The Status of Puerto Rico’s Recovery and Ongoing Challenges Following Hurricanes Irma and María: FEMA, SBA, and HUD Assistance

November 13, 2020 R46609

The Status of Puerto Rico’s Recovery and
November 13, 2020
Ongoing Challenges Following Hurricanes Irma Elizabeth M. Webster,
and María: FEMA, SBA, and HUD Assistance
Coordinator
Analyst in Emergency
Three years after Hurricanes Irma and María, Puerto Rico is still recovering from the devastation
Management and Disaster
to communities, homes and property, businesses, and infrastructure that was caused by the
Recovery
hurricanes. At the same time, Puerto Rico has faced destruction caused by an earthquake swarm,

which began in 2019 and is continuing into 2020, as well as the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Michael H. Cecire
(COVID-19) pandemic. These consecutive disasters have complicated response and recovery for
Analyst in
each incident.
Intergovernmental
Relations and Economic
Many types of federal assistance were authorized to support Puerto Rico’s recovery efforts
Development Policy
following the hurricanes, and the provision of assistance is ongoing. This report focuses on the

assistance provided by three federal agencies: the Federal Emergency Management Agency
Diane P. Horn
(FEMA), the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), and the U.S. Department of Housing
Analyst in Flood Insurance
and Urban Development (HUD). These programs provided grants, loans, and other forms of
and Emergency
assistance to the Government of Puerto Rico and its local governments (referred to as
Management
municipios), certain private nonprofit organizations, businesses, and individuals and households.

Some of these programs supported short- and intermediate-term recovery efforts, and some
continue to support Puerto Rico’s long-term recovery. Many other federal assistance programs
Joseph V. Jaroscak
were also authorized to support Puerto Rico’s recovery following these major disasters; however,
Analyst in Economic
this report does not address funding provided by other federal agencies (including the U.S. Army
Development Policy

Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Transportation,
and the U.S. Department of Education).
Natalie Keegan
Analyst in American
Members of Congress have raised serious concerns about the pace of Puerto Rico’s recovery;
Federalism and Emergency
inequities in the deployment of federal personnel to Puerto Rico and the delivery of assistance,
Management Policy
including through the FEMA Public Assistance (PA) program; the timely provision of federal

assistance; and delayed, partial, or improper federal payments and reimbursements, among other
Erica A. Lee
concerns described in this report.
Analyst in Emergency
Management and Disaster
Congress has taken an active role in supporting Puerto Rico’s hurricane recovery efforts by
Recovery
conducting oversight and appropriating funding for recovery. For example, Congress passed the

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA of 2018), which required the development of Puerto Rico’s
Bruce R. Lindsay
recovery plan and instructed the Government of Puerto Rico to submit regular reports to
Analyst in American
Congress about the status of its recovery activities and progress towards implementing its
National Government
recovery plan. Congressional committees have also conducted numerous hearings and published

reports focused on the recovery efforts following Hurricanes Irma and María. Additionally, at the
request of Congress, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has authored multiple reports

focused exclusively or substantially on Puerto Rico’s recovery. In 2020, the Government of
Puerto Rico and FEMA reported an increase in the pace, number, and dollar amounts of Public Assistance project obligations
(almost all of the funds for reconstruction and replacement of physical structures or permanent work were obligated during
September 2020). Further, Congress passed three supplemental appropriations acts that included a total of $35.4 billion in
HUD Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) assistance (through BBA of 2018 and two
other acts). Of the total amount provided in these three supplemental appropriations acts (i.e., $35.4 billion), Puerto Rico’s
allocation was $20.2 billion. However, Puerto Rico had only expended approximately $20.6 million in CDBG-DR funds,
which represents approximately 0.1% of all appropriated funds, according to a March 2020 report. A significant amount of
project work remains to be done, and a significant amount of the obligated and appropriated funding remains to be spent,
including related to the PA and CDBG-DR projects and funding. This is also true of FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP), the total available funding to Puerto Rico for which is $3.5 billion. However, by September 2020, FEMA
had only obligated approximately 1.1% of the HMGP funds for Puerto Rico for Irma and María, and no HMGP funds have
yet been disbursed for either hurricane. Meanwhile, other disasters, such as the earthquake swarm that began in 2019,
continue to affect Puerto Rico and its recovery, by delaying the progress and increasing costs of ongoing hurricane recovery
work.
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The Status of Puerto Rico’s Recovery Following Hurricanes Irma and María

Many challenges to Puerto Rico’s ongoing hurricane recovery efforts and future disaster preparedness remain. Frequent
policy and rule-making changes in pilot and non-statutory programs, such as FEMA’s PA Section 428 Alternate Procedures
and HUD’s CDBG-DR program, may have generated confusion and contributed to recovery delays. Further, low
participation rates in insurance programs and an inconsistent application of current building codes for hurricane-related
projects jeopardize community resilience. These challenges, and others described in this report, may also affect other states,
territories, and tribal governments, and considerations for Congress are discussed.
This report is intended to provide information to help inform Congress’s understanding of the status of Puerto Rico’s
recovery, including a recap of the above-listed forms of federal assistance provided to Puerto Rico, as well as considerations
for improving these and future recovery efforts. To that end, this report begins by describing the impact Hurricanes Irma and
María had on Puerto Rico, and the roles of the Government of Puerto Rico and of the federal government in administering
and implementing disaster recovery programs. It describes in detail the support provided by the above-listed federal
assistance programs, and it discusses the recovery challenges Puerto Rico may face in the future. Additionally, the
Appendices to this report describe Puerto Rico’s ongoing earthquake swarm and how it has affected Puerto Rico’s recovery
efforts following the 2017 hurricanes; sources of recovery program data; detailed information on building codes; and
additional Congressional Research Service products on topics relevant to understanding the underlying federal assistance
programs and the status of disaster recovery in Puerto Rico.
The data included in this report were obtained at different times, with most dating to September and October, 2020. The dates
associated with the data are noted. This report may be updated if warranted.
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Introduction
September 2020 marked the three-year anniversary of the significant destruction caused in Puerto
Rico by Hurricanes Irma and María. This report focuses on Puerto Rico’s recovery from these
disasters, with consideration given to additional disasters that have compounded and complicated
its recovery efforts, including an ongoing earthquake swarm and the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic.1
The Government of Puerto Rico has received significant federal assistance in the recovery effort,
primarily from:
 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (part of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS));
 the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA); and
 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
This report does not address the funding and assistance provided by other federal agencies (to
include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S.
Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Department of Education). Appendix D lists
additional Congressional Research Service (CRS) products on topics relevant to understanding
the underlying federal assistance programs and the status of disaster recovery in Puerto Rico. For
example, additional information on the restoration of Puerto Rico’s power grid can be found in
CRS Report R45263, Puerto Rico—Status of Electric Power Recovery, by Richard J. Campbell,
and CRS Insight IN10785, Puerto Rico and Electric Power Restoration from Hurricane Maria,
by Richard J. Campbell; and the status of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers work can be found in
CRS Insight IN10764, 2017 Hurricanes and Army Corps of Engineers: Background for Flood
Response and Recovery, by Nicole T. Carter and Charles V. Stern. Additionally, this report does
not address issues related to Puerto Rico’s political status (more information on this topic may be
found in CRS Report R44721, Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent
Developments for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett).
Appendix A provides specific information on the earthquakes that began in 2019 and the
assistance that has been provided through FEMA and the SBA.
Appendix B describes the sources of recovery data that may be referenced to help inform an
understanding of the status of specific recovery programs being used to support Puerto Rico’s
recovery efforts and work. However, this report does not independently estimate the total amount
of assistance required for Puerto Rico to recover, nor does it independently estimate the amount
of recovery work that remains to be completed.

1 For example, see “FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] Administrator Pete Gaynor approved Puerto
Rico for a FEMA grant under the Lost Wages Assistance program. FEMA’s grant funding will allow Puerto Rico to
provide $300 per week—on top of their regular unemployment benefit—to those unemployed due to COVID-19”
(Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “FEMA Announces Lost Wages Grant for Puerto Rico,” news
release HQ-20-283, October 7, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20201007/fema-announces-lost-wages-grant-
puerto-rico). On March 27, 2020, the President declared a major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended) authorizing Public Assistance Category B (emergency
protective measures) for Puerto Rico due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic (FEMA, “Puerto
Rico; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” 85 Federal Register 21874, April 20, 2020). The declaration was
amended to add Individual Assistance limited to Crisis Counseling (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 2 to Notice
of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 85 Federal Register 35326, June 9, 2020).
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Appendix C provides detailed information on building codes, which are referenced particularly
in the context of Puerto Rico’s rebuilding efforts, including as they relate to assistance provided
by the Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation Assistance programs.
Acronyms

Puerto Rico and Federal Departments/Agencies:

COR3—Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resiliency (Puerto Rico)

DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland Security

FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency

GAO—U.S. Government Accountability Office

HUD—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

P3—Public-Private Partnerships Authority (Puerto Rico)

SBA—U.S. Small Business Administration

Programs and Funding Sources:

CDBG-DR—Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (HUD)

CDBG-MIT—Community Development Block Grant-Mitigation (HUD)

DRF—Disaster Relief Fund (FEMA)

HMGP—Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (FEMA)

IA—Individual Assistance (FEMA)

NFIP—National Flood Insurance Program (FEMA)

PA—Public Assistance (FEMA)
Major Disasters Affecting Puerto Rico Between 2017 and 2020
Puerto Rico has received presidential declarations of emergency and major disaster under the
Stafford Act2 for Hurricanes Irma and María, as well as other natural disasters, including other
hurricanes,3 an ongoing swarm of earthquakes,4 and the COVID-19 pandemic.5 Puerto Rico’s
recovery efforts from these events are ongoing.

2 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C.
§§5121 et seq.).
3 FEMA’s “Declared Disasters” webpage, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters/disaster-declarations, includes
information on other emergencies and major disasters that have affected Puerto Rico, such as Tropical Storm Isaias (see
FEMA, “Puerto Rico Tropical Storm Isaias (DR-4560-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4560). For additional
information regarding hurricanes, including how they form and are categorized, see the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) website on “Hurricanes,” available at https://www.noaa.gov/education/
resource-collections/weather-atmosphere/hurricanes.
4 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Earthquakes (DR-4473-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4473. For additional information
regarding earthquakes, including what earthquakes are and how they are measured, see the U.S. Geological Survey’s
(USGS’s) website on “The Science of Earthquakes,” available at https://www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/earthquake-
hazards/science/science-earthquakes?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects.
5 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Covid-19 Pandemic (DR-4493-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4493. Additional
information regarding the nation’s response to COVID-19 can be found by visiting the websites for federal agencies,
including FEMA’s COVID-19 Response website, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters/coronavirus (for
additional information see CRS Report R46326, Stafford Act Declarations for COVID-19 FAQ, by Elizabeth M.
Webster, Erica A. Lee, and William L. Painter).
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The following sections briefly describe Hurricanes Irma and María, which caused substantial
physical damage to infrastructure, homes, and businesses, and resulted in significant loss of life in
2017.
Hurricane Irma
Hurricane Irma was a category 5
Hurricane Terminology and Definitions
hurricane when it passed just north of
“The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is a 1 to 5 rating
Puerto Rico on September 6, 2017. The
based on a hurricane’s sustained wind speed. This scale
damage in Puerto Rico was caused by
estimates potential property damage.”
tropical-storm-force winds and

category 5 hurricane = sustained winds of ≤157 miles
significant rainfall, which resulted in:
per hour (mph)

tropical-storm-force winds = maximum sustained winds
 “near-total” losses of electricity
of 39 to 73 mph
and water;

 damage to homes;
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
“Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale,” https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
 damage to businesses;
aboutsshws.php; NOAA, “Tropical Cyclone Climatology,”

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/.
collapsed structures;
 uprooted trees; and
 three reported indirect deaths.6
Figure 1 displays the wind speeds and the track of the hurricane.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
The Archipelago of Puerto Rico
Administration (NOAA) issued a
Puerto Rico is comprised of several islands. The main island is
hurricane warning for Puerto Rico,
named Puerto Rico. Other islands in the Puerto Rico
Vieques, and Culebra on September 5,
archipelago include the adjacent islands of Vieques (which is
2017. President Donald J. Trump
also a municipio—defined below) and Culebra (also a
municipio), among others. “Under the jurisdiction known as
declared an emergency under the
Puerto Rico are approximately 140 insular geostructures,
Stafford Act on September 5, 2017,
including islands, islets and keys of various sizes and
which initially authorized Public
magnitudes that border the coasts of the main island.”
Assistance Categories A and B

(assistance for debris removal and
Source: Harrison Flores Ortiz, “Archipelago of Puerto Rico,” in the
emergency protective measures,
Encyclopedia of Puerto Rico Online, Puerto Rican Endowment for the
Humanities, https://enciclopediapr.org/encyclopedia/archipelago-of-
respectively).7 The hurricane warning
puerto-rico/.
was discontinued on September 7,
2017.8

6 John P. Cangialosi, Andrew S. Latto, and Robbie Berg, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Irma,” National
Hurricane Center, AL112017, June 30, 2018, pp. 3, 5, 12, and 14, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/
AL112017_Irma.pdf. More specifically, Hurricane Irma’s eye tracked about 50 nautical miles north of San Juan, Puerto
Rico, on September 6, 2017, just before 0000 UTC (Universal Time Coordinated) on September 7, 2017. The highest
wind speed reported as 48 knots (kt) (or approximately 55.2 miles per hour (mph)), with a gust of 64 kt (or
approximately 73.6 mph) at 2230 UTC on September 6, 2017.
7 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Irma (EM-3384-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/3384; and FEMA, “Puerto
Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 44647, September 25, 2017.
8 The incident period was closed on September 7, 2017 (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 1 to Notice of an
Emergency Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 44640, September 25, 2017; and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No.
3 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 44641, September 25, 2017). The incident period is
defined as “[t]he time interval during which the disaster-causing incident occurs. No Federal assistance under the Act
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The President declared a major disaster on September 10, 2017.9 This decision was expedited
because Hurricane Irma was of such severity and magnitude that the need for supplemental
federal assistance was apparent even prior to the completion of a joint Preliminary Damage
Assessment (PDA).10 The major disaster declaration authorized Individual Assistance, expanded
Public Assistance in the designated areas, and authorized Hazard Mitigation throughout Puerto
Rico.11 Additionally, the President’s major disaster declaration enabled the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) to provide SBA Disaster Loans, including Physical Loans for homeowners,
businesses, and nonprofit organizations, and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) for
businesses and nonprofit organizations.12
Hurricane María
Two weeks after Hurricane Irma, a second hurricane made landfall in Puerto Rico. Hurricane
María was a category 4 hurricane (with wind speeds just below the category 5 threshold) when it
came ashore in Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, and lingered for several hours. Strong winds,
as well as powerful storm surge, heavy rainfall, and severe flooding resulted in:
 loss of power (80% of utility poles and all transmission lines were downed);13
 loss of cell service;
 loss of water;
 extensive damage to or the destruction of buildings;
 extensive damage to or the destruction of homes;
 blown off roofs;
 sunken boats;
 extensive damage to roads;

shall be approved unless the damage or hardship to be alleviated resulted from the disaster-causing incident which took
place during the incident period or was in anticipation of that incident....” (44 C.F.R. §206.32(f)). For more
information, see CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to and Recovering from Major Disasters
and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay and Elizabeth M. Webster.
9 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Irma (DR-4336-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4336; FEMA, “Preliminary
Damage Assessment Report: Puerto Rico—Hurricane Irma,” FEMA-4336-DR, September 10, 2017,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/FEMA4336DRPR_Expedited.pdf; and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Major
Disaster and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 44639, September 25, 2017.
10 FEMA, “Preliminary Damage Assessment Report: Puerto Rico—Hurricane Irma,” FEMA-4336-DR, September 10,
2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/FEMA4336DRPR_Expedited.pdf.
11 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 44639, September 25, 2017.
Initially, the municipios of Culebra and Vieques were authorized for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance.
Additional areas were then added for Individual Assistance, including Canóvanas, Loíza, Dorado, Fajardo, Toa Baja,
Cataño, Luquillo, and Vega Baja; and additional areas were added for Public Assistance, including Adjuntas,
Canóvanas, Carolina, Guaynabo, Juncos, Loíza, Luquillo, Orocovis, Patillas, Utuado, Aguas Buenas, Barranquitas,
Bayamón, Camuy, Cataño, Ciales, Comerío, Hatillo, Jayuya, Las Piedras, Quebradillas, Salinas, San Juan, Vega Baja,
Yauco, Dorado, Guarabo, and Naguabo (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 1 to Notice of a Major Disaster
Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 44639, September 25, 2017; FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a
Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 44632, September 25, 2017; and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment
No. 4 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 46816, October 6, 2017).
12 U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), “Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster for the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico,” 82 Federal Register 43441, September 15, 2017.
13 By the end of 2017, which was several months after Hurricane María made landfall in Puerto Rico, nearly half of its
residents lacked power.
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 downed, splintered, and defoliated trees;14 and
 2,975 “total excess mortality” for the period of September 2017 through February
2018 (this is Puerto Rico’s official death toll, which is based on an independent
study by the George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public
Health that was commissioned by former-Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares).15
Figure 1 displays the wind speeds and the track of the hurricane.
NOAA issued a hurricane warning for Puerto Rico, Vieques, and Culebra on September 18, 2017.
The President declared an emergency under the Stafford Act on September 18, 2017, which
initially authorized Public Assistance Categories A and B (assistance for debris removal and
emergency protective measures, respectively).16
The President declared a major disaster on September 20, 2017.17 As with Hurricane Irma, this
decision was expedited because Hurricane María was of such severity and magnitude that the
need for supplemental federal assistance was apparent even prior to the completion of a joint
Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA).18 The hurricane warning was discontinued on
September 21, 2017.19

14 Richard J. Pasch, Andrew B. Penny, and Robbie Berg, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Maria,” National
Hurricane Center, February 14, 2019, AL152017, pp. 2, and 4-8, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/
AL152017_Maria.pdf (hereinafter Pasch, Penny, and Berg, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Maria”). In 1928, a
category 5 hurricane made landfall in Puerto Rico, and Hurricane María is the strongest hurricane to make landfall in
Puerto Rico since then. Hurricane María crossed near Yabucoa on Puerto Rico’s southeast coast around 1015 UTC on
September 20, 2017. The highest wind speed was reported as 135 kt (or approximately 155.4 mph), weakening to 95 kt
(or approximately 109.3 mph) by the time Hurricane María emerged into the Atlantic Ocean around 1800 UTC on
September 20, 2017.
15 The George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health, with the University of Puerto Rico
Graduate School of Public Health, estimated the excess mortality post-hurricane to be 2,975 (The George Washington
University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health, Ascertainment of the Estimated Excess Mortality from
Hurricane María in Puerto Rico, project report, August 28, 2018, https://publichealth.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/
downloads/projects/PRstudy/
Acertainment%20of%20the%20Estimated%20Excess%20Mortality%20from%20Hurricane%20Maria%20in%20Puert
o%20Rico.pdf). Puerto Rico commissioned the Milken Institute School of Public Health “to conduct an independent
analysis to ... determine the loss of life ... [resulting from] Hurricane Maria. The hurricane took the lives of 2,975. ...
based on that fact, ... [Puerto Rico] adjusted the official death toll” (La Fortaleza, Oficina De La Gobernadora,
“Authorized statement of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo Rosselló,” September 13, 2018,
https://www.fortaleza.pr.gov/content/authorized-statement-governor-puerto-rico-ricardo-rossell-5). There are other
death toll estimates that are both lower than and higher than that adopted by Puerto Rico. For example, the Government
of Puerto Rico initially estimated the death toll at 64 people. Additionally, a study initiated by the Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health, Harvard University, and published in the New England Journal of Medicine, estimated a total
of 4,645 excess deaths during the period from September 20 through December 31, 2017 (Nishant Kishore et al.,
“Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria,” New England Journal of Medicine, online, May 29, 2018,
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1803972).
16 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Maria (EM-3391-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/3391; and FEMA, “Puerto
Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 45874-45875, October 2, 2017.
17 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Maria (DR-4339-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4339; FEMA, “Preliminary
Damage Assessment Report: Puerto Rico—Hurricane Maria,” FEMA-4339-DR, September 20, 2017,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/FEMA4339DRPR_Expedited.pdf; and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Major
Disaster and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 46820, October 6, 2017.
18 FEMA, “Preliminary Damage Assessment Report: Puerto Rico—Hurricane Maria,” FEMA-4339-DR, September 20,
2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/FEMA4339DRPR_Expedited.pdf.
19 The incident period was closed on November 15, 2017 (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of an
Emergency Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 61768, December 29, 2017; FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 6 to
Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 61787, December 29, 2017).
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The major disaster declaration authorized Individual Assistance and expanded Public Assistance
in the designated areas, and Hazard Mitigation throughout Puerto Rico.20 Additionally, the major
disaster declaration enabled the provision of SBA Disaster Loans, including Physical Loans for
homeowners, businesses, and nonprofit organizations, and EIDLs for businesses and nonprofit
organizations.21
In addition to the FEMA grants and direct assistance authorized pursuant to the President’s major
disaster declarations for Hurricanes Irma and María, Congress ultimately appropriated
$20,223,446,230 in recovery funding for Puerto Rico through HUD’s Community Development
Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) and Community Development Block Grant-
Mitigation (CDBG-MIT) programs through multiple pieces of enacted legislation (see Table 8 for
the allocation of CDBG-DR directed to Puerto Rico).
Figure 1. Wind Speeds Affecting Puerto Rico Caused by Hurricanes Irma and María

Sources: Created by CRS using data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration–National
Ocean Service, the Humanitarian Data Exchange–British Red Cross Mapping Team, and Esri Data and Maps
2018.
Notes: Hurricane Irma passed to the north of Puerto Rico, but Hurricane María’s path passed directly over
Puerto Rico’s main island, and significantly affected the principal other islands of Vieques and Culebra.

20 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 46820, October 6, 2017.
Initially, Public Assistance Categories A and B were authorized for all of Puerto Rico. Subsequently, Public Assistance
Categories C-G, permanent work, were authorized for all of Puerto Rico (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 4 to
Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 53515, November 16, 2017). Individual Assistance was
ultimately authorized for all of Puerto Rico through amendments to the declaration (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment
No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 47569, October 12, 2017).
21 SBA, “Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,” 82 Federal Register
45349, September 28, 2017.
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Relationship Between the Government of Puerto Rico and the
Federal Government in Delivering Assistance
The United States takes a “bottom up” approach
Defining Municipios
to emergency management, meaning that
Puerto Rico has 78 municipalities, the Spanish term
disaster response and recovery begin at the
for which is “municipios.” Municipios are second
“local” level. To that end, the Government of
order administrative divisions, which are run by
Puerto Rico and its municipios manage disaster
mayors, and they are the primary legal subdivision of
Puerto Rico. Municipios are “geographic, urban and
response and recovery, except in the most
suburban, adjacent areas governed by the same local
extraordinary circumstances. When Puerto
government. . They are equivalent to the ‘county’. . ”
Rico’s resources and capacity were
The municipalities of Puerto Rico are referred to as
overwhelmed by Hurricanes Irma and María,
municipios throughout this report.
then-Governor Rosselló Nevares requested

federal assistance. The role of the federal
Source: Mercedes Casablanca, “About the Municipalities:
government is to supplement the efforts and
Yesterday and Today,” in the Encyclopedia of Puerto Rico
Online, Puerto Rican Endowment for the Humanities,
resources of the Government of Puerto Rico and
https://enciclopediapr.org/encyclopedia/sobre-los-
its municipios, and disaster relief organizations
municipios-ayer-y-hoy/.
through the provision of assistance via federal
Notes: The Government of Puerto Rico’s website includes
a directory of municipios, available at https://www2.pr.gov/
recovery programs.22 The government of Puerto
Directorios/Pages/DirectoriodeMunicipios.aspx.
Rico and the federal government have different
roles and responsibilities in administering these programs and supporting Puerto Rico’s recovery
efforts, which are described below.
Role of the Government of Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico is responsible for establishing and implementing its recovery plan, managing various
federally-funded recovery programs, and meeting federal grants requirements, per congressional
and federal requirements. These responsibilities are described below.
Former-Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares established the Central Office of Recovery,
Reconstruction, and Resiliency (COR3) through Executive Order OE-2017-6523 to implement
Puerto Rico’s recovery plan, entitled Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation:
An Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico (hereinafter Economic and Disaster
Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico).24 COR3 “acts as the oversight function for the Governor’s Office
to verify compliance of the use of all disaster recovery grant funding [including FEMA

22 42 U.S.C. §5122(2). For more information on federal response and recovery, see CRS Report R41981,
Congressional Primer on Responding to and Recovering from Major Disasters and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay
and Elizabeth M. Webster.
23 Government of Puerto Rico, Executive Order of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, To
Create the Central Recovery and Reconstruction Office of Puerto Rico, Administrative Bulletin No. OE-2017-65,
October 23, 2017 (to access the Executive Order, visit the website of the Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Departamento de
Estado, available at https://www.estado.pr.gov/en/executive-orders/); see also Central Office of Recovery,
Reconstruction, and Resiliency (COR3), Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and
Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, August 8, 2018, p. iv, https://recovery.pr/documents/pr-transformation-
innovation-plan-congressional-submission-080818.pdf (hereinafter COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for
Puerto Rico). The Executive Order OE-2017-65 names the Central Recovery and Reconstruction Office, which is now
known as COR3.
24 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. viii. COR3 is a division of the Puerto Rico Public-
Private Partnerships (P3) Authority. The website of the Puerto Rico Public-Private Partnerships Authority (P3) is
available at https://aafaf.pr.gov/p3/.
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assistance].... The COR3 office maintains an oversight and coordination role across all federal
funding streams.”25 Further, COR3 maintains a “Transparency Portal” website (described in
Appendix B), which is intended to make recovery information related to Hurricanes Irma and
María publicly available.26
Separately, the Puerto Rico Department of Housing (PRDOH) was appointed by the Governor to
administer the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program,
in close collaboration with COR3.27 Thus, PRDOH is responsible for HUD grant management,
and CDBG-DR-funded program implementation and compliance (for which there are also
program guidance documents that align with the Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for
Puerto Rico).28 PRDOH reports information on the use of CDBG-DR funds to COR3, and this
information is included in required reports to Congress (described below).29
Puerto Rico’s Goals for Recovery
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA of 2018), which provided relief funding through
congressional appropriations in the wake of the 2017 hurricanes, includes requirements to support
congressional oversight of Puerto Rico’s recovery progress. The BBA of 2018 required the
Governor of Puerto Rico to submit a report to Congress describing the plan for economic and
disaster recovery, to include Puerto Rico’s priorities, goals, and expected outcomes.30 It also
requires regular progress reports (every 180 days), which are made public.31 The Government of
Puerto Rico, with support from FEMA and the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
(HSOAC), developed the Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico.32 The four core
areas that define the vision for Puerto Rico’s recovery, as outlined in the plan, are:
1. Society: which is focused on promoting an educated, healthy, and sustainable
society;
2. Economy: which is focused on ensuring rebuilding and restoration efforts
promote sustainable economic growth and social transformation, and contribute
to an economy that is more “vibrant and competitive” and can provide job
growth and personal advancement opportunities;

25 Puerto Rico Department of Housing (PRDOH), Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR
Funds in Response to 2017 Hurricanes Irma and María, Amendment 3, February 24, 2020, p. 8, https://cdbg-dr.pr.gov/
en/download/action-plan-amendment-3-nonsubstantial-amendment-effective-on-february-24-2020/ (hereinafter
PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3)).
26 Governor of Puerto Rico to U.S. Congressional Leaders, Third Congressional Status Report on the Economic and
Disaster Recovery Plan, January 29, 2020, https://recovery.pr/documents/Puerto_Rico_Third_Report_to_Congress.pdf
(hereinafter Governor of Puerto Rico, Third Congressional Status Report).
27 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. v.
28 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 8.
29 Section 21210 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA of 2018; P.L. 115-123); and PRDOH, Action Plan for the
Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 8.
30 Section 21210 of the BBA of 2018 (P.L. 115-123).
31 See, for example, Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, which is required by Section
21210(c) of the BBA of 2018 (P.L. 115-123). Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report on the
Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan, August 3, 2020, p. 2, https://recovery.pr/documents/
Congressional%20Report%20073020[2].pdf (hereinafter Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status
Report).
32 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. viii.
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3. Resilience: which is focused on future disaster response and recovery through
preparedness (individual, business, community, and government), and mitigation
(e.g., improved codes and standards); and
4. Infrastructure: which is focused on modern, sustainable, resilient design and
reconstruction of critical infrastructure.33
The plan also sets forth the recovery activities to achieve long-term recovery, including shorter-
term (1-2 year) objectives, such as:
 reestablishing energy, telecommunications, water, and transportation systems;
 repairing or rebuilding residential structures;
 improving emergency preparedness; and
 clarifying responsibility for infrastructure and services.34
Further, the plan sets forth longer-term (3-11 year) objectives, such as:
 encouraging economic growth;
 revitalizing urban centers;
 improving infrastructure and social services to meet the current and future
population’s needs;
 rebuilding infrastructure to modern codes and standards; and
 enhancing recovery and daily operational decisionmaking resources for the
public and private sectors.35
In total, the recovery plan identifies 276 courses of action (or individual goals)—grouped into
Capital Investments and Strategic Initiatives—to achieve Puerto Rico’s recovery goals.36 The
federal assistance programs, described in the “Federal Assistance Provided to Puerto Rico
Following Hurricanes Irma and María” section of this report, support Puerto Rico’s efforts to
achieve its recovery goals.
Puerto Rico’s Responsibilities as a Federal Grant Recipient
In addition to orchestrating the disaster recovery process at the state and substate level, the
Government of Puerto Rico serves as the primary grant recipient for federal disaster assistance,
such as FEMA’s Public Assistance program. The primary grant recipient plays a role in vetting
projects for eligibility and in coordinating with FEMA on project development and
implementation. The primary grant recipient is also responsible for ensuring compliance with all
federal requirements, including ensuring that subgrantees and subcontractors of the primary grant
recipient comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements of the federal assistance.37 The
primary grant recipient is also responsible for ensuring that any conditions placed on the federal
assistance, such as cost-share requirements, are met—regardless of whether the primary grant

33 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, pp. ix, and 4-5.
34 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, pp. 8-9.
35 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, pp. 8-9.
36 Letter from Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, Governor of Puerto Rico, to Leader McConnell, Senator, Minority Leader
Schumer, Senator, and Speaker Pelosi, Representative, and Minority Leader McCarthy, Representative, February 4, p.
2, 2019, https://recovery.pr/documents/Letter_Gov_Rossello_to_Congressional.pdf.
37 For more information on federal grants management, see CRS Report R42769, Federal Grants-in-Aid
Administration: A Primer, by Natalie Keegan.
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recipient directly expended the funds or passed them through to be expended by subgrantees or
subcontractors.
Role of Federal Agencies
Federal agencies are supporting the disaster recovery efforts of Puerto Rico. One of the federal
government’s primary recovery functions is to perform grants management, categorized as
financial management, program administration, and grant oversight.38 Further, federal grant
administration activities include:
 providing guidance on the use of funds, as well as technical assistance to grant
recipients;
 reviewing activities conducted under the terms of the grant award;
 reviewing and approving changes in the scope of work to be done under the grant
agreement; and
 assessing compliance with program and financial reporting requirements.39
Federal agencies also investigate allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of federal
assistance, and are required to conduct risk assessments to identify risks of improper payments
under grant programs and to implement additional grant management procedures to reduce that
risk.40 For purposes of administering aid under the Stafford Act, Puerto Rico is considered a
“state”41 by federal agencies, and, as such, is subject to the same statutory and regulatory
requirements as states.42 Federal agencies conduct risk assessments to review the financial
integrity of the state with respect to managing federal funding to determine whether there is a
high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of the federal grant award.43 Though FEMA does
not have a formal process for designating a grantee as “high risk,” it implemented a manual
review of reimbursement requests several times during the recovery period for payments
requested under the Public Assistance program (this is further discussed in the “Public Assistance
Obligation and Disbursement” section) to mitigate the risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. Because
manual review of reimbursements requires an additional step in the processing of reimbursement
payments, this may have caused additional delay in the processing of payments to Puerto Rico.
HUD also conducts risk assessments of grantees, but has established criteria to make a high-risk
grantee determination that may result in additional monitoring and oversight.44

38 Financial management activities are generally conducted by the agency’s finance personnel and include tracking
expenditures made under the terms of a grant award and disbursing grant funds. Program administration is often
undertaken by agency program specialists and involves monitoring grant recipient activities (e.g., compliance with the
terms of the grant award. With regard to oversight, the offices of inspector general (OIG) have broad authority to
conduct audits and investigations of federal grant programs to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the programs
and to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse. For more information on federal grants administration, see CRS Report R42769,
Federal Grants-in-Aid Administration: A Primer, by Natalie Keegan.
39 For more information, see the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Uniform Administrative Requirements,
Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, codified in 2 C.F.R. Part 200, available at
https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grant-policies/omb-uniform-guidance-2014.html.
40 Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act, P.L. 112-248.
41 42 U.S.C. §5122(4).
42 44 C.F.R. §59.1.
43 2 C.F.R. §200.205(1).
44 For additional information related to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) high-risk
considerations, see U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block
Grant Funds Is Needed, GAO-19-232, March 2019, pp. 34-35, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697827.pdf.
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Federal Assistance Provided to Puerto Rico
Following Hurricanes Irma and María
The following sections describe select forms of federal assistance that were authorized to support
Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Irma and María, and the sources of funding for such programs.
First, brief overviews of each program are provided, organized by the agency that delivers the
assistance. This is followed by an overview of the sources of federal recovery program funding.
The section concludes with more in-depth information, which is organized according to each
specific program. The program-specific sections include a brief overview of the work that has
been completed and the work that remains to be completed. Additionally, a few program-specific
considerations that may be of interest to Congress are included.
The presidential major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act authorized the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to provide the following disaster assistance:
 Public Assistance (PA), which provides grants to Puerto Rico and its local
governments, as well as certain private nonprofit organizations, for emergency
protective measures and debris removal operations, as well as the repair or
replacement of eligible public and nonprofit facilities;45
 Individual Assistance (IA), which provided direct aid to affected individuals and
households for housing assistance and other needs, crisis counseling, case
management services, legal services, and disaster unemployment assistance;46
and
 Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funding, which supports mitigation
and resiliency projects and programs across Puerto Rico.47 Hazard mitigation
funding is intended to save lives, preserve property, reduce the need for
temporary shelter, lower costs associated with disaster recovery, and facilitate
economic recovery after a disaster.48
In addition to assistance authorized pursuant to the major disaster declarations, the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) paid flood insurance claims to program participant policyholders.
Property owners or renters may elect to purchase a flood insurance policy, either through the
NFIP or from private companies. In the case of Puerto Rico, however, there were low rates of
NFIP and private flood insurance participation when Hurricane María made landfall.
(FEMA consolidated the grants of assistance provided for Hurricanes Irma and María for
purposes of program administration.49)

45 FEMA, “Public Assistance: Local, State, Tribal and Private Non-Profit,” https://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-
local-state-tribal-and-non-profit.
46 For more information, see CRS Report R46014, FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview, by Elizabeth
M. Webster; see also FEMA, “Individual Disaster Assistance,” https://www.fema.gov/individual-disaster-assistance.
47 FEMA, “The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Guide for State/Local Governments,” https://www.fema.gov/grants/
mitigation/hazard-mitigation/governments.
48 Multihazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves, 2017
Interim Report, Washington, DC, December 2017, p. i, https://www.nibs.org/page/reports.
49 For administrative purposes, FEMA consolidated Public Assistance work and obligations for either incident that was
initiated on or after September 17, 2017, into the declaration for Hurricane María, DR-4339. Alejandro R. De La
Campa, FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer, to Governor Ricard A. Rosselló Nevares, “FEMA-4336-DR-PR and
FEMA-4339-DR-PR,” memorandum, October 6, 2017, provided to CRS by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff.
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The presidential major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act authorized the Small Business
Administration to provide disaster assistance through the SBA Disaster Loan Program, which
provided Physical Loans for homeowners, businesses, and nonprofit organizations, and EIDLs for
businesses and nonprofit organizations.
Following Hurricanes Irma and María, Congress, in a series of separate legislative actions,
appropriated recovery funding for Puerto Rico through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) and
Community Development Block Grant-Mitigation (CDBG-MIT) programs (see Table 8 for the
allocation of CDBG-DR directed to Puerto Rico under P.L. 115-56, P.L. 115-123, and P.L. 116-20
to address unmet needs and mitigation activities).50
Sources of Federal Recovery Program Funding
The President and Congress authorized various forms of FEMA, SBA, and HUD assistance to
support the recovery efforts of Puerto Rico, as listed in Table 1 and described below.
Table 1. Sources of Recovery Program Funding
Agency
Program
Funding Source(s)
FEMA
Public Assistance (PA)
Disaster Relief Fund
FEMA
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
Disaster Relief Fund
FEMA
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)

Policy Premiums

Annual Appropriations

Borrowing from the U.S. Treasury
FEMA
Individual Assistance (IA)
Disaster Relief Fund
SBA
Disaster Loan Program
SBA Disaster Loan Account
HUD
Community Development Block Grant-
Supplemental Appropriations:
Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)

P.L. 115-56
Community Development Block Grant-

Mitigation (CDBG-MIT)

P.L. 115-123

P.L. 116-20
Sources: Compiled by CRS based on program funding data from FEMA, the SBA, and HUD.
Notes: For more information on assistance provided to Puerto Rico fol owing Hurricanes Irma and María, see
CRS Report R45084, 2017 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: Overview, by Wil iam L. Painter.
Federal funding for disaster recovery is provided through a combination of annual and
supplemental appropriations. The most well-known of these appropriations is the Disaster Relief
Fund (DRF): a “no-year appropriation” that funds FEMA’s activities under the Stafford Act,

Available to Members and congressional staff upon request. FEMA also consolidated the Individual Assistance data for
the hurricanes (email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 10, 2020).
50 On February 7, 2020, the House of Representatives passed Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster
Relief and Puerto Rico Disaster Tax Relief Act, 2020, H.R. 5687, which would include additional CDBG-DR funds
and provide flexibilities for the use of funds previously appropriated and allocated in response to Hurricanes Irma and
María. The bill has been placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
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including disaster response and recovery.51 The DRF is used to pay for FEMA’s PA, IA, and
HMGP programs.52
SBA disaster loans are provided through the SBA Disaster Loan Account, which is funded via
annual and supplemental appropriations.53
CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT funding is provided via supplemental appropriations.
The following sections provide a more in-depth overview of the assistance programs provided by
FEMA, the SBA, and HUD. Some of these programs supported short- and intermediate-term
recovery efforts in Puerto Rico, including certain forms of:
 FEMA Public Assistance (PA);
 FEMA Individual Assistance (IA); and
 SBA disaster loans.
Others continue to support Puerto Rico’s long-term recovery efforts, such as some forms of:
 FEMA PA;
 FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP); and
 HUD’s Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery and—
Mitigation (CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT, respectively).
These ongoing programs support many types of recovery work, including repairing or rebuilding
public infrastructure, mitigating against the threat of future disasters, and assisting with
community and individual recovery. Further, these programs connect in various ways. For
example, in addition to supporting infrastructure-related projects, the HUD CDBG-DR program
is continuing the housing recovery efforts that began with assistance provided through FEMA’s
PA and IA programs.
The following sections provide program-specific overviews. First, programs that provide
assistance to government entities and nonprofit organizations are described, followed by
programs that provide assistance to individuals and businesses, and then a combination of
government entities and individuals. It begins with FEMA’s PA program, which was the first
form of federal assistance authorized to support Puerto Rico’s disaster response and recovery
efforts.54 The report then describes FEMA-funded mitigation. These sections are followed by an
overview of assistance to individuals and households, which includes assistance provided by
FEMA, the SBA, and HUD. Then, SBA assistance is described, followed by HUD assistance. The
section concludes by describing insurance that supported individual recovery efforts.

51 For more information on the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), see CRS Report R45484, The Disaster Relief Fund:
Overview and Issues, by William L. Painter.
52 Unlike other FEMA programs, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) does not rely on congressional
involvement, nor is a presidential declaration under the Stafford Act required to allow policyholders to file claims.
Instead, the NFIP is funded in three ways: (1) receipts from the premiums of flood insurance policies, including fees
and surcharges; (2) direct annual appropriations for part of the costs of the flood hazard mapping and risk analysis
program; and (3) borrowing from the U.S. Treasury when funding is insufficient to pay the NFIP’s obligations (e.g.
insurance claims) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA Budget Overview FY2020, FEMA—NFIP –
4).
53 For more information on the SBA Disaster Loan Account, see CRS Insight IN11433, Supplemental Appropriations:
SBA Disaster Loan Account, coordinated by Bruce R. Lindsay.
54 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 44647, September 25, 2017;
FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 45874-45875, October 2, 2017.
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FEMA Public Assistance55
FEMA’s Public Assistance (PA) Program provides supplemental financial assistance to states,
tribes, and territories, as well as certain private nonprofit organizations, when authorized as part
of an emergency or major disaster declaration by the President under the Stafford Act.56 Public
Assistance for “emergency work” includes financial and direct assistance for debris removal and
emergency protective measures undertaken in immediate response to a hazard.57 Public
Assistance for “permanent work” provides assistance to repair, reconstruct, and replace disaster-
damaged public and eligible nonprofit facilities to facilitate long-term recovery.58 Table 2 lists the
categories of PA work.
Table 2. Statutory Authorities for Public Assistance
Category of
Stafford Act Sections
Assistance
What It Provides
Section 407
Category Aa
Emergency Work: Debris Removal
Section 403
Category Ba
Emergency Work: Emergency Protective Measures
Section 406 or Section 428
Category Cb
Permanent Work: Roads/Bridges
Section 406 or Section 428
Category Db
Permanent Work: Water Control Facilities
Section 406 or Section 428
Category Eb
Permanent Work: Buildings/Equipment
Section 406 or Section 428
Category Fb
Permanent Work: Utilities
Section 406 or Section 428
Category Gb
Permanent Work: Parks, Recreational, and Other Facilities
Source: FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG), FP 104-009-2, April 2018, https://recovery.pr/
documents/PAPPG_3.1_508_FINAL_5-4-2018.pdf (effective for declarations for the 2017 hurricanes and 2019-
2020 earthquakes).
Notes: The Public Assistance (PA) categories of assistance (i.e., Categories A-G) do not align with the
numbering in Section 403 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act,
P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.).
a. This type of assistance may be made available if authorized pursuant to a presidential declaration of
emergency or major disaster.
b. This type of assistance may only be made available if authorized pursuant to a presidential declaration of
major disaster.
Public Assistance provides financial assistance for at least 75% of eligible costs for both urgent
response and long-term recovery needs. In certain catastrophic situations, the President may
increase the federal cost share; the federal cost share may also be increased legislatively.59
Remaining costs are generally paid by nonfederal sources, unless the statute authorizing the funds

55 For more information on FEMA’s Public Assistance (PA) program, contact Erica A. Lee, Analyst in Emergency
Management and Disaster Recovery.
56 For general information on FEMA’s Public Assistance program, see CRS In Focus IF11529, A Brief Overview of
FEMA’s Public Assistance Program, by Erica A. Lee.
57 Assistance for PA emergency protective measures is authorized under Stafford Act Sections 402, 403, 418, 419, and
502; 42 U.S.C. §§5170a, 5170b, 5185, 5186, and 5192. Assistance for PA debris removal is authorized under Stafford
Act Sections 407, 428, and 502; 42 U.S.C. §§5173, 5189f, and 5192.
58 Assistance for PA permanent work is authorized under Stafford Act Sections 406 and 428; 42 U.S.C. §§5172 and
5189f. See 44 C.F.R. §206.220 for general eligibility for Public Assistance. See also 44 C.F.R. §206.226 for federal
regulations on restoration of damaged facilities.
59 44 C.F.R. §206.47.
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explicitly provides that they may be applied to cost sharing requirements of other federal
programs.60 For example, when appropriated, Community Development Block Grant funding for
disaster assistance (CDBG-DR) may be used to cover FEMA non-federal cost share amounts.
The President authorized Public Assistance “emergency work” in emergency declarations issued
for the 2017 hurricanes.61 The major disaster declaration for Hurricane María additionally
authorized PA “permanent work” throughout Puerto Rico’s 78 municipios.62 In acknowledgement
of the severity and magnitude of the hurricanes’ impact, the President amended the initial major
disaster declaration for Hurricane María to increase the federal cost share for “emergency work”
to 100% for a limited period of time.63
For the 2017 hurricanes, the Government of Puerto Rico is designated as the PA Recipient.64
Then-Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares delegated responsibility for PA administration to the
Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency (COR3) in 2017.65 The Government
of Puerto Rico and municipio agencies, as well as eligible nonprofits (hereinafter Applicants),
submit applications for funding for specific projects to both COR3 and FEMA.66 For example, the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) submitted applications for specific PA projects as
an Applicant.67 COR3, as the Recipient, and FEMA together assist Applicants in project
formulation and review of eligibility requirements.
Section 428 Alternative Procedures
On November 5, 2017, the President amended the major disaster declaration for Hurricane María
in Puerto Rico. The President’s amendment stated that Puerto Rico had elected to administer
Public Assistance for all permanent work large projects (in FY2017, those above $123,100) for
Hurricane María recovery according to Stafford Act Section 428—Alternative Procedures
(hereinafter Alternative Procedures).68 In recognition of Puerto Rico’s use of Alternative

60 See, for example, Section 406 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §5172, which states “Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the Federal share of assistance under this section shall be not less than 75 percent of the eligible cost of repair,
restoration, reconstruction, or replacement carried out under this section.” On the use of federal funds to meet
nonfederal cost shares, see 44 C.F.R. §200.306(b)(5).
61 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 44647, September 25, 2017;
FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 82 Federal Register 45874-45875, October 2, 2017.
62 “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 4 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 53515, November
16, 2017.
63 “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 1 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 46816, October 6,
2017.
64 2 C.F.R. §200.86.
65 Government of Puerto Rico, Executive Order of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, To
Create the Central Recovery and Reconstruction Office of Puerto Rico, Administrative Bulletin No. OE-2017-65,
October 23, 2017. To access the Executive Order, visit the website of the Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Departamento de
Estado, available at https://www.estado.pr.gov/en/executive-orders/, or visit
https://noticiasmicrojuris.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/oe-2017-065.pdf.
66 Per 2 C.F.R. §200.93, a Subrecipient is an Applicant that receives a subaward from a pass-through entity [here, the
Recipient] to carry out part of a federal program. FEMA refers to Subrecipients as Applicants, defined as entities
responsible for PA Projects. See 44 C.F.R. §206.22 for eligibility of Public Assistance Applicants, and FEMA, Public
Assistance Program and Policy Guide, FP 104-009-2, effective June 1, 2020, pp. 22, 42-47. See also 44 C.F.R.
§§206.220-228 for federal regulations regarding eligibility for public assistance.
67 See PR Electric Power Authority, Applicant ID 000-UA2QU-00, in FEMA, OpenFEMA, “Public Assistance
Applicants,” downloaded August 17, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/public-assistance-applicants.
68 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 5 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 53514,
November 16, 2017. In FY2017, large projects were defined as those that exceed $123,100. FEMA, “Per Capita Impact
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Procedures at this scale, the President increased the federal cost share for all PA projects for
Hurricane María from 75% to 90%, except those previously authorized at 100%.69 The cost share
increase was conditioned on the use of Alternative Procedures for all large, permanent work
projects, among several other requirements.70
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA) amended the Stafford Act to authorize Alternative
Procedures in the wake of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, in order to reduce costs, reward timely and
adept completion of PA projects, and allow Applicants to complete projects on basis of need
rather than pre-disaster design.71 Unlike the standard procedures that govern PA projects, in which
the awards are based on the costs of the actual work undertaken, under Alternative Procedures,
the awards are capped based on up-front and mutually agreed-to estimates of the cost of the work
to be done. Congress authorized Alternative Procedures as a pilot program and allowed FEMA to
waive the standard rulemaking process in order to expeditiously implement the new procedures.72
FEMA has instead issued guidance on Alternative Procedures. To address the specifics of Puerto
Rico’s complex recovery, FEMA issued three iterations of guidance on PA Alternative Procedures
and established policy changes in official letters to COR3. The GAO found that the lack of clear,
consistent, and accessible guidance sometimes generated confusion and contributed to recovery
delays in Puerto Rico.73
Congress has repeatedly expressed concern over whether Puerto Rico voluntarily elected to use
Alternative Procedures,74 as required by the Stafford Act.75 Though FEMA previously
implemented Alternative Procedures on a project-by-project basis elsewhere in the United States,

Indicator and Project Thresholds,” https://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-indicator-and-project-thresholds. For
general information on the Public Assistance program and a description of Section 406 and Section 428 program
procedures, see FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG), FP 104-009-2, April 2018,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1591036773793-4b7a09fc1680e09984629fc3ea77467a/
PAPPG_3.1_508_FINAL_5-4-2018_ARCHIVED.pdf (effective for declarations for the 2017 hurricanes and 2019-
2020 earthquakes).
69 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 5 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 53514,
November 16, 2017.
70 FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 5 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 82 Federal Register 53514,
November 16, 2017.
71 The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA), P.L. 113-2, 127 Stat. 39; Stafford Act Section 428. The Public
Assistance Program Alternative Procedures are codified at Section 1102 of SRIA; 42 U.S.C. §5189(f).
72 Section 1102 of SRIA, P.L. 113-2, 127 Stat. 41, as codified at 42 U.S.C. §5189f(f), Section 428(f) of the Stafford
Act.
73 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight, and Recovery Challenges, GAO 19-256, March
2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697528.pdf (hereinafter GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019); and GAO, Puerto
Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed to Strengthen Project Cost Estimation and Awareness of Program
Guidance, GAO 20-221, February 2020, pp. 27-29, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/704282.pdf (hereinafter GAO,
FEMA Actions).
74 Letter from Peter A. DeFazio, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Bennie G.
Thompson, Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, and Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking Member, Committee
on Energy and Commerce, to William B. “Brock” Long, FEMA Administrator, March 20, 2018; Letter from Senators
Robert Menendez, Sherrod Brown, Elizabeth Warren, and Catherine Cortez Masto, to Kathy Kraniger, OMB Program
Associate Director, July 10, 2018, pp. 2-3; Rep. DeFazio, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Emergency Response and Recovery: Central Takeaways from the Unprecedented Hurricane Season,
hearing, 115th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 2, 2017, H.Hrg. 115-29 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2017), p. 95.
75 Section 1102 of SRIA, P.L. 113-2, 127 Stat. 41, as codified at 42 U.S.C. §5189f(f), Section 428(d)(1) of the Stafford
Act.
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the required use of Alternative Procedures across an entire state, tribe, or territory is
unprecedented.76
In January 2020, in response to a request from COR3 to allow the use of standard PA procedures,
FEMA changed its policy to permit the use of standard procedures in certain cases.77 FEMA
permitted the use of standard procedures for large, permanent work projects that had not yet been
obligated and were not considered “critical services” (which include power, water, sewer,
wastewater treatment, communications, education, and medical care). FEMA estimated that
approximately 80% of the total estimated recovery costs for Hurricane María would continue to
use Alternative Procedures.78 Table 3 provides a comparison of the key features of the PA
standard procedures and the Alternative Procedures implemented in Puerto Rico.
Table 3. Public Assistance Alternative Procedures as Implemented in Puerto Rico
Key Variations from Public Assistance Standard Procedures
Alternative Public Assistance
Standard Public Assistance
Procedures in Puerto Rico
Topic
Procedures (“406 Procedures”)
(“428 Procedures”)
Award
Awards are based on costs of actual
Awards are capped on the basis of
work.
estimates of the cost of eligible work
agreed to by FEMA, Puerto Rico, and
the Applicant. Fixed-cost estimates may
not be amended after agreement is
reached, except if insurance proceeds
or failure to obtain and maintain
insurance alters the estimated cost of
the project. Certain cost estimates are
validated by a third-party expert panel.
Cost Overruns
Applicants may receive PA on a cost-
The Applicant is responsible for the
share basis for eligible costs that exceed difference between the cost of
initial project estimates.
estimated and actual work.
Excess Funds
Applicants may not access funds
Applicants may use award funds
remaining if project estimates exceed
remaining after the completion of actual
actual project costs.
work on eligible work, including
mitigation and other PA projects.
Consolidated Projects
Standard procedures require Applicants
An Applicant using Alternative
to use funds for the project
Procedures may consolidate funds from
documented in the original scope of
multiple fixed-cost PA awards across
work.
multiple facilities or projects. For
example, an Applicant may use funds
from a project that runs under budget
to fund a project that runs over budget.

76 As of April 2018, FEMA had implemented 428 alternative procedures in 30 states on a case-by-case basis. GAO,
Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 9.
77 Letter from Alex Amparo, FEMA Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator, FEMA-4339-DR-PR, to Ottmar J. Chávez
Piñero, Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR) for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, January 23, 2020.
Provided by FEMA Congressional and Legislative Affairs.
78 Letter from Alex Amparo, FEMA Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator, FEMA-4339-DR-PR, to Ottmar J. Chávez
Piñero, Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR) for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, January 23, 2020.
Provided by FEMA Congressional and Legislative Affairs.
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Alternative Public Assistance
Standard Public Assistance
Procedures in Puerto Rico
Topic
Procedures (“406 Procedures”)
(“428 Procedures”)
Alternate Projects
Standard procedures reduced funding
Applicants using Alternative Procedures
for alternate projects by 10% at the
may complete alternate projects using
time of the Hurricane María Stafford
funds from a fixed-cost estimate
Act declarations, though the Disaster
without any reduction in funding.
Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-
254) eliminated this reduction upon its
enactment in October 2018.
Sources: Stafford Act Section 428; 42 U.S.C. §4189f; 44 C.F.R. §206.204(e). See also FEMA, “Public Assistance
Alternative Procedures (Section 428) Guide for Permanent Work FEMA 4339-DR-PR,” February 10, 2020, pp 6-
16; Section §1207(a) of DRRA, P.L. 115-254, as it amends §406(c) of the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C.
§5172(c).
Public Assistance Obligation and Disbursement
PA funding procedures are complex and vary depending on a project’s size, purpose, and
approval under either alternative or standard procedures. In Puerto Rico, FEMA obligates funds
to COR3 after approving a PA project. COR3 then disburses funds to the Applicant.
Small projects are obligated according to special procedures established in federal regulations.79
According to these procedures, COR3 may disburse funds to Applicants as soon as FEMA
approves and obligates a small project (those up to $123,100).80 As a result, Applicants do not
need to locate nonfederal funds to cover initial funds needed to launch a project.81 FEMA
approved the obligation of small projects in Puerto Rico according to these procedures in
February 2019. Before that change, Applicants executing small projects were required to have
initial funds to launch and pay for completed work before requesting reimbursement through
PA.82 In December 2019, COR3 created the State Recovery Fund (SRF) in order to provide
working capital to Applicants launching small projects, so that work can be completed and paid
for prior to obligation.83 In February 2019, FEMA approved small project procedures, enabling

79 44 C.F.R. §206.205(a).
80 44 C.F.R. §206.205(a). FEMA defines project size based on an annually adjusted cost threshold. In FY2017 (the year
Hurricane Irma and María struck), a small project is a project above $3,300 and equal to or less than $123,100. FEMA,
“Per Capita Impact Indicator and Thresholds,” https://www.fema.gov/assistance/public/applicants/per-capita-impact-
indicator.
81 COR3, “Payment and Cash Management,” Chapter 7 in COR3 Disaster Recovery Federal Funds Management
Guide, p. 27, May 15, 2019, https://recovery.pr/documents/
CH7%20Payment%20and%20Cash%20Management%20FINAL%20V1.1.pdf (hereinafter COR3, “Payment and Cash
Management”).
82 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, p. 2, August 11, 2020; Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 4.
83 Letter from Wanda Vázquez Garced, Governor of Puerto Rico, to Leader McConnell, Senator, Minority Leader
Schumer, Senator, Speaker Pelosi, Representative, and Minority Leader McCarthy, Representative, January 29, 2020,
p. 2, https://recovery.pr/documents/Puerto_Rico_Third_Report_to_Congress.pdf; COR 3, State Recovery Fund,
Presentation Slides, December 26, 2019, https://recovery.pr/documents/CP122619-
%20Presentaci%C3%B3n%20COR3.pdf; Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, As Submitted
to the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico on May 3, 2020, p. 18, https://www.aafaf.pr.gov/
assets/2020-fiscal-plan-may-3-2020.pdf (hereinafter Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan).
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Applicants to access the full PA award upon the obligation of a small project, eliminating the need
to await reimbursement.84
For larger projects executed under either standard or Alternative Procedures, Applicants generally
receive reimbursement for costs paid for completed work, as noted earlier.85 As a result,
Applicants generally need nonfederal funds to pay upfront costs before they may request and
receive reimbursement.86 In certain circumstances, COR3 may approve requests for advances to
Applicants after FEMA has obligated funds for PA projects using either standard or Alternative
Procedures.87 COR3 explains that such exceptional advances are limited to the minimum amounts
needed, and are timed in accordance with actual, immediate cash requirements fully documented
in a procurement, contract, and cash needs timeline,88 as is the case under standard PA
procedures.89 The Government of Puerto Rico and U.S. congressional staff have found that
Applicants have sometimes lacked capital needed to begin or advance PA projects before
receiving reimbursement, resulting in substantial response and recovery delays.90
When completing projects under Alternative Procedures, Applicants may retain funds remaining
if actual costs fall short of project cost estimates. These excess funds may be put towards specific
uses, including additional eligible projects or mitigation measures (see Figure 2).91 Conversely,
Applicants are responsible for project costs that exceed the initial fixed-cost estimate, as noted
above.
At several points in the recovery process, FEMA instated “manual reimbursement” procedures for
hurricane recovery work to help ensure that federal funds were used properly.92 Under manual
reimbursement procedures, FEMA reviews PA Applicants’ documentation of payment for work
completed on PA projects (e.g., paid invoices, work orders) after COR3 submits a Request for
Reimbursement to the Agency (see Figure 3).93 FEMA may request additional documentation if
submissions are found insufficient. FEMA reviews documentation for completion, compliance,
and accuracy, after which COR3 may disburse obligated funds to PA Applicants.94 Under PA’s
standard “reimbursement procedures” for large projects, COR3, rather than FEMA, is responsible
for reviewing reimbursement requests and documentation for compliance and accuracy before

84 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, p. 2, August 11, 2020; Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 4.
85 44 C.F.R. §206.205(a); and email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 24, 2020.
86 Governor of Puerto Rico, Third Congressional Status Report, pp. 3-4.
87 See 44 C.F.R. §206.205(a)-(b) and 2 C.F.R. §200.305; COR3, “Payment and Cash Management,” pp.13-14, 21-22,
74.
88 COR3, “Payment and Cash Management,” p. 74.
89 2 C.F.R. §200.305.
90 Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan, pp. 28-29.
91 Stafford Act Section 428(c)(4) authorizes the provision of “financial incentives and disincentives for a State, tribal,
or local government, or owner or operator of a private nonprofit facility for the timely and cost-effective completion of
projects with such assistance.” 42 U.S.C. §5189f(c)(4). See also “Use of Excess Funds” in FEMA, “Public Assistance
Alternative Procedures-4339,” 2020, pp. 16-18.
92 Manual reimbursement procedures were in place from November 2017, through April 1, 2019, and from July 2019,
to September 2019. See GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 33-35; and FEMA, “FEMA to Reinstate Manual Drawdown Process
for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,” July 25, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200220/fema-reinstate-
manual-drawdown-process-commonwealth-puerto-rico.
93 DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico
Department of Education, OIG-20-26, April 9, 2020, p. 8, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-04/
OIG-20-26-Apr20.pdf (hereinafter DHS OIG, Capacity Audit).
94 DHS OIG, Capacity Audit.
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disbursing funds to Applicants.95 FEMA reviews this documentation at project closeout, and when
otherwise necessary.96 GAO observed that the instatement of manual reimbursement procedures
initially delayed PA project progress in Puerto Rico.97 The House Committee on Appropriations
also attributed delays in contractor payments for Puerto Rico recovery work to manual
reimbursement procedures.98 However, FEMA subsequently increased the number of personnel
processing reimbursement requests, after which delays decreased.99
Figure 2. Alternative and Standard Public Assistance Procedures
Funding Comparison for Eligible Costs of Large Projects*

Source: CRS analysis of Stafford Act Section 428(e)(1)(A) and (D).
Notes: * Large projects are those that exceed a certain project threshold ($123,100 for FY2017, the year of the
declarations for Hurricanes Irma and María in Puerto Rico). FEMA, “Per Capita Impact Indicator and Project
Thresholds,” https://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-indicator-and-project-thresholds.

95 44 C.F.R. §206.205(b)(1) and 44 C.F.R. §206.200. See also FEMA, “Public Assistance Program Management and
Grant Closeout Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 9570.14, December 2013, pp. 9-10.
96 For example, FEMA may review project documentation due to scope of work changes under standard procedures or
to address non-compliance issues.
97 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 23; GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 33-35.
98 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2021,
report to accompany H.R. 7669, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 20, 2020, H.Rept. 116-458, p. 70.
99 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 23; GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 33-35.
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Figure 3. Public Assistance Reimbursement Process
for Large Projects under Alternative Procedures in Puerto Rico*

Sources: CRS analysis of description of manual reimbursement process described in GAO, Puerto Rico
Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight, and Recovery Challenges, GAO-19-256, March 2019, pp. 19-20; and
standard reimbursement described in 44 C.F.R. §206.205(b) and Governor of Puerto Rico to U.S. Congressional
Leaders, Third Congressional Status Report on the Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan, January 29, 2020, pp. 8-9.
Notes: * Large projects are those that exceed a certain project threshold ($123,100 for FY2017, the year of the
declarations for Hurricanes Irma and María in Puerto Rico). FEMA, “Per Capita Impact Indicator and Project
Thresholds,” https://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-indicator-and-project-thresholds.
Note that Applicants may complete eligible work at different phases in the funding process. FEMA guidance
explains “For eligible work that has already been completed, the fixed amount wil be based on actual costs,
which are always subject to cost reasonableness. If eligible work has already started, but the restoration has not
been completed, the fixed cost may be based on actual and/or estimated costs as appropriate.” FEMA, “Public
Assistance Alternative Procedures (Section 428) Guide for Permanent Work FEMA-4339-DR-PR,” February 10,
2020.
Status of Public Assistance Projects for Hurricane Recovery
Federal officials, and officials of the Government of Puerto Rico and the municipios encountered
significant challenges implementing the Public Assistance program in Puerto Rico. In reporting
on the progress of recovery, this report cites the most comprehensive information on PA projects
available from FEMA and COR3—data on project obligations and disbursements. At the time of
publication, CRS can neither independently verify the data sets, nor reconcile any differences
between them due to several factors, including that PA project documentation is not readily
available and the granularity of each dataset differs. However, in 2020, both FEMA and COR3
reported a sizeable increase in the pace, number, and dollar amount of PA project obligations, as
detailed below.
While a substantial share of funds to support Puerto Rico’s hurricane recovery has yet to be
obligated, the pace of obligations has quickened substantially in 2020. According to FEMA and
COR3, FEMA obligated an average of 143 projects per month in the 35 months following the
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hurricanes; in 2020, the average was 333 projects per month (see Figure 4).100 In August 2020,
FEMA and COR3 reported that the agencies aimed to establish agreements for all cost estimates
on large reconstruction projects under Alternative Procedures by December 31, 2020.101 For
context, FEMA reported that the estimated value of projects still to be obligated under Alternative
Procedures in late August 2020 amounted to $19.1 billion.102 At that same time, FEMA reported
that only $741 million had been obligated under Alternative Procedures in the nearly three years
since the 2017 hurricanes made landfall.103
FEMA and COR3 have since reported significant progress in obligating PA funds. On September
18, 2020, the President announced that FEMA plans to award $11.6 billion in federal funds to
Puerto Rico: $9.6 billion in obligations to the Puerto Rico Power Authority (PREPA) for repair
and reconstruction of Puerto Rico’s electrical grid, and $2 billion for the Puerto Rico Department
of Education (PRDE) for the repair and reconstruction of educational facilities.104 These
obligations eclipsed all funds previously obligated for Puerto Rico’s hurricane response and
recovery since September 2017, which amounted to $7.4 billion.105 While these obligations are
historically large, they reflect smaller sums than the Government of Puerto Rico in November
2017 estimated for the costs of reconstructing a modernized power grid ($17.8 billion) and school
facility system ($8.4 billion).106

100 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, p. 6, August 11, 2020.
101 Briefing presented by Alex Amparo, Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator, FEMA-4339-DR-PR, and Ottmar J.
Chávez Piñero, GAR for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, August 11, 2020.
102 Estimated value of projects as of August 20, 2020. Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 10,
2020.
103 Reported value of obligations as of August 20, 2020. Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 10,
2020.
104 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Supporting the People of Puerto Rico as They Continue to Rebuild
Following Natural Disasters,” September 18, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-
j-trump-supporting-people-puerto-rico-continue-rebuild-following-natural-disasters/#:~:text=
PROVIDING%20DISASTER%20RELIEF%3A%20President%20Trump,Rico's%20recovery%20from%20Hurricane%
20Maria.
105 CRS analysis of FEMA, OpenFEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects Details” for Emergency 3384 and
Disasters 4336 and 4339, as of September 19, 2020 (data indicates the most recent data updates as of September 19,
2020), https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/public-assistance-funded-projects-details. See also FEMA,
“Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hurricane-maria-numbers.
106 [Former] Governor of Puerto Rico Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, Build Back Better Puerto Rico, November 2017, pp.
20, 82, https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/Build_Back_Better_PR.pdf.
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Figure 4. Public Assistance Obligations Per Month/Year
According to FEMA and COR3

Source: FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, and Earthquake Progress and Innovation in
Puerto Rico, briefing slides, p. 8, August 11, 2020.
Notes: Data presented on August 11, 2020, and may reflect obligations only through that date. FEMA defines
“version obligations” as fol ows: “Public Assistance Version Obligations: There are various projects are divided
into several Versions [sic]. The Obligations are made mainly for one of the Version of the Project and not for
the Total of the Project [sic]” (email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 24, 2020).
Public Assistance Obligations to Date—Hurricane Recovery
According to the COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, FEMA
estimated it would obligate $37.4 billion for hurricane reconstruction work through PA (the plan
did not include estimated obligations for emergency work).107 According to publicly available PA
data, FEMA had obligated $19.2 billion in PA for hurricane response and recovery efforts by
October 6, 2020.108
According to FEMA, $13.25 billion (approximately 70%) of obligated PA funds support
reconstruction and replacement of physical structures, or permanent work.109 Notably, almost all
of these funds were obligated during September 2020. By September 10, 2020, FEMA reported
only $1.5 billion in obligations for permanent work. The September 2020 obligations of $9.6
billion in obligations to the Puerto Rico Power Authority (PREPA) for repair and reconstruction
of Puerto Rico’s electrical grid, and $2 billion for the Puerto Rico Department of Education
(PRDE) for the repair and reconstruction of educational facilities primarily account for the spike
in obligated funds.110 Up until the approval of these obligations, the majority of obligated funds
supported PA emergency work.111 In many cases, funds for emergency protective measures

107 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. 163.
108 CRS analysis of FEMA, OpenFEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects Details” for Emergency 3384 and
Disasters 4336 and 4339, as of October 7, 2020 (data indicates the most recent data updates as of October 6, 2020),
https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/public-assistance-funded-projects-details (hereinafter “FEMA, “Public
Assistance Funded Projects”).
109 CRS analysis of FEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects” for Emergency 3384 and Disasters 4336 and 4339, as
of October 7, 2020.
110 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Supporting the People of Puerto Rico as They Continue to Rebuild
Following Natural Disasters,” September 18, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-
j-trump-supporting-people-puerto-rico-continue-rebuild-following-natural-disasters/#:~:text=PROVIDING%20
DISASTER%20relief%3A%20President%20Trump,Rico's%20recovery%20from%20Hurricane%20Maria.
111 CRS analysis of FEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects” for Emergency 3384 and Disasters 4336 and 4339, as
of October 7, 2020.
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financed the temporary relocation of essential facilities (e.g., hospitals, schools, temporary power
restoration) while permanent reconstruction is underway.112
The majority of obligated PA funds for permanent reconstruction work ($13.16 billion, or 99%)
reflect funding for large projects; the remainder are for small projects (defined as those up to
$123,100 in FY2017).113 While they are a small portion of the total amount of obligated funds,
these small projects represent approximately two-thirds of the number of projects obligated for
hurricane recovery. The recent increased pace of obligations may reflect, in part, FEMA and
COR3’s 2019 initiative to prioritize small projects in order to expedite recovery.114 According to
FEMA, only 47 small projects had been obligated prior to the launch of the small project
initiative. By August, 2020, 1,900 small projects had been obligated.115 These obligations may
expedite recovery, as COR3 may disburse obligated funds to Applicants as soon as a small project
is approved.116
Anticipated Public Assistance Obligations—Hurricane Recovery
In early 2020, FEMA and COR3 launched the FEMA Advanced Award Strategy Initiative
(FAAST), which is intended to expedite obligations and execution of several large-scale, critical
recovery projects. The FAAST program is working with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
(PREPA), Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority (PRASA), and the Puerto Rico
Department of Education (PRDE) to obligate funds to each Applicant based on a “master
recovery budget.”117 This budget aggregates estimates for prototypical projects, rather than
individual facilities, to streamline the project approval and obligation process.118 According to
COR3, these Applicants’ projects represent 65% of PA permanent work funds.119 According to
FEMA, the FAAST PA awards will provide each Applicant funds for the reconstruction of all
hurricane-damaged facilities and infrastructure systems to industry standards, including
components that did not suffer damage in the hurricanes but are functionally critical to the

112 See, for example, discussion of FEMA assistance provided for temporary facilities to operate in Vieques, Puerto
Rico while the Vieques permanent reconstruction project formulation is underway. Jeff Stein and Dennis M. Rivera
Pichardo, “‘The colony within the colony’: Puerto Rico fumes as FEMA deliberates over remote hospital,” New York
Times, May 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/05/06/colony-within-colony-puerto-rico-fumes-
fema-deliberates-over-remote-hospital/. Vieques is a smaller island to the east of the main island. An electrical power
cable between the main island and Vieques was severed during Hurricane María.
113 CRS analysis of FEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects” for Emergency 3384 and Disasters 4336 and 4339, as
of October 7, 2020.
114 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 4; and FEMA, “FEMA Approves Funding for
1,624 Small Permanent Projects in Puerto Rico,” Aug. 6, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200806/fema-
approves-funding-1624-small-permanent-projects-puerto-rico.
115 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, p. 6, August 11, 2020.
116 44 C.F.R. §206.205(a). FEMA defines project size based on an annually adjusted cost threshold. In FY2017 (the
year Hurricane Irma and María struck), a small project was a project above $3,300 and equal to or less than $123,100.
FEMA, “Per Capita Impact Indicator and Thresholds,” https://www.fema.gov/assistance/public/applicants/per-capita-
impact-indicator. For more details on the management of small projects in Puerto Rico, see Governor of Puerto Rico,
Third Congressional Status Report, p. 9.
117 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 5; and FEMA Representative Alex Amparo,
Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto Rico, briefing slides, slide 6, August 11,
2020.
118 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 24, 2020.
119 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 5.
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whole.120 On August 11, 2020, FEMA reported that these master recovery budgets were 95%
complete for PREPA, 95% complete for PRDE, and 50% complete for PRASA.121
Public Assistance Issues and Challenges
Numerous challenges have impeded the delivery of PA for Puerto Rico’s hurricane recovery.
Federal, territorial, and local stakeholders and officials have identified countless challenges that
include, but are not limited to:
 the scale of damaged sites and facilities and complexity of restoring territory-wide
infrastructure systems (e.g., Puerto Rico’s electrical grid);122
 inaccessibility of certain worksites;123
 a fiscal crisis that created liquidity constraints among Applicants and prompted FEMA to
establish fiscal controls;124
 the mid-recovery adoption of FEMA’s new Public Assistance “national delivery model”
to guide project formulation;125 and
 conflicting or delayed Public Assistance guidance.126
A complete discussion of all of these issues exceeds the scope of this report. Several additional
notable and persistent challenges are summarized below.
Implementation of Recent Legislation
In the largest supplemental appropriations act in the wake of the 2017 hurricanes—the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2018 (BBA of 2018)127—Congress authorized FEMA to provide additional
assistance to PA Applicants in Puerto Rico (and the U.S. Virgin Islands) for restoration of “critical

120 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, slide 6, August 11, 2020; and email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 24, 2020.
121 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, slide 6, August 11, 2020.
122 U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Hearing on Disaster Recoveries for
2017 and 2018, hearings, 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019 (hereinafter, House Homeland Security Subcommittee,
Disaster Recoveries), testimony of then-Deputy Administrator Peter Gaynor, pp. 9, 27; U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric Infrastructure, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., April 11,
2018 (hereinafter House Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric Infrastructure), especially testimony by FEMA
Associate Administrator Jeffrey Byard, pp. 15-16.
123 Opening Statement by Rep. Harper, House Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric Infrastructure, p. 2.
124 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery, Road to Recovery: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands After Hurricanes Irma And Maria, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 2019, https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/road-to-recovery-puerto-rico-and-the-us-
virgin-islands-after-hurricanes-irma-and-maria (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery).
Submitted Testimony, Omar Marrero, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery, p. 9.
125 See, for example, GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery, p.
30; and GAO, Emergency Management: FEMA’s Disaster Recovery Efforts in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
GAO 19-662T, July 11, 2019, pp. 19-20, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/700215.pdf (hereinafter GAO, FEMA’s
Efforts).
126 See, for example, GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery, p.
29-30; GAO, FEMA’s Efforts, p. 20; GAO, FEMA Actions, especially pp. 20-22, 27-29.
127 BBA of 2018 (P.L. 115-123).
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services” damaged during the 2017 hurricanes.128 Section 20601 authorized the reconstruction of
critical disaster-damaged facilities to industry standards, regardless of pre-disaster condition,
using PA Alternative Procedures.129 PA was additionally authorized for components or facilities
unaffected by the hurricanes that required upgrade or repair so the broader facility or system
improvements could comply with industry standards.130 These provisions addressed
contemporaneous Stafford Act limitations on the use of PA to improve—not simply reconstruct—
eligible facilities. Subsequently, Congress passed the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018
(DRRA; Division D of P.L. 115-254), which amended some of these limitations, in part by
authorizing PA for the costs of reconstructing or replacing eligible disaster-damaged facilities to
“the latest published editions of relevant consensus-based codes, specifications, and standards.”131
According to the GAO, both COR3 and FEMA officials reported challenges in implementing
Section 20601 of the BBA of 2018 through early 2019.132 Disagreements between COR3 and
FEMA on the application and scope of the provision has been a source of repeated congressional
concern.133 However, in multiple reports to Congress in 2020, the Governor of Puerto Rico
reported that the pace of project implementation was increased by FEMA guidance issued in
January 2020 on the application of this and other provisions from the BBA of 2018.134
Delayed Project Approval and Initiation
According to federal, territorial, and municipio officials, the initial requirement that Applicants
use Alternative Procedures delayed recovery efforts. Alternative Procedures were authorized in
part to expedite the delivery of PA.135 However, according to representatives of FEMA, the
Government of Puerto Rico, Applicants, and the GAO, the required use of Alternative Procedures
resulted in delayed PA obligations and overall recovery efforts. In the wake of the hurricanes, the
GAO stated that it was “unclear whether such flexibilities [of Alternative Procedures] will
eliminate other challenges associated with the PA program, such as reducing delays from
challenges to eligibility determinations and supporting a timely recovery.”136 The GAO further

128 Section 20601 of the BBA of 2018 (P.L. 115-123). “Critical services include power, water, sewer, wastewater
treatment, communications, education, emergency medical care, and emergency services.” “Industry standards” can
include either (1) voluntary standards which are generally established by consensus and are available for use by any
organization, private or government; or (2) proprietary standards which are developed by an organization and placed in
the public domain for widespread use. FEMA, Implementing Section 20601 of the 2018 Bipartisan Budget Act Through
the Public Assistance Program, FEMA Recovery Policy FP-104-009-5 Version 2, Sept. 11, 2019, pp. 2-4,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1569249349814-4e3a5164b53d77fc76f4320c10c2d52b/BBA_Policy_V2_9-
11-2019_508.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, BBA).
129 FEMA, BBA, p. 1.
130 Section 20601(2) of the BBA of 2018.
131 Section 1235(b) of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA; Division D of P.L. 115-254), as it amends
Stafford Act Section 406(e)(1)(A) (42 U.S.C. §5172(e)(1)(A)).
132 GAO, Emergency Management: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Challenges and Future Risks Highlight Imperative
for Future Improvements, GAO-19-594T, June 12, 2019, p. 19; Omar J. Marrero, Governor of Puerto Rico’s
Authorized Representative, Letter to Gene I. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, January 30, 2019, in
GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 37. GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 38-39; GAO, FEMA’s Efforts, pp. 21-22.
133 See, for example, testimony by Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard, House Homeland Security Subcommittee, Disaster
Recoveries, pp. 27-28; GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery, pp.
30-31.
134 Governor of Puerto Rico, Third Congressional Status Report, p. 2; Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth
Congressional Status Report, p. 1.
135 Section 428(c)(3) of the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §4189f(c)(3).
136 GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires Initial Observations on the Federal Response and Key Recovery Challenges,
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reported that FEMA officials had acknowledged that the use of Alternative Procedures in Puerto
Rico was unlikely to result in a faster recovery, and that capacity limitations among PA and local
officials had hampered early recovery efforts.137
One requirement of Alternative Procedures that delayed the delivery of PA was the need to
determine and establish consensus on estimated costs for PA projects. The GAO referred to the
process as a “massive challenge” facing Puerto Rico’s recovery,138 and the Office of the Governor
of Puerto Rico reported that the process to agree to an estimate is “onerous and time consuming,
which is causing the entire recovery process to be delayed.”139 FEMA and the GAO both
attributed delays to the process of determining, validating, and establishing consensus on fixed-
cost estimates.140 Disagreements on project costs, changes to FEMA’s cost-estimating formula,141
and, according to COR3, initial restrictions on the employment of locally licensed engineers to
validate cost estimates resulted in stalled projects.142 Additionally, according to FEMA, Puerto
Rico took nearly one year to appoint its representatives to the Center of Excellence, a body
created to ensure that cost estimation procedures were agreeable to both FEMA and Puerto
Rico.143 These and other factors resulted in substantial delays: Two years after the hurricanes
made landfall, FEMA reported that only 19 projects out of 9,344 identified damaged worksites on
the island (0.2% of the total) had finalized fixed cost estimates.144
More recently, Puerto Rico and FEMA have both publicly acknowledged progress on several of
the challenges posed by the use of Alternative Procedures. For example, FEMA has substantially
or fully met nine GAO-recommended improvements to cost-estimating procedures; three
remained partially or minimally met by February 2020.145 The progress made in the use of
Alternative Procedures may have contributed to the recent quickened pace of obligations.
Local and Federal Capacity to Implement Public Assistance
FEMA and the GAO have both attributed delays to the lack of federal, territorial, and municipio
staff with sufficient expertise to conduct damage estimates, manage projects, and process
reimbursement requests.146 For example, in 2018 congressional testimony, the Puerto Rico Power

GAO-18-472, September 2018, p. 56, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694231.pdf (hereinafter GAO, 2017 Hurricanes
and Wildfires); see also GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery,
p. 40.
137 GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires, p. 111.
138 GAO Representative Chris P. Currie, oral testimony, U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, Hearing on Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands Hurricane Recovery,
116th Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 2019.
139 Omar J. Marrero, Governor of Puerto Rico’s Authorized Representative, Letter to Gene I. Dodaro, Comptroller
General of the United States, January 30, 2019, in GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 37.
140 Omar J. Marrero, Governor of Puerto Rico’s Authorized Representative, Letter to Gene I. Dodaro, Comptroller
General of the United States, January 30, 2019, in GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, pp. 37-38.
141 GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 21-36, 44-48; GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland Security Committee,
Road to Recovery, pp. 31-32; GAO, FEMA’s Efforts, pp. 22-24.
142 Omar J. Marrero, Executive director of Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resilience, or COR3, oral
testimony, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery; see also Omar J. Marrero, House Homeland
Security Committee, Road to Recovery, p. 36.
143 GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 17-18.
144 GAO, FEMA Actions, p. 18.
145 See Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, pp. 1-2; and GAO, FEMA Actions, p. 23.
146 See, for example, the discussions on PREPA and PRDE capacity constraints in GAO, Puerto Rico Electricity Grid
Recovery: Better Information and Enhanced Coordination is Needed to Address Challenges, GAO-20-141, October 8,
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Restoration Coordinator147 stated that PREPA required additional human resources to restore
Puerto Rico’s electrical grid.148 Additionally, the GAO concluded that turnover of on-site FEMA
personnel in Puerto Rico had resulted in the erosion of expertise and an overreliance on new
employees without adequate training in PA Alternative Procedures.149 Multiple congressional
reports similarly attributed certain funding delays for Puerto Rico’s recovery to turnover among
FEMA officials.150
Public Assistance Reimbursement Process
A lack of capital may have contributed to ongoing PA project delays in Puerto Rico, according to
federal and territorial stakeholders.151 Members of Congress and the Government of Puerto Rico
have both found that Applicants’ inability to cover costs while waiting for reimbursement have
stalled PA-eligible reconstruction projects.152 One representative of the National Guard Bureau
reported to Congress that “[t]he FEMA reimbursement process impacts our operational
effectiveness – significantly,” which made deployment of Puerto Rico’s National Guard
infeasible in the wake of the 2017 hurricanes.153 The lack of working capital may also have
contributed to contracting problems. In one case, an Applicant explained that contractor selection
had been determined by the lack of a deposit requirement.154 To address liquidity constraints for
Applicants completing large projects, the Government of Puerto Rico announced in 2020 the
establishment of a $1 billion Working Capital Fund (Puerto Rico had earlier established the State
Recovery Fund, which provided working capital to Applicants completing small projects).155
According to the Government of Puerto Rico, the fund will be set up in FY2021.156 The fund may

2019, pp. 41-43, https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-20-141/; and DHS OIG, Capacity Audit, pp. 4-7. On shortfalls in
expertise and staffing among FEMA officials, see GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, pp. 21-22; Government of
Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 5; and GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland
Security Committee, Road to Recovery, p. 37.
147 The Puerto Rico Power Restoration Coordinator helped manage a concerted effort between the PREPA, FEMA, the
U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Army Core of Engineers, contractors, and mutual assistance crews.
148 Testimony of Carols Torres, Puerto Rico Power Restoration Coordinator and consultant for Edison Electric Institute,
House Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric Infrastructure, p. 54.
149 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, pp. 21-22; and GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires, p. 112.
150 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2021,
report to accompany H.R. 7669, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 20, 2020, H.Rept. 116-458, p. 70; and U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Recurring Problems Hinder Federal Disaster Response and Recovery,
115th Cong., 2nd sess., October 2018, pp. 11-12 (hereinafter, House Oversight Committee, Recurring Problems).
151 Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan, pp. 28-29; FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma,
María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto Rico, briefing slides, slide 6, August 11, 2020; and email
from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 24, 2020. For an overview of Puerto Rico’s fiscal challenges, see CRS
Report R44532, The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S.
2328), coordinated by D. Andrew Austin; CRS Report R44095, Puerto Rico’s Current Fiscal Challenges, by D.
Andrew Austin.
152 Office of House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, “Hoyer, Velázquez, Maloney, Ocasio-Cortez Conclude
Congressional Delegation Visit to Puerto Rico,” news release, February 19, 2020, https://www.majorityleader.gov/
content/hoyer-vel%C3%A1zquez-maloney-ocasio-cortez-conclude-congressional-delegation-visit-puerto-rico;
Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan, pp. 28-29; House Oversight Committee, Recurring Problems pp. 11-12.
153 House Oversight Committee, Recurring Problems, p. 12.
154 House Oversight Committee, Recurring Problems, p. 12.
155 Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan, pp. 28-29.
156 Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan p. 29.
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also address reimbursement delays that may impede recovery work or increase reconstruction
costs.157
Building Code Compliance for Recipients of Public Assistance
Changes introduced in the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA)158 related to the use of
the most current building codes may require that PA projects in Puerto Rico for disasters after
November 2019 are required to rebuild in compliance with the building codes for earthquakes as
well as wind and flooding. FEMA published an Interim Policy: Consensus-Based Codes,
Specifications and Standards for Public Assistance on November 9, 2019.159 Applicants under
disasters declared on or after the initial publication date of the interim policy are required to apply
the relevant codes to the planning, design, and execution of all permanent work PA projects for
applicable facility types for which they are seeking funding. Therefore, all PA projects associated
with damaged from the 2019-2020 earthquakes will have to apply all current codes. For any
damage associated with the 2017 hurricanes in Puerto Rico, PA Applicants have the option of
submitting a written request to FEMA to opt in to apply the revised building code policy to one or
more of their projects. Applicants in any of the categories above were originally required to
decide whether to opt in by May 4, 2020, but FEMA extended the deadline to opt into this policy
until October 31, 2020. As of October 28, 2020, 191 Applicants in Puerto Rico have chosen to opt
in, including 22 municipios.160
Applicants who fall into any of the categories below are able to submit to FEMA a written request
to opt in to apply the policy to one or more of their projects:
(a) incidents declared between August 1, 2017, and the date of the initial publication of this
policy;
(b) projects associated with incidents declared before August 1, 2017, but have not been
obligated based on a finalized cost estimate as of the date of the initial publication of this
policy;
(c) projects that have an Applicant-accepted fixed cost estimate (Section 428) that have not
been obligated; or
(d) projects associated with a cost estimate on appeal as of the date of the initial publication
of this policy.
Applicants who opt in to the policy for a particular project must evaluate design criteria for other
hazards and, depending on that evaluation, may be required to integrate codes, standards, and
specifications for other hazards into the project design.161

157 Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan p. 29.
158 Section 1235(b) of DRRA (Division D, P.L. 115-254), as it amends Stafford Act Section 406(e)(1)(A) (42 U.S.C.
§5172(e)(1)(A)).
159 FEMA, Interim Policy: Consensus-Based Codes, Specifications and Standards for Public Assistance Version 2.1,
FP 104-009-11, Washington, DC, December 20, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1579188158300-
159a38c75b6204517ad6c8641819c143/DRRA_1235(b)_V2.1_12-20-2019_508_FINAL.pdf. This interim policy was
updated in December 2019 and January 2020.
160 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, October 16, 2020.
161 FEMA, Consensus-Based Codes, Specifications and Standards for Public Assistance, Frequently Asked Questions,
Washington, DC, February 10, 2020, p. 3, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1581447085154-
4f8d1d175472a2fc54866b021ce208c6/DRRA_1235(b)_FAQ_2-7-2020_508.pdf.
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Insurance for FEMA Public Assistance Projects
When FEMA provides funding for permanent work to an Applicant for Public Assistance for
repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a facility, the Applicant must insure that
facility against future loss. Based on the ongoing earthquake swarm, insurance requirements
associated with Public Assistance projects in Puerto Rico have increased to require earthquake
insurance in addition to wind and flood insurance. PA Applicants are required to obtain and
maintain insurance on damaged insurable facilities (buildings, equipment, contents, and vehicles
exceeding $5,000) for the types of hazard that caused the damage in order to receive future PA
funding. When multiple hazards cause damage to a property, the Applicant must insure against
each hazard in an amount based on the damage caused by each hazard. FEMA requires insurance
against the hazard(s) that caused the damage, even if that means the Applicant must purchase
additional or broader coverage (for example, if the insurance for a particular peril is only
available as part of an all-risks policy). In the future, PA projects in Puerto Rico funded for
earthquake damage will need to obtain and maintain earthquake insurance, as well as flood
insurance and insurance against wind damage.
If an Applicant does not comply with the requirement to obtain and maintain insurance, FEMA
will deny or de-obligate assistance in the current disaster and deny future assistance for that
facility, regardless of the hazard(s) that caused the damage.162 Insurance coverage must be
subtracted from all applicable PA grants in order to avoid duplication of financial assistance. If an
Applicant has an insurance requirement from a previous event, FEMA is to reduce assistance by
the actual or anticipated insurance proceeds or the amount of insurance required in the previous
disaster, whichever is greater.
It is possible that insurance premiums in Puerto Rico will increase as a consequence of the 2017
hurricanes and 2019-2020 earthquakes. It may be financially difficult for municipios to meet PA
requirements for disaster insurance, particularly those which are required to purchase insurance
for multiple perils. However, an Applicant may request that FEMA modify the insurance
requirement if the Applicant attempts to comply with the requirement and believes that the
required insurance is not reasonably available.163 FEMA will not require greater types and
amounts of insurance than are certified as reasonably available, adequate, or necessary by the
appropriate State Insurance Commissioner. The State Insurance Commissioner cannot waive
federal insurance requirements, but may certify the types and extent of insurance reasonable to
protect against future loss to an insurable facility.164 FEMA will use the certification by the State
Insurance Commissioner to modify the Applicant’s insurance requirements.165
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has reported on
concerns about compliance with these insurance requirements since January 2001.166 A series of
reports identified concerns with Applicant compliance with insurance requirements, insurance

162 42 U.S.C. §5172(e).
163 FEMA, Public Assistance Policy on Insurance, FP 206-086-1, June 29, 2015, pp. 5-6, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1558538632295-d4165531878c8c8795551d3a7665d03e/Public_Assistance_Insurance_Policy_FP_206-
086-1_6-29-2015.pdf.
164 42 U.S.C. §5154(a)(2); 44 C.F.R. §206.252(d); and 44 C.F.R. §206.253(c).
165 FEMA, Public Assistance Policy on Insurance, FP 206-086-1, June 29, 2015, pp. 6-7, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1558538632295-d4165531878c8c8795551d3a7665d03e/Public_Assistance_Insurance_Policy_FP_206-
086-1_6-29-2015.pdf.
166 FEMA Office of Inspector General, Compliance with Public Assistance Program’s Insurance Purchase
Requirements, I-01-01, January 2001. Not available online.
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reviews, and FEMA and state monitoring of insurance requirements. The OIG carried out a
special review to notify FEMA of the challenges it may face managing insurance compliance
under the PA program during the recovery from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and María. They noted
that FEMA’s insurance specialists routinely waived the requirement to obtain and maintain
insurance for future disasters. The OIG concluded that the procedures used by FEMA to review
PA insurance compliance were inadequate. Because of this, FEMA could not ensure that approved
project costs included the required reductions for any insurance paid to the Applicant.167 The OIG
has not reported on the extent to which this has been identified as a problem in Puerto Rico
following Hurricanes Irma and María.
To date, FEMA has not reduced funding for any projects in Puerto Rico for lack of compliance
with prior obtain and maintain requirements. Congress may wish to monitor compliance with PA
insurance requirements in Puerto Rico for future disasters.
FEMA Mitigation and Rebuilding After Natural Disasters168
Mitigation Assistance Overview
The majority of funding for both pre- and post-disaster mitigation comes from FEMA, which
administers three programs, collectively referred to as Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA): (1)
the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP); (2) the Flood Mitigation Assistance Grant
Program (FMA); and (3) the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program (PDM), which has been
reframed in 2020 as Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).169 Funding for
FMA and PDM/BRIC are awarded competitively. Applicants for all three programs must have
hazard mitigation plans that meet the requirements of Stafford Act Section 322—Mitigation
Planning170 and 44 C.F.R. Part 201.
While Puerto Rico has received funding from the HMGP program, it has not applied for other
HMA funding (FMA or PDM) since Hurricanes Irma and María,171 and has not received an FMA
award since 2004, nor a PDM award since 2016.172 Both programs award grants annually; for
context, FMA has awarded 1,206 grants for a total of $928.6 million since 2004, and PDM has
awarded 657 grants for a total of $250 million since 2016.173

167 DHS OIG, Special Report: Lessons Learned from Previous Audit Reports on Insurance Under the Public Assistance
Program. OIG-18-12, November 7, 2017, pp. 6-7, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-11/OIG-18-
12-Nov17.pdf.
168 For more information on FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance program and the National Flood Insurance
Program, contact Diane P. Horn, Analyst in Flood Insurance and Emergency Management.
169 FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), https://www.fema.gov/bric.
170 42 U.S.C. §5165.
171 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 27, 2020.
172 CRS analysis of Open FEMA hazard mitigation data at https://www.fema.gov/about/openfema/data-sets#hazard,
accessed August 25, 2020.
173 Calculated by CRS using Hazard Mitigation Assistance Projects V2 at https://www.fema.gov/about/openfema/data-
sets#hazard, downloaded September 22, 2020. Note that the PDM data do not include 2019 or 2020, and the FEMA
data do not include 2020.
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Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
The HMGP is authorized by Stafford Act Section 404—Hazard Mitigation174 and is funded
through the Disaster Relief Fund. The key purpose of the HMGP is to ensure that the opportunity
to take critical mitigation measures is not lost during the reconstruction process following a
disaster. HMGP funding is available to all areas of a state, territory, or tribal lands where it is
requested by a governor or tribal chief executive following a major disaster declaration or Fire
Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). Eligible applicants include state, territorial, and local
governments; federally-recognized tribes or tribal organizations; and certain nonprofit
organizations. A state with an Enhanced State Mitigation Plan approved by FEMA within five
years of the disaster declaration is eligible for HMGP funding not to exceed 20% of the total
amount of Stafford Act of assistance for that disaster.175 Puerto Rico does not have an approved
Enhanced State Mitigation Plan.
The level of HMGP176 funding available for a given disaster is based on a percentage of the
estimated total federal assistance under the Stafford Act for each presidential major disaster
declaration.177 The HMGP recipient must provide a 25% cost share, which can include a
combination of cash and in-kind sources. Funding from other federal sources cannot be used for
the 25% nonfederal share, with one exception: funding provided under the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. In order to provide 100% funding to HMGP sub-
recipients, the Government of Puerto Rico elected to implement a global match strategy in
coordination with the Puerto Rico Department of Housing, the recipient of HUD CDBG-DR and
CDBG-MIT funds.178 This global match strategy will use CDBG-DR funding for the non-federal
cost share, so no cost share will be required from HMGP subapplicants.179 The Government of
Puerto Rico will dedicate approximately $1 billion in CDBG-DR funding to provide the required
cost share. On October 22, 2018, FEMA approved the Governor’s request to use the global match
approach to meet the HMGP nonfederal cost share requirement. FEMA also acknowledged the
intent to use the value of projects funded with CDGB-DR funds to carry out the global match
program.180
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funding to Puerto Rico
FEMA establishes the maximum amount of HMGP for each disaster at 12 months after the
presidential major disaster declaration. This amount, also known as the “lock-in” value for
HMGP, is the maximum that FEMA can obligate for eligible HMGP activities. Puerto Rico was

174 42 U.S.C. §5170c.
175 44 C.F.R. §201.5.
176 For additional information on the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), see the section on “Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program Funding to Puerto Rico” in this report.
177 HMGP funding is based on the estimated aggregate grant amount made under 42 U.S.C. §§5170b, 5172, 5173,
5174, 5177, and 5173. See 44 C.F.R. §206.432(b) for the sliding scale to calculate HMGP assistance.
178 COR3, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) Administrative Plan, FEMA-4336-DR-PR (Hurricane Irma)
and FEMA-4339-DR-PR (Hurricane María), amended April 20, 2020, pp. 49-55, https://recovery.pr/documents/
COR3%20HMGP%20Administrative%20Plan%20-Approved-May_13_2020.pdf.
179 COR3, Amendment No. 1 – Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Notice of Funds Availability FEMA-4339-DR-PR
(Hurricane María), p. 3, https://recovery.pr/documents/ENG-HMGP-NoFA-Amendment-No.1-DR-4339.pdf.
180 COR3 Transparency Portal, Hazard Mitigation Assistance, https://recovery.pr/en/recovery-programs/hazard-
mitigation-assistance#hazard-mitigation-assistance, accessed August 31, 2020 (hereinafter COR3 Transparency Portal,
Hazard Mitigation Assistance).
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notified of the 12-month lock-in level on February 12, 2019.181 According to FEMA, the total
amount of HMGP funding available to Puerto Rico for Hurricane Irma was $4,647,032 with
$3,549,536,374 available for Hurricane María (significantly more funding was made available for
Hurricane María).182
The first HMGP funding obligated for Hurricane Irma in Puerto Rico was for state management
costs on April 11, 2018. No funding has yet been disbursed for HMGP for Hurricane Irma.183 The
first HMGP funding obligated for Hurricane María in Puerto Rico was for a code enforcement
project on January 25, 2018. A total of $248,525,973 has been approved for Hurricane María,
with $38,433,726 obligated and—possibly—$649,322 disbursed. However, FEMA believes that
the $649,322 showing as disbursed may be an accounting error and they do not believe that any
disbursements have yet been made. FEMA is working with COR3 to resolve this.184
By September 2020, $755,217 was obligated for Puerto Rico for Hurricane Irma185 and
$38,433,726 for Hurricane María.186 FEMA had obligated approximately 16.25% of available
HMGP funding for Hurricane Irma, and had obligated 1.08% of the available funding for
Hurricane María.187 Overall, 1.1% of HMGP funds for Puerto Rico for Irma and María had been
obligated three years after the disasters.188 FEMA indicates that no funds have yet been disbursed
for either hurricane (see above).189
For comparison, FEMA obligated amounts of the available HMGP funding for other jurisdictions
affected by the 2017 hurricanes are as follows:
 56.41% of the available HMGP funding to the U.S. Virgin Islands for Hurricane
Irma;
 11.69% of the available HMGP funding to the U.S. Virgin Islands for Hurricane
María;
 31.82% of the available HMGP funding to Texas for Hurricane Harvey; and
 37.53% of the available HMGP funding to Florida for Hurricane Irma.
Mitigation Issues and Challenges
Obligation of HMGP Funding
The post-disaster period may be the best opportunity to incorporate hazard mitigation measures
and rebuild in a more resilient manner. Post-disaster reconstruction is possibly the single largest
opportunity to bring existing vulnerable structures up to current or new codes,190 when mitigation

181 COR3 Transparency Portal, Hazard Mitigation Assistance.
182 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 8, 2020.
183 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 8, 2020.
184 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 8, 2020.
185 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Irma (DR-4336-PR),” accessed October 7, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/
4336.
186 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Maria (DR-4339-PR),” accessed October 7, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/
4339.
187 Calculated by CRS using data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 14, 2020.
188 Calculated by CRS using data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 14, 2020.
189 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 8, 2020.
190 James C. Schwab et al., Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery: Next Generation, American Planning Association,
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can be incorporated into post-disaster modifications to building codes and land development
policies.
The lengthened time period over which HMGP funding is being made available to Puerto Rico
may make it more difficult to implement long-term recovery plans and to carry out oversight over
mitigation activities. This may also mean that communities continue to be subject to the same
level of risk from future disasters and may be less resilient to future disasters. Additionally,
individual households with financial resources may have been able to pay for their own recovery,
while those without resources must wait for federal funds to be available.
The data availability issues described in this report191 make it difficult to determine the rate of
obligation of HMGP funding, whether it has changed over time, and how it compares to the rate
of obligation for other disasters (see the “Availability of Information on Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program and Public Assistance Funding and Projects” section for more information). According
to FEMA, no dataset exists from which the rate of obligation can be calculated.192 However,
approximately three years after Hurricanes Irma and María, FEMA has only obligated $39.2
million to Puerto Rico for HMGP, none of which has been disbursed, out of the total $3.54 billion
awarded.
Given the disparity in obligated amounts, Congress may wish to determine what constraints have
been responsible for sluggish HMGP obligation in Puerto Rico, and how these constraints might
be addressed. Congress may also wish to require FEMA to publish data on obligation rates.
Mitigation Against Multiple Hazards
The 2019-2020 earthquakes in Puerto Rico highlighted the challenges of building properties that
can resist damage from wind, flood, and earthquakes. Communities that are exposed to multiple
hazards may use construction materials that perform well for the most frequent hazard, but that
may present an increased risk for less frequent hazards. For example, homes that are elevated on
stilts or pilings to reduce flood risk may be more vulnerable to ground shaking during
earthquakes if not adequately designed and constructed.193
Building to mitigate multiple risks can be done, but is likely to be significantly more expensive.194
For example, PRDOH stated that construction under CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT will adhere to
the Puerto Rico building codes adopted in November 2018, and specifically noted that the code
includes requirements regarding earthquake loads, in addition to wind and flood.195 HUD’s
assessment of Puerto Rico’s unmet needs estimated that additional costs associated with

PAS Report 576, Chicago, IL, December 2014, p. 78, https://www.planning.org/publications/report/9026899/.
191 For more information on the availability of HMGP funding information, see the “Obligation of HMGP Funding”
section.
192 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 8, 2020.
193 Eduardo Miranda et al., Puerto Rico M6.4 Earthquake, 7 January 2020, Structural Extreme Events Reconnaissance,
Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report PRJ-2670, January 10, 2020, pp. 6, 66-7, https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/338528208_StEER_-_7_JAN_2020_PUERTO_RICO_Mw_64_
EARTHQUAKE_PRELIMINARY_VIRTUAL_RECONNAISSANCE_REPORT_PVRR.
194 National Institute of Building Sciences, Whole Building Design Guide Secure/Safe Committee, Natural Hazards
Mitigation, September 14, 2017, https://www.wbdg.org/design-objectives/secure-safe/natural-hazards-mitigation.
195 Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds in Response to 2017 Hurricanes Irma
and María, Amendment Five, Draft for Public Comment, September 10, 2020, p. 18, https://www.cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/
download/action-plan-amendment-5-substantial-amendment/?ind=1599767012369&filename=Action%20Plan%20
Amendment%205_Substantial_EN%20(DRAFT%20FOR%20PUBLIC%20COMMENT)_.pdf&wpdmdl=13941&refre
sh=5f7ca5b0328791602004400 (hereinafter PRDOH, Action Plan for the use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5)).
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necessary resilience measures, such as more stringent building codes and the cost of compliance
measures may add more than 30% to the cost of repairs and rebuilding.196 PRDOH estimated that
this could increase the total cost of repairs from $4.7 billion to $5.8 billion.197 This suggests that
the available funding may not support as many projects and may need to be supplemented.
Congress may wish to require FEMA to clarify whether comparable building code requirements
will apply to work funded by HMGP and Individual Assistance, or funded by a combination of
programs. Depending on decisions made in Puerto Rico about opting in to FEMA’s policy on
Consensus-Based Codes, Specifications and Standards for Public Assistance, FEMA may require
PA-funded structures that were damaged by Hurricanes Irma and María to be repaired or rebuilt
to current codes for earthquakes, as well as current codes for wind and flood.198
Assistance to Individuals and Households199
Many federal programs provide assistance to individuals and households, including in the form of
grants, direct federal assistance, and loans. These forms of assistance may also be combined to
help address the unmet needs of disaster survivors (subject to applicants being authorized to
receive such assistance); however, Stafford Act Section 312 prohibits disaster survivors from
receiving federal assistance for losses for which they have already been compensated (i.e., a
duplication of benefits).200 This report focuses on assistance provided to individuals and
households through FEMA, the SBA, and HUD, including:
 emergency housing assistance provided directly to disaster survivors through the
FEMA Public Assistance (PA) program;
 grants of assistance and direct federal assistance for housing needs, and grants of
assistance for other needs, as well as other forms of assistance provided directly
to disaster survivors to support their recovery efforts, provided through the
FEMA Individual Assistance (IA) program;
 low-interest loans for real and personal property provided through the SBA
Disaster Loan program (see the “Small Business Administration Disaster Loan
Program” section for more information on the SBA Disaster Loan program); and
 assistance provided to disaster survivors with ongoing unmet needs provided
through the HUD Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery
(CDBG-DR) program (see the “Ongoing Housing Recovery Through HUD’s
CDBG-DR Program” section for more information on the programs provided to
support disaster survivors’ recovery efforts, and the “CDBG-DR and Variants”
section for more information on the CDBG-DR program).
This section provides an overview of the FEMA IA program, and then focuses specifically on the
forms of emergency and interim housing assistance provided to disaster survivors from Puerto

196 PRDOH, Action Plan for the use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5), p. 70.
197 PRDOH, Action Plan for the use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5), p. 95.
198 See the section on “Building Code Compliance for Recipients of Public Assistance” in this report.
199 For more information on FEMA’s Individual Assistance (IA) program, contact Elizabeth M. Webster, Analyst in
Emergency Management and Disaster Recovery.
200 42 U.S.C. §5155. If an individual receives assistance that constitutes a duplication of benefits, the individual must
repay the duplicated assistance. For more information on duplication of benefits issues, see “Section 1210: Duplication
of Benefits” of CRS Report R45819, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA): A Summary of Selected
Statutory Provisions, coordinated by Elizabeth M. Webster and Bruce R. Lindsay.
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Rico through FEMA’s PA and IA programs, as well as other forms of assistance provided through
the IA program, and ongoing housing assistance being provided through HUD’s CDBG-DR
program.
FEMA Individual Assistance Overview
In Puerto Rico, IA was authorized following Hurricanes Irma and María. FEMA’s IA program
may provide aid to affected individuals and households when authorized following a presidential
declaration of emergency or major disaster.201 IA can take the form of assistance for housing and
for other needs (known as Other Needs Assistance or ONA) through the Individuals and
Households Program (IHP), which may be made available following either an emergency or
major disaster declaration.202 FEMA’s IA program may also provide assistance through the Crisis
Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA),
Disaster Legal Services (DLS), or Disaster Case Management (DCM); these forms of assistance
may only be made available following a major disaster declaration.203 Mass Care and Emergency
Assistance (e.g., emergency sheltering) may also be provided following an emergency or major
disaster declaration. Table 4 includes the statutory authorities and brief descriptions of each IA
program.
Table 4. Statutory Authorities for Individual Assistance
Stafford Act Section
Category of Assistance
What It Provides
Section 408
Individuals and Households Program
Housing Assistance and Other Needs
Assistance (ONA)
Section 426
Disaster Case Management
Case Management Services
Section 416
Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training
Supportive Crisis Counseling, Psycho-
Program
education, Development of Coping Skil s,
and Linkage to Appropriate Resources
Section 415
Disaster Legal Services
Legal Aid to Low-income Disaster
Survivors (e.g., assistance with insurance
claims and replacing legal documents)
Section 410
Disaster Unemployment Assistance
Unemployment Benefits and
Re-employment Assistance Services
Source: FEMA, Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG), FP 104-009-03, March 2019, pp. 6-9,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1551713430046-1abf12182d2d5e622d16accb37c4d163/IAPPG.pdf.
Different forms of IA include different eligibility requirements and application processes. For
example, in order to receive IHP assistance, an applicant must satisfy general conditions of
eligibility, as well as additional eligibility requirements related to the type of IHP assistance they
are requesting.204

201 For more information on FEMA’s Individual Assistance (IA) program, see CRS Report R46014, FEMA Individual
Assistance Programs: An Overview, by Elizabeth M. Webster.
202 FEMA, “How a Disaster Gets Declared,” last accessed August 21, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/disasters/how-
declared (hereinafter FEMA, “How a Disaster Gets Declared”).
203 FEMA, “How a Disaster Gets Declared.”
204 FEMA, Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG), FP 104-009-03, March 2019, pp. 47-48,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1551713430046-1abf12182d2d5e622d16accb37c4d163/IAPPG.pdf
(hereinafter FEMA, IAPPG)). General conditions of eligibility include that (1) “[t]he applicant must be a U.S. citizen,
noncitizen national, or qualified alien” (or the parent or guardian of a minor child who is one); (2) “FEMA must be able
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Additionally, different types of IA are subject to different cost share requirements. FEMA
provides 100% federal funding for costs associated with providing IHP housing assistance,205
CCP, DUA, DLS, and DCM.206 However, IHP ONA is subject to a 75% federal and 25%
nonfederal cost share.207
Emergency Sheltering and IHP Assistance Provided After the Hurricanes
The hurricanes significantly affected housing in Puerto Rico. According to Puerto Rico’s
recovery plan,
[a]pproximately 90 percent of the Island’s nearly 1.23 million households applied for
immediate relief and housing assistance from FEMA, with 78 percent of these indicating
damage to their structure or personal property.208
The President’s Stafford Act declarations authorized FEMA to provide various types of short- and
interim-term housing assistance to meet the needs of disaster survivors.209 Emergency sheltering
was authorized under Stafford Act Section 403 following the major disaster declarations for the
hurricanes.210 This assistance is commonly referred to as Public Assistance (PA) Category B—
Emergency Protective Measures. The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) was used to
support interim housing needs, and was authorized under Stafford Act Section 408.211 IHP
assistance helped people transition out of emergency sheltering solutions and into longer-term
temporary or permanent housing solutions. (The program data for the hurricanes was combined
by FEMA in its publicly available program information, which is reflected hereinafter.212)

to verify the applicant’s identity”; (3) “[t]he applicant’s insurance, or other forms of disaster assistance received, cannot
meet their disaster-caused needs”; and (4) “[t]he applicant’s necessary expenses and serious needs are directly caused
by a declared disaster.” Additionally, the applicant may need to meet occupancy and ownership eligibility requirements
for some types of Housing Assistance and Other Needs Assistance. When Hurricanes Irma and María occurred, the
Individuals and Households Program Unified Guidance (IHPUG) was the relevant guidance. The program information
and general conditions of eligibility noted above are consistent with the IAPPG (see FEMA, IHPUG, FP 104-009-03,
September 2016, p. 11, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1483567080828-
1201b6eebf9fbbd7c8a070fddb308971/FEMAIHPUG_CoverEdit_December2016.pdf).
205 42 U.S.C. §5174(g)(1). Additionally, some forms of emergency housing assistance are authorized under FEMA’s
PA program (Category B—Emergency Protective Measures), and are subject to the PA cost share, the federal share of
which shall not be less than 75%. This applies to the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, authorized
under Stafford Act Section 403 or 502 (FEMA, IAPPG, p. 40; and 42 U.S.C. §5170b(b) and 42 U.S.C. §5193(a)).
206 FEMA, IAPPG, p. 4.
207 42 U.S.C. §5174(g)(2).
208 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. 113. Additional information on the damage to
housing in Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Irma and María can be found in the HUD, Housing Recovery Support
Function, Housing Damage Assessment and Recovery Strategies Report Puerto Rico, June 29, 2018, https://cdbg-
dr.pr.gov/en/download/revised-draft-submitted-to-hud-for-evaluation-and-final-approval/?ind=1594482621623&
filename=22-Q_HUD%20Housing%20Damage%20Assessment%20and%20Recovery%20Strategies%20Report.pdf&
wpdmdl=12323&refresh=5f4f91a9111711599050153.
209 A presidential declaration authorizing Individual Assistance also makes Small Business Administration (SBA)
Disaster Loans available (SBA, A Reference Guide to the SBA Disaster Loan Program, May 2015, p. 4,
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/SBA_Disaster_Loan_Program_Reference_Guide.pdf). For more
information on SBA Disaster Loans, see CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and
Possible Issues for Congress.
210 42 U.S.C. §5170b.
211 42 U.S.C. §5174.
212 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 10, 2020.
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In Puerto Rico, FEMA provided short-term emergency accommodations through:
 congregate shelters (e.g., facilities such as school gymnasiums that provide safe,
secure, and sanitary places for displaced disaster survivors to shelter);213
 the Transitional Sheltering
Emergency Sheltering Assistance
Assistance (TSA) program, which

helped transition people out of

Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA): “FEMA
congregate shelters and into
funded about $101 mil ion for the TSA program for
hotel/motel accommodations.
disaster survivors from Puerto Rico.” More than 7,000
Some disaster survivors sheltered
families were housed in over 1,000 hotels in 41 states,
in hotels/motels for nearly a year,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico through the
in part due to disaster-caused
TSA Program, which was authorized in late October
2017, and ended in September 2018.
challenges that delayed or

prevented them from identifying

Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power
(STEP): Under Tu Hogar Renace, repairs were
longer-term solutions (e.g.,
completed to 108,484 homes at an average cost of
unavailable affordable
approximately $10,409 per home.
housing);214

Voluntary Agencies Leading and Organizing

Repair (VALOR): Through the VALOR program,
Sheltering and Temporary
6,323 homes were repaired at an estimated cost of $25
Essential Power (STEP) Pilot
mil ion.
Program, known as Tu Hogar

Operation Blue Roof and Self-help Tarps: In
Renace (meaning “Your Home
Puerto Rico, 59,469 blue roofs were installed by the
Reborn” in Spanish), which
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 125,981 FEMA self-
allowed disaster survivors to
help tarps were installed. Some disaster survivors
shelter at home while repairs
continue to live under temporary roofs, including tarp
were made;
solutions.
215

 Voluntary Agencies Leading and
Sources: FEMA, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” last accessed
Organizing Repair (VALOR), a
October 7, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hurricane-Maria-
pilot program in which voluntary
numbers; and email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, March
20, 2019.
agencies used FEMA-funded
materials to repair homes;216 and
 Operation Blue Roof and self-help tarps, which were intended to temporarily
protect the contents of damaged homes and prevent further property damage until
permanent repairs could be made. Operation Blue Roof was a mission assigned
by FEMA and managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to
provide temporary covering using fiber-reinforced blue plastic sheeting and strips
of wood secured to the roof with nails or screws.217

213 Emergency sheltering operations extending beyond 90 days (FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action
Report (AAR), July 12, 2018, p. 39, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1533643262195-
6d1398339449ca85942538a1249d2ae9/2017FEMAHurricaneAARv20180730.pdf).
214 FEMA, “Transitional Shelter Assistance,” last accessed August 21, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/
20200220/transitional-shelter-assistance.
215 FEMA, “Recovery Program Guidance: Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) Pilot Program for
FEMA-4336-DR-PR and FEMA-4339-DR-PR,” October 25, 2017.
216 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, March 20, 2019.
217 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Temporary Roofing,” last accessed August 21, 2020, https://www.usace.army.mil/
Missions/Emergency-Operations/National-Response-Framework/Temporary-Roofing/.
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In addition to emergency sheltering solutions, FEMA’s IA program was used to provide
temporary housing assistance and ONA through the IHP. The types of housing assistance
provided included financial assistance for Rental Assistance, as well as Home Repair Assistance,
Home Replacement Assistance,218 and Direct Housing Assistance, including Direct Lease,
Multifamily Lease and Repair, and Permanent Housing Construction.219
FEMA extended the IHP program
Individuals and Households Program (IHP)
following Hurricanes Irma and
Assistance
María. The IHP period of assistance

does not typically exceed 18
Financial Housing Assistance:
months from the date of declaration

Rental Assistance: $143.3 mil ion
unless extended by FEMA when it

is determined that “due to

Home Repairs: $566.4 mil ion
extraordinary circumstances an

Home Replacement: $90.7 mil ion
extension would be in the public
Direct Temporary Housing Assistance:
interest.”220 Thus, without the

Permanent Housing Construction—Repair: $45.4 mil ion
extensions, the IHP would have
in funding was provided to repair 51 properties.
ended around March 2019 (18

Direct Lease: $12.3 mil ion
months from when the disasters

Multi-Family Lease and Repair: $1.0 mil ion in funding was
occurred in September 2017).
provided to assist 367 families.
Instead, assistance provided
Financial Assistance for Other Needs:
through the FEMA IHP concluded

Other Needs Assistance: $586.9 mil ion
for the disaster survivors of

Hurricane Irma on November 30,
Sources: FEMA, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” last accessed October
2019, and for the disaster survivors
7, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hurricane-Maria-numbers; and
emails from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 21 and 24,
of Hurricane María on December 6,
2020, and October 1, 2020. This information details assistance provided.
2019 (and February 6, 2020, for
specific cases—i.e., owners/renters with inspections pending).221
Other Forms of Individual Assistance Provided
Other forms of IA were also provided, including Disaster Unemployment Assistance, which
provided temporary benefits to individuals whose employment or self-employment was “lost or
interrupted as a direct result of a major disaster and who are not eligible for regular
unemployment insurance (UI),”222 and Disaster Case Management, which partners disaster case
managers with disaster survivors to develop and execute an individual disaster recovery plan.223
Disaster Legal Services were also provided via a DLS Hotline that was supported by the

218 FEMA, “DR-4336-PR & DR-4339-PR Individual Assistance Public Notice,” June 14, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/
disaster-federal-register-notice/dr-4336-pr-dr-4339-pr-individual-assistance-public-notice.
219 FEMA, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hurricane-Maria-numbers.
220 44 C.F.R. §206.110(e).
221 FEMA’s Office of External Affairs confirmed that the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) concluded for the
disaster survivors of the hurricanes in an email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 10, 2020.
222 FEMA, IAPPG, p. 222. For more information on Disaster Unemployment Assistance, see CRS Report RS22022,
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), by Julie M. Whittaker.
223 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 11; and FEMA, IAPPG, p. 172.
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Louisiana Civil Justice Center (LCJC) and services were also provided at Disaster Recovery
Centers.224
Other Individual Assistance


Disaster Unemployment Assistance: $16 mil ion in funding was approved for 11,663 claims.

Disaster Case Management: 29,693 cases were closed (15,542 with a successful outcome), and 1,340
cases were transferred internally. $72.8 mil ion was approved for 9 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)
($69.8 mil ion was approved for an initial 12-month period; and $2.9 mil ion was approved for 6 NGOs for a
6-month extension).

Disaster Legal Services: $23,562.48 in funding was provided for DLS.

Crisis Counseling Program: $6.7 mil ion in funding was provided for the Immediate Services Program,
which provided 583,839 services, and $29.2 mil ion in funding was provided for the Regular Services Program,
which provided 1,897,513 services. Services included Individual/Family Crisis Counseling, Group
Counseling/Public Education, Brief Education/Supportive Contact, and Disaster Recovery Center Visits.

Sources: FEMA, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” last accessed October 7, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/
hurricane-Maria-numbers; and Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report on the Economic and Disaster
Recovery Plan, August 3, 2020, p. 11, https://recovery.pr/documents/Congressional%20Report%20073020[2].pdf; and email from
FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 10, 2020.
Most of these Individual Assistance programs have concluded for Hurricanes Irma and María;
however, the DCM period of performance was extended through November 3, 2020 for one
provider due to the COVID-19 pandemic.225
Ongoing Housing Recovery Through HUD’s CDBG-DR Program
Puerto Rico’s recovery goal for housing involves creating resilient communities and safe,
affordable housing.226 This requires transitioning from informal to formal housing (i.e.,
construction completed with assistance from an architect or engineer, received a permit and
conforms to building and land-use codes)227 and relocating some people, as well as increasing

224 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 10, 2020. According to FEMA, the Disaster Legal
Services (DLS) Hotline services concluded on March 9, 2018, and the DLS at Disaster Recovery Centers concluded
October 4, 2018, “when the services were transitioned to pro-bono services by Legal Services of PR through Voluntary
Agency Liaisons (VAL).”
225 The period of performance for Disaster Case Management (DCM) assistance concluded for five providers on
August 3, 2020, and a 90-day no-cost extension was approved for one provider due to COVID-19, which extended the
period of performance through November 3, 2020. Disaster Unemployment Assistance concluded July 24, 2019.
Disaster Legal Services concluded October 4, 2018. Finally, the period of performance for the Crisis Counseling
Program—Immediate Services Program was from September 20, 2017, through March 19, 2018, and the period of
performance for the Regular Services Program was from March 20, 2018, through December 19, 2019 (email from
FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 10, 2020).
226 The specific courses of action for “Repair and Rebuild Resilient Housing” are detailed in the COR3 Economic and
Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico beginning on p. 286. Additional detailed information can be found in the
supplemental report developed by the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) (see Noreen Clancy,
Lloyd Dixon, Dan Elinoff, Kathryn Kuznitsky, and Sean McKenna, Modernizing Puerto Rico’s Housing Sector
Following Hurricanes Irma and Maria: Post-Storm Challenges and Potential Courses of Action, Homeland Security
Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation, September 30, 2020, p. xi, https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR2602.html (hereinafter HSOAC, Modernizing Puerto Rico’s Housing Sector).
227 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. 32. The anticipated cost capital improvements for
housing are $33,000,000 (COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. 160).
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insurance coverage and clarifying homeownership records.228 Housing assistance provided
through FEMA’s IHP and programs such as Tu Hogar Renace helped with Puerto Rico’s housing
recovery; however, many disaster survivors from Hurricanes Irma and María continue to live
under roofs with blue tarps or in homes that remain damaged or destroyed.229 In order to meet
Puerto Rico’s unmet housing needs—estimated at nearly $34 billion230—several housing
programs are being funded through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD’s) Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program,231
including the Home Repair, Reconstruction, or Relocation (R3) Program and the Title Clearance
Program (described below). Thus, although the FEMA housing assistance programs have
officially concluded for Hurricanes Irma and María, federally funded housing recovery work is
ongoing.232
The Government of Puerto Rico designated the Puerto Rico Department of Housing (PRDOH) as
the agency responsible for administering the CDBG-DR funds (in collaboration with COR3).233
The Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery Action Plan for the use of CDBG-DR Funds in Response to
2017 Hurricanes Irma and María details the CDBG-DR-eligible programs that are being
provided for Puerto Rico’s unmet needs. It aligns with the courses of action detailed in the
Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico.234
R3 Program
The R3 Program, launched in July 2019, helps eligible homeowners repair or reconstruct
hurricane-damaged single-family homes, and relocates some families to other homes.235
Applicants with significant property damage, including those still living under blue roofs, are
among those being given priority.236 The R3 program accepted approximately 26,951

228 COR3, Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico, p. 115; and PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of
CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 51.
229 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 124.
230 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 69.
231 See PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 108. The table presented in the Action
Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds includes the list of housing programs.
232 As with the FEMA housing assistance programs, the CDBG-DR-funded housing assistance also has a range of
eligibility requirements, which are detailed in the Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds.
233 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. v.
234 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. iv.
235 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 125. The guidelines for the R3 Program,
which include information on the eligible use of funds, the application process and program eligibility, and other
administrative information, including related to the decision-making process for whether it is appropriate to repair,
reconstruct, or relocate applicants, are available at PRDOH, CDBG-DR Program Guidelines: Home Repair,
Reconstruction, or Relocation Program (R3 Program), v. 8, September 17, 2020, https://cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/download/
home-repair-reconstruction-or-relocation-program/?ind=1600370442179&filename=
1600370442wpdm_HSN_R3_Guidelines_Program%20Guidelines_v8_EN.pdf&wpdmdl=6679&refresh=
5f7dd9fb5866f1602083323 (hereinafter PRDOH, R3 Program Guidelines).
236 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 124; and PRDOH, DRAFT Puerto Rico
Disaster Recovery Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds in Response to 2017 Hurricanes Irma and María,
Amendment 4, July 9, 2020, p. 73, https://cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/download/revised-draft-submitted-to-hud-for-evaluation-
and-final-approval/?ind=1594483059667&filename=Action%20Plan%20Amendment%204%20Substantial%20-
%20July%209,%202020.pdf&wpdmdl=12323&refresh=5f4f91a90fcf21599050153 (subject to HUD approval)
(hereinafter PRDOH, DRAFT Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 4)). Puerto Rico Secretary of
the Housing Department, Luis C. Fernández Trinchet was quoted by the AP as stating that “more than 2,600 of the
applicants are still using blue tarps instead of roofs” (Dánica Coto, “Thousands in Puerto Rico Still Without Housing
Since María,” AP, July 24, 2020, last accessed August 20, 2020, https://apnews.com/
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applications,237 of which 18,500 are priority applicants.238 Program intake (i.e., the application
process) was 46% complete by March 2020, and 24% of the applicants were deemed eligible to
receive assistance.239
The Associated Press and El Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (CPI—or the Center for
Investigative Journalism) have reported on criticism of the R3 program, including by Puerto Rico
Governor Wanda Vázquez Garced and program applicants, alleging that the pace of work is
slow.240 Critics are also concerned that actions by homeowners to make repairs on their own are
penalized by the R3 program.241 However, the current Puerto Rico Secretary of the Housing
Department, Luis C. Fernández Trinchet, was quoted by CPI in August 2020, as saying “[f]orty-
four homes have been completed as part of the [R3] program and we’re moving ahead with what
we had said of having 300 more homes in repair or reconstruction a month.”242
Title Clearance Program
Lack of formal documentation proving homeownership made it difficult for some disaster
survivors from Puerto Rico to access housing recovery resources.243 According to the guidance
for the Title Clearance Program
Many homeowners in Puerto Rico lack a legal property title, which, for the most part, is a
direct consequence of migration flows dating back to the 1930’s and 1940’s. In addition,
there is no legal requirement to register the transfer of title to properties on the Island, so
families have lived decades without registering their ownership of land or structures with
the government and some have subdivided properties without complying with the
applicable rules and regulations. Therefore, such homeowners do not hold clear and
marketable titles to their properties.
After ... Hurricanes Irma and María, ... [FEMA] denied financial assistance to individuals
who could not prove ownership of their own homes. According to the Housing Damage
Assessment and Recovery Strategies Report for Puerto Rico, FEMA estimates that nearly
sixty percent (60%) of the 1.1 million applications for FEMA assistance were found
ineligible. Although many factors contributed, one of the main reasons was the Applicant’s

a2cf35e2f8893592ec4b59d90baae1ac (which states that nearly 1.5 years after federal funding was released to local
officials, not a single repair or rebuilding job had been completed) (hereinafter Coto, “Thousands in Puerto Rico Still
Without Housing Since María”)).
237 PRDOH, “PRDOH Reaches Maximum Capacity for R3 Program Applications,” May 1, 2020, https://www.cdbg-
dr.pr.gov/en/prdoh-reaches-maximum-capacity-for-r3-program-applications/. Former Secretary of the Puerto Rico
Department of Housing, Fernando Gil-Enseñat, announced that the R3 program reached its “maximum capacity of
applicants” based on the funds assigned in the HUD-approved Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds.
238 PRDOH, DRAFT Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 4), p. 73. Priority applicants include
applicants living in homes that still have significant damage remaining from the hurricanes.
239 PRDOH, DRAFT Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 4), p. 73; and PRDOH, R3 Program
Guidelines, p. 11. The intake process refers to the application process, which is described in the PRDOH, R3 Program
Guidelines (see pp. 11-16).
240 Coto, “Thousands in Puerto Rico Still Without Housing Since María”; and Jeniffer Wiscovitch, “Housing Options
Don’t Get Off the Ground After Hurricane María, Earthquakes,” María: The Money Trail, August 20, 2020, last
accessed August 20, 2020, https://periodismoinvestigativo.com/2020/08/housing-options-dont-get-off-the-ground-after-
hurricane-María-earthquakes/ (hereinafter Wiscovitch, “Housing Options Don’t Get Off the Ground”).
241 Wiscovitch, “Housing Options Don’t Get Off the Ground.”
242 Wiscovitch, “Housing Options Don’t Get Off the Ground.”
243 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 130. The lack of documentation proving
homeownership prevented or delayed assistance to some disaster survivors from Puerto Rico following the hurricanes.
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inability to prove that they own the homes and/or the land for which they were claiming
damages.244
In addition, lack of documentation also stems from informal building practices.245 Following
Hurricanes Irma and María, FEMA addressed the challenge of insufficient documentation to
prove homeownership by accepting a signed form declaring ownership and accompanying
documentation proving homeownership (e.g., receipts or invoices proving the person claiming
ownership paid to maintain the property), in lieu of title.246
To address these challenges moving forward, Puerto Rico’s Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR
Funds details the Title Clearance Program, which launched in September 2019. The program’s
goal is to provide clear title to thousands of homeowners.247 Additionally, the program will
prioritize assistance for homeowners who experienced challenges receiving federal assistance due
to lack of clear title.248 The Title Clearance Program accepted nearly 2,000 applications by March
2020, 64% of which were from priority applicants (including those who had trouble receiving
federal assistance due to lack of clear title).249
The Title Clearance Program also supports R3 Program applicants who lack clear title because R3
applicants
can only move forward ... up to the point of Award Coordination. To move forward with
an award under the R3 Program, Applicants need to have a clear title due to local permit
requirements for construction work in Puerto Rico.250

244 PRDOH, CDBG-DR Program Guidelines: Title Clearance Program, v. 2, May 27, 2020, p. 6, https://www.cdbg-
dr.pr.gov/en/download/title-clearance-program/?ind=1590610774888&filename=
HSN_TC_Guidelines_Program%20Guidelines_EN_v2.pdf&wpdmdl=6692&refresh=5f7ddd42006c31602084162
(hereinafter PRDOH, Title Clearance Program Guidelines). The guidelines for the Title Clearance Program, include
information on the eligible use of funds, the application process and program eligibility, and other administrative
information. See also HSOAC, Modernizing Puerto Rico’s Housing Sector, pp. 14-15.
245 Ivis Garcia, “The Lack of Proof of Ownership in Puerto Rico Is Crippling Repairs in the Aftermath of Hurricane
María,” American Bar Association Human Rights Magazine, vol. 44, no. 2, October 2, 2019,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/vol—44—no-2—housing/the-
lack-of-proof-of-ownership-in-puerto-rico-is-crippling-repai/; Andres Viglucci, “Half of Puerto Rico’s Housing Was
Built Illegally, Then Came Hurricane María,” Miami Herald, February 14, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
nation-world/world/americas/article199948699.html; and PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds
(Amendment 3), p. 42.
246 FEMA, “Additional Options Available for Applicants to Verify Home Ownership,” release 254, August 17, 2018,
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200220/additional-options-available-applicants-verify-home-ownership; Ayuda
Legal Puerto Rico, “Formulario para Solicitar o Apelar a FEMA sin Título de Propiedad [Form to request or appeal to
FEMA without title],” last accessed November 26, 2019, https://ayudalegalpr.org/resource/formulario-para-solicitar-o-
apelar-a-fema-sin-titulo-formal?ref=yXD0X. See also Carolina Bolado and Natalie Rodriguez, “‘Now Is the Real
Crisis’: Puerto Ricans Struggle for Disaster Aid,” Law 360, February 10, 2019, https://www.law360.com/articles/
1123340.
247 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 131; and PRDOH, DRAFT Action Plan
for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 4), p. 74.
248 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 130.
249 PRDOH, DRAFT Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 4), p. 74.
250 PRDOH, Title Clearance Program Guidelines, p. 6.
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Issues and Challenges Regarding the Future Delivery of Housing Assistance
Emergency Sheltering Assistance
Changes have been made to FEMA’s emergency and interim housing assistance programs as a
result of policy changes and legislation enacted subsequent to the 2017 hurricane season.251 These
changes may affect the housing assistance options FEMA may provide to disaster survivors,
including disaster survivors in Puerto Rico.
For example, in order to provide temporary sheltering assistance, FEMA used a variety of
emergency sheltering programs, including Tu Hogar Renace (i.e., the STEP Pilot Program).
However, although it was used following several significant disasters,252 FEMA announced that it
was ending the STEP Pilot Program in October 2019, because the program “was not meeting its
established objectives” and repairs could not be made quickly enough for the program to
effectively serve as an emergency sheltering solution.253 GAO noted that FEMA had not
evaluated its remaining sheltering options when it discontinued the STEP Pilot Program, so the
GAO recommended that the FEMA Administrator evaluate the agency’s emergency housing
solutions.254 DHS concurred with the GAO’s recommendation,255 and as of August 2020, FEMA
fully implemented the GAO’s suggestion and the GAO considers the recommendation “closed as
implemented.”256 Specifically, FEMA determined that it could provide emergency sheltering to
disaster survivors by
using a combination of existing capabilities and building capacity for specialized teams
tasked with coordinating with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to identify
viable sheltering options.257

251 The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 was enacted in October 2018, following the 2017 hurricane season.
DRRA made changes to the IHP to expand housing assistance options and increase program customization. For more
information, see the “Individual Assistance” section of the CRS Report R45819, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of
2018 (DRRA): A Summary of Selected Statutory Provisions, coordinated by Elizabeth M. Webster and Bruce R.
Lindsay.
252 GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could Strengthen FEMA’s Key Disaster Recovery Efforts,
GAO-20-54, November 2019, pp. 31 and 34, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/702744.pdf (hereinafter GAO, U.S.
Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions). Including being implemented in Puerto Rico following the 2017
hurricanes, the STEP pilot program was authorized following eight declared disasters since 2012.
253 FEMA, “Bulletin Week of October 21, 2019,” https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSFEMA/bulletins/
2679511.
254 GAO noted that the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) Pilot Program was used “for the specific
purpose of providing necessary additional capacity to supplement these [FEMA housing assistance] and other federal
programs. Further, in certain cases, the STEP pilot program was used when implementing these other programs was
unfeasible ... where the particular circumstances on the ground made using the Transitional Sheltering Assistance
program or deploying temporary housing units impractical....” GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions,
p. 35.
255 GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions, p. 44.
256 GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could Strengthen FEMA’s Key Disaster Recovery Efforts,
GAO-20-54, November 2019, “Recommendations for Executive Action,” https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-54?
mobile_opt_out=1#summary_recommend (hereinafter GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions,
“Recommendations for Executive Action”). See Recommendation 1 “Status” and “Comments.” This involved
“review[ing] a range of existing documentation, including findings from after action reports conducted following prior
disasters and the agency’s Continuous Improvement Program.”
257 GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions, “Recommendations for Executive Action.” See
Recommendation 1 “Status” and “Comments.”
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Congress may still wish to monitor FEMA’s efforts to implement emergency sheltering assistance
programs to meet the short-term emergency housing needs of disaster survivors—particularly
those disaster survivors who reside in areas with limited housing stock, such as Puerto Rico.
Confusion Regarding Applying for Assistance
In September 2020, the GAO published a report on actions needed to improve the FEMA IHP,
which focused on challenges to obtaining assistance through the program. One challenge the
GAO reported related to the requirement to complete an SBA disaster loan application to receive
some forms of IHP assistance (e.g., Other Needs Assistance for the repair or replacement of
personal property). Officials from Puerto Rico and FEMA told the GAO that disaster survivors
“did not understand or were confused by” the requirement.
FEMA recovery officials in Puerto Rico said that the agency faces challenges with the IHP
requirement to apply for an SBA loan in every disaster, and Individual Assistance officials
from ... FEMA regional offices ... noted that this requirement has been a long-standing
issue with the program.258
To address the challenge of confusion in the SBA-IHP application process, the GAO made two
recommendations, which DHS concurred with:
1. FEMA should improve the way it communicates the SBA Disaster Loan
application requirement that must be completed before an applicant may be
considered for the forms of ONA that are “SBA-dependent”; and
2. FEMA should assess the extent to which the SBA-dependent ONA application
process limits or prevents disaster survivors from accessing IHP assistance, and
FEMA should work with SBA to identify options to simplify and streamline the
application process.259
Per the GAO’s report, by doing this, “FEMA can help ensure that its process does not delay or
serve as a barrier to IHP assistance.... ”260 This improvement may be critical to ensuring disaster
survivors from Puerto Rico, and elsewhere, receive all of the assistance for which they are
eligible following future disasters. Congress may wish to monitor FEMA and the SBA’s progress
towards clarifying, simplifying, and streamlining the IHP/SBA application process.
Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program261
Through its Office of Disaster Assistance (ODA), the Small Business Administration (SBA) has
been a major source of assistance for the restoration of commerce and households in areas
stricken by natural and human-caused disasters since the agency’s creation in 1953. Through its
disaster loan program, the SBA offers low-interest, long-term loans for physical and economic
damages to businesses to help repair, rebuild, and recover from economic losses after a declared
disaster. The majority of the agency’s disaster loans (over 80%), however, are made to individuals

258 GAO, Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program,
GAO-20-503, September 2020, p. 36, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/709775.pdf (hereinafter GAO, Actions Needed
to Strengthen FEMA’s IHP).
259 GAO, Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s IHP, pp. 76-77.
260 GAO, Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s IHP, p. 42.
261 For more information on the SBA’s Disaster Loan program, contact Bruce R. Lindsay, Analyst in American
National Government.
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and households (renters and property owners) to help repair and replace homes and personal
property.262
SBA disaster loans for disaster-related losses include SBA Home Disaster Loans and SBA
Business Disaster Loans. Both loan categories were made available to Puerto Rico in response to
Hurricane María. The following sections describe the loans in more detail.263
SBA Home Disaster Loans
The SBA Disaster Loan Program provides two categories of home disaster loans: (1) Real
Property Disaster Loans; and (2) Personal Property Disaster Loans. Both loan categories have
interest rate ceilings that are statutorily set at 8% per annum, or 4% per annum if the applicant is
unable to obtain credit elsewhere, and have loan maturities up to 30 years.264
Real Property Disaster Loans
Real Property Disaster Loans provide creditworthy homeowners located in a declared disaster
area with up to $200,000 to repair or restore the homeowner’s primary residence to its pre-
disaster condition. The loans may not be used to upgrade a home or build additions to the home,
unless the upgrade or addition is required by city or county building codes. Secondary homes or
vacation properties are ineligible for Real Property Loans.
Personal Property Disaster Loans
Personal Property Disaster Loans provide creditworthy homeowners or renters located in a
declared disaster area with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property owned by the
disaster survivor. Personal Property Loans can be used to repair or replace clothing, furniture,
cars, or appliances damaged or destroyed in the disaster.
SBA Business Disaster Loans
The SBA Disaster Loan Program provides two categories of business disaster loans to eligible
small businesses: (1) Business Physical Disaster Loans; and (2) Economic Injury Disaster Loans
(EIDLs). Business Physical Disaster Loans have interest rate ceilings statutorily set at 8% per
annum or 4% per annum. EIDLs have interest rate ceilings statutorily set at 4% per annum. Both
loans have maturities up to 30 years.265 Eligible nonprofit organizations may also apply for
Business Physical Disaster loans and EIDLs. The loan terms are the same as those offered to
businesses.

262 SBA disaster loans can only be used for uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated damages.
263 For more information on the SBA Disaster Loan Program including its creation, see CRS Report R41309, The SBA
Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
264 In certain circumstances individuals and household can use grant assistance and an SBA Home Disaster Loan to
recover from a disaster provided they do not use the assistance for losses for which they have already been
compensated or may expect to be compensated. For more information see CRS Report R45238, FEMA and SBA
Disaster Assistance for Individuals and Households: Application Processes, Determinations, and Appeals, by Bruce R.
Lindsay and Elizabeth M. Webster.
265 For information on SBA size standards, see CRS Report R40860, Small Business Size Standards: A Historical
Analysis of Contemporary Issues, by Robert Jay Dilger.
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Business Physical Disaster Loans
Business Physical Disaster Loans provide up to $2 million to repair or replace damaged physical
property, including machinery, equipment, fixtures, inventory, and leasehold improvements that
are not covered by insurance.
Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs)
EIDLs provide up to $2 million to help meet financial obligations and operating expenses that
could have been met had the disaster not occurred. Loan proceeds can only be used for working
capital necessary to enable the business or organization to alleviate the specific economic injury
and to resume normal operations. Loan amounts for EIDLs are based on actual economic injury
and financial needs, regardless of whether the business suffered any property damage.
SBA Disaster Loans: 2017 Hurricanes
The SBA approved roughly $261 million in business disaster loans and $1.3 billion for home
disaster loans in response to Hurricane María (see Table 5 and Table 6). The number of loans that
were issued may be lower than the number of loan applications approved, because not all
approved loan applications are accepted by the borrower.
Table 5. SBA Business Disaster Loans
Hurricane María, 2017
Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Adjuntas
$1,488,500 Fajardo
$1,892,100 Naranjito
$4,299,100
Aguada
$2,122,000 Florida
$73,200 Orocovis
$1,425,900
Aguadil a
$2,578,900 Guánica
$665,300 Pattil as
$1,243,700
Aguas Buenas
$1,051,200 Guayama
$2,069,000 Peñuelas
$412,000
Aibonito
$974,600 Guayanil a
$2,200,500 Ponce
$8,295,100
Añasco
$777,900 Guaynabo
$6,513,100 Quebradil as
$825,400
Arecibo
$4,555,700 Guarabo
$3,665,600 Rincón
$881,200
Arroyo
$261,300 Hatil o
$1,902,000 Río Grande
$3,036,000
Barceloneta
$2,029,400 Hormigueros
$1,757,800 Sabana Grande
$54,600
Barranquitas
$1,653,800 Humacao
$7,746,200 Salinas
$693,800
Bayamón
$10,198,700 Isabela
$1,328,400 San Germán
$2,788,200
Cabo Rojo
$1,229,100 Jayuya
$626,800 San Juan
$61,069,300
Caguas
$21,206,100 Juana Díaz
$1,041,400 San Lorenzo
$1,798,300
Camuy
$755,700 Juncos
$2,139,300 San Sebastien
$976,300
Canóvanas
$6,757,900 Lajas
$136,800 Santa Isabel
$698,100
Carolina
$11,052,200 Lares
$523,600 Toa Alta
$1,657,100
Cataño
$591,100 Las Piedras
$582,300 Toa Baja
$5,417,400
Cayey
$3,751,100 Loíza
$818,100 Trujil o Alto
$2,292,900
Ceiba
$323,900 Luquil o
$3,490,200 Utuado
$5,023,700
Ciales
$597,700 Manatí
$2,538,400 Vega Alta
$1,274,700
Cidra
$4,406,200 Maunabo
$151,200 Vega Baja
$1,274,300
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Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Coama
$1,836,300 Mayagüez
$3,489,800 Vieques
$8,755,300
Comerío
$1,123,400 Moca
$458,400 Vil alba
$1,114,900
Corozal
$4,172,900 Morvis
$497,600 Yabucoa
$3,675,100
Culebra
$1,181,500 Naguabo
$3,986,400 Naranjito
$4,299,100
Dorado
$4,247,100 Fajardo
$1,892,100 Yauco
$413,100

Total
$260,613,200
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, Open Data Sources, SBA Disaster Loan Data FY2017,
https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-performance/open-government/digital-sba/open-data/open-data-sources.
Notes: Not all applicants accept approved loans. The SBA applies the term “County/Parish” to “municipios” in
their data. Puerto Rico’s municipios are the functioning equivalent to counties and parishes.
Table 6. SBA Home Disaster Loans
Hurricane María, 2017
Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Adjuntas
$5,464,100 Fajardo
$14,599,400 Naguabo
$15,443,200
Aguada
$10,569,200 Florida
$4,831,400 Naranjito
$21,035,400
Aguadil a
$10,546,600 Guánica
$3,805,500 Orocovis
$18,538,400
Aguas Buenas
$11,044,900 Guayama
$22,779,800 Patil as
$11,700,900
Aibonito
$17,674,600 Guayanil a
$3,797,800 Peñuelas
$4,572,500
Añasco
$7,730,900 Guaynabo
$31,081,700 Ponce
$36,529,400
Arecibo
$27,146,100 Gurabo
$23,691,100 Quebradil as
$2,604,500
Arroyo
$10,387,900 Hatil o
$6,988,300 Rincón
$1,915,500
Barceloneta
$11,151,700 Hormigueros
$2,228,200 Río Grande
$27,099,000
Barranquitas
$23,800,300 Humacao
$47,954,900 Sabana Grande
$2,231,000
Bayamón
$62,955,700 Isabela
$7,771,600 Salinas
$18,188,200
Cabo Rojo
$5,566,800 Jayuya
$5,763,200 San Germán
$3,287,100
Caguas
$51,730,200 Juana Díaz
$22,709,800 San Juan
$74,461,100
Camuy
$6,462,100 Juncos
$17,279,800 San Lorenzo
$11,231,300
Canóvanas
$27,833,900 Lajas
$2,260,000 San Sebastián
$6,427,800
Carolina
$56,444,000 Lares
$4,141,000 Santa Isabel
$8,896,300
Cataño
$5,726,500 Las Marías
$1,952,900 Toa Alta
$24,678,300
Cayey
$22,093,000 Las Piedras
$24,431,200 Toa Baja
$58,352,300
Ceiba
$7,113,200 Loíza
$8,768,300 Trujil o Alto
$20,491,200
Ciales
$11,342,100 Luquil o
$8,888,700 Utuado
$14,262,700
Cidra
$21,526,100 Manatí
$14,231,200 Vega Alta
$10,505,800
Coamo
$19,056,600 Maricao
$963,600 Vega Baja
$18,822,700
Comerío
$13,870,100 Maunabo
$9,948,400 Vieques
$5,694,300
Corozal
$14,007,700 Mayagüez
$11,240,500 Vil alba
$11,570,300
Culebra
$728,800 Moca
$5,469,900 Yabucoa
$21,779,900
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Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Dorado
$16,393,500 Morovis
$17,687,000 Yauco
$6,866,700

Total
$1,260,817,600
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, Open Data Sources, SBA Disaster Loan Data FY2017,
https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-performance/open-government/digital-sba/open-data/open-data-sources.
Notes: Not all applicants accept approved loans. The SBA applies the term “County/Parish” to “municipios” in
their data. Puerto Rico’s municipios are the functioning equivalent to counties and parishes.
SBA Disaster Loan Policy Considerations
Language Translation Services
According to a report issued by the SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG), Hurricane María
created an unprecedented demand for Spanish translation services. Prior to the storm, the SBA
contracted language translations services from one translation service company for several
years.266 The SBA, however, changed contractors and the new contract was issued on September
5, 2017. The new contractor began translation services nine days after Hurricane María struck
Puerto Rico, on September 29, 2017. The new translation service contractor could not handle the
call volume.267 According to the SBA Office of Disaster Assistance (ODA), managers and staff
estimated that some of the disaster loan applicants waited over 45 minutes for an interpreter or
experienced dropped calls. Upon reviewing the contracts, the SBA OIG noted they lacked a
performance standard for translator wait times and the SBA was unable to provide vendor
performance reports to the SBA OIG. In response to the OIG, SBA officials stated that the
contractors’ system limitations prevented the SBA from monitoring translation wait times. The
SBA OIG recommended that the SBA include performance standards for wait times in its
agreements.268
Congress could require the SBA to develop a performance standard for translation wait times and
develop a compatible system to monitor the wait times. Congress could also require the SBA to
provide a report to Congress detailing wait times for translations services.
Loan Processing Times
Reports issued by GAO and the SBA OIG on SBA loan processing times found that, despite
significant demand for SBA disaster assistance and challenges associated with translation
services, the SBA was able to meet its 45-day processing goal (see Table 7).269 With respect to the

266 SBA OIG, Inspection of SBA’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to Hurricane María, Report Number 18-19,
July 19, 2018, p. 5, https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/SBA-OIG-Report-18-19.pdf (hereinafter
SBA OIG, SBA’s Initial Response to Hurricane María).
267 SBA OIG, SBA’s Initial Response to Hurricane María, p. 5.
268 SBA OIG, SBA’s Initial Response to Hurricane María, p. 5. In an email correspondence with the SBA Office of
Congressional and Legislative Affairs on October 8, 2020, SBA stated it did not make any changes to the language in
the contract in response to the suggestions from the SBA OIG Inspection Report for Hurricane María. The SBA
indicated, however, that the contracts expire in February 2021, and that SBA is considering adding a performance
standard in the new contract for wait times.
269 See GAO, Disaster Loan Processing Was Timelier, but Planning Improvements and Pilot Program Evaluation
Needed, GAO-20-168, February 7, 2020, pp. 34-35, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-168 (hereinafter GAO,
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OIG’s findings, the SBA’s average disaster loan processing times for loans that were approved,
denied, or withdrawn was approximately 30 days. When computer generated declines were
included in the calculation, the overall average disaster loan processing time was roughly 27
days.270
SBA disaster loan processing times are a perennial concern for Congress. Although Congress
wants to provide assistance to disaster survivors as quickly as possible, providing the assistance
too quickly can lead to waste, fraud, and abuse. If Congress believes the SBA’s 45-day loan
processing goal is too long, it could investigate methods that might reduce loan-processing times.
Table 7. Hurricane María Loan Processing Times
As of March 30, 2018

All
Home
Business
EIDLa
Non Profitb
Total Number of

86,598
78,266
6,908
1,244
180
Applications Processed
Loan Processing With
Average
27
25
40
40
41
Auto- and Pre-LV Declinec
Processing Days
Loan Processing Without
Average
30
29
44
44
41
Auto- and Pre-LV Decline
Processing Days
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration: Office of Inspector General, Inspection of SBA’s Initial Disaster
Assistance Response to Hurricane María, “Table 1,” Report Number 18-19, July 19, 2018, pp. 8-9; recreated by
CRS.
Notes:
a. Economic Injury Disaster Loan.
b. Eligible nonprofit organizations may also apply for Business Physical Disaster loans and Economic Injury
Disaster Loans. The loan terms are the same as those offered to businesses.
c. Pre-LV = pre-loss verification.
HUD Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery
and—Mitigation271
The Community Development Block Grant program for disaster recovery (CDBG-DR) refers to
the deployment of Community Development Block Grant authorities to fund temporary programs
in response to emergency or disaster situations. In Puerto Rico, CDBG-DR funds have been
appropriated and allocated for disaster recovery purposes, such as long-term economic recovery
needs unmet by other federal resources, and to support long-term disaster mitigation through
infrastructure resiliency (which is referred to as CDBG-MIT).

Disaster Loan Processing Was Timelier); and SBA OIG, Inspection of SBA’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to
Hurricane María, Report Number 18-19, July 19, 2018, pp. 8-9.
270 The SBA application process is programed to decline applicants who do not meet certain criteria such as having a
minimum credit score or being a U.S. citizen.
271 For more information on HUD’s CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT programs, contact Michael H. Cecire, Analyst in
Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Development Policy, and Joseph V. Jaroscak, Analyst in Economic
Development Policy.
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Assistance Overview
CDBG Background
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) is the flagship community and economic
development program administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). CDBG was developed primarily to assist urban areas’ housing, infrastructure, and
community development needs, with a special emphasis on addressing the needs of low- and
moderate-income persons.272
CDBG is administered as two subprograms: (1) an entitlement cities program for municipalities
with populations of 50,000 or greater (or urban counties of 200,000 or greater); and (2) a state
program, which allows states to sub-award CDBG funds (usually competitively) to non-
entitlement communities.273 The entitlement cities program receives approximately 70% of
CDBG funds.274
In Puerto Rico, 27 municipios are considered entitlement communities,275 which received a
combined $33 million in conventional CDBG entitlement funding for FY2020, and $24 million in
non-entitlement funding.276 Puerto Rican entitlement communities received an additional $33
million in CDBG funds through multiple CARES Act programs, and $33 million in non-
entitlement funding.277 Unlike other territories or insular areas, Puerto Rico is treated as a state by
HUD for the purposes of the CDBG program.
The flexibility of the CDBG program provides grantees with the ability to use those funds to deal
with emergencies and disasters. Existing CDBG funds can be adapted to disaster recovery and
mitigation through: (1) planning for and obligating future funds in service of these objectives; or
(2) reprogramming existing funds by amending their consolidated plans in coordination with
HUD. CDBG funds may be allocated or reprogrammed to meet any eligible need, including post-
disaster recovery. However, although this is a feasible use of CDBG funds, CDBG grantees will
have often already planned or obligated preexisting CDBG allocations prior to the occurrence of a
disaster, limiting the use of those funds in recovery. HUD does allow CDBG grantees to
reprogram existing funds for other eligible uses, including disaster recovery, but this may be an
insufficient or impractical option for various localities, depending on the circumstances and scale
of the disaster.

272 For more information on CDBG, see CRS Report R43520, Community Development Block Grants and Related
Programs: A Primer, by Eugene Boyd.
273 See HUD, State Community Development Block Grant Program, accessed January 24, 2020,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-state/.
274 There are other CDBG components for insular and tribal entities that are beyond the scope of this report.
275 HUD, CDBG Contacts: Puerto Rico, accessed October 20, 2020, https://www.hud.gov/states/
puerto_rico_virgin_islands/community/cdbg.
276 HUD, CPD Program Formula Allocations and CARES Act Supplemental Funding for FY2020, current as of
September 25, 2020, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/budget/fy20.
277 For more information on CARES Act funding, see CRS Report R46449, Tallying Federal Funding for COVID-19:
In Brief, by William L. Painter, and for more information on
CDBG and CARES Act funding, see CRS Insight IN11315, Community Development Block Grants and the CARES
Act, by Joseph V. Jaroscak.
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CDBG-DR and Variants
In extraordinary circumstances, Congress has provided emergency supplemental appropriations
specifically for disaster recovery through CDBG authorities. This process has come to be known
as CDBG-DR.278 When appropriating CDBG-DR funds, Congress utilizes CDBG authorities to
create one or more temporary programs to flexibly respond to the unique circumstances,
geographies, and policy issues of the disaster. By extension, CDBG-DR programs are broadly
guided and administered by HUD through CDBG frameworks. A single CDBG-DR appropriation
or allocation can sometimes represent significantly greater funding compared to the conventional
CDBG program as a whole, which received $3.4 billion for FY2020. This is inclusive of
appropriations made as part of the normal budget cycle, and not in response to the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) emergency. In contrast, CDBG-DR appropriations to Puerto Rico
under P.L. 115-123, for example, totaled approximately $8.2 billion.279
CDBG-DR appropriations are broadly governed by the CDBG program’s statutory authority and
program administration. However, CDBG-DR activities differ in allocation, design, and
implementation based on the statutory direction provided in the supplemental appropriation act,
as well as the types of the disaster events in question, their severity, the characteristics of the
areas affected, and the unmet needs as determined by HUD. While the exact nature of any
CDBG-DR appropriation may vary to meet the unique needs of an incident, several common
themes have emerged in their purpose and design:
 typically, CDBG-DR provides significant additional funding to communities for
long-term disaster recovery needs, as opposed to immediate uses;
 CDBG-DR allocations are often tied to major disaster declarations (although this
is not an absolute requirement) and recovery funds for non-declared disasters
may be included in a CDBG-DR supplemental;
 CDBG-DR funds are regularly employed to cover grantees’ Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) cost share requirements,280 particularly in cases of
severe fiscal strain;281
 often, CDBG-DR is meant to cover “unmet needs” not already addressed by
FEMA and Small Business Administration (SBA) disbursements; and
 because of these considerations, CDBG-DR funds are usually the last to be
appropriated, allocated, and disbursed in response to the disaster.
In recent disaster supplemental appropriations acts, Congress has utilized other terms to describe
CDBG-DR-type packages to emphasize unique or special purposes. For example:

278 Although CDBG authorities for disaster relief have been used since the early 1990s, the term “CDBG-DR” has only
come into common usage over the past decade. Prior to that, CDBG-DR actions were broadly referred to as a variation
of the CDBG program, described as being for the purposes of disaster relief or recovery, with no single common term.
279 See Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 (Division B of the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, P.L. 115-123); see also U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 83
Federal Register 40314, August 14, 2018.
280 FEMA cost shares are based on language in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.), which defines the federal cost share to be 75%. The remaining 25% must be
matched with nonfederal funds. However, depending on the program and allocation, the exact cost share amount may
differ. See CRS Report R41101, FEMA Disaster Cost-Shares: Evolution and Analysis, by Natalie Keegan and
Elizabeth M. Webster.
281 CDBG-DR funds are being used for the HMGP cost shares in Puerto Rico; see the “Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program” section of this report for more information.
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 “CDBG-MIT” funds, developed as part of CDBG-DR appropriations for Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, encompasses supplemental funding designated
to increase broader infrastructure resiliency and mitigate the risk of future
hazards.
 During the COVID-19 pandemic, the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) provided
supplemental CDBG appropriations organized into three tranches as part of the
pandemic response. These appropriations are sometimes referred to as “CDBG-
CV.”
Despite these separate funding designations, all supplemental emergency appropriations that
make use of CDBG authorities could be considered CDBG-DR actions.
Assistance Provided
Following Hurricanes Irma and María, Congress passed three supplemental appropriations acts
that included a total of $35.4 billion in CDBG-DR assistance pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§5301 et
seq.:
1. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for
Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-56), on September 8, 2017;
2. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123 on February 9, 2018; and
3. Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-
20, on April 9, 2019.
HUD publishes rulemaking and allocations decisions for CDBG-DR appropriations in the
Federal Register. HUD has issued several Federal Register notices related to the above
supplemental appropriations:
 On February 9, 2018, HUD published a notice in the Federal Register
announcing the allocation of funds, rules, and alternative requirements governing
$7.4 billion in CDBG-DR funds appropriated under P.L. 115-56.282
 On August 14, 2018, HUD published another Federal Register notice allocating
funds and announcing rules and alternative arrangements governing $10.03
billion of the $28 billion in funds appropriated under P.L. 115-123. These funds
are to be used principally for the restoration of housing, infrastructure, and
economic revitalization.283
 Federal Register notices addressing rules for upgrading the electrical grids of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands had not been released by September
2020, although allocation amounts have been announced.
Table 8 provides a breakdown of the allocation of CDBG-DR directed to Puerto Rico under P.L.
115-56, P.L. 115-123, and P.L. 116-20 to address unmet needs and mitigation activities.284

282 HUD, “Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements for 2017 Disaster Community
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees,” 83 Federal Register 5844, February 9, 2018.
283 HUD, “Allocations, Common Application, Waivers and Alternative Requirements for Community Development
Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees,” 83 Federal Register 40314, August 14, 2018.
284 HUD defines unmet needs as the financial resources necessary to recover from a disaster that are not likely to be
addressed by other public or private sources of funds, including but not limited to private insurance, FEMA’s Stafford
Act assistance programs, Federal Highway Administration’s Emergency Relief Program, and Small Business
Administration Disaster Loans.
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Table 8. Allocation of CDBG-DR Funds Designated to Puerto Rico to Address
Unmet Needs and Mitigation Activities Related to Hurricanes Irma and María

P.L. 115-56
P.L. 115-123
P.L. 116-20
Total
Unmet Needs
$1,507,179,000
$10,153,130,000a
$277,853,230
$11,938,162,230
Mitigation
$0
$8,285,284,000
$0
$8,285,284,000
Total
$1,507,179,000 $18,438,414,000 $277,853,230
$20,223,446,230
Sources: HUD Federal Register Notice of February 9, 2018, and April 10, 2018, HUD Press Release.
a. This amount includes $1.9 bil ion for upgrades to Puerto Rico’s electrical grid.
Of the total amount provided in these three supplemental appropriations acts ($35.4 billion),285
Puerto Rico’s allocation was $20.2 billion.286 HUD approved Puerto Rico’s original action plan in
July 2018, and subsequent amendments have been approved. Puerto Rico’s planned activities
seek to address needs related to planning, housing, the economy, infrastructure, and multi-sector
coordination.287
CDBG–DR and –MIT Assistance Committed
According to a CDBG-DR grant report made public on March 1, 2020, Puerto Rico had expended
approximately $20.6 million in CDBG-DR funds.288 According to this report, all spending had
come from funds appropriated and allocated under P.L. 115-56, which focused on unmet disaster
recovery needs and did not include CDBG-MIT funding. The $20.6 million represents
approximately 0.1% of all the CDBG-DR funds appropriated for Puerto Rico (see Table 8).
Potential Issues with CDBG–DR and –MIT Assistance
It may take months, or even years in some cases, before CDBG-DR appropriations rules are
published, allocations are made, and funds are obligated. To some extent, this is by design, as
CDBG-DR is generally utilized to (1) address unmet needs not already addressed by other
private, local, state, and federal interventions; and (2) to provide a basis for long-term recovery,
as opposed to immediate relief. As such, various CDBG-DR appropriations are often enacted well
after the disaster event. For example, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), enacted
in February 2018, provided CDBG-DR funding in response to Hurricane María approximately
five months after the storm’s September 2017 impact.289 A Federal Register notice with HUD
advisories governing those funds was not published until August 2018. The vast majority of
CDBG-DR funding connected with Hurricanes Irma and María has yet to be obligated or
expended.

285 HUD, 83 Federal Register 4836, August 14, 2018; and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 85
Federal Register 4681, January 27, 2020.
286 For a list of all the Federal Register notices that have been issued on CDBG-DR funds for Puerto Rico, see
PRDOH, Federal Register, https://www.cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/resources/federal-register.
287 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3).
288 HUD, Monthly CDBG-DR Grant Financial Report, February 28, 2020, https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/
documents/CDBG-DR-Financial-Report-2020-03-01.pdf.
289 Similarly, for example, CDBG-DR funds were appropriated in P.L. 113-2 in late January 2013 in response to
Hurricane Sandy’s impact, which occurred in October 2012.
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At the end of 2019, Puerto Rico’s CDBG-DR allocation of approximately $8.3 billion for disaster
mitigation activities (CDBG-MIT)290 was subject to a publicized delay pending risk assessment
activities.291 Prior to the release of funds and publication of rules by HUD in January 2020, HUD
officials pointed to concerns about financial irregularities, corruption, and capacity in Puerto
Rico.292 However, some Members of Congress questioned HUD’s ability to process allocations
and publish rules in a timely manner.293 On January 27, 2020, HUD published rules governing
mitigation funds allocated to Puerto Rico.294
In March 2020, HUD’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released a report of findings from
its audit of the Puerto Rico Department of Housing’s (PRDOH’s) capacity to administer funds
under CDBG-DR.295
The audit assessed (1) PRDOH’s compliance with HUD regulations and requirements in
administering CDBG-DR funds, and (2) the existence of financial and procurement policies and
procedures consistent with federal requirements. Overall, the OIG report made several
recommendations regarding PRDOH’s administration of CDBG-DR funds during the audit period
of August 2014 through August 2019. The audit called on PRDOH to improve its financial
controls and capacity more generally.
Additionally, the OIG recommended that PRDOH be required to submit documentation of
compliance with procurement requirements pertaining to a nonstatistical sample of the $416,511
in expended CDBG-DR funds. In light of its findings, the OIG recommended that PRDOH return
$55,010 and cancel existing obligations on the remaining $361,501.
As described above, HUD engages in a rulemaking process after a CDBG-DR appropriation is
made to create a structure for the allocation and implementation of funds. However, given that
each CDBG-DR supplemental appropriation differs in its scope and activities—and at times
significantly so—the length and complexity of that process may vary widely. Issues of risk and
oversight are considered in the section “Considerations for Improving the Recovery Process.”

290 HUD, Community Development Block Grant Mitigation Program, accessed July 6, 2020,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-mit/.
291 Jessica Wehrman, “Report: Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure Failing as Federal Aid Remains on Hold,” Roll Call,
November 12, 2019, https://www.rollcall.com/2019/11/12/report-puerto-ricos-infrastructure-failing-as-federal-aid-
remains-on-hold/.
292 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Transportation, and
Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery Program, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 17, 2019,
https://appropriations.house.gov/events/hearings/oversight-hearing-the-department-of-housing-and-urban-development-
s-community.
293 House Committee on Appropriations, “Lowey, Price Statement on Long Overdue Disaster Funding for Puerto
Rico,” press release, January 15, 2020, https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/lowey-price-statement-on-
long-overdue-disaster-funding-for-puerto-rico.
294 HUD, “Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements for Community Development
Block Grant Mitigation Grantees; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Allocation,” 85 Federal Register 4676, January 27,
2020.
295 HUD Office of Inspector General, The Puerto Rico Department of Housing, San Juan, PR, Should Strengthen Its
Capacity to Administer Its Disaster Grants, March 16, 2020, https://www.hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/
puerto-rico-department-housing-san-juan-pr-should-strengthen-its.
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Insurance
Federal assistance programs that provide housing-related assistance are not intended to serve as
substitutes for insurance. For example, the FEMA Individuals and Households Program (IHP)
may be used to provide housing assistance to eligible individuals and households who, as a result
of a disaster, have uninsured or underinsured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be
otherwise met.296 However, the IHP cannot compensate disaster survivors for all losses and it is
not intended to make disaster survivors whole again.297 IHP assistance is intended to meet basic
needs—not to return primary residences or property to their pre-disaster condition. Unlike the
IHP, which provides assistance in the form of a grant, the SBA Disaster Loan Program may
provide loans to creditworthy homeowners located in a declared disaster area. Although the SBA
loans may support the repair or restoration of the homeowner’s primary residence to its pre-
disaster condition, the loans can only be used for uninsured or underinsured loss. Additionally,
SBA disaster loans cannot be used to upgrade a home or build additions to the home that are not
required by city or county building codes, nor are secondary homes or vacation properties eligible
for SBA loans. Thus, unlike federal assistance programs, insurance may be more effective at
making real and personal property owners whole again.
Homeowners’ insurance generally covers losses resulting from a wide array of hazards, including
some forms of natural catastrophes. Typically, homeowner insurance satisfies mortgage lender
requirements for the property to be covered by insurance for losses resulting from perils such as
fire, wind, and hail. Coverage for perils such as flood and earthquake, however, generally requires
the purchase of a separate policy for the specific peril, as insurers do not include these perils in
standard homeowners’ policies. Following the receipt of federal assistance through the IHP or
SBA Disaster Loan Program when the peril causing the damage was related to flooding,
recipients of assistance are required to insure against floods and must maintain flood insurance as
an eligibility requirement for future federal assistance.298
National Flood Insurance Program
Policyholders whose property has been mapped into a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)299 are
required to purchase flood insurance as a condition of receiving a federally backed mortgage.
Property owners or renters in the United States who wish to have flood coverage, whether or not
it is required, must purchase a separate flood insurance policy, either from a private insurance
company or through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
At the time that Hurricane María hit, there were about 40,000 private residential flood insurance
policies in Puerto Rico. In total, less than 4% of Puerto Rico’s housing units were covered by
flood insurance at the time of the 2017 hurricanes.300 Puerto Rico has participated in the NFIP

296 42 U.S.C. §5174; 44 C.F.R. §206.110(a); and FEMA, IAPPG, p. 6.
297 42 U.S.C. §5174; 44 C.F.R. §§206.110 et seq.; and FEMA, IAPPG, p. 6.
298 For example, if an applicant is eligible for IHP Home Repair, Home Replacement, or Personal Property Assistance
as a result of a flooding, they are required to purchase and maintain flood insurance as both a condition of the
assistance and in order to receive any future federal assistance for flood damage to any insurable property (note that
this applies only to real and personal property that is in or will be in a designated Special Flood Hazard Area and that
can be insured under the National Flood Insurance Program) (44 C.F.R. §206.110(k)(3) and 44 C.F.R. §206.113(b)(8)).
299 A Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) is defined by FEMA as an area with a 1% or greater risk of flooding every
year.
300 Carolyn Kousky and Brett Lingle, Residential Flood Insurance in Puerto Rico, Wharton Risk Management and
Decision Processes Center, Issue Brief, Philadelphia, PA, March 2018, https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
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since 1978; however, when Hurricane María made landfall in September 2017, there were only
5,744 NFIP policies in Puerto Rico, which represented an average penetration rate of 0.47%.301
This represents a 91% decrease in NFIP policy coverage in Puerto Rico from the maximum of
64,481 policies in 2007, with most policyholders leaving the NFIP between 2012 and 2015.302
This reduction has been attributed to private insurance companies beginning to offer flood
insurance policies bundled with vandalism coverage at lower prices than the NFIP.
The number of NFIP policies increased immediately after Hurricane María but decreased in the
following years, with 10,609 policies at the end of July 2018, 9,343 policies at the end of July
2019, and 7,701 policies as of July 31, 2020.
As of September 2020, the NFIP had closed all claims for Hurricane Irma with total net payments
of $119,972 to policyholders in Puerto Rico, with an average claim of $29,948.303 The NFIP has
closed 708 claims for María, with four open claims. Total payments for María came to
$27,375,634, with an average claim of $51,798.304 Additionally, 4,556 private flood insurance
claims resulted in payments of $25 million over 1,399 payouts,305 with $737.5 million paid in
homeowners’ insurance claims.306
Insurance Claims in Puerto Rico After the 2017 Hurricanes
Claims from Hurricane María have highlighted the issue of underfunded private insurers, and
particularly those with insufficient reserves or reinsurance to pay claims.307 An estimated $1.6
billion in insurance claims remain unresolved, particularly high-dollar claims filed for repairs of
public facilities, with only $6.9 billion of an estimated $8.5 billion in claims paid by February
2020.308 Two insurers went out of business after Hurricane María, and many of those that did not
collapse offered pennies on the dollar, leading to numerous lawsuits.309 The Office of the
Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico has issued fines of more than $2.4 million against at least

content/uploads/2018/03/WRCib2018_Flood-Insurance-in-Puerto-Rico.pdf.
301 FEMA describes NFIP penetration rates as the proportion of all properties with NFIP flood insurance. See, for
example, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Flood Insurance, GAO-14-297R, April 9, 2014, p. 6,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662438.pdf. The penetration rate for Puerto Rico was calculated by CRS using data
provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 13, 2020, by dividing the number of residential policies by the
number of residential structures.
302 Calculated by CRS using data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 13, 2020.
303 Data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, October 15, 2020.
304 Data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, October 15, 2020.
305 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5), p. 55.
306 PRDOH, Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds in Response to 2017
Hurricanes Irma and María, Amendment 2, August 16, 2019, p. 72, https://www.cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/download/action-
plan-amendment-2-non-substantial-amendment-effective-on-august-23-2019/?ind=1567102634209&filename=
PRDOH_AmendmentTwo_Non-SubstantialAmendment_EFFECTIVE082319.pdf&wpdmdl=4994&refresh=
5f5135e02b0f61599157728, https://www.cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/action-plan/ (hereinafter PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use
of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 2)).
307 “The Hidden Reason for the Lack of Insurance Payments After Hurricane María,” Centro de Periodismo
Investigativo, June 10, 2019, http://periodismoinvestigativo.com/2019/06/the-hidden-reason-for-the-lack-of-insurance-
payments-after-hurricane-Maria/.
308 Frances Robles and Patricia Mazzei, “After Disasters, Puerto Ricans Are Left with $1.6 Billion in Unpaid Insurance
Claims,” New York Times, February 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/puerto-rico-insurance-
tsunami.html (hereinafter Robles and Mazzei, “Puerto Ricans Are Left with $1.6 Billion in Unpaid Insurance Claims”).
309 Robles and Mazzei, “Puerto Ricans Are Left with $1.6 Billion in Unpaid Insurance Claims.”
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seven companies for delays in resolution and payment of claims.310 The Department of Consumer
Affairs sued 16 insurers on behalf of a putative class of insured consumers whose claims have not
been resolved as they had expected,311 and the Office of the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto
Rico sued those same 16 insurers.312 In November 2018, the Puerto Rican legislature passed six
laws intended to expand insurance coverage for the island’s policyholders and expedite payments
following disasters. Although these laws will not ensure that claims from the 2017 hurricanes are
paid, they apply to any claims associated with the 2019-2020 earthquakes.
Insurance Issues and Challenges
Take-up of Disaster Insurance
Although the number of NFIP policies in Puerto Rico increased immediately after the 2017
hurricanes, it has decreased in the years since, and Puerto Rico is still significantly underinsured
against floods.313 FEMA carried out an outreach campaign to increase the penetration rate of
flood insurance in Puerto Rico,314 but as of July 2020, there are only 7,701 NFIP policies.
Congress may wish to investigate the role that affordability has played in the low take-up rate of
NFIP insurance in Puerto Rico and the extent to which the migration to private flood insurance
could be attributed to pricing.
An insured flood victim is likely to recover more quickly and will generally receive more from
NFIP flood insurance than from FEMA Individual Assistance (IA). Homeowners can get up to
$350,000 for buildings and contents together, and renters are able to get up to $100,000 from an
NFIP policy,315 compared to a maximum of $36,000 (FY2021) per household from IA for repairs
and replacement of housing.316 In addition, most disaster victims do not receive the maximum

310 Danica Coto, “Insurers Under Scrutiny in Puerto Rico with 13,600 Hurricane María Claims Still Open,” Insurance
Journal, October 25, 2018, https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/10/25/505580.htm.
311 See Michael Pierluisi, as Secretary of the Department of Consumer Affairs et al. v. MAPFRE PRAICO Ins. Co. et
al., SJ2018CV07570, before the Court of First Instance, San Juan Judicial Region, Higher Court, at para. 38, p. 13.
Cited by Thais Passerieu, “Not Off the Hook... Trouble in Paradise for Puerto Rico Insurers,” JD Supra, February 22,
2019, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/not-off-the-hook-trouble-in-paradise-72007/.
312 Case SJ2018CV0016, before the Court of First Instance, San Juan Judicial Region, Higher Court. Cited by Thais
Passerieu, “Not Off the Hook... Trouble in Paradise for Puerto Rico Insurers,” JD Supra, February 22, 2019,
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/not-off-the-hook-trouble-in-paradise-72007/.
313 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5), pp. 54-55.
314 FloodSmart, Puerto Rico Outreach Campaign, https://agents.floodsmart.gov/marketing/participate-in-campaigns/
puerto-rico-outreach.
315 FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program: Flood Insurance Manual, 3. How to Write, October 2020, p. 3-34,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/fema_fim-3-how-to-write_04-2020-10-2020.pdf.
316 FEMA, “Notice of Maximum Amount of Assistance Under the Individuals and Households Program,” 85 Federal
Register 69340, November 2, 2020. Prior to the enactment of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA;
Division D of P.L. 115-254), there was a cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance an individual or
household could receive. Financial assistance provided for both housing assistance and Other Needs Assistance (ONA)
combined to count towards the cap. DRRA Section 1212 both separated the cap on the maximum amount of financial
assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA, and also made changes to
the types of assistance that count towards the new caps. Thus, post-DRRA, financial assistance for housing-related
needs may not exceed $36,000 (FY2021; adjusted annually), and separate from that, financial assistance for ONA may
not exceed $36,000 (FY2021; adjusted annually). Additionally, DRRA Section 1212 removed financial assistance to
rent alternate housing accommodations from the financial housing assistance cap, and created an exception for
accessibility-related costs so they do not count towards either the financial housing assistance cap or the ONA cap.
Thus, households can receive a total of $72,000 from FEMA Individual Assistance through the Individuals and
Households Program.
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amount available under FEMA disaster assistance. For example, the average NFIP residential
claim in Puerto Rico for Hurricane María was $61,581,317 whereas the average IA payment was
$2,812.318
Information on private flood insurance take-up rates is not readily available. No up-to-date
information is available on the total amount of claims paid by private flood insurance companies,
nor is there any information about private flood insurance coverage amounts or whether the
coverage is as broad as that of the NFIP. Any requirements by lenders for homeowners to have
wind or earthquake insurance as a condition of a mortgage are not likely to have a significant
impact on insurance take-up, as there are only slightly more than 500,000 active mortgages in
Puerto Rico.319 Private insurers may choose to withdraw from the residential flood market due to
losses from the 2017 hurricanes, or to increase premiums for flood coverage. However,
households and businesses are able to buy flood insurance from the NFIP, and commercial flood
insurance is still available.320 According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
private companies wrote $21.66 million in premiums in 2018, compared to $7.64 million written
by the NFIP. Private flood insurance coverage increased 11% in Puerto Rico between 2016 and
2018, with $19.44 million in premiums in 2016 and $19.55 million in 2017. These figures do not
distinguish between residential and commercial insurance.321
Enforcement of Insurance Requirements
The low take-up rate for flood insurance in Puerto Rico has implications for future federal
disaster assistance. Properties in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) are required to obtain and
maintain flood insurance as a condition of receiving future disaster assistance for a flood event.322
Compliance is required in order to receive support from FEMA Public Assistance and Individual
Assistance, the SBA Disaster Loan Program, and HUD CDBG-DR.323
Some evidence indicates that enforcement of these requirements could be improved. For example,
the GAO reviewed the SBA’s response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and María. They found that
applicants for SBA disaster loans experienced difficulty in producing required documentation,
such as insurance policies, because of extensive physical damage and power issues, with
particular problems associated with flood insurance.324 In addition, as discussed earlier in this
report,325 the DHS Office of the Inspector General has expressed repeated concerns about
FEMA’s enforcement of the disaster insurance requirements for Public Assistance. Congress may

317 Data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 10, 2020.
318 Calculated by CRS from FEMA data at https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4339, accessed September 2, 2020.
319 Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, Puerto Rico Without Insurance: An Island in Turmoil, 2018,
http://www.pciaa.net/docs/default-source/industry-issues/7_puertorico.pdf.
320 See, for example, Mapfre Puerto Rico, Flood Insurance, https://www.mapfre.pr/insurance-pr/business-insurance/
property-contingency/flood/.
321 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Actions for State Regulators in Building the Private Flood
Insurance Market, December 9, 2019, pp. 7-11, https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/
ConsiderationsofPrivateFlood_Final%20%28reduced%29.pdf.
322 For Individual Assistance, see 44 C.F.R. §206.110(k)(3), and 13 C.F.R. §120.170 for SBA Disaster Loans.
323 See, for example, CRS Report R44808, Federal Disaster Assistance: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Other Federal Disaster Assistance Programs Available to Individuals and Households After a Flood.
324 GAO, Disaster Loan Processing Was Timelier, pp. 44-46.
325 For more information on insurance and the FEMA Public Assistance program, see the “Insurance for FEMA Public
Assistance Projects” section.
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wish to have the GAO report specifically on enforcement of disaster assistance requirements in
Puerto Rico in order to identify their particular challenges.
The Future of Recovery in Puerto Rico and
Considerations for Congress
Puerto Rico is entering its fourth year of recovery from Hurricanes Irma and María, as it
concurrently deals with ongoing earthquakes and a global pandemic. Puerto Rico’s recovery has
faced considerable challenges and delays. For example, as noted above, two years after the
hurricanes made landfall, FEMA reported that only 19 out of 9,344 identified damaged worksites
(0.2% of the total) eligible for FEMA’s Public Assistance (PA) program had finalized cost
estimates required for restoration (see section on “FEMA Public Assistance”).326 Additionally, the
Government of Puerto Rico and U.S. congressional staff have found that PA Applicants have
sometimes lacked capital needed to begin or advance PA projects before receiving
reimbursement, resulting in substantial response and recovery delays.327 Congress has expressed
significant interest in these challenges and delays, and committees in both chambers have
conducted hearings on different aspects of Puerto Rico’s recovery.328 GAO has additionally
authored multiple reports focused exclusively or substantially on Puerto Rico’s recovery.329 The
following sections address select issues that may challenge or delay Puerto Rico’s disaster
recovery efforts, and include considerations for Congress.
(Appendix A to this report provides specific information on the earthquakes that began in 2019
and the assistance that has been provided through FEMA and the SBA. Considerations related to
the future of recovery, including as related to the earthquakes, are included in this section.)
In addition to the considerations described below, Puerto Rico’s recovery from future incidents
may also be affected by:
 Puerto Rico’s political status (more information on this topic may be found in
CRS Report R44721, Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and
Recent Developments for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett) and the potential effects
of the 2020 vote by Puerto Ricans in favor of U.S. statehood via a nonbinding
referendum;330

326 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 22.
327 Government of Puerto Rico, 2020 Fiscal Plan, pp. 28-29; and House Oversight Committee, Recurring Problems,
pp. 28-29.
328 See, for example, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery; U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Emergency Response and Recovery: Central Takeaways from the Unprecedented
Hurricane Season, hearing, 115th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 2, 2017, H.Hrg. 115-29 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2017); House
Homeland Security Subcommittee, Disaster Recoveries; and House Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric
Infrastructure; U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and
Recovery, Hearing on Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands Hurricane Recovery, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 2019.
329 See, for example, GAO, FEMA Actions, p. 18; GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires; GAO, FEMA’s Efforts, pp.
19-20; and GAO, 2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support for Electricity Grid Restoration in the U.S. Virgin Islands
and Puerto Rico, GAO-19-296, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/698626.pdf.
330 See Abdiel Santiago, Alexander Kustov and Ali A. Valenzuela, “Puerto Ricans Voted to Become the 51st U.S.
State—Again,” Washington Post, November 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/13/puerto-
ricans-voted-become-51st-us-state-again/; and Zack Budryk, “Puerto Rico Votes in Favor of US Statehood,” The Hill,
November 5, 2020, https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/524590-puerto-rico-votes-in-favor-of-us-statehood.
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 changes in Puerto Rico’s leadership (there have been several changes in
leadership since the 2017 hurricane season. Former-Governor Ricardo Rosselló
Nevares resigned in 2019, and in 2020, current-Governor Wanda Vázquez
Garced lost her party’s primary and Governor-elect Pedro Rafael Pierluisi Urrutia
won the majority of votes to become the next Governor of Puerto Rico.331 There
have also been changes in Cabinet-level positions. For example, the current
Puerto Rico Secretary of the Housing Department, Luis C. Fernández Trinchet,
replaced former-Secretary Fernando Gil-Enseñat332);
 changes in the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico’s
membership (some Board Members have stepped down, and new Board
Members have been appointed by President Donald J. Trump);333 and
 the ongoing debt restructuring proceedings under Title III of the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187)
(more information on this topic may be found in CRS Report R44532, The
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA;
H.R. 5278, S. 2328), coordinated by D. Andrew Austin).
Challenges to Delivering Disaster Assistance in Puerto Rico
The following sections describe major challenges to delivering disaster assistance in Puerto Rico,
including the condition of Puerto Rico’s critical infrastructure prior to the 2017 hurricanes, Puerto
Rico’s vulnerability to multiple hazards (including hurricanes and earthquakes), insufficient
insurance coverage, the consecutive disasters that compounded the challenges of recovering from
the 2017 hurricanes, design standards and building codes, and its location outside the continental
United States.

331 Patricia Mazzei and Frances Robles, “Ricardo Rosselló, Puerto Rico’s Governor, Resigns After Protests,” New York
Times, July 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/us/rossello-puerto-rico-governor-resigns.html; Dánica
Coto, “Puerto Rico Governor Loses Primary of Pro-statehood Party,” Associated Press, August 16, 2020,
https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-election-2020-caribbean-ap-top-news-puerto-rico-
ed440d53d3d565f9320305dc0739803c; and Dánica Coto, “Pedro Pierluisi Wins Gubernatorial Race in Puerto Rico,”
Associated Press, November 7, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/puerto-rico-general-elections-elections-latin-america-
pedro-pierluisi-12defbcc08b4e5dbd53940c18ba87ff7.
332 Governor Wanda Vázquez Garced removed Fernando Gil-Enseñat and replaced him with Luis C. Fernández
Trinchet (Rafael Romo and Christina Maxouris, “Puerto Rico Governor Fires 2 More Cabinet Members After the
Discovery of Hurricane Maria Supplies Stacked in a Warehouse,” CNN, January 19, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/
01/19/us/puerto-rico-governor-fires-secretaries-housing-and-family-services/index.html; and La Fortaleza, Oficina De
La Gobernadora, “Governor announces appointment of Secretary of Housing,” press release, January 28, 2020,
https://www.fortaleza.pr.gov/content/gobernadora-anuncia-nombramiento-del-secretario-de-la-vivienda).
333 For example, in October 2020, Judge Arthur J. González announced that he was stepping down (Financial Oversight
and Management Board for Puerto Rico, “Oversight Board Member Arthur J. González Steps Down: Judge González
Served on the Board for More Than Four Years,” press release, October 8, 2020, https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1Rom659PB0wV5-l4upbCkDW67-830VakO/view), and Justin Peterson was appointed by President Donald J. Trump
(Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, “Peterson Ready to Work Alongside Fellow Members of
the Oversight Board,” press release, October 9, 2020, https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1nKA3iHxktz1v30hNzDgP_vYcI0e-SOUX/view). Links to the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto
Rico’s press releases and statements can be found at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/press/. The Financial Oversight and
Management Board for Puerto Rico was established under Title 1 of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187), and is “tasked with working with the people and Government of
Puerto Rico to create the necessary foundation for economic growth and to restore opportunity to the people of Puerto
Rico” (Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, “About Us,” https://oversightboard.pr.gov/about-
us/).
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Pre-Disaster Condition of Critical Infrastructure
Prior to the arrival of the 2017 hurricanes, critical components of Puerto Rico’s infrastructure had
deteriorated due to insufficient investment.334 Damage to the island’s vulnerable electrical grid
resulted in power outages that persisted for eleven months in some areas, limiting the
functionality of communications, healthcare, water, and transportation systems.335 FEMA has
attributed response delays and challenges to the persistent inoperability of critical infrastructure,
including the need for the longest sustained air mission of food and water in FEMA history, and
the inability to determine whether damage resulted from disaster or disrepair.336
Puerto Rico’s Vulnerability to Multiple Hazards
Puerto Rico’s geographical location and topography put it at risk of multiple natural hazards,
including hurricanes, floods, landslides, earthquakes, and tsunami. Puerto Rico is located at the
intersection of the North American and Caribbean tectonic plates. Two fault systems cross the
island in a roughly east-west direction, with the southwest tip of the island most commonly
affected.337
Settlement patterns have increased Puerto Rico’s vulnerability to hazards. Evidence of informal
construction,338 or construction without a permit, is common throughout Puerto Rico. The
prevalence of informal housing may be attributed to economic considerations, lack of code
enforcement, or tolerance for unregulated construction of smaller structures.339 Although there is
no reliable public record of informally constructed housing units, a housing study commissioned
by the Puerto Rico Home Builders Association estimated that 55% of the existing housing units in
Puerto Rico were built informally,340 without the use of an architect or engineer, or proper
permits, and often in non-conformance with land-use codes.
In general, informally constructed homes often perform poorly in a disaster.341 The FEMA
Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT), which reported on building performance in Puerto Rico

334 See American Society of Civil Engineers, “2019 Report Card for Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure,” pp. 8-11,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/2019-Puerto-Rico-Report-Card-Final.pdf; GAO,
Federal Support for Electricity Grid Restoration pp. 4-5, 19; Thaddeus R. Miller et al., “Rethinking Infrastructure in an
Era of Unprecedented Weather Events, Issues in Science and Technology, vol. 34, no. 2 (Winter 2018), pp. 46-58.
335 GAO, Federal Support for Electricity Grid Restoration, p. 1. For a background and overview of the issues facing
electrical power reconstruction in Puerto Rico, see CRS Report R45023, Repair or Rebuild: Options for Electric Power
in Puerto Rico, by Richard J. Campbell, Corrie E. Clark, and D. Andrew Austin.
336 FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report, July 12, 2018, pp. ii; v; 7-8, https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-action-report_2017.pdf.
337 USGS, “M 6.4 - 13km S of Indios, Puerto Rico: Tectonic Summary,” https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/
eventpage/us70006vll/executive.
338 Informal settlements are defined as areas where groups of housing units have been constructed on land that the
occupants have no legal claim to or occupy illegally, or unplanned settlements and areas where housing is not in
compliance with current planning and building regulations. See HUD, Housing Damage Assessment and Recovery
Strategies Report for Puerto Rico, June 29, 2018, p. 37, http://spp-pr.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/07/
HUD-Housing-Damage-Assessment-Recovery-Strategies-6-29-18.pdf (hereinafter HUD, Housing Damage Assessment
and Recovery Strategies).
339 Eduardo Miranda et al., Puerto Rico M6.4 Earthquake, 7 January 2020, Structural Extreme Events Reconnaissance,
Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report PRJ-2670, January 10, 2020, p. 6, https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/338528208_StEER_-_7_JAN_2020_PUERTO_RICO_Mw_64_EARTHQUAKE_PRELIMINARY_
VIRTUAL_RECONNAISSANCE_REPORT_PVRR.
340 HUD, Housing Damage Assessment and Recovery Strategies, p. 37.
341 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Report. Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico. Building Performance
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after Hurricanes Irma and María, observed a high count of damaged residences that were not
compliant with the current building code.
Puerto Rico adopted the most recent international building code standards in November 2018.342
However, the implementation of building code depends on local enforcement during the
permitting and inspection processes.343 While the federal government cannot enforce this,
Congress may wish to require oversight of local enforcement.
Insufficient Insurance Coverage
Insurance against natural disasters can serve as a financial incentive for safer construction and
encouraging businesses and homes to build in safer locations. There is evidence that insurance
can increase resilience to natural hazards more effectively than disaster aid after the event, and
insured disaster victims are likely to recover more quickly.344 FEMA disaster assistance is
intended to supplement, but not substitute for, insurance coverage. Insured households and
businesses are less likely to rely on federal disaster assistance to help finance repairs and
rebuilding, which has the potential to reduce the amount of federal assistance required after a
disaster. For example, according to FEMA, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) saves
the nation an estimated $1.87 billion annually in avoided flood losses.345
Low-probability, high-cost events, such as floods and earthquakes, can cause substantial financial
loss but are difficult to predict reliably. As such, they are generally excluded from standard
insurance policies, which cover standard perils, such as fire, windstorms, hail, and theft. Property
owners must purchase a separate earthquake insurance policy and a flood insurance policy. The
latter can be obtained from either a private insurance company or through the NFIP.
When Hurricane María made landfall in September 2017, less than 4% of Puerto Rico’s housing
units were covered by NFIP and private flood insurance.346 Wind damage, including hurricane
winds, is generally covered in standard homeowners’ policies. However, it is estimated that only
about half of homeowners in Puerto Rico have homeowners’ insurance (for more information, see
the “Insurance” section).347

Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance, FEMA P-2020, October 31, 2018, pp. 1-7,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/mat-report_hurricane-irma-maria-puerto-rico_2.pdf (hereinafter
FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Report. Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and Technical
Guidance).
342 See Appendix C for more information on building codes.
343 Ellen Vaughan and Jim Turner, The Value and Impact of Building Codes, 2014, pp. 1-27,
http://www.coalition4safety.org/ccsc-toolkit/.
344 Swenja Surminski et al., “Reflections on the Current Debate on How to Link Flood Insurance and Disaster Risk
Reduction in the European Union,” Natural Hazards, vol. 79, no. 3 (December 2015), pp. 1451-1479.
345 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 2, 2019.
346 Carolyn Kousky and Brett Lingle, Residential Flood Insurance in Puerto Rico, Wharton Risk Management and
Decision Processes Center, Issue Brief, Philadelphia, PA, March 2018, https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/WRCib2018_Flood-Insurance-in-Puerto-Rico.pdf.
347 Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, Puerto Rico Without Insurance: An Island in Turmoil, 2018,
http://www.pciaa.net/docs/default-source/industry-issues/7_puertorico.pdf. Individuals and households applying for
assistance through the Individuals and Households Program were required to inform FEMA of insurance coverage
available to meet their disaster-caused needs, and “applicants who live in a designated SFHA [Special Flood Hazard
Area] and receive disaster assistance for Home Repair, Replacement, PHC, or Personal Property [are required] to
obtain and maintain flood insurance coverage for at least the amount of disaster assistance they receive from FEMA for
flood-insurable items” (FEMA, Individuals and Households Program Unified Guidance (IHPUG), FP 104-009-03,
September 2016, pp. 14 and 23, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1483567080828-
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Consecutive Disasters Complicate Response and Recovery Efforts
The consecutive nature of the 2017 hurricanes, ongoing 2019-2020 earthquakes, and the COVID-
19 pandemic have complicated response and recovery for each incident. For example, FEMA’s
PA program is generally designed to assist with response and recovery for a single, discrete
incident. Post-disaster damage assessments attribute damage to a specific incident, and grants are
awarded based on these assessments. However, in some cases, the damage caused by an earlier
event, combined with incomplete restoration, can significantly affect the performance of a
structure or infrastructural system under subsequent hazards. Damaged facilities and open
construction sites may also be more vulnerable to subsequent hazards, compounding losses from
subsequent disasters.348 For example, Puerto Rico’s hurricane-damaged electrical grid was further
impacted by the earthquake swarm, which debilitated a critical power plant349 and significantly
expanded the scope of work required to construct a resilient system.350
The 2019-2020 earthquakes highlighted the challenges of building structures that can resist
damage from wind, flood, and seismic activity. Construction activities that address flood risk,
such as elevating a property, typically do not account for seismic activity and may increase
vulnerability during an earthquake. Such problems are exacerbated by the informal construction
process, which may not conform to building codes. It is unclear if informally-constructed
buildings are treated differently by FEMA with respect to eligibility for funding, or whether
FEMA has established guidelines for repair and reconstruction of informally-constructed
buildings.
Some scholarly and industry reports have also found that the hurricanes increased the
vulnerability of Puerto Rico’s population to health hazards.351 For example, physical damages to
Puerto Rico’s health care infrastructure hampered access to and delivery of healthcare in some
cases.352 The diminished capacity of Puerto Rico’s healthcare system may have exacerbated the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.353

1201b6eebf9fbbd7c8a070fddb308971/FEMAIHPUG_CoverEdit_December2016.pdf).
348 Ehsan Fereshtehnehjad and Abdollah Shafieezadeh, “A Multi-Type Multi-Occurrence Hazard Lifecycle Cost
Analysis Framework for Infrastructure Management Decision Making,” Engineering Structures, vol. 167 (July 15,
2018), pp. 504-517. Marleen C. de Ruiter et al., “Why We Can No Longer Ignore Consecutive Disasters,” Earth’s
Future, vol. 8, no. 3 (January 6, 2020), pp. 9-10.
349 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Puerto Rico’s Electricity Generation Mix Changed Following early 2020
Earthquakes,” June 24, 2020, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44216.
350 Patricia Mazzei, Ivan Penn, and Frances Robles “With Earthquakes and Storms, Puerto Rico’s Power Grid Can’t
Catch a Break,” New York Times, January 10, 2020; Peter Maloney, “How PREPA Brought Earthquake-Damaged Plant
Online Ahead of Isaias,” American Public Power Association, August 24, 2020.
351 Deborah S.K. Thomas, Sojin Jang, and Jean Scandlyn, “The CHASMS Conceptual Model of Cascading Disasters
and Social Vulnerability: The COVID-19 Case Example,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, vol. 51,
December 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7467012/ (hereinafter Thomas, Jang, and Scandlyn,
“The CHASMS Conceptual Model”); Cornelia Hall et al., “One Year After the Storms: Recovery and Health Care in
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,” September 19, 2018, https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/one-year-
after-the-storms-recovery-and-health-care-in-puerto-rico-and-the-u-s-virgin-islands/ (hereinafter Cornelia Hall et al.
“One Year after the Storms”).
352 Thomas, Jang, and Scandlyn, “The CHASMS Conceptual Model”; Cornelia Hall et al. “One Year After the
Storms”; and EA Irvin-Barnwell et al., “Evaluating Disaster Damages and Operational Status of Health Care Facilities
during the Emergency Response Phase of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico,” Disaster Med Public Health Prep, vol. 14,
no. 1, August 2020, pp. 80-88.
353 Thomas, Jang, and Scandlyn, “The CHASMS Conceptual Model.”
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Design Standards and Building Codes
FEMA’s current strategic plan states that disaster resilience starts with building codes.354 The
adoption and enforcement of stronger building codes can be effective in reducing losses,
protecting lives and property, and increasing the resiliency of communities after a disaster. The
Multihazard Mitigation Council (MMC) of the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS)355
produced a series of reports to assess future savings from mitigation activities. They found that,
on average, society saves $6 for every dollar spent through major federal mitigation grants, and
saves $4 for every dollar spent on investments to exceed building code requirements.356
Overall compliance with
Defining Design Standards and Building Codes
the most recent building

codes (i.e., the 2018
Design standards and building codes are technical guidelines that promote the
edition of the I-Codes)
design, construction, alteration, and maintenance of structures. They specify the
must be enforced by
minimum requirements to safeguard the health, safety, and general welfare of
the occupants of new and existing buildings, and are general y developed by
Puerto Rico (local
organizations, such as professional engineering societies, or committees or
jurisdictions are
councils consisting of recognized trade professionals.
responsible for building

code adoption and
A design standard is a specified criterion or standard that dictates that a
enforcement and local
provision, practice, requirement, or limit be met (e.g., the use of the 1% annual-
building officials are
chance-flood or the degree of protection of a structural project).
responsible for enforcing

the latest building codes
Building codes are officially adopted comprehensive specifications regulating
within their
building construction, materials, and performance to protect the public health,
jurisdiction).357 Several
safety, and welfare. Building codes may reference more than one design
standard.
bodies govern building
and development in Puerto

Rico. The Puerto Rico
Sources: James M. Wright, Regulatory and Design Standards for Reducing
Losses, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Floodplain Management:
Planning Board (PRPB)
Principles and Current Practices, 2007, p. 13-1, https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/
guides development. The
docs/fmc/chapter%2013%20-%20
Permits Management
regulatory%20and%20design%20standards%20for%20reducing%20lo.pdf; and
Office (OGPe) administers
FEMA, Glossary, Building Codes Toolkit, February 7, 2013, p. 1,
building permits and
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1903-25045-7477/
building_codes_toolkit_glossary.pdf.
enforces regulations on

354 FEMA, 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, p. 14, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/fema-strategic-
plan_2018-2022.pdf.
355 The National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization that brings
government and the private sector to focus on problems and potential problems that hamper the construction of safe and
affordable structures and support advances in building science and technology to improve the built environment. See
https://www.nibs.org/ for further information.
356 Multihazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019
Report, Washington, DC, https://www.nibs.org/page/reports.
357 The most commonly used building codes are developed by the International Code Council (ICC), a non-profit
organization that was formed to develop national model construction codes (for further information, see
https://www.iccsafe.org/). These are known as International Codes or I-Codes, which are updated every three years.
They are referred to as model codes (GAO, Climate Change: Improved Federal Coordination Could Facilitate
Forward-Looking Climate Information in Design Standards, Building Codes, and Certifications, GAO-17-3,
November 2016, p. 2, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-3). The ICC’s family of I-Codes includes the
International Building Code (IBC), which applies to almost all types of new buildings and some existing buildings. For
more information on building codes, see Appendix C.
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licensing, inspections, certification, and land use planning. Autonomous municipios across Puerto
Rico also may be granted degrees of fiscal autonomy and self-government if they meet certain
requirements.358 At the time of the 2017 hurricanes, the PRPB employed 11 code compliance
officers, who were responsible for compliance inspections throughout Puerto Rico.359 At that
time, OGPe had 13 inspectors assigned to construction permits and 12 to uses permits, and the
International Code Council (ICC) listed three ICC-certified individuals in Puerto Rico.360
According to FEMA, 39 staff have been hired, with more hires planned.361
The 2011 Puerto Rico Building Code (PRBC) was the building code in force for residential and
commercial structures at the time of the 2017 hurricanes. In November 2018, Puerto Rico adopted
the 2018 ICC family of I-Codes, and enacted legislation that directed the Construction Codes
Review Committee362 to revise Puerto Rico building codes on a three-year cycle.363
FEMA’s guidelines require that damage assessment associated with the 2019-2020 earthquakes in
Puerto Rico must use the latest published earthquake building codes for projects funded by Public
Assistance. Puerto Rico may choose whether or not to require use of the most recent standards for
repairs of damage from the 2017 hurricanes.364 However, these requirements only apply to Public
Assistance; Congress may wish to require comparable requirements for repair and rebuilding
funded by other federal programs.
Puerto Rico’s Location Outside of the Continental United States
The location of Puerto Rico—separated from the response and recovery resources available in the
continental United States—was cited by FEMA and the GAO as a logistical challenge with regard
to deploying federal resources and personnel to Puerto Rico.365 Following Hurricanes Irma and
María, FEMA identified the need to build its capability to stage and expedite delivery of critical
commodities to disaster survivors.366 FEMA has taken steps to increase its logistics capabilities in
the Caribbean, including by increasing its commodities supplies of meals and water, emergency

358 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Compendium Report. 2017 Hurricane Season: Building Performance
Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance., FEMA P-2054, September 30, 2019, pp. 2-7 to 2-9,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/mat-report_2017-hurricane-season.pdf.
359 FEMA, New Building Codes Support Puerto Rico in Building Back Stronger, News Release 316, January 2, 2019.
360 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Compendium Report. 2017 Hurricane Season: Building Performance
Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance, FEMA P-2054, September 30, 2019, p. 2-7,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/mat-report_2017-hurricane-season.pdf.
361 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, September 14, 2020.
362 The Construction Codes Committee was established in 2017, and is comprised of representatives from the
Construction Council of Puerto Rico, regulatory government agencies, and FEMA. The committee was responsible for
the review and transition from the 2011 to 2018 building codes. See Juan Nieves, Puerto Rico’s New Building Codes
Are Creating a More Resilient Island, https://www.dewberry.com/news/blog/post/blog/2019/06/27/puerto-ricos-new-
building-codes-are-creating-a-more-resilient-island.
363 Law 2018-109. This refers to Puerto Rico law number 109, which passed in 2018.
364 See the section on “Building Code Compliance for Recipients of Public Assistance” in this report.
365 GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires, p. 29.
366 FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report, July 12, 2018, pp. 31-32, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1533643262195-6d1398339449ca85942538a1249d2ae9/2017FEMAHurricaneAARv20180730.pdf
(hereinafter FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season AAR). In a hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, FEMA described actions taken by the agency to facilitate the movement of resources, including via
airlifts (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Emergency Response and Recovery:
Central Takeaways from the Unprecedented 2017 Hurricane Season, 115th Cong., 1st sess., November 2, 2017, H.Rept.
115-29, p. 136).
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generators, and other critical supplies.367 FEMA also updated priority national-level contracts,
including the National Evacuation Contract, Caribbean Transportation Contract, and National
Ambulance Contract.368
With regard to deploying personnel, future disasters may continue to challenge the ability of
federal agencies to deploy staff to Puerto Rico because of the reliance on commercial travel
options and roadways. For example, the GAO noted that the deployment of personnel to Puerto
Rico was challenged by limits on commercial air travel caused by power outages. Destruction of
major transportation routes and infrastructure, such as bridges, further limited intra-island travel,
which meant commodities and personnel had to be brought in by helicopter.369
Causes for Delays in the Provision of Federal Assistance to Puerto
Rico
Members of Congress have raised concerns related to delays and impediments in the delivery of
federal assistance in Puerto Rico. Many of these concerns are discussed previously, and include
but are not limited to:
 inequities in the deployment of federal personnel to Puerto Rico and the delivery
of Public Assistance, including the initial requirement to use Public Assistance
Alternative Procedures for all large permanent work projects;370
 delayed, partial, or improper federal payments and reimbursements;371
 cancelled, disputed, improper, or noncompliant federal and local contracts for
disaster recovery work;372 and
 pre-disaster issues with Applicants’ management of facilities and infrastructure
systems;373

367 FEMA includes information on its inventory of commodities in Puerto Rico and states that the information is
updated monthly. See FEMA, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” accessed September 3, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/
fact-sheet/hurricane-maria-numbers.
368 FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season AAR, p. 49. The shipping limitations imposed by the Jones Act presented additional
challenges. For further information, see CRS Insight IN10790, Waivers of Jones Act Shipping Requirements, by John
Frittelli.
369 GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires, p. 30.
370 See, for example, testimony by Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard and FEMA then-Deputy Administrator Peter Gaynor,
House Homeland Security Subcommittee, Disaster Recoveries pp. 28-29; Rep. Bennie Thompson, U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Homeland Security, Preparedness, Response, and Rebuilding: Lessons from the 2017 Disasters,
hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., March 15, 2018 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Lessons from the
2017 Disasters); Senators Robert Menendez, Sherrod Brown, Elizabeth Warren, and Catherine Cortez-Masto, Letter to
Program Associate Director Kathy Kranginer, Office of Management and Budget, July 10, 2019; Rep José E. Serrano
et al., Letter to President Donald J. Trump, January 23, 2019; Reps. Peter DeFazio, Bennie Thompson, and Frank
Pallone, Letter to FEMA Administrator William B. “Brock” Long, March 20, 2018.
371 See, for example, testimony of Rep. Gonzalez-Colon, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, FEMA’s
Priorities for 2020 and Beyond, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11, 2020, pp. 20-21.
372 See, for example, testimony of Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, House Homeland Security Subcommittee, Disaster
Recoveries, pp. 22-23; testimony of Rep. Diane Degette, House Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric
Infrastructure, pp. 3-4; testimony of Rep. Bennie Thompson, House Homeland Security Committee, Lessons from the
2017 Disasters; testimony of Rep. Peter King, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery, pp. 37-38.
373 Testimony of Rep. Frank Pallone, House Energy and Commerce, Puerto Rico’s Electric Infrastructure, pp. 4-5;
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The following sections discuss some of the delays in providing disaster assistance to Puerto Rico,
including those related to the capacity of Puerto Rico’s government to manage and perform the
disaster recovery work following the hurricanes, the reimbursement process for Public
Assistance, and the delivery of HMGP funding assistance.
Strained Local and Federal Capacity
Most Stafford Act assistance is designed to support, not supplant, state, tribal, territorial, and local
response and recovery efforts. For this reason, insufficient staffing and resources at the
“subfederal” level may challenge disaster response and recovery. In the case of Puerto Rico, both
federal officials and officials of the Government of Puerto Rico concluded that both territory and
local government agencies lacked the capacity to swiftly carry out critical recovery work due to
the sheer magnitude of the 2017 hurricane damage.374 Additionally, in 2019, the GAO found that
some FEMA and local officials attributed certain challenges to excessive turnover and lack of
necessary expertise of some of FEMA’s on-site workforce.375 FEMA acknowledged the issue of
staffing shortages in its after-action report on the 2017 hurricane response efforts.376 GAO noted
that FEMA’s “dedicated” workforce in Puerto Rico has itself been challenged by the use of the
Public Assistance Alternative Procedures pilot program at an unprecedented scale,377 as it
required new policy expertise.
Public Assistance Funding and Reimbursement Process
Public Assistance generally provides assistance on a reimbursement basis for large projects (see
the “Public Assistance Obligation and Disbursement” section for more information). Media and
congressional reports indicate that this reimbursement process has significantly challenged PA
Applicants with liquidity constraints.378 For example, in 2018, the House Committee on Oversight
and Reform found that Puerto Rico’s hurricane response had been hindered due to the fact that
the government “had no independent capacity to begin taking those initial steps [of procuring
goods and services] toward recovery.”379
Puerto Rico attributed additional delays to FEMA’s instatement of a manual reimbursement
process during two different intervals of hurricane recovery.380 Officials from the federal
government and Puerto Rico have separately attributed delays to the widespread use of awards

374 See, for example, the discussions on PREPA and capacity constraints in GAO, Puerto Rico Electricity Grid
Recovery: Better Information and Enhanced Coordination is Needed to Address Challenges, GAO-20-141, October 8,
2019, pp. 41-43, https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-20-141/; and DHS OIG, Capacity Audit, pp. 4-7.
375 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, pp. 21-22.
376 FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report (AAR), July 12, 2018, p. vii, https://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/1533643262195-6d1398339449ca85942538a1249d2ae9/2017FEMAHurricaneAARv20180730.pdf.
377 Testimony of GAO Representative Chris Currie, House Homeland Security Committee, Road to Recovery, pp. 17-
18.
378 See, for example, Mark Walker and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “FEMA’s Hurricane Aid to Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands Has Stalled,” New York Times, Nov. 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/us/politics/fema-
hurricane-aid-puerto-rico-virgin-islands.html; and GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 23.
379 House Oversight Committee, Recurring Problems, p. 28.
380 Omar J. Marrero, Governor of Puerto Rico’s Authorized Representative, Letter to Gene I. Dodaro, Comptroller
General of the United States, January 30, 2019, in GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 37; GAO, FEMA Actions,
pp. 17-18.
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based on fixed-cost estimates under Alternative Procedures rather than actual costs (see the
“Section 428 Alternative Procedures” section for further information).381
Delivery of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funding
State agencies and federally-recognized tribes applying for HMGP funding must have a FEMA-
approved state or tribal hazard mitigation plan by the application deadline and at the time of
obligation of the award.382 As of August 26, 2020, only 35 of the 78 municipios in Puerto Rico
had a currently approved hazard mitigation plan and 43 municipios had a lapsed hazard
mitigation plan. This could put them at risk of being denied HMGP for a future disaster.383 Puerto
Rico announced it is updating the State Hazard Mitigation Plan, which expires in August 2021.384
The timing at which states receive obligations from HMGP varies widely based on a number of
factors, including eligible project determinations and the FEMA-State Agreement. In the case of
Puerto Rico’s recovery from the 2017 hurricanes, HMGP funding was deferred in order to
leverage other funding sources before using HMGP funding. For example, FEMA and COR3
chose to begin mitigation activities with Public Assistance funding, with HMGP funding
introduced later in the process.385 This means that many HMGP project applications are
contingent on the coordination of HMGP and Public Assistance projects. The view of COR3 is
that HMGP projects cannot logically be submitted until supported PA projects are identified and
scoped.386 Congress may wish to consider whether this approach has led to unnecessary delays in
obligation of HMGP funding to Puerto Rico, particularly since only 1% of HMGP funding has
been obligated. This is significantly lower than for the other 2017 hurricanes, including the
obligations for the U.S. Virgin Islands for Hurricanes Irma and María, Texas for Hurricane
Harvey, and Florida for Hurricane Irma.387
HMGP funding may be obligated in phases, with obligation of the second phase of work delayed
until the first phase is completed. Another cause of deferred HMGP funding may be attributed to
the fact that the majority of obligated Public Assistance in Puerto Rico to date has been for
emergency work,388 whereas HMGP is intended to follow PA permanent work.389
The Government of Puerto Rico submitted requests for time extensions for HMGP associated
with Hurricane María on October 10, 2019390 and August 4, 2020. The latter request cited changes
in circumstances due to the earthquakes and COVID-19.391

381 GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 17-18, 35.
382 44 C.F.R. §201.4.
383 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 26, 2020.
384 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report.
385 Briefing from FEMA Mitigation staff, August 31, 2020.
386 Letter from Ottmar J. Chavez Piñero, Governor’s Authorized Representative, COR3, to Michael Moriarty, FEMA
Region II Mitigation Division Director, “RE: FEMA 4339-DR-PR Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) Request
for Time Extension,” October 10, 2019, https://recovery.pr/documents/
COR3%20Request%20to%20Extend%20the%20Application%20Submission%20Period%20for%20the%20HMGP-
Oct_10_2019.pdf (hereinafter Letter from Ottmar J. Chavez Piñero to Michael Moriarty, “RE: HMGP Request for
Time Extension”).
387 See the “Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funding to Puerto Rico” section in this report.
388 For more information on Public Assistance emergency work, see the “FEMA Public Assistance” section.
389 Briefing from FEMA Mitigation staff, August 31, 2020.
390 Letter from Ottmar J. Chavez Piñero to Michael Moriarty, “RE: HMGP Request for Time Extension.”
391 Letter from Ottmar J. Chavez Piñero, Governor’s Authorized Representative, COR3, to Michael Moriarty, FEMA
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Considerations for Improving the Recovery Process
The following sections relate to some potential congressional considerations that may improve
disaster recovery processes in Puerto Rico and nationally, including developing regulations for PA
Alternative Procedures, codifying CDBG-DR, providing additional program information and
technical assistance, integrating mitigation funding, and increasing access to program data.
Promulgating Regulations for Public Assistance Alternative Procedures
The majority of Public Assistance reconstruction projects for Puerto Rico’s hurricane recovery
utilized Alternative Procedures (see the “Section 428 Alternative Procedures” section for further
information). The Stafford Act was amended after Hurricane Sandy to allow FEMA to use
Alternative Procedures as a pilot program in an effort to accelerate the provision of Public
Assistance and encourage efficiency in project execution.392 Since it is a pilot program,
Alternative Procedures are not subject to federal regulations. For Puerto Rico’s recovery, FEMA
instead issued three distinct iterations of guidance, as well as separate policy amendments, which
may have generated confusion and contributed to recovery delays.393 Promulgating Alternative
Procedures in regulations may increase clarity and facilitate recovery.
Codifying CDBG-DR
The variability of CDBG-DR allocation, rulemaking, and process is partially attributable to the
necessity to reconstitute the “program” anew following a major disaster. Congress may seek to
permanently authorize CDBG-DR in statute and prescribe certain principles and policy features to
inform its programmatic contours. This would likely provide the greatest degree of consistency in
the delivery of CDBG-DR funds in the future, though it may also potentially come at some
expense to programmatic flexibility. Several bills have been introduced in the 116th Congress that
would permanently authorize CDBG-DR, with varying degrees of detail and policy scope.
One such bill, H.R. 3702, the Reforming Disaster Recovery Act of 2019, includes a number of
provisions to codify and define the CDBG-DR program. These features include:
 requiring that CDBG-DR funds are spent on both infrastructure and housing
rehabilitation, and that federal funds be used to replace damaged or destroyed
public or federally subsidized affordable housing;
 emphasizing housing, and particularly affordable housing and housing for low-
income persons, by requiring broader terms of relief for renters and the homeless
in addition to homeowners;
 requiring that HUD allocate funds within 60 days of appropriation, and that the
public is provided opportunities for comment;
 expanding data-sharing provisions to coordinate with other agencies, and to make
HUD and state processes more defined and publicly available; and

Region II Mitigation Division Director, “RE: FEMA 4339-DR-PR Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) Request
for Time Extension,” August 4, 2020, https://recovery.pr/documents/FEMA%204339%20DR-
PR%20Hazard%20Mitigation%20Grant%20Program%20(HMGP)%20Request%20for%20Time%20Extension-
Aug_4_2020.pdf.
392 Section 428(f)(2) of the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §4189f(f)(2).
393 See GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 22; and GAO, FEMA Actions, pp. 33-35.
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 encouraging infrastructure rebuilt with CDBG-DR funds to include minimum
resiliency and disaster mitigation standards.
The House, under suspension of the rules, passed H.R. 3702 by a vote of 290-118 on November
18, 2019. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate (S. 2301). The Senate bill included the
reforms in the House version, along with some additional provisions, including:
 creating an office at HUD to coordinate CDBG-DR administration;
 requiring a common disaster assistance application between FEMA, the SBA,
and HUD; and
 broadening homelessness assistance.
S. 2301 was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and has seen no
further action.
Another bill, S. 2796, The Ensuring Disaster Recovery for Local Communities Act, was
introduced in the Senate and also has seen no further action. It takes a significantly different
approach compared to H.R. 3702/S. 2301. S. 2796 would:
 direct HUD to set spending goal thresholds for state grantees to facilitate a more
rapid disbursement of CDBG-DR relief funds;394
 provide local communities with the ability to receive CDBG-DR funds as
subgrantees, and provide technical assistance to localities with limited capacity to
administer CDBG-DR funds; and
 require FEMA to adjudicate property acquisition (“buyout”) applications within
60 days, and require that GAO undertake a review of property acquisition
programs.
Additional Technical and Direct Assistance
News reports indicate that the catastrophic 2017 hurricanes and subsequent 2019-2020
earthquakes overwhelmed territorial and municipio officials, including those applying for Public
Assistance. In response, COR3 has provided supplemental technical assistance for damage
assessments and project formulation to PA Applicants.395 Applicants in Puerto Rico may benefit
from additional technical assistance and/or direct assistance to navigate the complex PA program
and execute PA projects.
Additionally, local officials from Puerto Rico informed the GAO that they needed a better
understanding of the FEMA IHP, including the types of available assistance and applicant
eligibility and application requirements. This could be accomplished through providing additional
training, support, or guidance.396 To that end, the GAO recommended, and DHS agreed, that
FEMA should
identify and implement strategies to provide readily accessible information and resources,
such as guidance and training, about the Individuals and Households Program to state,
local, tribal, and territorial officials.397

394 HUD treats Puerto Rico as a state for the purposes of CDBG allocations.
395 GAO, Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions, pp. 30-32.
396 GAO, Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s IHP, p. 60.
397 GAO, Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s IHP, p. 78.
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Delivery of Assistance for Compound Disasters
Stafford Act emergency and major disaster assistance revolves around declarations for discrete
incidents. This design may complicate response and recovery for consecutive disasters, as in
Puerto Rico. Given the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events due to
climate change,398 Congress may consider opportunities to streamline the delivery of assistance in
cases of multiple disasters. For instance, Congress could consider providing an option to
consolidate awards and track requirements for a given facility or Applicant across active disasters,
and across FEMA and HUD programs.
HMGP funding is awarded following a major disaster declaration, but states can use HMGP funds
for any eligible activity and the funds do not have to be used to mitigate risk associated with the
particular disaster for which it was awarded. It is unclear, however, how mitigation funding would
be awarded should a HMGP project be damaged by a concurrent disaster before work is
completed. FEMA’s current guidance says that activities initiated or completed prior to the date
of the grant award are generally ineligible. In addition, projects for which actual physical work, as
in groundbreaking or demolition, has occurred prior to award or final approval are ineligible.399
Congress may wish to require FEMA to clarify the guidelines for HMGP funding in the case of
successive disasters.
Integration of Mitigation Funding
Mitigation activities can be funded by:
 any one of three FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance programs (described in the
“Mitigation Assistance Overview” section);400
 Public Assistance funding under Stafford Act Section 406; and
 HUD Community Development Block Grant funding, particularly CDBG-DR or
its CDBG-MIT variant.401
The above-listed programs can all fund similar activities. Recent guidance directs FEMA and
applicants to consider the use of Stafford Act Sections 404 (hazard mitigation) and 406 (Public
Assistance repair, restoration, and replacement of damaged facilities) mitigation opportunities
holistically.402 However, HMGP, PA, and CDBG-MIT have different standards for rebuilding after
a disaster, which could potentially preclude consistency of mitigation activities across the
programs. For instance, the requirements for building code compliance introduced in Section
1235(b) of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA; Division D of P.L. 115-254) only
apply to repair or rebuilding with Public Assistance funding under Section 406 of the Stafford
Act.403 HMGP guidance encourages the use of building codes and standards, but the only firm
requirement for the adoption of disaster-resistant building codes is in a special set-aside for

398 D.J. Wuebbles et al., Executive Summary, Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment,
vol. 1, pp. 12-34, https://science2017.globalchange.gov/chapter/executive-summary/.
399 FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance Guidance, pp. 42 and 55, February 27, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1424983165449-38f5dfc69c0bd4ea8a161e8bb7b79553/HMA_Guidance_022715_508.pdf.
400 For further information on FEMA hazard mitigation programs, see the “Hazard Mitigation Grant Program” section.
401 For further information on CDBG-MIT, see the “HUD Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery
and—Mitigation” section.
402 FEMA, BBA, p. 7.
403 For further discussion of building code compliance for Public Assistance, see the “Building Code Compliance for
Recipients of Public Assistance” section.
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projects, which are difficult to evaluate using FEMA-approved cost-effectiveness measures.404
The HUD guidance for CDBG-MIT grantees encourages, but does not require, the adoption of the
latest edition of published disaster-resilient building codes and standards.405 Congress may wish
to consider requiring all post-disaster rebuilding to incorporate the latest version of building
codes, and standardizing requirements across all mitigation programs.
Availability of Information on Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and Public
Assistance Funding and Projects
There are no publicly available datasets that provide the dates at which HMGP funding is
approved or obligated,406 which makes it difficult to compare the obligation of HMGP across
disasters or to compare state responses. In addition, FEMA does not provide a simple
visualization of the amount of HMGP funding obligated for a particular disaster as it does, for
example, for Public Assistance and disaster housing assistance,407 which makes it more difficult
to determine the amount of funding for a particular disaster. FEMA has added information on
HMGP dollars obligated to disaster relief pages,408 but Congress may wish to require FEMA to
provide additional publicly available information on hazard mitigation funding.
Additionally, Congress may wish to require FEMA to report PA project status information for
catastrophic events like Puerto Rico’s hurricane recovery. Currently, FEMA requires Recipients
to provide quarterly progress reports on open PA projects, though this information is not publicly
available.409 FEMA does provide publicly available data on PA obligations, pursuant to DRRA.410
However, PA obligations may not clearly reflect the status of recovery. For example, project
funding may be fully obligated long before the completion of the on-the-ground reconstruction
work. Congress may wish to consider requesting other recovery information not publicly or
readily available during the writing of this report (e.g., project progress reports, project appeals
documents, facility operability metrics). However, Congress may also wish to consider the
administrative burden more comprehensive reporting requirements may put on FEMA, Puerto
Rico, or local officials, and how to utilize data of such volume and complexity to conduct
oversight.
Increasing Access to Program Data and Project Status Information
No single authoritative source of current funding data for all federal disaster response and
recovery assistance exists. Various data sources do not provide publicly available data, provide
differing levels of detail, or use different descriptive terminology. This inhibits straightforward
assessments of how much federal assistance has been committed and provided to Puerto Rico.

404 This is known as the 5% Initiative. Communities are only eligible to participate in the 5% Initiative if they can
demonstrate that disaster-resilient building codes have been adopted. See FEMA, Clarifying the Additional 5 Percent
Initiative, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1471961428254-698793a6376496d84044426321f010ac/
FactSheet_Clarifying-Building-Code-Elements_081716.pdf.
405 HUD, “Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements for Community Development
Block Grant Mitigation Grantees,” 84 Federal Register 45838-45871, August 30, 2019.
406 Briefing from FEMA Mitigation staff, August 31, 2020.
407 See FEMA, “Data Visualizations,” https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-data/data-visualizations.
408 This information was available as of late September 2020. See, for example, FEMA, “Puerto Rico Hurricane Maria
(DR-4339-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4339.
409 44 C.F.R. §206.204(f).
410 §1224 of DRRA, P.L. 115-254, adding a new §430 of the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §5189h.
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(Detailed information on recovery program data and associated caveats for the use of data, as well
as links to program data, can be found in Appendix B.)
Given the challenges regarding the usefulness of available program data and the absence of a
unified source for federal recovery assistance information, Congress may wish to require federal
agencies to evaluate whether the publicly available data is sufficient to address congressional
questions regarding the cost of recovery (including funding that has been committed and funding
that has been disbursed). Additionally, Congress may wish to consider whether federal agencies
should provide information to help contextualize the funding data and support performance
evaluations, such as information on the status of project work. This could include information that
reflects the performance measurements included in the quarterly reports that are submitted by
federal grant recipients, which may increase congressional and public understanding of the status
of recovery (for more information on this, see the above section “Availability of Information on
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and Public Assistance Funding and Projects”).
Further, it may be useful to consider the need for coordinated information reporting. For example,
in the case of Puerto Rico, COR3 aggregates federal assistance information in the context of
Puerto Rico’s recovery from Hurricanes Irma and María. However, there is not a similar federally
managed source of detailed information for multiple federal programs. Congress may wish to
consider the need for institutionalizing the coordination of federal recovery program data
reporting following catastrophic disasters. To that end, Congress may wish to consider the need
for a federal-level coordinating agency, such as FEMA, to provide a single source for detailed,
publicly available recovery program data.
Additionally, as different disasters may involve different federal agencies or federal programs,
Congress may consider institutionalizing a requirement for public progress reporting by federal
agencies providing assistance following catastrophic disasters. This reporting requirement could
be modeled on what has been required of the recipients of assistance following some disasters,
such as the Government of Puerto Rico. For example, Section 21210(c) of the BBA of 2018 (P.L.
115-123) requires the Governor of Puerto Rico, in coordination with the FEMA Administrator, to
“make public a report on progress achieving the goals set forth in such report [meaning the
Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico].”411
Having detailed information on the status of work (e.g., the percentage of work completed), as
well as a more complete picture of federal recovery assistance, may help to better answer
questions regarding the work that remains to be done and the factors that are impeding recovery
work than can financial data alone.
Agency Oversight412
There continue to be oversight concerns by agencies and Congress regarding federal disaster
assistance to Puerto Rico for disaster recovery. Improper payments that may be provided to
Puerto Rico under the authority of Stafford Act programs present a risk of waste, fraud, and
abuse. FEMA is the federal administering agency for the Stafford Act disaster assistance
programs. As such, FEMA is required to conduct appropriate oversight of funding provided under
those programs as set forth in statutory language addressing auditing of federal funding and

411 See, for example, Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report. Status reports are submitted
every 180 days, as required by Section 21210(c) of the BBA of 2018 (P.L. 115-123).
412 For more information on agency oversight and grants management, contact Natalie Keegan, Analyst in American
Federalism and Emergency Management Policy.
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reducing the risk of improper payments.413 However, FEMA has not established a formal process
to identify either high-risk programs or high-risk grantees, as discussed above. As a result, the
main indicator of a high-risk program is one in which there is an anticipated or actual high rate of
improper payments. The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as amended by the
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) and the Improper Payments
Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA), requires federal agencies to
assess programs and program activities on an annual basis to determine whether there is a risk for
significant improper payments.414 The program assessment includes estimating the annual amount
of improper payments and submitting the estimates to Congress. FEMA submits the improper
payment estimates to Congress in its annual financial reports (AFR). According to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), high-risk programs are programs that have a significant risk of
improper payments:
For the purposes of this guidance, “significant improper payments” are defined as gross
annual improper payments (i.e. the total amount of overpayments and underpayments) in
the program exceeding (1) both 1.5 percent of program outlays and $10,000,000 of all
program or activity payments made during the fiscal year or (2) $100,000,000 (regardless
of the improper payment percentage of total program outlays).415
For FEMA disaster assistance programs providing funding to Puerto Rico for hurricane recovery,
additional oversight mechanisms are generally determined based on program risk assessments
rather than risk assessments of Puerto Rico as a grantee. Using the OMB guidance for
determining which programs are high-risk, and implementing requirements set forth in IPIA, as
amended, federal agencies annually evaluate programs and designate which programs may
require additional oversight and monitoring. Through this annual program risk assessment
process, the Department of Homeland Security provides program-wide estimated improper
payment rates for each fiscal year that are not specific to any single state receiving Public
Assistance funding in any given year. They estimated the FY2018 improper payment rate at
0.90% for the FEMA Public Assistance program, and reported overpayments for Public
Assistance of $32.9 million.416 Approximately $22 million in the FY2018 improper payments for
FEMA Public Assistance were overpayments as a result of errors made by state and local
agencies.417 For FY2019, the FEMA Public Assistance program was estimated to have an
improper payment rate of 0.71%, approximately $26.72 million, the entirety of which was
attributed to administrative or process errors made by state and local agencies.418 Notably,
however, a substantial portion of the Public Assistance program expenditures in Puerto Rico for
the 2017 hurricanes will have occurred in FY2020, and the improper payment rate for FY2020
has not yet been published.

413 Federal agency grant administration requirements may include those contained in the Single Audit Act, P.L. 98-502,
as amended by P.L. 104-156, and the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act, P.L. 112-248,
among others.
414 The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, P.L. 107-300, as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination
and Recovery Act of 2010, P.L. 111-204, and the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of
2012, P.L. 112-248. For additional information on improper payments legislation see CRS Report R44702, Improper
Payments Legislation: Key Provisions, Implementation, and Selected Proposals in the 114th Congress, by Garrett
Hatch.
415 Office of Management and Budget, Transmittal of Appendix C to OMB Circular A-123, Requirements for Payments
Integrity Improvement, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, June 26, 2018, p. 10.
416 Department of Homeland Security, FY2018 Agency Financial Report, pp. 176-179.
417 Department of Homeland Security, FY2018 Agency Financial Report, p. 179.
418 Department of Homeland Security, FY2019 Agency Financial Report, p. 166.
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An April 2018 fiscal plan for Puerto Rico’s recovery from Hurricane María estimates FEMA
Public Assistance needs at $35.3 billion.419 Approval of public assistance projects is ongoing and
Public Assistance obligations will likely significantly increase for Puerto Rico (and the U.S.
Virgin Islands). Based on the FY2018 improper payment rate of 0.90% estimated by DHS, should
Public Assistance spending projections reach the estimated need identified by Puerto Rico, the
improper payment amount for Puerto Rico Public Assistance for the Hurricane María disaster
declaration could be at least $318 million (i.e., 0.90% of $35.3 billion). Under OMB guidance,
this would qualify the Public Assistance program for a high-risk program designation. DHS
indicated that the risk assessment to determine susceptibility to improper payments includes
factors such as recent major changes in program funding, authorities, or procedures. According to
GAO, although FEMA has approved use of the Section 428 Alternative Procedures program on a
project-by-project basis in previous disasters, Puerto Rico is the first Recipient to use the Section
428 program for all large permanent work.420 Additionally, as discussed in previous sections of
this report, changing program guidance and changing financial situations of grantees also creates
a higher risk for waste, fraud, and abuse. Consequently, such a change in procedure, guidance,
and grantee financial status may be a factor in assessing the improper payment risk of the Public
Assistance program and requiring FEMA to implement additional oversight and accountability
measures.
Conclusion
Puerto Rico has entered its fourth year of recovery from the 2017 hurricanes and is concurrently
dealing with ongoing earthquakes and a global pandemic. Puerto Rico faces challenges in its
ongoing recovery, including related to the severity of the disasters that affected Puerto Rico, the
state of Puerto Rico’s infrastructure and resiliency when each of these disasters struck, and
program-related administrative challenges. Given their breadth, some of these challenges are
likely to persist in the future, although actions could be taken by the federal government and
Government of Puerto Rico to improve the recovery process. To help inform such actions,
Congress may wish to direct federal agencies to provide more comprehensive information
regarding the status of recovery, and may also engage in oversight activities, including on the
basis of such enhanced data.

419 Government of Puerto Rico, New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, April 5, 2018, p. 24.
420 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes 2019, p. 9.
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Appendix A. Overview of the Earthquakes Affecting
Puerto Rico Beginning in 2019
Since 2017, Puerto Rico has received several presidential declarations of emergency and major
disaster under the Stafford Act, including for earthquakes.421 This appendix describes the
earthquakes that began in 2019 and are continuing. This has been a period of the most, and
highest intensity and magnitude earthquakes since the establishment of the Puerto Rico Seismic
Network in 1974.422 The appendix also describes the federal assistance provided to support Puerto
Rico’s ongoing earthquake-related recovery efforts.
Earthquakes—2019 and Continuing
On December 28, 2019, an earthquake of
Defining “Magnitude”
magnitude423 5.8 occurred, followed by a
An earthquake’s magnitude is “a number that
magnitude 6.4 earthquake within 24 hours.424
characterizes the relative size of an earthquake.
Additionally, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake
Magnitude is based on measurement of the maximum
occurred on January 7, 2020.425 Earthquakes
motion recorded by a seismograph.... Several scales
have been defined.. . All magnitude scales should yield
continue to affect Puerto Rico almost daily.426
approximately the same value for any given
Earthquakes differ from other natural hazards,
earthquake.”
such as floods, hurricanes, or wildfires, in that

earthquake swarms can last for weeks, years, or
Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Earthquake Hazards
decades, rather than occurring as just one event
Program, “Earthquake Glossary,” https://earthquake.usgs.gov/
or season.427 The U.S. Geological Survey
learn/glossary/?term=magnitude.

421 For additional information regarding earthquakes, including what earthquakes are and how they are measured, see
the U.S. Geological Survey’s website on “The Science of Earthquakes,” available at https://www.usgs.gov/natural-
hazards/earthquake-hazards/science/science-earthquakes?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects.
422 Kimberly M. S. Cartier, “Rare Earthquake Swarm Strikes Puerto Rico,” Eos, accessed August 11, 2020,
https://eos.org/articles/rare-earthquake-swarm-strikes-puerto-rico (hereinafter Cartier, “Rare Earthquake Swarm”). The
website for the Puerto Rico Seismic Network is available at http://redsismica.uprm.edu/English/. Scientific models
“suggest that aftershocks of the magnitude 6.4 southwestern Puerto Rico earthquake will decrease in frequency as time
goes on but will persist for a long time.... [T]he probabilities of magnitude 5 or greater aftershocks remain sufficiently
high to warrant concern and will for some time into the future.” (Nicholas J. van der Elst, Jeanne L. Hardebeck, and
Andrew J. Michael, Potential Duration of the Aftershocks of the 2020 Southwestern Puerto Rico Earthquake, USGS,
Open-File Report 2020-1009, p. 4, https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2020/1009/ofr20201009.pdf.)
423 The Moment Magnitude, MW, is an indicator of the amount of energy released during an earthquake. The MW scale
is logarithmic, with an increase of one step corresponding to a tenfold increase in the measured amplitude of the ground
motion of the earthquake, and 32 times more energy release. In other words, an MW 7.0 earthquake releases 32 time
more energy than an MW 6.0 earthquake. For more information on how earthquakes are measured, see CRS Report
RL33861, Earthquakes: Risk, Detection, Warning, and Research, by Peter Folger.
424 Cartier, “Rare Earthquake Swarm.”
425 USGS, “Aftershock Forecast,” August 10, 2020, accessed September 2, 2020, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/
earthquakes/eventpage/us70006vll/oaf/commentary.
426 Puerto Rico Seismic Network, “Recent Significant Earthquakes,” accessed September 1, 2020,
http://redsismica.uprm.edu/English/php/CatalogS/Mseismicity.php.
427 Nicholas J. van der Elst, Jeanne L. Hardebeck, and Andrew J. Michael, Potential Duration of Aftershocks of the
2020 Southwestern Puerto Rico Earthquake, United States Geological Survey, Open-File Report 2020-1009, Reston,
VA, January 29, 2020, pp. 1-3, https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20201009.
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(USGS) expects aftershocks to continue for years.428
The earthquakes and associated aftershocks resulted in damage in the southwestern portion of
Puerto Rico, including:
 losses of electricity and water;
 damage to homes (more than 2,000 homes were damaged, and more than 10,000
people were displaced);429
 damage to structures, including schools and government buildings;430
 damage to infrastructure, including roads and bridges, power plants, and public
buildings; and
 one reported direct death and multiple injuries.431
The President declared an emergency under the Stafford Act on January 7, 2020, which initially
authorized Public Assistance Category B (assistance for emergency protective measures).432
Subsequently, the President declared a major disaster on January 16, 2020.433 The major disaster
authorized Individual Assistance and Public Assistance in the designated areas, and Hazard
Mitigation throughout Puerto Rico.434 Additionally, the major disaster declaration authorized SBA

428 United States Geological Survey, “USGS Scientists Find Seafloor Faults Near Puerto Rico Quakes’ Epicenters,”
May 26, 2020, accessed September 2, 2020, https://www.usgs.gov/news/usgs-scientists-find-seafloor-faults-near-
puerto-rico-quakes-epicenters.
429 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 2; FEMA, Preliminary Damage Assessment
Report: Puerto Rico—Earthquakes, FEMA-4473-DR, January 16, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4473; and
Center for Disaster Philanthropy, Puerto Rico Earthquakes, January 28, 2020, https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disaster/
puerto-rico-earthquakes/. The FEMA Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT), which reported on building performance in
Puerto Rico after Hurricanes Irma and María, observed a high count of damaged residences that were not compliant
with the current building code. In particular, informally constructed homes often performed poorly (FEMA, Mitigation
Assessment Team Report. Hurricanes Irma and María in Puerto Rico. Building Performance Observations,
Recommendations, and Technical Guidance, pp. 1-7), with at least 200,000 homes not built to code (Danica Coto,
“Experts: Earthquake Showed Puerto Rico Unprepared for Catastrophe,” Claims Journal, January 14, 2020,
https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/southeast/2020/01/14/294999.htm (hereinafter Coto, “Earthquake Showed Puerto
Rico Unprepared”).
430 FEMA, FEMA and the Federal Family Continue Puerto Rico Earthquake Response Support, FEMA Congressional
Advisory #8, Washington, DC, January 14, 2020. Approximately 95% of public school buildings were built before
seismic building codes were introduced, leaving these structures vulnerable to shaking from earthquakes (Alberto M.
Lopez, K. Stephen Huges, and Elizabeth Vanacore, “Puerto Rico’s Winter 2019-2020 Seismic Sequence Leaves the
Island on Edge,” Tremblor, January 7, 2020, https://temblor.net/earthquake-insights/puerto-ricos-winter-2019-2020-
seismic-sequence-leaves-the-island-on-edge-10321/). The Puerto Rican government estimates that repairs could cost
between $1 million and $5 million per school (Coto, “Earthquake Showed Puerto Rico Unprepared”).
431 Cartier, “Rare Earthquake Swarm.”
432 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Earthquakes (EM-3426-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/3426 (hereinafter FEMA,
“Puerto Rico Earthquakes (EM-3426-PR)”); and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 85
Federal Register 6965-6966, February 6, 2020.
433 FEMA, “Puerto Rico Earthquakes (DR-4473-PR),” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4473; FEMA, “Puerto Rico;
Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” 85 Federal Register 6964, February 6, 2020; and FEMA, “Preliminary
Damage Assessment Report: Puerto Rico—Earthquakes,” FEMA-4473-DR, January 16, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-03/FEMA4473DRPR.pdf.
434 Public Assistance Categories A and B (assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures) were
authorized for Adjuntas, Guánica, Guayanilla, Jayuya, Juana Díaz, Lajas, Las Marías, Mayagüez, Peñuelas, Ponce,
Sabana Grande, San Germán, Utuado, and Yauco. Public Assistance Categories C-G (permanent work) were later
authorized for the municipios of Adjuntas, Guánica, Guayanilla, Jayuya, Juana Díaz, Lajas, Las Marías, Mayagüez,
Peñuelas, Ponce, Sabana Grande, San Germán, Utuado, and Yauco. Individual Assistance was authorized for the
municipios of Adjuntas, Aguada, Añasco, Arecibo, Barceloneta, Cabo Rojo, Ciales, Coamo, Corozal, Guánica,
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Disaster Loans, including Physical Loans for homeowners, businesses, and nonprofit
organizations, and EIDLs for businesses and nonprofit organizations.435 FEMA listed the incident
period as continuing in September 2020.436
Many earthquakes have occurred in Puerto Rico since December 28, 2019. Figure A-1 represents
select significant seismic events in Puerto Rico between December 29, 2019, and August 7, 2020,
and Figure A-2 depicts some of the ongoing seismic activity occurring in August 2020.
Figure A-1. Significant Seismic Events in Puerto Rico
December 29, 2019-August 7, 2020

Source: Created by CRS using data from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Earthquake Hazards Program,
https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/browse/significant.php?year=2020 & 2019.
Notes: This figure represents “significant events” in Puerto Rico since December 2020, as determined by the
USGS

Guayanilla, Hormigueros, Jayuya, Juana Díaz, Lajas, Lares, Las Marías, Maricao, Mayagüez, Moca, Morovis,
Naranjito, Orocovis, Peñuelas, Ponce, Sabana Grande, Salinas, San Sebastián, Santa Isabel, Utuado, Villalba, and
Yauco. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program was authorized throughout Puerto Rico. (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Major
Disaster and Related Determinations,” 85 Federal Register 6964-6965, February 6, 2020; FEMA, “Puerto Rico;
Amendment No. 1 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 85 Federal Register 6966, February 6, 2020; FEMA,
“Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 85 Federal Register 13175, March 6,
2020; FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 3 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 85 Federal Register 13175,
March 6, 2020; FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 5 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 85 Federal
Register 18582, April 2, 2020; and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 6 to Notice of a Major Disaster
Declaration,” 85 Federal Register 18583, April 2, 2020).
435 SBA, Disaster Declaration PR-00034: Earthquakes, https://disasterloan.sba.gov/ela/Declarations/
DeclarationDetails?declNumber=6045344&direct=false; SBA, “Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,” 85 Federal Register 4346, January 24, 2020.
436 The incident period was closed effective February 4, 2020, for both the emergency and major disaster declarations
associated with the earthquakes (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 1 to Notice of an Emergency Declaration,” 85
Federal Register 18585, April 2, 2020; and FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 4 to Notice of a Major Disaster
Declaration,” 85 Federal Register 18582, April 2, 2020), but it was later reopened, and was listed as “continuing” on
August 12, 2020 (FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 7 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” 85 Federal
Register 31199, May 22, 2020; see also FEMA, “Puerto Rico Earthquakes (EM-3426-PR)”).
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“by a combination of magnitude, number of Did You Feel It responses, and PAGER alert level.” The
equation is as fol ows:
mag_significance = magnitude * 100 * (magnitude / 6.5);
pager_significance = red is 2000 : orange is 1000 : yellow is 500 : green is 0;
dyfi_significance = min(num_responses, 1000) * max_cdi / 10;
significance = max(mag_significance, pager_significance) + dyfi_significance.
Any event with a significance > 600 is considered a significant event.”
(USGS, “Significant Earthquakes—2019 & 2020,” https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/browse/significant.php?
year=2020 & 2019.)

The circles in shades of yellow, orange, and red indicate the locations of significant events, as determined by the
equation, above. These earthquake depictions (i.e., circles) are not to scale and circle size does not represent a
comparative magnitude. These incidents range in magnitude from 4.8 to 6.4 MW. The USGS reports magnitude as
“MW,” which represents the “Moment Magnitude.” MW provides the most reliable estimate for very large
earthquakes, and is
“based on physical properties of the earthquake derived from an analysis of all the waveforms recorded
from the shaking. First the seismic moment is computed, and then it is converted to a magnitude designed
to be roughly equal to the Richter Scale in the magnitude range where they overlap.
Moment (MO) = rigidity x area x slip
where rigidity is the strength of the rock along the fault, area is the area of the fault that slipped, and slip is
the distance the fault moved. Thus, stronger rock material, or a larger area, or more movement in an
earthquake wil all contribute to produce a larger magnitude. Then,
Moment Magnitude (MW) = 2/3 log10(MO) - 10.7.”
(USGS, “Earthquake Magnitude, Energy Release, and Shaking Intensity,” https://www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/
earthquake-hazards/science/earthquake-magnitude-energy-release-and-shaking-intensity?qt-
science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects.)

For more information on how magnitude is defined, see the USGS “Earthquake Glossary,” available at
https://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/. For more information on the different magnitude scales, see USGS,
“Moment Magnitude, Richter Scale—What Are the Different Magnitude Scales, and Why Are There So Many?”
available at https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/moment-magnitude-richter-scale-what-are-different-magnitude-scales-and-
why-are-there-so-many?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products.
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Figure A-2. Seismic Activity in Puerto Rico
August 7-20, 2020

Source: Created by CRS using data from the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (PRSN), “Recent Significant
Earthquakes,” accessed August 24, 2020, http://redsismica.uprm.edu/English/php/CatalogS/Felts.php.
Notes: This figure represents ongoing seismic activity in Puerto Rico (and nearby area). These earthquake
depictions (i.e., circles) are not to scale and circle size does not represent a comparative magnitude. These
incidents range in magnitude from 1.91 to 3.85 Md. The PRSN often reports magnitude as “Md,” which
represents the “Duration Magnitude.” According to the PRSN’s website, “The duration magnitude is computed
by searching for the time at which the amplitude of the signal returns to the pre-earthquake level as well as the
maximum amplitude of the signal. These two data points are then input into the local empirical equation to
determine the magnitude of the event.” PRSN, “Education, the Size of an Earthquake, Duration Magnitude,”
accessed August 28, 2020, http://redsismica.uprm.edu/English/education/earthquakes/size.php.
Federal Assistance Provided to Puerto Rico Following the
Earthquakes That Began in 2019
The following sections describe select forms of federal assistance that were authorized to support
Puerto Rico’s disaster recovery efforts following the earthquakes that began in 2019 and are
continuing. First, they detail the FEMA programs, including Public Assistance (PA), Hazard
Mitigation Assistance (HMA), the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and Individual
Assistance (IA), then they describe the SBA Disaster Loan program. At the time of publication,
HUD’s Community Development Block Grant–Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) and Community
Development Block Grant–Mitigation (CDBG-MIT) programs had not received appropriations in
response to the 2019-2020 earthquakes.437
Detailed program overviews can be found in the program-specific sections in the “Federal
Assistance Provided to Puerto Rico Following Hurricanes Irma and María” section of this report.

437 Efforts to reprogram existing CDBG-DR or CDBG-MIT funds would likely require approval at the discretion of
HUD.
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What follows are brief overviews of the work that has been completed and the work that remains
to be completed, and a few program-specific considerations for Congress related to the
earthquakes.
FEMA Public Assistance438
The President’s major disaster declaration for the 2019-2020 earthquakes and subsequent
amendments authorized all categories of Public Assistance in 14 affected municipios.439
Applicants may choose to complete individual projects according to either alternative or standard
procedures under this declaration. As with previous disasters, Puerto Rico is the PA Recipient,
which helps FEMA administer PA awards authorized under the declarations for the 2019-2020
earthquakes.440 Responsibility for PA administration was delegated to the Central Office of
Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resiliency (COR3).441
Status of PA Projects for Earthquake Recovery
By August 10, 2020, FEMA reported that it had obligated funds for nine projects for earthquake
recovery in Puerto Rico, for a total of $833,325.442 FEMA estimated that damages eligible for
Public Assistance totaled more than $32 million.443 All obligated earthquake projects support
emergency work or management costs, with no reported obligations for permanent facility
reconstruction.444
PA Considerations Related to Earthquake Recovery
For any damage associated with the 2019-2020 earthquakes in Puerto Rico, because the disaster
declaration was after the initial publication date of FEMA’s Interim Policy on consensus-based
codes, use of the latest published earthquake codes is mandatory.

438 For more information on FEMA’s Public Assistance program, contact Erica A. Lee, Analyst in Emergency
Management and Disaster Recovery.
439 FEMA, DHS, “Initial Notice: Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations,” 85 Federal Register 6965-
6966, January 7, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/06/2020-02300/puerto-rico-emergency-
and-related-determinations; FEMA, “Puerto Rico; Amendment No. 6 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,”
March 11, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/notices/amendment-no-6-17. Permanent work was authorized in 14
municipios: Adjuntas, Guánica, Guayanilla, Jayuya, Juana Díaz, Lajas, Las Marías, Mayagüez, Peñuelas, Ponce,
Sabana Grande, San Germán, Utuado, and Yauco.
440 2 C.F.R. §200.86.
441 Government of Puerto Rico, Executive Order of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares,
To Create the Central Recovery and Reconstruction Office of Puerto Rico, Administrative Bulletin No. OE-2017-65,
October 23, 2017 (to access the Executive Order, visit the website of the Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Departamento de
Estado, available at https://www.estado.pr.gov/en/executive-orders/).
442 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, August 11, 2020.
443 FEMA, “Preliminary Damage Assessment Report: Puerto Rico—Earthquakes FEMA-4473-DR,”
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/FEMA4473DRPR.pdf.
444 FEMA Representative Alex Amparo, Hurricanes Irma, María, & Earthquake Progress and Innovation in Puerto
Rico, briefing slides, August 11, 2020.
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Mitigation and Rebuilding After Natural Disasters445
Territorial and local governments in Puerto Rico, and certain nonprofit organizations, are eligible
applicants for assistance through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).
Status of HMGP for Earthquake Recovery
$90,988,238 in HMGP funding is available to Puerto Rico for the earthquakes. However, none of
the earthquake HMGP funding had been obligated by October 2020.446
Mitigation and Insurance Considerations Related to Earthquake Recovery
Multiple Hazards
The 2019-2020 earthquakes in Puerto Rico highlighted the challenges of building properties that
can resist damage from wind, flood, and earthquakes. Communities that are exposed to multiple
hazards may use construction materials that perform well for the most frequent hazard, but that
may present an increased risk for less frequent hazards. For example, homes that are elevated on
stilts or pilings to reduce flood risk may be more vulnerable to ground shaking during
earthquakes if not adequately designed and constructed.447 There are approximately 100,000
housing structures built on stilts in Puerto Rico.448
Building to mitigate multiple risks can be done, but is significantly more expensive.449
It is unclear if structures damaged by Hurricanes Irma and María will be repaired or rebuilt to
current codes for earthquakes, as well as current codes for wind and flood. If rebuilt for multiple
hazards, it is likely that the available funding will not go as far and may need to be supplemented.
In addition, FEMA and HUD should clarify whether comparable building code requirements will
apply to work funded by HMGP and CDBG-DR, or by a combination of funding.
Earthquake Insurance
Earthquake coverage, like flood coverage, is generally excluded from regular homeowners’
insurance and only offered as an endorsement or stand-alone policy. Earthquake insurance
typically covers losses caused by an earthquake and aftershocks that occur within 72 hours of the
earthquake.450 Despite the prospect of catastrophic losses, the take-up rate for earthquake

445 For more information on FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance program and the National Flood Insurance
Program, contact Diane P. Horn, Analyst in Flood Insurance and Emergency Management.
446 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, August 27, 2020.
447 Eduardo Miranda et al., Puerto Rico M6.4 Earthquake, 7 January 2020, Structural Extreme Events Reconnaissance,
Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report PRJ-2670, January 10, 2020, pp. 6, 66-7, https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/338528208_StEER_-
_7_JAN_2020_PUERTO_RICO_Mw_64_EARTHQUAKE_PRELIMINARY_VIRTUAL_RECONNAISSANCE_RE
PORT_PVRR.
448 Alberto M. Lopez, K. Stephen Huges, and Elizabeth Vanacore, “Puerto Rico’s Winter 2019-2020 Seismic Sequence
Leaves the Island on Edge,” Tremblor, January 7, 2020, https://temblor.net/earthquake-insights/puerto-ricos-winter-
2019-2020-seismic-sequence-leaves-the-island-on-edge-10321/.
449 National Institute of Building Sciences, Natural Hazards Mitigation, Whole Building Design Guide Secure/Safe
Committee, September 14, 2017, https://www.wbdg.org/design-objectives/secure-safe/natural-hazards-mitigation.
450 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, A Consumer’s Guide to Earthquake Insurance, Washington, DC,
2011, p. 7, https://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_events_150814_naic_earthquake_consumer_guide.pdf.
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insurance is extremely low across the country.451 Mortgage lenders do not generally require
earthquake insurance as a loan condition.452 Relatively few U.S. homeowners have purchased
earthquake insurance; only 8% of homeowners who responded to a May 2016 poll by the
Insurance Information Institute said that they have earthquake insurance.453 The low take-up rate
may be explained by the cost and coverage limitations for earthquake insurance, homeowners’
perception of earthquake risk, and, unlike flood insurance, the voluntary nature of this
coverage.454
There is some indication that the take-up rate for earthquake insurance may be higher in Puerto
Rico than in the rest of the United States. This may be because, in contrast to the rest of the U.S.,
lenders in Puerto Rico require earthquake insurance as a condition of granting a residential
mortgage loan.455 For example, Puerto Rico ranked fifth highest among U.S. states and territories
in terms of earthquake insurance direct premiums written in 2018. Puerto Rico’s $93.4 million in
premium volume accounted for 2.9% of the total earthquake business reported in 2018 by U.S.
property and casualty insurers, whereas Puerto Rico contributed only 0.3% of the 2018 direct
premiums across all other property and casualty lines.456
Assistance to Individuals and Households457
The FEMA Individual Assistance (IA) program may provide aid to affected individuals and
households when authorized following a presidential declaration of emergency or major
disaster.458 In Puerto Rico, IA was authorized following the earthquakes that began in 2019.
Status of IA Projects for Earthquake Recovery
Disaster survivors from the earthquakes continued to receive assistance through the IHP in
2020—and more than $65.8 million in housing assistance had been disbursed by September 2020
according to FEMA.459

451 Federal Insurance Office, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of
the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, Washington, DC, September 2015, p. 4,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/Natural%20Catastrophe%20Report.pdf
(hereinafter Federal Insurance Office, Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance).
452 Federal Insurance Office, Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance, p. 38.
453 Insurance Information Institute, Background on Earthquake Insurance and Risk, January 14, 2020,
https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-earthquake-insurance-and-risk.
454 Federal Insurance Office, Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance, p. 38.
455 Federal National Mortgage Association, Selling Guide: Additional Insurance Coverage, B7-3-05, October 7, 2020,
https://selling-guide.fanniemae.com/Selling-Guide/Origination-thru-Closing/Subpart-B7-Insurance/Chapter-B7-3-
Property-and-Flood-Insurance/1032998971/B7-3-05-Additional-Insurance-Coverage-07-29-2014.htm.
456 Tim Zawacki, “Puerto Rico’s Earthquake Insurance Market,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, January 9, 2020,
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/xzlxg8rx5wojwj0b_idlhw2.
457 For more information on FEMA’s Individual Assistance program, contact Elizabeth M. Webster, Analyst in
Emergency Management and Disaster Recovery.
458 For more information on FEMA’s IA program, see CRS Report R46014, FEMA Individual Assistance Programs:
An Overview, by Elizabeth M. Webster.
459 According to an email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 24, 2020, the FEMA IHP period of
performance will run through July 16, 2021. FEMA-funded Disaster Legal Services concluded on June 30, 2020.
However, according to FEMA, as of September 24, 2020, “PR Legal Services continues to provide pro bono services to
the survivors of 4473 PR under their own budget.” Further, the Government of Puerto Rico has submitted a grant
application to provide Disaster Case Management (DCM), which, according to FEMA, is in the process of approval, to
include Congressional Notification. DCM will begin once the Notice of Grant Award is issued. Per FEMA, DCM “is
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The earthquakes are having a significant
Earthquake Assistance Provided
housing impact. According to COR3, the
“earthquakes resulted in the intermittent

displacement of over 10,000 people, [and] over
Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA): more
than $3.0 mil ion was paid to contract 198 hotel
2,000 homes with structural damage....”460
rooms for 255 households.
The delivery of assistance to disaster survivors
Disaster Unemployment Assistance: $775,734
from the earthquakes has concluded for most
awarded in benefits to 432 applicants.
forms of IA.461 Following the earthquakes,
Disaster Legal Services: $5,000 in funding
emergency sheltering assistance was provided
supported the provision of assistance to 317 disaster
survivors.
through the Transitional Sheltering Assistance
(TSA) program (authorized under FEMA
Individuals and Households Program (IHP):
$65.4 mil ion was approved for Housing Assistance,
PA).462 Additional forms of IA included
and $2.2 mil ion was approved for ONA (assistance is
Disaster Unemployment Assistance,463
ongoing).
assistance through the Crisis Counseling

Assistance and Training Program—Immediate
Sources: FEMA, “Federal Disaster Assistance for Puerto Rico
Services Program464 and Disaster Legal
Earthquakes Tops $104 Mil ion,” DR-4473-PR NR, July 14,
2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200716/federal-
Services.465
disaster-assistance-puerto-rico-earthquakes-tops-104-mil ion;
and email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated
Some forms of IA, however, are still being
September 24, 2020.
provided, including assistance through the
FEMA IHP, including funding for Rental Assistance, Home Repair, and ONA (e.g., to repair or
replace personal property),466 and the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program—
Regular Services Program, which began on August 31, 2020, and is set to conclude in May
2021.467

currently under Congressional review for approval.” See also FEMA, “Federal Disaster Assistance for Puerto Rico
Earthquakes Tops $104 Million,” DR-4473-PR NR, July 14, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200716/
federal-disaster-assistance-puerto-rico-earthquakes-tops-104-million (hereinafter FEMA, “Federal Disaster Assistance
for Puerto Rico Earthquakes”).
460 Government of Puerto Rico, Fourth Congressional Status Report, p. 2.
461 FEMA, “Federal Disaster Assistance for Puerto Rico Earthquakes.”
462 FEMA, “Earthquake Survivors Helped by FEMA’s Transitional Sheltering Assistance,” NR 39, July 21, 2020,
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200722/earthquake-survivors-helped-femas-transitional-sheltering-assistance.
TSA assistance for disaster survivors following the earthquakes concluded on July 20, 2020. According to FEMA,
checkout was July 21, 2020 (email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 24, 2020).
463 FEMA, “Deadline for Disaster Unemployment Assistance Extended to June 30,” DR-4473-PR MA006, April 6,
2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200514/deadline-disaster-unemployment-assistance-extended-june-30.
464 FEMA, “Crisis Counseling Approved for Six Municipalities in Southwest Puerto Rico,” DR-4473-PR NR 17,
February 13, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200220/crisis-counseling-approved-six-municipalities-
southwest-puerto-rico. According to FEMA, “the Immediate Services Program under Crisis Counseling concluded on
August 30, 2020” (email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 24, 2020).
465 FEMA, “Free Legal Information Available for Those Affected by the Earthquakes,” DR-4473-PR NR 15, February
12, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200220/free-legal-information-available-those-affected-earthquakes.
FEMA-funded Disaster Legal Services concluded on June 30, 2020. However, according to FEMA, as of September
24, 2020, “PR Legal Services continues to provide pro bono services to the survivors of 4473 PR under their own
budget” (email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 24, 2020).
466 FEMA, “Federal Disaster Assistance for Puerto Rico Earthquakes”; FEMA, “Earthquake Survivors Have Until July
2 to Apply for FEMA Disaster,” DR-4473-PR MA 08, May 29, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200716/
earthquake-survivors-have-until-july-2-apply-fema-disaster.
467 Email from FEMA Congressional Affairs staff dated September 24, 2020.
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SBA Disaster Loans468
The SBA Disaster Loan Program provides low-interest disaster loans to homeowners, renters, and
businesses, as well as to private and nonprofit organizations to repair or replace real estate,
personal property, machinery and equipment, inventory, and business assets that have been
damaged or destroyed in a declared disaster.469
SBA Disaster Loans: 2019-2020 Earthquakes
SBA approved $250 million in business disaster loans and $39 million for home disaster loans in
response to the earthquakes that began in 2019 (see Table A-1 and Table A-2). The number of
loans that were issued by SBA may be lower than the number of loan applications approved,
because not all approved loan applications are accepted by the borrower.
Table A-1. SBA Business Disaster Loans
2019 Earthquake
Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Guánica
$145,500 Lajas
$17,100 Unidentifieda
$25,000
Guayanil a
$594,200 Ponce
$682,600 Utuado
$38,000
Juana Díaz
$1,200 Sabana Grande
$109,800 Vil alba
$14,700
Jayuya
$36,600 San Germán
$18,500 Yauco
$703,500

San Sebastián
$78,600 Total
$2,465,300
Source: CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Congressional and
Legislative Affairs on August 8, 2020. The amounts are subject to change because the assistance for the 2019
earthquake is ongoing.
Notes: Not all applicants accept approved loans. The SBA applies the term “County/Parish” to “municipios” in
their data. Puerto Rico’s municipios are the functioning equivalent to counties and parishes.
a. The municipio was not identified by SBA.
Table A-2. SBA Home Disaster Loans
2019 Earthquake
Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Adjuntas
$622,500 Juana Díaz
$1,109,400 Ponce
$8,569,900
Aguada
$55,000 Jayuya
$633,600 Sabana Grande
$598,100
Añasco
$55,000 Lajas
$888,500 Salinas
$85,800
Arecibo
$251,200 Lares
$536,900 San Germán
$318,100
Barceloneta
$86,600 Las Marías
$109,400 San Sebastián
$480,900
Cabo Rojo
$174,600 Manatí
$12,100 Santa Isabel
$256,000
Ciales
$262,100 Mayagüez
$259,900 Seminole
$5,200

468 For more information on the SBA’s Disaster Loan program, contact Bruce R. Lindsay, Analyst in American
National Government.
469 SBA disaster loans can only be used for uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated damages.
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Approved
Approved
Approved
Application
Application
Application
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Municipio
Amount
Coamo
$103,600 Maricao
$90,500 Unidentifieda
$32,900
Corozal
$253,500 Morovis
$70,100 Utuado
$1,060,300
Guánica
$6,050,100 Naranjito
$24,800 Vil alba
$633,700
Guayanil a
$4,464,100 Orocovis
$25,000 Yauco
$8,934,300
Hormigueros
$36,500 Peñuelas
$2,166,200
Total
$39,316,400
Source: CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Congressional and
Legislative Affairs on August 8, 2020. The amounts are subject to change because the assistance for the 2019
earthquake is ongoing.
Notes: Not all applicants accept approved loans. The SBA applies the term “County/Parish” to “municipios” in
their data. Puerto Rico’s municipios are the functioning equivalent to counties and parishes.
a. The municipio was not identified by SBA.
Considerations Regarding the Future of Recovery
Congressional considerations related to the earthquakes are included in the “The Future of
Recovery in Puerto Rico and Considerations for Congress” section of this report.
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Appendix B. Tracking Recovery Program Funding
and the Status of Work
The status of Puerto Rico’s recovery efforts following the disasters occurring between 2017 and
2020 remains the subject of congressional interest and activity. The following sections discuss the
sources of data that may be used to evaluate the cost and status of Puerto Rico’s recovery work
following Hurricanes Irma and María, and the ongoing earthquakes that began in 2019.
Recovery Program Data Limitations
Members of Congress have maintained a high level of interest in the funding that has been
committed to Puerto Rico’s disaster recovery efforts, as well as how it has been received and
expended. However, there is no single authoritative source of current funding data for all federal
assistance. Additionally, some programmatic data are not publicly available. Existing data sources
are not easily reconcilable and require discrete analysis, for reasons including the following:
 data accuracy cannot be easily verified, as federal agencies (e.g., FEMA) may be
the sole source of information;
 detail varies among different data sources (e.g., the FEMA Recovery Support
Function Leadership Group (RSFLG) “State Profiles” website provides data at
the appropriation level for the DRF, rather than at the program level);
 data available through different public-facing sources are updated at different
times;470
 terms are not defined in a standard way across data sources and agencies (e.g.,
the term “obligated”471 has different meanings depending on the data source); and
 some federal recovery programs have largely been completed, while the work
associated with other programs is in the initial stages of project development.
These distinctions inhibit straightforward assessments of how much federal assistance has been
committed and provided to Puerto Rico. Additionally, the insights that can be gleaned from the
available recovery program data depend on the status of the particular federal program.472 To that

470 For example, per the OpenFEMA Data description of the “OpenFEMA Dataset: Individuals and Households
Program - Valid Registrations - v1” dataset, available at https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/individuals-and-
households-program-valid-registrations-v1, “[t]his is raw, unedited data from FEMA’s National Emergency
Management Information System (NEMIS) and as such is subject to a small percentage of human error. Any financial
information is derived from NEMIS and not FEMA’s official financial systems. Due to differences in reporting periods,
status of obligations and how business rules are applied, this financial information may differ slightly from official
publication on public websites such as usaspending.gov; this dataset is not intended to be used for any official federal
financial reporting.”
471 For example, per the FEMA website, “obligation” is defined as “[a]n entry made by a member of a discretionary
grant team in the federal agency’s automated accounting system authorizing payments of federal grant funds to a
grantee.” (FEMA, “Glossary,” https://www.fema.gov/about/glossary). Whereas, per the glossary on the FEMA
Recovery Support Function Leadership Group (RSFLG) “State Profiles” website, an “obligation” is “a binding
agreement” that the U.S. government enters when awarding funding. “The government promises to spend the money,
either immediately or in the future....” FEMA, RSFLG, “State Profiles, Glossary,” https://recovery.fema.gov/glossary/o
(hereinafter FEMA RSFLG, “State Profiles, Glossary”).
472 For example, the unique characteristics of both disasters and grantees may result in federal agencies’ issuance of
disaster-specific guidance to tailor programs to best meet the needs of disaster survivors, businesses, nonprofit
organizations, and government entities. However, this practice of issuing disaster-specific guidance may also lead to
confusion related to program implementation.
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end, caution should be exercised when relying solely on numerical program data as an oversight
tool, and contextual information may be needed to adequately interpret the available data.
Additional considerations are further discussed in the “Increasing Access to Program Data and
Project Status Information” section of this report.
Recovery Program Data Resources
To establish a picture of the status of recovery in Puerto Rico following the disasters occurring
between 2017 and 2020, publicly available sources of federal funding data should be referenced
with the above-listed data limitations in mind. Sources of discrete recovery program funding data
for FEMA’s PA, IA, HMGP, and NFIP programs, SBA’s Disaster Loan Program, and HUD’s
CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT programs, as well as caveats related to relying on such data sources,
are included in Table B-1 and described below. Federal assistance was also provided by other
federal agencies, however data and information related to these sources of assistance are not
included herein.
Table B-1. Sources of Discrete Disaster Recovery Program Data
Applies to Assistance for Puerto Rico Associated with the 2017 Hurricanes and 2019-2020 Earthquakes
Data Resource
Agency
Programs
Resource Available at
OpenFEMA Data
FEMA
PA, IA, HMGP, NFIP
https://www.fema.gov/about/openfema/
data-sets
(search by major disaster number: Irma =
4336; María = 4339; and Earthquakes =
4473)
DRF Monthly Report
FEMA

https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-
data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports
FEMA Disasters
FEMA
PA, IA—IHP, HMGP

Hurricane Irma:
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4336

Hurricane María:
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4339

2019-2020 Earthquakes:
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4473
Hurricane Maria by the
FEMA
PA, IA, SBA, Other
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/
Numbers
hurricane-Maria-numbers
FEMA Office of External
FEMA
HMGP
HMGP data provided by FEMA
Affairs
Congressional Liaisons; all HMA data
available at https://www.fema.gov/
openfema-data-page/hazard-mitigation-
assistance-projects-v2
NFIP Bureau and
FEMA
NFIP
https://nfipservices.floodsmart.gov/home/
Statistical Agent (BSA)
reports

SBA Open Data Sources
SBA
Disaster Loans
https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-
performance/open-government/digital-
sba/open-data/open-data-sources
HUD Exchange
HUD
CDBG-DR
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/
CDBG-MIT
cdbg-dr/reports/
Sources: Compiled by CRS from publicly available federal agency data sources.
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FEMA Data Sources
FEMA websites, such as OpenFEMA, include several sources of program data.473 OpenFEMA
Data is detailed, but has its limitations. Using the Individual Assistance datasets as an example,
two of the datasets provide applicant-level information that is extremely detailed, but one
includes data dating back to 2002, and the other dates back to 2013.474 There are other separate IA
datasets for homeowners and renters that aggregate all applicant data at the zip code level.475
These datasets all include information on the grants of financial assistance approved for housing
assistance and other needs assistance. However, some datasets aggregate the assistance provided
for some distinct IHP programs (e.g., the homeowner dataset aggregates the financial assistance
provided for the Home Repair and Home Replacement assistance programs, and the datasets
aggregate the financial assistance provided for Other Needs Assistance). Additionally, some
forms of IHP assistance are not documented in the publicly available data and instead must be
requested directly from FEMA, including data on direct housing assistance.476 Data on other
forms of IA (other than the IHP) is publicly unavailable and must be requested from FEMA (e.g.,
information on crisis counseling). Additionally, information posted to public-facing websites,
such as FEMA’s disaster-specific webpages or other websites (e.g., usaspending.gov) may differ
from the OpenFEMA Data. This may be due to a lag in when the data is imported from
OpenFEMA Data, as well as “differences in reporting periods, status of obligations and how
business rules are applied....”477
In addition to OpenFEMA Data, program data for IA—IHP, PA, and HMGP is also usually
available through the FEMA Disasters webpages. Such webpages are created for presidentially
declared emergencies and disasters and include a “Financial Assistance” section.478 However,
again using the IA data as an example, the assistance listed for IA is limited to the IHP (because
that is the only program that provides financial assistance to individuals). Further, the PA
financial assistance listed aggregates the categories of emergency work (i.e., Categories A and B)
and permanent work (i.e., Categories C-G). In some cases, FEMA may provide more detailed
information on the assistance provided, which was done in the case of Hurricane María. FEMA
produced a “By the Numbers” report for this disaster with more detailed information on the types

473 The FEMA OpenFEMA Data Sets, and descriptions of the data provided, are available at https://www.fema.gov/
about/openfema/data-sets. FEMA’s OpenFEMA Data Sets provides publicly available program data sets for some
elements of PA, IA (limited to assistance provided through the Individuals and Households Program), HMGP, and the
NFIP.
474 See FEMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Individuals and Households Program - Valid Registrations - v1,” last accessed
October 28, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/individuals-and-households-program-valid-registrations-
v1; and FEMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Registration Intake and Individuals Household Program (RI-IHP) - v2,” last
accessed October 28, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/registration-intake-and-individuals-household-
program-ri-ihp-v2.
475 See FEMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Housing Assistance Program Data - Owners - v2,” last accessed October 28,
2020, https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/housing-assistance-program-data-owners-v2; and FEMA,
“OpenFEMA Dataset: Housing Assistance Program Data - Renters - v2,” last accessed October 28, 2020,
https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/housing-assistance-program-data-renters-v2.
476 See, for example, the IHP data for homeowners, available at FEMA, “Housing Assistance Program Data—Owners,”
https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/housing-assistance-program-data-owners.
477 See, for example, the data description in the FEMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Individuals and Households Program -
Valid Registrations - v1” dataset, available at https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/individuals-and-households-
program-valid-registrations-v1.
478 FEMA, “Declared Disasters,” https://www.fema.gov/disasters/disaster-declarations.
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of assistance provided, including the amount of funding provided and the number of people
served, projects developed, etc.479
FEMA publishes Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) monthly reports, which include an appropriations
funding summary, a summary of the obligations for catastrophic events (i.e., those costing more
than $500 million), and other information, including changes in program activity organized by
catastrophic event.480
SBA Data Sources
SBA Disaster Loan data is available through the SBA’s Open Data Sources (see the “Small
Business Administration Disaster Loan Program” section of this report for more detailed
information).
HUD Data Sources
Program data for HUD’s CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT programs is available through the HUD
Exchange website (see the “HUD Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery
and—Mitigation” section of this report for more detailed information). HUD produces a CDBG-
DR Grant History Report that lists the grants provided since 1992.481 HUD also posts information
on active disaster grants, including linking to grantee information and resources.482 Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, HUD suspended the monthly CDBG-DR financial reporting process.483
Aggregated Data Sources
Sources of aggregated program data, including the agencies responsible for administering and
managing the programs, the program data provided, and where the data can be accessed, are
included in Table B-2 and described below. While this report is focused on data associated with
the recovery programs provided by FEMA, the SBA, and HUD, the aggregated data sources
described herein also include data for most of the other federal recovery assistance programs that
are providing discretionary funded relief or recovery resources.

479 FEMA, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers,” https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hurricane-Maria-numbers.
480 The FEMA Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) Monthly Reports are available at https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-
data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports. For more information on the DRF, see CRS Report R45484, The Disaster
Relief Fund: Overview and Issues, by William L. Painter.
481 The HUD CDBG-DR Grant History Report is available at https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/
reports/.
482 The HUD “CDBG-DR Active Disaster Grants and Grantee Contact Information” is available at
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/cdbg-dr-grantee-contact-information/#all-disasters.
483 HUD, CDBG-DR COVID-19 Fact Sheet, 2020, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CPD/documents/COVID-19-
CDBG-DR-FAQs-072420.pdf.
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Table B-2. Sources of Aggregated Disaster Recovery Program Data
Applies to Assistance for Puerto Rico Associated with the 2017 Hurricanes and 2019-2020 Earthquakes
Data Resource
Agency
Programs
Resource Available at
State Profiles
FEMA Recovery Support
FEMA—PA, IA, and HMGP;
https://recovery.fema.gov/
Function Leadership
SBA Disaster Loans; and
index.php/state-profiles
Group (RSFLG)
HUD—CDBG-DR
(additional federal agency
programs are also included)
COR3 Transparency
COR3
FEMA—PA, IA, and HMGP;
https://recovery.pr/en
Portal
SBA Disaster Loans; and
HUD—CDBG-DR
(additional federal agency
programs are also included)
USAspending.gov
Treasury
All
https://www.usaspending.gov/
Sources: Compiled by CRS from publicly available data sources provided by federal agencies and the
Government of Puerto Rico.
The FEMA Recovery Support Function Leadership Group (RSFLG), “State Profiles” website
provides information on funding “allocated,”484 “obligated,”485 and “outlayed”486 from various
program accounts/funds (e.g., the DRF, Disaster Loan Program Account, and Community
Development Fund).487 The information can be filtered, including by territory, agency, and
funding source (e.g., enacted disaster supplemental appropriations legislation since FY2017, as
well as annual appropriations for disaster funding through FEMA). A challenge with relying on
the “State Profiles” website for program-level information is that the data are aggregated and do
not provide detailed information on specific recovery programs.
Puerto Rico maintains an additional resource for aggregated data. COR3, the entity responsible
for supporting the Government of Puerto Rico’s recovery efforts, maintains a “Transparency
Portal” website488 that reports FEMA and other federal agency funding that has been

484 Per the glossary on the FEMA Recovery Support Function Leadership Group (RSFLG) “State Profiles” website,
“allocations” are defined as the “[a]ssignment of appropriated federal funds to specific states, territories, tribes or local
units of government. Note: Not all agencies allocate disaster funds in advance of obligations.” FEMA RSFLG, “State
Profiles, Glossary.”
485 Per the glossary on the FEMA RSFLG “State Profiles” website, an “obligation” is “a binding agreement” that the
U.S. government enters when awarding funding. “The government promises to spend the money, either immediately or
in the future. An agency incurs an obligation, for example, when it places an order, signs a contract, awards a grant,
purchases a service, or takes other actions that require it to make a payment.” FEMA RSFLG, “State Profiles,
Glossary.”
486 Per the glossary on the FEMA RSFLG “State Profiles” website, “outlays” are “[p]ayments made to liquidate an
obligation.” “An outlay occurs when Federal money is actually paid out, not just promised to be paid (‘obligated’).”
FEMA RSFLG, “State Profiles, Glossary.”
487 The RSFLG “State Profiles” website is available at https://recovery.fema.gov/index.php/state-profiles.
488 The COR3 “Transparency Portal” is available at https://recovery.pr/en (the website is also available in Spanish). The
COR3 Transparency Portal was established to ensure a “transparent and effective recovery process” (COR3,
“Transparency Portal: What Is Transparency?,” https://recovery.pr/en/what-is-transparency).
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“allocated,”489 “obligated,”490 and “disbursed.”491 The COR3 “Transparency Portal” website states
that the FEMA program data are obtained from FEMA and COR3. Other federal program data
note the agency the data were obtained from (in some cases they were obtained from the agency
that provided the funding and in some cases FEMA provided the information). Challenges with
relying on the COR3 “Transparency Portal” website for program-level information include:
 different dates when program data were updated (e.g., the Transparency Portal
notes when the content was last updated, but also acknowledges that “the date of
the financials vary by each Federal Agency....”); and
 COR3 uses different funding status definitions than federal agencies, such as
FEMA.
The database USAspending.gov (http://www.usaspending.gov), maintained by the U.S. Treasury
Department, enables tracking of federal contract and grant awards, loans, and other assistance
funding at state and local levels.492 While this source may be useful for researching specific
awards related to natural disaster responses in Puerto Rico, users should be aware that search
results may be incomplete or contain inaccuracies, as identified in reports by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office.493 Additionally, USAspending.gov does not include filtering
options for specific disaster events.
Congressional considerations related to program data are discussed in the “The Future of
Recovery in Puerto Rico and Considerations for Congress” and “Increasing Access to Program
Data and Project Status Information” sections of this report.

489 The COR3 “Transparency Portal” website defines “allocated” as “[f]unding appropriated by Congress for Puerto
Rico recovery efforts.” COR3, “Transparency Portal.”
490 The COR3 “Transparency Portal” website defines “obligated” as “[a]llocated funding that has been committed by
Federal Agencies for distribution.” COR3, “Transparency Portal.”
491 The COR3 “Transparency Portal” website defines “disbursed” as “[o]bligated funding that has been distributed to
Recipients, Subrecipients, and agencies.” COR3, “Transparency Portal.”
492 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10231, Tracking Federal Awards in States and Congressional Districts
Using USAspending.gov, by Jennifer Teefy.
493 Recent GAO reports include DATA Act: OIGs Reported That Quality of Agency-Submitted Data Varied, and Most
Recommended Improvements, GAO-20-540, July 9, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-540; and Data Act:
Quality of Data Submissions Has Improved but Further Action Is Needed to Disclose Known Data Limitations, GAO-
20-75, November 8, 2019, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-75.
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Appendix C. Building Codes494
Puerto Rico has recognized that structures that are being repaired and rebuilt must be resilient
against sea level rise, high winds, hurricane storm surge, and seismic activity.495 The Puerto Rican
government has affirmed their intention to build back stronger and more resilient to future
hazards through the adoption of stringent building codes.496 In addition, FEMA is increasingly
emphasizing the importance of building codes for disaster resilience, to enhance both public
safety and protection of property.497
Building codes in the United States are not regulated at the federal level, and there are no national
building codes. Building codes are administered at a community level and the federal government
cannot mandate the level of code enforcement in states or communities. Although the process of
developing building codes is often initiated at the state level through a legislative and public
policy process, the final adoption and enforcement of a building code is a local responsibility;
local building officials are responsible for enforcing the latest building codes within their
jurisdiction.
Rather than create and maintain their own codes, most states and local jurisdictions adopt model
codes that are created on a national or international level by standards-developing organizations,
and amend them where needed prior to adoption into state laws and local ordinances, making
compliance a requirement for builders and building owners. Model codes are transformed into
law when local governments enact them.
Building codes set out what can be built, and how, but generally do not address the question of
where to build; this must be done through land use planning or other policy actions. Building
codes may only regulate new construction, without addressing the issue of retrofitting older
buildings built before the code was implemented. Except in certain circumstances,498 the code
requirements for existing buildings are those that were in effect when the structure was designed
and constructed.499 Adoption of new codes does not require retrofitting older buildings, and
legislation or regulations may not require, or may prohibit, the application of new building codes
until the building has suffered a pre-determined amount of damage. For example, when a building
is determined by a community to be substantially damaged500 following a flood, floodplain
management standards adopted by local communities can require the building to be rebuilt to
current floodplain management requirements, even if the property previously did not need to do
so.

494 For more information on building codes, contact Diane P. Horn, Analyst in Flood Insurance and Emergency
Management.
495 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5), p. 18.
496 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 5), p. 95.
497 See, for example, FEMA, 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, p. 14, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/fema-
strategic-plan_2018-2022.pdf.
498 This may occur when a building is significantly renovated or altered, or there is a change in use that triggers an
update by the International Building Code (IBC) or International Existing Building Code (IEBC).
499 FEMA, “Frequently Asked Questions, Building Codes Toolkit,” January 29, 2014, p. 2, https://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/20130726-1902-25045-9664/building_codes_toolkit_faq_508.pdf.
500 44 C.F.R. §59.1 defines “substantial damage” as damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby the cost of
restoring the structure to its before-damaged condition would equal or exceed 50% of the market value of the structure
before the damage occurred.
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Risk reduction from the implementation of building codes is due to both the extent of the code as
it applies to new construction and the degree of local adoption and enforcement, as the
implementation of provisions of a strict building code depend on both the permitting and the
inspection process.501
The Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS)502 has produced a suite of design
standards labelled FORTIFIED Home, a set of performance-based engineering and building
standards designed to help strengthen new and existing homes through the installation of specific
building upgrades that reduce damage from hurricanes, hailstorms, low-level tornadoes, and
severe thunderstorms. These include the FORTIFIED Home Hurricane Standards, FORTIFIED
Home High Wind and Hail Standards, and FORTIFIED Home High Wind Standards.503 Each of
these standards provides three optional levels to exceed I-Code design requirements. These are
known as bronze, silver, and gold, with gold representing the highest standard. The gold hurricane
designation, for example, aims to minimize damage and loss resulting from a category 3
hurricane. Switching from conventional construction standards to FORTIFIED standards has been
shown to increase the resale value of a home by 6.8%.504
The IBHS has produced three Rating the States reports which assess elements of code
enforcement and administration and contractor licensing in the states and jurisdictions that are
most vulnerable to hurricanes. These reports rate each state on a 100-point scale, and consider
factors such as:
 a state’s current residential building code;
 the processes in effect to ensure universality of code application without weakening
amendments;
 state and local enforcement; and
 licensing and education of building officials, contractors, and subcontractors who
implement building code provisions.505
The IBHS did not assign a score to Puerto Rico, noting the difficulty of obtaining reliable
information regarding the effectiveness of building code administration and enforcement
programs to strengthen residential buildings against high winds and flooding.

501 Ellen Vaughan and Jim Turner, The Value and Impact of Building Codes, 2014, pp. 1-27,
http://www.coalition4safety.org/ccsc-toolkit/.
502 The Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) is a non-profit organization supported by property
insurers and reinsurers that conducts research to identify and promote the most effective ways to strengthen buildings
and communities against natural disasters and other causes of loss. See https://disastersafety.org/ for further
information.
503 IBHS, FORTIFIED Standards, 2015, https://ibhs.org/guidance/fortified-construction-standards/. Additional
information about the “FORTIFIED: New IBHS Commercial Construction Tools Protect the Bottom Line” can be
found at https://www.mylosscontrolservices.com/documents/loss-control-library/ibhs-fortified-commercial-
construction-standards.
504 Sebastain Awando et al., Estimating the Effect of FORTIFIED Home Construction on Home Resale Value, Alabama
Center for Insurance Information and Research, 2016, p. 4, https://www.smarthomeamerica.org/resources/the-effect-of-
fortified-construction-on-home-resale-value.
505 IBHS, Rating the States 2018: An Assessment of Residential Building Code and Enforcement Systems for Life
Safety and Property Protection in Hurricane-Prone Regions, Atlantic and Gulf Coast States, March 2018, p. 5,
https://ibhs.org/wp-content/uploads/wpmembers/files/Rating-the-States-2018_IBHS.pdfhttp://disastersafety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/ibhs-rating-the-states-2018.pdf.
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Building Codes in Puerto Rico
The 2011 Puerto Rico Building Code (PRBC) was the building code in force for residential and
commercial structures at the time of the 2017 hurricanes. The PRBC was based on the 2009
edition of the International Residential Code (IRC) with local amendments. The PRBC provided
structural provisions for reinforced concrete design, as well as masonry construction built to
withstand the wind load from a three-second gust of 145 mph,506 but these provisions were not
mandatory and the extent to which these standards were applied throughout Puerto Rico is
unclear.507 The 2011 code also included requirements for earthquake loads.
In response to the 2017 hurricanes, Puerto Rico stated that it intended to require rebuilding
methods that:
 produced stronger and more resilient properties that are better able to reduce the
risk from future disasters, rather than rebuilding to pre-storm standards;
 increased resilience in the face of natural hazards and address the risk of potential
future hazards;508 and
 incorporated an industry-recognized standard for building resilient or disaster-
resistant structures in any new construction or substantial rehabilitation
projects.509
In November 2018, Puerto Rico adopted the 2018 ICC family of I-Codes, and enacted legislation
that directed the Construction Codes Review Committee510 to revise Puerto Rico building codes
on a three-year cycle.511 Puerto Rico Codes 2018, Regulation No. 9049,512 contains requirements
for wind, flood, and earthquake loads. The Puerto Rico Permits Management Office is in the
process of reviewing the Puerto Rico Building Codes to adopt the 2018 ICC codes.513 As required
by FEMA, the government of Puerto Rico intends to use the recovery period to address the
problem of informal housing.514

506 A three-second gust speed of 145 mph corresponds to a category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale. See
ASCE/SEI 2005, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Structures, ASCE/SEI 7-05, p. 33, https://ascelibrary.org/
doi/book/10.1061/9780784408094.
507 IBHS, Rating the States 2018: An Assessment of Residential Building Code and Enforcement Systems for Life
Safety and Property Protection in Hurricane-Prone Regions, Atlantic and Gulf Coast States, March 2018, p. 25,
https://ibhs.org/wp-content/uploads/wpmembers/files/Rating-the-States-2018_IBHS.pdf.
508 See PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. ix.
509 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 2).
510 The Construction Codes Committee was established in 2017, and is comprised of representatives from the
Construction Council of Puerto Rico, regulatory government agencies, and FEMA. The committee was responsible for
the review and transition from the 2011 to 2018 building codes. See Juan Nieves, Puerto Rico’s New Building Codes
Are Creating a More Resilient Island, https://www.dewberry.com/news/blog/post/blog/2019/06/27/puerto-ricos-new-
building-codes-are-creating-a-more-resilient-island.
511 Law 2018-109. This refers to Puerto Rico law number 109, which passed in 2018.
512 See 9049 - Puerto Rico Codes 2018, https://ogpe.pr.gov/freedom/publicSearch/publicDocument?sort=name&max=
10&order=asc.
513 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 3), p. 115.
514 Governor of Puerto Rico, Build Back Better Puerto Rico, Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery, San
Juan, PR, November 13, 2017, p. 12, https://media.noticel.com/o2com-noti-media-us-east-1/document_dev/2017/11/
13/Build%20back%20better%20Puerto%20Rico_1510595877623_9313474_ver1.0.pdf (hereinafter Governor of
Puerto Rico, Build Back Better Puerto Rico).
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Wind Building Codes
The IBC adopts standards developed by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
Structural Engineering Institute (ASCE/SEI) to specify minimum design loads for wind,
earthquake, and flood.515 The wind-related provisions developed by the ASCE/SEI provide the
methodology for determining design wind pressures and forces, the design wind speed, and
requirements for windborne debris protection. Buildings are designed to withstand a certain wind
speed (the design wind speed) based on historic wind speeds documented for different geographic
areas. The wind loads prescribed for a particular structure are dependent on both the geographic
location of the building and the wind hazard maps published at the time of design.516 These wind
maps describe the relationship between the frequency and severity of winds that will affect the
building in the future, and the wind speeds that a building in a given area should be able to
withstand.517
High winds in the 2017 hurricanes caused severe damage, particularly to structures that were not
built to code.518 The building codes in force at the time of Hurricanes Irma and María specified a
design wind speed of 145 mph for all of Puerto Rico. A 2018 study for the Puerto Rico Planning
Board recommended that a design wind speed of 187 mph be applied for the whole island.519 The
design wind speed for new buildings in Puerto Rico under the 2018 I-Codes ranges from 150 to
200 mph, depending on structure type and risk category.520
Flood Building Codes
Standards for buildings in the floodplain to protect against flood risk are generally based on the
minimum standards required by FEMA for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP). Key conditions of the NFIP minimum standards include, among many other conditions,
that communities:
(1) require permits for development in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA);
(2) require elevation of the lowest floor of all new residential buildings in the SFHA to be at
or above the Base Flood Elevation (BFE);521
(3) restrict development in the regulatory floodway to prevent increasing the risk of flooding;
and

515 These are included in a broader set of guidelines called Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures,
commonly referred to as ASCE 7. See https://www.asce.org/asce-7/.
516 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 2), p. 94.
517 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 2), p. 51.
518 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Compendium Report. 2017 Hurricane Season: Building Performance
Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance, FEMA P-2054, September 30, 2019, p. ES-4,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/mat-report_2017-hurricane-season.pdf.
519 Puerto Rico Cost and Constructability Report: Impacts of Updating the Natural Hazard Provisions of the 2011
Puerto Rico Building Code for Residential Buildings Using the 2018 International Residential Code (IRC) as the Base
Code. Report provided to CRS by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, February 25, 2020.
520 See International Code Council, “Puerto Rico,” https://www.iccsafe.org/about-icc/government-relations/map/
puerto-rico/.
521 The Base Flood Elevation is the elevation of surface water resulting from a flood that has a 1% chance of being
equaled or exceeded in any given year.
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(4) require certain construction materials and methods that minimize future flood damage.522
These standards are minimum requirements for NFIP participation, but states and communities
can elect to adopt higher standards as a means of mitigating flood risk.
One of the main flood mitigation strategies in the NFIP regulations and I-Codes is the elevation
of properties above the Base Flood Elevation (BFE). Such elevation above BFE is commonly
referred to as freeboard. Since 2015, the I-Codes have required at least one foot of freeboard be
incorporated into elevation requirements, and requirements may also exist for adding additional
freeboard for critical facilities, depending on the type of facility and flood zone. Communities
that use I-Codes have the option to establish a design flood elevation that exceeds I-Code
standards.
Puerto Rico has participated in the NFIP since 1978, and approximately 58% of the total occupied
housing units in Puerto Rico are in the SFHA.523 Puerto Rico’s floodplain management ordinance
is the Puerto Rico Special Flood Hazard Areas Regulation (Planning Regulation 13), which
became effective in January 2010. This ordinance enacted standards that are compliant with NFIP
minimum requirements described above. However, the Puerto Rico floodplain management
ordinance is not consistent with the standards included in the recently adopted 2018 ICC family
of I-Codes, which require the minimum elevation of the lowest floor of a new building to be at
least one to two feet above BFE, depending on the flood design class.524 In addition, informal
construction does not usually meet NFIP standards.525
The Puerto Rico Department of Housing (PRDOH) has expressed its intention to apply elevation
standards for new construction, repair of substantially damaged structures, or substantial
improvements to residential structures in the SFHA such that the lowest floor is at least two feet
above the BFE. Substantially damaged structures in the SFHA will need to be reconstructed,
elevated, or bought out. PRDOH will determine when elevation, as opposed to other strategies, is
cost reasonable to promote a community’s long-term recovery. PRDOH estimates a potential
average cost of $44,307 for elevating a single-family wooden structure.526
Seismic Building Codes
The main objective of seismic building codes is to prevent structural collapse due to ground
shaking and/or liquefaction. Seismic design requirements have increased in length and
complexity with each new I-Code. The most recent recommended seismic provisions for new
buildings require buildings to be able to withstand the ground acceleration leading to a 1%
probability of structural collapse within a 50-year period.527 Ground acceleration is a relatively

522 See 44 C.F.R. §60, particularly 44 C.F.R. §60.3.
523 Governor of Puerto Rico, Build Back Better Puerto Rico, p. 12.
524 For more information, see ASCE 24-14, Flood Resistant Design and Construction, highlights for which are available
at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1436288616344-93e90f72a5e4ba75bac2c5bb0c92d251/ASCE24-
14_Highlights_Jan2015_revise2.pdf.
525 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Report. Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and
Technical Guidance, p. 2-8.
526 PRDOH, Action Plan for the Use of CDBG-DR Funds (Amendment 2), p. 101.
527 FEMA, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) Recommended Seismic Provisions: Design
Examples, FEMA P-1050-1, Washington, DC, July 2016, pp. 2-4, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1474320077368-125c7a1d1a3b864648554198526d671f/FEMA_P-1051.pdf. For more information, see CRS Report
RL33861, Earthquakes: Risk, Detection, Warning, and Research.
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simple design parameter which allows engineers to design a building to resist a certain horizontal
force.528
The most common approach to making
Defining Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
new buildings more seismically
Peak ground acceleration (PGA) is measure of how hard the
resilient—less likely to be damaged and
earth shakes, or accelerates, and is commonly used in seismic
more likely to be usable after an
hazard maps and earthquake engineering. PGA represents the
earthquake—is to design them with
largest increase in velocity recorded by a particular station
during an earthquake and is usually expressed as a percentage
increased strength and stiffness. A
of the acceleration due to gravity.
stronger building is less likely to

collapse, and a stiffer building is less
Source: Federal National Mortgage Association, United States
likely to suffer nonstructural damage
Geological Survey (USGS) Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) Calculator
such as cracks in partition walls, broken
Tutorial, 2017, https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/media/7371/display.
windows, etc.529 Stiffness is a measure
of how much force is required to displace a building by a certain amount. A structure that is too
stiff (often referred to as brittle) will be prone to failure under relatively small deformation
demands. An example of a brittle structure is an unreinforced masonry building, which will
tolerate very little displacement before the onset of damage and failure.530 Strength is an indicator
of the resistance of a substance before it deforms permanently or fractures.531
Reportedly, the 2011 Puerto Rico Building Code had incorporated seismic design parameters that
were more restrictive than the ICC code upon which it was based, by adding amendments based
on a study of the island’s seismic history.532 After adopting the 2018 ICC, rebuilding in Puerto
Rico after the earthquakes will require an even higher seismic standard.
Building Codes for Multiple Hazards
Wood-framed second stories atop concrete ground floor structures are typical of informal
construction, which has been built without analyzing the additional structural loads imposed on
the first-floor house. Structures that are elevated on stilts or pilings to reduce flood risk may be
more vulnerable to ground shaking during earthquakes, with concrete or wood-framed structures
over column or pier foundations particularly at risk of failure during earthquakes, leading to
foundation failure and/or structural collapse.533 Post-disaster analysis has established that
informally-constructed buildings are particularly prone to damage from compound disasters.534

528 USGS, Earthquake Hazards 201–Technical Q&A, https://www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/earthquake-hazards/
science/earthquake-hazards-201-technical-qa.
529 Keith Porter, Society Can Afford Seismically Resilient Buildings, National Institute of Building Sciences, Working
Paper, August 31, 2019, pp. 1-6, https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nibs.org/resource/resmgr/mmc/
mmc_workingpaper_porter.pdf.
530 Andrew O’Donnell and Julia Krezel, Ductility and Stiffness—What They Are and Why They Matter in an
Earthquake, AIR Worldwide, December 16, 2016, https://www.air-worldwide.com/blog/posts/2016/12/ductility-and-
stiffness-what-they-are-and-why-they-matter-in-an-earthquake/ (hereinafter O’Donnell and Krezel, Ductility and
Stiffness).
531 O’Donnell and Krezel, Ductility and Stiffness.
532 “Puerto Rico Permits Office Presents New Construction Code,” Caribbean Business, January 24, 2020,
https://caribbeanbusiness.com/puerto-rico-permits-office-presents-new-construction-code/.
533 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Compendium Report. 2017 Hurricane Season: Building Performance
Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance, FEMA P-2054, September 30, 2019, pp. 3-3 to 3-7,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/mat-report_2017-hurricane-season.pdf.
534 FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Report. Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and
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A 2017 study by the Multihazard Mitigation Council of the National Institute of Building
Sciences found that dependencies are likely to exist where strategies for mitigating more than one
hazard are undertaken at a single facility or single system of facilities (e.g., buildings on a
medical campus). They found that designing to exceed I-Code requirements could have multiple
benefits. For example, designing to exceed 2015 I-Code earthquake requirements could reduce
losses from fire following an earthquake, and could reduce losses from wind. Similarly, adopting
a higher standard for wind might also reduce earthquake losses by improving the building’s
ability to resist lateral forces.535

Technical Guidance, p. 1-7.
535 Multihazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves, 2017
Interim Report, Washington, DC, December 2017, pp. 60-61, https://www.nibs.org/page/reports.
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Appendix D. CRS Resources on Disaster Recovery
Assistance and Puerto Rico’s Recovery
For general information on the federal assistance programs described in this report, see:
 CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to and Recovering
from Major Disasters and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay and Elizabeth M.
Webster;
 CRS Report R45484, The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues, by William
L. Painter;
 CRS In Focus IF11529, A Brief Overview of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program,
by Erica A. Lee;
 CRS Insight IN11187, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazard
Mitigation Assistance, by Diane P. Horn;
 CRS In Focus IF10988, A Brief Introduction to the National Flood Insurance
Program, by Diane P. Horn;
 CRS Insight IN10450, Private Flood Insurance and the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), by Baird Webel and Diane P. Horn;
 CRS In Focus IF11298, A Brief Overview of FEMA’s Individual Assistance
Program, by Elizabeth M. Webster;
 CRS Report R46014, FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview, by
Elizabeth M. Webster;
 CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible
Issues for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay;
 CRS Report R44412, SBA Disaster Loan Program: Frequently Asked Questions,
by Bruce R. Lindsay;
 CRS Report R46475, The Community Development Block Grant’s Disaster
Recovery (CDBG-DR) Component: Background and Issues, by Michael H.
Cecire and Joseph V. Jaroscak; and
 CRS Insight IN11389, CDBG-DR Funding and Oversight: Puerto Rico, by
Joseph V. Jaroscak and Michael H. Cecire.
For additional information on the sources of recovery funding for Puerto Rico, see:
 CRS Report R45084, 2017 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: Overview, by
William L. Painter; and
 CRS In Focus IF10755, Major Disaster Assistance from the DRF: Puerto Rico,
by Bruce R. Lindsay.
For additional information on other recovery efforts, see:
 CRS Report R45263, Puerto Rico—Status of Electric Power Recovery, by
Richard J. Campbell;
 CRS Insight IN10785, Puerto Rico and Electric Power Restoration from
Hurricane Maria, by Richard J. Campbell; and
CRS Insight IN10764, 2017 Hurricanes and Army Corps of Engineers: Background for Flood
Response and Recovery, by Nicole T. Carter and Charles V. Stern.
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Author Information

Elizabeth M. Webster, Coordinator
Natalie Keegan
Analyst in Emergency Management and Disaster
Analyst in American Federalism and Emergency
Recovery
Management Policy

Michael H. Cecire
Erica A. Lee
Analyst in Intergovernmental Relations and
Analyst in Emergency Management and Disaster
Economic Development Policy
Recovery

Diane P. Horn
Bruce R. Lindsay
Analyst in Flood Insurance and Emergency
Analyst in American National Government
Management

Joseph V. Jaroscak

Analyst in Economic Development Policy

Acknowledgments
William L. Painter, Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations, and Shawn Reese, Analyst in
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy, provided structural and editorial comments and
suggestions. D. Andrew Austin, Analyst in Economic Policy, and R. Sam Garrett, Specialist in American
National Government provided editorial comments and suggestions. Jared C. Nagel, Senior Research
Librarian, and Jennifer Teefy, Senior Research Librarian, provided editorial comments and suggestions on
the data included in this report, and research support.
Shelley Harlan, Editor, helped edit the report text and footnotes.
Lauren R. Stienstra, Federalism and Emergency Management Section Research Manager, and James M.
Specht, Legislative and Budget Process Section Research Manager, advised the authors throughout the
report’s development, and provided structural and editorial comments and suggestions.
Maura Mullins, Research Librarian, assisted with data audits in the Public Assistance section of this report,
and helped compile data for the Small Business Administration section of this report.
Mari Y. Lee, Visual Information Specialist, developed the figures included in this report. Jim C. Uzel,
Geospatial Information Systems Analyst, and Amber Hope Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist,
developed the maps included in this report.
CRS would like to thank Adam C. Shapiro, Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs Liaison, FEMA
Office of External Affairs, and the staff of FEMA’s Office of Response and Recovery’s Recovery
Directorate, its Puerto Rico Joint Field Office, and the Office of External Affairs for contributing data and
information to this report.
CRS would like to thank John D. Ford, SBA Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, for
contributing data and information to this report.
Congressional Research Service

102

The Status of Puerto Rico’s Recovery Following Hurricanes Irma and María

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American Law

Economic Policy

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