China’s Political System in Charts: A Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress

November 24, 2021 R46977

China’s Political System in Charts: A Snapshot
November 24, 2021
Before the 20th Party Congress
Susan V. Lawrence
This report provides a visual representation of China’s leading political institutions and current
Specialist in Asian Affairs
leaders in the form of 16 CRS-created organization charts and accompanying explanatory text.

The charts present China’s political system as it emerged from the Communist Party of China’s
(CPC’s) 19th Congress in October 2017 and the First Session of the 13th National People’s

Congress in March 2018. The CPC is scheduled to convene its 20th Congress in the second half
of 2022. Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping is widely expected to seek to extend his time in power at that
congress, possibly by seeking a third term as general secretary. That would break a norm established by his two predecessors
that general secretaries serve two terms and then step down. Xi is also widely believed to be seeking appointment to a third
term as state president at the First Session of the 14th National People’s Congress in March 2023.
China’s polity is a Party-state, featuring interlocking Communist Party and state hierarchies under Xi’s increasingly
personalized leadership. In addition to serving concurrently as general secretary of the CPC’s Central Committee and State
president, Xi also serves as chairman of the CPC and State Central Military Commissions and as the “core” of the Central
Committee and the Party as a whole. Below him in the Party hierarchy are the Central Committee’s elite 7-man Political
Bureau (Politburo) Standing Committee, of which Xi is a member, and the Central Committee’s broader 25-person Politburo,
from which the Standing Committee is drawn.
The Central Committee’s 204 voting members elect the General Secretary, Politburo Standing Committee, and Politburo,
ratify the Party’s choices for members of the CPC’s Central Military Commission, and approve the Politburo Standing
Committee’s nominations for the Party Secretariat. A Party Secretariat oversees the powerful Party bureaucracy, which keeps
a tight grip on portfolios the Party deems critical to its survival. They include the armed forces, the security services, media
and culture, and personnel appointments across the political system. The Party tasks its Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection and the state’s National Supervisory Commission, whose operations are fused, with rooting out wrongdoing
among public servants and enforcing loyalty to the Party Central Committee and to Xi.
The CPC presents itself as “coordinating the work of all sides,” and assuming “the role of leadership core among all other
organizations at the corresponding level [of government].” Other hierarchies in China’s political system are those headed by
China’s unicameral legislature, the National People’s Congress; an administrative body, the State Council; an adjudicatory
body, the Supreme People’s Court; a prosecutorial body, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; and what China calls a
“political consultation” body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). At every level of
government, the heads of those bodies serve concurrently as senior Party officials at the same level. The Secretary of the
Party Committee for each level of government is the most senior official at that level. The Party also operates “leading Party
members groups” or Party committees within the other institutions, and requires the institutions to report to higher Party
bodies.
Since ascending to the top position in Chinese politics in 2012, Xi has worked to bolster both the Party’s authority and his
own. His 2018 reorganization of the Party and state bureaucracies served to strengthen the Party at the expense of the state.
Also in 2018, the Party under Xi ordered the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission, which works jointly
with the Party’s discipline inspectors to investigate public servants. In 2015, Xi reorganized China’s Party military, the
People’s Liberation Army. The organization charts in this report reflect those changes.
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Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 35

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China’s Political System in Charts: A Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress

Introduction
The political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) defies easy
categorization. China is both a nation state and a Leninist “Party-state,” with the Party being the
Communist Party of China (CPC or Party), also known as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The political system operates under two “constitutions,” one for the Party, China’s dominant
political institution, and one for the state.1 State institutions operate fundamental y differently
from their Western counterparts. In the case of China’s national parliament, for example, because
China eschews separation of powers, a third of the delegates are sitting senior Party and state
officials, with China’s top leader, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping, among them.2 The
parliament, like every other political institution in China, both reports to the Party and includes a
Party cel within it. Atop the political system is a leader, Xi, who is not subject to direct or
competitive indirect election, and who has signaled an intention to remain in power indefinitely.3
As strategic competition between the United States and China has grown more acute in recent
years, Congress has shown a strong interest in understanding China’s political system. In the
116th Congress, Members introduced 99 bil s referencing the CPC, six of which were enacted into
law.4 More than 100 such bil s are pending in the 117th Congress. This report seeks to provide
Congress with a detailed understanding of China’s political system ahead of the CPC’s 20th
National Congress, which is scheduled to convene in the second half of 2022. The report opens
with a discussion of how the CPC exercises its self-anointed leadership role in China’s Party-
state. The report then briefly discusses the ways the CPC has embedded its claim to Taiwan
within China’s political system. The main part of the report introduces readers to China’s major
political institutions through 16 organization charts and accompanying explanatory text. Al
individuals’ names are listed in Chinese style, with family names preceding given names. CRS
Visual Information Specialist Mari Y. Lee created al the charts in this report.
Note on Sources and Language
Much of the information in this report is drawn from PRC sources, including Chinese-language official websites
and Chinese-language reports from China’s state-control ed media. Where English translations of these sources
are known to exist, CRS has endeavored to identify them in the footnotes. Because of the difficulty of tracing
Romanized personal names back to their original Chinese characters, and because the names of Chinese political
bodies can often be translated into English in multiple ways, CRS has included Chinese characters in the charts in
this report for reference.

1 Although in English the Party-state refers to both documents as “constitutions,” the Chinese-language terms are
different. T he Party document is a “ zhangcheng 章程.” T he state document is a “ xianfa 宪法.” T he Party constitution is
also sometimes referred to in English as the Party “charter.” “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua,
October 24, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/download/
Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf; “ Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/constitution.shtml.
2 “领导干部比例降低！一图看懂第十三届全国人大代表构成” (“The Proportion of Leadership Cadres Has Fallen! See the
Composition of the 13th NPC Delegates in One Chart”), 新京报 (Beijing News) via Huanqiu, March 4, 2018, at
https://lianghui.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnK6PUS.
3 Chris Buckley and Adam Wu, “ Ending T erm Limits for China’s Xi Is a Big Deal. Here’s Why,” New York Times,
March 10, 2018.
4 T he six laws from the 116th Congress referencing the CPC are the Let Everyone Get Involved in Opportunities for
National Service Act (P.L. 116-35), the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020 ( P.L. 116-92), the Uyghur
Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145), the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (P.L. 116-222),
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260 ), and the William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283).
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The Mechanics of Communist Party Rule in China
The CPC has led China continuously since Mao Zedong and his colleagues established the PRC
on October 1, 1949. In July 2021, in a speech marking the 100th anniversary of the Party’s
founding in 1921, General Secretary Xi asserted that Communist Party leadership of China is “the
foundation and lifeblood of the Party and the country, and the crux upon which the interests and
wel being of al Chinese people depend.”5
How the Party exercises its leadership is not straightforward, however. China’s Leninist Party-
state polity features interlocking Party and state hierarchies that extend from the national level
down as far as the vil age. According to the Party constitution, the Party sees itself “guiding the
overal situation,” “coordinating the work of al sides,” and assuming “the role of leadership core
among al other organizations at the corresponding level [of government].”6
The Party’s top national-level institution is the Central Committee, led by a General Secretary
and including an elite 25-person Political Bureau (Politburo) and even more elite 7-person
Politburo Standing Committee. Party bodies directly exercise leadership over portfolios the Party
deems critical to its survival, including the armed forces (see “The CPC Central Military
Commission”), the security services, media and culture, and personnel appointments across the
political system (see “The CPC Central Committee Bureaucracy”). The Party’s Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, the latter
ostensibly a state body, enforce conformity with Party policies and loyalty to the Party and to Xi.
The state consists of several hierarchies. The national-level institutions in each hierarchy are the
National People’s Congress, China’s unicameral legislature; the State Council, China’s
government cabinet; the National Supervisory Commission; the Supreme People’s Court; the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China’s top prosecutor’s office; and the National Committee of
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a “political consultation” body.
The interlocking nature of the Party’s relationship with the state hierarchies manifests itself most
prominently in personnel assignments and reporting lines.
 At every level of government, the Party committee is the leading political
institution, with its Secretary (also known as the Party Secretary) serving as the
most senior official at that level. At the provincial level, the secretary of the
provincial Party committee outranks the provincial governor. At the city level,
the secretary of the municipal Party committee outranks the mayor.
 The heads of the state institutions at every level of government serve
concurrently on the Party committee at same level. CPC General Secretary Xi
serves concurrently as state president, for example, while the CPC’s number
three official, Li Zhanshu, serves concurrently as chairman of the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee. At the provincial level, the secretary of
the Party committee often serves concurrently as chair of the provincial people’s
congress, while a deputy secretary of the provincial Party committee always
serves concurrently as the provincial governor.
 In a wide array of non-Party institutions, the Party establishes “leading Party
members groups” (dang zu) or Party committees (dang wei). According to Article

5 Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China,” July 1, 2021, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2021-07/01/c_1310038244.htm.
6 “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/
download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf .
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48 of the Party constitution, the role of leading Party members groups is to “play
the role of the leadership core” within each institution. The Party constitution
stipulates that, among other tasks, leading Party members groups ensure
implementation of Party policies, “discuss and make decisions on matters of
major significance” within the institution, “manage officials to proper effect”
(i.e., control personnel assignments), and “encourage non-Party officials and the
people in fulfil ing the tasks entrusted to them by the Party and the state.” The
head of the leading Party members group serves as the institution’s powerful
Party secretary. The leading Party members group reports to the Party
organization that approves its establishment—the Party committee at the same
level of government.7
 Article 45 of the Party constitution requires that the Party’s discipline inspection
commissions—charged with investigating wrongdoing among Party members—
“accredit discipline inspection teams to al Party and state organs at the
corresponding level.” The Party constitution states that the teams “shal attend
relevant meetings of the leading Party organizations in the organs.” The leading
Party members groups are required to support the teams’ work.8
 State institutions are required to report to Party bodies. The Ministry of Culture,
for example, reports to the Party’s Publicity Department (also known as the
Propaganda Department).9
The Party has worked to build a Party presence in every workplace and neighborhood. As of June
2021, the Party boasted 4.86 mil ion “primary-level” Party organizations, including in al
neighborhoods.10
Moves to Bolster Communist Party Rule
Since coming to power in 2012, General Secretary Xi has worked to strengthen the Party’s
presence and authority in institutions throughout the Party-state. In a major reorganization in
2018, the Party moved a group of government offices directly into the Party bureaucracy, citing
the need to “strengthen the Party’s centralized and unified leadership” over “work involving the
overal state of the Party and the country” as wel as over specific areas of administration.11 As
part of the same restructuring, the Party upgraded four “leading smal groups” that had operated

7 Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/
download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf .
8 Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/
download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf .
9 T he Publicity Department’s (Propaganda Department’s) website is http://www.wenming.cn/. A full list of “Central
Publicity and Cultural Institutions” is available at http://www.wenming.cn/syzhq/ljq/zyxcwhdw/.
10 “China Focus: CPC Membership Exceeds 95 Million as Its Centenary Nears,” Xinhua, June 30, 2021, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2021-06/30/c_1310036387.htm.
11 See CRS In Focus IF10854, China’s Communist Party Absorbs More of the State, by Susan V. Lawrence.
See also “ 中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改革方案》” (“ CPC Central Committee Releases ‘Deepening Party and
State Institutional Reform Plan’”), Xinhua, March 21, 2018. T ranslation by the Center for Security and Emerging
T echnology available at https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/ccp-central-committee-publishes-plan-for-deepening-
the-reform-of-party-and-state-agencies/. See also “ 《中共中央关于深化党和国家机构改革的决定》和《深化党和
国家机构改革方案》诞生记” (“An Account of the Birth of the CPC Central Committee Decision on Deepening Party
and State Institutional Reform and the Deepening Party and State Institutional Reform Plan”), Xinhua, March 22, 2018,
at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/22/content_5276718.htm.
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in the shadows to become high-profile commissions.12 The CPC also created a new institution—
the “supervisory commission”—that works hand-in-hand with the Party’s discipline inspection
commissions, expanding those subject to investigations to al public servants. Under Xi, leading
Party member groups within the major state institutions report annual y to the Politburo Standing
Committee about their work, underscoring the Party’s control of those institutions.13
With a 2018 amendment to the state constitution, the Party explicitly sought to strengthen the
legal basis for its rule. In a front-page article justifying the amendment, the CPC’s paper of
record, People’s Daily, blamed the collapse of the Soviet Union on Soviet leaders’ 1990 decision
to amend Article 6 of the Soviet constitution to remove the requirement for Communist Party
rule. In China, the article’s author insisted, “The Party’s leadership can only be strengthened; it
cannot be weakened.”14
As Xi has sought to bolster the Party’s authority, he has increasingly equated its authority with his
own, creating a highly personalized form of governance. In 2016, the Party named Xi the “core”
of the leadership. Since 2018, top Party leaders and Xi himself have exhorted Party members first
to “uphold General Secretary Xi’s position as the core of the Party Central Committee and of the
whole Party” and second to “uphold the Party Central Committee’s authority and centralized,
unified leadership.” The formulation is known in China as “the two upholds.”15
At the 20th Party Congress in the second half of 2022, Xi is widely expected to seek to extend his
time in power, possibly by seeking a third five-year term as General Secretary of the Party’s
Central Committee.16 Alternatively, some have speculated that he may seek to reinstitute the
position of chairman of the Central Committee, which the CPC abolished in 1982.17 Whether Xi
faces resistance to his plans within the Party, and if so, how much, remains unknown.
Taiwan in China’s Political System
The Republic of China (ROC), led by the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalists), assumed control of
Taiwan from Japan in 1945, after the end of World War II. The KMT moved the seat of the ROC
government to Taiwan in 1949, before the CPC established the PRC on mainland China.18 The
PRC has thus never controlled Taiwan. It has consistently claimed sovereignty over the island,
however, and has embedded that claim in China’s political system.

12 T hey are the Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, Commission for Foreign Affairs, Central Cyberspace
Affairs Commission, and Central Commission for Deepening Overall Reform.
13 T he Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, “Full T ext: T he CPC: Its Mission and Contributions,”
Xinhua, August 26, 2021, at http://www.news.cn/english/2021-08/26/c_1310148193.htm.
14 Zhong Yan, “ 把“中国共产党领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征”载入宪法的理论、实践、制度依据” (“The T heory, Practice,
and Institutional Basis for Adding ‘T he defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of
the Communist Party of China” to t he Constitution,” 人民日报 (People’s Daily) via Xinhua, February 28, 2018, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-02/28/c_1122465517.htm.
15 “坚决维护习近平总书记核心地位维护党中央权威和集中统一领导” (“Resolutely Uphold General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Core
Position, Uphold the Party Central Committee’s Authority and Centralized, Unified Leadership”), Xinhua via The
People’s Daily, p. 1, May 15, 2018; Zhou Hanmin, “ 坚决做到 ‘两个维护’” (“Resolutely Do the ‘T wo Upholds’”), 红旗文稿
(Red Flag Manuscripts), QST heory.com, at http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2021-08/11/c_1127750103.htm.
16 Jude Blanchette and Richard McGregor, “China’s Looming Succession Crisis: What Will Happen When Xi is
Gone?” Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2021, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-07-20/chinas-looming-
succession-crisis.
17 Ling Li, “How Xi Jinping Could Rule China for Life,” Washington Post, November 11, 2021.
18 “History,” Government Portal of the Republic of China (T aiwan), https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php.
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 The PRC describes itself as having 23 provinces, including Taiwan.
 Since 1975, China’s National People’s Congress has included a delegation
purporting to represent “Taiwan Province.”19
 The CPC Central Committee’s 14 departments include one dedicated to Taiwan
affairs, the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee (also known as
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council). The mission of another Central
Committee department, the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central
Committee, includes promoting unification with Taiwan.
 China’s eight official y-sanctioned minor political parties include two ostensibly
linked to Taiwan.20 The chairs of both parties serve as vice chairs of the NPC
Standing Committee, and both parties are among those with seats set aside for
them in China’s political consultation body, the CPPCC.
 The CPPCC also al ots seats to a delegation from the Al -China Federation of
Taiwan Compatriots.
 The CPPCC’s 10 special committees include a Committee on Liaison with Hong
Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Overseas Chinese.
China’s Leading Political Institutions
The PRC has cycled through four state constitutions in the 72 years since its establishment in
October 1949. The NPC adopted the current constitution in 1982 and has since amended it five
times, most recently in 2018.21 Prior to 2018, al references to the Party were confined to the state
constitution’s preamble. In 2018, the Party directed the legislature to insert a reference to it into
Article 1 of the state constitution, in an explicitly acknowledged bid to “strengthen the legal
authority” for Party rule.22 After stating that “the socialist system” is the PRC’s “fundamental
system,” Article 1 now states, “Leadership by the Communist Party of China is the defining
feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The constitution provides no additional detail
about how the Party exercises that leadership.
Chapter III of the state constitution outlines the roles of and relative relationships among state
institutions, including “the highest organ of state power” (the National People’s Congress), and
administrative (State council), supervisory (National Supervisory Commission), adjudicatory

19 People with family ties to T aiwan served in the NPC prior to 1975, but not as part of a “T aiwan Province”
delegation. T aiwan Democratic Self-Government League Central Publicity Department , “ 全国人大台湾省代表团的由来”
(“T he Origin of the T aiwan Provincial Delegation in the National People’s Congress”), T he United Front Work
Department of the CPC Central Committee, at http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzgs/353594.jhtml.
20 T he two parties are the T aiwan Democratic Self-Government League, officially described as “composed of T aiwan
compatriots residing in the mainland and intellectuals in T aiwan studies,” and the Revolutionary Committee of the
Chinese Kuomintang (KMT ), which includes members with historical links to the KMT , now T aiwan’s leading
opposition party, and those with “relationships with T aiwan compatriots.” State Council Information Office of the
PRC, “Full T ext: China’s Political Party System: Cooperation and Consultation,” June 25, 2021, at
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1707413/1707413.htm.
21 China’s legislature amended the 1982 state constitution in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2018. For an official English
translation of the constitution, as amended, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/constitution.shtml.
22 Zhong Yan, “ 把“中国共产党领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征”载入宪法的理论、实践、制度依据” (“The T heory, Practice,
and Institutional Basis for Adding ‘T he defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of
the Communist Party of China” to the Constitution”), 人民日报 (People’s Daily) via Xinhua, February 28, 2018, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-02/28/c_1122465517.htm.
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(Supreme People’s Court), and prosecutorial (Supreme People’s Procuratorate) organs. The
preamble to the state constitution mentions one more leading Chinese political institution, the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), referring to it as “a broadly based
representative organization of the united front.” The Party describes its “united front” work as a
“means for the Party to unite al the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, both at home and
abroad” to support the Party’s goal of “national rejuvenation.”23 Figure 1 depicts China’s
national-level political institutions as described in the state constitution.
Figure 1. China’s National-Level Political Structure
According to China’s 1982 state constitution as last amended in March 2018

Source: Graphic by CRS, based on the 1982 Constitution of the PRC, as last amended in March 2018.
Notes: (a) CPC Central Committee General Secretary Xi Jinping serves concurrently as state presiden t. The
NPC elects the president and vice president, but does not oversee their work.
(b) The State Military Commission is believed to exist in name only; the Party Central Military Commission leads
China’s armed forces.
(c) The National Supervisory Commission operates jointly with and shares leadership with the Party’s Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).
(d) The state constitution mentions the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in its
preamble, but not in Chapter III, which covers state institutions.

23 “CPC United Front Work T ransparent, Open: Official,” Xinhua, August 26, 2021, at http://www.news.cn/english/
2021-08/26/c_1310150185.htm.
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Levels of Administration and Leading Political
Institutions
Article 30 of the state constitution outlines three sub-national levels of administration: provinces,
counties, and townships. In practice, China’s political system includes two additional levels of
administration between provinces and counties, namely quasi-provincial and prefectural-level
administrative units.24 China’s government does not treat vil ages as a formal part of the political
system. Figure 2 depicts the leading political institutions at each level of administration. Each
level of formal administration is introduced below.
Provincial level: 34 administrative units: 4 municipalities directly under central government
jurisdiction (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions
(Guangxi Zhuang, Inner Mongolia, Ninghui Hui, Tibet, and Xinjiang Uyghur), and 2 special
autonomous regions (Hong Kong and Macao). Although the PRC has never controlled Taiwan, it
counts Taiwan among the PRC’s 23 provinces.25 The Party secretaries of six provincial-level
jurisdictions outrank their counterparts because they serve concurrently as members of the Party
Politburo. They are the leaders of Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong Province,
and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Quasi-provincial level: 15 cities, of which 10 are provincial capitals: Changchun, Chengdu,
Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin, Jinan, Nanjing, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xi’an. The 5 that are not
provincial capitals are Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenzhen, and Xiamen.26
Prefectural level: 318 administrative units. They comprise 278 prefectural-level cities, 7
prefectures, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 3 “leagues” (in Inner Mongolia).27
County level: 2,844 administrative units. They include 973 city districts, 388 county-level cities,
1,312 counties, 117 autonomous counties, and more than 50 “banners” (in Inner Mongolia).
Township level: Nearly 39,000 administrative units. They comprise more than 8,000
neighborhoods, more than 21,000 towns, nearly 8,000 townships, and nearly 1,000 ethnic
minority townships.
The leading political institutions at each level of formal administration are known as the “four
teams” (sì tào bānzi): the Party committee, the People’s congress, the people’s government, and
the CPPCC. At every level, the Party’s role is to provide leadership and coordinate the work of
the other institutions. The head of the Party committee, known as the Party Secretary, is the most
senior official at every level of government.28

24 Central People’s Government of the PRC, “ 中国的行政区划概述” (“Overview of China’s Administrative Divisions”),
April 17, 2009, at http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-04/17/content_1288030.htm; “ 中国行政区划（2020年）” (“ China’s
Administrative Divisions (2020)”), September 15, 2021, at http://www.xzqh.org/html/show/cn/2020.html.
25 Central People’s Government of the PRC, “ 中国的行政区划——省级行政单位” (“China’s Administrative Divisions—
Provincial-Level Administrative Units,” April 17, 2009, at http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-04/17/content_1288035.htm.
26 Lin Xiaozhao, “ 15个副省级城市上半年GDP：深圳总量第一，厦门增速最快” (“First Half GDP for the 15 Quasi-Provincial
Cities: Shenzhen Is No. 1 Overall, Xiamen’s Growth Is Fastest”), Yicai, August 8, 2021, at https://www.yicai.com/
news/101134571.html.
27 Including the quasi-provincial-level cities, the total would be 333 administrative units, including 293 cities.
28 T his is usually the case for provinces, but not for the cities of Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and T ianjin, or for the
autonomous regions of T ibet and Xinjiang. For current provincial-level leaders, see http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/rw/rspd/
201302/17/t20130217_766061.shtml.
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Figure 2. Leading Political Institutions at Each Level of Administration
The four institutions are known as the “four teams”; the Party provides leadership at every level

Source: Graphic by CRS. Central People’s Government of the PRC, “地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民
政府” (“Each Local Level of People’s Congress and People’s Government”), March 23, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/
guoqing/2018-03/23/content_5274724.htm.
Notes: China does not consider vil ages and urban neighborhoods to be part of the formal administrative
hierarchy. The people’s congress hierarchy extends down to the township level. The CPPCC hierarchy extends
down to the county level.
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The Communist Party of China (CPC)
Figure 3 depicts the senior CPC hierarchy, showing both the power relationship between
institutions (solid arrows) and the formal selection process for those institutions (dotted arrows).
At the top of the hierarchy is Xi Jinping, who first assumed the position of General Secretary of
the Central Committee at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. The Central Committee reelected him
to a second five-year term in 2017. In 2016, to boost Xi’s authority further, the Party named Xi
the “core” of the Party leadership, a designation previously granted to three leaders: Mao Zedong,
Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.29 In addition to his General Secretary post, Xi serves as
chairman of the Party Central Military Commission, overseeing China’s armed forces. (He is also
chairman of the State Central Military Commission, which exists in name only.) Rounding out his
troika of top positions, Xi serves as State President.
The General Secretary is required to be drawn from among the members of the Political Bureau
(Politburo) Standing Committee, the Party’s most senior decisionmaking body. The Standing
Committee currently has seven members. It is an elite body of the full 25-person Political Bureau
(Politburo). The Secretariat serves as the “working body” of the Politburo and its Standing
Committee, charged with drafting the directives to implement their decisions and overseeing the
Central Committee bureaucracy. The Politburo Standing Committee nominates its members and
the Central Committee formal y approves them.
Per the CPC Constitution, the Party’s Central Committee formal y elects the members of the
Politburo and its Standing Committee, as wel as the General Secretary. The Central Committee
also “decides” (appoints) the members of the Party Central Military Commission.30 Sitting and
retired top leaders draw up the candidate lists, however. The Politburo and Politburo Standing
Committee elections are non-competitive, with the top leadership offering Central Committee
members offered as many candidates as available positions.
The Party holds a national congress every five years. Delegates to the congress elect the Central
Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). This process is modestly
competitive. At 19th Party Congress in 2017, delegates could choose 204 candidates for ful
Central Committee membership from a list of 222, for example, al owing them to reject 18
candidates, or 8.8% of the candidate pool. At that congress, almost a quarter of the nearly 2,300
delegates were themselves Party leadership-proposed candidates for the new Central Committee
and CCDI, who were able to vote for themselves.31 Delegates to each national congress ostensibly
represent the Party’s more than 95 mil ion dues-paying members, the equivalent of 6.7% of
China’s population of 1.41 bil ion.32 Article 22 of the CPC Constitution requires the Politburo to
convene meetings of the Central Committee at least annual y. Each such meeting is known as a
plenary session, or plenum. The 18th Congress held seven plenums.

29 “CPC Central Committee with President Xi as ‘Core’ Leads China to Centenary Goals,” Xinhua, October 28, 2016,
at http://www.scio.gov.cn/m/32618/Document/1495816/1495816.htm. Since 1982, three General Secretaries have not
served as the leadership “core”: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Hu Jintao.
30 “Full T ext of Constitution of Communist Party of China,” Xinhua News Agency, November 3, 2017, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725945.htm.
31 Zhao Cheng, Huo Xiaoguang, Zhang Xiaosong, and Luo Zhengguang, “ 肩负历史重任开创复兴伟业——
新一届中共中央委员会和中共中央纪律检查委员会诞生记” (“Shouldering Historical Duty, Creating the Great Mission of
Revival: T he Birth of the New Central Committee and the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection”),
Xinhua News Agency, October 24, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/24/
c_1121850995.htm.
32 “China Focus: CPC Membership Exceeds 95 Million as its Centenary Nears,” Xinhua, June 30, 2021, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2021-06/30/c_1310036387.htm. The membership total is as of June 5, 2021.
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Figure 3. Communist Party of China (CPC) Hierarchy
Numbers are for the 19th Central Committee, elected for a five-year term in October 2017; solid black
arrows reflect the direction of authority; dotted gray arrows reflect the formal selection process

Source: Graphic by CRS, based on “第十九届中共中央组织结构图” (“19th CPC Central Committee
Organizational Structure Chart”), CPC News Portal, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/414940/index.html and
“中国政要” (“China’s Important Political Figures”), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/394696/index.html.
Note: The CPC Constitution does not require the CPC General Secretary to serve concurrently as Chairman
of the Central Military Commission, but Xi Jinping holds both positions, as wel as that of State President.
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The CPC Political Bureau (Politburo) Standing Committee
The CPC Political Bureau (Politburo) Standing Committee (PBSC) is China’s most senior
decisionmaking body, exercising the functions and powers of the Central Committee when the
latter body is not in session. According to a public Party database of PBSC meetings, which may
not be complete, in 2020, the PBSC met 14 times, or an average of just over once a month.33
Article 23 of the CPC constitution requires the General Secretary to be drawn from the PBSC’s
members. It also requires al Party committees to operate according to “the principle of
combining collective leadership with individual responsibility based on the division of work.”34
On the current PBSC, Xi Jinping’s dominant role chal enges that collective leadership principle,
but members continue to divide responsibility for specific portfolios, as shown in Figure 4.
The CPC’s process for choosing its top leaders is opaque. One U.S. scholar suggests that
“incumbent and retired leaders (essential y current and past members of the Politburo) negotiate
over who wil be appointed and to what positions in order to maintain a balance of power among
key leaders and their factions.”35 In recent decades, the process has been guided by certain norms.
The first is that a general secretary serves two five-year terms and then steps down. Although the
CPC constitution does not include term limits for the general secretary, Xi’s immediate
predecessors in the post, Jiang Zemin (in office 1989-2002) and Hu Jintao (in office 2002-2012),
each ceded the post to his successor after serving two full five-year terms.
A second norm relates to age. Ahead of the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Jiang decreed that
Politburo members aged 70 or over at the end of their five-year terms should retire. (Jiang, aged
71 at the time, exempted himself.) Ahead of the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Jiang tightened the
mandate to require those aged 68 or above at the end of their terms to step down.36 (Jiang retired
as general secretary at that congress, but stayed on as Party Central Military Commission
chairman for another two years, implicitly exempting the CMC chairman position from the
retirement age.) At the 17th (2007), 18th (2012), and 19th (2017) Party Congresses, the Party
appointed no one aged 68 or older to a new term on the Politburo. A final, nascent norm related to
the General Secretary appointing a successor to the PBSC at the start of his second term. Hu and
Xi both served a term on the PBSC, handling Party affairs, before taking on the top job.
Term limits and retirement ages helped to move older leaders out of top jobs every five or ten
years and to give ambitious younger officials a path to higher office. Having an anointed
successor serve on the top decisionmaking body for a term helped take some of the drama out of
leadership transitions. Xi’s apparent desire to remain in power after the conclusion of his second
term as general secretary has cast the future of those norms into question, however. He has
already ended one norm: entering his second term, in 2017, Xi declined to appoint anyone to the
PBSC who was young enough to serve two terms as his successor. If he serves a third term as
general secretary, he wil have cast aside the other two norms.

33 “中共中央政治局常务委员会会议” (“CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee Meetings”), website of the
CPC Central Organization Department, at http://www.12371.cn/special/zzjcwwyhhy/index.shtml.
34 “Full T ext of Constitution of Communist Party of China,” Xinhua News Agency, November 3, 2017, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725945.htm. T he principle of collective leadership is
presented in Chapter 2, Article 10 (5).
35 Bruce J. Dickson, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Princeton University Press, 2021,
p. 48.
36 Dickson, pp. 48-53. Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking Chinese Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 80, 86.
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Figure 4. The 19th CPC Political Bureau (Politburo) Standing Committee
The Politburo Standing Committee is China’s most senior decisionmaking body. Numbers indicate rank in
the Party hierarchy; al members were elected in 2017 for five-year terms ending in 2022.

Source: Graphic by CRS. Name list from “第十九届中共中央组织结构图” (“19th CPC Central Committee
Organizational Structure Chart”), Communist Party of China (CPC) News Portal, at http://cpc.people.com.cn/
GB/64162/414940/index.html, accessed November 1, 2021. Titles from “中国政要” (“China’s Important Political
Figures”), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/394696/index.html.
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The CPC Political Bureau (Politburo)
The full CPC Politburo is China’s second-most-senior decisionmaking body. Its 25 members
include the 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee plus 18 regular members. Figure 5
and Figure 6 show the current 19th Central Committee Politburo members, arranged according to
their primary areas of responsibility, as determined by CRS. The current 19th Politburo includes:
 The only Politburo member ever to be subject to U.S. sanctions, Chen Quanguo.
The U.S. government designated Chen in 2020 for “serious rights abuses against
ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” where he serves
concurrently as Party Secretary.37 The sanctions remain in effect.
 A single woman, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan. She is the sixth woman ever to have
served as a member of a CPC Politburo. No woman has ever served on a
Politburo Standing Committee.38
 The two vice chairmen of the Party’s Central Military Commission. The last
military officer to serve on the elite Politburo Standing Committee was Admiral
Liu Huaqing, who served on the 16th PBSC, from 1992 to 1997.
 Six of the seven members of the Party Secretariat, one of whom is a PBSC
member. The only Secretariat member who is not a Politburo member is You
Quan, head of the CPC Central Committee’s United Front Work Department.
 Two current regular Politburo members, Cai Qi and Yang Xiaodu, who joined the
Politburo without having first served on the Central Committee. In a political
system in which officials almost always work their way up rung by rung, both
effectively skipped two rungs. (The last senior official to make a leap of such
proportions was Premier Zhu Rongji in 1998.) Four more regular members of the
current Politburo—Ding Xuexiang, Huang Kunming, Li Qiang, and Li Xi—
skipped one rung when they joined in 2017. They were promoted from the ranks
of alternate members of the Central Committee directly into the Politburo.39
 Nine regular members born after 1954. If the Party retains its norm of treating
those age 67 or below as eligible for appointment to a new term, al would be
eligible for reappointment and possible promotion to the PBSC in 2022.
The 19th Politburo meets approximately once a month. The Politburo often schedules group study
sessions on the days it meets. Recent topics include rural policy and artificial intel igence.40 Xi
requires that each Politburo member submit an annual written report on his or her work to him
and the CPC Central Committee. The Party portrays this as one of several “institutional
arrangements for strengthening and upholding the Central Committee’s centralized leadership.”41

37 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act ,” July 9, 2020, at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1055; U.S.
Department of State, “ The United States Imposes Sanctions and Visa Restrictions in Response to the Ongoing Human
Rights Violations and Abuses in Xinjiang,” July 9, 2020.
38 T he others are Liu Yandong (17th, 18th Politburos, 2007-2017), Wu Yi (16th Politburo, 2002-2007), Deng Yingchao
(11th, 12th Politburos, 1978-1987), Jiang Qing (9th, 10th Politburos, 1969-1974), and Ye Qun (9th Politburo, 1969-1971).
39 Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking Chinese Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 165.
40 “中央政治局集体学习（十九届）” (“Central Committee Political Bureau Group Study (19th)”), web portal of the CPC, at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1025/c414940-29608670.html.
41 T he Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, “Full T ext: T he CPC: Its Mission and Contributions,”
Xinhua, August 26, 2021, at http://www.news.cn/english/2021-08/26/c_1310148193.htm.

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