Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy

September 22, 2021 R46919

Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy
September 22, 2021
Overview. Congressional interest in Cameroon has grown since 2017, when separatists claiming
to represent the Anglophone minority in largely French-speaking Cameroon launched a rebellion
Tomás F. Husted
against the government. Activism by Cameroonians living abroad has helped draw international
Analyst in African Affairs
attention to that conflict, including from some Members of Congress representing constituencies

with Cameroonian diaspora communities. Human rights abuses by Cameroonian security forces
in the course of the Anglophone conflict have raised challenges for U.S.-Cameroon security

cooperation, which is primarily focused on efforts to combat the Nigerian-origin Boko Haram
and an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (IS-WA), which are active in northern
Cameroon. The United States has restricted some security assistance for Cameroon due to human rights concerns, though
some counterterrorism programs and other assistance continue.
People and Politics. Cameroon is a diverse, resource-rich country of 28.5 million people. Formed through a merger of two
separately colonized entities—one administered by France, one by England—Cameroon is largely French-speaking, with a
minority population of English-speakers concentrated in the west. Perceived marginalization among Anglophones has long
provoked demands for political decentralization as well as calls from some activists for the independence of the English-
speaking regions. Cameroon is predominately Christian; Muslims comprise an estimated 20% of the population and are
concentrated in the north, which is generally poorer and less economically developed than the south.
President Paul Biya, age 88, is Africa’s oldest head of state and one of its longest-serving leaders. He won reelection to
another seven-year term in 2018 and has no clear successor. His administration has long restricted freedoms of speech and
assembly, and the government arguably has used the conflicts in the north and west as a pretext to bring terrorism- and
separatism-related charges against journalists, activists, and opponents. His administration has initiated some decentralization
measures, which many analysts view as necessary to resolve the Anglophone conflict and other challenges. Observers have
questioned the pace and sufficiency of such measures and the government’s commitment to meaningful reform.
Security and Humanitarian Conditions . In the past decade, Cameroon’s reputation for stability under President Biya has
dissipated with the emergence of security crises on several fronts. Boko Haram began operating more openly in northern
Cameroon around 2013, and attacks by Boko Haram and IS-WA (which split from Boko Haram in 2016) persist. In the west,
the conflict between Anglophone separatists and state security forces has featured widespread abuses against civilians, while
efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement have foundered. Together, the conflicts in the north and west have displaced over
one million Cameroonians internally. Cameroon also hosts nearly 330,000 refugees fleeing insecurity in neighboring Central
African Republic, and 120,000 Nigerians displaced by the Boko Haram and IS-WA insurgencies, according to U.N. agencies.
Economy. A collapse in global oil prices and Coronavirus Dis ease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic-related shocks caused
Cameroon’s economy to contract by -2.8% in 2020, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Economic growth
relies heavily on commodity exports, notably of crude oil and petroleum products, agricultural products, timber, and
aluminum. Cameroon ranked 153 out of 189 countries on the 2020 U.N. Human Development Index, above many African
countries, but roughly a quarter of the population lives below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day. Conflict in the
Anglophone regions, a hub for farming and rubber cultivation, has impeded agricultural activity. State -owned enterprises are
prominent in major sectors; several have faced allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Public debt is a key challenge.
COVID-19. Consistent with regional trends, Cameroon has recorded fewer COVID-19 cases per capita than many non-
African countries, though it also has administered comparatively fewer tests on a per capita basis. Limited vaccine supply and
local vaccine hesitancy have reportedly stymied vaccination efforts. Reports that the government misappropriated COVID-19
response funds, including IMF loans, gave rise to a state investigation in 2021 that has implicated several ministries.
U.S. Assistance. According to public budget materials, State Department and USAID-administered assistance for Cameroon
included $66.2 million in FY2020 appropriations. Health programs comprised over 90%; the balance included funds for civil
society strengthening and other governance programs ($4.0 million) and military professionalization ($800,000). These
figures exclude emergency humanitarian aid, which public budget documents do not disaggregate by country. They similarly
do not include State Department-administered security assistance allocated on a regional or global basis, the main vehicles
through which Cameroon has received U.S. military training and equipment to strengthen counterterrorism, peacekeeping,
and maritime security capacities. The Department of Defense has provided additional security assistance to Cameroon.
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Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy

Overview
Cameroon is an ethno-linguistical y diverse, resource-rich Central African country of 28.5 mil ion
people bordering the Gulf of Guinea. In the past decade, its reputation for general stability under
authoritarian president Paul Biya—Africa’s oldest head of state, and one of its longest-serving—
has dissipated with the emergence of governance and security crises on several fronts. In the
north, attacks by the Nigerian-origin Boko Haram as wel as the Islamic State West Africa
Province (IS-WA) have increased since 2018. In the west, violence between government forces
and separatists claiming to represent Cameroon’s Anglophone minority has spurred concerns over
Cameroon’s territorial integrity and the viability of President Biya’s centralized governance
system. State security forces have been implicated in extensive abuses in both conflicts.
President Biya won reelection to a seventh term in a 2018 election marred by violence, low
turnout, and administrative irregularities. His top chal enger in that election spent months in
prison after contesting the vote result. Biya has no clear successor, prompting concerns of
potential political instability should he die or become incapacitated in office.
With the Boko Haram/IS-WA conflict’s expansion from northeast Nigeria into northern
Cameroon in 2013-2014, U.S.-Cameroon relations increasingly emphasized counterterrorism
cooperation. U.S. security assistance for Cameroon increased, and U.S. military forces deployed
there to conduct regional intel igence, surveil ance, and reconnaissance operations. Reported
human rights abuses by Cameroonian security personnel have created chal enges for bilateral ties,
prompting restrictions on some U.S. security assistance and other punitive measures.
Congressional attention on Cameroon has mounted with the escalation of the separatist rebel ion
in western Cameroon, often referred to as the “Anglophone conflict” or “Anglophone crisis.”
Congress has shaped the U.S. response to deteriorating security and governance conditions in the
country through legislation and oversight activities. Members of Congress may continue to assess
whether U.S. engagement with Cameroon reflects an appropriate balance of priorities and debate
the effectiveness of various tools for advancing U.S. interests in the country.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Cameroon
As of mid-September 2021, Cameroon had recorded around 85,000 COVID-19 infections, amounting to nearly
298 cases per 100,000 people—wel below many countries worldwide, though Cameroon has conducted fewer
COVID-19 tests than many countries on a per capita basis.1 Daily recorded cases reached their peak, to date, in
April 2021. In August 2020, the State Department announced that it had committed nearly $19.3 mil ion in health
and humanitarian assistance to help Cameroon respond to COVID-19.2 In July 2021, the Biden Administration
donated 303,050 single-shot COVID-19 vaccine doses to Cameroon, which has also received vaccine donations
from China and via the multilateral COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility.3 Cameroon’s vaccination
campaign has been limited amid ongoing global supply chal enges for governments in low- and middle-income
countries seeking to procure vaccine doses. Logistical hurdles and local vaccine hesitancy also have impeded local
vaccination efforts. In a June 2021 report, for instance, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) noted that an internal Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) survey found that 37% of
Cameroonian medical staff were unwil ing to receive any vaccine.4

1 Case count from Johns Hopkins University (JHU) COVID-19 Dashboard, accessed September 14, 2021. Estimate of
cases per 100,000 people reflects CRS calculation based on JHU data and population figure from CIA World Factbook.
2 State Department, “ UPDATE: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” August 21,
2020.
3 U.S. Embassy in Cameroon, “T he United States Donates 303,050 Doses of Johnson & Johnson COVID -19 Vaccine to
Cameroon,” July 22, 2021. U.S. vaccine donations were coordinated with COVAX and the African Union.
4 OCHA, “Cameroon: COVID-19 Emergency Situation Report No.17, 1 to 31 May 2021,” June 2021.
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Historical Background and Politics
Present-day Cameroon (see Figure 1) was formed through the 1961 merger of two separately
colonized entities: French Cameroun, which gained independence from France in 1960, and
Southern Cameroons, which the British administered as a semi-autonomous territory until the
1961 unification. That unification resulted from a United Nations (U.N.)-organized referendum in
which a majority of Southern Cameroonians voted to merge with French Cameroon rather than
integrate into neighboring Nigeria; independence as a separate country was not on the bal ot. A
period of federalism under President Ahmadou Ahidjo—in which majority French-speaking East
Cameroon and largely English-speaking West Cameroon each ostensibly enjoyed a degree of
autonomy—ensued until 1972, when voters approved a new constitution replacing the federal
system with a unitary state, formalizing Ahidjo’s efforts to centralize power under the
Francophone-dominated central government.5 Many Anglophone activists continue to view the
1972 constitutional revision as il egal and discriminatory. Some seek independence, while others
have cal ed for a return to federalism along the lines of the pre-1972 governance structure.6
Figure 1. Cameroon

Source: CRS graphic using data from Department of State; Esri; ArcWorld; and DeLorme.

5 For further background, see Piet Konings and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “T he Anglophone Problem in Cameroon,” The
Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 35, no. 2 (1997): 207-229.
6 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Cameroon’s Anglophone Dialogue: A Work in Progress,” September 26, 2019.
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President Biya, age 88, has been in office since 1982, having previously served as Ahidjo’s prime
minister. He initial y headed a single-party political system but authorized multi-party politics in
1990, amid a wave of similar transitions in Africa at the end of the Cold War. Opposition and civil
society activity expanded, including by Anglophones demanding greater autonomy. In 1996, Biya
promulgated a new constitution that—while retaining Cameroon’s unitary governance structure—
notional y devolved some powers to regional authorities, among other decentralization measures.
Political liberalization was limited. Before long, according to the International Crisis Group, Biya
had enacted an “authoritarian restoration” entailing the “harassment of independent media, the
selective distribution of state resources [. . and] fraud and manipulation at al points in the
electoral process.”7 These moves effectively neutralized the opposition, including the
Anglophone-led Social Democratic Front (SDF), the leading opposition party at the time, whose
share of seats in the National Assembly has steadily declined since the late 1990s. Parliament
removed presidential term limits in 2008, spurring protests that security forces suppressed.
Current Political Dynamics
In recent years, the government has used the conflicts in the north and the Anglophone regions as
a pretext to restrict opposition activity, press freedom, and civil society activism, according to
multiple assessments.8 Advocates have criticized a 2014 law that established an expansive
definition of terrorism and grants state authorities the power to restrict freedoms of assembly and
association and infringe on due process, such as by enabling indefinite detention without charge.9
Observers assert that political repression has intensified since Biya won a seventh term in 2018.10
According State Department, those polls featured “intimidation of voters and representatives of
candidates at polling sites, late posting of polling sites and voter lists, bal ot stuffing, voters with
multiple registration, and a lack of transparency in the vote tal ying process.”11 After the vote,
second-place finisher Maurice Kamto of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC)—which
has become the main opposition force as the SDF’s influence has waned—refused the recognize
the result and cal ed for protests against al eged fraud. In early 2019, authorities arrested Kamto
and dozens of his supporters. Their detention attracted international criticism, including from U.S.
policymakers: in March 2019, then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy
cal ed publicly for Kamto’s release, and in July 2019, the House of Representatives agreed to
H.Res. 358, cal ing for the release of detained MRC members, among other measures.12 Biya
ordered the termination of proceedings against Kamto in late 2019, at the conclusion of a national
dialogue focused on the Anglophone conflict (see “The Anglophone Conflict,” below).
Authorities have continued to curtail the activity of the MRC and other opposition groups. In late
2020, authorities detained hundreds of MRC supporters and placed Kamto under house arrest for
nearly three months following peaceful protests ahead of regional elections.13 Journalists also

7 ICG, Cameroon: Fragile State? 2010.
8 According to the State Department, Cameroonian authorities have “ cited laws against terrorism or protecting national
security to arrest or punish critics of the government ” (State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Hum an Rights
Practices: Cam eroon, 2020). See also Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) annual reports.
9 Committee to Protect Journalists, Journalists Not Terrorists, 2017.
10 See, e.g., HRW, “World Report 2020: Cameroon,” 2020, and HRW, “World Report 2021: Cameroon,” 2021.
11 State Department, 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon , 2019.
12 RFI, “Le ‘Monsieur Afrique’ de Donald T rump entame une tournée sur le continent,” March 4, 2019.
13 T he State Department reports that authorities arrested 593 MRC members in connection with those protests. State
Department, 2020 Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Cam eroon , 2021.
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have faced harassment and arrest, including for reporting on the Anglophone conflict. In a case
that garnered congressional attention, police detained reporter Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe (known as
Wazizi) in mid-2019 for al egedly supporting Anglophone separatists. Wazizi reportedly died in
military custody soon thereafter, but authorities did not report his death until the following year.14
President Biya’s Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) party holds large majorities
in the National Assembly, Senate (provided for in the 1996 constitution and inaugurated in 2013),
and regional councils (inaugurated in 2020). Amid restrictions on opposition to Biya within the
electoral arena, many analysts have focused attention on political dynamics within the president’s
inner circle, particularly in relation to Biya’s eventual succession; some have raised concern over
the potential for heightened instability due to political power struggles should Biya die or become
incapacitated in office. More broadly, observers have expressed alarm over rising ethno-regional
tensions in Cameroon: according to the International Crisis Group, the struggle between Kamto
and Biya has spurred tensions between the economical y influential Bamileke ethnic group in the
central highlands, to which Kamto belongs, and the Bulu and Beti—southern ethnic groups
perceived as loyal to Biya, an ethnic Bulu. Hate speech, including on social media, has inflamed
tensions and raised concerns about the potential for violence along ethno-regional lines.15
Security and Humanitarian Conditions
Prior to 2013, when Boko Haram began to operate more openly in the country’s north, Cameroon
had enjoyed a reputation for general stability in a Central African sub-region that has experienced
recurrent conflicts and humanitarian crises. As insecurity has since proliferated in Cameroon,
some analysts have debated the effectiveness of what many observers have characterized as a
militarized state response to security threats in the north and, more recently, the predominately
Anglophone west. As discussed below, the Anglophone conflict, in particular, also has fueled
debates over the viability of Cameroon’s unitary, heavily centralized governance system.
Cameroon’s security crises have generated high levels of displacement and humanitarian need in
the north and Anglophone regions. As of August 2021, the U.N. refugee agency estimated that
roughly 341,000 Cameroonians were displaced in the Far North region, which also hosts nearly
114,000 Nigerian refugees.16 Roughly 711,000 Cameroonians were displaced in the Anglophone
North West and South West, with nearly 70,000 more living as refugees across the border in
southern Nigeria. Separately, eastern Cameroon hosts around 330,000 refugees fleeing protracted
conflicts in neighboring Central African Republic (CAR). Residents in eastern Cameroon have
faced periodic cross-border raids, kidnappings, and other threats from CAR-based militias.
Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA)
Boko Haram’s presence in Cameroon reportedly dates to at least 2009, the year it launched an
uprising against the Nigerian state.17 By 2013, it had expanded its activities in Cameroon’s
predominately Muslim Far North region from recruitment and logistical operations to include
kidnappings for ransom, notably targeting foreigners. Biya declared war on Boko Haram in 2014.

14 Reporters Without Borders, “ Cameroonian journalist Samuel Wazizi died in detention,” June 4, 2020. S.Res. 684,
which passed the Senate during the 116th Congress, highlighted Wazizi’s case in the context of “ attacks on freedom of
the press and detention of journalists on politically motivated charges in recent years.”
15 ICG, Easing Cameroon’s Ethno-political Tensions, On and Offline, December 3, 2020.
16 UNHCR, “Operational Portal: Cameroon,” accessed September 14, 2021.
17 ICG, Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram. For background on Boko Haram and IS-WA, see CRS In Focus IF10173,
Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province.
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Attacks in Cameroon attributed to Boko Haram and IS-WA—which split from Boko Haram in
2016, and has become the stronger faction—have since fluctuated, declining under pressure from
Cameroonian and regional forces in 2015-2017 but intensifying from late 2018, as the groups
reasserted their presence along Cameroon’s northern border with Nigeria.
IS-WA has established itself as the stronger of the two groups in northern Cameroon and the Lake
Chad Basin region more broadly. In May 2021, IS-WA militants reportedly kil ed Boko Haram
leader Abubakar Shekau, prompting many former Boko Haram fighters, family members, and
unaffiliated residents of former Boko Haram-controlled areas to surrender to Nigerian and
Cameroonian authorities.18 In July 2021, Cameroonian officials warned that militants appeared to
be increasingly targeting state security personnel, as opposed to civilians, a pattern some analysts
have attributed to strategic shifts and factional shakeups in the wake of Shekau’s death.19
Several factors may have contributed to Boko Haram’s entry into Cameroon and the resilience of
armed Islamist threats in the country’s north. Porous borders and ethnic, linguistic, and religious
ties along the frontier between northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon have long permitted
cross-border movements of people, commerce, and ideologies. (Muslims comprise roughly one-
fifth of Cameroon’s population, which is largely Christian, and are primarily concentrated in the
north.20) Before Boko Haram launched its uprising in Nigeria in 2009, some members reportedly
may have used the Far North as a safe haven, and the group began to recruit more openly there in
2010-2011.21 Perceived marginalization among residents of the Far North—which has the highest
poverty rate and lowest literacy rate of any region in Cameroon22—may strengthen the appeal of
anti-government messages and incentives that may accompany membership in Islamist armed
groups, such as financial support or social standing.
Some observers have expressed concerns that the Cameroonian government’s response to Boko
Haram and IS-WA may have served further to alienate communities in the north. Such measures
have included restrictions on cross-border movements, the closure of markets, mosques, and
schools, and a ban on the wearing of full-face veils, which together have disrupted economic
activity and reportedly stoked local perceptions of official anti-Muslim bias.23 As discussed below
(see “Security Force Abuses and Other Concerns”), government forces also have been implicated
in extensive abuses during counterterrorism operations in the north, which may further fuel local
grievances, and some personnel have reportedly redeployed to the west since the onset of the
Anglophone conflict in 2017, drawing resources away from counterterrorism efforts in the north.
The Anglophone Conflict
Since 2017, the emergence of a separatist rebel ion in western Cameroon has drawn attention
away from insecurity in the north, while also heightening concerns about Cameroon’s stability
and the behavior of its security forces. Unrest began in 2016, as members of the English-speaking
minority—who comprise roughly 20% of Cameroon’s total population but predominate in the

18 Nigerian authorities were unable to confirm Shekau’s death, which had previously been incorrectly reported on
several occasions, but stated in August 2021 that it was “ safe to assume” Shekau was dead. Jeff Seldin, “ Nigeria Says
'Safe to Assume' Boko Haram Leader Is Dead,” VOA, August 24, 2021.
19 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon Says Boko Haram Attacks Military, Seduces Civilians,” VOA, July 30, 2021.
20 T here are also significant Muslim populations in parts of West region and some southern cities. State Depar tment,
2020 Report on International Religious Freedom : Cam eroon , 2021.
21 ICG, Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram .
22 Cameroon National Institute of Statistics and ICF, Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Cameroun 2018 , 2020.
23 ICG, Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram.
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western North West and South West regions, commonly known as the Anglophone regions—
launched demonstrations against perceived anti-Anglophone bias in state institutions. Protests
initial y centered on the appointment of French-speaking magistrates to English-speaking courts
and other al eged infringements of Cameroon’s “bijural” justice system, in which the Anglophone
regions operate under British common law while the rest of the country follows French civil
law.24 Teachers and students also mobilized, voicing grievances concerning al eged discrimination
in the education sector, and began boycotting schools in late 2016. The government responded by
arresting hundreds and prosecuting prominent civil society activists on security charges.25 By
early 2017, some armed separatists began to violently enforce the school boycott and other forms
of civil disobedience, such as weekly stay-at-home actions known as “ghost towns.”26
In October 2017, protesters marked the anniversary of the 1961 merger of the Anglophone and
Francophone regions (see “Historical Background and Politics”) by symbolical y proclaiming the
independence of the North West and South West. Cameroonian security forces reportedly kil ed
several protesters.27 According to some analysts, the government’s response helped strengthen the
position of armed separatists vis-à-vis more moderate, non-violent Anglophone activists who
have continued to cal for a transition to federalism and other political solutions to Anglophone
grievances.28 Armed attacks by separatist groups subsequently escalated and factions proliferated,
each claiming to fight for an independent state of “Ambazonia,” a reference to a bay that once
marked the boundary between French- and British-held colonial territories, or “Southern
Cameroons,” as the Anglophone regions were known under British colonial administration.
The ensuing conflict between government forces and a fractious array of Anglophone rebel
groups has displaced hundreds of thousands of people and has raised charges of extensive abuses
against civilians by al parties. Armed separatists reportedly have kil ed hundreds of security force
personnel and kidnapped or kil ed al eged government sympathizers, civil servants, traditional
leaders, health workers, and humanitarians. Schools, an emblem of state authority and language
policy, have been a focus of separatist attacks. Some rebel commanders reportedly reside outside
Cameroon, and members of the diaspora in Europe and the United States have reportedly played a
role in fundraising for armed groups (see Text Box). State security forces, meanwhile, have been
accused of extrajudicial kil ings, torture, and other abuses during counterinsurgency efforts.
The Separatist Movement: Size, Factions, and the Role of the Diaspora
Considerable uncertainty exists regarding the size and composition of the Anglophone separatist movement.
Among other chal enges, access constraints and violence against journalists have hindered reporting in conflict-
affected areas, impeding such assessments. A 2019 International Crisis Group (ICG) report estimated that there
were between 2,000 and 4,000 armed separatists, divided between more than a dozen groups—some larger
(roughly 200-500 fighters), with others consisting of several dozen combatants.29 According to the ICG’s report,
“[a]bout 20 smal er semi-criminal, semi-separatist groups also exist and have a few dozen members.”
Some, but not al , armed factions are al ied with political formations that each claim to represent the genuine
leadership of the would-be Anglophone breakaway state. These include the Interim Government of Ambazonia led

24 On bijuralism in Cameroon, see Charles Manga Fombad, “Managing Legal Diversity: Cameroonian Bijuralism at a
Critical Crossroads” in Mixed Legal System s, East and West, ed. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mohamed Y. Mattar, and
Anna Koppel (London, UK: Routledge, 2015): 101 -119.
25 Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA), Cameroon’s Unfolding Catastrophe: Evidence of
Hum an Rights Violations and Crim es Against Hum anity, June 2019.
26 AI, A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations in Anglophone Cameroon , 2018.
27 AI, “Cameroon: Seventeen killed following protests in Anglophone regions,” October 2, 2017.
28 ICG, Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: Dialogue Remains the Only Viable Solution , December 21, 2017.
29 ICG, Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?
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by Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, imprisoned in Cameroon since January 2018; the Interim Government of Ambazonia
led by Samuel Ikome Sako, who split from Ayuk Tabe after a leadership dispute in 2019; and the Ambazonia
Governing Council, led by Ayaba Cho Lucas.30 Rifts within the separatist movement have impeded the pursuit of
peace negotiations and periodical y led to fighting on the ground between rival separatist factions.
The crisis has galvanized Anglophone Cameroonian diaspora populations living abroad, including in the United
States. Diaspora activism has arguably been significant in drawing attention to the conflict—including attention
from Members of Congress representing constituencies with Cameroonian diaspora populations. ( The foreign-
born Cameroonian population in the United States is concentrated in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area,
fol owed by Dal as-Fort Worth, Atlanta, and Houston metropolitan areas.31) The role of some diaspora members
in contributing to the violence also has garnered attention among analysts and policymakers. Several separatist
leaders reportedly live abroad, including in the United States. According to ICG, Anglophone armed groups were
“[i]nitial y funded almost exclusively by the diaspora” during the early stages of conflict.32 Armed groups’ financial
reliance on the diaspora has reportedly declined as factions have increasingly self-funded (e.g., through kidnapping
for ransom). It is unclear to what extent diaspora-based separatist leaders exert control over armed groups on
the ground.33 Diaspora members remain prominent within the separatist political leadership, and some have
engaged in hate speech and misinformation related to the conflict on social media. Some advocates have cal ed for
the United States and other countries to take action against diaspora members implicated in inciting violence.34
Attempts at Settlement: The 2019 “National Dialogue” and Peace Talks
To date, little progress toward a political settlement to the Anglophone conflict has been apparent.
Divisions within the separatist movement and hardliners on each side of the conflic t complicate
the path toward negotiations, as does the presence of criminal actors who profit from the violence
through extortion and kidnapping for ransom. The Biya government held a political dialogue
aimed at resolving the conflict in late 2019 (see below), but appears intent on pursuing a military
solution to the crisis. Many separatist leaders continue to publicly reject any solution short of
independence for the Anglophone regions. Moderate, non-violent activists have come under
pressure from both sides, amid repression and political marginalization by the government and
accusations of betrayal by armed separatists.35
National Dialogue. In September 2019, President Biya announced plans for a “major national
dialogue” focused on the Anglophone conflict. Many analysts expressed doubt over the likely
impact of the talks, citing the limited time for preparation (the event was held three weeks after it
was announced), inadequate incentives and protections to encourage participation by separatists
and moderate Anglophones, and concerns over the credibility of the facilitator, Prime Minister
Joseph Dion Ngute.36 Despite Biya’s pledge to convene a range of stakeholders for the dialogue,

30 R. Maxwell Bone, “ Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements,” The New
Hum anitarian, July 8, 2020.
31 U.S. Census Bureau, 2019 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates. CRS Analyst in Immigration Policy Jill
H. Wilson assisted in collecting and analyzing data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
32 ICG, Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?
33 Ibid; HRW, “ Armed Separatists’ Abuse Rife in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions,” March 28, 2019.
34 HRW, “ These Killings Can Be Stopped”: Abuses by Government and Separatist Groups in Cameroon’s Anglophone
Regions, 2018; U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Simon -Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, Risk of Mass
Atrocities in Cam eroon, 2020.
35 For example, Anglophone lawyer Felix Agbor Nkongho (also known as Agbor Balla)—a prominent advocate of
federalism—was arrested in 2017 on charges of terrorism that were later dropped, and in 2020 was dismissed from his
university teaching position, allegedly in relation to an exam question on the Anglophone conflict (HRW, “ No Room
for Debate in Cameroon Classrooms,” May 1, 2020). Separatist groups, for their part, have accused Nkongho of
betraying the Anglophone cause in connection with his reporting on human rights abuses by separatist groups.
36 See, e.g., ICG, “ Cameroon’s Anglophone Dialogue: A Work in Progress,” September 26, 2019; R. Maxwell Bone
and Akem Kelvin Nkwain, “ Why Cameroon’s national dialogue will accomplish nothing,” African Arguments,
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key opposition and separatist leaders remained in prison. These included opposition leader
Maurice Kamto and separatist leader Ayuk Tabe. Separatists based in Cameroon and the diaspora
ultimately did not attend; some moderate Anglophones also declined or walked out of the event.
The weeklong dialogue resulted in a series of proposals aimed at stemming the conflict. These
included granting “special status” to the North West and South West, entailing greater autonomy
over local affairs, and other measures focused on political decentralization, the reconstruction and
development of the Anglophone regions, the return of displaced people, and the reintegration of
combatants.37 At the end of the dialogue, Biya ordered the termination of proceedings against
Kamto and the release of over 300 people arrested in connection with the Anglophone conflict.
The dialogue did little to resolve tensions. Separatist attacks surged after the event, and legislative
and regional elections held in February and December 2020, respectively, featured violence and
opposition boycotts.38 Pledged devolution efforts have been slow to progress, and may be
insufficient to meet Anglophone demands for greater autonomy.39 More broadly, analysts have
questioned both the sufficiency of pledged reforms and the commitment of the Biya government
to enact meaningful devolution and other concessions.40 That past decentralization efforts faced
delays and an apparent lack of commitment on the part of the Biya administration also has bred
distrust. For instance, one pledge emerging from the dialogue, the creation of regional councils ,
was mandated in the 1996 constitution but went unimplemented until 2020. Regional council
members have accused the central government of failing to provide funds for the bodies.41
Peace Talks. In June 2019, the Swiss government and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, a
Swiss organization, announced that they were facilitating negotiations between the government
and some armed groups.42 That effort has yielded little, if any, tangible progress, and may be
stal ed. Separately, in 2020, some government officials reportedly initiated direct peace talks with
Ayuk Tabe, whose faction has rejected the Swiss effort as biased toward the government.43 The
government later denied those reports, casting doubt on the viability of that process.
Security Force Abuses and Other Concerns
Government forces have reportedly committed extensive human rights abuses during operations
in the north and the Anglophone regions. Recent State Department annual human rights reports
have documented extrajudicial kil ings, forced disappearances, and torture and other cruel
treatment by state security forces.44 The U.S. Embassy condemned and cal ed for investigation
into some widely publicized incidents, such as a February 2020 massacre in Ngarbuh (North West

September 30, 2019.
37 Rapporteur General of the Major National Dialogue, “Major National Dialogue - Recommendations to Restore
Peace, Stability and Development ,” Cam eroon Tribune, October 7, 2019.
38 T he MRC boycotted the February 2020 legislative election, and both the MRC and SDF boycotted regional elections
in December 2020.
39 Jeune Afrique, “Au Cameroun, la décentralisation lancée par Paul Biya est en suspens,” June 22, 2020 .
40 R. Maxwell Bone, “Paul Biya Is Offering Cameroon’s Anglophones T oo Little, T oo Late,” Foreign Policy,
November 21, 2020.
41 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “ Cameroon Regional Councils Starved of Resources to Solve Anglophone Separatist Crisis,”
VOA, May 19, 2021.
42 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “ Swiss facilitation process in Cameroon,” June 27, 2019.
43 R. Maxwell Bone, “ Cameroon’s elusive peace: Rivals, rifts, and secret talks,” New Humanitarian, March 29, 2021.
44 See, e.g., State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2014-2021.
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region), in which security forces and al ied militia kil ed more than 20 civilians, and a mass rape
by military personnel during a March 2020 raid in Ebam (South West).45
Arbitrary detentions and detainee abuses have attracted particular attention from international
media and human rights groups. In 2016, Amnesty International accused Cameroonian security
forces of arbitrarily arresting hundreds of people they accused of supporting Boko Haram “often
with little or no evidence,” subjecting them to life-threatening prison conditions and torture, and
violating their legal rights.46 In 2019, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and others
documented instances of arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, and torture of Anglophone
separatists as wel as opposition members in a gendarmerie detention facility in Yaoundé.47
Separately, Cameroonian peacekeepers (and other foreign troops) serving in neighboring CAR
have been implicated in sexual exploitation and abuse.48
Reported abuses have implicated elements of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), an elite
military unit that has received U.S. counterterrorism training and other support. (The BIR was
established in 2001 to address banditry and other criminality, particularly in border areas; BIR
personnel began receiving U.S. training in the mid-2000s.49) In 2017, Amnesty International
accused BIR personnel of extrajudicial kil ings and torture, including at a facility in the Far North
where it al eged that U.S. military forces were regularly present during the period in which such
incidents reportedly occurred.50 U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) denied knowledge of
abuses.51 Human rights groups also have accused BIR personnel of abuses in the Anglophone
conflict, including extrajudicial kil ings, rape, torture, the looting and destruction of homes and
other property, and the desecration of heritage sites.52
Security force abuses have triggered restrictions on U.S. security assistance, including support for
the BIR, pursuant to the U.S. “Leahy Laws,” and in 2019 prompted the United States to terminate
some planned security assistance for Cameroon (see “U.S. Relations and Assistance,” below).
Observers have raised concerns over the possible diversion, to the Anglophone regions, of
materiel provided by the United States and other donor countries to support counterterrorism
efforts in the north. For instance, analysts al ege that U.S.-provided vehicles and aircraft have

45 U.S. Embassy in Yaoundé, “ U.S. Condemns Killings in Ngarbuh,” February 20, 2020 and “ U.S. Deeply Disturbed by
Reports of Abuses in Ebam,” March 2, 2021.
46 AI, Right Cause, Wrong Means: Human Rights Violated and Justice Denied in Cameroon’s Fight Against Boko
Haram , July 2016.
47 HRW, “Cameroon: Routine T orture, Incommunicado Detention,” May 6, 2019; HRW, “Cameroon: Detainees
T ortured,” August 20, 2019; AI, “ Cameroon: Nearly 60 opposition members tortured by security forces,” July 26,
2019; Emmanuel Freudenthal, “ Inside Cameroon’s Bunker: ‘Different guys had different torture techniques,’” African
Argum ents, May 7, 2019.
48 Jennifer Peltz, “ UN seeks inquiry into new claims of peacekeeper sexual abuse,” AP, October 5, 2018.
49 T he BIR supplanted the Light Intervention Battalion, established in 1999. On the creation of the BIR and early
human rights concerns, see The New Hum anitarian, “ IRIN Focus on banditry,” August 2, 2002 and “ Rapid intervention
military unit strays from its mission,” August 29, 2008. On early U.S. training for the BIR, see State Department,
Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagem ent Activities of Interest, 2005 -2006, 2006, and subsequent reports.
50 AI, Cameroon’s Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Fight Against Boko
Haram , July 2017.
51 Conor Gaffey, “ U.S. Military Denies Knowledge of Boko Haram Suspects 'T orture' at Base Used by American
T roops,” Newsweek, July 20, 2017.
52 HRW, “ Cameroon: New Attacks on Civilians By T roops, Separatists,” March 28, 2019; Center for Human Rights
and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA) and Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights, Cam eroon’s Unfolding
Catastrophe: Evidence of Hum an Rights Violations and Crim es against Hum anity , June 2019; HRW, “ World Heritage
Site Attacked in Cameroon,” October 11, 2019.
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been relocated from the Far North to the west.53 U.S. officials have stated that Cameroonian
authorities have offered assurances that U.S. assistance would not be diverted from its intended
use.54 The State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has documented chal enges
with the oversight of some U.S.-provided military equipment intended for use in counterterrorism
efforts in the north (see “Counterterrorism Cooperation and other Security Assistance”).
The Economy
Cameroon is rich in natural resources. The economy relies heavily on primary commodity
exports, notably of crude oil and petroleum products, including Chadian-origin oil exported via
the World Bank-financed Chad-Cameroon pipeline. Other exports include timber, aluminum, and
agricultural products such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, rubber, palm oil, and bananas. Cameroon
ranked 153 out of 189 countries on the 2020 U.N. Human Development Index, above many
African countries. Poverty in Cameroon is widespread. The World Bank reports that population
growth and a “lack of redistributive policies” have impeded poverty reduction; roughly a quarter
of Cameroonians live on less than $1.90 per day, according to World Bank estimates.55
The COVID-19 pandemic, low global oil prices, and conflict in the Anglophone regions have
weighed on Cameroon’s economic performance. Cameroon’s economy contracted by -2.8% in
2020, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which projects a rebound to 3.6%
growth in 2021—though this outlook remains highly uncertain.56 Cameroon’s recovery may
depend on the government’s ability to manage the continued public health threat of COVID-19.
Conflict in the Anglophone regions, a hub for coffee, cocoa, rubber, banana, and palm oil
production, has hampered agricultural output. Cameroon’s agribusiness state-owned enterprise
(SOE), the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC)—the second largest employer after the
government—is headquartered in the South West, and has been attacked by armed separatists.57
Armed conflict has damaged Cameroon’s development outlook and imparted a humanitarian and
social cost. Population displacements and other conflict-related disruptions to farming have been
a key chal enge for women, around 40% of whom work in agriculture.58 The United Nations and
others have raised concerns over sexual violence in conflict, particularly targeting women and
girls.59 (Several prominent women-led groups have mobilized to cal for improved security and
human rights conditions.60) More broadly, women in Cameroon continue to face social biases and

53 Chris W.J. Roberts and Billy Burton, “Cameroon’s Government Is Deceiving the West While Diverting Foreign
Aid,” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2020; Billy Burton, “ Has the Anglophone Crisis Diverted Cameroon’s Resources
from Fighting Boko Haram?” T he Anglophone Crisis Monitoring Project , November 22, 2020.
54 Siobhán O'Grady, “Divided by Language,” Washington Post, February 5, 2019.
55 World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook: Cameroon, April 2021; IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2021.
56 IMF, Requests for Three-Year Arrangements Under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility,
July 2021.
57 In October 2019, for instance, suspected separatists reportedly assaulted six workers and kidnapped four o thers in an
attack on a CDC plantation (CHRDA, “Statement on the Assault of CDC Workers in T iko Rubber Plantation, the
Southwest Region of Cameroon). In August 2020, suspected separatists reportedly abducted a CDC manager and three
of his guards, killed a child, and burned the manager’s home in an attack on a CDC settlement in Littoral region, which
borders the South West (Cam eroon Tribune, “ Penda-Mboko - Suspected Separatists Arrested,” August 24, 2020).
58 Cameroon National Institute of Statistics and ICF, Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Cameroun 2018 , 2020.
59 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 2020, S/2021/312, March 30, 2021.
60 See, e.g., VOA, “Cameroon Women Appeal to the UN Security Council to Discuss Escalating Crises,” June 5, 2021;
Corinne Aurelie Moussi, “ Women, Peace and Security in Cameroon: the missing voices of the Anglophone Crisis,”
London School of Econom ics Blog, November 27, 2020.
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other impediments to economic advancement, despite laws prohibiting discrimination; the State
Department reports that in 2020, for instance, “the overal sociocultural practice of denying
women the right to own land, especial y through inheritance, was prevalent in most regions.”61
SOEs are active in other sectors, including telecommunications, energy, and mining, and “tend to
have quasi-monopoly or monopsony status in their markets,” according to the State Department.62
Observers have expressed concern over mismanagement and corruption w ithin Cameroon’s SOEs
and other state institutions.63 Little information on SOE finances is public, though many
reportedly operate at a loss.64 Loss-making SOEs reportedly include the state oil refinery, the
National Refining Company (SONARA), which the IMF considers “systemical y important.”65 In
2019, a fire at a facility led SONARA to suspend operations, and the facility remained partly
offline as of mid-2021.66 Cameroonian authorities have restructured some of SONARA’s debt.
Cameroon’s debt burden has risen in recent years to reach an estimated 46% of GDP in 2021.67
China is Cameroon’s top bilateral creditor, holding nearly one-fifth of its total debt stock.68
The government has solicited financial support from the IMF, which approved $382 mil ion in
pandemic-related emergency loans for Cameroon in 2020—separate from a three-year, $590
mil ion IMF extended credit facility (ECF) loan package that ended in late 2020.69 Amid reports
in mid-2020 that health facilities were experiencing shortages of basic equipment, observers and
opposition politicians accused the government of diverting or mismanaging COVID-19 response
funds, including IMF emergency loans.70 The “Covidgate” affair, as the al egations became
known, prompted an audit by a Supreme Court investigative body that reportedly identified
significant irregularities in the use of funds by several ministries and recommended a criminal
inquiry.71 The Special Criminal Court, mandated to investigate the misappropriation of public
funds, has since opened an investigation into the al egations. Some human rights advocates urged
the IMF to withhold budget support to Cameroon pending a transparent inquiry into the

61 State Department, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
62 State Department, “ 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Cameroon,” 2021. T he legislature passed a law in 2017
(Law No. 2017/011) intended to improve the management and effectiveness of public corporations, but t he State
Department reports that “[a]s of 2021, it does not appear that any of these objectives have been completed.”
63 See, e.g., Moki Kindzeka, “Conflicts and corruption in Cameroon drain the economy ,” January 23, 2019; State
Department, “ 2021 Investment Climate Statements.”
64 State Department, “ 2021 Investment Climate Statements.” See also State Department, “2021 Fiscal T ransparency
Report: Cameroon,” 2021.
65 IMF, Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for a Waiver of No nobservance of a
Perform ance Criterion and Modification of Perform ance Criteria —Debt Sustainability Analysis, January 2020.
66 Elza T urner, “Refinery News Roundup: New refinery, hydrogen projects in Africa,” S&P Global, July 12, 2021.
67 IMF, Cameroon: Requests for Three-Year Arrangements Under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund
Facility, July 2021.
68 Ibid.
69 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves a US$226 million Disbursement to Cameroon to Address the impact of the
COVID-19 Pandemic,” May 4, 2020, and “ IMF Executive Board Approves a US$ 156 million New Disbursement for
Cameroon to Address the impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” October 21, 2020. T he ECF arrangement was approved
at a value of $666 million, but Cameroon did not complet e a sixth review necessary for the release of the final tranche
of funds. IMF, Cam eroon: Request for Disbursem ent Under the Rapid Credit Facility, October 5, 2020.
70 HRW, “ Cameroon: Investigate, Distribute Health Fund,” June 12, 2020; Sarah Saadoun, “ In Cameroon, Government
Secrecy in the Management of Funds Destined for Covid-19 Response,” HRW, September 24, 2020.
71 T he audit was not made public, though a (nonpublic) purported summary was widely circulated in Cameroonian
media. See Reuters, “ Cameroon stat e audit questions ministries' use of COVID-19 funds, says report ,” May 21, 2021.
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expenditure of COVID-19 funds and other anti-corruption measures.72 In July 2021, the IMF
approved a new three-year, $689.5 mil ion loan program for Cameroon.73 Under the program,
Cameroon is to publicly release the Supreme Court’s audit of COVID-19-related expenditures by
December 2021, among other efforts to boost the transparency of state finances.
U.S. Relations and Assistance
The State Department describes U.S.-Cameroon relations as “positive” but “adversely affected by
concerns over human rights abuses, in particular in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest
Regions, and the pace of political and economic liberalization.”74 Prior to the regional expansion
of the Boko Haram crisis in 2014, U.S.-Cameroon policy focused on “finding ways to influence
the Cameroonian Government to adopt political reforms,” according to then-Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson.75 After 2014, bilateral relations came to emphasize
counterterrorism cooperation. U.S. security assistance and military sales increased (see below),
and some 300 U.S. military personnel deployed to northern Cameroon in 2015 to conduct
regional intel igence, surveil ance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.76 That deployment ended
in early 2020, as part of the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce and reorient the U.S.
military presence in Africa.77
Annual State Department and USAID-administered assistance for Cameroon has increased over
the past decade. USAID added Cameroon as a President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) focus country
in 2017 and, in 2019, USAID upgraded its presence in Cameroon to an office (a bilateral USAID
mission in Cameroon closed in 1994). According to public budget materials, State Department
and USAID-administered assistance for Cameroon included $66.2 mil ion in FY2020
appropriations. Health programs comprised over 90% of this total; the balance included funds for
democracy and governance programs ($4.0 mil ion) and military professionalization ($800,000).
The Biden Administration requested $114.2 mil ion for Cameroon in FY2022.78 These figures do
not include emergency assistance provided in response to Cameroon’s humanitarian and
displacement crises, which public budget materials do not disaggregate by country.
Counterterrorism Cooperation and other Security Assistance
Public budget materials do not provide country-level funding data on U.S. security assistance
provided through regional y and central y managed programs, the primary vehicles through which
Cameroon has received U.S. counterterrorism training and equipment. This arguably poses a
chal enge for congressional oversight, and makes it difficult to comprehensively assess the scale

72 HRW, “ IMF: Make Cameroon Loan Contingent on Anti-Corruption,” June 18, 2021.
73 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves US$ 689.5 Million Arrangements Under the Extended Credit Fa cility and
Extended Fund Facility for Cameroon,” July 29, 2021.
74 State Department, “U.S. Relations with Cameroon,” December 20, 2019.
75 T estimony of Assistant Secretary Carson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African
Affairs, “ Examining the U.S. Policy Response to Entrenched African Leadership,” 112 th Cong., 2nd sess., April 18,
2012.
76 White House, “Letter From T he President -- War Powers Resolution Regarding Cameroon,” October 14, 2015.
77 On U.S.-Africa engagement during the T rump Administration, see CRS Report R45428, Sub-Saharan Africa: Key
Issues and U.S. Engagem ent, coordinated by T omás F. Husted.
78 State Department annual budget justifications for Department of State and Foreign Operations.
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and scope of counterterrorism or other security assistance for Cameroon.79 The State Department
added Cameroon as a partner country under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) in 2014 and the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) in 2016. Over the past
decade, Cameroon also has ranked as a top African recipient of Department of Defense (DOD)
global train-and-equip assistance (authorized under 10 U.S.C. 333).80 The country has received
additional support under the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), administered jointly by
the State Department and DOD, among other U.S. security assistance programs.
Since 2015, U.S. security assistance funding has provided Cameroon with, among other materiel,
Cessna aircraft and accompanying modifications to support ISR capabilities, ScanEagle
unmanned aerial vehicle systems, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other vehicles, and
logistics equipment.81 Cameroonian personnel have received U.S. specialized counterterrorism
training, such as in explosive ordinance disposal.82 The United States has provided logistics and
advisory support for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional force combating
Boko Haram and IS-WA comprising troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin.
The United States has provided Cameroon with training and equipment to support maritime
security operations in the Gulf of Guinea, which rank among the world’s most dangerous waters
for piracy and other criminality.83 The United States provided several small naval vessels to
Cameroon in 2017, and more recently approved a transfer of two former Coast Guard cutters to
Cameroon under the Excess Defense Articles program.84 Cameroon’s military has received
additional U.S. support in the context of its peacekeeping deployments, the largest of which is to
CAR, with 750 troops and 277 police deployed there as of July 2021.85
U.S. “Leahy laws,” which prohibit the provision of U.S. security assistance to security force units
implicated in gross violations of human rights, have precluded some Cameroonian personnel,
including selected BIR units, from receiving certain types of U.S. security assistance.86 In 2020,
the State Department designated Cameroon under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA, Title
IV of P.L. 110-457) for its recruitment and use of child soldiers, a designation that can trigger
restrictions on U.S. security assistance. The Trump Administration waived such restrictions for
Cameroon for FY2021, and the State Department removed Cameroon from the CSPA list in 2021.
In 2020, the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) identified various
deficiencies in the management of assistance under TSCTP.87 Based on a review of eight TSCTP

79 See CRS Report R46368, U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview, coordinated by T omás F. Husted.
80 CRS assessment based on DOD notifications to Congress of planned security cooperation activities.
81 DOD contract announcements provide detail on these procurements. On the Cessna aircraft, see DOD, “ Contracts
For Sept. 21, 2016,” September 21, 2016, and “ Contracts For May 9, 2016,” May 9, 2016. On the ScanEagle systems,
see DOD, “ Contracts For Sept. 29, 2015,” September 29, 2015. On the APCs and other vehicles, see DOD, “Contracts
For Sept. 25, 2015,” September 25, 2015, and DOD, “ Contracts For Sept. 23, 2016,” September 23, 2016. On support
for logistics systems, see DOD, “ Contracts For April 20, 2017,” April 20, 2017. Media have reported delivery of other
U.S.-provided material (see, e.g., Jane’s, “ Cameroon’s Bastion APCs now in action,” June 6, 2018).
82 See, e.g., DOD, “ Cameroon’s T roops Learn About Counter-Bomb Operations,” November 24, 2017.
83 CRS In Focus IF11117, Gulf of Guinea: Recent Trends in Piracy and Armed Robbery, by T omás F. Husted.
84 U.S. Embassy Yaoundé, “ U.S. Contributes to Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security,” January 21, 2020; U.S. Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, Excess Defense Articles database, accessed September 15, 2021.
85 U.N. Peacekeeping, “T roop and Police Contributors,” accessed September 15, 2021.
86 See response by then-U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon Michael S. Hoza in AI, Cameroon’s Secret T orture Chambers.
See also CRS In Focus IF10575, Hum an Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”).
87 State OIG, Audit of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs Monitoring and Coordination of the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program , 2020.
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awards, the report identified potential wasteful spending of $201.6 mil ion due to mismanagement
and inadequate oversight. Of this total, $77.5 mil ion had funded programs in or involving
Cameroon. Moreover, OIG assessed that U.S. officials could not ensure that U.S.-provided
equipment was being used for its intended purpose. The OIG’s report documented that:
“OSC [Office of Security Cooperation] Chiefs in Cameroon and Niger did not have
information on the location of equipment awarded through the Logistical Support for
Counter Boko Haram project. The equipment included armored vehicles, spare parts, and
radio equipment, all of which are high-risk exports in United States Munitions List. They
were also not able to confirm if the equipment was being used as intended.”
U.S. Responses to Human Rights Concerns
Restrictions on Security Assistance. In early 2019, citing human rights concerns, the State
Department stated that it would withhold roughly $17 mil ion in planned security assistance for
Cameroon. Press reports indicated that affected funds included support for radar equipment, four
patrol boats, nine armored vehicles, and various aircraft training programs; DOD also reportedly
rescinded Cameroon’s eligibility for a National Guard State Partnership Program and withheld
some counterterrorism support.88 In congressional testimony after the decision was made public,
then-AFRICOM Commander General Thomas D. Waldhauser stated that Cameroon had “been a
good partner with us counterterrorism wise, but you can't neglect.. al eged atrocities.”89 He stated
that certain U.S. security assistance would continue, including support for ScanEagle unmanned
aerial vehicle systems and Cessna aircraft used in counterterrorism operations in the north.
Termination of African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Benefits. In 2019, President
Trump terminated Cameroon’s eligibility for duty-free access to the U.S. market under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended), pursuant to a
determination that “the Government of Cameroon currently engages in gross violations of
international y recognized human rights.”90 That termination took effect January 1, 2020.
Visa Restrictions Related to the Anglophone Conflict. U.S. officials have continued to cal for
an inclusive dialogue without preconditions focused on resolving the conflict in the Anglophone
regions.91 As violence has persisted, some have cal ed for the United States to impose sanctions
on individuals found responsible for inciting violence or committing human rights abuses; in the
116th Congress, S.Res. 684, passed by the Senate, urged the Department of State, Department of
the Treasury, and other U.S. agencies to “consider imposing targeted sanctions on individual
government and separatist leaders ‘responsible for extrajudicial kil ings, torture, or other gross
violations of international y recognized human rights.’” In June 2021, the State Department
announced a policy “imposing visa restrictions on [unnamed] individuals who are believed to be
responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the
Anglophone regions of Cameroon.”92

88 Ryan Browne and Jennifer Hansler, “US to cut aid to Cameroon due to alleged human rights violations,” CNN,
February 7, 2019.
89 T estimony of then-AFRICOM Commander General T homas D. Waldhauser before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, “United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command,” hearing, 116th Cong., 1st Sess.,
February 7, 2019.
90 White House, “Message to the Congress on T erminating the Designation of Cameroon as a Beneficiary Sub-Saharan
African Country Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act,” October 31, 2019.
91 State Department, “ U.S. Concerned Over Violence Uptick in Cameroon,” November 6, 2018.
92 State Department, “ Announcement of Visa Restrictions on T hose Undermining the Peaceful Resolution of the Crisis
in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon,” June 7, 2021.
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Recent Congressional Engagement
Congress has acted in response to reported security force abuses. Provisions in successive State,
Foreign Operations, and Other Programs appropriations measures (most recently, Division K of
P.L. 116-260, §7042b) have directed that Title IV (International Security Assistance) funds for
Cameroonian forces, including the BIR, “may only be made available to counter regional
terrorism, including Boko Haram and other Islamic State affiliates, participate in international
peacekeeping operations, and for military education and maritime security programs.” That
provision appears primarily intended to restrict U.S. support for units or capabilities that may be
used in the Anglophone conflict. The joint explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 also
directed the Secretary of State to submit quarterly reports to Congress “on the status of
investigations conducted by the Government of Cameroon of security force personnel who have
been credibly al eged to have committed, ordered, or covered up gross violations of human
rights,” and on security force units that have been denied aid pursuant to the Leahy laws.93
In 2019 and 2020, some Senators also proposed to amend annual National Defense Authorization
Acts (NDAAs) for FY2020 and FY2021, respectively, to restrict security assistance for Cameroon
until the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that such forces demonstrate improved
adherence to human rights standards, particular in the Anglophone regions.94 Similar to the
aforementioned §7042b, assistance for counterterrorism efforts in the Far North would have been
exempted from the restriction in these amendments. Neither amendment was adopted.
Immigration and Asylum-Seeker Issues
In 2020 and 2021, several Members of Congress expressed alarm over al eged mistreatment of
Cameroonian asylum-seekers by U.S. immigration authorities and the safety of those removed
from the United States.95 Some have expressed support for deportation relief for Cameroonian
asylum-seekers on humanitarian grounds, such as under Temporary Protected Status (TPS).96 In
April 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas reportedly stated that the Biden
Administration was reviewing the possibility of granting TPS for Cameroonian nationals.97
Outlook and Issues for Congress
Congressional attention on Cameroon has mounted since 2017, as the Anglophone conflict has
heightened U.S. concerns with human rights and security force abuses in Cameroon and

93 Joint Explanatory Statement Accompanying Division K of P.L. 116-260, p. 2103.
94 Senators Richard Durbin, Ben Cardin, Chris Van Hollen, and T im Kaine proposed the amendment to the FY2020
NDAA (Office of Senator Durbin, “ Durbin, Cardin, Van Hollen, Kaine Introduce NDAA Amendment T o Halt Security
Assistance T o Cameroon,” June 25, 2019). Senators Durbin, Cardin, and Van Hollen proposed the amendment to the
FY2021 NDAA (Office of Senator Durbin, “ Durbin Joins Risch, Cardin In Condemning In Violence In Anglophone
Cameroon,” September 9, 2020).
95 See, for example, letter from Representatives Bennie T hompson and Karen Bass to T ony Pham, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, October 13, 2020; letter from
Senators Chris Van Hollen, Edward Markey, Chris Coons, and Ben Cardin to Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Chad Wolf, October 28, 2020; letter from Representative Jerrold Nadler and Zoe Lofgren to Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security David Pekoske, February 1, 2021.
96 See, for example, letter from Representatives Zoe Lofgren and Jerrold Nadler to Secretary of Homeland Security
Alejandro Mayorkas, July 30, 2021; Letter from Senator Van Hollen, Rep. Anthony Brown, and other Members to
President Biden and Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, February 17, 2021.
97 Geneva Sands, “ DHS reviewing humanitarian protections for Hait ians and others in the US,” CNN, April 30, 2021.
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Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy

galvanized the U.S.-based Cameroonian diaspora to cal for U.S. action in response to the
conflict. Congress has shaped U.S. engagement with Cameroon through its authorization and
appropriation of U.S. assistance, communications with the executive branch and Cameroonian
officials, and oversight activities, including a 2018 hearing on crises in Cameroon.98 During the
116th Congress, the House and Senate respectively passed H.Res. 358 and S.Res. 684, which each
largely focused on the Anglophone conflict and cal ed for a ceasefire, an end to human rights
abuses, and a credible dialogue. As noted, Congress also has acted to restrict State Department-
administered security assistance for Cameroon that may be used in the Anglophone regions.
Amid continued regional security threats, global health chal enges, and concern over security and
human rights conditions in Cameroon, Members may debate the merit of various policy tools for
advancing U.S. interests in the country. In light of claims that Cameroonian forces have diverted
U.S.-provided materiel from the north to the Anglophone regions, Members also may debate
whether current measures for monitoring the end-use of U.S. security assistance are sufficient to
ensure that U.S. equipment is put to its intended use.

Author Information

Tomás F. Husted

Analyst in African Affairs

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98 House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International
Organizations, Crisis in the Republic of Cam eroon, hearing, 115th Congress, 2nd sess, June 27, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
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