022.
21 Ethan Jewell, “COVID Outbreaks Depress North Korea-China Trade in June,” NK News, July 19, 2022.
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Notes: Customs data only account for legal trade of goods; il icit trade or trade in services is not represented in
these data.

Following storms in 2021 that damaged domestic agriculture, the Kim government said the
country was facing a “food crisis.”22 North Korea has experienced food shortages for decades,
and the difficulty of importing food and agricultural products during the 2020-2022 border
shutdown period may be exacerbating the problem. The United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) estimates that over 10 million North Koreans, roughly 40% of the
population, are undernourished.23
There are few outward signs that North Korea’s economic difficulties are threatening the regime’s
stability. The poor conditions of the DPRK economy also have not led Kim to pursue engagement
with the United States or South Korea. Despite some domestic constraints on his rule, Kim
continues to dominate North Korea’s polity, promoting, demoting, and resurrecting top officials
frequently, as he has done since succeeding his father in 2011.24 Since the beginning of the
pandemic, Kim’s government has taken a number of measures that appear aimed at strengthening
social control, particularly aiming to reduce the influence of foreign culture.25 The government
also has intensified the state and party’s control over the economy, though some observers
contend it has not gone so far as to reverse many of the measures adopted in the early years of
Kim’s reign that granted greater economic independence.26 Additionally, the hundreds of millions
of dollars North Korea reportedly has earned through sanctions-evading activities and cyber-
crime, discussed below, likely is enabling the Kim regime to prolong its control, as well as
maintain and advance its weapons programs.
North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs, including reportedly
producing fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons, despite UNSC
sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts to deter such pursuits.27 North Korea made multiple

22 Colin Zwirko, “North Korea Admits ‘Food Crisis,’ Says Grain to Be Distributed to Population,” NK News, June 20,
2021; Robert King, “North Korea Facing ‘Acute Food Insecurity’ but United Nations Plans No Aid,” December 10,
2021.
23 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022, p.
140.
24 For an example of the reshuffles, see Martin Weiser, “Reshuffles at North Korea’s Parliament Session Suggest
Volatility at the Top,” NK PRO, January October 4, 2021. For more on the constraints Kim Jong-un confronts, see
Peter Ward, “The Limits to Tyranny: Why Kim Jong Un Doesn’t Actually Have Absolute Power,” NK PRO, August
29, 2022; and Ruediger Frank, “Not Monolithic: The Need to Better Understand North Korea’s Internal Dynamics,”
NK PRO, January 7, 2022.
25 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, “North Korea’s ‘Anti-Capitalist’ Crackdown,” 38 North, November 5, 2021.
26 Rachel Minyoung Lee and Robert Carlin, “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking,” 38 North,
March 24, 2022. One interpretation of the apparent contradictions in this description of Kim’s economic policies is that
he has sought to formalize previously illegal forms of economic activities, such as buying and selling in consumer
markets, not only to boost economic productivity but also to enable the party and state greater administrative control
over such activities. Additionally, legalizing some market-based behaviors and allowing somewhat more independence
for individuals and enterprises likely have boosted state revenue through increased taxes and fees. See Benjamin
Katzeff Silberstein, “Kim Jong Un’s Congress Report: More Economic and Social Controls on the Horizon,” 38 North,
February 9, 2021; William Brown, “North Korea’s Economy in the Kim Jong Un Era,” Presentation for GW North
Korea School, October 25, 2021, available at https://naeia.com/analysis.
27 “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” International Atomic Energy Agency,
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commitments during previous episodes of U.S.-DPRK diplomacy to allow inspections or
completely dismantle nuclear weapons material production sites, but failed to fulfill those
promises when those talks eventually collapsed. Recent ballistic missile tests and military parades
suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade
regional ballistic missile defenses. North Korea also possesses biological weapons and chemical
weapons capabilities.28
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2022 annual threat assessment, Kim Jong-un
views nuclear weapons and ICBMs as “the ultimate guarantor of his totalitarian and autocratic
rule of North Korea and believes that over time he will gain international acceptance as a nuclear
power.”29 In a speech at an April 2022 military parade, Kim said the country “will continue to
take measures for further developing the nuclear forces of our state at the fastest possible speed.”
As in past statements, he underscored the primary mission of its nuclear forces is to “deter a war”
while also emphasizing the survivability of its nuclear deterrent force and readiness to apply
“nuclear combat capabilities in any situations of warfare.”30 In a September 9, 2022, speech to
North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un said, “there will never be any
declaration of ‘giving up our nukes’ or ‘denuclearization,’ nor any kind of negotiations or
bargaining to meet the other side’s conditions.” He vowed the country would continue developing
its “nuclear power.” The Assembly adopted a new law that reportedly expands the conditions
under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to include non-nuclear attacks and
situations that threaten the regime’s survival.31
Despite a longstanding UNSC ban on “all ballistic missile tests” by North Korea, the country
continues to flight-test a variety of systems, advancing the reliability and precision of its missile
forces, and improving its ability to defeat regional missile defense systems. North Korea has
publicly announced plans to develop and test new delivery vehicles. At the 8th North Korean
Workers Party Congress in January 2021, Kim announced North Korea would field a new
nuclear-capable submarine, develop its tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a
single missile, and improve its ICBMs’ accuracy, among other goals.32 North Korea accelerated
its testing in 2022, flight-testing 30 ballistic missiles.33 In mid-April 2022, North Korea flight-
tested a short-range “tactical guided weapon” that is nuclear-capable.34

September 12, 2022. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, by
Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
28 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), North Korea Military Power 2021; Department of State, “Adherence to and
Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” 2022.
29 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 7, 2022, p. 16.
30 North Korea has made similar statements since 2013. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea Military Power
2021, p. 26; “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Military Parade Held in Celebration of 90th Founding
Anniversary of KPRA,” Chongnyon Chonwi, April 26, 2022, accessed on NKNews’ KCNA Watch website.
31 Ellen Kim, “North Korea States It Will Never Give Up Nuclear Weapons,” CSIS Critical Questions, September 9,
2022; Colin Zwirko, “Kim Jong Un Says He Will ‘Never Give Up’ Nuclear Weapons, Rejects Future Talks,” NK News,
September 9, 2022; “Second-Day Sitting of 7th Session of 14th SPA of DPRK Held,” Rodong Sinmun, September 9,
2022, accessed on NKNews’ KCNA Watch website.
32 “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-Style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory on Report Made by
Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK,” Rodong Sinmun, January 10, 2021, accessed on NKNews’
KCNA Watch website.
33 U.S. Special Representative to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sung Kim on Recent DPRK Missile
Launches,” U.S. Department of State Special Briefing, June 7, 2022.
34 Ankit Panda, “North Korea’s Latest Missile Launch a Step Toward Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” NKNews, April 18,
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In 2022, North Korea has resumed efforts to improve its ability to strike the continental United
States with an ICBM, ending a nearly five-year pause in long-range tests.35 On March 16, a failed
ICBM flight test exploded over Pyongyang. North Korea followed up with a second ICBM test
on March 24, which it claimed was a Hwasong-17, but South Korean intelligence reportedly
assessed it as a Hwasong-15 test.36 The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assesses that the
Hwasong-17 ICBM, first displayed at an October 2020 military parade, is “probably designed to
deliver multiple warheads.”37 On May 25, North Korea again test launched an ICBM, on the heels
of President Biden’s visit to South Korea and Japan.38 In early June, North Korea test-launched
eight short-range ballistic missiles following the conclusion of a joint U.S.-South Korea naval
exercise.39 U.S. Forces Korea and the South Korean military responded to that test launch by
jointly firing eight ballistic missiles, similar to their response to the May 25 test.40 A U.S. Forces
Korea statement said the response was to “demonstrate the ability of the combined ROK-U.S.
force to respond quickly to crisis events.”41 A South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff statement said,
“Our military’s show of force was intended to highlight our resolve to firmly respond to any
North Korean provocations, including an ICBM launch, and our overwhelming capability and
readiness to conduct a surgical strike on the origin of the provocation.”42
In July 2022, the Senate Armed Services Committee cited North Korea’s expanded nuclear and
missile capabilities as part of the committee’s justification for including provisions in the FY2023
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that address the modernization of the U.S. nuclear
weapons programs.43 The House version of the FY2023 NDAA includes a requirement that the
Department of Defense produce an annual public report on North Korea’s military capabilities,
similar to past NDAAs.44
U.S. and U.N. Sanctions
Intermixed with the ebb and flow of U.S. and international efforts at engagement are moments
when U.S. law or domestic politics, or North Korea’s flouting of international norms, have
prompted the United States to impose unilateral economic sanctions and the United Nations
Security Council to impose international economic sanctions. The United States has imposed

2022.
35 State Department, Briefing with Special Representative for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sung Kim on
Recent Developments in the DPRK and U.S. Efforts to Advance Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,” April 6,
2022.
36 Vann H. Van Diepen, “Revisiting the Hwasong 17/15 Controversy,” 38North, April 27, 2022,
https://www.38north.org/2022/04/revisiting-the-hwasong-17-15-controversy-what-if-north-korea-had-launched-a-
hwasong-15/.
37 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), North Korea Military Power 2021.
38 Hyonhee Shin and Soo-Hyang Choi, “North Korea Launches ICBM After Biden Summits with Asia Allies,” Reuters,
May 25, 2022.
39 Mitch Shin, “North Korea Launches 8 Ballistic Missiles,” The Diplomat, June 6, 2022.
40 Jack Kim and Soo-Hyang Choi, “South Korea, U.S. Launch Eight Missiles in Response to North Korea Missile
Tests,” Reuters, June 6, 2022.
41 “U.S. ROK Conduct Combined Live Fire Missile Launch,” United States Forces Korea press releases, May 25, 2022
and June 5, 2022.
42 Hyonhee Shin and Soo-Hyang Choi, “North Korea Launches ICBM After Biden Summits with Asia Allies,” Reuters,
May 25, 2022.
43 Section 153 of S. 4543, reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee July 18, 2022.
44 Section 1205 of H.R. 7900.
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unilateral sanctions in response to North Korea’s first detonation of a nuclear explosive device in
2006; rampant money laundering; use of an illicit chemical agent in violation of international law
to assassinate Kim Jong-un’s half-brother in Malaysia in 2017; and ongoing belligerent activities
that resulted in a return of its designation as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism, also
in 2017. These sanctions affect foreign aid, exports including arms sales, and support in
international financial institutions.45 In addition, a succession of U.S. Presidents, dating back to
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, have invoked national emergency authorities to curtail
most aid and trade with the rogue state.46
The United States also participates in international sanctions required by the UNSC. Beginning
with its response to North Korea’s 2006 nuclear weapons test, the Security Council has adopted
10 resolutions that require member states to restrict trade, banking, and other engagement with
North Korea.47 UNSC sanctions cite North Korea’s weapons proliferation, including its ballistic
missile program and “diversion of financial, technical, and industrial resources toward developing
its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program”;48 the threat to regional stability; domestic
humanitarian conditions; misuse of diplomatic privileges; and abrogation of international
obligations, including its active efforts to evade and undermine sanctions.49
Despite international agreement to stop all trade in resources required to advance North Korea’s
weapons and ballistic missile programs and adoption of measures intended to curtail the North
Korean government’s access to finances, Pyongyang continues to evade sanctions and conduct
illicit activities to raise funds. In its most recent report, the U.N. Panel of Experts (POE) that

45 On December 7, 2006, President George W. Bush determined that North Korea, a non-nuclear-weapon state, had
detonated a nuclear explosive device, citing Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Section 129 of the
Atomic Energy Act. Presidential Determination No. 2007-07, Public Papers of the President, December 18, 2006. In
late 2017, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an “Advisory on
North Korea’s Use of the International Financial System,” FIN-2017-A008, November 2, 2017; and “Imposition of
Special Measure Against Bank of Dandong as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,” 31
C.F.R. Part 1010, 82 Federal Register 51758. On March 5, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security
and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford announced that the government of North Korea was in violation of international
norms for its illicit use of a chemical agent. Department of State Public Notice 10340, “Bureau of International Security
and Nonproliferation; Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons by North Korea Under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991,” 83 Federal Register 9362, March 5, 2018.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson designated the Government of North Korea as a state sponsor of acts of international
terrorism on November 17, 2017. Department of State Public Notice 10211, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST),” November 27, 2017, 82 Federal Register 56100.
46 President George W. Bush revoked the proclamation invoking the Trading With the Enemy Act (first issued in
Presidential Proclamation 2914; December 16, 1950; 15 Federal Register 9029) as being “no longer in the national
interest of the United States.” Presidential Proclamation 8271, June 26, 2008, 73 Federal Register 36785. He replaced
it, however, on the same day, with a national emergency declaration invoking the National Emergencies Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (NEA and IEEPA, respectively), in Executive Order 13466,
“Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals,” 73 Federal Register
36787, June 26, 2008; 31 C.F.R. Part 510, November 4, 2010. The President is required to continue annually any
national emergency he issues under NEA, or it expires, along with the sanctions established under IEEPA. President
Biden most recently renewed the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 in a notice of June 13, 2022
(87 Federal Register 36049).
47 United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to North Korea and supporting documentation are available at
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718.
48 United National Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) of March 2, 2016.
49 Sanctions evasion is first addressed in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013) of January 23, 2013,
which cites North Korea’s misuse of financial institutions, bulk cash smuggling, seagoing vessels refusing to cooperate
with inspection and the related challenges of seizing contraband, and the complicity of third parties in North Korea’s
sanctions evasion.
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monitors and informs the Security Council on DPRK sanctions implementation noted that
weapons and ballistic missile programs continue to progress, and trade that either directly
provides materiel for the illicit programs or generates revenue to underwrite weapons
development also continues.50 The POE particularly noted that sanctions evaders were finding the
means to accomplish their goals by:51
 engaging in “intangible transfer of technology” by participating in or facilitating
academic exchanges (the POE cites universities in China; study-abroad programs
in Sweden, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe, South
America, and Asia; conferences in the European Union; and exchanges with
Malaysia);
 taking advantage of a lack of clarity in defining restricted goods and services (the
POE cites illicit procurement activities in China and Russia);
 misusing—deliberately or by accounting error—country codes in reporting
imports and exports (to hide data on goods eventually arriving in/from North
Korea);
 increasing the maritime export of coal from North Korea (primarily to China);
 increasing the importation of refined petroleum into the DPRK (primarily from
China and Russia, but with other East Asian oil terminals also implicated as a
source);
 manipulating financial and ownership networks in shipping so that the DPRK’s
relationship to a transaction is obfuscated, considered “sophisticated evasion”
(the POE notes seemingly “stateless” sea-going vessels capable of onloading or
offloading energy resources docking in DPRK ports; it also notes Chinese ports
being used to alter the appearance of vessels in order to evade country-affiliation
or ownership-identification);
 DPRK diplomatic representatives misusing their overseas positions, including
earning prohibited income (the POE cites activities in Russia); and
 engaging in “cyberattacks, in particular on cryptocurrency assets,” which are an
“important revenue source” for the North Korean government.52

50 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) established the Panel of Experts (POE). The POE’s most
recent report was issued on March 1, 2022 (S/2022/132).
51 Bullet points all from the most recent POE report, Ibid.
52 Ibid. In July 2022, U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger
said that cybercrime provides as much as a third of the funds for North Korea’s missile program. Center for a New
American Security, “Virtual Event. Cybersecurity Threats and Information Sharing,” July 28, 2022,
https://www.cnas.org/events/virtual-event-cybersecurity-threats-and-information-sharing-with-anne-neuberger;
relevant discussion begins at 16’05”. See also Benjamin R. Young, “North Korea Knows How Important Its
Cyberattacks Are: Pyongyang’s Tradition of Guerrilla Warfare Keeps Its ‘All-Purpose Sword’ Sharp,” Foreign Policy;
February 9, 2022; Bruce Klingner, North Korean Cyberattacks: A Dangerous and Evolving Threat, Heritage
Foundation report, September 2, 2021, 51 p.; and Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “North Korea’s Illicit Cyber Operations:
What Can Be Done?” Henry L. Stimson Center, 38 North, February 2020, 16 p.
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Recent U.S. Sanctions Decisions
In the past several months, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) or the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has designated
multiple North Korean entities or their affiliates for sanctions, including:
 The DPRK’s Second Academy of Natural Science Foreign Affairs Bureau and
affiliated DPRK, Chinese, and Russian entities and individuals for illicit weapons
proliferation;53
 Three Russian entities and two Russian individuals for providing material or
technological support for a DPRK entity subject to sanctions (secondary
sanctions);54
 Corad Technology Ltd., a Chinese (Hong Kong) entity, and its affiliates in
Singapore and Japan, for involvement in sales of sensitive technology to Iran,
North Korea, and restricted Chinese government or defense subordinate
entities;55 and
 Blender and Tornado Cash, “virtual currency mixers,” were designated on May 6,
2022, and August 8, 2022, respectively, in part for processing a virtual currency
heist pulled off by Lazarus Group, a DPRK state-sponsored cyber hacking group.
The Lazarus Group theft of nearly $620 million is considered the largest-ever
virtual currency heist; Blender’s designation was the United States’ first such
action targeting a virtual currency facilitator.56 On August 10, 2022, the
Netherlands arrested Alexey Pertsev, a software developer with Tornado Cash,
and charged him with “concealing criminal financial flows and facilitating
money laundering.”57
In addition, in 2021 and 2022, the Department of Justice filed charges against persons under U.S.
jurisdiction and foreign persons for violating U.S. sanctions laws by engaging in transactions with
North Korean designees or by evading sanctions. Reports cited in this memorandum and reports
of the POE in recent years note that North Korea’s illicit trade and cyber activities offer targets—
in North Korea and in third countries—that are not yet subject to economic restrictions.
In June 2022, the Senate passed the Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and
Surveillance Act of 2021 (S. 2129), which among other steps would require the State and

53 Department of State, Public Notice 11689, March 24, 2022. “Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against
Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement,” 87 Federal Register 16819. In addition, the
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added one of the Chinese entities—Jiangsu
Tianyuan Metal Powder Co., Ltd.—to its Entity List, requiring a presumption of denial for any export licenses to that
end-user. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity
List,” February 14, 2022, 87 Federal Register 8180.
54 Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions,” March 10,
2022, 87 Federal Register 15491.
55 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Addition of Entities and Revision of Entries on the
Entity List; and Addition of Entity to the End-User (MEU) List,” November 26, 2021, 86 Federal Register 67317.
56 Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Issues First-Ever Sanctions on a Virtual Currency Mixer, Targets DPRK
Cyber Threats,” May 6, 2022; “U.S. Treasury Sanctions Notorious Virtual Currency Mixer Tornado Cash,” August 8,
2022.
57 Fiscale inlichtingen—en opsporingsdienst (FIOD; Fiscal Information and Investigation Service), “Arrest of
Suspected Developer of Tornado Cash,” August 12, 2022; Ravie Lakshmanan, “Tornado Cash Developer Arrested
After U.S. Sanctions the Cryptocurrency Mixer,” The Hacker News, August 14, 2022.
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Treasury Departments to report annually to Congress on U.S. government sanctions-related
activities and enforcement. The bill, in addition, would require the State Department to submit to
Congress a strategy “on combating North Korea’s repressive information environment,” and
would authorize $10 million annually for FY2022-FY2026 to increase U.S. government-
sponsored broadcasting and information dissemination efforts into North Korea.58
In August 2022, the State Department extended its restrictions on the use of U.S. passports to
travel to North Korea through August 2023.59 Since 2017, U.S. travel to the DPRK has required a
special validation passport issued by the State Department. Such passports are reserved for travel
in the U.S. national interest and are intended for professional reporters, officials with the
American Red Cross or International Committee of the Red Cross, or those who have a
compelling humanitarian justification.60
Regional Responses to North Korea’s Tests
South Korea
Implications of South Korean Presidential Election
President Yoon’s victory in South Korea’s March 2022 election ushered in greater alignment
between South Korea and the United States on policy toward North Korea. During the election
campaign, Yoon criticized the Moon government for being insufficiently committed to North
Korea’s denuclearization. Under the overarching policy of seeking “reciprocity” in most dealings
with North Korea, he proposed making economic aid to North Korea and inter-Korean economic
cooperation conditional on North Korea’s progress in denuclearizing. Yoon argued that sanctions
should be maintained until North Korea’s “complete denuclearization.”61 Yoon has unveiled some
incentives for DPRK denuclearization, including offering “large-scale” food assistance;
assistance for power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure; help modernizing
North Korea’s ports and airports; agricultural assistance; aid to help modernize the DPRK’s
hospitals and medical infrastructure; and help to “implement international investment and
financial support initiatives.” In Yoon’s plan, North Korea would need to begin the process of
denuclearization to begin receiving such assistance. Yoon also has promised that he would not try
to change North Korea’s government by force.62 Yoon’s aid plan does not appear to involve
lifting sanctions, as North Korea has demanded, though it would almost certainly require waivers
to UNSC sanctions for some elements to be carried out. Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, who
appears to have assumed a prominent role in his regime, has dismissed Yoon’s plan as “an absurd

58 S. 2129, the Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act of 2021, introduced by
Senator Portman with bipartisan cosponsorship on June 17, 2021; reported out of the Committee on Foreign Relations
on October 28, 2021; and agreed to by voice vote on June 16, 2022.
59 Department of State, Public Notice 11840, “United States Passports Invalid for Travel to, in, or Through the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” 87 Federal Register 51728, August 23, 2022.
60 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Passport for Travel to North Korea,” accessed June 2022.
61 Yoon Suk-yeol Transition Team, “Yoon Suk Yeol’s Foreign and Security Policy,” March 14, 2022,
https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/20220314-YSY-FOPO.docx; “Incoming Gov’t to Seek N.
Korea’s Complete Denuclearization, Boost Defense Capability,” Yonhap News Agency, May 3, 2022.
62 Office of the President, “Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol on Korea’s 77th Liberation Day,” August 15, 2022;
Jeongmin Kim, “Seoul Can’t Provide Security Guarantees to North Korea, Yoon Suk-yeol Says,” NK News, August 17,
2022.
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dream,” saying that that any assumption that North Korea might take steps toward
denuclearization is a “wrong prerequisite.”63
Both the U.S. and ROK administrations also have offered to provide humanitarian aid to ordinary
North Koreans unconditionally. Such offers include assistance to respond to North Korea’s 2022
COVID-19 outbreak. According to a variety of reports, North Korea has refused offers of
COVID-19 vaccines from the multilateral COVAX initiative and from China, and reportedly has
not responded to U.S. and ROK offers of COVID-19 assistance.64 International analysts assess
that the absence of vaccines and prior infections, combined with a reportedly severe general
shortage of medicine, widespread chronic malnutrition, and an extremely fragile public health
infrastructure, make the North Korean population particularly vulnerable to a severe COVID-19
outbreak. By mid-summer 2022, North Korean authorities had declared their battle with COVID
a success, officially attributing fewer than 100 deaths to COVID-19 and claiming that cases had
declined from over 400,000 in May to zero in late July.65 In August, Kim declared that the
country had “eradicated” COVID-19, which his sister claimed had been intentionally introduced
into North Korea by South Korea, by way of balloons and other materials South Korean activists
had launched over the inter-Korean border.66 Many experts have expressed skepticism about
North Korea’s official COVID-19 statistics.67 In his September 9, 2022, speech to the DPRK’s
Supreme People Assembly, Kim said that North Korea would start a vaccine campaign in
November 2022, and that it would likely need to import the shots.68
Uptick in U.S.-ROK Alliance Activities
Yoon has emphasized a need to expand South Korea’s defense and deterrence capabilities in
conjunction with the U.S. alliance, including developing offensive strike capabilities and
enhanced missile defense.69 His government has spoken publicly about plans for massive strikes
against North Korea—including against its leadership—in the event of a North Korean
provocation.70 During the May 2022 Biden-Yoon summit, the two leaders appeared to shift their
emphasis from diplomacy to deterrence. The two countries reactivated a high-level consultation
group on extended deterrence under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Biden committed to deploy

63 “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” Rodong Sinmun, as reproduced on
NKNews’ KCNAwatch.org, August 19, 2022.
64 Timothy Martin, “North Korea Rejects Covid-19 Vaccine Doses,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2021; The
White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press
Conference,” May 21, 2022; “N. Korea Silent on S. Korea’s Offer for COVID-19 Talks for 3rd Day: Official,” Yonhap
News, May 18, 2022.
65 Chaewon Chung, “North Korea Reports First-Ever COVID-19 Outbreak,” NKNews, May 12, 2022; Victor Cha,
Katrin Fraser Katz, and J. Stephen Morrison, North Korea’s Covid-19 Lockdown, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, March 2022; “North Korean COVID-19/Fever Data Tracker,” 38 North, July 25, 2022; Heeje Lee and Samuel
S. Han, “North Korea Appears to Have Managed Its COVID-19 Outbreak: What Comes Next?,” 38North, August 15,
2022.
66 Colin Zwirko, “North Korea Declares COVID-19 ‘Eradicated,’ Implies Kim Jong Un Caught Virus,” NK News,
August 11, 2022.
67 See, for example, Martyn Williams, “Examining North Korea’s COVID-19 Data: A Two-Month Miracle?” 38North,
July 15, 2022.
68 Colin Zwirko, “North Korea to Start COVID Vaccine Campaign in November: Kim Jong Un,” NKNews, September
9, 2022.
69 Jeongmin Kim, “Yoon Hails Peace ‘Through Strong Might’ on Anniversary of North Korea’s Invasion,” NK News,
June 27, 2022; Yoon Suk-yeol Transition Team, “Yoon Suk Yeol’s Foreign and Security Policy,” March 14, 2022.
70 Ankit Panda, “South Korea’s ‘Decapitation’ Strategy Against North Korea Has More Risks Than Benefits,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Commentary, August 15, 2022.
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“strategic U.S. military assets” to South Korea in a “timely and coordinated manner as
necessary.”71
Biden and Yoon also announced their shared intention to “expand the scope and scale of
combined military exercises and training on and around the Korean Peninsula.”72 Trump and
Moon curtailed the exercises from June 2018 through May 2022 in order to facilitate diplomacy
with the North; other reasons cited for the decision were Trump’s conviction that the exercises
were too costly, and the health risks of conducting large-scale exercises during the COVID-19
pandemic. As mentioned earlier, Yoon and Biden’s announcements at their summit were soon
followed by joint exercises, some of which included a U.S. aircraft carrier for the first time in
over four years.73 The pace and scale of joint military cooperation continued to increase in the
following months, with the dispatch of U.S. F-35 stealth fighters joining ROK F-35s for training
in July 202274 and full-scale live-fire exercises in August 2022 including combined air carrier
strike group training and amphibious operation drills.75
U.S.-South Korea-Japan coordination over North Korea has deepened since Yoon’s inauguration.
From 2018 to 2022, U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination ebbed, due in part to a sharp rise in Seoul-
Tokyo tensions over historical issues and to the Moon government’s apparent preference to
curtail overt trilateral cooperation to avoid jeopardizing engagement initiatives with North Korea.
Since mid-May 2022, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have held multiple high-level
meetings, including a trilateral presidential summit on the sidelines of the June 2022 Madrid
NATO meeting. Yoon has said he would like to lift South Korea-Japan relations out of their
current state of distrust and tension. It remains unclear whether and how the two sides will
resolve the thorniest issues.76
China
Following North Korea’s March 2022 test of an ICBM, China expressed “concern” and urged
“restraint on all sides.”77 Although China’s chief nuclear envoy has engaged in talks with his
South Korean and U.S. counterparts, China subsequently vetoed (along with Russia) a U.S.-led
UNSC resolution that would have imposed additional restrictions on the amount of petroleum
North Korea is allowed to import and would have designated for sanctions the Lazarus Group, a
hacking group linked to the DPRK government that reportedly has stolen hundreds of millions of
dollars.78 In July 2022, as observers predicted that Kim may attempt to justify a seventh nuclear
test as a response to U.S. and South Korean “hostile acts,” some analysts pointed out that China

71 The White House, “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2022.
72 The White House, “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2022.
73 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S., ROK Conduct Combined Live Fire Missile Launch,” June 5, 2022; U.S. Navy,
“Republic of Korea, U.S. Navies Conclude Carrier Strike Group Exercise,” June 4, 2022.
74 “US and South Korean Stealth Fighters Train Together for the First Time,” Stars and Stripes, July 5, 2022.
75 “North Korea’s Latest Threat Seen as Pretext for Nuclear Test,” Voice of America, July 31, 2022.
76 South Korea’s Presidential Office, “Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol on Korea’s 77th Liberation Day,” August
15, 2022.
77 “China Urges Restraint by ‘All Sides’ on North Korea’s Missile Tests,” Reuters, March 25, 2022.
78 United Nations Security Council, “United States of America: Draft Resolution,” May 26, 2022, S/2022/431; U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Statement on Attribution of Malicious Cyber Activity Posed by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea,” April 14, 2022.
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and Russia may use a similar justification for not supporting potential additional UNSC sanctions
if and when a test is carried out.79
Historically, China is the DPRK’s chief benefactor and has served as a lifeline for the
impoverished nation. China’s overriding priority with North Korea is preserving regional
stability. DPRK provocations—particularly tests of its nuclear weapons program—have the
potential to upset the status quo.80 However, Beijing often has acted to forestall more severe
sanctions by the United Nations that seek to punish North Korea for its actions. As U.S.-China
relations have deteriorated, analysts expect little help from Beijing in reining in North Korea’s
provocations.81 Congress has encouraged and authorized the President to use sanctions on third
parties that ignore, overlook, or violate the requirements of U.N. Security Council resolutions in
their trade with North Korea.82 Congress has also authorized the Department of Homeland
Security to use enhanced inspection tools on shipments arriving in the United States from foreign
jurisdictions that the President determines are failing to comply with Security Council
requirements for limiting trade with North Korea.83
Japan
The DPRK ICBM test launched on March 25, 2022, landed in Japan’s 200-nautical-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone and prompted a strong reaction from Tokyo. Foreign Minister
Yoshimasa Hayashi called the test a “blatant and grave threat to the international community.”84
Hayashi also explicitly tied the situation in Ukraine to the launch, warning that the DPRK may be
taking advantage of the international community’s focus on Europe to engage in provocative
actions. A month later, Hayashi joined U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel aboard a U.S.
aircraft carrier to observe a display of U.S. and Japanese air power, with both Emanuel and
Commander of the Pacific Fleet Karl Thomas emphasizing in their remarks the strength of the
alliance’s deterrence against DPRK threats.85
North Korea’s steadily advancing capabilities add to Japan’s increasing sense of vulnerability.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine unnerved Tokyo for its raw aggression, and Japan’s strong
response was due in part to Japanese leaders’ concern that the crisis could have implications for
Japan’s security in Asia.86 A number of commentators have drawn comparisons between Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan.87 Japanese leaders have
increasingly linked the security of Taiwan with Japan’s own security in a reflection of Tokyo’s

79 “North Korea’s Latest Threat Seen as Pretext for Nuclear Test,” Voice of America, July 31, 2022.
80 Bruce Bennett and Diana Myers, “North Korean Nuclear Weapons Pose an Existential Threat to China,” RAND
blog, July 13, 2021.
81 “China Draws North Korea Closer Than Ever as Biden Visits Region,” Washington Post, May 18, 2022.
82 See, especially, Section 104, North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. 9214.
83 See, especially, Section 205, North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. 9225.
84 Extraordinary Press Conference by Foreign Minister HAYASHI Yoshimasa, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
March 24, 2022.
85 “USS Abraham Lincoln, with VIPs Aboard, Displays Airpower at Sea to Underline US-Japan Alliance,” Stars and
Stripes, April 23, 2022.
86 In a February 25, 2022, statement, Foreign Minister Hayashi said Russia’s invasion “shakes the foundation of
international order not only in Europe but also in Asia.” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Sanction Measures
Following the Launch of Military Actions by Russia in Ukraine (Statement by Foreign Minister HAYASHI
Yoshimasa),” February 25, 2022.
87 “The Ukraine Crisis Is a Wake-up Call for Taiwan and Japan,” The Federalist, March 15, 2022.
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sense of threat from China.88 The combination of these threats could influence Japan’s new
National Security Strategy, which will be released soon amid indications that Japan is ready to
invest more heavily in defense, a departure from Tokyo’s traditionally incremental and modest
increases.89 The DPRK tests may give more leverage to those in Tokyo who favor a better-funded
and more muscular security policy. Congress has supported Japan developing a more capable and
flexible military force, including the passage of a joint resolution in July 2022 that
commemorated former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and praised his strengthening of U.S.-Japan
military cooperation.90
For nearly two decades, Japan has imposed unilateral sanctions that bar virtually all trade with
North Korea. In addition to the threat posed by missile tests and nuclear weapons development,
Japan prioritizes resolving the abduction of Japanese citizens by DPRK agents in the 1970s and
1980s, demanding that Pyongyang account for the abductees’ fates. At the UNSC, Japan has
supported U.S. and other countries’ efforts to issue strong condemnations and uncompromising
UNSC resolutions regarding North Korea’s missile tests.
Russia
Russia, increasingly isolated from the international community and struggling economically
because of the sanctions imposed on Moscow in response to its war against Ukraine, appears
unlikely to support a new UNSC statement or resolution criticizing and/or penalizing the DPRK.
In response to North Korea’s early 2022 shorter-range missile tests, Russian officials commented
that they were sympathetic to the DPRK’s decision to renew its program, and that U.S. pressure
to increase sanctions were the reason denuclearization talks have halted.91 Similar to China,
Russia’s hostile relations with the United States make it unlikely to productively engage in
negotiating with North Korea, despite its earlier participation in the Six-Party Talks in the early
2000s aimed at brokering a deal that would curtail the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.92 In
July 2022, North Korea officially recognized the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and
Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), regions of Ukraine controlled by Russian-backed separatists.
North Korea reportedly also plans to dispatch workers—in contravention of UNSC sanctions—to
the DPR once the DPRK eases its COVID border restrictions.93 In early September 2022,
following reports that North Korea was supplying Russia with “millions” of artillery shells as
well as rockets, the U.S. Department of Defense acknowledged that U.S. intelligence indicated
that Russia had asked North Korea for ammunition.94 The same month, North Korea and Russia

88 Isabel Reynolds and Emi Nobuhiro, “Japan Sees China-Taiwan Friction as Threat to its Security,” Japan Times, June
25, 2021.
89 Thisanka Siripala, “Japan Needs a Revamped North Korea Policy,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2022. “Japan Pushes to
Include Defense Budget Hike in Key Policy Guidelines,” Japan Times, June 4, 2022.
90 S.Res. 706
91 “Russia Says It Understands N.Korea’s Move to Renew Missile Launches –RIA,” Reuters, March 8, 2022.
92 For more, see CRS Report R45033, Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-
Avery, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
93 Ethan Jewell, “North Korea Recognizes Breakaway Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine,” NK News, July
14, 2022; Colin Zwirko, “North Korea Confirms Plan to Send Workers to Russia-Occupied Ukraine,” NK News,
August 2, 2022.
94 Defense Department, “Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds an On-Camera Press
Briefing,” September 6, 2022; Julian Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S.
Intelligence,” New York Times, September 5, 2022.

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reportedly agreed to resume rail traffic, which North Korea halted in early 2020 as part of its
COVID-19 border closure.95
Issues for Congress
Historically, Members of Congress seeking to influence U.S. policy toward North Korea have
utilized a range of tools. Opportunities for Congress to weigh in tend to increase when there is
greater U.S.-DPRK interaction and when the executive branch is contemplating large-scale
initiatives toward North Korea. During U.S.-North Korea denuclearization negotiations, for
instance, past Congresses sought to influence the talks and in multiple cases affected the
implementation of negotiated agreements.96 Between 1995 and 2009, when the United States
provided over $1 billion in food and energy aid to North Korea, Congress often sought to
influence the development and implementation of these assistance programs.97 Congressional
activity related to North Korea also was high in 2016 and 2017, when tensions spiked over North
Korea’s nuclear and missile tests.98 Over time, however, deteriorating U.S.-DPRK relations, the
lack of success of both U.S. diplomatic efforts and pressure tactics, as well as North Korea’s
refusal to engage have narrowed congressional options.
In the 117th Congress, some Members have acted on the stasis in U.S.-DPRK relations. Some
have sought to push the Biden Administration to offer greater incentives for North Korea to return
to the negotiating table.99 Others have sought to require the Administration to tighten pressure by
enacting additional sanctions legislation or by increasing funds for broadcasting information into
North Korea.100 Some Members have sought to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act
of 2004, which seeks to raise the priority of addressing the DPRK’s human rights record,
including by establishing a special envoy for North Korean human rights issues.101 Authorities in
the 2004 Act expire at the end of FY2022, and the special envoy position has been vacant since
January 2017. Yet other congressional efforts, such as in the annual National Defense
Authorization Act, focus on countering the growing North Korean threat through increased
support for missile defense and U.S. nuclear weapons funding and tightening export controls.

95 Dasl Yoon, “North Korean Weapons Supplied to Russia Would Likely Have Limits,” Wall Street Journal,
September 15, 2022.
96 Congress’s role, by way of appropriating funds, has been particularly significant in negotiations over the United
States providing energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea. For more, see CRS Report R45033, Nuclear
Negotiations with North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
97 For more, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin.
98 For more on some of the issues Congress considered during this period, see CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery, and CRS Report R44994,
The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis.
99 In the 117th Congress, for example, some Members supported the United States pre-emptively issuing, with South
Korea, a declaration formally stating that the Korean War has ended, as an incentive for North Korea to come to the
negotiating table. This initiative, which the Biden Administration resisted and which other Members publicly opposed
in the absence of comprehensive negotiations with North Korea, arguably is less feasible since the Yoon
Administration came into office. President Yoon has opposed offering an end-of-war declaration before
denuclearization advances. Chaewon Chung, “US Lawmakers Urge White House to Reject End-of-War Declaration
with North Korea,” NK News, December 8, 2021; Victor Cha and Dana Kim, “Yoon Seok-youl: What to Expect from
South Korea’s Next President,” Critical Questions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 9, 2022.
100 See, for example, S. 2129, the Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act of 2021,
which the Senate passed on June 16, 2022
101 See, for example, H.R. 7332 and S. 4216.
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North Korea: September 2022 Update

Recent NDAAs have included requiring the Executive Branch to report to Congress on the
evolving North Korean threat.
Amid signs that basic human needs inside North Korea are not being met, some Members of
Congress have shown interest in offering food and medical aid packages to Pyongyang and/or
easing the process for obtaining sanctions waivers and licenses for those delivering humanitarian
aid.102 As mentioned above, both the Biden and Yoon administrations support delinking efforts to
provide humanitarian assistance from other issues such as North Korea’s weapons of mass
destruction programs. Kim Jong-un’s September 2022 statement that North Korea will need to
import vaccines to carry out its first COVID-19 vaccination campaign in November could present
an opening for a U.S. or U.N. aid offer.
The relative paucity of direct U.S.-DPRK interaction in recent years has led the executive branch
to seek to influence North Korea’s behavior through enhanced coordination with South Korea and
Japan. Congress often has done the same, using oversight hearings and annual authorization and
appropriations bills—including the National Defense Authorization Act and State Department,
Foreign Operations Appropriations bills—as opportunities to guide and oversee U.S.-ROK
coordination over North Korea policy. Congress also has used these tools, as well as separate
resolutions, to send messages about U.S.-South Korea deterrence measures and the value it places
on the U.S.-ROK alliance as a whole.103 In the past Congress has also passed measures calling on
enhanced U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation to address the threat from North Korea.104
In the past, some Members and congressional staff sought to engage with the DPRK directly by
traveling to North Korea, though such trips do not appear to have occurred for more than a
decade. Opportunities for CODELS and STAFFDELS could be explored if North Korea reopens
its COVID-19 related border closures. Other options for direct contact could include seeking to
meet in New York City with officials at the DPRK mission to the United Nations, meeting in so-
called “track 1.5” or “track 2” fora convened in 3rd countries, or encouraging the State
Department to grant visas to enter the United States to select North Koreans for meaningful
exchange.

102 See, for example, H.R. 1504 and S. 690, Enhancing North Korea Humanitarian Assistance Act.
103 See, for example, Section 1302 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) and Section 1252 of the Senate-passed FY2023
NDAA (S. 4543).
104 See, for instance, H.Res. 127 and S.Res. 67, passed by the House and Senate, respectively, in September and April
2019, respectively.
“Bipartisan, Bicameral Group of Lawmakers Offers Legislation on U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation,”
House Foreign Affairs Committee press release, February 12, 2019.
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North Korea: September 2022 Update

Author Information

Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Dianne E. Rennack
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation

Emma Chanlett-Avery
Keigh E. Hammond
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Senior Research Librarian

Mary Beth D. Nikitin

Specialist in Nonproliferation

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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