The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market
December 8, 2020
Implications for Women
Sarah A. Donovan
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic dramatical y disrupted the labor
Specialist in Labor Policy
force in early 2020 as businesses closed or reduced operations and consumer demand
shifted away from in-person commerce. The swift drop in economic activity translated
Marc Labonte
into widespread and massive employment loss. This report considers the implications for Specialist in
women, who disproportionately lost employment during the early months of the
Macroeconomic Policy
pandemic; as 2020 comes to a close, labor market data suggest that to some degree these
losses may be lasting.
Women’s employment declined by 17.8% (13.3 mil ion fewer women were employed)
between January 2020 and April 2020. In contrast, men’s employment declined by 14.3% between January and
April. Employment loss (as a share of January employment) for Black women and Hispanic women has been
considerable and exceeded that of other groups. Women’s employment has recovered to some extent since April,
with particularly large gains in October. In that month, women’s employment was 6% below January values, and
men’s employment was lower by about 5%. However, with COVID-19 cases spiking and new business
restrictions being reintroduced this fal , some of the recent employment gains could reverse in the near term. If so,
women may again bear a disproportionate burden of employment losses.
Two forces placed significant downward pressure on women’s employment in early 2020. First, women are more
concentrated in the jobs most affected by business closures and restrictions. Second, women appear to have
disproportionately reduced employment in response to caregiving needs, which increased as schools closed and
family members became il or needed assistance in quarantine.
In the near term, some women may disengage from the labor market or shift into work, to the extent that it is
available, that al ows them to minimize the likelihood of COVID-19 exposure or accommodate caregiving
responsibilities. These changes can have lasting impacts on women’s labor outcomes. Lower labor engagement
can lead to fewer opportunities for advancement (e.g., promotion, training) and less work experience, slowing
wage growth and affecting future employability. This can have lasting negative effects at the individual and
macroeconomic levels, including increased inequality—both between sexes and among women—and lost
productivity.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Labor Market Outcomes in 2020 ....................................................................................... 1
Women are Concentrated in the Most Affected Occupations and Industries......................... 2
COVID-19 Pandemic Caregiving and Women’s Labor Supply ......................................... 3
Women’s Employment Loss by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity ........................................... 6
Longer-Term Implications for Women in the Labor Force...................................................... 7
Effects on Current and Future Employment ................................................................... 7
Effects on Employment and Earnings Inequality............................................................. 9
Inequality Among Women ..................................................................................... 9
Employment and Earnings Gaps Between Women and Men ...................................... 11
Potential Macroeconomic Impacts ................................................................................... 12
Interaction with Long-Term Trends in Women’s Employment .............................................. 13
Figures
Figure 1. Employment Levels and Unemployment Rates, by Sex............................................ 1
Figure 2. Average Usual Hours Worked and Actual Hours Worked, by Sex .............................. 2
Figure 3. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020, by Sex and
the Presence of a Minor Child in the Worker’s Home ......................................................... 5
Figure 4. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020 among
Married and Unmarried Mothers..................................................................................... 5
Figure 5. Percentage Change in Women’s Employment since January 2020, by Race and
Hispanic Ethnicity ........................................................................................................ 6
Figure 6. Women’s Unemployment Rate, by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity ............................... 7
Tables
Table 1. Women’s Median Weekly Earnings and Percentage Change in Women’s
Employment, by Major Occupation Group ....................................................................... 9
Table A-1. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Industry ................... 15
Table A-2. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Occupation............... 16
Appendixes
Appendix. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Industry and
Occupation ................................................................................................................ 15
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 16
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Introduction
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic dramatical y disrupted the labor force in
early 2020 as businesses closed or reduced operations and consumer demand shifted away from
in-person commerce. The swift drop in economic activity translated into widespread and massive
employment loss. This report considers the implications for women, who disproportionately lost
employment during the early months of the pandemic; as 2020 comes to a close, labor market
data suggest that to some degree these losses may be lasting.
Labor Market Outcomes in 2020
Women’s employment declined sharply in early 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The number of employed women declined by 13.3 mil ion, a 17.8% drop, between January and
April (the month in which overal unemployment peaked), and women’s unemployment rate rose
to 16.2% (a 12.7 percentage point increase) over that period (Figure 1). Men’s employment
declined to a considerable but lesser extent than women’s. Between January and April, men’s
employment levels fel by 12 mil ion (a 14.3% decrease) and their unemployment rate rose to
13.5%.1
Employment levels have increased steadily since April 2020, but as of October women’s and
men’s employment were both more than 4 mil ion workers below January levels (4.6 mil ion for
women and 4.3 mil ion for men). Unemployment rates in October were more than three
percentage points above their January values. While women continued to be more affected by the
pandemic through October, the gender gap in (absolute) employment losses has closed partial y
since April. The upward trend in employment is welcome news, but the pandemic and its
economic impacts do not appear to be ending. With COVID-19 cases spiking and new business
restrictions being reintroduced in fal 2020, some of the recent employment gains could reverse in
the near term. If so, women may again bear a disproportionate burden of employment losses.
Figure 1. Employment Levels and Unemployment Rates, by Sex
January to October 2020
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notes: Sample is non-institutionalized civilian population, ages 16 and older. Data are seasonal y adjusted.
1 Unemployment may have been underreported because of misclassification error, especially early in the pandemic. For
more information, see CRS Insight IN11456, COVID-19: Measuring Unem ploym ent, by Lida R. Weinstock.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Among employed workers—both men and women—actual hours worked started to diverge from
usual hours worked staring in March 2020, with the largest gap in April.2 Thereafter, actual hours
worked started to rise, before dropping sharply in September for both sexes—possibly in response
to the start of the school year.3 Actual hours worked rose for both women and men between
September and October. In October, the gap between usual hours and actual hours worked
narrowed, but a portion of this was due to a decline in usual hours worked.
Figure 2. Average Usual Hours Worked and Actual Hours Worked, by Sex
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notes: Sample comprises the employed non-institutionalized civilian population, ages 16 and older. The rise in
usual hours worked in April 2020 likely reflects larger job losses among part-time workers.
Women are Concentrated in the Most Affected Occupations and
Industries
One reason that women’s employment dropped drastical y relative to men’s at the onset of the
pandemic is that industries and occupations most affected by the pandemic had high shares of
women workers. Between January and April 2020, the total number of employed workers (male
and female) declined by about 23.7 mil ion, with three industries making up more than half of
that loss (Table A-1). About 25% of lost employment was in leisure and hospitality, nearly 20%
was in education and health services, and almost 15% was in wholesale and retail trade. Large
losses in these sectors are not unexpected as they feature in-person services and commerce in
group settings, both of which were discouraged by public health guidance or restricted by state
laws. Women are disproportionately represented in two of these industries and comprise a large
share of the third: in January, women made up 74.5% of education and health services
employment, 51.8% of leisure and hospitality workers, and 44.5% of wholesale and retail trade
employment.
In terms of occupation, service jobs made up nearly one-third (33.2%) of total employment lost
between January and April 2020, and professional and related jobs made up another 14% (Table
A-2).4 Both occupational groups were majority female in January (58.6% and 56.4%,
2 T he Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects information on usual hours—the number of hours the respondent
typically works at their job per week; and actual hours—the number of hours they actually worked during the survey
reference week.
3 See the “ COVID-19 Pandemic Caregiving and Women’s Labor Supply” section for a discussion of how virtual
learning may interact with labor supply.
4 Per CPS occupational classification, the major occupation category service jobs includes health care support
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
respectively). In addition, sales and related jobs declined by almost 14% between January and
April, and women made up nearly half of these workers (49.2%).
Not only did women’s employment fal , but it fell disproportionately over the January to April
2020 period, such that the female share declined in several industries (including leisure and
hospitality, education and health services, and wholesale and retail trade) and in al occupation
groups.5 For example, whereas men lost about 2.7 mil ion jobs (about a 40% loss) in the leisure
and hospitality sector between January and April, women lost approximately 3.1 mil ion jobs (a
nearly 43% loss) in that sector. As a result of women’s disproportionate loss—a 43% decline in
women’s employment in leisure and hospitality businesses compared to the 40% decline for
men—women’s share of employment in this sector fel from 51.8% in January to 50.5% in April
(women’s share continued to fal in this sector, and in October it was 49.7%).
COVID-19 Pandemic Caregiving and Women’s Labor Supply
Recent research suggests that women’s increased caregiving responsibilities related to the
pandemic depressed labor supply, putting additional downward pressure on women’s
employment. By April 2020, al U.S. public schools had closed their buildings and moved
mil ions of children home for online learning, and many daycare facilities closed or reduced
operations in response to states’ stay-at-home orders.6 These closures placed considerable
pressure on working parents who, in short order, had to find a new balance between work and
childcare needs. Social distancing guidelines that discouraged caregiving by family members
(such as grandparents) and neighbors compounded this chal enge and left many families with few
options for care outside the home. Care for relatives infected by COVID-19 or whose normal paid
caregiving was interrupted by COVID-19 (e.g., spouses or elderly parents) may have also fal en
disproportionately on women.
Research indicates that these additional caregiving responsibilities were largely, but not
exclusively, taken up by women.7 One study, for example, found that over the same time period
working mothers living in states that were the first to close schools were considerably more likely
to be absent from work than those in late closure states, but no such effect was observed for
working fathers or for women without school age children.8 Another study found that among
occupations, protective services occupations, food preparation and serving related occupations, building and grounds
cleaning and maintenance occupations, and personal care and service occupations. T he major occupation category
professional and related includes computer, engineering, and science occupations; education, legal, community
service, arts, and media occupations; and healthcare practitioners and technical occupations.
5 In terms of industry of employment, the female share of employment increased between January and April 2020 in the
public administration sector (46.1% to 47.3%), information sector (40.7% to 41.9%), mining sector (11.9% to 14.3%),
and construction (10.7% to 10.8%). It declined in all other industries.
6 By March 25, all public schools were closed, according to an EdWeek T imeline, at https://www.edweek.org/ew/
section/multimedia/the-coronavirus-spring-the-historic-closing-of.html.
7 T his is consistent with research findings that women’s labor supply responds to the availability of childcare or early
education. A review of this literature is in Daniel Aaronson et al., The Effect of Fertility on Mothers’ Labor Supply over
the Last Two Centuries, Federal Reserve of Chicago, Working Paper 2017 -14, 2017, at https://www.chicagofed.org/
publications/working-papers/2017/wp2017-14.
8 T he study also found that mothers in early closure states who continued to work (i.e., did no t report taking leave)
increased their work hours, possibly to offset a spouse or partner’s lost earnings. Misty Heggeness, Why Is Mommy So
Stressed? Estim ating the Im m ediate Im pact of the COVID-19 Shock on Parental Attachm ent to the Labor Market and
the Double Bind of Mothers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Institute Working Paper 33, October 2020, at
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/institute-working-papers/why-is-mommy-so-stressed-estimating-the-
immediate-impact -of-the-covid-19-shock-on-parental-attachment-to-the-labor-market-and-the-double-bind-of-mothers.
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married employed parents with young children, mothers’ work hours decreased between February
and April 2020 to a much greater extent than fathers’ work hours.9
National employment data reveal a similar pattern. Figure 3 shows the percentage change in
monthly employment levels since January 2020 by sex and the presence of a worker’s minor
child in the home. By April, women’s and men’s monthly employment levels were considerably
lower than they were in January, with the data showing women having greater losses than men
and larger gender gaps among parents. Among workers with a minor child in the home, women’s
employment in April was 15.8% lower than in January; for men in this group, employment
declined by 8.9% between January and April. Among those without a minor child in the home,
women’s employment in April was 19.1% below the January level, and men’s was 16.2% lower.10
Although employment losses (in percentage terms) were initial y greater for those without a
minor child in the home, employment recovery has occurred at a faster pace and with more
balance in gains for men and women workers in this group than it has for workers with a minor
child in the home. By September, the percentage difference in monthly employment had largely
converged for men and women without a minor child at home, but for those with at least one
child in the house, a gender gap remained.11 This gap narrowed in October as, among parents,
women’s employment levels increased relative to men’s.
9 Caitlin Collins et al., “COVID‐19 and the gender gap in work hours,” Gender, Work, and Organization, 2000, pp. 1-
12.
10 T he groups presented in Figure 3 differ in other ways, beyond the presence of a child in the home, that may partly
explain why workers without a minor child in the home had higher percentage loses in employment between January
and April 2020 than those with a minor child. For example, among workers 16 to 55 years old (the sample for Figure
3), workers without a child are, on average, younger than those with a minor child, which may mean that they have less
job experience or tenure with the current employer, making them more vulnerable to job loss. In addition, those without
a minor child in this sample have less education, on average, than those with a minor child in the home.
11 CRS explored the possibility that these patterns reflect typical labor force differences between parents and non -
parents of minor children over the school year by com paring the percentage change in monthly employment between
2019 and 2020. Similar patterns were found. By April 2020, women’s and men’s monthly employment levels were
considerably lower than they were in April 2019, with women showing greater over -year losses than men. Employment
levels rose steadily since April 2020 for all groups, but whereas the over -year percentage difference in monthly
employment converged for men and women without a minor child at home, for those with at least one child in the
house, a gender gap persisted. T he gender gap for non -parents was 0.6 percentage points in September 2020; among
parents of a minor child, the gap was 4.8 percentage points.
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Figure 3. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020, by Sex and
the Presence of a Minor Child in the Worker’s Home
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–October 2020.
Notes: Sample comprises men and women ages 16 to 55.
Among mothers with a minor child in the home, unmarried mothers experienced greater
employment losses than married mothers (Figure 4). This may be due in part to their greater
concentration (relative to married mothers) in service sector jobs.12 Some single mothers may
have had fewer childcare options outside the home as schools and childcare centers closed during
the early months of the pandemic. However, the gap between married and unmarried mothers’
employment loss closed partial y in September 2020—the month in which most elementary and
secondary school years begin. Unmarried mothers’ gained some jobs between August and
September, but to a large degree the gap narrowed due to reductions in employment among
married mothers. By October, the gap in employment loss (in percentage terms) had largely
closed as employment increased for both groups.
Figure 4. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020 among
Married and Unmarried Mothers
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–October 2020.
12 In January 2020, about 30% of unmarried mothers’ employment was in service sector jobs (compared to about 16%
of married mothers’ employment). Married mothers were more concentrated in professional and related jobs, about
37% of employment compared to about 20% of unmarried mothers’ employment.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 to 55 who have at least one minor child who lives with them.
Unmarried mothers are those who report that they were widowed, divorced, separated, or never married at
the time of the survey interview. The sample does not exclude unmarried parents who cohabit with a partner.
Women’s Employment Loss by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity
Employment losses for Hispanic women and Black women since January 2020 have been
considerable and have exceeded that of non-Hispanic women and non-Black women. Hispanic
women’s employment declined by 22.5% between January and April (compared to a 16.2%
decline experienced by non-Hispanic women) and their unemployment rate increased by more
than 15 percentage points (compared to 11.5 percentage points for non-Hispanic women) over the
same period. Black non-Hispanic women’s employment fel by 17.1% (compared to a 16.0% loss
for White non-Hispanic women and a 16.1% loss for Asian non-Hispanic women). Black
women’s unemployment rate reached 16.3% in April and continued to climb through May, when
it reached 17.2%.
Figure 5. Percentage Change in Women’s Employment since January 2020, by Race
and Hispanic Ethnicity
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 and older. Data are not seasonal y adjusted.
Al groups of women experienced some degree of recovery in recent months. However, in
October 2020 Black non-Hispanic women’s employment was stil 6.6% lower than in January
and Hispanic women’s employment was 6.7% lower. White non-Hispanic women’s employment
in October was 4.1% below their January level and Asian non-Hispanic women’s employment
was 2.1% lower.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Figure 6. Women’s Unemployment Rate, by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 and older. Data are not seasonal y adjusted.
Disproportionate employment losses among Hispanic women and Black women are explained in
part by the concentration of these workers in service jobs, which represented nearly a third of al
employment lost between January and April 2020. About 30% of Hispanic women’s employment
and 27% of Black non-Hispanic women’s employment in January were in service jobs.13 In
contrast, White and Asian women were more concentrated in professional and related jobs, which
represented a considerable but smal er share of employment loss.
Longer-Term Implications for Women in the
Labor Force
Altogether, the current state of the labor market paired with increased caregiving responsibilities
and COVID-19 exposure concerns has resulted in a marked loss in women’s employment, and
recent labor market trends suggest that these losses may be lasting. The COVID-19 pandemic
lowered women’s labor market standing in absolute and relative terms. The degree to which these
effects persist over the longer-term depends on several factors, such as how long the recession
lasts, the speed and robustness of the subsequent recovery, how current employment status affects
future job opportunities, and whether changes in choices about caregiving are lasting.
Effects on Current and Future Employment
Absolute losses were large and readily apparent as mil ions of women lost jobs in the early
months of the pandemic. Since April 2020, large shares of these women have returned to work,
raising hopes that pandemic-related effects for many workers would be fleeting. Yet permanent
layoffs (as opposed to temporary layoffs) continue to grow; by October, nearly 1.6 mil ion
women had permanently lost their jobs (up from about 600,000 in January).14
13 Within service occupations, large shares of Hispanic women worked in food preparation and service jobs and in
building and grounds maintenance.
14 Men’s permanent job loss has also increased substantially since January 2020. In October, more than 2 million men
had permanently lost their jobs; in January, this number was about 780,000.
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Research demonstrates that job displacement (i.e., permanent loss of a job) can have long-lasting
consequences, even for workers who are able to find a new job relatively quickly.15 This can
happen if workers are reemployed in jobs with lower earnings or workplace benefits, have fewer
opportunities for career growth, or are otherwise less desirable than the job previously held,
among other reasons.16 Options for finding a new job are limited during recessions, and are likely
more so in a recession characterized by massive job loss and increased workplace hazards. To the
extent that workers displaced in the current recession can find work, it is reasonable to expect that
many wil have to accept some degree of loss in terms of earnings or job quality. However, in
response to recent economic recessions, including the current recession, Congress has enacted
temporary measures related to unemployment insurance programs and benefits, which may
mitigate the effects of employment loss for some workers.17 Research on the relationship between
unemployment insurance benefits in past recessions suggests that expanded unemployment
insurance benefits (in terms of benefit amounts and duration) improved the quality of job matches
for some workers by al owing them to search longer for a better job.18
In addition to a potential lack of desirable jobs, the greater caregiving responsibilities created by
the pandemic may shift some women into a different and more limited set of jobs. Some may
trade higher wages and stronger career paths for jobs that have a lower risk of COVID-19
exposure, offer scheduling flexibility, have shorter commutes, or otherwise facilitate an
increasingly complicated work-family balance.19
Alternatively, recent labor force data and research indicate that some women may opt to
disengage from the labor market completely. Prime-age women’s labor force participation rates
have declined since June 2020, and an increasing number of women are quitting jobs—a
phenomenon not typical to recession. Specifical y, 464,000 prime-age women (ages 25 to 54) left
the labor force between June and October. In June, job leavers (those who quit their jobs)
represented 2.8% of women’s unemployment; in October, job leavers represented 7% of women’s
unemployment.
Workers may leave the labor force because they have become discouraged or because of changing
circumstances that make work impractical or undesirable. The results of a recent large-scale
survey of corporate employees indicate that 15% of such female employees had considered a
leave of absence (compared to 9% of male corporate employees) and 7% had considered
dropping out of the workforce (compared to 4% of male employees).20 Shifting from market to
non-market work (e.g., family caregiving) may be necessary for some workers, but it comes at a
cost to both current and future earnings, and thus to retirement savings as wel . Some of these
15 Brendan Moore and Judith Scott -Clayton, The Firm’s Role in Displaced Workers’ Earnings Losses, NBER Working
Paper 26525, December 2019, at https://www.nber.org/papers/w26525.
16 See discussion in Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Max, and Stephen A. Woodbury, “Sources of Displaced Workers’
Long-T erm Earnings Losses,” Am erican Econom ic Review, vol. 110, no. 10 (2020), pp. 3231 -3266.
17 See CRS Report R46472, Comparing the Congressional Response to the Great Recession and the COVID-19-
Related Recession: Unem ploym ent Insurance (UI) Provisions, by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
18 Ammar Farooq, Adriana D. Kugler, and Umberto Muratori, Do Unemployment Insurance Benefits Improve Match
Quality? Evidence From Recent U.S. Recessions, NBER Working Paper 27574, July 2020, at https://www.nber.org/
papers/w27574.
19 See discussion in Betsey Stevenson, The Initial Impact of COVID-19 on Labor Market Outcomes Across Groups and
the Potential for Perm anent Scarring, T he Hamilton Project, Essay 2020-16, July 2020, at
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
the_initial_impact_of_covid_19_on_labor_market_outcomes_across_groups_and_the_potential_for_permanent_sca rrin
g.
20 T he share of workers who considered leaving the workforce excludes those who indicated they were considering
retiring. Lean In and McKinsey and Company, Wom en in the Workplace, 2020, at https://womenintheworkplace.com.
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workers may leave the labor force for extended periods or permanently, while others may plan for
a temporary departure (e.g., until caregiving duties subside). In each case, but to varying degrees,
workers who drop out of the workforce forgo work experience, training, and other opportunities
to build skil s and advance careers, and potential y fal out of networks that can play an important
role in job searches and hiring. In addition, some employers may perceive workers who take a
career interruption as being less committed, which can affect employers’ wil ingness to hire or
invest in those returning to work.
Effects on Employment and Earnings Inequality
The disproportionate effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on women’s employment affect
employment and earnings inequality in multiple ways. The next section discusses how the
pandemic has affected inequality among women workers. The following section discusses how
the pandemic has affected inequality between men and women. The long-term effects on
inequality depend on several factors, including the degree to which the disproportionate effects of
the pandemic on women’s employment persist after it is over.
Inequality Among Women
Current labor force dynamics have the potential to increase inequality among women in terms of
employment, job quality, and earnings. Women workers in lower-paying jobs were far more likely
to lose a job in the early months of the pandemic than those in higher-paying ones. As shown in
Table 1, women’s employment in lower-paying jobs such as service occupations, sales, and
transportation fel sharply in percentage terms over the January to April 2020 period, whereas
women’s employment declined to a considerable but lesser degree in higher-pay occupations like
professional and managerial jobs.21 By October, relative losses between higher-earning and
lower-earning women were smal er, yet remained.
Table 1. Women’s Median Weekly Earnings and Percentage Change in Women’s
Employment, by Major Occupation Group
% Change in Women’s
Employment
Women’s Median Weekly
Jan.–Apr.
Jan.–Oct.
Major Occupation Group
Earnings in 2019
2020
2020
Management, business, and financial
$1,154
-6.3%
-5.0%
Professional and related
$980
-9.5%
-2.2%
Instal ation, maintenance, and repair
$800
-49.4%
5.8%
Office and administrative support
$654
-12.1%
-2.2%
Construction and extraction
$650
-21.7%
3.3%
Production
$570
-28.9%
-6.2%
Transportation and material moving
$504
-28.2%
-6.6%
21 T he large fluctuations in women’s employment in farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and extraction; and
installation, maint enance, and repair jobs in part reflect the relatively small number of women in those occupations in
January 2020. Each occupation group made up less than 1% of women’s employment in January 2020.
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% Change in Women’s
Employment
Women’s Median Weekly
Jan.–Apr.
Jan.–Oct.
Major Occupation Group
Earnings in 2019
2020
2020
Sales and related
$500
-22.6%
-7.3%
Farming, fishing, and forestry
$480
-30.6%
1.7%
Service
$425
-34.0%
-9.6%
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January 2019–October 2020.
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 and older. Data are not seasonal y adjusted. Rows are ordered by
median weekly usual earnings in 2019.
Workers in higher-paying professional and management jobs were also far more likely to report
that they had teleworked recently due to the pandemic than those in lower-paying service
occupations.22 The ability to work from home has clear benefits, particularly during the
pandemic: telework helps workers to avoid a break in employment, while at the same time
minimizing workplace exposure to COVID-19. One recent study found, for example, that
between mid-March and late-July 2020, non-remote workers were more likely to lose jobs than
those who could work from home, and they were also more likely to develop symptoms of
respiratory il ness.23
Other employer responses to the pandemic can have distributional impacts among female workers
as wel . In addition to telework, some employers have offered greater scheduling flexibilities and
other benefits, such as additional paid leave, subsidized childcare, and various school-related
supports for employees’ children.24 These supports can be important for working parents,
particularly mothers who have taken on a large share of additional caregiving responsibilities.
However, these new benefits are not offered at al workplaces, and currently appear to be
concentrated in large companies that employ highly educated and higher-earning workers.
Women without these workplace supports and options may be more likely to leave the labor
force, increasing female inequality.
To the extent that the pandemic changes commercial patterns and the organization of work, some
of these patterns—such as disproportionate job loss among low-wage workers and increased
workplace benefits for higher-wage workers—may have distributional impacts among female
22 BLS reports that in October 2020, managers and professionals made up about 42% of employment and nearly 76% of
those who teleworked due to the pandemic; in contrast, service workers made up almost 16% of employment but only
about 3% of those who teleworked for pandemic-related reasons. T hese estimates exclude those who se telework was
unrelated to the pandemic (e.g., workers who teleworked exclusively prior to the pandemic). BLS, Supplem ental data
m easuring the effects of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandem ic on the labor m arket; available at https://www.bls.gov/
cps/effects-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic.htm#concepts. T hese patterns are consistent with occupational
access to telework before the pandemic. See https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/article/ability-to-work-from-
home.htm.
23 Manuela Angelucci, Marco Angrisani, Daniel M. Bennett, Arie Kapteyn, and Simone G. Schaner, Remote Work and
the Heterogeneous Im pact of COVID-19 on Em ploym ent and Health, NBER Working Paper 27749, August 2020, at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27749. T his finding aligns with BLS data on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which show that while 6% of professional and managerial workers reported being unable to work at some point in the
last four weeks because their employer closed or lost business, 12% of service workers reported such losses.
24 Claire Cain Miller, “Private Tutors, Pop-Up Schools or Nothing at All: How Employers Are Helping Parents,” New
York Tim es, September 17, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/upshot/pandemic-workers-benefits-
disparity.html
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
workers in the longer term. It is plausible, for example, that new consumer preferences may shift
sales (and jobs) from brick-and-mortar retail businesses to online companies. Increased adoption
of telework may further reduce demand for service and transportation jobs that support workers
who commute to work; these include jobs in building maintenance and cleaning, security,
lunchtime restaurants, and commuter bus and rail.25 If job loss in these occupations is permanent,
then affected workers may eventual y find new jobs, but those jobs might be lower paying,
especial y if these workers lack skil s to qualify for higher-paying opportunities.
Employment and Earnings Gaps Between Women and Men
The pandemic and accompanying recession have the potential to increase employment and
earnings gaps between women and men, and growth in these differentials may be long lasting.
Thus far in 2020, women have lost more jobs and have left the labor market at a greater rate than
men.26 The impact on the gender employment gap is clear: among prime-age workers, the gap
between men and women’s employment as a share of population has grown since the start of
2020 from 11.9 percentage points in January to 12.2 percentage points in October.
A portion of women’s employment loss is due to their greater concentration in jobs vulnerable to
pandemic-related closures and restrictions. As the economy recovers, many of these jobs are
likely to come back, and some may be fil ed by female workers displaced by the pandemic. But
this is not guaranteed. Prolonged periods of non-work create hurdles for workers seeking
reemployment: as noted earlier, some workers may lose skil s or require retraining to qualifying
for job offers, others may lose job networks, and employers may be reluctant to hire workers
whom they perceive to be less attached to the workforce.
There has also been some speculation that women’s employment prospects can further deteriorate
if workplaces reorganize or change production processes in response to the pandemic. One study,
for example, finds that women are relatively vulnerable to such changes because they are more
likely to be employed in occupations that are jointly at high risk for automation (based on job
tasks) and for workplace transmission of an airborne virus (based on physical proximity to
customers and co-workers and workplace exposure to disease or infections).27
As noted earlier, job displacement and career interruptions can have negative and lasting impacts
on wages and wage growth. These career breaks can lead to a considerable loss of job experience,
which is critical to career advancement, or movement into lower paying or lower-quality jobs, at
least temporarily. To the extent that women are displaced or leave the labor market more so than
men, the gender earnings gap wil increase, al else being equal.28
In addition, some women—particularly mothers—who remain attached to the labor market may
shift into careers that al ow them greater scheduling flexibility or otherwise accommodate family
needs. This may mean changing jobs or it may mean remaining with a current employer but not
pursuing promotion or other opportunities for career growth. This is another channel through with
25 T his observation is made and explored in David Autor and Elisabeth B. Reynolds, The nature of work after the
COVID crisis: Too few low-wage jobs, T he Hamilton Project, Essay 2020-14, July 16, 2020, at
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-nature-of-work-after-the-covid-crisis-too-few-low-wage-jobs/.
26 In October 2020, BLS data show that women made up nearly 60% of the 3.6 million individuals who were out of the
labor market and did not search for work due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
27 Alex W. Chernoff and Casey Warman, Covid-19 and Implications for Automation, NBER Working Paper 27249,
2020, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w27249.
28 An overview of the gender earnings gaps can be found in CRS In Focus IF10414, The Gender Earnings Gap, by
Sarah A. Donovan.
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the pandemic and recession can lead to a larger gender earnings gaps in the near term, especial y
if those changes outlast the pandemic.
Potential Macroeconomic Impacts
The disproportionate decline in female employment during the pandemic has implications for the
overal performance of the economy, particularly if female employment does not fully rebound in
the next expansion. However, as discussed above, although women have been disproportionately
affected by the pandemic so far, the gap between male and female employment loss has more
recently been converging, suggesting it is too soon to say how long the disparate impact wil
persist.
During the pandemic, the downturn may be deeper than it would otherwise have been because
some workers were forced to leave their jobs or cut their work hours because of childcare or other
care responsibilities, which disproportionately affected female workers. As a result, those
workers’ income declined, which reduced overal demand in the economy.
The long-term economic effects of the decline in women’s employment during the pandemic wil
depend on how much, if any, of this job loss is permanent. As the economy recovers once the
health crisis ends, most unemployed workers wil eventual y return to work, either moving back
to their old jobs or getting new jobs. If the economy can eventual y fully recover from the
pandemic (i.e., al disrupted economic activity resumes once the health crisis is over), the
permanent effects on GDP and income could be relatively smal . How large the permanent effects
turn out to be wil depend in part on the recovery in women’s employment.
In the standard growth accounting framework, economic growth (increases in the output of goods
and services or gross domestic product) derives from increases in labor supply, capital
investment, and productivity. A decline in women’s labor supply—whether in female
employment or hours worked per worker—directly reduces economic output, and if women’s
labor supply does not return to its pre-pandemic trend, the size of the economy wil not return to
its pre-pandemic trend either, al else being equal. Because national income is equal to national
output,29 a smal er economy would also result in lower national income compared to the pre-
pandemic trend.30
A modest decrease in female employment in the long-term may seem insignificant in comparison
to the magnitude of the current recession.31 But if the female labor force remains permanently
smal er—even if the permanent job loss is modest relative to the loss at the pandemic peak—GDP
and income would be permanently lower.
Some evidence from the Great Recession supports the idea that long-term job loss can have long-
lasting negative effects on workers.32 There is some evidence that workers who leave the labor
29 T echnically, national income is equal to net national product (NNP) by accounting identity. T he difference between
NNP and GDP is depreciation, and the former measures the output of Americans while the latter measures the output in
the United States.
30 Note that the negative effect on growth and income will be the same whether female workers remain officially
unemployed (i.e., not working but actively seeking work) or leave the labor force (e.g., because of childcare
responsibilities).
31 See CRS Insight IN11388, COVID-19: U.S. Economic Effects, by Rena S. Miller and Marc Labonte.
32 Danny Yagan, Employment Hysteresis from the Great Recession, Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 127, no.
5, at https://eml.berkeley.edu/~yagan/Hysteresis.pdf; and Brad J. Hershbein and Bryan A. Stuart, “ Recessions and
Local Labor Market Hysteresis,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper 20 -325, Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
force following a deep recession are less likely to return than workers who become unemployed
(i.e., continue an active job search).33 This is of particular concern in the current context because,
as discussed above, childcare and other care duties imposed by the pandemic have
disproportionately affected women, contributing to a greater decline in their labor force
participation rate.34 As the pandemic persists, the share of long-term unemployed workers has
been rising and is expected to continue to rise until economic normalcy resumes.
Long-term job separations can cause an erosion of skil s and loss of opportunities that can lead to
long-lasting negative effects on employment and earnings. The negative effects of long-term job
loss on long-term growth are not limited to a smal er labor force, but also potential y include
negative effects on productivity growth. Workers general y accumulate more skil s and
experience over their careers that boosts their productivity, increasing their contribution to GDP.
Long-term job loss can interrupt that productivity growth, particularly if it occurs early- or mid-
career when workers are typical y advancing the most in their careers. Early- and mid-career
workers may be the most likely to be faced with childcare disruptions caused by the pandemic.35
Long-lasting departures from the labor force may also harm productivity by reducing
entrepreneurship and innovation.
Interaction with Long-Term Trends in Women’s
Employment
If women’s labor force participation does not fully rebound from the pandemic, it wil compound
longer-term labor force trends that have contributed to lower economic growth this century and
wil pose chal enges for the economy moving forward. First, the aging of the population has
reduced the potential long-run growth rate of the labor force and the economy. The 2020 Social
Security trustees report, which does not incorporate the effects of the pandemic, projected that
economic growth wil average about 2% per year for the next 75 years under the intermediate
scenario, compared to about 3% for the period from 1969 to 2007, and employment growth
would average about 0.4% per year over the next 75 years, compared to 1.6% from 1969 to
2007.36
Employment Research, 2020, at https://doi.org/10.17848/wp20-325.
33 Romain Duval, Mehmet Eris and Davide Furceri, The Effects Of Downturns On Labour Force Participation:
Evidence And Causes, OECD, working paper No. 875, June 21, 2011, at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-
effects-of-downturns-on-labour-force-participation_5kg9q0nmbws8-en.
34 In contrast, men were disproportionately displaced from jobs during the Great Recession. T his may have been
attributable to the fact that predominantly male occupations such as manufacturing and construction were
disproportionately affected in that recession. Predominantly female occupations have been disproportionately affected
in this recession, as discussed previously. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10984, Long-Tenured Displaced
Workers, by Sarah A. Donovan and Marc Labonte.
35 Although the pandemic phenomenon of large-scale involuntary job separation because childcare suddenly becomes
unavailable may be unique, the potential effects on earnings and employment can be compared to the experience of
women who temporarily leave the labor force to raise children. Research literature finds a wage penalty for mothers
who interrupt their careers and later return to work. A review is in Francine D. Blau and Lawren ce M. Kahn, “ T he
Gender Wage Gap: Extent, T rends, and Explanations,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 55, no. 3 (2017), pp. 789-
865.
36 T he trustees present economic projections in three scenarios. In the trustees’ more optimistic scenario, annual
employment growth would be about 0.2 percentage points higher than in the intermediate scenario. In the pessimistic
scenario, annual employment growth would be close to zero in later decades. Chapter V.B, at https://www.ssa.gov/oact/
tr/2020/tr2020.pdf.
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Second, after almost doubling from the end of World War II to 2000, the female labor force
participation rate fel by about three percentage points between 2000 and 2019. The rapid rise in
women’s labor force participation was an important source of growth in the labor force that
underpinned robust growth in the earlier period, and its decline contributed to the slowing of
labor force growth since 2000.
Third, U.S. female employment rates are lower than in many other countries. At 57.4% in the
second quarter of 2020, the U.S. female employment rate is below the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 61.3% and far below several other OECD
countries (e.g., the female employment rate in Japan, the UK, Germany, and several other smal er
OECD countries is above 70%). This marks a reversal from before the pandemic. In 2019, the
U.S. female employment rate was five percentage points above the OECD average, albeit stil
wel below the 70% achieved by several OECD countries.37
37 Measured as a share of the working age female population. See https://data.oecd.org/emp/employment-rate.htm.
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Appendix. Change in Employment Between January
and April 2020, by Industry and Occupation
Table A-1. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Industry
Women’s
Change in
Share of
Employment,
Industry Share of
Industry
Jan.-Apr. 2020
Total Employment
Employment,
Industry Group
(in 100,000)
Lost, Jan.–Apr. 2020
Jan. 2020
Educational and health services
-46.3
19.6%
74.5%
Financial activities
-4.2
1.8%
53.7%
Other services
-21.1
8.9%
52.9%
Leisure and hospitality
-58.4
24.7%
51.8%
Public administration
-3
1.3%
46.1%
Wholesale and retail trade
-34.4
14.5%
44.5%
Professional and business services
-18
7.6%
41.9%
Information
-3.4
1.4%
40.7%
Manufacturing
-19.6
8.3%
29.4%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and
0.1
-0.1%
26.9%
hunting
Transportation and utilities
-10
4.2%
24.2%
Mining
-1.4
0.6%
11.9%
Construction
-16.7
7.1%
10.7%
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–April 2020.
Notes: Data are not seasonal y adjusted. Rows are ordered by female share of industry group employment in
January 2020. The “Industry Share of Total Employment Lost, Jan.–Apr. 2020” column reports the distribution of
total employment loss between January and April 2020 across industries. It shows, for example, that 19.6% of the
employment loss occurred in educational and health services businesses.
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Table A-2. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Occupation
Women’s
Change in
Occupation Share
Share of
Employment,
of Total
Occupational
Jan.-Apr. 2020
Employment Lost,
Employment,
Occupation Group
(in 100,000)
Jan.–Apr. 2020
Jan. 2020
Office and administrative support
-16.6
7.0%
73.9%
Service
-78.6
33.2%
58.5%
Professional and related
-33.2
14.0%
56.4%
Sales and related
-32.2
13.6%
49.2%
Management, business, and financial
-10.8
4.6%
45.7%
Production
-19.5
8.2%
28.5%
Farming, fishing, and forestry
-0.1
0.0%
26.5%
Transportation and material moving
-24.7
10.5%
21.0%
Instal ation, maintenance, and repair
-6.4
2.7%
4.3%
Construction and extraction
-14.6
6.1%
4.1%
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–April 2020.
Notes: Data are not seasonal y adjusted. Rows are ordered by female share of occupation group employment in
January 2020. The “Occupation Share of Total Employment Lost, Jan.–Apr. 2020” column reports the
distribution of total employment loss between January and April 2020 across occupation. It shows, for example,
that 33.2% of the employment loss was in service jobs.
Author Information
Sarah A. Donovan
Marc Labonte
Specialist in Labor Policy
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R46632 · VERSION 1 · NEW
17
December 8, 2020
Implications for Women
Sarah A. Donovan
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic dramatical y disrupted the labor
Specialist in Labor Policy
force in early 2020 as businesses closed or reduced operations and consumer demand
shifted away from in-person commerce. The swift drop in economic activity translated
Marc Labonte
into widespread and massive employment loss. This report considers the implications for Specialist in
women, who disproportionately lost employment during the early months of the
Macroeconomic Policy
pandemic; as 2020 comes to a close, labor market data suggest that to some degree these
losses may be lasting.
Women’s employment declined by 17.8% (13.3 mil ion fewer women were employed)
between January 2020 and April 2020. In contrast, men’s employment declined by 14.3% between January and
April. Employment loss (as a share of January employment) for Black women and Hispanic women has been
considerable and exceeded that of other groups. Women’s employment has recovered to some extent since April,
with particularly large gains in October. In that month, women’s employment was 6% below January values, and
men’s employment was lower by about 5%. However, with COVID-19 cases spiking and new business
restrictions being reintroduced this fal , some of the recent employment gains could reverse in the near term. If so,
women may again bear a disproportionate burden of employment losses.
Two forces placed significant downward pressure on women’s employment in early 2020. First, women are more
concentrated in the jobs most affected by business closures and restrictions. Second, women appear to have
disproportionately reduced employment in response to caregiving needs, which increased as schools closed and
family members became il or needed assistance in quarantine.
In the near term, some women may disengage from the labor market or shift into work, to the extent that it is
available, that al ows them to minimize the likelihood of COVID-19 exposure or accommodate caregiving
responsibilities. These changes can have lasting impacts on women’s labor outcomes. Lower labor engagement
can lead to fewer opportunities for advancement (e.g., promotion, training) and less work experience, slowing
wage growth and affecting future employability. This can have lasting negative effects at the individual and
macroeconomic levels, including increased inequality—both between sexes and among women—and lost
productivity.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Labor Market Outcomes in 2020 ....................................................................................... 1
Women are Concentrated in the Most Affected Occupations and Industries......................... 2
COVID-19 Pandemic Caregiving and Women’s Labor Supply ......................................... 3
Women’s Employment Loss by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity ........................................... 6
Longer-Term Implications for Women in the Labor Force...................................................... 7
Effects on Current and Future Employment ................................................................... 7
Effects on Employment and Earnings Inequality............................................................. 9
Inequality Among Women ..................................................................................... 9
Employment and Earnings Gaps Between Women and Men ...................................... 11
Potential Macroeconomic Impacts ................................................................................... 12
Interaction with Long-Term Trends in Women’s Employment .............................................. 13
Figures
Figure 1. Employment Levels and Unemployment Rates, by Sex............................................ 1
Figure 2. Average Usual Hours Worked and Actual Hours Worked, by Sex .............................. 2
Figure 3. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020, by Sex and
the Presence of a Minor Child in the Worker’s Home ......................................................... 5
Figure 4. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020 among
Married and Unmarried Mothers..................................................................................... 5
Figure 5. Percentage Change in Women’s Employment since January 2020, by Race and
Hispanic Ethnicity ........................................................................................................ 6
Figure 6. Women’s Unemployment Rate, by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity ............................... 7
Tables
Table 1. Women’s Median Weekly Earnings and Percentage Change in Women’s
Employment, by Major Occupation Group ....................................................................... 9
Table A-1. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Industry ................... 15
Table A-2. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Occupation............... 16
Appendixes
Appendix. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Industry and
Occupation ................................................................................................................ 15
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 16
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Introduction
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic dramatical y disrupted the labor force in
early 2020 as businesses closed or reduced operations and consumer demand shifted away from
in-person commerce. The swift drop in economic activity translated into widespread and massive
employment loss. This report considers the implications for women, who disproportionately lost
employment during the early months of the pandemic; as 2020 comes to a close, labor market
data suggest that to some degree these losses may be lasting.
Labor Market Outcomes in 2020
Women’s employment declined sharply in early 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The number of employed women declined by 13.3 mil ion, a 17.8% drop, between January and
April (the month in which overal unemployment peaked), and women’s unemployment rate rose
to 16.2% (a 12.7 percentage point increase) over that period (Figure 1). Men’s employment
declined to a considerable but lesser extent than women’s. Between January and April, men’s
employment levels fel by 12 mil ion (a 14.3% decrease) and their unemployment rate rose to
13.5%.1
Employment levels have increased steadily since April 2020, but as of October women’s and
men’s employment were both more than 4 mil ion workers below January levels (4.6 mil ion for
women and 4.3 mil ion for men). Unemployment rates in October were more than three
percentage points above their January values. While women continued to be more affected by the
pandemic through October, the gender gap in (absolute) employment losses has closed partial y
since April. The upward trend in employment is welcome news, but the pandemic and its
economic impacts do not appear to be ending. With COVID-19 cases spiking and new business
restrictions being reintroduced in fal 2020, some of the recent employment gains could reverse in
the near term. If so, women may again bear a disproportionate burden of employment losses.
Figure 1. Employment Levels and Unemployment Rates, by Sex
January to October 2020
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notes: Sample is non-institutionalized civilian population, ages 16 and older. Data are seasonal y adjusted.
1 Unemployment may have been underreported because of misclassification error, especially early in the pandemic. For
more information, see CRS Insight IN11456, COVID-19: Measuring Unem ploym ent, by Lida R. Weinstock.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Among employed workers—both men and women—actual hours worked started to diverge from
usual hours worked staring in March 2020, with the largest gap in April.2 Thereafter, actual hours
worked started to rise, before dropping sharply in September for both sexes—possibly in response
to the start of the school year.3 Actual hours worked rose for both women and men between
September and October. In October, the gap between usual hours and actual hours worked
narrowed, but a portion of this was due to a decline in usual hours worked.
Figure 2. Average Usual Hours Worked and Actual Hours Worked, by Sex
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notes: Sample comprises the employed non-institutionalized civilian population, ages 16 and older. The rise in
usual hours worked in April 2020 likely reflects larger job losses among part-time workers.
Women are Concentrated in the Most Affected Occupations and
Industries
One reason that women’s employment dropped drastical y relative to men’s at the onset of the
pandemic is that industries and occupations most affected by the pandemic had high shares of
women workers. Between January and April 2020, the total number of employed workers (male
and female) declined by about 23.7 mil ion, with three industries making up more than half of
that loss (Table A-1). About 25% of lost employment was in leisure and hospitality, nearly 20%
was in education and health services, and almost 15% was in wholesale and retail trade. Large
losses in these sectors are not unexpected as they feature in-person services and commerce in
group settings, both of which were discouraged by public health guidance or restricted by state
laws. Women are disproportionately represented in two of these industries and comprise a large
share of the third: in January, women made up 74.5% of education and health services
employment, 51.8% of leisure and hospitality workers, and 44.5% of wholesale and retail trade
employment.
In terms of occupation, service jobs made up nearly one-third (33.2%) of total employment lost
between January and April 2020, and professional and related jobs made up another 14% (Table
A-2).4 Both occupational groups were majority female in January (58.6% and 56.4%,
2 T he Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects information on usual hours—the number of hours the respondent
typically works at their job per week; and actual hours—the number of hours they actually worked during the survey
reference week.
3 See the “ COVID-19 Pandemic Caregiving and Women’s Labor Supply” section for a discussion of how virtual
learning may interact with labor supply.
4 Per CPS occupational classification, the major occupation category service jobs includes health care support
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
respectively). In addition, sales and related jobs declined by almost 14% between January and
April, and women made up nearly half of these workers (49.2%).
Not only did women’s employment fal , but it fell disproportionately over the January to April
2020 period, such that the female share declined in several industries (including leisure and
hospitality, education and health services, and wholesale and retail trade) and in al occupation
groups.5 For example, whereas men lost about 2.7 mil ion jobs (about a 40% loss) in the leisure
and hospitality sector between January and April, women lost approximately 3.1 mil ion jobs (a
nearly 43% loss) in that sector. As a result of women’s disproportionate loss—a 43% decline in
women’s employment in leisure and hospitality businesses compared to the 40% decline for
men—women’s share of employment in this sector fel from 51.8% in January to 50.5% in April
(women’s share continued to fal in this sector, and in October it was 49.7%).
COVID-19 Pandemic Caregiving and Women’s Labor Supply
Recent research suggests that women’s increased caregiving responsibilities related to the
pandemic depressed labor supply, putting additional downward pressure on women’s
employment. By April 2020, al U.S. public schools had closed their buildings and moved
mil ions of children home for online learning, and many daycare facilities closed or reduced
operations in response to states’ stay-at-home orders.6 These closures placed considerable
pressure on working parents who, in short order, had to find a new balance between work and
childcare needs. Social distancing guidelines that discouraged caregiving by family members
(such as grandparents) and neighbors compounded this chal enge and left many families with few
options for care outside the home. Care for relatives infected by COVID-19 or whose normal paid
caregiving was interrupted by COVID-19 (e.g., spouses or elderly parents) may have also fal en
disproportionately on women.
Research indicates that these additional caregiving responsibilities were largely, but not
exclusively, taken up by women.7 One study, for example, found that over the same time period
working mothers living in states that were the first to close schools were considerably more likely
to be absent from work than those in late closure states, but no such effect was observed for
working fathers or for women without school age children.8 Another study found that among
occupations, protective services occupations, food preparation and serving related occupations, building and grounds
cleaning and maintenance occupations, and personal care and service occupations. T he major occupation category
professional and related includes computer, engineering, and science occupations; education, legal, community
service, arts, and media occupations; and healthcare practitioners and technical occupations.
5 In terms of industry of employment, the female share of employment increased between January and April 2020 in the
public administration sector (46.1% to 47.3%), information sector (40.7% to 41.9%), mining sector (11.9% to 14.3%),
and construction (10.7% to 10.8%). It declined in all other industries.
6 By March 25, all public schools were closed, according to an EdWeek T imeline, at https://www.edweek.org/ew/
section/multimedia/the-coronavirus-spring-the-historic-closing-of.html.
7 T his is consistent with research findings that women’s labor supply responds to the availability of childcare or early
education. A review of this literature is in Daniel Aaronson et al., The Effect of Fertility on Mothers’ Labor Supply over
the Last Two Centuries, Federal Reserve of Chicago, Working Paper 2017 -14, 2017, at https://www.chicagofed.org/
publications/working-papers/2017/wp2017-14.
8 T he study also found that mothers in early closure states who continued to work (i.e., did no t report taking leave)
increased their work hours, possibly to offset a spouse or partner’s lost earnings. Misty Heggeness, Why Is Mommy So
Stressed? Estim ating the Im m ediate Im pact of the COVID-19 Shock on Parental Attachm ent to the Labor Market and
the Double Bind of Mothers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Institute Working Paper 33, October 2020, at
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/institute-working-papers/why-is-mommy-so-stressed-estimating-the-
immediate-impact -of-the-covid-19-shock-on-parental-attachment-to-the-labor-market-and-the-double-bind-of-mothers.
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married employed parents with young children, mothers’ work hours decreased between February
and April 2020 to a much greater extent than fathers’ work hours.9
National employment data reveal a similar pattern. Figure 3 shows the percentage change in
monthly employment levels since January 2020 by sex and the presence of a worker’s minor
child in the home. By April, women’s and men’s monthly employment levels were considerably
lower than they were in January, with the data showing women having greater losses than men
and larger gender gaps among parents. Among workers with a minor child in the home, women’s
employment in April was 15.8% lower than in January; for men in this group, employment
declined by 8.9% between January and April. Among those without a minor child in the home,
women’s employment in April was 19.1% below the January level, and men’s was 16.2% lower.10
Although employment losses (in percentage terms) were initial y greater for those without a
minor child in the home, employment recovery has occurred at a faster pace and with more
balance in gains for men and women workers in this group than it has for workers with a minor
child in the home. By September, the percentage difference in monthly employment had largely
converged for men and women without a minor child at home, but for those with at least one
child in the house, a gender gap remained.11 This gap narrowed in October as, among parents,
women’s employment levels increased relative to men’s.
9 Caitlin Collins et al., “COVID‐19 and the gender gap in work hours,” Gender, Work, and Organization, 2000, pp. 1-
12.
10 T he groups presented in Figure 3 differ in other ways, beyond the presence of a child in the home, that may partly
explain why workers without a minor child in the home had higher percentage loses in employment between January
and April 2020 than those with a minor child. For example, among workers 16 to 55 years old (the sample for Figure
3), workers without a child are, on average, younger than those with a minor child, which may mean that they have less
job experience or tenure with the current employer, making them more vulnerable to job loss. In addition, those without
a minor child in this sample have less education, on average, than those with a minor child in the home.
11 CRS explored the possibility that these patterns reflect typical labor force differences between parents and non -
parents of minor children over the school year by com paring the percentage change in monthly employment between
2019 and 2020. Similar patterns were found. By April 2020, women’s and men’s monthly employment levels were
considerably lower than they were in April 2019, with women showing greater over -year losses than men. Employment
levels rose steadily since April 2020 for all groups, but whereas the over -year percentage difference in monthly
employment converged for men and women without a minor child at home, for those with at least one child in the
house, a gender gap persisted. T he gender gap for non -parents was 0.6 percentage points in September 2020; among
parents of a minor child, the gap was 4.8 percentage points.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Figure 3. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020, by Sex and
the Presence of a Minor Child in the Worker’s Home
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–October 2020.
Notes: Sample comprises men and women ages 16 to 55.
Among mothers with a minor child in the home, unmarried mothers experienced greater
employment losses than married mothers (Figure 4). This may be due in part to their greater
concentration (relative to married mothers) in service sector jobs.12 Some single mothers may
have had fewer childcare options outside the home as schools and childcare centers closed during
the early months of the pandemic. However, the gap between married and unmarried mothers’
employment loss closed partial y in September 2020—the month in which most elementary and
secondary school years begin. Unmarried mothers’ gained some jobs between August and
September, but to a large degree the gap narrowed due to reductions in employment among
married mothers. By October, the gap in employment loss (in percentage terms) had largely
closed as employment increased for both groups.
Figure 4. Percentage Change in Monthly Employment since January 2020 among
Married and Unmarried Mothers
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–October 2020.
12 In January 2020, about 30% of unmarried mothers’ employment was in service sector jobs (compared to about 16%
of married mothers’ employment). Married mothers were more concentrated in professional and related jobs, about
37% of employment compared to about 20% of unmarried mothers’ employment.
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Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 to 55 who have at least one minor child who lives with them.
Unmarried mothers are those who report that they were widowed, divorced, separated, or never married at
the time of the survey interview. The sample does not exclude unmarried parents who cohabit with a partner.
Women’s Employment Loss by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity
Employment losses for Hispanic women and Black women since January 2020 have been
considerable and have exceeded that of non-Hispanic women and non-Black women. Hispanic
women’s employment declined by 22.5% between January and April (compared to a 16.2%
decline experienced by non-Hispanic women) and their unemployment rate increased by more
than 15 percentage points (compared to 11.5 percentage points for non-Hispanic women) over the
same period. Black non-Hispanic women’s employment fel by 17.1% (compared to a 16.0% loss
for White non-Hispanic women and a 16.1% loss for Asian non-Hispanic women). Black
women’s unemployment rate reached 16.3% in April and continued to climb through May, when
it reached 17.2%.
Figure 5. Percentage Change in Women’s Employment since January 2020, by Race
and Hispanic Ethnicity
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 and older. Data are not seasonal y adjusted.
Al groups of women experienced some degree of recovery in recent months. However, in
October 2020 Black non-Hispanic women’s employment was stil 6.6% lower than in January
and Hispanic women’s employment was 6.7% lower. White non-Hispanic women’s employment
in October was 4.1% below their January level and Asian non-Hispanic women’s employment
was 2.1% lower.
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Figure 6. Women’s Unemployment Rate, by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 and older. Data are not seasonal y adjusted.
Disproportionate employment losses among Hispanic women and Black women are explained in
part by the concentration of these workers in service jobs, which represented nearly a third of al
employment lost between January and April 2020. About 30% of Hispanic women’s employment
and 27% of Black non-Hispanic women’s employment in January were in service jobs.13 In
contrast, White and Asian women were more concentrated in professional and related jobs, which
represented a considerable but smal er share of employment loss.
Longer-Term Implications for Women in the
Labor Force
Altogether, the current state of the labor market paired with increased caregiving responsibilities
and COVID-19 exposure concerns has resulted in a marked loss in women’s employment, and
recent labor market trends suggest that these losses may be lasting. The COVID-19 pandemic
lowered women’s labor market standing in absolute and relative terms. The degree to which these
effects persist over the longer-term depends on several factors, such as how long the recession
lasts, the speed and robustness of the subsequent recovery, how current employment status affects
future job opportunities, and whether changes in choices about caregiving are lasting.
Effects on Current and Future Employment
Absolute losses were large and readily apparent as mil ions of women lost jobs in the early
months of the pandemic. Since April 2020, large shares of these women have returned to work,
raising hopes that pandemic-related effects for many workers would be fleeting. Yet permanent
layoffs (as opposed to temporary layoffs) continue to grow; by October, nearly 1.6 mil ion
women had permanently lost their jobs (up from about 600,000 in January).14
13 Within service occupations, large shares of Hispanic women worked in food preparation and service jobs and in
building and grounds maintenance.
14 Men’s permanent job loss has also increased substantially since January 2020. In October, more than 2 million men
had permanently lost their jobs; in January, this number was about 780,000.
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Research demonstrates that job displacement (i.e., permanent loss of a job) can have long-lasting
consequences, even for workers who are able to find a new job relatively quickly.15 This can
happen if workers are reemployed in jobs with lower earnings or workplace benefits, have fewer
opportunities for career growth, or are otherwise less desirable than the job previously held,
among other reasons.16 Options for finding a new job are limited during recessions, and are likely
more so in a recession characterized by massive job loss and increased workplace hazards. To the
extent that workers displaced in the current recession can find work, it is reasonable to expect that
many wil have to accept some degree of loss in terms of earnings or job quality. However, in
response to recent economic recessions, including the current recession, Congress has enacted
temporary measures related to unemployment insurance programs and benefits, which may
mitigate the effects of employment loss for some workers.17 Research on the relationship between
unemployment insurance benefits in past recessions suggests that expanded unemployment
insurance benefits (in terms of benefit amounts and duration) improved the quality of job matches
for some workers by al owing them to search longer for a better job.18
In addition to a potential lack of desirable jobs, the greater caregiving responsibilities created by
the pandemic may shift some women into a different and more limited set of jobs. Some may
trade higher wages and stronger career paths for jobs that have a lower risk of COVID-19
exposure, offer scheduling flexibility, have shorter commutes, or otherwise facilitate an
increasingly complicated work-family balance.19
Alternatively, recent labor force data and research indicate that some women may opt to
disengage from the labor market completely. Prime-age women’s labor force participation rates
have declined since June 2020, and an increasing number of women are quitting jobs—a
phenomenon not typical to recession. Specifical y, 464,000 prime-age women (ages 25 to 54) left
the labor force between June and October. In June, job leavers (those who quit their jobs)
represented 2.8% of women’s unemployment; in October, job leavers represented 7% of women’s
unemployment.
Workers may leave the labor force because they have become discouraged or because of changing
circumstances that make work impractical or undesirable. The results of a recent large-scale
survey of corporate employees indicate that 15% of such female employees had considered a
leave of absence (compared to 9% of male corporate employees) and 7% had considered
dropping out of the workforce (compared to 4% of male employees).20 Shifting from market to
non-market work (e.g., family caregiving) may be necessary for some workers, but it comes at a
cost to both current and future earnings, and thus to retirement savings as wel . Some of these
15 Brendan Moore and Judith Scott -Clayton, The Firm’s Role in Displaced Workers’ Earnings Losses, NBER Working
Paper 26525, December 2019, at https://www.nber.org/papers/w26525.
16 See discussion in Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Max, and Stephen A. Woodbury, “Sources of Displaced Workers’
Long-T erm Earnings Losses,” Am erican Econom ic Review, vol. 110, no. 10 (2020), pp. 3231 -3266.
17 See CRS Report R46472, Comparing the Congressional Response to the Great Recession and the COVID-19-
Related Recession: Unem ploym ent Insurance (UI) Provisions, by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
18 Ammar Farooq, Adriana D. Kugler, and Umberto Muratori, Do Unemployment Insurance Benefits Improve Match
Quality? Evidence From Recent U.S. Recessions, NBER Working Paper 27574, July 2020, at https://www.nber.org/
papers/w27574.
19 See discussion in Betsey Stevenson, The Initial Impact of COVID-19 on Labor Market Outcomes Across Groups and
the Potential for Perm anent Scarring, T he Hamilton Project, Essay 2020-16, July 2020, at
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
the_initial_impact_of_covid_19_on_labor_market_outcomes_across_groups_and_the_potential_for_permanent_sca rrin
g.
20 T he share of workers who considered leaving the workforce excludes those who indicated they were considering
retiring. Lean In and McKinsey and Company, Wom en in the Workplace, 2020, at https://womenintheworkplace.com.
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workers may leave the labor force for extended periods or permanently, while others may plan for
a temporary departure (e.g., until caregiving duties subside). In each case, but to varying degrees,
workers who drop out of the workforce forgo work experience, training, and other opportunities
to build skil s and advance careers, and potential y fal out of networks that can play an important
role in job searches and hiring. In addition, some employers may perceive workers who take a
career interruption as being less committed, which can affect employers’ wil ingness to hire or
invest in those returning to work.
Effects on Employment and Earnings Inequality
The disproportionate effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on women’s employment affect
employment and earnings inequality in multiple ways. The next section discusses how the
pandemic has affected inequality among women workers. The following section discusses how
the pandemic has affected inequality between men and women. The long-term effects on
inequality depend on several factors, including the degree to which the disproportionate effects of
the pandemic on women’s employment persist after it is over.
Inequality Among Women
Current labor force dynamics have the potential to increase inequality among women in terms of
employment, job quality, and earnings. Women workers in lower-paying jobs were far more likely
to lose a job in the early months of the pandemic than those in higher-paying ones. As shown in
Table 1, women’s employment in lower-paying jobs such as service occupations, sales, and
transportation fel sharply in percentage terms over the January to April 2020 period, whereas
women’s employment declined to a considerable but lesser degree in higher-pay occupations like
professional and managerial jobs.21 By October, relative losses between higher-earning and
lower-earning women were smal er, yet remained.
Table 1. Women’s Median Weekly Earnings and Percentage Change in Women’s
Employment, by Major Occupation Group
% Change in Women’s
Employment
Women’s Median Weekly
Jan.–Apr.
Jan.–Oct.
Major Occupation Group
Earnings in 2019
2020
2020
Management, business, and financial
$1,154
-6.3%
-5.0%
Professional and related
$980
-9.5%
-2.2%
Instal ation, maintenance, and repair
$800
-49.4%
5.8%
Office and administrative support
$654
-12.1%
-2.2%
Construction and extraction
$650
-21.7%
3.3%
Production
$570
-28.9%
-6.2%
Transportation and material moving
$504
-28.2%
-6.6%
21 T he large fluctuations in women’s employment in farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and extraction; and
installation, maint enance, and repair jobs in part reflect the relatively small number of women in those occupations in
January 2020. Each occupation group made up less than 1% of women’s employment in January 2020.
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% Change in Women’s
Employment
Women’s Median Weekly
Jan.–Apr.
Jan.–Oct.
Major Occupation Group
Earnings in 2019
2020
2020
Sales and related
$500
-22.6%
-7.3%
Farming, fishing, and forestry
$480
-30.6%
1.7%
Service
$425
-34.0%
-9.6%
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January 2019–October 2020.
Notes: Sample comprises women ages 16 and older. Data are not seasonal y adjusted. Rows are ordered by
median weekly usual earnings in 2019.
Workers in higher-paying professional and management jobs were also far more likely to report
that they had teleworked recently due to the pandemic than those in lower-paying service
occupations.22 The ability to work from home has clear benefits, particularly during the
pandemic: telework helps workers to avoid a break in employment, while at the same time
minimizing workplace exposure to COVID-19. One recent study found, for example, that
between mid-March and late-July 2020, non-remote workers were more likely to lose jobs than
those who could work from home, and they were also more likely to develop symptoms of
respiratory il ness.23
Other employer responses to the pandemic can have distributional impacts among female workers
as wel . In addition to telework, some employers have offered greater scheduling flexibilities and
other benefits, such as additional paid leave, subsidized childcare, and various school-related
supports for employees’ children.24 These supports can be important for working parents,
particularly mothers who have taken on a large share of additional caregiving responsibilities.
However, these new benefits are not offered at al workplaces, and currently appear to be
concentrated in large companies that employ highly educated and higher-earning workers.
Women without these workplace supports and options may be more likely to leave the labor
force, increasing female inequality.
To the extent that the pandemic changes commercial patterns and the organization of work, some
of these patterns—such as disproportionate job loss among low-wage workers and increased
workplace benefits for higher-wage workers—may have distributional impacts among female
22 BLS reports that in October 2020, managers and professionals made up about 42% of employment and nearly 76% of
those who teleworked due to the pandemic; in contrast, service workers made up almost 16% of employment but only
about 3% of those who teleworked for pandemic-related reasons. T hese estimates exclude those who se telework was
unrelated to the pandemic (e.g., workers who teleworked exclusively prior to the pandemic). BLS, Supplem ental data
m easuring the effects of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandem ic on the labor m arket; available at https://www.bls.gov/
cps/effects-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic.htm#concepts. T hese patterns are consistent with occupational
access to telework before the pandemic. See https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/article/ability-to-work-from-
home.htm.
23 Manuela Angelucci, Marco Angrisani, Daniel M. Bennett, Arie Kapteyn, and Simone G. Schaner, Remote Work and
the Heterogeneous Im pact of COVID-19 on Em ploym ent and Health, NBER Working Paper 27749, August 2020, at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27749. T his finding aligns with BLS data on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which show that while 6% of professional and managerial workers reported being unable to work at some point in the
last four weeks because their employer closed or lost business, 12% of service workers reported such losses.
24 Claire Cain Miller, “Private Tutors, Pop-Up Schools or Nothing at All: How Employers Are Helping Parents,” New
York Tim es, September 17, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/upshot/pandemic-workers-benefits-
disparity.html
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workers in the longer term. It is plausible, for example, that new consumer preferences may shift
sales (and jobs) from brick-and-mortar retail businesses to online companies. Increased adoption
of telework may further reduce demand for service and transportation jobs that support workers
who commute to work; these include jobs in building maintenance and cleaning, security,
lunchtime restaurants, and commuter bus and rail.25 If job loss in these occupations is permanent,
then affected workers may eventual y find new jobs, but those jobs might be lower paying,
especial y if these workers lack skil s to qualify for higher-paying opportunities.
Employment and Earnings Gaps Between Women and Men
The pandemic and accompanying recession have the potential to increase employment and
earnings gaps between women and men, and growth in these differentials may be long lasting.
Thus far in 2020, women have lost more jobs and have left the labor market at a greater rate than
men.26 The impact on the gender employment gap is clear: among prime-age workers, the gap
between men and women’s employment as a share of population has grown since the start of
2020 from 11.9 percentage points in January to 12.2 percentage points in October.
A portion of women’s employment loss is due to their greater concentration in jobs vulnerable to
pandemic-related closures and restrictions. As the economy recovers, many of these jobs are
likely to come back, and some may be fil ed by female workers displaced by the pandemic. But
this is not guaranteed. Prolonged periods of non-work create hurdles for workers seeking
reemployment: as noted earlier, some workers may lose skil s or require retraining to qualifying
for job offers, others may lose job networks, and employers may be reluctant to hire workers
whom they perceive to be less attached to the workforce.
There has also been some speculation that women’s employment prospects can further deteriorate
if workplaces reorganize or change production processes in response to the pandemic. One study,
for example, finds that women are relatively vulnerable to such changes because they are more
likely to be employed in occupations that are jointly at high risk for automation (based on job
tasks) and for workplace transmission of an airborne virus (based on physical proximity to
customers and co-workers and workplace exposure to disease or infections).27
As noted earlier, job displacement and career interruptions can have negative and lasting impacts
on wages and wage growth. These career breaks can lead to a considerable loss of job experience,
which is critical to career advancement, or movement into lower paying or lower-quality jobs, at
least temporarily. To the extent that women are displaced or leave the labor market more so than
men, the gender earnings gap wil increase, al else being equal.28
In addition, some women—particularly mothers—who remain attached to the labor market may
shift into careers that al ow them greater scheduling flexibility or otherwise accommodate family
needs. This may mean changing jobs or it may mean remaining with a current employer but not
pursuing promotion or other opportunities for career growth. This is another channel through with
25 T his observation is made and explored in David Autor and Elisabeth B. Reynolds, The nature of work after the
COVID crisis: Too few low-wage jobs, T he Hamilton Project, Essay 2020-14, July 16, 2020, at
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-nature-of-work-after-the-covid-crisis-too-few-low-wage-jobs/.
26 In October 2020, BLS data show that women made up nearly 60% of the 3.6 million individuals who were out of the
labor market and did not search for work due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
27 Alex W. Chernoff and Casey Warman, Covid-19 and Implications for Automation, NBER Working Paper 27249,
2020, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w27249.
28 An overview of the gender earnings gaps can be found in CRS In Focus IF10414, The Gender Earnings Gap, by
Sarah A. Donovan.
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the pandemic and recession can lead to a larger gender earnings gaps in the near term, especial y
if those changes outlast the pandemic.
Potential Macroeconomic Impacts
The disproportionate decline in female employment during the pandemic has implications for the
overal performance of the economy, particularly if female employment does not fully rebound in
the next expansion. However, as discussed above, although women have been disproportionately
affected by the pandemic so far, the gap between male and female employment loss has more
recently been converging, suggesting it is too soon to say how long the disparate impact wil
persist.
During the pandemic, the downturn may be deeper than it would otherwise have been because
some workers were forced to leave their jobs or cut their work hours because of childcare or other
care responsibilities, which disproportionately affected female workers. As a result, those
workers’ income declined, which reduced overal demand in the economy.
The long-term economic effects of the decline in women’s employment during the pandemic wil
depend on how much, if any, of this job loss is permanent. As the economy recovers once the
health crisis ends, most unemployed workers wil eventual y return to work, either moving back
to their old jobs or getting new jobs. If the economy can eventual y fully recover from the
pandemic (i.e., al disrupted economic activity resumes once the health crisis is over), the
permanent effects on GDP and income could be relatively smal . How large the permanent effects
turn out to be wil depend in part on the recovery in women’s employment.
In the standard growth accounting framework, economic growth (increases in the output of goods
and services or gross domestic product) derives from increases in labor supply, capital
investment, and productivity. A decline in women’s labor supply—whether in female
employment or hours worked per worker—directly reduces economic output, and if women’s
labor supply does not return to its pre-pandemic trend, the size of the economy wil not return to
its pre-pandemic trend either, al else being equal. Because national income is equal to national
output,29 a smal er economy would also result in lower national income compared to the pre-
pandemic trend.30
A modest decrease in female employment in the long-term may seem insignificant in comparison
to the magnitude of the current recession.31 But if the female labor force remains permanently
smal er—even if the permanent job loss is modest relative to the loss at the pandemic peak—GDP
and income would be permanently lower.
Some evidence from the Great Recession supports the idea that long-term job loss can have long-
lasting negative effects on workers.32 There is some evidence that workers who leave the labor
29 T echnically, national income is equal to net national product (NNP) by accounting identity. T he difference between
NNP and GDP is depreciation, and the former measures the output of Americans while the latter measures the output in
the United States.
30 Note that the negative effect on growth and income will be the same whether female workers remain officially
unemployed (i.e., not working but actively seeking work) or leave the labor force (e.g., because of childcare
responsibilities).
31 See CRS Insight IN11388, COVID-19: U.S. Economic Effects, by Rena S. Miller and Marc Labonte.
32 Danny Yagan, Employment Hysteresis from the Great Recession, Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 127, no.
5, at https://eml.berkeley.edu/~yagan/Hysteresis.pdf; and Brad J. Hershbein and Bryan A. Stuart, “ Recessions and
Local Labor Market Hysteresis,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper 20 -325, Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
force following a deep recession are less likely to return than workers who become unemployed
(i.e., continue an active job search).33 This is of particular concern in the current context because,
as discussed above, childcare and other care duties imposed by the pandemic have
disproportionately affected women, contributing to a greater decline in their labor force
participation rate.34 As the pandemic persists, the share of long-term unemployed workers has
been rising and is expected to continue to rise until economic normalcy resumes.
Long-term job separations can cause an erosion of skil s and loss of opportunities that can lead to
long-lasting negative effects on employment and earnings. The negative effects of long-term job
loss on long-term growth are not limited to a smal er labor force, but also potential y include
negative effects on productivity growth. Workers general y accumulate more skil s and
experience over their careers that boosts their productivity, increasing their contribution to GDP.
Long-term job loss can interrupt that productivity growth, particularly if it occurs early- or mid-
career when workers are typical y advancing the most in their careers. Early- and mid-career
workers may be the most likely to be faced with childcare disruptions caused by the pandemic.35
Long-lasting departures from the labor force may also harm productivity by reducing
entrepreneurship and innovation.
Interaction with Long-Term Trends in Women’s
Employment
If women’s labor force participation does not fully rebound from the pandemic, it wil compound
longer-term labor force trends that have contributed to lower economic growth this century and
wil pose chal enges for the economy moving forward. First, the aging of the population has
reduced the potential long-run growth rate of the labor force and the economy. The 2020 Social
Security trustees report, which does not incorporate the effects of the pandemic, projected that
economic growth wil average about 2% per year for the next 75 years under the intermediate
scenario, compared to about 3% for the period from 1969 to 2007, and employment growth
would average about 0.4% per year over the next 75 years, compared to 1.6% from 1969 to
2007.36
Employment Research, 2020, at https://doi.org/10.17848/wp20-325.
33 Romain Duval, Mehmet Eris and Davide Furceri, The Effects Of Downturns On Labour Force Participation:
Evidence And Causes, OECD, working paper No. 875, June 21, 2011, at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-
effects-of-downturns-on-labour-force-participation_5kg9q0nmbws8-en.
34 In contrast, men were disproportionately displaced from jobs during the Great Recession. T his may have been
attributable to the fact that predominantly male occupations such as manufacturing and construction were
disproportionately affected in that recession. Predominantly female occupations have been disproportionately affected
in this recession, as discussed previously. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10984, Long-Tenured Displaced
Workers, by Sarah A. Donovan and Marc Labonte.
35 Although the pandemic phenomenon of large-scale involuntary job separation because childcare suddenly becomes
unavailable may be unique, the potential effects on earnings and employment can be compared to the experience of
women who temporarily leave the labor force to raise children. Research literature finds a wage penalty for mothers
who interrupt their careers and later return to work. A review is in Francine D. Blau and Lawren ce M. Kahn, “ T he
Gender Wage Gap: Extent, T rends, and Explanations,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 55, no. 3 (2017), pp. 789-
865.
36 T he trustees present economic projections in three scenarios. In the trustees’ more optimistic scenario, annual
employment growth would be about 0.2 percentage points higher than in the intermediate scenario. In the pessimistic
scenario, annual employment growth would be close to zero in later decades. Chapter V.B, at https://www.ssa.gov/oact/
tr/2020/tr2020.pdf.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Second, after almost doubling from the end of World War II to 2000, the female labor force
participation rate fel by about three percentage points between 2000 and 2019. The rapid rise in
women’s labor force participation was an important source of growth in the labor force that
underpinned robust growth in the earlier period, and its decline contributed to the slowing of
labor force growth since 2000.
Third, U.S. female employment rates are lower than in many other countries. At 57.4% in the
second quarter of 2020, the U.S. female employment rate is below the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 61.3% and far below several other OECD
countries (e.g., the female employment rate in Japan, the UK, Germany, and several other smal er
OECD countries is above 70%). This marks a reversal from before the pandemic. In 2019, the
U.S. female employment rate was five percentage points above the OECD average, albeit stil
wel below the 70% achieved by several OECD countries.37
37 Measured as a share of the working age female population. See https://data.oecd.org/emp/employment-rate.htm.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Appendix. Change in Employment Between January
and April 2020, by Industry and Occupation
Table A-1. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Industry
Women’s
Change in
Share of
Employment,
Industry Share of
Industry
Jan.-Apr. 2020
Total Employment
Employment,
Industry Group
(in 100,000)
Lost, Jan.–Apr. 2020
Jan. 2020
Educational and health services
-46.3
19.6%
74.5%
Financial activities
-4.2
1.8%
53.7%
Other services
-21.1
8.9%
52.9%
Leisure and hospitality
-58.4
24.7%
51.8%
Public administration
-3
1.3%
46.1%
Wholesale and retail trade
-34.4
14.5%
44.5%
Professional and business services
-18
7.6%
41.9%
Information
-3.4
1.4%
40.7%
Manufacturing
-19.6
8.3%
29.4%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and
0.1
-0.1%
26.9%
hunting
Transportation and utilities
-10
4.2%
24.2%
Mining
-1.4
0.6%
11.9%
Construction
-16.7
7.1%
10.7%
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–April 2020.
Notes: Data are not seasonal y adjusted. Rows are ordered by female share of industry group employment in
January 2020. The “Industry Share of Total Employment Lost, Jan.–Apr. 2020” column reports the distribution of
total employment loss between January and April 2020 across industries. It shows, for example, that 19.6% of the
employment loss occurred in educational and health services businesses.
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
Table A-2. Change in Employment Between January and April 2020, by Occupation
Women’s
Change in
Occupation Share
Share of
Employment,
of Total
Occupational
Jan.-Apr. 2020
Employment Lost,
Employment,
Occupation Group
(in 100,000)
Jan.–Apr. 2020
Jan. 2020
Office and administrative support
-16.6
7.0%
73.9%
Service
-78.6
33.2%
58.5%
Professional and related
-33.2
14.0%
56.4%
Sales and related
-32.2
13.6%
49.2%
Management, business, and financial
-10.8
4.6%
45.7%
Production
-19.5
8.2%
28.5%
Farming, fishing, and forestry
-0.1
0.0%
26.5%
Transportation and material moving
-24.7
10.5%
21.0%
Instal ation, maintenance, and repair
-6.4
2.7%
4.3%
Construction and extraction
-14.6
6.1%
4.1%
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) for
January–April 2020.
Notes: Data are not seasonal y adjusted. Rows are ordered by female share of occupation group employment in
January 2020. The “Occupation Share of Total Employment Lost, Jan.–Apr. 2020” column reports the
distribution of total employment loss between January and April 2020 across occupation. It shows, for example,
that 33.2% of the employment loss was in service jobs.
Author Information
Sarah A. Donovan
Marc Labonte
Specialist in Labor Policy
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
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The COVID-19 Pandemic: Labor Market Implications for Women
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Congressional Research Service
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