U.S. Employment-Based Immigration Policy

June 22, 2022 – July 21, 2022 R47164

U.S. Employment-Based Immigration Policy
July 21, 2022
Each year, the United States grants lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, or green cards, to
about 140,000 foreign workers and their family members. These employment-based (EB)
William A. Kandel,
immigrants are part of a broader permanent immigration system established by federal law—the
Coordinator
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—that grants LPR status to roughly 1 million foreign
Analyst in Immigration
nationals annually. Employment-based immigrants acquire LPR status through one of five
Policy
preference categories: three hierarchical categories based on qualifications and needed skills

(EB1, EB2, and EB3); a miscellany special immigrant category (EB4); and an immigrant investor
Jill H. Wilson
category (EB5). Each category is numerically limited and has its own eligibility requirements.
Analyst in Immigration
The INA further limits each immigrant-sending country to no more than 7% of all employment-
Policy
based LPRs granted each year.

The process to acquire a green card depends on where prospective employment-based
Sarah A. Donovan
immigrants reside. Foreign nationals residing overseas petition for an immigrant visa as new
Specialist in Labor Policy
arrivals. Those residing in the United States apply to adjust status from a nonimmigrant

(temporary) status to LPR status. Most prospective EB immigrants require U.S. employers to
sponsor them for LPR status regardless of where they reside. The Department of State (DOS)

tracks and allocates all green cards.
A sizable proportion of EB immigrants work in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), health care,
and financial sectors. Indian, Chinese, Korean, and Filipino nationals accounted for 38% of all EB immigrants in FY2019.
Most prospective EB immigrants adjust status while residing in the United States and are already embedded in the U.S. labor
market, often working for their sponsoring employers. Because the demand for EB green cards far outweighs the annual
statutory allotment, a sizeable employment-based queue has emerged. This queue of foreign workers and their accompanying
family members—who have approved EB petitions and are waiting for an immigrant visa number—totaled about 870,000 in
September 2021. The EB queue exists largely because U.S. employers sponsor roughly twice as many nonimmigrants (and
their family members) for LPR status as there are statutorily available slots. New prospective immigrants from major
immigrant-sending countries like India and China can anticipate a years-long or decades-long wait, depending on
employment-based visa category, to acquire a green card.
In recent years, U.S. employers have hired more nonimmigrant workers, particularly those with science and technological
skills. In addition, foreign students have assumed a prominent role at many U.S. universities, as have foreign-born workers in
technical sectors of the U.S. labor market. Certain nonimmigrant visas bridge the otherwise separate nonimmigrant and
immigrant systems, because the INA grants their recipients dual intent that allows them to work temporarily in the United
States and seek LPR status as nonimmigrants. Prominent dual intent visa categories include the H-1B specialty worker and L
intra-company transferee visas.
The last major legislative change to the permanent employment-based system occurred with the Immigration Act of 1990,
which established the current preference category system and its numerical limits. Since 1990, the U.S. gross domestic
product (GDP) has doubled and technology has expanded throughout the U.S. economy. Some consider statutory
immigration limits insufficient for current U.S. labor market needs. Opponents of increasing immigration levels cite concerns
over employment competition and limited evidence of tight labor markets.
Some have proposed policies to address the employment-based queue, including eliminating the 7% per-country ceiling and
increasing the total number of employment-based immigrants admitted. Some support increasing the annual limit on
employment-based immigrants to accommodate current labor market needs. Others argue that Congress should alter the
criteria by which the United States admits all permanent immigrants, putting greater emphasis on labor market contribution.
Some have proposed points-based systems that reward attributes associated with positive economic and labor market
outcomes. Others propose decentralizing immigrant selection through place-based systems that allow states and jurisdictions
to sponsor foreign workers based on local labor needs. Others have proposed regularly adjusting immigrant levels based on
national needs.
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Introduction
Each year, the United States grants lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, or green cards, to
140,000 employment-based (EB) immigrants and their family members.1 LPRs can live and work
permanently in the United States and can become U.S. citizens through the naturalization process.2
This pathway is part of a broader permanent immigration system established by federal law—as
part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—that limits annual worldwide permanent
immigration to 675,000 persons.3 Exemptions from this limit and the granting of LPR status to
qualified refugees, asylees, and others results in roughly 1 million foreign nationals receiving green
cards each year.
Employment-based immigrants acquire LPR status through one of five preference categories: three
hierarchical categories based on qualifications and needed skills (EB1, EB2, and EB3); a
hodgepodge special immigrant category (EB4); and an immigrant investor category (EB5). Each
category is numerically limited and has its own eligibility requirements.4
The current 140,000 annual EB immigrant limit was established in 1990. Since then, U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) has more than doubled and technological innovation has expanded
throughout all sectors of the U.S. and global economy, fueling growing demand for skilled workers.
U.S. employers have increasingly sought workers with scientific and technological skills, and
foreign-born workers have assumed a prominent role in the U.S. labor market. As part of this trend,
U.S. employers have increasingly relied on nonimmigrant (temporary) workers.5 Foreign-born
graduate students, who sometimes work in the United States following graduation, typically
outnumber native-born graduate students in technical disciplines at many U.S. universities.6
The immigrant and nonimmigrant workforces are linked because U.S. employers can sponsor
certain nonimmigrant workers, foreign students, and other foreign nationals for employment-based
green cards. Because current demand for employment-based green cards far exceeds the INA’s
annual allocation, a sizable waiting line or EB queue has emerged (see the “The Employment-Based
Queue” section below).7 The queue comprises prospective employment-based immigrants and their
accompanying family members who have been approved for a green card but because of statutory
numerical limits might wait years or even decades to receive one.
While most employment-based immigrants have college degrees, the INA allows up to 10,000
workers in high-demand occupations to acquire LPR status within the EB3 preference category

1 INA §201(d), 8 U.S.C. §1151(d). The exact number granted each year deviates from this limit for reasons explained in
sections to follow. In this report, the terms immigrant, LPR, and green card holder are used interchangeably.
2 For more information, see CRS Report R43366, U.S. Naturalization Policy.
3 INA §201, 8 U.S.C. §1151. The INA was enacted as Act of June 27, 1952, Ch. 477, and has been since amended.
4 INA §203(b); 8 U.S.C. §1153(b).
5 Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals admitted to the United States for a specific purpose and a limited period. They
include tourists, students, diplomats, agricultural workers, and exchange visitors. Nonimmigrant workers are discussed in
the “Nonimmigrants in the Employment-Based System” section below. See also CRS Report R45040, Immigration:
Nonimmigrant (Temporary) Admissions to the United States.
6 See, for example, National Foundation for American Policy, The Importance of International Students to American
Science and Engineering, October 2017.
7 In this report, queue refers to persons who are waiting to advance in the process of obtaining LPR status because of the
numerical limits and per-country ceiling specified in the INA. In contrast, backlog refers to persons waiting due to
administrative processing. Backlogs expand or contract depending on how agencies utilize their personnel.
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without holding a college degree.8 Some immigration policy observers consider this relatively
limited allocation inadequate to meet the much greater demand for such workers, and they cite the
lack of legal immigration options more broadly for fostering the sizable unauthorized worker
population in the United States.9
There has long been congressional interest in revising the permanent employment-based
immigration system while not disadvantaging native-born workers. Some legislative proposals have
been limited to adjusting specific annual numeric limits for employment-based immigrants. Others
would involve broader reforms to the permanent immigration system by, for example, increasing
the number of employment-based immigrants while reducing limits or eliminating categories for
other immigrant types. Other proposals involve changing how immigrant workers are selected.
This report begins by explaining the permanent employment-based immigration system, its
numerical limits, and its processes. It next describes key employment-based immigration trends,
including a brief review of relevant economic and demographic trends. The report then discusses
several categories of nonimmigrant (temporary) workers that are intertwined with the permanent
immigration system. It continues with a review of policy proposals for revising employment-based
immigration, including the key findings of a 1997 congressional commission on immigration
reform. The report then discusses key elements of prominent immigration reform bills introduced
since 2000 that pertain to employment-based immigration. It ends with concluding observations.
The Employment-Based Immigration System
Employment-based immigration occurs within a broader system of permanent immigration that
embodies four major principles: reunifying families, admitting individuals with needed skills,
providing humanitarian assistance, and diversifying immigrant flows by country of origin.10 These
principles are reflected in the INA, which authorizes corresponding pathways for acquiring LPR
status according to each principle. Family reunification occurs primarily through family-sponsored
immigration.11 Admitting individuals with needed skills occurs primarily through employment-
based immigration. Humanitarian assistance occurs primarily through the refugee and asylum
programs.12 Origin-country diversity occurs most directly through the diversity immigrant visa.13
The INA places numerical limits on the annual number of green cards that may be issued under
each of the five EB preference categories. In addition, a per-country ceiling (described in the “The
Per-Country Ceiling” section below) limits green card issuance by country of origin. Statutory
provisions (described below) allow the numeric limits and per-country ceiling to be breached for
immigrant categories and origin countries if certain conditions are met.

8 INA §203(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(3)(B).
9 See, for example, American Immigration Council, Why Don’t Immigrants Apply for Citizenship? There is No Line for
Many Undocumented Immigrants, Fact Sheet, October 7, 2021.
10 For a more complete discussion of permanent legal immigration, see CRS Report R42866, Permanent Legal
Immigration to the United States: Policy Overview.
11 For more information, see CRS Report R43145, U.S. Family-Based Immigration Policy.
12 For more information, see CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy; and CRS Report
R45539, Immigration: U.S. Asylum Policy.
13 For more information, see CRS Report R45973, The Diversity Immigrant Visa Program. Immigrant diversity is also
addressed through the 7% per-country ceiling discussed below.
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Preference Categories and Numerical Limits
Table 1 presents the eligibility requirements and annual numerical limits for each of the five
employment-based preference categories. The EB1, EB2, and EB3 categories are each limited to
40,040, sum to 120,120, and account for 86% of the 140,000 total EB green cards available
annually. These three categories are often the focus of congressional attention on employment-
based immigration (see “Other Recent Reform Proposals” section below).
Table 1. Employment-Based Immigration Preference System
(Total Worldwide Level of 140,000)
Category
INA Eligibility Criteria
Annual Numerical Limit
1st preference (EB1):
Priority workers: persons of extraordinary ability
28.6% of worldwide limit
“Priority workers”
in the sciences, arts, education, business, or
(40,040) plus unused 4th and 5th
athletics; outstanding professors and researchers;
preference
and certain multinational executives and managers
2nd preference (EB2):
Members of the professions holding advanced
28.6% of worldwide limit
“Members of the professions degrees or persons of exceptional abilities in the
(40,040) plus unused 1st
holding advanced degrees or
sciences, arts, or business
preference
aliens of exceptional ability”
3rd preference (EB3):
Skil ed shortage occupations workers with at
28.6% of worldwide limit
“Skilled workers,
least two years training or experience;
(40,040) plus unused 1st and 2nd
professionals, and other
professionals with baccalaureate degrees; and
preference; “other workers”
workers”
“unskil ed” shortage workers
limited to 10,000
4th preference (EB4):
Special immigrants, including ministers of religion,
7.1% of worldwide limit (9,940);
“Certain special immigrants”
religious workers, certain employees of the U.S.
religious workers limited to 5,000
government abroad, special immigrant juveniles,
and broadcasters limited to 100
and others
5th preference (EB5):
Immigrant investors who invest at least $1.8
7.1% of worldwide limit (9,940);
“Employment creation”
mil ion ($900,000 in rural areas or areas of high
3,000 minimum reserved for
unemployment) in a new commercial enterprise
investors in rural or high
that creates at least 10 new jobs
unemployment areas
Source: CRS summary of INA §203(b); 8 U.S.C. §1153(b).
Note: See 8 C.F.R. §204.5 for the eligibility criteria for each EB category.
The EB4 and EB5 categories are each limited to 9,940, sum to 19,880, and account for the
remaining 14% of the employment-based annual limit. The EB4 special immigrant category
includes foreign nationals in various occupations, as well as persons admitted primarily on
humanitarian grounds.14 The EB5 immigrant investor category technically falls within the
employment-based immigration system, but represents a separate immigration-related program that
incentivizes foreign financial investment and job creation.15 Most of this report focuses on the EB1,
EB2, and EB3 preference categories.
The number of foreign nationals receiving employment-based green cards has also long been
affected by two statutes that provided humanitarian immigration relief for certain individuals facing
political oppression: the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA)16 and the

14 For background on the EB4 category, see “Legislative History of the Special Immigrant Category” in CRS Report
R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs.
15 For more information on the EB5 category, see CRS Report R44475, EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa.
16 P.L. 105-100, Title II, as amended by §1(e) of P.L. 105-13. NACARA was enacted on November 19, 1997, and interim
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Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA).17 To grant foreign nationals LPR status under these two
statutes without exceeding INA limits, both laws provided eligible individuals with LPR status in
the initial years following enactment, and then “repaid” those additional LPR numbers using annual
offsets against other LPR pathways. Almost all of the immigrant visa numbers used under
NACARA have been fully offset,18 and all of those used under the CSPA have been fully offset.19
The Per-Country Ceiling
The INA further specifies a per-country ceiling, or cap, which limits the number of immigrants
from any single country for all five employment-based preference categories combined to 7% of the
annual limit.20 The per-country level is not a quota for individual countries, as each country in the
world could not receive 7% of the overall limit. Rather, according to the Department of State
(DOS), “the country limitation serves to avoid monopolization of virtually all the annual limitation
by applicants from only a few countries,” and is not “a quota to which any particular country is
entitled.”21
Exceptions to Numerical Limits and the Per-Country Ceiling
The INA contains several provisions to distribute unused employment-based visa numbers. First,
unused visa numbers for each employment-based category roll down to the next preference
category. Thus, unused EB1 visa numbers roll down for use in the EB2 category, and unused EB2
visa numbers roll down for use in the EB3 category. Unused visa numbers in the EB4 and EB5
categories roll up to the EB1 category.22

regulations implementing the law went into effect on June 21, 1999. NACARA provides immigration benefits and relief
from deportation to certain Nicaraguans, Cubans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, nationals of former Soviet bloc countries,
and their dependents who arrived in the United States seeking asylum.
17 P.L. 102-404.
18 Between FY1998 and FY2020, 261,665 persons have received LPR status under NACARA: 71,436 under Section 202
of the act (Salvadorians, Guatemalans and former Soviet bloc country nationals) and 190,229 under Section 203
(Nicaraguans and Cubans). See DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, multiple years, Table 7. NACARA reduces by
5,000 the number of immigrant visa numbers that can be allocated annually both for the EB3 other worker preference
category (from 10,000 to 5,000) and for the diversity immigrant visa (from 55,000 to 50,000). For FY2022 this reduction
for both annual limits will be limited to 150 visas. U.S. Department of State, Visa Bulletin For November 2021.
19 CSPA required that the annual per-country limit for China be reduced by 1,000 until such accumulated allotment
equaled the number of aliens (54,396, CSPA Total) acquiring LPR status under the act. Consequently, each year, 300
immigrant visas were deducted from the EB3 and 700 from the EB5 employment-based preference categories for China
to account for Chinese students receiving LPR status under the CSPA, largely between FY1993 and FY1996. The CPSA
total was also offset by the number of family-sponsored and employment based immigrant visas that were not allocated to
China (mainland, not including Taiwan) compared to its annual upper limit of 25,600 as noted above. See DOS, Visa
Office, “Report of the Visa Office 2007,” Offset in the Per-Country Numerical Level for China -Mainland Born
Immigrant Visas (Per Section 2(d) of Pub. L. 102 -404); and DOS, Visa Office, Annual Numerical Limits for Fiscal Year
2020. In FY2021, these two offsets fully recaptured all LPRs granted under the CSPA.
20 INA §202(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. §1152. The 7% per-country ceiling also applies separately to family-sponsored preference
immigrants. For example, if the annual numerical limits for family-sponsored preference and employment-based
immigrants in a given year were 226,000 and 140,000, respectively, the total number of such immigrants from any single
country would be initially limited to 25,620, which is equal to (7% x 226,000) + (7% x 140,000). This report uses per-
country ceiling in the singular form, but technically two ceilings exist: one for foreign states and the other for dependent
foreign states. For the latter—which encompasses any colony, component, or dependent area of a foreign state, such as
the Azores and Madeira Islands of Portugal and Macau of the People’s Republic of China—the per-country ceiling is 2%.
21 DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs, Operation of the Immigrant Numerical Control Process, undated, p. 3.
22 INA §203(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(1). Unused EB3 and EB4 visa numbers do not roll down.
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Second, the INA increases the employment-based annual limit by the number of family-sponsored
visa numbers that remain unused at the end of the prior fiscal year.23 As a result, annual limits for
both employment-based and family-sponsored immigrants can vary. In FY2020, for example,
122,000 family-sponsored immigrant visa numbers were not used because of circumstances
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.24 These unused visa numbers fell across to employment-
based immigrants, increasing the FY2021 annual limit from 140,000 to 262,000.25
Third, if total available visa numbers for all five preference categories exceed the number of
applicants in any fiscal year quarter, the per-country ceiling does not apply for the remainder of that
quarter’s available visa numbers.26 This allows nationals from oversubscribed countries like India
and China to receive more than the 7% maximum limit that they would otherwise be entitled to
(2,802 or 7% x 40,000) if nationals from other countries used all their available visa numbers. As a
result of all three of these provisions, for example, the number of Indian nationals receiving LPR
status through the EB1 category was 10,967 in FY2018, 9,008 in FY2019, and 17,014 in FY2020.27
Employment-Based Immigration Processing
To acquire LPR status, employers and prospective immigrants must complete a multi-step process
involving several federal agencies. The Department of Labor (DOL), Employment and Training
Administration adjudicates applications for any required labor certifications that serve as a
preliminary screening (discussed in more detail below). The Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS’s) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates all EB immigrant
petitions, as well as adjustment of status applications for prospective immigrants who reside in the
United States.28 The Department of State’s (DOS’s) Bureau of Consular Affairs adjudicates
immigrant visa applications for prospective immigrants who reside abroad.29 DOS is also
responsible for the allocation, enumeration, and assignment of all numerically limited visa numbers
(see the “Immigrant Numerical Control ” section below).30

23 INA §201(d)(2)(C); 8 U.S.C. §1151(d)(2)(C).
24 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11362, COVID-19-Related Suspension of Immigrant Entry.
25 DOS, Annual Numerical Limits, FY-2021, undated. Fall across provisions work differently for family-sponsored
preference immigrants. Because of a statutory quirk in the INA, unused employment-based visa numbers that fall across
for use by family-sponsored preference immigrants are effectively lost. For more information, see Assessing Four
Department of State Methods to Compute Recapturable Immigrant Visa Numbers, Congressional Distribution
Memorandum, September 8, 2021, available to congressional staff upon request.
26 This flexibility resulted from provisions in the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000
(P.L. 106-313). The act enables the per-country ceiling for employment-based immigrants to be surpassed for
oversubscribed individual countries (e.g., India, China) as long as unused visa numbers are available within the 140,000
annual worldwide limit for employment-based preference immigrants in the fiscal year. INA §202(a)(5)(A); 8 U.S.C.
§1152(a)(5)(A).
27 DOS, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Report of the Visa Office, 2018, 2019, and 2020, Table V.
28 Applications to USCIS for immigration benefits are submitted directly by the individuals seeking them. Petitions to
USCIS are submitted by sponsoring parties on behalf of individuals seeking immigration benefits.
29 Visas are required for prospective immigrants who reside overseas, but not for those residing in the United States who
are seeking to adjust status from a nonimmigrant status. Visas allow foreign nationals to travel to a U.S. land, air, or sea
port of entry and request permission from a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspector to enter the United States.
Having a visa does not guarantee U.S. entry but it shows that a consular officer at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad has
determined that the visa bearer is eligible to seek U.S. entry for the specific purpose indicated by the specific visa. For
background information on visa issuances, see archived CRS Report R43589, Immigration: Visa Security Policies.
Prospective employment-based immigrants who present themselves at a U.S. port of entry and are admitted to the United
States from overseas receive LPR status upon arrival.
30 In this report, visa numbers refers to numerically limited immigrant slots for LPR status that the INA permits each year
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Who initiates the EB immigration process depends on the EB preference category. While
prospective EB1 employment-based immigrants can self-petition and do not require labor
certification, most prospective EB2 and all prospective EB3 immigrants require U.S. employers to
submit petitions on their behalf and obtain labor certification.31 Employers of prospective EB2 and
EB3 immigrants thus initiate the process by applying to DOL for permanent labor certification.32 To
grant it, DOL must determine that (1) there are insufficient able, willing, qualified, and available
U.S. workers to perform the work in question; and (2) the employment of foreign workers will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.33
Upon receiving labor certification from DOL (if applicable), the next step involves submitting an
Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) to USCIS.34 Among prospective immigrants, the
INA distinguishes between principal immigrants who meet the qualifications of the employment-
based preference category, and derivative immigrants who qualify as the spouse or children of a
principal immigrant. Derivative immigrants appear on the same petition as principal immigrants
and are entitled to the same status and order of consideration as long as they are accompanying or
following to join principal immigrants.35
Foreign nationals with approved petitions can only apply for an immigrant visa, or apply to adjust
status, if an immigrant visa number is immediately available. When that occurs according to the
INA numerical limits as determined by DOS, the prospective immigrant can conclude the process to
acquire LPR status. If the prospective LPR resides abroad, the USCIS-approved petition is
forwarded to the DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs in the alien’s home country. The individual then
submits an Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration (DOS Form DS-260) at a DOS
consulate that allows him or her to request admission at a U.S. port of entry.36 Prospective
immigrants residing in the United States submit an Application to Register Permanent Residence or
Adjust Status (Form I-485). The INA refers to this as adjustment of status because the alien

under its numerical, categorical, and per-country limits (e.g., 140,000 visa numbers available each year for employment-
based immigrants). Visa numbers apply to both individuals who reside abroad and receive actual immigrant visas that
allow them to travel to the United States and request admission at a U.S. port of entry as well as individuals residing in
the United States who adjust to LPR (immigrant) status from a nonimmigrant status.
31 Self-petitioning is available to persons of extraordinary ability within the EB1 category (INA §204(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C.
§1154(a)(1)(E)); immigrants applying within the EB2 category as aliens of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or
business and who are granted a national interest waiver (8 C.F.R. §204.5(k)(1)); most special immigrants within the EB4
category (INA §204(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. §1154(a)(1)(G)); and EB5 investor immigrants within the EB5 category (INA
§204(a)(1)(H); 8 U.S.C. §1154(a)(1)(H)). A national interest waiver allows foreign nationals to self-petition for
employment-based LPR status without having to be sponsored by a U.S. employer and without obtaining a labor
certification from DOL, because it is in the interest of the United States. The INA does not define which jobs qualify for
the waiver, but it is typically granted to individuals “with exceptional ability and whose employment in the United States
would greatly benefit the nation.” For more information, see USCIS, “Employment-Based Immigration: Second
Preference EB-2.”
32 For more information, see DOL, “Permanent Labor Certification.”
33 INA §212(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(5).
34 Employers of EB4 immigrants submit a Petition for Amerasian Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (Form I-360).
Prospective EB5 immigrants submit an Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur (Form I-526).
35 INA §203(d); 8 U.S.C. §1153(d). Accompanying refers to either being in the physical company of the principal
immigrant or being issued an immigrant visa within six months of the principal immigrant’s admission or adjustment of
status. Following to join allows a derivative immigrant to acquire an immigrant visa and be admitted or adjust status more
than six months after the principal immigrant does so, once the derivative immigrant establishes the required relationship
to the principal immigrant. See DOS, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), 9 FAM 502.1-1(C)(2).
36 LPR applicants residing abroad must be interviewed by DOS consular officers who verify the contents of their
applications and check their medical, criminal, and financial records for any INA grounds of inadmissibility.
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transitions from a temporary status (e.g., a student on an F-1 visa or a specialty occupation worker
on an H-1B visa) to LPR status.37
Immigrant Numerical Control and LPR Waiting Times
DOS’s immigrant numerical control system ensures that eligible prospective immigrants receive
LPR status according to the INA’s numerical limits.38 When USCIS approves an EB immigrant
petition, the agency forwards it to DOS’s National Visa Center (NVC), which assigns a priority
date—the earlier date of either DOL’s receipt of a labor certification application or USCIS’s receipt
of an immigrant petition—that represents the prospective immigrant’s place in the employment-
based queue.39 Individuals must wait for their priority date to become current—indicating that a
visa number is available—before applying for an immigrant visa or to adjust to LPR status. Priority
dates are current when they are earlier than the final action dates (often referred to as cutoff dates)
published in DOS’s monthly Visa Bulletin (Table 2). If the Visa Bulletin indicates a category for a
given country is current, applicants can apply for a visa or apply to adjust status regardless of their
priority date.
Cutoff dates in the Visa Bulletin typically advance with time. However, visa number demand by
prospective immigrants with different priority dates can fluctuate from month to month, affecting
cutoff dates. Such fluctuations can cause cutoff date movement to slow or stop. In some cases, more
people apply for a visa number in a particular category or origin country than there are visa
numbers available for that month. DOS then may have to regress cutoff dates (visa retrogression) to
maintain an orderly queue.40
Table 2. Visa Bulletin Final Action Dates for EB Immigrants, April 2022
El Salvador,
Guatemala,
All
Category
China
Honduras
India
Mexico
Philippines
Others
EB1 (Priority)
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
EB2 (Professional)
3/1/19
Current
7/8/13
Current
Current
Current
EB3 (Skil ed/other)
3/22/18 and
6/1/12*
Current
1/15/12
Current
Current
Current
EB4 (Special)
Current
5/1/17
Current
4/1/20
Current
Current
EB5 (Investor)
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
Source: DOS, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin for April 2022, “Final Action Dates for Employment-Based
Preference Cases,” https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bul etin/2022/visa-bul etin-for-april-
2022.html.
Notes: * For some preference categories, the Visa Bulletin provides separate priority dates for each subcategory
within that category. Because most priority dates are the same for all subcategories within a preference category,
Table 2 presents one priority date for the entire preference category. The exception is the 3d preference category

37 USCIS’s National Benefits Center conducts background investigations for I-485 applications, including collecting
fingerprints, conducting background checks, and reviewing for possible fraud and grounds of inadmissibility. USCIS
places applicants who pass these reviews into an interview queue and schedules them for in-person interviews.
38 For more information on how DOS allocates numerically limited immigrant visa numbers, see DOS, The Operation of
the Immigrant Numerical Control System, not dated.
39 8 C.F.R. §204.5(d). For more information, see USCIS, “Visa Availability and Priority Dates.”
40 For more information, see USCIS, Visa Retrogression, updated March 8, 2018.
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for China, where the Visa Bulletin shows a priority date of March 22, 2018, for those applying as professional and
skilled workers, and a priority date of June 1, 2012, for those applying as other workers.
Priority dates in the Visa Bulletin do not necessarily reflect accurate wait times for a visa number to
become available. If greater or fewer foreign nationals apply for LPR status, waiting times can shift
accordingly. For example, the Visa Bulletin for April 2022 indicates that Indian nationals who
submitted EB2 petitions on or before July 8, 2013, could apply to adjust to LPR status or to receive
an immigrant visa (Table 2). Some might interpret this to mean that Indian nationals petitioning as
EB2 immigrants in April 2022 could expect to wait about nine years to acquire a green card, the
same length of time as those who submitted their EB2 petitions in July 2013. However, if
substantially more or substantially fewer Indian nationals applied for LPR status as EB immigrants
between 2013 and 2022 compared to the number applying during the nine years prior to April 2022,
wait times for LPR status could be longer or shorter, respectively.
Employment-Based Immigration Trends
This section presents descriptive statistics that illuminate key facets of employment-based
immigration. They include the number of EB green cards issued by preference category; the
number of EB immigrants who acquired LPR status by obtaining an immigrant visa versus those
who adjusted status; the top origin countries of EB immigrants; and the occupational distributions
of immigrants from several top origin countries. Because of significant reductions in immigrant
visa issuances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the most recent year presented is FY2019.
Employment-Based Immigrants by Preference Category
In FY2019, employment-based immigrants and their family members numbered 139,458 and
represented 13.5% of the 1,031,765 foreign nationals who received LPR status.41 From FY2000 to
FY2019, annual employment-based immigration fluctuated from a low of 81,727 in 2003 to a peak
of 246,877 in 2005 (Figure 1).42
The FY2003 drop and FY2005 spike in the number of foreign nationals who became employment-
based LPRs occurred because of issues related to the transfer of certain immigration functions from
the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) to the
newly created USCIS in 2003.43 In addition, the Real ID Act of 2005 provided for the recapture of
50,000 past unused employment-based visa numbers.44

41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2019,
Table 6.
42 Ibid., multiple years. The sizable number of employment-based immigrant visa numbers used in FY2005 resulted from
the first recapture of unused employment-based visas passed by Congress in 1999, the American Competitiveness in the
21st Century Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-313). For more information, see DOS, Report of the Visa Office 2006, Appendix D.
43 Confirmed by USCIS briefing to CRS, October 31, 2018. Functions of the former INS were transferred to DHS with
the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296).
44 The Real ID Act of 2005 is found in Division B of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief (P.L. 109-13). Section 502 contains the EB visa number recapture provisions.
For more information on past immigrant visa recaptures as well as estimates of potentially recapturable visa numbers
currently, see Assessing Four Department of State Methods to Compute Recapturable Immigrant Visa Numbers, CRS
Congressional Distribution Memorandum, September 8, 2021, available to congressional staff upon request.
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Figure 1. Number of EB Immigrants, by Preference Category
(FY2000-FY2019)

Source: DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Tables 4 and 6, multiple years.
More recently, such fluctuations have largely disappeared. The number of individuals acquiring
LPR status through the EB1, EB2, and EB3 categories (as well as through the EB4 and EB5
categories) has equalized over time, corresponding closely to INA numerical limits (Table 1).45
These trends indicate that relatively few employment-based visas in any category remained unused
in the years immediately preceding the COVID-19 pandemic. Post-2019 employment-based
immigration was influenced by unused family-sponsored immigrant visas.46
New Arrivals Versus Adjustments of Status
Most foreign nationals who became employment-based immigrants in the past two decades were
already living in the United States and adjusted to LPR status from some other nonimmigrant status
(Figure 2).47 In FY2019, for example, 79% of all employment-based LPRs had adjusted to that
status from within the United States, while 21% acquired LPR status as new arrivals from abroad.
EB5 immigrant investors were the exception; most have been admitted as new arrivals since 2006.48

45 In FY2011, to cite one example, 139,339 individuals received employment-based LPR status, a number that is close to
the INA’s statutory total limit of 140,000. However, these visas were distributed among 25,251 EB1, 66,831 EB2, and
37,216 EB3 category immigrants, as well as 6,701 EB4 and 3,340 EB5 category immigrants. Such figures indicate
considerable use of “roll downs” and other provisions that permit unused visa numbers in one category to be utilized by
another. By contrast, in FY2019, the 139,458 persons granted LPR status through the five employment-based preference
categories closely matched their categorical numerical limits, as can be seen in Figure 1.
46 As noted above, restrictions on permanent immigration were imposed in FY2020 in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, causing 122,000 family-sponsored visa numbers to remain unused. These numbers fell across to increase the
FY2021 employment-based annual limit from 140,000 to 262,000. As of the end of FY2021, an estimated 62,000
employment visas remained unused because USCIS lacked sufficient personnel to adjudicate the additional petitions. See
for example, Michelle Hackman, “Democrats Push Fix for Green-Card Logjam in Social-Spending Bill,” Wall Street
Journal, November 5, 2021.
47 DHS does not publish data detailing what nonimmigrant categories status adjusters are leaving.
48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, multiple
years, Table 6. In FY2000, EB5 immigrants numbered 218 and grew to 3,688 in FY2009 and 9,085 in FY2019. As the
program grew over this time, it was used increasingly by foreign nationals residing abroad. For more information, see
CRS Report R44475, EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa.
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Figure 2. Percentage of EB Immigrants Who Adjusted Status, by Preference Category
(FY2000-FY2019)

Source: DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Tables 4 and 6, multiple years.
Employment-Based Immigrants by Country of Origin
Table 3 lists the top 15 countries of origin for the most employment-based immigrants in FY1999,
FY2009, and FY2019 and how those countries’ rankings have changed these three points. The data
reveal what could be characterized as two groups of origin countries. The first group consists of
countries such as India, China, Canada, the Philippines, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and
Mexico, which since FY1999 have consistently sent the most employment-based immigrants to the
United States. Among these top-sending countries, the number of immigrants has fluctuated across
the fiscal years presented, but their relative ranks have remained largely stable.
The second group consists of countries that have sent numerous but relatively fewer employment-
based immigrants to the United States. Some in this group, such as Taiwan, Brazil, and Pakistan
have consistently ranked within the top 15 EB immigrant-sending countries over the past two
decades. Others in this group have seen their relative rank increase (e.g., Venezuela, Iran, France,
Vietnam) or decrease (e.g., Poland, Japan) over the 20-year period.
These patterns have occurred over a period of time in which the total number of EB immigrants has
fluctuated, from 56,813 in FY1999 (when demand for EB green cards regularly fell below the
INA’s annual limit of 140,000), to 144,034 in FY2009, to 139,458 in FY2019. Accordingly, the
absolute number of EB immigrants from some countries may have increased but the country’s
relative rank between FY1999 and FY2009 in Table 3 may have remained the same (e.g., Japan
and Germany) or declined (e.g., Philippines and Russia).
The origin-country distribution of employment-based immigration, and the role of immigration
policy in producing that distribution, has labor market implications, because EB immigrants from
certain countries such as India and the Philippines tend to work in specific occupations and
corresponding industrial sectors. This is discussed further in the next section.
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Table 3. EB Immigrants, by Top 15 Countries of Origin
(Countries are ranked by number of EB immigrants in FY1999, FY2009, and FY2019)

FY1999
FY2009
FY2019

Number Percent
Rank
Number Percent
Rank Number Percent
Rank
India
5,362
9%
1
20,264
14%
1
18,553
13%
1
China
5,282
9%
2
11,295
8%
3
17,154
12%
2
Canada
3,951
7%
3
6,927
5%
7
4,998
4%
7
Philippines
3,871
7%
4
8,516
6%
5
7,358
5%
4
South Korea
3,653
6%
5
14,147
10%
2
10,495
8%
3
United Kingdom
2,860
5%
6
7,044
5%
6
4,565
3%
8
Mexico
2,637
5%
7
8,660
6%
4
6,698
5%
5
El Salvador
2,053
4%
8
836
1%
30
1,725
1%
18
Taiwan
1,460
3%
9
2,519
2%
12
2,551
2%
10
Brazil
1,296
2%
10
3,292
2%
8
5,867
4%
6
Pakistan
1,293
2%
11
3,184
2%
9
2,266
2%
13
Poland
1,268
2%
12
1,351
1%
21
922
1%
35
Japan
1,154
2%
13
2,502
2%
13
1,607
1%
21
Russia
910
2%
14
1,916
1%
18
2,082
1%
14
Germany
834
1%
15
2,251
2%
15
1,727
1%
17
Venezuela
490
1%
28
2,915
2%
10
2,871
2%
9
Colombia
568
1%
22
2,850
2%
11
1,356
1%
25
Iraq
107
0%
67
2,347
2%
14
86
0%
97
Iran
497
1%
26
1,200
1%
25
2,512
2%
11
France
557
1%
23
2,061
1%
16
2,364
2%
12
Vietnam
74
0%
81
D
0%
NA
1,804
1%
15
All Other
16,636
29%

37,957
26%

39,897
29%

Total
56,813
100%

144,034
100%

139,458
100%

Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 8 (FY1999) and Table 10
(FY2009, and FY2019).
Notes: All countries that ranked in the top-15 EB immigrant sending countries for either FY1999, FY2009, or
FY2019 are shown in the table. Bolded figures indicate that the country falls within the top 15 ranked countries
for that year. D indicates data withheld to limit disclosure (small numbers). NA indicates not applicable.
Occupational Distribution
Figure 3 displays the occupational distributions of employment-based immigrants (EB1, EB2, and
EB3) from the top five major immigration origin countries and all other countries combined who
acquired LPR status in FY2017, FY2018, or FY2019. Indian and Chinese nationals made up three-
fifths of all EB1, EB2, and EB3 green card recipients over this period and worked largely in
computer-related occupations. Filipino nationals were concentrated overwhelmingly in health care
occupations, primarily nursing. In contrast, nationals from South Korea, Mexico, and all other
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countries had occupational distributions that were more evenly distributed across the broad
categories shown. The occupational distributions have particular relevance for discussions on
revising the 7% per-country ceiling (see the “Revising or Eliminating the Per-Country Ceiling”
section below).
Figure 3. Occupations of EB Immigrants from Top Five Origin Countries
(EB1, EB2, and EB3 immigrants, FY2017-FY2019)

Source: Unpublished FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019 microdata provided to CRS by USCIS, Office of Legislative
Affairs, February 2020.
Notes: The USCIS dataset included 397,740 cases for EB1, EB2, and EB3 immigrants only, of which 336,918, or
84.7%, had useable Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) codes. The 15.3% of cases lacking occupation data
displayed an origin country distribution similar to that shown in the figure. CRS grouped the data into the fol owing
broad categories: Industrial: farming, fishing, forestry, construction, extractive, installation and repair, production,
and transportation occupations; Services/Sales: protective services, food services, building and maintenance,
personal services, sales, office and administrative support occupations; Health care: health care practitioners,
technical, and support occupations; Education/Arts: community, social service, legal, educational instruction,
library, arts, entertainment, sports and media occupations; Science/Engineering: architecture, engineering, and
science occupations; Business/Management: management, business and financial occupations; Computer:
computer (96% of cases) and mathematical (4% of cases) occupations.
Nonimmigrants in the Employment-Based System
Nonimmigrant (temporary) workers are a significant facet of the permanent employment-based
immigration system. Nonimmigrant workers supplement the U.S. labor force to meet seasonal or
unexpected labor demand, and address insufficient labor supply. Many nonimmigrant workers
subsequently are sponsored for employment-based LPR status. As such, temporary visas for
professional foreign workers, in particular, have become an important gateway for employment-
based permanent immigration to the United States.
U.S. employers’ sponsorship of an increasing number of nonimmigrant workers for LPR status,
combined with static numerical limits and per country caps on immigrant visas, have contributed to
a sizable queue of foreign nationals waiting to receive employment-based LPR status. The
following sections discuss nonimmigrant workers generally, review three categories of skilled
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nonimmigrant workers who comprise most new entrants to the EB pipeline, and conclude with an
assessment of the role of these temporary skilled workers in the permanent immigration system.
Overview of Nonimmigrant Workers
Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals admitted to the United States for a specific purpose and a
limited period. They include, for example, tourists, students, diplomats, agricultural workers, and
exchange visitors. Nonimmigrants are often referred to by the letter and number denoting their
statutory provision, such as H-2A agricultural workers, F-1 students, or L-1 intracompany
transferees. Over the past three decades, the number of nonimmigrant visas issued specifically for
workers has trended upward, increasing from 159,778 in FY1989 to 964,628 in FY2019.49
To hire a temporary foreign worker, prospective employers must submit a petition to USCIS.50
USCIS adjudicates the petition to determine whether the prospective employee possesses the
required qualifications for the position and visa class and whether other statutory and regulatory
requirements have been met. If the petition is approved by USCIS, a prospective employee outside
the United States applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate. A DOS consular officer determines whether
the prospective employee is admissible and eligible for the visa class for which he or she is
applying. An approved visa gives the worker permission to travel to the United States and seek
admission at a U.S. port of entry. If the prospective employee is already in the United States, he or
she applies to USCIS for a change of status rather than applying for a visa abroad.
Most applicants for nonimmigrant visas are subject to the general presumption in INA Section
214(b)51 that aliens seeking admission to the United States intend to settle permanently. As a result,
most prospective nonimmigrants must demonstrate that they are not coming to reside permanently.
However, there are two main nonimmigrant visas—H-1B and L—for which dual intent is allowed,
meaning that the prospective nonimmigrant is permitted simultaneously to seek admission to the
United States on a nonimmigrant visa and LPR status. Nonimmigrants seeking H-1B specialty
occupation visas and L-1 intracompany transferee visas are exempt from the requirement to show
that they are not coming to the United States to live permanently.52
As such, among the visa categories of nonimmigrant workers, the H-1B and L-1 visa categories
effectively bridge the employment-based systems for nonimmigrants and immigrants. Many such
nonimmigrants work for the same employers who sponsor them for LPR status. Together, H-1B and
L-1 workers and their families account for the majority of nonimmigrant adjustments to LPR status
under the EB1, EB2, and EB3 categories.53 In addition, many foreign students on F-1 visas are able
to obtain temporary employment authorization for work related to their degree through a program
called Optional Practical Training (OPT). Some employers subsequently sponsor students on OPT
for H-1B or LPR status.

49 Employment-related nonimmigrant visas include the CW, E, H, I, L, O, P, Q, R, and TN visas. (For information on
these categories, see CRS Report R45938, Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visa Categories: Data Brief.) DOS, Report of
the Visa Office 2019, Table XVI(A); and DOS Nonimmigrant Visa Statistics, “Nonimmigrant Visas by Individual Class of
Admission, FY1987-1991,” Detail Table.
50 Prospective employers of H-1B specialty occupation workers are required to first file a labor condition application
(LCA) with the Department of Labor attesting that the employer will comply with program requirements related to fair
wages and working conditions. An approved LCA is then submitted with the petition to USCIS.
51 INA §214(b), 8 U.S.C. §1184(b).
52 For more information on the INA Section 214(b) presumption of immigrant intent and the concept of dual intent, see
CRS Report R45040, Immigration: Nonimmigrant (Temporary) Admissions to the United States.
53 CRS calculation based on data provided to CRS by USCIS, August 2020. Data cover fiscal years 2010 through 2019.
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Major Nonimmigrant Categories Contributing to the EB Pipeline
H-1B visa: for workers in specialty occupations, typically requiring at least a bachelor’s degree; numerical limit of
65,000 per year plus 20,000 for those with U.S. advanced degrees; renewals do not count toward the annual limit
nor do workers employed at certain educational and research institutions.
L-1 visa: for intra-company transferees who are executives and managers (L-1A), or have specialized knowledge
relating to the organization’s interests (L-1B) and are employed with an international firm. No numerical limits.
F visa: for ful -time academic students; F visa holders may apply for work authorization during or after completing
their degree through Optional Practical Training (OPT). OPT provides 12 months of work authorization for
non-STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) graduates and 36 months for STEM graduates. No
numerical limits for F visas or OPT authorizations.
Since 1990, temporary worker visa issuance has increased substantially. H-1B visa issuances
largely trended upward, more than tripling from 50,000 in FY1991 (the first year they were issued)
to 188,123 in FY2019. Over the same period, L-1 visas almost quadrupled from 20,000 to 76,988.54
In addition, the number of F-1 students authorized to work under OPT grew from less than 25,000
foreign students in CY2007 to over 204,000 in CY2017. In CY2021, 164,528 F-1 nonimmigrants
were working under OPT (Figure 4).55 These major nonimmigrant categories are discussed in
greater detail below.
Figure 4. Visas Issued for H-1B and L-1 Nonimmigrant Workers, FY1990-FY2019 and
F-1 Nonimmigrants Employed via OPT, FY2007-FY2019

Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of State, Report of the Visa Office, Table XVI (A) “Classes
of Nonimmigrants Issued Visas,” various fiscal years.
Notes: Data do not include foreign nationals changing to H-1B or L-1 status within the United States. Data for
OPT are only available starting in FY2007.

54 These data do not include foreign nationals changing to H-1B or L-1 status from within the United States, but rather
cover only those who received a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad.
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “2007 to 2021 Annual Growth in
OPT, STEM OPT and CPT Authorizations and Employment Authorization Document (EAD) Issuances,”
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/data-ApprovedEmploymentAuthorizations2007-2021.pdf.
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Specialty Occupation Workers: H-1B Visas
The H-1B visa for workers in specialty occupations56 accounts for the largest share of visas issued
to nonimmigrant workers. H-1B workers also make up the largest share of temporary workers who
adjust to LPR status through the employment-based immigration system.57 Although H-1B
employees may work in a variety of fields, the majority have been hired to work in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) occupations, with about two-thirds working in
computer-related occupations.58 Most H-1B visa holders originate from India and to a lesser extent
China.59 Prospective H-1B employers must attest that, among other things, they will pay the H-1B
worker the greater of the actual wages paid to similar employees or the prevailing wages for that
occupation in the area of intended employment.60
H-1B status is generally valid for up to three years and renewable for another three years. However,
if an employer sponsors an H-1B nonimmigrant for an employment-based green card, the H-1B
nonimmigrant is eligible to renew his or her status beyond the six-year limit if at least one year has
passed since the filing of a labor certification with DOL or an EB immigrant petition with USCIS.61
Given the lengthy waits for an employment-based green card, many H-1B workers, particularly
those from India, spend decades in the United States as nonimmigrant workers before acquiring
LPR status.62 These H-1B workers function much like permanent employment-based immigrants
but lack LPR status and the ability to change employers without losing their place in the EB
queue.63
While the current statutory annual limit (or cap) of 65,000 H-1B visas per year is the same as when
it was established in 1990, Congress has enacted policy changes expanding the H-1B program

56 INA §214(i)(1) defines specialty occupation as “an occupation that requires theoretical and practical application of a
body of highly specialized knowledge and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.” Specialty occupation is similarly defined in
regulation at 8 C.F.R. §214.2(h)(4)(i)(A)(1).
57 USCIS has estimated that the population of H-1B workers in the United States was approximately 583,420 as of
September 30, 2019. See USCIS, H-1B Authorized-to-Work Population Estimate, Office of Policy & Strategy, June 2020.
Adjustment of status calculation based on data provided to CRS by USCIS. Data cover fiscal years 2000 through 2019.
58 See, for example, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), USCIS, Characteristics of Specialty Occupation
Workers: Fiscal Year 2019 Annual Report to Congress, March 5, 2020. Annual reports from other recent years show
similar occupational patterns.
59 Workers born in India and China comprised 75% and 12%, respectively, of approved H-1B petitions in FY2020. See
USCIS, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers: Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Report to Congress, February
17, 2021.
60 INA §212(n) (8 U.S.C. §1182(n)).
61 Section 106 of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-313) allows H-1B visa
holders with pending EB1, EB2, or EB3 adjustment of status applications to extend their H-1B status in one-year
increments while they wait for their labor certification or LPR applications to be processed. It also allows those with
approved EB1, EB2, or EB3 petitions who are waiting because of the per-country limit to extend their H-1B status in
three-year increments while they wait for a visa number to become available. The H-1B employer and the employer
sponsoring the worker for LPR status need not be the same. See 8 C.F.R. §214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)-(E). These provisions have
allowed hundreds of thousands of H-1B workers to remain in the country for many years while awaiting LPR status. See
for example, Testimony of Ronil Hira, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Howard University, U.S. Congress, Senate
Judiciary Committee, Immigration Reforms Needed to Protect Skilled American Workers, 115th Cong., 1st sess., March
17, 2015.
62 For more information, see CRS Report R46291, The Employment-Based Immigration Backlog.
63 When employment-based LPR status is based on employer sponsorship, a sponsored H-1B worker who changes
employment before a visa number is available will lose the prior employer’s sponsorship for LPR status and would need
to restart the LPR sponsorship process with the new employer.
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(Figure 5). Congress temporarily raised the limit for several years in the late 1990s and early
2000s, and has progressively exempted more H-1B workers from the limit.64 Despite these
exemptions, the number of employer petitions for new, cap-subject H-1B workers has routinely
exceeded the limit—in some years during the first week or even on the first day that petitions are
accepted.
Figure 5. Approved Employer Petitions for H-1B Workers, FY2000-FY2020
(With annual numerical limits and major policy changes)

Source: CRS presentation of numeric data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers, FY2000-FY2020. Policy changes based on
P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-313, and P.L. 108-447.
Notes: “Approved H-1B Petitions” are based on data from Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker. Not
all approved petitions result in the issuance of a visa by Department of State because (1) some approved workers
do not pursue a visa or are denied a visa and (2) individuals already in the United States who are changing to H-1B
status are not issued visas by DOS.
The growing use of H-1B visas has generated public debate. Proponents contend that the H-1B visa
allows American employers to fill gaps in the skilled labor market, largely benefiting the U.S.
economy.65 They also point to competition with other nations over emerging technologies, arguing
that U.S. economic and national security depend on recruiting and retaining what are often called

64 Congress temporarily increased the limit to 115,000 for FY1999-FY2000 and to 195,000 for FY2001–FY2003. Since
FY2004, the limit has remained at 65,000. In 2000, Congress enacted P.L. 106-313 to exempt from the limit petitions
filed for workers employed at institutions of higher education, nonprofit research organizations, and governmental
research organizations. P.L. 106-313 also made H-1B workers who extend their stay exempt from the cap. In 2004,
Congress passed P.L. 108-447 making exempt from the limit up to 20,000 petitions filed on behalf of aliens with a
master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution of higher education (often referred to as the master’s cap). As discussed
in the prior section, since 2000, H-1B workers waiting at least a year for LPR status approval are exempt from the six-
year limit on their approved length of stay in the United States; these workers may continue to renew their H-1B status
until their LPR application is adjudicated, and they are not counted against the annual H-1B cap. These policy changes are
illustrated in Figure 5.
65 See, for example, Rachel Rosenthal and Noah Smith, “Do H-1B Workers Help or Hurt American Workers?,”
Bloomberg, August 24, 2020; and Stuart Anderson, Setting the Record Straight on High-Skilled Immigration, National
Foundation for American Policy, August 2016.
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the “best minds,” including foreign nationals graduating from U.S. universities. Some argue that
high demand for H-1B workers by U.S. employers underscores the need to increase the annual H-
1B limit.
Critics emphasize its substantial use by overseas-based labor outsourcing firms that hire workers
with ordinary skill levels.66 They cite the lack of empirical evidence of labor shortages,67 note the
lack of any labor market test for hiring H-1B workers, and argue that the presence of such foreign
workers negatively impacts wages and working conditions in the U.S. industrial sectors where they
are employed.68 They contend that many H-1B workers are subject to abuse and have been used to
replace U.S. workers,69 and favor policies that incentivize employers to hire U.S. workers.70
Arguments favoring or opposing the use of H-1B visas often treat H-1B workers as a homogenous
group. In practice, individuals typically acquire H-1B status through two distinct selection systems
that have differing objectives. Foreign nationals who acquire H-1B visas from abroad typically are
hired directly by foreign outsourcing companies as information technology (IT) contract workers to
help U.S. firms lower their labor costs.71 In contrast, a sizable portion of foreign nationals in the
United States acquire H-1B visas by changing from another temporary status, frequently F student
visas.72 While many work in IT-related fields, they are employed across a broader array of industrial
sectors than H-1B visa holders from abroad.73 Foreign students who acquire H-1B status thus have

66 See for example, Nicole Torres, “The H-1B Visa Debate, Explained,” Harvard Business Review, May 4, 2017; and Ron
Hira, “Top 10 H-1B employers are all IT offshore outsourcing firms, costing U.S. workers tens of thousands of jobs,”
Working Economics Blog, Economic Policy Institute, August 22, 2016. One former top Indian government official
dubbed the H-1B visa “the outsourcing visa.” See Steve Lohr, “Parsing the Truths About Visas for Tech Workers,” New
York Times, April 15, 2007.
67 See for example, Hal Salzman, Daniel Kuehn, and B. Lindsay Lowell, “Guestworkers in the High-Skill U.S. Labor
Market: An Analysis of Supply, Employment, and Wage Trends,” EPI Briefing Paper #359, Economic Policy Institute,
April 24, 2013.
68 See, for example, Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, New Evidence of Widespread Wage Theft in the H-1B Visa Program,
Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021; David North, “A Tale of Two Exploitative Foreign Worker Programs,”
Center for Immigration Studies, October 31, 2018; and Alan B. Krueger, “The Rigged Labor Market,” Milken Institute
Review, April 28, 2017. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also recommended more controls to
protect workers, prevent abuse. See, for example, GAO, H-1B Visa Program: Reforms are Needed to Minimize the Risks
and Costs of Current Program, GAO-11-26, January 14, 2011.
69 See, for example, CBS, “You’re Fired,” 60 Minutes, March 19, 2017; Testimony of Ronil Hira, Associate Professor of
Public Policy, Howard University, before U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest,
The Impact of High-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Workers, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 25, 2016; and Julia Preston,
“Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs,” The New York Times, November 10, 2015.
70 See, for example, Alexia Fernández Campbell, “There’s a Clear Way to Fix the H-1B Visa Program,” The Atlantic,
December 6, 2016; and Ron Hira and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Reforming U.S.’ High-Skilled Guestworker Program,
Atlantic Council, January 2019.
71 Nicole Torres, “The H-1B Visa Debate, Explained,” Harvard Business Review, May 4, 2017.
72 In FY2020, 64% of approved H-1B petitions for initial employment were for nonimmigrants already in the United
States. Of these, 77% were students and their families. USCIS, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers,
FY2021 Annual Report to Congress, p. 19.
73 Evidence of differing occupational diversity within these two groups can be obtained directly from publicly available
USCIS data on nonimmigrant petition (USCIS Form I-129) approvals for the first quarter of FY2019. The data indicate
that of the 60,788 individuals who acquired H-1B status without adjusting from an F-1 student visa, 70% were employed
in computer related, computer system technical support, computer system user support, and system analysis and
programming occupations. For the 18,109 individuals acquiring H-1B status who did adjust from an F-1 student visa, the
proportion was 55%. Figures computed by CRS. For data, see USCIS, I-129 Approvals for FY 2019, July 15, 2019,
https://www.uscis.gov/records/electronic-reading-room?ddt_mon=&ddt_yr=&query=h-1b&items_per_page=10&
options%5Bvalue%5D&page=1.
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undergone two selection processes: the first by U.S. universities (often for graduate study) to
acquire an F student visa, and the second by employers to acquire an H-1B visa.
Intracompany Transferees: L-1 Visas
The L-1 visa for intra-company transferees allows U.S. employers to transfer employees from their
affiliated offices overseas to their U.S. offices.74 The INA distinguishes two L-1 categories:
executives and managers (L-1A classification); and employees with specialized knowledge (L-1B
classification). L-1A visa holders can work in the United States for up to seven years and are
typically qualified to adjust to LPR status through the EB1 category, which does not require labor
certification. In contrast, L-1B visa holders can work in the United States for up to five years, and
those who adjust to LPR status typically do so through the EB2 and EB3 categories that do require
labor certification. L-1 visas are not numerically limited. Issuances have increased from 14,342 in
FY1990 to 76,988 in FY2019 (Figure 4), overall trending upward over the time period.
Some consider L-1 visas essential “to prevent retaliation against U.S. companies and workers
transferring abroad, to make it easier for U.S. companies to expand abroad, and to encourage
multinationals to invest in the United States without fear of being cut off from their key
employees.”75 However, others assert that L-1 visa holders displace U.S. workers.76 Some argue
that the L-1 visa has become a substitute for the H-1B visa, noting that L-1B employees often have
comparable skills and occupations to H-1B workers but do not have to pass through the INA’s labor
market protections for hiring H-1B workers.77 Indeed, some argue that the standards to qualify for
L-1B specialized knowledge are so vague that any worker can qualify.78 These concerns have arisen
particularly for outsourcing and information technology firms that employ L-1 workers as
subcontractors within the United States.79 A related concern is that the unchecked use of L-1 visas
allows foreign managers and specialists to gain U.S. experience before transferring their operations
and STEM and other high-skilled jobs overseas.80
Optional Practical Training (OPT)
Roughly 700,000 foreign nationals attended U.S. colleges and universities as undergraduate or
graduate students in 2021.81 Most did so on an F-1 visa, which allows them to remain in the United

74 The L-1 visa also allows foreign companies that lack an affiliated U.S. office to send employees to the United States
with the purpose of establishing one. L-1 visa recipients must have been employed abroad by the firm for at least one year
in the preceding three years. INA §101(a)(15)(L) (8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(L)).
75 David J. Bier, “The Facts About the L-1 Visa Program,” Cato Institute, June 10, 2020.
76 Ron Hira, The H-1B and L-1 Visa Programs: Out of Control, Economic Policy Institute, October 14, 2010.
77 Unlike the H-1B visa, the L-1 visa has no wage floor and does not require employers to attest that they will pay the
prevailing wage for the occupation in the area of intended employment. See, for example, George Avelos, “Workers paid
$1.21 an hour to install Fremont tech company’s computers,” The Mercury News, October 22, 2014. For more
information, see U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, “H-1B Program,” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
whd/immigration/h1b.
78 See Testimony of Ronil Hira, Associate Professor, Howard University, U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on
Immigration and Citizenship, Oh Canada! How Outdated U.S. Immigration Policies Push Top Talent to Other Countries,
117th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2021.
79 Ibid.
80 See, for example, Office of Inspector General, Implementation of L-1 Visa Regulations, Department of Homeland
Security, OIG-13-107, August 2013; and Office of the Inspector General, Review of Vulnerabilities and Potential Abuses
of the L-1 Visa Program, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, OIG-06-22, January 2006.
81 Institute of International Education, “International Student Enrollment Trends.” Open Doors Report on International
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States for the duration of their study.82 When F-1 nonimmigrants have completed their education,
most return to their home countries, but some remain in the United States. Most of those who
remain apply for work authorization through Optional Practical Training (OPT).83
OPT provides work authorization to foreign students and recent graduates seeking short-term
employment directly related to their major areas of study. Generally, an F-1 student may work up to
12 months in OPT, which can be completed before and/or after graduation. Those who receive a
degree in a STEM field84 may apply for a two-year extension, known as STEM OPT, allowing them
to work a total of 36 months.85 In this way, OPT often serves as a bridge for students on F-1 visas to
transition to H-1B status, which subsequently may lead to employment-based LPR status.86
The OPT program is not numerically limited, and its use increased from less than 25,000 foreign
students in CY2007 to over 204,000 in CY2017. In CY2021, 164,528 F-1 nonimmigrants were
working under OPT.87 As OPT participation has increased—along with the length of time OPT
participants may work in the United States—some observers have questioned the program’s merits.
Supporters argue that OPT allows recent graduates with in-demand skills to remain in and
contribute to the U.S. economy, and allows U.S. employers to screen workers for permanent
employment. They cite the absence of evidence showing OPT workers take jobs from American
students and college graduates.88 In particular, they argue that the three years of work allowed under
the STEM OPT extension—as opposed to the 12 months allowed under regular OPT—justifies a
company’s investment in training these new employees.
Opponents argue that what was initially intended to give students work experience in their field has
become a large-scale temporary worker program without safeguards in place to protect U.S.
workers and students. They contend that OPT effectively circumvents the numerical limitations and
more lengthy application processes for H-1B or LPR status.89 Opponents also note that the program

Educational Exchange, 2021.
82 8 C.F.R. §214.2(f).
83 Graduating students can also be sponsored directly by employers for employment-based green cards.
84 DHS maintains a list of STEM degree programs that qualify for the STEM OPT extension, available at
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/stem-list.pdf.
85 The STEM OPT extension began in 2008 as a 17-month extension. DHS expanded it to 24 months in 2016 (for a total
of 36 months in OPT). For more information, see DHS, “Improving and Expanding Training Opportunities for F-1
Nonimmigrant Students With STEM Degrees and Cap-Gap Relief for All Eligible F-1 Students,” 81 Federal Register
13039-13122, March 11, 2016.
86 In FY2020 and FY2021, 47% of H-1B petitions approved for initial employment were for individuals requesting a
change from F-1 status to H-1B status. See USCIS, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers, FY2020 and
FY2021 Annual Report[s] to Congress. It is likely that many of these students changing to H-1B status (85% of whom
had received Master’s or higher degrees) were first hired by a U.S. employer through the OPT program (during which
they maintain their F-1 status). In some cases, the employer previously may have attempted to hire the student as an H-1B
worker but been denied due to numerical limits or other program restrictions.
87 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “2007 to 2021 Annual Growth in
OPT, STEM OPT and CPT Authorizations and Employment Authorization Document (EAD) Issuances,”
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/data-ApprovedEmploymentAuthorizations2007-2021.pdf.
88 See, for example, Stuart Anderson, “Setting the Record Straight on Optional Practical Training,” Forbes, June 21,
2021.
89 See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, The Department of Homeland Security’s proposed STEM OPT extension
fails to protect foreign students and American workers, Economic Policy Institute, December 1, 2015; Karin Fischer,
“How a Little-Known Program for Foreign Students Became Embroiled in a Hot-Button National Debate,” The Chronicle
of Higher Education, January 20, 2016; David North, Now Is the Perfect Time to Downsize the OPT Program, Center for
Immigration Studies, May 26, 2020; and Elizabeth Redden, “Will Trump Opt to Restrict Foreign Student Work
Program?,” Inside Higher Ed, May 29, 2020.
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incentivizes U.S. employers to hire recent foreign graduates over U.S. citizen graduates because
employers are not required to pay Social Security and Medicare (FICA) taxes for F-1 students.90
Assessing the Role of Nonimmigrant Workers
Skilled nonimmigrant workers may be well suited to meet the specific needs of individual
employers (i.e., as opposed to general labor market needs). Unless they have dual intent, temporary
workers are generally required to leave the United States when their period of stay expires, limiting
their impact on the long-term labor market prospects of native workers. Therefore, some
policymakers may consider increasing nonimmigrant worker limits a more effective and/or
expedient way to meet U.S. labor market demands than by increasing permanent EB immigration.
Some argue that the growing use of temporary skilled workers signals not only increased labor
demand for individuals with specific skills, but also labor market pressure resulting from the INA’s
annual statutory limit on permanent employment-based immigration.91 Given the level of economic
growth and technological innovation since 1990, when current employment-based immigration
limits were established, employers seeking skilled workers from abroad appear to be increasingly
relying upon the INA’s nonimmigrant provisions, some of which were not intended for their current
uses.92 Additionally, a sizable portion of skilled nonimmigrant workers can renew their status
indefinitely, which makes the temporary designation of their status artificial. Greater numbers of
nonimmigrants working in the United States will likely increase the number seeking to stay in the
country permanently, thereby contributing to the EB queue.
Economic, Labor Market, and Demographic Trends93
Observers of employment-based immigration trends note that the size and composition of the U.S.
economy has changed significantly since 1990 when the EB immigration limit of 140,000 was
established. Gross domestic product (GDP) has more than doubled from $9.4 trillion in the first
quarter of 1990 (Q1 1990) to $19.8 trillion in Q4 2021.94
Despite economic growth, some measures have pointed to a slowdown in productivity growth and
economic dynamism—as measured by business start-up rates and gross worker flows, for

90 See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, The Department of Homeland Security’s proposed STEM OPT extension
fails to protect foreign students and American workers, Economic Policy Institute, December 1, 2015; and Matthew
Bultman, “OPT Extension Is Hurting Us, Tech Workers Tell DC Circ.,” Law360, February 4, 2016. For information on
taxation rules for F and other nonimmigrants, see Internal Revenue Service (IRS), “U.S. Tax Guide for Aliens,”
Publication 519, March 4, 2020, pp. 42-43, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p519.pdf. See also IRS, “Aliens Employed in
the U.S. – Social Security Taxes,” November 3, 2020, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/aliens-
employed-in-the-us-social-security-taxes.
91 See, for example, Daniel Costa, “Temporary Migrant Workers or Immigrants? The Question for U.S. Labor Migration,”
The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, vol. 6, no. 3 (November 2020); and Muzaffar Chishti and
Jessica Bolter, Despite Political Resistance, Use of Temporary Worker Visas Rises as U.S. Labor Market Tightens,
Migration Policy Institute, June 20, 2017.
92 See, for example, Jeremy Neufeld, Optional Practical Training (OPT) and International Students After Graduation,
Niskanen Center, March 2019; and Lazaro Zamora, Are “Temporary Workers” Really Temporary? Turning Temporary
Status into Green Cards, Bipartisan Policy Center, May 2016.
93 In this report section, permanent employment-based immigrants and temporary nonimmigrant workers are discussed
broadly as one group.
94 Figures are in 2012 dollars. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Real Gross Domestic Product [GDPC1], retrieved
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1, September 21, 2021.
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example—particularly since 2000.95 Dynamic economies foster innovation and open channels to
apply new ideas to production and the delivery of services, and create an environment in which new
businesses open, successful firms thrive, and unproductive firms exit, thereby contributing to a
more efficient, productive economy. Consequently, for some, evidence of declining dynamism
raises concerns about future U.S. economic growth.96
Industry composition in the United States has also changed since 1990, affecting, among other
things, the mix of skills needed to meet employer demand. For example, as a percentage of GDP,
the value added of the computer systems design and related services subsector more than tripled
between 1990 and 2020 (the most current year of annual data available), and the value added of the
data processing, internet publishing, and other information services subsector quintupled.97
Employers’ demand for STEM skills have increased across several occupation groups since 1990,98
and relatively high growth in STEM employment is expected to continue.99
Several studies identify positive contributions of foreign-born workers—particularly highly
educated immigrants—to the U.S. economy.100 Foreign workers have helped meet employers’
demand for hard-to-find skills in STEM jobs, advanced new ideas and methods of production, and
launched start-ups, boosting U.S. commerce and creating jobs. Given concerns around declining
dynamism, and changes in U.S. industrial structure and skill demands, these contributions may be
more sought-after today than when Congress revised the existing employment-based immigrant
levels in 1990.
To some, the relatively large contribution of highly educated foreign workers to U.S. innovation
and commerce may lend support to increasing annual numerical limits on foreign-born workers as a
strategy to boost economic dynamism. By some estimates, for example, immigrants accounted for
about a quarter of U.S. patent awards and entrepreneurship in recent years.101 One study identifies
economic impacts of immigration across several measures (e.g., job creation and destruction,
patents per person, wages) at the local (county) level.102

95 Ryan A. Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “Declining Dynamism, Allocative Efficiency,
and the Productivity Slowdown,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 107 (2017), pp. 322-326.
96 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, America Without
Entrepreneurs: The Consequences of Dwindling Startup Activity, 114th Cong., June 29, 2016.
97 Value added is the difference between the value of final produced goods and the cost of materials or supplies used in
producing them. BEA, Value Added by Industry as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (Annual Data, 1990 to
2020), https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_industry_gdpIndy.cfm. Data for 1990 are in BEA’s Historical 1947-1997 Data.
98 See, for example, David J. Deming and Kadeem Noray, “STEM Careers and the Changing Skill Requirements of
Work,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 25065, June 2019. The estimated increase in STEM jobs
depends on the occupational classification used in the analysis (i.e., which jobs are counted as STEM jobs).
99 BLS projects that STEM employment will grow at rate of 10.5% between 2020 and 2030, whereas non-STEM
employment is projected to grow by 7.5%. BLS, Table 1.11 Employment in STEM occupations, 2020 and projected 2030,
https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/stem-employment.htm.
100 For a summary of the extensive literature on this topic, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, ed. Francine D. Blau and Christopher Mackie,
National Academies Press, 2017.
101 For a summary of studies on the contribution of immigrants to patents and startups, see Sari Pekkala Kerr and William
R. Kerr, Immigration Policy Levers for U.S. Innovation and Startups, NBER Working Paper 27040, April 2020; and
Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter, High-Skilled Immigration and the Rise of STEM Occupations in U.S.
Employment, NBER Working Paper 22623, September 2016.
102 Konrad B. Burchardi et al., Immigration, Innovation, and Growth, NBER Working Paper No. 27075, May 2020,
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27075 (hereinafter referred to as “Burchardi et al. 2020”).
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However, the relationship between immigration, innovation, and economic outcomes is complex.103
For example, the same economic impacts study cited above found that local impacts were much
stronger for highly educated immigrants; by contrast, it found that “an inflow of relatively
uneducated migrants has almost no effect on local innovation.” Further, the spillover effects of
immigration on selected economic outcomes of neighboring communities dissipated over
geographic distance, suggesting that effects may be concentrated in communities that attract highly
educated immigrants.104
More broadly, immigration’s impact on the U.S. economy has become increasingly significant in
light of two fundamental U.S. demographic trends: declining birthrates and increasing mortality.
During the past three decades, for example, the U.S. birthrate has declined, with the average
number of births per thousand women aged 15 to 44 falling from 71 in 1990 to 56 in 2020.105
Mortality, on the other hand, has increased because of aging baby boomers—the large post-World
War II population cohort born between 1946 and 1964. Over the past decade, for example, the
current population aged 55 and above has increased by 27%, or 20 times faster than the population
under age 55 (1.3%).106
Both trends have significantly reduced the level of growth in the total U.S. population and civilian
labor force. They have also contributed to foreign-born workers’ accounting for a disproportionate
share of such growth (Table 4). In 2020, the foreign born represented about one seventh (14%) of
the total U.S. population and about one sixth (17%) of the total U.S. civilian labor force age 16 and
above. Yet between 1990 and 2020, the foreign born accounted for 30% of the growth in total U.S.
population growth and 57% of the growth in the total U.S. civilian labor force.
More recently, declining international migration to the United States has contributed to slowing
U.S. population growth.107 For example, between 2001 and 2015, net international migration ranged
between about 750,000 and 1 million persons annually; it has since declined to 477,000 from 2019
to 2020; and 247,000 from 2020 to 2021.108 Despite that decline, it still exceeded U.S. natural
increase (births over deaths) in 2021 for the first time in U.S. history.109

103 Measuring this relationship is further complicated by methodological challenges, such as the difficulty of separating
the contribution of immigrants to strong economic outcomes from the tendency of immigrants to locate in thriving areas.
104 Burchardi et al. 2020.
105 Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin, and Michelle J.K. Osterman, Births: Provisional Data for 2020, Vital Statistics
Rapid Release Report 012, National Center for Health Statistics, May 2021.
106 William Frey, “What the 2020 census will reveal about America: Stagnating growth, an aging population, and youthful
diversity,” Brookings Institution, January 11, 2021.
107 The Bureau attributes this recent decline to travel restrictions and the impact of COVID on international migration. See
Jason Schachter, Pete Borsella, and Anthony Knapp, “New Population Estimates Show COVID-19 Pandemic
Significantly Disrupted Migration Across Borders,” U.S. Census Bureau, December 21, 2021.
108 See Jason Schachter, Pete Borsella, and Anthony Knapp, “Net International Migration at Lowest Levels in Decades,”
U.S. Census Bureau, December 21, 2021. For international migration trends since 2001, see Luke Rogers, “U.S.
Population Grew 0.1% in 2021, Slowest Rate Since Founding of the Nation,” Figure 2, U.S. Census Bureau, December
21, 2021. The Census Bureau uses the term international migration to refer to the movement of people across a national
border. It includes both immigration (migration to a country) and emigration (migration from a country), with net
international migration being the combination of the two. See U.S. Census Bureau, “About Migration and Place of
Birth,” December 3, 2021.
109 The Census Bureau estimated net natural increase at 148,043 compared to net international migration of 244,622.
Deaths from the COVID pandemic amplified the trend of declining natural increase in recent decades. See U.S. Census
Bureau, “New Vintage 2021 Population Estimates Available for the Nation, States and Puerto Rico,” Press Release,
December 21, 2021.
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Table 4. Native-Born and Foreign-Born Workers in the U.S. Labor Force, 1990 and 2020
Change
% Change

1990
2020
1990-2020
1990-2020
Total Population
248,709,873 331,449,281
82,739,408
33%
Native-Born Population
228,909,873 286,549,281
57,639,408
25%
Foreign-Born Population
19,800,000
44,900,000
25,100,000
127%
% Foreign Born of Total Population
8%
14%
30%

Total Civilian Labor Force Age 16+
124,800,000 162,744,000
37,944,000
30%
Native-Born Civilian Labor Force Age 16+
119,185,000 135,429,000
16,244,000
14%
Foreign-Born Civilian Labor Force Age 16+
5,615,000
27,315,000
21,700,000
386%
% Foreign Born of Total Civilian Labor Force
4%
17%
57%

Sources: Total Population, 1990 and 2020: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Population Change Data (1910-2020),
April 2021; Native-Born Population, 1990 and 2020: derived by subtracting foreign-born population from total
population; Foreign-Born Population, 1990: Susan J. Lapham, Patricia Montgomery and Debra Miner, We, The
American Foreign Born, U.S. Census Bureau, September 1993; Foreign-Born Population, 2020: Jeanne Batalova, Mary
Hanna and Christopher Levesque, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,
Migration Policy Institute, February 2021; Total Civilian Labor Force Age 16+, 1990: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1992, Table 609, 1992; Total Civilian Labor Force Age 16+, 2020: Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Civilian labor force, by age, sex, race and ethnicity, Table 3.1, Employment Projections, September 2021;
Native-Born Civilian Labor Force Age 16+, 1990 and 2020: derived by subtracting foreign-born civilian labor force
age 16+ from total U.S. civilian labor force age 16+; Foreign-Born Civilian Labor Force Age 16+, 1990: Joseph R.
Meisenheimer II, “How do immigrants fare in the U.S. Labor Market?,” Monthly Labor Review, December 1992;
Foreign-Born Civilian Labor Force Age 16+, 2020: Average of monthly counts from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, https://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab7.htm.
Notes: Foreign Born percentages shown in bold are column percentages. For example, the 30% figure refers to
the change between 1990 and 2020. Labor force Includes employed and unemployed workers.
The result of these three trends—declining birthrates, increasing mortality, and recently declining
net international migration—has been the slowest U.S. population growth (0.1% from 2020 to
2021) recorded since the country’s founding.110 Some observers have linked these trends to the need
to increase immigration levels.111 Others have questioned that assessment as well as the country’s
capacity to absorb immigrants.112

110 See Luke Rogers, “U.S. Population Grew 0.1% in 2021, Slowest Rate Since Founding of the Nation,” U.S. Census
Bureau, December 21, 2021.
111 See, for example, Ali Noorani and Danilo Zak, Room to Grow: Setting Immigration Levels in a Changing America,
National Immigration Forum, February 2021.
112 See, for example, Steven A. Camarota, “There Is No Evidence that Population Growth Drives per Capita Economic
Growth in Developed Economies,” Center for Immigration Studies, June 1, 2021; and Steven Camarota, “The Case
Against Immigration,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2017. For articles on Americans’ views of immigration policy, see, for
example, Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Remain Divided on Preferred Immigration Levels,” Gallop, July 23, 2021;
National Immigration Forum, “Polling Update: Americans Continue to Resist Negative Messages about Immigrants, but
Partisan Differences Continue to Grow,” September 18, 2020; and Claire Brockway and Carroll Doherty, “Growing share
of Republicans say U.S. risks losing its identity if it is too open to foreigners,” Pew Research Center, July 17, 2019.
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Policy Options Within the Current Framework
Legislative proposals to revise the employment-based immigration system vary widely in scope.
Some proposals are limited to revising or eliminating the 7% per-country ceiling, thus altering who
receives the current statutorily mandated number of EB green cards rather than how many people
are able to receive them. Others would alter the current numerical limits for EB immigrants, either
alone or combined with revisions to numerical limits on other permanent immigrant categories.
Some would change the criteria by which immigrants are selected. Despite their distinct approaches
and scopes, many proposals seek to address a situation that some consider emblematic of systemic
dysfunction: the sizable and lengthy employment-based queue.
The Employment-Based Queue
The queue of prospective EB immigrants waiting to receive green cards continues to be a
significant immigration policy issue.113 The queue currently numbers an estimated 870,000
prospective EB immigrants and their family members, most of whom reside lawfully in the United
States and are seeking LPR status through the EB2 and EB3 categories.114 Many individuals in the
queue must wait years and in some cases decades to acquire a green card.115 As sponsored
employment-based immigrants with approved EB petitions, they have met the EB eligibility criteria
and are employed in their fields. The long waiting times impose financial, and career and family
hardships.116 Some also contend that such extended wait times for LPR status not only prevent these
individuals from contributing more to the U.S. economy, but also discourage other talented
prospective students and immigrants from seeking education and employment in the United
States.117
This queue exists because U.S. employers sponsor more foreign nationals and their family members
for EB1, EB2, and EB3 employment-based green cards each year than can be issued under current
INA annual limits. In addition, most H-1B visa recipients—a key nonimmigrant pathway to EB

113 For more information, see CRS Report R46291, The Employment-Based Immigration Backlog.
114 Ibid. This estimate is based solely on immigrant petitions that USCIS has processed and approved. It does not account
for employment-based immigrant petitions or adjustment of status applications that USCIS has not yet fully processed.
USCIS issues quarterly processing reports for all applications and petitions. See for example, USCIS, “Number of Service
wide Forms By Quarter, From Status, and Processing Time, Fiscal Year 2022, Quarter 1.”
115 Some have suggested revising the employment-based system by statutorily limiting the amount of time a foreign
national with an approved employment-based petition must wait to receive LPR status. See Stuart Anderson, “Chapter 2:
Reducing Long Wait Times for Family-Sponsored and Employment-Based Immigrants,” in Alex Nowrasteh and David J.
Bier (eds.) 12 New Immigration Ideas for the 21st Century, Cato Institute, 2020.
116 Spouses of H-1B visa holders with approved LPR status who have been waiting in the EB queue at least a year can
apply for work authorization, but other H-1B spouses are not allowed to work. Some families struggle to live on one
income, particularly in expensive areas of the country where many H-1B are concentrated. Children of H-1B visa holders
who are waiting with their parents in the EB queue run the risk of “aging out” of legal status when they reach age 21.
While their H-1B-visa-possessing parents continue to reside legally, they become removable upon reaching age 21 unless
they are able to obtain another status. Many such children consider the United States their home country. Some observers
have characterized this population as legal Dreamers, corresponding to Dreamers who entered the United States at a
young age with their parents but who lack lawful immigration status. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11844,
Legal Dreamers.
117 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship,
‘Why Don't They Just Get in Line?’ Barriers to Legal Immigration, Statement by Chairman Nadler, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,
April 28, 2021. For an earlier hearing with similar arguments, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, Need for Green Cards for
Highly Skilled Workers, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., June 12, 2008.
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sponsorship, as noted above—originate from India and China, the countries with the longest
waiting times for EB LPR status.118 As a result, the queue may not diminish substantially over time
and could expand if current EB petitioning rates continue.119
Table 5. Employment-Based Queue—Principal Immigrants Only
(Number of approved principal immigrant petitions by origin country, September 2021)
EB2
Country of
EB1
(Profes-
EB3
EB3
EB4
EB5
Origin
(Priority)
sional)
(Skilled)
(Other)
(Special)
(Investor)
Total
China
79
23,648
6,542
863
—
15,794
46,926
El Salvador
—
—
—
—
9,921
—
9,921
Guatemala
—
—
—
—
13,359
—
13,359
Honduras
—
—
—
—
8,466
—
8,466
India
65
295,933
61,576
146
—
—
357,720
Mexico
3
—
—
—
1643
—
1,646
Philippines
—
—
132
—
—
—
132
All Other
102
3
100
2
—
—
207
Total
249
319,584
68,350
1,011
33,389
15,794
438,377
Source: USCIS, Form I-140, I-360, I-525 Approved Employment-Based Petitions Awaiting Visa Availability by Preference
Category and Country of Birth As of September 2021.
Notes: “—” indicates either no category value or values too small to meet disclosure standards.
The most recent publicly available USCIS data indicate that 438,377 foreign nationals possessed
approved employment-based petitions and were waiting for an available EB visa number as of
September 2021 (Table 5).120 Indian nationals, with 357,720 approved petitions (82%), and Chinese
nationals, with 46,926 approved petitions (11%), together account for 93% of the EB queue. By
preference category, EB2 and EB3 petitioners represented 73% and 16% of the queue, respectively.
The numbers presented in Table 5 represent principal immigrants, not derivative (family member)
immigrants. Multiplying the number of principal immigrants by a “derivative multiplier” yields an
estimated number of accompanying derivative immigrants (Table 6).121 Summing principal and
derivative immigrants yields the estimated total of foreign nationals approved for LPR status who
are waiting in the EB queue to receive it.

118 In FY2020, Indian and Chinese nationals made up 74.9% and 12.1%, respectively of all H-1B petition beneficiaries.
See DHS, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers: Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Report to Congress.
119 See CRS Report R46291, The Employment-Based Immigration Backlog. Congressional proposals to address the visa
queue itself have taken a range of forms. For example, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act (S. 744) introduced in the 113th Congress would have eliminated much of the family-based and
employment-based queues over seven years. In contrast, the RAISE Act (S. 1720) introduced in the 115th Congress would
have invalidated almost all petitions held by persons waiting in the queue.
120 USCIS, Form I-140, I-360, I-526 Approved Employment-Based Petitions Awaiting Visa Availability by Preference
Category and Country of Birth As of September 2021.
121 The derivative multiplier is the ratio of counts of primary and derivative immigrants who were granted LPR status, as
recorded in Table 7 of the DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2019. For example, each approved EB1 petition
represents an average of 2.52 persons seeking LPR status: one principal immigrant and 1.52 derivative immigrants. CRS
used 2019 data rather than 2020 data, because the former did not include the distorting impact of COVID-19.
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Table 6. Employment-Based Queue—Principal and Derivative Immigrants
(Number of approved principal immigrant petitions and estimated derivative immigrants, September 2021)
EB2
EB1
(Profess-
EB3
EB3
EB4
EB5

(Priority)
ional)
(Skilled)
(Other)
(Special)
(Investor)
Total
Principal
Immigrant
249
319,584
68,350
1,011
33,389
15,794
438,377
Petitions
Derivative
Immigrant
1.52
0.99
1.08
0.48
0.36
1.77
N/A
Multiplier
Estimated
Derivative
378
316,974
73,954
488
12,178
27,886
431,857
Immigrants
Total Estimated
Immigrants
627
636,558
142,304
1,499
45,567
43,680
870,234
Source: Principal Immigrant Petitions: USCIS, Form I-140, I-360, I-525 Approved Employment-Based Petitions Awaiting
Visa Availability by Preference Category and Country of Birth As of September 2021. CRS computed the derivative
immigrant multiplier using figures from the DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2019, Table 7. See text for an
explanation of computations.
Notes: N/A indicates not applicable for the category. Numbers may not be exact because of rounding.
Recent legislative proposals have attempted to address the queue, either by revising or eliminating
the per-country ceiling, or by increasing the number of employment-based green cards issued.
Revising or Eliminating the Per-Country Ceiling
Legislative proposals to revise or eliminate the 7% per-country ceiling for employment-based
immigration have repeatedly been introduced in Congress (see “Recent Comprehensive Reform
Proposals” section below).122 In general, opponents of the 7% per-country ceiling characterize it as
unfair to Indian and Chinese nationals who dominate the EB queue. They argue that eliminating it
would have no impact on annual statutory EB immigration limits, which some in Congress would
oppose changing.123 Opponents of the per-country ceiling further contend that making prospective
immigrants who are in the United States and seeking to adjust to LPR status remain in
nonimmigrant status for much of their working lives undermines the legitimacy of the employment-
based pathway to LPR status.124 They point out that most foreign nationals in the EB queue already
reside and work in the United States on temporary visas. Because these foreign nationals rely on
their employers to sponsor them for LPR status, they cannot change jobs to seek better pay,
working conditions, or career advancement. Forced to either remain with their employers or
sacrifice their pending petitions and their place in the EB queue, they remain vulnerable to potential
exploitation. Some argue that these circumstances incentivize employers to recruit Indian and

122 Among the earliest examples of a bill with this provision is the Securing America’s Borders Act (S. 2454) in the 109th
Congress (from 2005 to 2006) which would have increased the per-country ceiling from 7% to 10%.
123 See, for example, David Bier, Fairness for High Skilled Immigrants Act: Wait Times and Green Card Grants, Cato
Institute, September 30, 2019; and Pema Levy, “Indian Nationals Say the Green Card Backlog Is Unfair. Silicon Valley’s
Plan to Fix It Could Be Too,” Mother Jones, November 20, 2019.
124 See, for example, Stuart Anderson, Waiting and More Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-Based
Immigration System, National Foundation for American Policy, October 4, 2011.
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Chinese nationals over nationals from other countries who face relatively short waits before
receiving LPR status.125
Supporters of the 7% ceiling cite the provision’s original purpose: to prevent monopolization of
employment-based green cards by nationals from only a few countries. The ceiling, they maintain,
currently allows prospective immigrants from almost all countries in the world to acquire LPR
status relatively quickly. It thereby expands and diversifies the skilled worker pool from which U.S.
employers may draw. Eliminating the ceiling would increase access to the annual number of EB
green cards for Indian and Chinese nationals and reduce it in equal measure for prospective EB
immigrants from all other countries.126 Because Indian and Chinese EB immigrants have been
concentrated in specific industries, particularly information technology, and because they are the
most constrained by the per-country ceiling, supporters of maintaining the ceiling argue that it helps
other industries and institutions access the limited annual pool of skilled immigrants.127 Supporters
of the 7% ceiling warn that removing it would substantially increase green card waiting times for
prospective immigrants outside of India and China. That, in turn, could discourage future
prospective immigrants from around the world from choosing the United States as their destination
for study or work. Supporters of the 7% ceiling also argue that removing it would not address what
they contend is the more fundamental issue of too few EB green cards available every year; doing
so, they argue, would merely reallocate waiting times among those in the EB queue.128 Some of
these critiques have been addressed in recent proposed legislation (see “Selected Employment-
Based Legislation in the 117th Congress (2021-present)”).
Eliminating the per-country ceiling could create unintended outcomes. Shorter wait times for LPR
status could alter the decision calculus for nationals from countries with currently long wait times
and encourage more of them to seek employment-based green cards.129 If so, the expected reduction
in wait times for nationals from these countries might not last.
Increasing Overall Employment-Based Immigration
Debates about the annual level of employment-based immigration, like debates over the per-country
ceiling, often highlight the employment-based queue. Proponents of raising EB immigration levels
argue that doing so would correct the imbalance between the number of people annually seeking
LPR status through employment sponsorship and the number of green cards available to them each
year.
While some support increasing employment-based immigration, research provides mixed guidance
on an appropriate employment-based immigration level. The assertion that immigration has
generally benefited the U.S. national economy is not widely disputed. Concerns arise, however,
over how increased immigration might affect particular worker groups. More specifically, there is

125 See, for example, Maria L. Ontiveros, “H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploitation for
High Tech Workers,” Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law, vol. 38 (2017), pp. 2-46.
126 For a quantitative analysis of this process, see CRS Report R46291, The Employment-Based Immigration Backlog.
127 See, for example, Jessica Vaughan, “Scrapping the Per-Country Cap Helps the Companies that Shun U.S. Tech
Workers,” Center for Immigration Studies, November 9, 2018; and Chris Musillo, “The Fairness for High-Skilled
Immigrants Act Will Decimate Nurse Immigration,” ILW Immigration Daily, March 12, 2019. The EAGLE Act
introduced in the 117th Congress, discussed below, includes a reserve allotment for nurses within the EB3 category.
128 See, for example, Ira Kurzban, “Congress is About to End Immigration of Skilled Workers in the U.S.,” Medium,
September 23, 2019.
129 See, for example, Karin Fischer, “Latitudes: House Rejects Plan to Award Green Cards to International STEM
Graduates,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 13, 2022.
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some uncertainty around whether immigrants fill positions left open by U.S. workers or compete
with U.S. workers for similar jobs. Research on the impact of immigrant labor on the employment
and wages of native (or resident) workers has produced mixed results, depending on the empirical
methods, data sources, study timeframe, and which workers are examined.130
In theory, immigration may have relatively neutral impacts on incumbent workers’ employment and
wages if incoming foreign-born workers fill vacancies that cannot be filled by native-born workers.
If immigration responds to increasing labor demand in certain industries or occupations, negative
wage effects may be negligible. However, under some conditions, if immigrants compete with and
can substitute for native-born workers, immigration may put downward pressure on wages and
employment of native-born workers. On the other hand, some research indicates that immigration
can improve productivity and employment if firms respond to increased labor supply by investing
in technology that expands capacity, or if immigrant and native-born workers specialize in different
occupations and native-born workers can upgrade their jobs.131
Some argue that, from a national interest perspective, current U.S. immigration limits may
discourage skilled foreign workers from seeking graduate degrees and starting their careers in the
United States.132 According to this view, prospective immigrants who face the prospect of waiting
for decades to obtain LPR status may choose to immigrate elsewhere to attend college, work, or
start businesses. Some scholarship highlights the role of U.S. colleges and universities in attracting
and training foreign students who contribute to U.S. innovation and supply needed skills to U.S.
workplaces.133 Some empirical research suggests that green card waiting times affect how many
foreign STEM graduates remain in the United States to work.134 U.S. firms seeking highly educated
foreign workers or those with specific skill sets may face competitive disadvantages against firms
in countries that provide permanent legal residence more quickly.135
Research on how temporary status affects economic decisions indicates that workers’ incentives to
invest in professional skills as well as host-country specific skills (e.g., mastering English) depend
on how long foreign workers expect to remain in host countries.136 Nonimmigrant workers who

130 See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of
Immigration, ed. Francine D. Blau and Christopher Mackie (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2016).
Research cited distinguishes between impacts of temporary and permanent immigrant workers. For a discussion of
foundational research on the impacts of immigration on host country labor markets, see George Borjas, “The Economic
Analysis of Immigration,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, eds. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, vol. 3A (North
Holland, 1999), pp. 1697-1760.
131 Ibid.
132 See, for example, Parija Kavilanz, “Immigrant doctors in rural America are sick of waiting for green cards,” CNN
Money, June 13, 2018; Stuart Anderson, “Will Congress Ever Solve The Long Wait For Green Cards?” Forbes, May 21,
2018; and The White House, Modernizing and Streamlining Our Immigration System for the 21st Century, July 2015.
133 See, for example, Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter, High-Skilled Immigration and the Rise of STEM
Occupations in U.S. Employment, NBER Working Paper 22623, September 2016.
134 See, for example, Shulamit Kahn and Megan MacGarvie, “The Impact of Permanent Residency Delays for STEM
PhDs: Who Leaves and Why,” Research Policy, vol. 49 (2020), pp. 1-22; Michael Roach and John Skrentny, “Why
foreign STEM PhDs are unlikely to work for US technology startups,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, vol. 116 (2019), pp. 16805-16810; and Pooja Khosla, “The Impact of Permanent
Residency Delays for STEM PhDs: Who Leaves and Why,” Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 57 (2018), pp. 33-43.
135 See, for example, Testimony of Stuart Anderson, Executive Director, National Foundation for American Policy, U.S.
Congress, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship, Oh Canada! How Outdated U.S. Immigration Policies
Push Top Talent to Other Countries, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2021.
136 Christian Dustmann and Joseph-Simon Görlach, “The Economics of Temporary Migrations,” Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 54 (2016), pp. 98-136.
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remain tethered to their sponsoring employers for extended periods, or whose mobility is otherwise
curtailed, can have limited productivity gains.137
Legislative proposals to increase EB immigration have often included raising the current annual
worldwide limit of 140,000 and/or excluding derivative immigrants (family members) from the
annual limit (see the “Reform Proposals” section below). Other proposals would increase the
employment-based proportion of total immigrants, sometimes by reducing immigration in equal
measure from other LPR pathways. Immigrant pathways repeatedly targeted for reduction or
elimination include the diversity immigrant visa, and the first, third, and fourth family-sponsored
preference categories.138
Maintaining or Reducing Employment-Based Immigration
Some question the arguments favoring the expansion of employment-based immigration and
support maintaining current levels. Questioners posit that increasing the number of foreign workers
in the U.S. labor market would negatively impact employment opportunities, worker training
efforts, wages, and working conditions for native-born workers, particularly less-educated and
disadvantaged groups as well as recent immigrants.139 They have long contended (current COVID-
era conditions excepted) that empirical studies have produced little evidence of tight labor markets,
such as increasing real incomes and declining unemployment rates.140
Others argue that in certain industrial sectors that rely heavily on foreign workers, such as
information technology, some U.S. employers have economic incentives to hire or outsource jobs to
lower paid foreign workers and firms that sponsor them rather than hire or retrain native workers.141
They question the utility of increasing employment-based immigration in light of research showing

137 This occurs when a more economically productive match could be made between the nonimmigrant worker and a
different employer, but visa restrictions limit the worker’s ability to accept a new offer. Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R.
Kerr, Immigration Policy Levers for US Innovation and Startups, NBER Working Paper No. 27040, April 2020.
138 These preference categories, respectively, correspond to adult unmarried children of U.S. citizens (1st), adult married
children of U.S. citizens (3rd), and siblings of U.S. citizens (4th). For more information about these immigrant pathways,
see CRS Report R45973, The Diversity Immigrant Visa Program and CRS Report R43145, U.S. Family-Based
Immigration Policy. Some have questioned these proposals by citing research indicating that family-based immigration
provides social and economic benefits not captured in immigration statistics. See, for example, Kerry Abrams, “What
Makes the Family Special,” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 80 (2013), pp. 7-28; and Guillermina Jasso and
Mark R. Rosenzweig, “Do Immigrants Screened for Skills Do Better than Family Reunification Immigrants?,”
International Migration Review, vol. 29, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 85-111.
139 See, for example, George J. Borjas, “Yes, Immigration Hurts American Workers,” Politico Magazine,
September/October 2016; and National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal
Consequences of Immigration, ed. Francine D. Blau and Christopher Mackie, National Academies Press, 2017, p. 189.
140 For a summary of this argument, see Heidi Shierholz, “U.S. labor shortage? Unlikely. Here’s why,” Economic Policy
Institute, May 4, 2021. Other studies find mixed evidence. See for example, Yi Xue and Richard C. Larson, “STEM crisis
or STEM surplus? Yes and yes,” Monthly Labor Review, BLS, May 2015. This extensive review finds that the STEM
labor market is heterogeneous, with no shortage of STEM labor in academic settings, and high demand for STEM
workers in some private settings.
141 See, for example, Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, “The H-1B visa program remains the “outsourcing visa”,” Economic
Policy Institute, March 31, 2021; Kirk Doran, Alexander Gleber, and Adam Isen, “The Effects of High-Skilled
Immigration Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2020; John
Bound, Gaurav Khanna, and Nicolas Morales, “Understanding the Economic Impact of the H-1B Program on the U.S.,”
National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2017; and Testimony of Ronil Hira, Associate Professor of Public
Policy, Howard University, U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest, The Impact of
High-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Workers, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 25, 2016.
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that labor market competition in such fields has discouraged native-born workers from pursuing
careers in these occupations.142
A broader argument for not increasing employment-based immigration is that it also fosters what
some refer to as “chain migration,” a label applied to the family-based INA provisions allowing
U.S. citizens and LPRs to sponsor certain family members for green cards.143 While employment-
based immigrants are selected for their skills and ability to advance the interests of their U.S.
employers, any family members they sponsor subsequently through the INA’s family-based
provisions may not possess comparable labor market skills.144
Adjusting Employment-Based Immigration as Needed
Some have criticized the current employment-based immigration system for its lack of
responsiveness to economic conditions. One proposed solution would include automatic
adjustments to annual immigration levels based on current economic indicators.145 An example of
this approach can be found in a comprehensive immigration reform bill introduced in the 113th
Congress (S. 744, discussed in the “Reform Proposals” section below). The bill contained
provisions that would have allowed the number of newly created merit-based immigrants to
fluctuate based on the national unemployment rate and the prior year’s demand for such immigrant
visas.146
Another proposal would adjust immigration levels based on recommendations from Congress or an
independent entity.147 An example of this approach can be found in the Jordan Commission report
(also discussed below) which recommended that Congress regularly reevaluate annual admission

142 See, for example, Tyler Ransom and John V. Winters, “Do Foreigners Crowd Natives out of STEM Degrees and
Occupations? Evidence from the US Immigration Act of 1990,” ILR Review, vol. 74 (2021), pp. 321-351; M. Demirci,
“International students and labor market outcomes of US natives,” SSRN, 3371469, 2019; Massimo Anelli, Kevin Shih,
and Kevin Williams, “Foreign Peer Effects and STEM Major Choice,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6466, 2017; and
George J. Borjas, “Do Foreign Students Crowd Out Native Students from Graduate Programs?” Working Paper 10349,
NBER, 2004.
143 These categories include spouses, minor and adult children, parents, and siblings for U.S. citizens; and spouses and
minor and adult unmarried children for LPRs. See CRS Report R43145, U.S. Family-Based Immigration Policy. Recent
estimates of the number of additional immigrants who arrive in the United States as the result of granting one person a
green card range from about 3.5 to 6.5. See Marta Tienda, “Multiplying Diversity: Family Unification and the Regional
Origins of Late-Age US Immigrants,” International Migration Review, vol. 51 (2017), pp. 727-756; and Jessica Vaughan,
Immigration Multipliers: Trends in Chain Migration, Center for Immigration Studies, September 2017.
144 Few studies have compared the skills of employment-based immigrants with family members they sponsor. Data
limitations hinder such analyses; neither USCIS nor DOS publish statistics on the education levels or occupations of
family-based immigrants broken out by sponsoring LPR category. Other studies indicate that educated immigrants are
likely to have similarly educated spouses. See, for example, Kira Olsen-Medina and Jeanne Batalova, “College-Educated
Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, September 16, 2020.
145 See, for example, Daniel Griswold, “Chapter 1: Automatic Adjustment of the H-1B Visas and Employment-Based
Green Card Caps,” in Alex Nowrasteh and David J. Bier (eds.) 12 New Immigration Ideas for the 21st Century, Cato
Institute, 2020.
146 S. 744, Section 2301. For more information, see archived CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in
the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744.
147 See, for example, Joanna Howe, “Does Australia Need an Expert Commission to Assist with Managing Its Labour
Migration Program?” Australian Journal of Labour Law, vol. 27(2014), pp. 1-25; and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Doris
Meissner, Marc R. Rosenblum and Madeleine Sumption, Harnessing the Advantages of Immigration for a 21st-Century
Economy: A Standing Commission on Labor Markets, Economic Competitiveness, and Migration, Migration Policy
Institute, May 2009.
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numbers and categories to ensure immigration policies met the nation’s economic needs and
immigrant absorptive capacity.148
Some in Congress and elsewhere are skeptical that an independent entity charged with evaluating
current economic conditions could replace political negotiation and function as well as employers
whose hiring decisions, according to some, is the best mechanism for meeting labor market
requirements.149 Canada, for example, has introduced a point system with mechanisms allowing
officials to adjust immigration targets to meet the country’s economic demands. Challenges with
this system include public disengagement (because the topic of economic immigration is no longer
controlled through legislation), and difficulties assessing applicants’ full range of skills and talents
beyond those measured by the program’s eligibility criteria.150
Automatic LPR Status for STEM Workers
STEM fields of study are considered essential for addressing complex technical and economic
challenges.151 The United States has long been a desirable destination for international students, and
many such students pursue degrees in STEM fields.152 In 2016, for example, foreign nationals
comprised 71% of full-time graduate students in electrical engineering and 77% of those in
computer science.153 Foreign students are attracted to U.S. institutions of higher education for their
quality of education and research as well as the prestige conferred by a U.S. degree. American
colleges and universities, in turn, strive to attract top international students, who often fulfill critical
roles in higher education by teaching and assisting with research. Foreign students, who typically
do not qualify for many forms of college financial aid, are more likely than U.S. students to pay full
tuition, thereby providing U.S. institutions with a key source of financial support.154
Because foreign students who complete graduate education in STEM and other fields in the United
States have few options to apply for LPR status, many return to their home countries.155 Some argue
that the United States should try to retain STEM-trained foreign students after graduation by
offering more options for foreign students to obtain LPR status, citing the potential benefits to the

148 See U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American – Immigration and Immigrant Policy,
Washington, DC, 1997, p. 62.
149 For more on the challenges of immigration commissions, see Philip L. Martin and Eugen Stark, “Editorial: Expert
commissions and migration policy making,” Migration Letters, vol. 11 (2014), pp. 1-10; and Philip Martin and Martin
Ruhs, “Labor Shortages and U.S. Immigration Reform: Promises and Perils of an Independent Commission,”
International Migration Review, vol. 45 (2011), pp. 174-187.
150 For more information, see Daniel Hiebert, The Canadian Express Entry System for Selecting Economic Immigrants:
Progress and Persistent Challenges, Migration Policy Institute, April 2019.
151 See, for example, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal STEM Education Strategic Plan, December 2020.
152 Of the 1,075,496 foreign students enrolled in U.S. institutions of higher learning, 52% were studying STEM
disciplines in the 2019/2020 academic year. Of the 123,508 international scholars (defined as scholars on nonimmigrant
visas engaged in temporary academic activities and not enrolled as U.S. students) in the United States in the same
academic year, 77.5% specialized in STEM disciplines. Institute of International Education, Open Doors Report on
International Educational Exchange 2020.
153 See, for example, Stuart Anderson, Setting the Record Straight on High-Skilled Immigration, National Foundation for
American Policy, August 2016.
154 See CRS In Focus IF11347, Foreign STEM Students in the United States. Foreign students made up 12% of the total
student population in 2015 but contributed nearly 30% of total tuition revenue at public universities in that year. See
Education Data Initiative, “College Enrollment & Student Demographic Statistics,” August 7, 2021.
155 For more information, see Xueying Han and Richard P. Appelbaum, Will They Stay or Will They Go: International
STEM Students Are Up for Grabs, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, July 2016.
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U.S. economy and the investments in their education made by U.S. institutions.156 Others argue that
giving foreign students with STEM training greater access to the U.S. labor market would displace
domestic students entering the labor force and may discourage U.S. students from going into certain
in-demand fields.157
Other Options for Revising the Current Employment-Based System
Some argue that the current employment-based immigration system fails to procure the “best and
brightest” workers from around the world.158 They often cite the disproportionate number of EB
immigrants employed in conventional IT occupations that require no more than a bachelor’s
degree.159 One approach to revising the current EB system involves increasing immigrant
selectivity. This could take several forms; one of these would be making the eligibility criteria more
selective for the employment-based categories, as well as for dual-intent nonimmigrant visas like
the H-1B.
Others point out that the INA imposes the same annual numerical limit of 40,040 individuals on the
EB1 preference category—persons with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and
researchers, and multinational executives—as it does on the EB3 preference category—skilled
shortage workers with at least two years training or experience. Some have proposed redistributing
the number of green cards within the EB1, EB2, and EB3 categories to favor only the most skilled
subcategories of immigrants.160
Policy Options Beyond the Current Framework
Members of Congress have occasionally introduced legislation proposing large, systemic changes
to the employment-based immigration system.161 Recent prominent proposals include incorporating
points-based systems that would admit immigrants based on their possession of certain
advantageous characteristics and instituting place-based immigration programs that would allow
states and/or localities to petition for immigrants based on local labor market needs.
Points-Based Systems
Some describe the current U.S. employment-based immigration system as demand-driven because
private employers select immigrant workers. Although the INA’s five EB preference categories

156 See, for example, Ryan Heath, “Why Silicon Valley could become tomorrow’s Detroit,” Politico, December 18, 2020.
157 See, for example, Letter from Bill Hagerty, United States Senator, to Bernie Sanders, United States Senator, October
22, 2021, J. M. Rieger, “For years, Bernie Sanders warned that increased immigration would lower the wages of U.S.
workers. Now he barely mentions it.,” Washington Post, March 16, 2020.
158 See, for example, Norman Matloff, “Are foreign students the ‘best and brightest?” Briefing Paper 356, Economic
Policy Institute, February 28, 2013.
159 Testimony of Ronil Hira, Associate Professor, Howard University, U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on
Immigration and Citizenship, Oh Canada! How Outdated U.S. Immigration Policies Push Top Talent to Other Countries,
117th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2021.
160 See Testimony of Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies, U.S. Congress, House
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International
Law, Need for Green Cards for Highly Skilled Workers, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., June 12, 2008.
161 For an overview of some immigration selection options, see Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Meghan Benton, and Kate
Hooper, Equipping Immigrant Selection Systems for a Changing World of Work (Transatlantic Council Statement),
Migration Policy Institute, July 2019.
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mandate specific employment-related characteristics of prospective immigrants, and although DHS
and DOS must screen prospective immigrants for inadmissibility, employers decide which
immigrants to sponsor for LPR status.
In contrast, points-based systems grant LPR status to immigrants based upon attributes associated
with labor market benefits that extend beyond the needs of any specific sponsoring employer.162
Points-based systems typically assign scores to each attribute. Applicants who receive a minimum
total score (sometimes called a pass mark) or higher are then admitted as immigrants, subject to
whatever annual numerical limits may be established. Point systems may also rate prospective
immigrants on attributes associated with other desirable outcomes, such as English proficiency,
social integration (e.g., having a U.S. citizen relative), having a job offer from a U.S. employer, or
direct economic benefit (e.g., investment in a new commercial enterprise). Points-based systems
can also incorporate tiers with separate scoring schemes to attract distinct immigrant subgroups
(e.g., those in shortage occupations, STEM graduates, relatives of U.S. citizens, etc.). Some points-
based systems allow scores to be adjusted to respond to changes in labor demand or other
conditions (e.g., by changing the scores of different attributes). This feature converts a points-based
system into a hybrid system that maintains immigrant selection criteria while incorporating the
flexibility provided to employers of a demand-driven system.163
Points-based system proposals have been introduced in recent Congresses. Some would have
augmented existing systems of selecting immigrants (e.g., through family relationships, or on
diversity criteria). For example, S. 744 from the 113th Congress (discussed in the “Recent
Comprehensive Reform Proposals” section below) would have established two points-based
systems that would have also maintained some existing mechanisms for selecting immigrants.
Other proposed points-based systems, such as the RAISE Act (S. 1720 from the 115th Congress
(also discussed below)), would have entirely replaced the current employment-based system.
Proponents of points-based systems contend that the systems select immigrants based on their
contribution to the nation’s economic and labor market needs, which outweighs specific benefits to
individual employers or benefits of reunifying immigrants with U.S.-based relatives.164 Proponents
assert that such systems possess clearly defined and transparent selection criteria, and they point to
their current use in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand, among other countries.165 In

162 Points-based systems are sometimes referred to as merit-based immigration. This broad label also describes the current
U.S. employment-based system to some extent, because its eligibility criteria emphasize labor market attributes such as
educational attainment, work experience, and professional recognition (Table 1).
163 For examples of some proposed points-based system, see Stephen Yale Loehr and Mackenzie Eason, Recruiting for
the Future: A Realistic Road to a Points-Tested Visa Program in the United States, Cornell Law School, July 2020; and
Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Jacqueline Varas, Building a Pro-Growth Legal Immigration System, American Action Forum,
May 2019. For an alternative example of a points-based system, see Justin Gest, “Chapter 8: Immigration Moneyball,” in
in Alex Nowrasteh and David J. Bier (eds.) 12 New Immigration Ideas for the 21st Century, Cato Institute, 2020.
164 For two recent perspectives on points-based systems, see David J. Bier, “What Factors Should an Immigration Points
System Include,” Cato Institute, May 23, 2019; and Muzaffar Chishti and Jessica Bolter, “‘Merit-Based’ Immigration:
Trump Proposal Would Dramatically Revamp Immigrant Selection Criteria, But with Modest Effects on Numbers,”
Migration Policy Institute, May 30, 2019. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, An Examination of Point Systems as a
Method for Selecting Immigrants, hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., May 1, 2007; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Employment-Based Permanent Immigration: Examining the Value of a Skills
Based Point System, hearing, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., September 14, 2006.
165 For more information on the points-based systems of these and other countries, see Library of Congress, Law Library,
Points-Based and Family Immigration: Australia • Austria • Canada • Japan• South Korea New Zealand • United
Kingdom, File 2020-018552, January 2020.
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these countries, points-based systems supplement, rather than replace, other systems for selecting
immigrants, such as those based on family relationships.
Opponents of points-based systems contend that specific judgements of individual employers rather
a single arrangement overseen by a government entity best determine labor market needs.166 They
cite relatively high unemployment rates among immigrants admitted under a points-based system in
other countries as evidence to support demand-based systems or to use demand-based criteria (e.g.,
a job offer) for selecting immigrants.167 They contend that limiting EB immigrant selection to
points-based systems could harm industrial sectors not involved in technical production or
innovation that produce critical goods and services (e.g., agriculture, food processing, construction)
or that involve lower-skilled occupations.168 Some warn that, absent an annual limit, the number of
aspiring immigrants worldwide who could meet the criteria of proposed points-based systems
would overwhelm the U.S. labor market. Some point to recent modifications of points-based
systems as evidence that they may not work as intended.169
Other observers suggest that points-based systems may not work in the United States.170 They note
that countries where point-based systems currently operate, such as Canada and Australia, possess
parliamentary systems of government that allow relatively quick changes to immigration policy in
response to economic and labor market needs. They contend that unless the points-based system
were to incorporate mechanisms that automatically adjusted admissions, Congress would need to
pass legislation every time there was a need to change the number or types of immigrants admitted.
Place-Based Immigration Programs
The current employment-based immigration system operates largely at the federal level, with
decisions about who and how many immigrate determined for the entire nation. Some have
proposed place-based systems that would decentralize that process for a portion of foreign-born
workers. Such arrangements would assign admitted foreign nationals to live and work in specified
locations such as a state, metropolitan area, or county. With the federal government maintaining its
vetting and enforcement roles, these systems would allow states or municipalities to establish how
many foreign nationals to accept, the criteria for their selection, and the duration of their stay.171

166 The Jordan Commission (discussed below), for example, rejected the use of points-based systems, arguing for the
superiority of “the judgement of American families and employers within a framework that protects U.S. workers from
unfair competition.” See U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Legal Immigration Report to Congress, Legal
Immigration: Setting Priorities, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 5.
167 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper, Competing Approaches to Selecting Economic Immigrants: Points-
Based vs. Demand-Driven Systems, Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, 2019, p. 9.
168 For a discussion of which sectors are expected to grow and contract in the coming decade, see Kevin Dubina et al.,
“Projections overview and highlights, 2019–29,” Monthly Labor Review, BLS, September 2020.
169 “What’s the Point?,” The Economist, July 7, 2016.
170 Stuart Anderson, The Impact of a Point-Based Immigration System on Agriculture and Other Business Sectors,
National Foundation for American Policy and National Immigration Forum, August 2017.
171 For two placed-based approaches, see David J. Bier, “Chapter 5: State-Sponsored Visas,” and Jack Graham and
Rebekah Smith, “Chapter 6: The Community Visa: A Local Solution to America’s Immigration Deadlock,” in Alex
Nowrasteh and David J. Bier (eds.) 12 New Immigration Ideas for the 21st Century, Cato Institute, 2020. While the United
States does not currently operate place-based admissions programs, states are involved in two U.S. immigration programs:
the EB5 investor visa—that provides LPR status to foreign nationals who create jobs and invest in targeted areas—and the
“Conrad 30” J visa waiver program—that allows foreign physicians who receive U.S. medical training to remain in the
United States if they work in medically underserved areas. See CRS Report R44475, EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa and
CRS Report R47159, Temporary Professional Foreign Workers: Background, Trends, and Policy Issues.
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Like the current employment-based system, place-based approaches are demand driven. However,
instead of employers, state or local governments would petition for foreign workers based on the
industrial and occupational needs in their areas. Some place-based proposals would admit foreign
workers permanently, while others would provide temporary admission convertible to permanent
status if applicants met certain residence, investment, or employment criteria. Most proposed place-
based systems would supplement the federal immigration system, not replace it.172
Place-based proposals have been introduced in recent Congresses. S. 1040 in the 115th Congress
and the identical H.R. 5174 in the 116th Congress would have created a new nonimmigrant visa
category to admit foreign nationals to a state “to perform services, provide capital investment,
direct the operations of an enterprise, or otherwise contribute to the economic development agenda
of the state in a manner determined by the State.” Under this plan, states would have opted into the
system by creating a program—approved by their state legislatures and DHS—regulating
participants’ residence and employment and allowing changes of employers within the state or
(under an interstate compact) within a group of states.173
Place-based visa programs currently supplement federal immigration systems in Canada and
Australia. Canada’s Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) allows provinces and territories to set
criteria and nominate qualified foreign nationals who are then admitted to settle permanently in that
province or territory.174 Begun in 1998, the PNP accounted for a quarter of Canada’s economic
immigration by 2015 and has dispersed economic immigrants outside their historic concentrations
in Ontario, British Colombia, and Quebec.175 Australia began regional migration measures in 1995
to encourage immigrants to settle outside of Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane.176 In 2015, state-
based visas made up 19% of skilled immigration to Australia.177
In the United States, some proponents of place-based approaches tout them as a means of re-
invigorating places experiencing population loss and economic decline.178 One such proposal—
dubbed the Heartland Visa—focuses on the Rust Belt and other parts of the United States
undergoing above-average population aging and/or prime working-age population loss.179

172 See, for example, Michele Waslin, Immigration at the State Level: An Examination of Proposed State-Based Visa
Programs in the U.S., Bipartisan Policy Center, May 2020; and Brandon Fuller and Sean Rust, State-based Visas: A
Federalist Approach to Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy, Cato Institute, April 23, 2014.
173 The bills would have required that states keep DHS informed of participants’ employment and addresses and any
failures to comply with the program. Participants initially would have been admitted for renewable terms of up to three
years. Participating states would have been allocated at least 5,000 nonimmigrant visas per year, with the maximum
allocation based on state population, national GDP growth, and the state’s program compliance. While participants could
have applied for permanent status if they qualified under existing mechanisms, these bills would not have created a
pathway to permanent status.
174 Government of Canada, “How the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) works,” https://www.canada.ca/en/
immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/provincial-nominees/works.html.
175 While PNP participants are free to move to another province as soon as they arrive, the latest government evaluation of
the program found high retention rates in the provinces of initial settlement. See Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship
Canada, Evaluation of the Provincial Nominee Program, November 2017.
176 M. Chand and R.L. Tung, “Skilled immigration to fill talent gaps: A comparison of the immigration policies of the
United States, Canada, and Australia,” Journal of International Business Policy, vol. 2 (2019), pp. 333–355; and
Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs, “Designated Regional Areas,” March 2020.
177 Ibid.
178 Rick Su, “Immigration as Urban Policy.” Fordham Urban Law Journal, vol. 38 (2010), pp. 363–391; Matt Bevilacqua,
“A Few Americans Who Want to See Place-Based Immigration,” NextCity, March 25, 2013; Steve Tobocman,
Revitalizing Detroit: Is There a Role for Immigration?, Migration Policy Institute, August 2014; and Great Lakes Metro
Chamber Coalition, Supporting Place-Based Immigration in the Great Lakes Region, August 2019.
179 Adam Ozimek, Kenan Fikri, and John Lettieri, From Managing Decline to Building the Future: Could a Heartland
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Supporters contend that many potential immigrants would agree to live in specified locations in
exchange for the opportunity to work in the United States and that many places would benefit from
immigrants’ dispersion away from traditional urban destinations.180
Opponents of place-based approaches argue that admitting more foreign workers could depress
wages for U.S. workers, and that places struggling with population loss and economic decline
should focus on raising wages, improving benefits, and increasing training to keep or attract
workers.181 Opponents also argue that a place-based approach would be susceptible to corruption,
citing scandals associated with the EB5 investor visa, an immigration program with a regional
component.182 Some argue that place-based approaches increase the risk for abuse of foreign
workers, particularly if some type of indemnity agreement (e.g., a bond) is involved, essentially
making the workers “indentured servants.”183 Opponents also question whether and how states
could force visa recipients to remain in specific locations. If many such workers moved to more
economically vibrant parts of the country, the purported benefits of a place-based approach would
diminish.184
Reform Proposals
Major reforms or proposed reforms to the employment-based immigration system in past decades
have usually occurred within a comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) framework. CIR is a label
that typically refers to omnibus legislation encompassing major immigration policy areas such as
border security, immigration enforcement, employment eligibility verification, and legal temporary
and permanent immigration, among others. CIR proposals also have included provisions to legalize
some or all of the millions of unauthorized aliens currently residing in the United States. The
following section summarizes a prominent CIR framework and several relatively recent CIR
proposals.
The Jordan Commission
To facilitate reforming the U.S. immigration system, Congress has sometimes convened federal
commissions to evaluate major proposed reforms.185 The most recent was the U.S. Commission on

Visa Help Struggling Regions, Economic Innovation Group, April 2019.
180 See Testimony of John Lettieri, President and Chief Executive Officer Economic Innovation Group, U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax, and Capital Access, Small Business
Economy: Opportunity Zones, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 17, 2019; and Brandon Fuller and Sean Rust, State-
based Visas: A Federalist Approach to Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy, Cato Institute, April 23, 2014.
181 Dan Cadman, State-Based Visas: Unwise, Unworkable, and Constitutionally Dubious, Center for Immigration Studies,
May 9, 2017; David D. Haynes, “Are foreign workers the answer to Wisconsin losing people in their prime working
years? Laboring for labor,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 26, 2019.
182 Dan Cadman, State-Based Visas: Unwise, Unworkable, and Constitutionally Dubious, Center for Immigration Studies,
May 9, 2017. For information on the EB5 investor visa, see CRS Report R44475, EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa.
183 Dan Cadman, State-Based Visas: Unwise, Unworkable, and Constitutionally Dubious, Center for Immigration Studies,
May 9, 2017.
184 Ibid.
185 In 1907, Congress and President Roosevelt established the United States Immigration Commission headed by Senator
William Dillingham which, in 1911, released the 41-volume Reports of the Immigration Commission
(https://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=96158&p=625946). Policy organizations have also issued extensive
recommendations for revising U.S. immigration policy. See, for example, Doris Meissner et al., Immigration and
America’s Future: A New Chapter, Migration Policy Institute, September 2006; Jeb Bush, Thomas F. McLarty III, and
Edward Alden, U.S. Immigration Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 63, New
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Immigration Reform established by the Immigration Act of 1990 and chaired for several years by
former Representative Barbara Jordan (hence, the Jordan Commission).186 The Jordan Commission
relied heavily on the findings of its predecessor, the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy (the Hesburgh Commission), which recommended extensive changes to the entire
immigration system.187 In the same year (1997) that the Jordan Commission concluded, the
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences published a landmark
empirical study of immigration’s impact on the nation.188
The Jordan Commission considered all forms of permanent immigration.189 Regarding
employment-based immigration, it recommended reducing the annual numerical limit from 140,000
to 100,000 and eliminating the existing 10,000 allocation to other (lesser skilled) immigrants within
the third preference category. The commission based this recommendation on the findings of the
1997 NRC report showing that less educated immigrants were likely to compete for jobs with less
educated American workers and more established immigrants. Less educated immigrants were also
found to be likely to consume more in public services than their lifetime tax contributions. The
reasoning for emphasizing higher-skilled employment-based immigration also stemmed from an
anticipated beneficial multiplier effect, whereby immigrants with relatively high levels of education
submit petitions for their similarly educated spouses and children.190 The commission also
recommended that the “lengthy, costly, and ineffectual labor certification system” be replaced by
one relying on “market forces” (e.g., using industry-standard recruitment procedures, paying
prevailing wages, complying with labor standards).191 Congress did not enact key employment-
based recommendations of the Jordan Commission, but they have appeared in subsequent
legislative proposals, including those of recent Congresses discussed below.192

York, NY, 2009; and David Inserra, Legal Immigration and the U.S. Economy: How Congress should Reform the System,
The Heritage Foundation, January 30, 2018.
186 Barbara Jordan served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1973 to 1979. See U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy, Washington, DC, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as
the “Jordan Report”).
187 U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Final Report: U.S. Immigration Policy and the National
Interest, Washington, DC, March 1, 1981. Theodore Hesburgh served as President of the University of Notre Dame from
1952 to 1987 and Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights from 1969 to 1972. Recommendations of the Hesburgh
Commission undergirded the seminal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). See Muzaffar Chishti, Doris
Meissner, Claire Bergeron, “At Its 25th Anniversary, IRCA’s Legacy Lives On,” Migration Policy Institute, November 16,
2011.
188 National Research Council, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, ed.
James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997).
189 Jordan Report, pp. 67-69.
190 See, for example, Kira Olsen-Medina and Jeanne Batalova, College Educated Immigrants in the United States,
Migration Policy Institute, September 16, 2020, Figure 4.
191 Jordan Report, p. 69. Some have criticized the labor certification process for being ineffectual and susceptible to fraud.
See David North, “DoL IG’s Report Is a Devastating Critique of Foreign Worker Programs,” Center for Immigration
Studies, November 23, 2020; and U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Overview of Vulnerabilities and
Challenges in Foreign Labor Certification Programs, November 13, 2020.
192 Some who support more restrictive immigration policies have cited key findings from the Jordan Report. Others have
disputed this characterization. For two different perspectives, see David North, “Revisiting the Jordan Commission
Report,” Center for Immigration Studies, February 11, 2013; and Susan Martin, “Trump’s Misuse of Barbara Jordan’s
Legacy on Immigration,” Center for Migration Studies, February 5, 2018.
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Recent Comprehensive Reform Proposals
During the past two decades, certain major comprehensive immigration reform bills introduced in
Congress would have substantially restructured employment-based immigration. In the 109th
Congress, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611) passed the Senate but was
not considered in the House.193 In the 110th Congress, a CIR bill (S. 1639) was considered in the
Senate but failed to get cloture.194 In the 113th Congress, the Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744) passed the Senate but was not considered
in the House. The employment-based provisions of these three proposals are discussed below.
S. 2611 from the 109th Congress (2006)
S. 2611 was the first major CIR bill of the 109th and 110th Congresses that included provisions
revising permanent immigration. Among other provisions, S. 2611 would have increased
employment-based immigration in several ways: by increasing the annual numerical limit from
140,000 to 450,000 for ten years (FY2007-FY2016) and reducing it to 290,000 thereafter; by
excluding derivative family members from the employment-based limit; and by recapturing unused
family-based visa numbers from FY2001-FY2005. An amendment passed in the Senate would have
capped total employment-based immigration from all these provisions at 650,000 annually between
FY2007-FY2016.
S. 2611 would have also reallocated visa numbers among employment-based immigrant categories:
from 28.6% to 15% for EB1 and EB2; from 28.6% to 65% for EB3; from 7.1% to unlimited for
EB4; and from 7.1% to 5% for EB5. The bill would have exempted from numerical limits for ten
years employment-based immigrants working in DOL-designated shortage occupations,195 as well
as their spouses and children.196
S. 1639 from the 110th Congress (2007)
S. 1639 from the 110th Congress, like S. 2611 from the 109th Congress, contained provisions that
would have affected all major facets of immigration policy including permanent employment-based
immigration.197 The bill would have overhauled employment-based immigration by replacing the
first three preference categories with a multi-tiered points-based system based on employment

193 The 109th Congress also considered the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005
(H.R. 4437) which was passed by the House but not considered by the Senate. H.R. 4437 was largely oriented toward
immigration enforcement. It did not contain provisions altering employment- or family-based immigration levels, but
would have eliminated the diversity immigrant visa. Lawmakers failed to form a conference committee, and House-
passed H.R. 4437 and Senate-passed S. 2611 expired with the end of the 109th Congress.
194 The title of S. 1639 was “A bill to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes.” Several of
these bills emerged from prior bills introduced in Congress. For example, S. 2611 was a compromise bill that was
introduced after the Senate failed to invoke cloture on its predecessor, S. 2454, the Securing America’s Borders Act. For
historical background on these bills, see archived CRS Report R42980, Brief History of Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Efforts in the 109th and 110th Congresses to Inform Policy Discussions in the 113th Congress.
195 Such shortage occupations are commonly referred to as Schedule A because of the subsection of the code, 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a)(5)(A), from which DOL’s authority derives. Schedule A currently lists nurses and physical therapists, as well as
some persons deemed of exceptional ability in the sciences or arts. See 20 C.F.R. §656.5(a).
196 In addition, aliens who had worked in the United States for three years and had earned an advanced degree in a STEM
field would have been exempt from numerical limits, as would have certain widows and orphans who met specified risk
factors. The bill would have also reduced the annual number of diversity immigrant visas from 55,000 to 18,333.
197 For more background information, see archived CRS Report R42980, Brief History of Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Efforts in the 109th and 110th Congresses to Inform Policy Discussions in the 113th Congress.
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characteristics (occupation, employer endorsement, work experience), age, educational attainment,
English proficiency, U.S. civics knowledge, and family relationships with U.S. citizens. U.S.
employer sponsorship would not have been required, but points would have been awarded for a
U.S. job offer. The bill would have eliminated the labor certification process required for EB2 and
EB3 immigrants; the EB4 and EB5 categories would have remained unchanged.
S. 744 from the 113th Congress (2013)
S. 744, a comprehensive immigration bill from the 113th Congress, would have substantially revised
legal permanent immigration provisions.198 It would have expanded the number of employment-
based immigrants admitted each year by exempting from numerical limits:
 persons qualifying for the EB1 category;
 persons who earned a doctorate from a U.S. institution of higher education or the
foreign equivalent;
 physicians who met foreign residence requirements under INA Section 212(e);199
 persons who earned a graduate degree in a STEM field from a U.S. institution
within five years of petitioning for LPR status and who have a U.S. offer of
employment in the related field; and
 derivative beneficiaries of employment-based immigrants.
S. 744 would have also substantially altered the EB preference categories. It would have expanded
the EB1 category to include advanced professional degree holders with a U.S. job offer,200
physicians accepted to a U.S. residency or fellowship program, and prospective employees of
national security facilities. Under S. 744, the revised EB2 category would continue to consist of
advanced degree holders, but its visa allotment would increase from 28.6% to 40% of the 140,000
total EB limit. The bill would have exempted from this new EB2 numerical limit foreign nationals
with an advanced degree in a STEM field if they had a job offer and met other requirements. The
bill would also have exempted their petitioning employers from obtaining labor certification
required under INA Section 212(a)(5). S. 744 would have increased the EB3 category limit from
28.6% to 40% of the worldwide level and would have repealed the limit of 10,000 on “unskilled”
workers within that 40%. It would have increased both the EB4 and EB5 category limits from 7.1%
to 10%.
Also relevant to employment-based immigration, S. 744 would have established two major systems
that it referred to as merit-based. The first would have provided for the admission of 120,000 to
250,000 LPRs annually, depending on the previous year’s visa demand and average unemployment
rate. During the first three years following enactment, visas would have been made available to

198 For more information, see archived CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress:
Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744.
199 INA Section 212(e) applies to J (exchange visitor) visa holders who either are sponsored by the U.S. government or a
foreign government; entered the United States to obtain graduate medical education or training; or are nationals of a
country that has deemed their fields of specialized knowledge or skill necessary to the development of the country. It
requires that such J visa holders reside in their home countries for at least two years following their U.S. departure before
they can be eligible to apply for LPR status or an H or L visa. For more information, see https://travel.state.gov/content/
travel/en/us-visas/study/exchange.html.
200 The requirement for a U.S. job offer could be waived. Under INA Section 203(b)(2)(B) certain foreign nationals with
advanced degrees or exceptional ability may apply for LPR status without an employer sponsor or the PERM labor
certification process if such employment is determined to be in the national interest. For more information, see USCIS,
“Employment-Based Immigration: Second Preference EB-2.”
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foreign nationals who met existing criteria for the EB3 category. After the first three years, half of
these visas would have been allocated based on characteristics such as educational attainment, job
skills, and employment in certain fields, and the other half to workers in high-demand occupations
that required less formal preparation. For both sets of workers, the points-based system would have
prioritized younger working ages, English proficiency, U.S. familial relationships, origin country
diversity, and civic engagement, among other characteristics.
The second system would have emphasized family-based and employment-based immigrant
backlog reduction. Among other provisions, it would have eliminated the existing employment-
based backlog by providing immigrant visas over seven years—according to immigrant petition
filing date—to prospective immigrants waiting for at least five years in the queue. S. 744 would
have also eliminated the per-country ceiling for employment-based immigrants and recaptured
unused immigrant visas from past years.201
Other Recent Reform Proposals
The legislation discussed below include bills that would have made or would make substantial
changes to employment-based immigration policy. Some include provisions affecting other parts of
the immigration system, but none are considered comprehensive immigration reform proposals
such as the bills discussed in the previous section above. This section does not review all related
legislation introduced in the past three Congresses. Bills presented below are intended to highlight
the range of employment-based-related proposals. Few of the bills discussed below were acted
upon.
Selected Employment-Based Legislation in the 115th Congress (2017-2019)
In the 115th Congress, The Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act (RAISE
Act, S. 1720) and The Securing America’s Future Act (SAFE Act, H.R. 4760) were two of the bills
introduced that would have substantially revised the employment-based system. S. 1720 would
have replaced the existing employment-based immigration system with a points-based system that
emphasized age, education, English proficiency, extraordinary achievement, a job offer, and an
intention to invest in a new U.S. commercial enterprise.202 Congress did not act on the bill. H.R.
4760 would have expanded employment-based immigration by eliminating the diversity immigrant
visa and allocating its 55,000 annual limit equally among the EB1, EB2, and EB3 categories.203 The
SAFE Act failed to pass the House by a vote of 193-231.

201 For more information on the number of potentially recapturable visa numbers, see CRS Congressional Distribution
Memorandum, Assessing Four Department of State Methods to Compute Recapturable Immigrant Visa Numbers,
September 8, 2021, available upon request to congressional clients.
202 For a comparison of S. 1720 with S. 744, see CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, The RAISE Act of the
115th Congress: Comparison with Current Law and with Provisions of S. 744 of the 113th Congress, with Appendix,
November 30, 2017, available upon request to congressional clients.
203 For a comparison of H.R. 4760 with S. 1720 and other prominent immigration reform bills and proposals, see CRS
Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Summary comparison of the Graham-Durbin immigration framework with the
White House immigration proposal, S. 744 from the 113th Congress and six immigration-related bills from the 115th
Congress, February 2, 2018, available upon request to congressional clients.
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Selected Employment-Based Legislation in the 116th Congress (2019-2021)
Three prominent employment-based immigration proposals were introduced during the 116th
Congress. All would have eliminated the 7% per-country ceiling, and two of the three would have
increased permanent immigration levels.
In July 2019, the House passed the Fairness for High Skilled Immigrants Act (H.R. 1044).204 The
bill would have eliminated the 7% per-country ceiling on employment-based immigration over a
three-year period (extended to a nine-year period in the Senate bill version) and maintained the
current level of employment-based immigration.205 The Senate considered its version of the bill (S.
386) and passed a substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 906). The House and Senate bills were not
reconciled in conference before the end of the 116th Congress.
The Resolving Extended Limbo for Immigrant Employees and Families Act (RELIEF Act, S. 2603)
also would have eliminated the 7% per-country ceiling for employment-based immigration. Unlike
H.R. 1044, it would have also expanded EB immigrant numbers in two significant ways. S. 2603
would have eliminated the visa queue for both employment-based and family-based immigrants by
issuing additional immigrant visas over five years. Congress did not act on the bill.
The Startup Act (S. 328), would have eliminated the 7% per-country ceiling for employment-based
immigration. The bill also would have increased the number of employment-based immigrants by
providing conditional LPR status to up to 50,000 student visa holders who had acquired advanced
degrees in STEM fields. As long as they were “actively engaged” in their fields for five years, DHS
would have automatically granted such individuals full LPR status.206 The bill also would have
provided conditional LPR status for up to 75,000 entrepreneurs. To acquire this conditional status,
the entrepreneurs would have been required to (1) invest at least $100,000 in at least one new
business, (2) employ at least two full-time employees unrelated to the entrepreneur in the first year,
and (3) employ at least five such employees in each of the following three years. If such conditions
were met after four years, DHS would have adjusted the conditional status of such individuals to
full LPR status. Congress did not act on the bill.
Selected Employment-Based Legislation in the 117th Congress (2021-present)
As of the date of this report, employment-based immigration proposals that have been introduced
during the 117th Congress include those that contain provisions that would recapture unused
immigrant visa numbers, eliminate the 7% per country ceiling, and increase the annual
employment-based immigration limit.
Several bills would recapture unused immigrant visas. For example, the Preserving Employment
Visas Act (H.R. 5498/S. 2828) would recapture employment-based visa numbers for FY2020 and
FY2021 that were unused due to USCIS processing delays. The Healthcare Workforce Resilience

204 The Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act was first introduced in the 112th Congress. In July 2019, H.R. 1044
passed in the House by a vote of 365-65. In September 2019, Senator Mike Lee proposed a substitute amendment to a
similar bill introduced in the Senate (S. 386) that would have modified the House-passed version, but it did not pass a
unanimous consent vote. It has been reintroduced repeatedly, most recently as the EAGLE Act (H.R. 3648) in the 117th
Congress. For more information on the bill version introduced in the 116th Congress, see CRS Report R46291, The
Employment-Based Immigration Backlog.
205 For more information on this proposal and related debates, see CRS Report R46291, The Employment-Based
Immigration Backlog.
206 Actively engaged is defined in the bill as employed in a STEM occupation or teaching a college-level STEM course.
Such individuals seeking work in a STEM field would be granted conditional LPR status for up to one year following the
expiration of their student (F) visa, and persons actively engaged in their STEM field would be granted conditional LPR
status indefinitely.
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Act (H.R. 2255/S. 1024) would recapture 40,000 unused employment-based visa numbers from
FY1992-FY2020 for medical professionals. The Build Back Better Act (H.R. 5376), as passed by
the House on November 18, 2021, would have recaptured all employment-based and family-
sponsored preference immigrant visa numbers that remained unused from FY1992 to FY2021. It
also would have prevented future unused employment-based visa numbers from being effectively
lost after falling across to the family-based system, as described in the “Employment-Based
Immigration Processing” section above.
Like the Fairness for High Skilled Immigrants Act from earlier Congresses, the Equal Access to
Green cards for Legal Employment (EAGLE) Act of 2022 (H.R. 3648) would eliminate the 7% per-
country ceiling for EB immigrants over a nine-year transition period. The bill would also allow a
prospective immigrant in the EB queue and residing in the United States, whose immigrant petition
had been approved at least two years prior to enactment, to file to adjust status even if an EB
immigrant visa number were not immediately available. The act of filing to adjust status does not
provide LPR status; a prospective immigrant would still have to wait until an immigrant visa
number became available before actually adjusting to LPR status. However, filing an adjustment of
status application provides prospective immigrants with some of the significant benefits that they
would otherwise receive with LPR status while they wait for an immigrant visa number to become
available. These benefits include the ability to remain in the United States without a valid
nonimmigrant status, eligibility for advance parole,207 and eligibility for an employment
authorization document (EAD).208 The bill would thus address several major restrictions for foreign
nationals waiting in the queue (regardless of origin country) that detractors of the 7% ceiling have
argued are burdensome, including the inability to change employers or to travel abroad. On April 6,
2022, the EAGLE Act was ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee.209
The Backlog Elimination, Legal Immigration, and Employment Visa Enhancement Act (BELIEVE
Act, S. 970) would also eliminate the 7% per-country ceiling for EB immigrants.210 In addition, it
would double the allotment for each employment-based preference category, except the EB4
category, thereby increasing the total annual EB limit from 140,000 to 270,000. It would exempt
derivative family members from the limit, which, combined with the first increase to the total
annual EB limit, would effectively quadruple annual EB immigration. In addition, it would exempt
Schedule A nurses and physical therapists from the employment-based limit.211 The bill would also
exempt from numerical limits children of nonimmigrant workers with E, H, and L visas if such
children had resided in the United States for at least a decade and were college graduates. For the
children and spouses of the same nonimmigrants, the bill would grant work authorization. Finally,

207 Advance parole allows a foreign national in the United States to travel abroad without having to obtain a visa in order
to return to the United States. Advance parole, however, does not ensure U.S. entry upon arrival. Entry is granted at the
discretion of the inspecting immigration officer at the port of entry. For more information, see CRS Report R46570,
Immigration Parole.
208 The EAD, or work permit, could be used with any U.S. employer and is not limited to the original employer. This
eligibility also applies to the spouse and children of a principal immigrant who files to adjust status. For more
information, see USCIS “Employment Authorization Document.”
209 The EAGLE Act also contains set aside provisions that would reserve 8,800 EB3 visa numbers for immigrants
working in Schedule A occupations (see footnote 211) and their accompanying family members. It would also reserve
5.75% of EB2 and EB3 visa numbers not otherwise reserved for backlogged immigrants residing abroad who are not from
India and China.
210 The BELIEVE Act was also introduced in the 116th Congress as S. 2091.
211 Professions are included in the DOL’s Schedule A (Group 1) list of shortage occupations when DOL determines that
labor demand is sufficiently high that hiring non-U.S. workers would not adversely affect wages. 20 C.F.R. §656.5(a).
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the bill would permit foreign nationals residing in the United States with approved immigrant
petitions to file to adjust status, providing them with the benefits described above for H.R. 3648.
Concluding Observations
Congress last substantially revised the employment-based immigration system in 1990. Since then,
roughly twice as many prospective immigrants have been seeking EB green cards each year as are
statutorily allotted. While the most highly skilled EB1 immigrants have relatively short waiting
times to receive a green card, EB2 and EB3 skilled workers—particularly those from India and
China—can wait decades. An estimated 870,000 prospective EB immigrants were waiting in the EB
queue in September 2021. This figure is lower than in prior years.212 The COVID-19 pandemic
interrupted what were otherwise consistent trends. Assuming employment-based immigration levels
revert to pre-COVID levels, the queue can be expected to increase again. Firms and employers have
been responding to the lengthy queue of prospective employment-based immigrants by increasingly
relying on the major nonimmigrant categories that permit U.S. employment.
Some immigration observers continue to argue for increased employment-based immigration, with
or without reductions in other types of permanent immigration.213 To support this argument, they
cite the increased size of the U.S. economy since 1990, recent demographic trends highlighting the
critical role of the foreign born for U.S. population and labor force growth, consistent high demand
for technologically trained workers, the lengthy employment-based immigrant queue, and the
expanding use of nonimmigrant workers.
Opponents of expanding employment-based immigration emphasize the need to protect
employment opportunities for U.S. workers of all skill levels, particularly during economic
downturns. Some Members of Congress have repeatedly indicated their willingness to consider
such reforms only when combined with improvements in Southwest border security and control of
unauthorized immigration.
Much of the legislative debate on employment-based immigration centers on college-educated
workers. However, projected U.S. labor market growth highlights jobs that require relatively little
formal education.214 Current immigration laws include few avenues for such workers to immigrate
permanently or temporarily.215 This is particularly relevant for industrial sectors that have difficulty
recruiting native-born workers under current wages and working conditions, such as agriculture,
meat processing, food services, health care, and childcare. While automation and technology has
reduced labor demand for some jobs, others continue to be characterized by relatively high
proportions of foreign-born workers.216 Some argue that U.S. employers’ inability to fill positions

212 As of April 20, 2020, for example, USCIS reported 592,322 approved pending petitions for prospective principal EB
immigrants, which, when combined with 598,480 estimated prospective derivative immigrants, yields a total estimated
backlog of 1,190,802. This represents the largest EB backlog reported by USCIS since it began publishing such statistics
in 2018. See USCIS, Forms I-140, I-360, I-526 Approved Employment-Based Petitions Awaiting Visa Availability by
Preference Category and Country of Birth as of April 20, 2020.
213 See, for example, Dan Berger et al., Unleashing international entrepreneurs to help the U.S. economy recover from the
pandemic, Brookings Institution, May 20, 2021.
214 For example, among the 30 occupations with the highest projected growth between 2020 and 2030, three occupations
(home health care and personal aides; restaurant cooks; and bartenders) had the highest employment levels in 2020,
representing 52% of all employed workers among those 30 categories. See BLS, “Employment Projections, Fastest
growing occupations,” https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/fastest-growing-occupations.htm, September 8, 2021.
215 For more information, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and
Citizenship, Why Don't They Just Get in Line?’ Barriers to Legal Immigration, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2021.
216 For a discussion of immigrants’ future prospects in the U.S. labor market, see Julia Gelatt, Jeanne Batalova, and Randy
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requiring less formal education through immigration pathways has fostered a sizable unauthorized
workforce.217
Others refute these arguments, pointing to high unemployment rates among less advantaged native-
born workers—particularly racial and ethnic minorities and rural-based workers.218 They consider
tight labor markets and limited access to foreign workers essential for addressing labor market
discrimination and benefiting the most disadvantaged U.S. workers. They also point out that who
actually benefits from immigration depends on both the selection criteria and labor market impacts
of such immigrants. They support maintaining current limits on lower-skilled permanent
immigrants and more strictly enforcing laws and policies intended to prevent native-worker
displacement.219
More fundamentally, some question the extent to which the employment-based system fulfills its
objective of attracting “the best and the brightest” to the United States. They contend that the
pronounced use of H-1B and other nonimmigrant visas by foreign-based outsourcing firms
demonstrates that part of the current employment-based immigration system (permanent and
temporary) may not be serving the national interest as intended by Congress. At a broader level,
some observers have drawn a distinction between two broad conceptual frameworks for admitting
foreign workers: an assimilation model and a guest model.220 Under the former, immigrant workers
who are admissible and eligible for LPR status acquire it relatively promptly, are encouraged to
naturalize, and become integrated as civic participants.221 Under the latter, seen in countries with
restricted citizenship, temporary workers have a narrow or nonexistent path to citizenship in the
host country. Within the U.S. immigration system, these two models might be analogous to the
experience, respectively, of family-based immediate relatives who face no statutory limit-based
waiting times, versus prospective employment-based immigrants who reside and work in the United
States and who may wait for decades in the backlog with limited employment mobility and other
restrictions.
Against this backdrop of competing arguments and concerns, policymakers have introduced
legislative proposals to revise employment-based immigration in a variety of ways. Proposals have
ranged from making relatively limited changes to the current system to overhauling substantial
portions of immigration policy. Among the former, bills such as the EAGLE Act would eliminate

Capps, Navigating the Future of Work: The Role of Immigrant-Origin Workers in the Changing U.S. Economy, Migration
Policy Institute, October 2020.
217 The agricultural sector represents one example where legislative proposals have been repeatedly introduced in
Congress to grant LPR status to workers beyond current INA limits. Reasons include a sizable unauthorized workforce
and concerns over maintaining a relatively stable and secure domestically produced food supply. Most recently, the Farm
Workforce Modernization Act of 2021 (H.R. 1603) would allow temporary agricultural workers to apply for LPR status
after an extended period of agricultural employment.
218 See, for example, Rachel Rosenthal, “Biden is Caught Between Big Tech and Black Voters,” Bloomberg, May 29,
2022.
219 See, for example, Mark Krikorian and Roy Beck, “Immigration’s Impact on Black Americans: A 200-Year
Chronology,” Parsing Immigration Policy, Episode 31, December 2, 2021.
220 For a more thorough and nuanced treatment of these frameworks, see Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Bean,
“Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a Long-Term Process,” Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2006; and
Slobodan Djanjić, “Some Essentials of a Workable Guest-Worker Program,” International Economic Review, vol. 54
(2013), pp. 739-766.
221 One form of integration for U.S. immigrants involves converting educational and occupational attainment acquired in
foreign countries to licensing and certification credentials in the United States. Such practices can effectively serve as an
alternative to skilled worker migration by elevating the occupation levels of immigrants already residing in the United
States. For more information, see Jeanne Batalova and Michael Fix, Leaving Money on the Table: The Persistence of
Brain Waste among College-Educated Immigrants, Migration Policy Institute, June 2021.
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the per-country ceiling on individual countries—thereby reallocating who receives employment-
based green cards—but would maintain the number of employment-based immigrants receiving
LPR status each year. Some proposals not discussed above would increase immigration only for
targeted populations whose qualifications are broadly considered beneficial to the United States.222
Proposals with a broader scope would increase employment-based immigration by raising the
annual limit or excluding accompanying family members from it. Other proposals would eliminate
existing immigrant categories and reallocate their annual limits to employment-based
immigration.223 While the former approach would increase employment-based immigration in
isolation, the latter approach would do so while reducing annual limits for, or eliminating, other
immigrant categories.

Author Information

William A. Kandel, Coordinator
Sarah A. Donovan
Analyst in Immigration Policy
Specialist in Labor Policy

Jill H. Wilson

Analyst in Immigration Policy

Acknowledgments
Sarah Caldwell, CRS Senior Research Librarian, provided research assistance for this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its
entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy
or otherwise use copyrighted material.

222 Examples include the Let Immigrants Kickstart Employment or LIKE Act (H.R. 4681) from the 117th Congress, which
would grant LPR status to certain immigrant entrepreneurs in the United States; and the National Security Innovation
Pathway Act (H.R. 7256) from the 116th Congress, which would have granted LPR status to scientists and technical
experts whose work served national security interests.
223 See, for example, Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Jacqueline Varas, Building a Pro-Growth Legal Immigration System,
American Action Forum, May 2019.
Congressional Research Service
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