The “Regular Order”: A Perspective

November 6, 2020 R46597

The “Regular Order”: A Perspective
November 6, 2020
Many contemporary lawmakers urge a return to “regular order” lawmaking. In general,
the regular order refers to a traditional, committee-centered process of lawmaking, very
Walter J. Oleszek
much in evidence during most of the 20th century. Today, Congress has evolved to
Senior Specialist in
become largely a party-centered institution. Committees remain important, but they are
American National
less important than previously as “gatekeepers” to the floor. This development
Government
represents a fundamental “then and now” change in the power dynamics of Capitol Hil .

Regular order is general y viewed as a systematic, step-by-step lawmaking process that
emphasizes the role of committees: bil introduction and referral to committee; the conduct of committee
hearings, markups, and reports on legislation; House and Senate floor consideration of committee-reported
measures; and the creation of conference committees to resolve bicameral differences. Many Members and
commentators view this sequential pattern as the ideal or “best practices” way to craft the nation’s laws. Regular
order is a lawmaking process that promotes transparency, deliberation, and the wide participation of Members in
policy formulation. Significant deviations from the textbook model of legislating—common in this party-centric
period—might be called “irregular,” “nontraditional,” “unorthodox,” or “unconventional” lawmaking. The wel -
known “Schoolhouse Rock” model of legislating stil occurs, but its prominence has declined compared with the
rise of newer, party leadership-directed processes.
Regular or irregular procedures can successfully be used to translate ideas into laws. They can be employed to
enact partisan or bipartisan legislation. Neither is necessarily better than the other as a lawmaking approach. Much
depends on contextual (e.g., divided or unified government) and situational factors (e.g., statutory deadlines or
national crises). Sometimes, regular order is observed for problem-solving; on other occasions, nontraditional
lawmaking may be the best or only way to pass legislation. Or a combination of both could be employed to
achieve legislative objectives.
In short, the regular order can be an elusive and changeable concept. People may legitimately contend that there is
no such thing as the regular order for enacting laws. No legislative process or procedure can ensure that outcome.
Moreover, the term is defined neither by the Constitution nor in House and Senate rules. As the U.S. Constitution
(Article I, Section 5) authoritatively states, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”
Accordingly, lawmakers who muster sufficient support and votes have wide freedom to create or change
parliamentary rules, precedents, and norms.
Since at least the mid-1990s, if not earlier (e.g., the early 1980s), nontraditional lawmaking has surged in both
legislative chambers. Why? In large measure because a sharper, combative form of partisan and ideological
polarization gradual y emerged both in Congress and the country. Regular order legislating through bipartisan
compromise is often harder to achieve in a polarized legislative environment.
Today, major policy and political disagreements between the two parties are at times so wide and deep on many
issues that gridlock can be the result. In response, the majority party may turn to nontraditional processes, in
whole or in part, to advance the legislative agenda. Nontraditional processes have their own virtues, such as
expedition over deliberation. An oft-used measure of partisan polarization is “party unity”: roll cal votes on
which a majority of Democrats and a majority of Republicans align against each other. Annual y, CQ Weekly
compiles, analyzes, and publishes the party unity scores. For example, partisan voting in 2019 for the Democratic-
controlled House was a record-setting 95% compared with 58% of partisan votes in 1972; for the GOP-controlled
Senate, 94% of Republicans in 2019 voted with their party against the other party; in 1972, 62% of votes split
Republicans from Democrats.
Congress functions on occasion like a parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary body, where the majority party
governs and the minority party opposes. With party unity high, each side might employ any number of procedural
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The “Regular Order”: A Perspective

tactics either to prevail or to stymie action. Parliamentary warfare is often the result, w ith each party turning to
nontraditional procedures (bypassing committee consideration, for example, or limiting floor amendments) to
achieve desired results. The centrality of partisan polarization has provoked an adaptive response common to both
chambers: set aside regular order legislating as circumstances warrant and employ unorthodox procedures to
advance party and policy priorities.
In brief, the broad purposes of this report are to provide various perspectives on the meaning of the “regular
order”; to discuss an array of nontraditional procedures that characterize decisionmaking in the contemporary
House and Senate; to examine the forces and factors that gave rise to party polarization and wider use of
nonconventional legislating; and, lastly, to offer summary observations about the transformation of contemporary
lawmaking.

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Introduction
A return to “regular order” lawmaking is a refrain heard quite often in the contemporary House
and Senate. When Paul Ryan, R-WI, was Speaker of the House (2016-2018), as an example, he
stated that he was working with the two leaders of the Senate to get back to the “regular order.”1
The term implies a systematic lawmaking process rooted in a committee structure that promotes
deliberation, negotiation, and compromise, as wel as amendment opportunities for lawmakers of
both parties. At its core, remarked a Senator, regular order meant “that everybody gets to
participate in the process” through committee activities and floor amendments.2 Today, rank-and-
file lawmakers have fewer opportunities “to participate in the deliberative work of Capitol Hil ”
because party leaders have “come to dominate the [policymaking] process.”3
A Capitol Hil veteran with decades of legislative service suggested that the regular order is a
political Rorschach: a term interpreted differently at different times by “different folks with
differing agendas.”4 It is a phrase subject to variable interpretations. Various analysts and
legislative experts have stated that there is no such thing as “the” regular order. Even so, Figure 1
provides a general sketch of what many refer to as “regular order” legislating. However,
legislative rules and procedure are not inert devices; they change regularly to reflect and respond
to new developments and chal enges.
During much of the 20th century (roughly 1915-1970), there was general understanding of the
“regular order.” Deviations from the sequential, step-by-step approach provide the baseline for
examining how legislating has changed from that earlier era to now.5 Regular lawmaking during
this earlier period was mainly a collegial, decentralized, and largely bipartisan system of
“committee government.” Customary procedures largely governed lawmaking. Committee chairs,
selected by a rigid seniority system, dominated legislative policymaking. “House and Senate
leadership,” wrote two congressional scholars, “resembled confederations of committee chairs,
each acting as sovereign over a committee’s jurisdiction.”6 An informal but influential
conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats supported the chairs’ views and
preferences on many issues (e.g., opposition to civil rights).7
Regular order and the legislative norms of this period—“to get along, go along”—limited
participation by junior lawmakers, blocked liberal-oriented measures, and al owed chairs to act
independently of their party. A particularly stark example is what a Rules Committee chair said to

1 T amar Hallerman, “A Return to Regular Order?,” CQ Weekly, January 4, 2016, p. 18.
2 Sen. John Cornyn, “Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 162 (February 3, 2016), p. S540.
3 Lee H. Hamilton, “How Congress Has Changed,” Indiana University Center on Representative Government, April 22,
2020, p. 2.
4 Don Wolfensberger, “Regular Order Is a Political Rorshach,” Roll Call, May 8, 2013, p. 12. T he Rorschach is a
psychological test t hat asks individuals to interpret what they see in a display of inkblot images.
5 See, for example, Kenneth A. Shepsle, “T he Changing T extbook Congress,” in Can the Government Govern? eds.
John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, DC: T he Brookings I nstitution, 1989), pp. 238-266; Donald R.
Matthews, U.S. Senators & Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); Neil MacNeil, Forge of Dem ocracy: The
House of Representatives (New York: David McKay, 1963); and Sam Rosenfeld, The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of
Our Partisan Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).
6 Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in Congress, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1990), p.
45. Ranking Members of committees often worked closely with the chair s to shape decisionmaking.
7 James T . Patterson, “A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress, 1933 -1939,” The Journal of American History,
vol. 52, no. 4 (March 1966), pp. 757 -772.
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his panel colleagues: “You can go to ___. It makes no difference what a majority of you decide; if
it meets with my disapproval, it shal not be done; I am the Committee; in me reposes absolute
obstructive powers.”8 Committee oligarchs, wrote an influential Member in 1964, “rule their
committees with the assured arrogance of absolute monarchs.”9 Party leaders lacked the rules and
tools to require the autonomous chairs to implement an agenda of party-preferred priorities.
Instead, they had to cajole, persuade, and broker deals with the committee chairs, who could
deliver the votes to advance policy priorities.
Committees remain important forums for processing legislation and conducting oversight of the
executive branch, but they are not as independent of party leadership direction as in previous eras.
Figure 1. From Bill to Law

Source: Prepared by Kevin A. Borden, former CRS Section Research Manager, Government and Finance
Division.
The Shift to Party Government
Today, majority party leaders exercise centralized management of and major influence over
lawmaking (i.e., “party government”). The centralization of power in the hands of the top House
and Senate majority leadership occurred gradual y for numerous reasons, such as the adoption of
chamber and party rules that augmented their authority, as wel as through hikes in leadership
staff resources. The heightened intensity of electoral competition also fortifies the role of party
leaders who, for instance, schedule measures that appeal to their partisan electoral constituencies.
In this period of party parity and “unstable majorities,” the two parties compete constantly and
vigorously to claim majority control of the House and Senate, as the case may be.10
A compel ing argument of majority party leaders to their partisans is at least twofold: they must
stick together to win passage of their agenda priorities and do whatever it takes political y and
procedural y to retain their majority status. Similarly, minority party leaders may urge their

8 Floyd M. Riddick, Congressional Procedure (Boston: Chapman and Grimes Publishers, 1941), p. 95. Riddick later
served for many years as Parliamentarian of the U.S. Senate.
9 Richard Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1966), p. 70.
10 Frances E. Lee, Unstable Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2006).
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lawmakers to follow the leadership’s playbook because it could lead to majority control.
Opposition party leaders have their own arsenal of procedural and political resources to stal or
foil legislative policymaking, especial y in the Senate with its permissive rules and procedures
that grant large parliamentary prerogatives to every Senator (e.g., the filibuster).11
Although partisanship has been part of Congress since its beginning, the transition from the
committee government era to today’s party-centric period has brought with it an often sharper,
more frequent, more combative—even excessive—partisanship. Observers can witness such
changes as an emphasis on procedural “hard bal ” tactics, party line legislating, and nontraditional
lawmaking procedures. Party polarization is also evident in the country, as depicted in maps
indicating the GOP “red” states and the Democratic “blue” states. As a representative institution,
Members often reflect the divergent views and interests of the constituents who reside in these
areas, such as the South (largely conservative) and far West (broadly liberal).
As a dynamic institution, Congress adapts to the exigencies of the times. Procedural variation and
flexibility in lawmaking, whether in the committee or party eras, are not novel developments.
Sometimes legislative and political circumstances warrant traditional lawmaking; at other times,
nontraditional processes (or some combination) might better suit the goals and preferences of
Members and party leaders. In short, the regular order is not always regular. It is an alterable
construct that evolves with the conditions and imperatives of different eras.
Parliamentary processes that appear irregular or unconventional when first used—which can
provoke anger or angst among Members and between the two parties when initial y employed—
may, with repeated use, become accepted as routine features of a “new normal” in lawmaking.
They become part of lawmakers’ parliamentary toolkit until modified or changed by new
developments that produce a “new procedural normal.” A historical example from each legislative
chamber il ustrates the rise of new procedures.
Illustrative Instances: Rise of New Procedures
In 1963, Senator Hubert Humphrey, D-MN, expressed concern that a number of his colleagues
were filibustering the motion to proceed to a measure. It is “most unusual for any Senator to
object to a motion to consider in this body.”12 Normal procedure, he said, is to “adopt the motion
to proceed and then debate the substance of the measure.” He later added, “To take up a motion or
a bil in a parliament or the Congress is as normal as the Fourth of July, and to deny people the
opportunity to even take up a bil for debate and consideration is unusual, abnormal, and the
burden of proof rests with those who take that position.”13 Senator Clinton Anderson, D-NM,
added the following: “Now we have established a precedent in this Congress whereby every time
the majority leader moves to proceed to the consideration of a measure, an attempt wil be made
to engage in a 2 or 3 week filibuster. This procedure wil come back to plague the Senate.”14
Today, the threat or reality of filibustering the motion to proceed to consider a measure is, as
Senator Humphrey noted, “as normal as the Fourth of July.” “Normal,” too, in the polarized era is
the ability of Senators to launch a “double filibuster”: on the motion to proceed and then on the
legislation itself. Although not as common as filibusters of the motion to proceed, repetitive use

11 See, for example, James I. Wallner, On Parliamentary War: Partisan Conflict and Procedural Change in the U.S.
Senate (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2019), and Matthew Green, Underdog Politics: The Minority
Party in the U.S. House of Representatives (New Haven, CT : Yale University Press, 2015).
12 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 109 (February 5, 1963), p. 1790.
13 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 109 (February 5, 1963), p. 1795.
14 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 109 (February 5, 1963), p. 1795.
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in recent years of the “nuclear option” to circumvent filibusters on presidential nominations might
harbinger its wider use (see the section below, “The “Nuclear Option” Is Detonated (2013, 2017,
2019)”).
As for the House, prior to the early 1880s, it could be difficult to bring measures to the floor, in
part because individual lawmakers or the minority party had relatively easy ways to obstruct
chamber consideration. For example, two common procedures for taking up measures were
unanimous consent and suspending the rules, which required a two-thirds vote of the
membership.15 In 1883, however, a major procedural innovation occurred that fundamental y
transformed chamber proceedings.
The House upheld the Speaker’s ruling that the Rules Committee could report procedural
resolutions (cal ed “rules,” “special orders,” or “special rules”) that, if adopted by majority vote,
would al ow measures to be taken up for House consideration. “In so doing, the House launched a
procedure that has guided its conduct of business to this day.”16 The Rules Committee now could
design, subject to majority party influence and House approval, tailor-made resolutions to govern
the conditions (e.g., debate and amendment) for floor consideration of major legislation and other
matters. Special rules, therefore, constantly establish a unique “regular order” process to
accommodate the procedural and political conditions surrounding a particular measure or series
of measures.
Today, Rules is known as the “Speaker’s committee”; the Speaker names 9 of its 13 members (the
other 4 are selected by the minority leader). Majority party lawmakers on Rules—and in the
House as wel —are expected to vote for special rules because they are critical to the advancement
of the majority’s priorities. Commonly, special rules limit lawmakers’ debate and amendment
opportunities to protect, for instance, vulnerable majority party lawmakers from voting on
political y charged amendments that might cause them electoral grief. As a House
Parliamentarian wrote, because special orders supersede the standing rules of the House and may
be reported on a daily basis, “they have had the pervasive effect of minimizing amendment
opportunities—a reversal of tradition on virtual y al major measures which had come to be
expected as ‘regular order’ in the first 200 years of procedure in the House.”17
Summing Up
The conduct of parliamentary business in the House and Senate is broadly the story of change.
Even so, stability and continuity are also important features of the lawmaking process. Legislators
expect some reasonable certainty, predictability, and uniformity regarding various committee and

15 See, for example, Stanley Bach, “Suspension of the Rules, the Order of Business, and the Development of
Congressional Procedure,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1 (February 1990), pp 49-63; and Jason M.
Roberts, “T he Development of Special Orders and Special Rules in the U.S. House, 1881 -1937,” Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3 (August 2010), pp. 307 -335.
16 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, A History of the Committee on Rules, committee print, 97th Cong., 2nd
sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), p. 9. T his history is a book -length committee print.
17 William McKay and Charles W. Johnson, Parliament & Congress: Representation & Scrutiny in the Twenty-First
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 196. Hereinafter McKay and Johnson, Parliam ent & Congress.
House Parliamentarian Charles W. Johnson has worked in or assisted the chamber’s parliamentary of fice for nearly 60
years and served as House Parliamentarian for a decade (1994 -2004). After almost six decades of House service,
Johnson identified an array of major parliamentary changes that occurred from the mid-1960s to 2013, such as wider
use of special rules to structure the amendment process; expanded use of suspension of the rules procedure (40 minutes
of debate, no freestanding amendments, and two -thirds vote required to pass legislative matters); and a revamped
budgetary process, among other procedural alterations.
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chamber proceedings (see the section below, “Settled Practice”). Nonetheless, the contemporary
lawmaking process has undergone significant alterations from what it was in previous decades to
what it is now: an array of “newer and more idiosyncratic [nontraditional] pathways that now
characterize lawmaking on Capitol Hil .”18
Unorthodox legislating is Congress’s reaction and response to the current intensity of electoral,
political, and policy competition between the two legislative parties and their outside al ies (e.g.,
partisan-affiliated interest groups, media outlets, and think tanks). Lawmaking is difficult enough
given the constitutional design of separate institutions sharing and competing for power, let alone
surmounting procedural obstacles erected by the opposition. Nontraditional procedures facilitate
achievement of the majority’s governing agenda, as wel as fulfil traditional responsibilities of
the legislative branch (e.g., funding the government and responding to national disasters).
Both legislative approaches—traditional and nontraditional—have advantages and disadvantages.
Lawmaking during the committee governance period witnessed the prevalence of bipartisan
compromise, deliberation, negotiation, and participation; today’s polarized era features party
accountability, unity, adaptability, and procedural inventiveness. Whereas committee governance
was largely decentralized (or “bottom up” from standing committees and the general
membership), legislating today in both chambers is often subject to centralized (“top down”)
direction from the majority party leadership. (Party caucuses in each chamber also influence
decisionmaking by their top leaders.)
The expansion of leaders’ political roles—media spokesperson, outreach to diverse stakeholders,
“talking points” formulator for party colleagues, policy designer and negotiator, campaign
fundraiser, and legislative and electoral strategist—considerably strengthened their authority. To
assist in carrying out these duties, both parties won significant hikes in leadership staff resources.
As a House member wrote, while “there was a 35 percent decline in committee staffing from
1994 to 2014, funding over that period for [House] leadership staff rose to 89 percent.”19
Changes in the institutional balance of power—the shift from committee to party government, for
example—commonly provoke clashes between those who have power and those who want it. For
example, individual lawmakers who urge a return to traditional, regular order lawmaking often
want a larger role in policymaking and more autonomy for committees. They often favor a
decentralized and deliberative legislative process rather than one that is mal eable, less
participatory, and hierarchical (largely majority leadership-directed). “Centralization versus
decentralization” of decisionmaking, and the balance between the two, are hardy perennials of
legislative debate and reform.
Purposes of the Report: A Look Ahead
The broad purposes of this report are to provide diverse perspectives on regular order (traditional)
lawmaking and to assess why and in what ways nontraditional procedures came to influence
much contemporary legislating.20 The report analyzes major developments that shifted Congress
from a “committee dominate” form of legislative decisionmaking to the “party centric” era of
today.

18 C. Lawrence Evans, “Book Reviews: American Politics,” Perspective on Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (June 2019), p. 578.
19 Rep. Bill Pascrell Jr., “Why is Congress so Dumb?,” The Washington Post, January 11, 2019, p. B1. See also Paul
Glastris and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “ T he Big Lobotomy,” Washington Monthly, June/July/August 2014, pp. 49-59.
20 See, for example, Charles T iefer, The Polarized Congress: The Post-Traditional Procedure of Its Current Struggles
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2016); and Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawm aking: New
Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016.)
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The first section of the report provides additional background analysis regarding traditional
versus nontraditional lawmaking review and some reasons for the emergence of unorthodox
lawmaking. In addition, this section provides an example of orthodox and unorthodox
policymaking through a mini case representation of each.
Second, the report focuses briefly on a key provision in the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section
5) that al ows each chamber to establish its own rules for making laws. There are many
rulemaking statutes (the 1974 Budget Act or trade laws, for instance) that provide special
legislative procedures for certain measures. Interpretations of House and Senate rules can
provoke political and procedural controversy, as shown by an example from each chamber.
Third, the report discusses “settled practice”—general y noncontroversial procedures and
precedents widely accepted for decades as the regular order in the House or Senate. Informal
procedural guidelines or practices are also briefly discussed; some become so fundamental to the
House or Senate’s lawmaking processes that they are adopted as formal rules with a body of
precedents (the “common law” of the chambers) al their own. A Senate example (unanimous
consent agreements) highlights this sequential pattern: from informal practice to formal rule.
Fourth, various lawmakers and scholars provide definitions of the “regular order.” The definitions
indicate the diversity of views on the basic elements of the regular order. Fifth, several
unorthodox lawmaking developments are examined to highlight how unlike they are from the
regular order of earlier congressional eras. Sixth, the report analyzes several major social and
political developments that contribute significantly to the centrality of nontraditional lawmaking
in contemporary Congresses. Lastly, the report concludes with summary observations.
General Background
Overview
Neither the Constitution nor House or Senate rules prescribe a specific procedural pathway that
must be observed if ideas are to be enacted into law. A consequence is that the House and
Senate—both unique institutions (e.g., size, constituency, term of office, and procedure)—have
wide latitude to determine their own policymaking processes. Procedural flexibility is a feature of
both chambers, especial y in the Senate given its permissive rules and significant reliance on
“unanimous consent” to accomplish its business.
The “regular order” of lawmaking is not set in concrete. It changes in response to various
conditions and developments (partisan, political, social, etc.) inside and outside Congress. What
constitutes regular order legislating can be a moving target. Nonetheless, many lawmakers and
informed citizens have expectations about how laws ideal y should be made, such as with open
procedures and processes that provide fair opportunities for Members of both parties to debate
and to amend legislation. This lawmaking pattern requires “goodwil ” by both parties to prevent
its exploitation for political and electoral purposes.
A publication (How Our Laws Are Made) authorized by the Congress since 1953, currently in its
24th edition (2007), provides “a basic outline of our federal law-making process from the source
of an idea for a legislative proposal through publication as a statute.”21 Many view this repeatable,
step-by-step process as the embodiment of “textbook” legislating. Even schoolchildren may learn

21 John V. Sullivan, How Our Laws Are Made (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), p. 1. Sullivan, as the House
Parliamentarian, prepared this document.
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the lawmaking stages by watching the wel -known cartoon video series entitled Schoolhouse
Rock.22 Major deviations from the sequential model imply an unpredictable, convoluted, or
mal eable lawmaking process. Departures from textbook legislating are sometimes cal ed
nontraditional, irregular, unorthodox, or unconventional. (These characterizations are used
synonymously in this report.)
Conventional lawmaking diagrams, as Representative Lee Hamilton, D-ID (1965-1999), stated,
provide “a woefully incomplete picture of how complicated and untidy the process can be, and
barely hints at the difficulties facing any member of Congress who wants to shepherd an idea into
law.”23 Representative Hamilton’s “complicated and untidy” lawmaking frequently means that
new and uncommon procedures are utilized to enact an array of measures, such as “must pass”
spending bil s, emergency measures, or the policy priorities of the majority party.
Complications and untidiness inhere in lawmaking whether the parliamentary method is regular
or irregular. Even so, Representative Hamilton highlights the benefits of regular order lawmaking,
which many lawmakers would likely endorse. “Different voices get heard through the regular
order, opposing views get considered, and our representatives get the chance to ask hard
questions, consider the merits of various approaches, propose alternatives, smooth out problems,
build consensus, knock out bad ideas, and refine good ideas to make better laws.”24 A Senate
GOP leader added that the regular order encourages “some meaningful buy-in” from the minority
party. Enacting consequential legislation by relying exclusively on votes from the majority party
leads to “instability and strive” in lawmaking.25
During the committee-centric period, liberals and conservatives populated each legislative party.
For example, liberal Northern Democrats favored civil rights, conservative Southern Dixiecrats
opposed such legislation; Eastern liberal and moderate Republicans supported internationalism,
conservative Republicans from the Midwest and rural areas resisted foreign involvements.
Overlapping political alignments promoted negotiating across party lines to pass legislation. A
seasoned analyst wrote that this period was the “age of bargaining” in Congress, with Figure 1
policymaking usual y the order of the day. “This system,” he added, “did not eliminate conflict
between the parties. But it muted and diffused that conflict.”26
Congress gradual y moved to a different configuration of internal power. A decentralized
committee process that dominated policymaking for much of the 20th century transitioned to a
centralized, party-driven system of decisionmaking. Party leaders, not committee chairs, assumed
major responsibility for shaping legislative priorities, policies, and procedures. Representative
John Dingel , D-MI, the longest serving lawmaker in history (1955-2015), experienced legislative
life in both eras, first as a powerful chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee and then as an
influential lawmaker during the strong party era. In an apt comment, he captured the basic

22 T he cartoon video and jingle, which began in 1975, identified the key lawmaking stages in “I’m Just a Bill.” As a
news article explained, “Bill,” portrayed as a piece of legislation, “sits on the Capitol steps and explains to a young boy
all the hoops he has to go through, from committee to the House to the Senate to the White House, to become law.” See
Paul Kane, “‘Bill’ Could School Ryan on Immigration Proposal,” The Washington Post, June 22, 2018, p. A18.
23 Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and Why You Should Care, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
2014), p. 56.
24 Lee H. Hamilton, “Why Congress’s Future Should Lie in the Past,” Center on Congress at Indiana University, July
25, 2012, p. 2.
25 James Hohmann, “Why T rump and the Republicans Are Suddenly T alking Up Bipartisanship,” The Washington
Post, January 9, 2018, p. A15.
26 Ronald Brownstein, The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized
Am erica (New York: T he Penguin Press, 2017), p. 65.
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difference between the two periods: “It used to be that the chairman would cal the Speaker up
and say, ‘I want this bil on the floor at this time.’ Now it’s the opposite.”27
Numerous factors precipitated the several-decade transition from committee power to party
power. Two are mentioned briefly for il ustrative purposes. First, numerous reform-oriented
lawmakers won election to Congress (1958 for the Senate and 1974 for the House are classic
examples28). Dissatisfied with a seniority system that elevated lawmakers to positions of power
regardless of their abilities or policy views, committee chairs, starting in the 1970s, became
subject to secret bal ot election by their party colleagues. Several House chairs were ousted from
their chairmanships. House and Senate Republicans also imposed six-year term limits on their
committee leaders, in part to ensure that committee chairs, unlike the seniority leaders of old,
could not accumulate independent power to chal enge their top party leaders.
Second, a new House rule in 1975 permitted the Speaker to multiply refer measures to more than
one committee; single committee referral was the long-standing practice before the change.
Multiple referrals reduced the monopolistic control of standing committees over various policy
domains and increased the Speaker’s ability to coordinate and direct the work of committees.
Consider that the jurisdictional mandates of a number of standing committees are outdated. No
committee, for instance, has specific authority for cybersecurity. Several committees may claim
jurisdictional responsibility for such legislation, provoking intercommittee “turf” battles. To
mediate and resolve these disagreements, the Speaker has an array of resources, including the
absolute right to refer bil s to committee(s). The Speaker is also authorized to impose deadlines
for committees to report legislation to the House.
Unorthodox Lawmaking Gains Prominence: A Brief Review
Contemporary legislating is often infused with what some cal hyperpartisanship—a more
intense, political y charged, highly competitive, and conflict-laden relationship between the two
parties; such factors spawned nontraditional lawmaking. Bipartisan lawmaking seems far harder
to achieve than previously, even on issues that may enjoy broad legislative and public support
(e.g., infrastructure modernization) or are traditional responsibilities of Congress (e.g., timely
funding of federal military and health programs). Three contributing factors for consideration
follow.
First, the two parties are more ideological y unified and polarized than before, as reflected in their
widely divergent policy preferences and Members’ party-line voting records. As a legislative
scholar explained, ideological “polarization is defined by [Members’] consistency across issues
[i.e., party unity]; ideological polarization in the public is defined by consistency in responses
across survey data [liberal or conservative views on issues such as climate change, same-sex
marriage, or health care].”29

27 Paul Glastris and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “T he Big Lobotomy,” Washington Monthly, June/July/August 2014, p.
57.
28 See Michael Foley, The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution (New Haven, CT : Yale
University Press, 1980); and John A. Lawrence, The Class of ’74: Congress After Watergate and the Roots of
Partisanship (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018).
29 Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy (New
Haven, CT : Yale University Press, 2010), p. 35. Worth a brief mention is an ongoing debate in political science about
the source of ideological polarization. Professor Abramowitz of the University of Georgia is a lead proponent of the
view that congressional polarization reflects polarization among the politically engaged citizenry. A contrary
perspective is by Stanford University Professor Morris Fiorina, who argues that the mass public is not polarized but
“elites” are—the party activists, elective officeholders, and so on. Stated differently, moderate voters hold relatively
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For example, the average party unity scores (partisans voting together) demonstrate that “both
representatives and senators exhibit far more [party] loyalty to their parties than they did in the
past. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the typical member of Congress voted with his [or her] party
on party-dividing questions just 60% of the time; in the 1980s, over 70% of the time; and in the
1990s, over 80% of the time.”30 The 2000s have witnessed party unity scores in the 90s, where it
remains today. A Senate President pro tempore observed, “[M]ost Democrats are … left, most
Republicans are to the right, and there are very few [centrists] in between.”31
Problem-solving in this environment can be chal enging, especial y on contentious issues that
divide the two parties (e.g., gun control, abortion, taxation, climate change). Partisan clashes and
quarrels can be so profound that they provoke policy paralysis. Compounding the difficulty of
ending gridlock through cross-party negotiations is that “the political parties each depend on
[many] voters who [oppose] the very notion of compromise.”32 Compromises are hard to reach
because the “deep ideological divide that exists between Democrats and Republicans in
Washington … is itself based on deep divisions within American society.”33
Further, many voters intensely dislike the other party, a development that contributes in elections
to straight party ticket voting. Straight-ticket voting is influenced, too, by the party label of the
President. Many voters know the “team” they are on and cast their bal ot accordingly. An analyst
noted, “In the 1970s and ‘80s, an average of around 30 percent of voters split their tickets, for
congressional and presidential candidates of different parties. Today, [the] corresponding number
is around 10 percent.”34 In short, an “us versus them” outlook has seeped into peoples’ political
attitudes and behavior. This perspective is also evident in Congress.
Second, there is the occurrence at times of British-style, one-party governance. The European
parliamentary model, however, is incompatible with the American constitutional system of
“separation of powers” and “checks and balances.” Moreover, most measures enacted by
Congress are accomplished with bipartisan support. “When majority parties succeed on their
agenda priorities,” wrote two legislative scholars, “they usual y do so with support from a
majority of the minority party in at least one chamber and with the endorsement of one or more of
the minority party’s top leaders.”35
Neither party, of course, has a monopoly on wisdom and thoughtfulness. Minority party
lawmakers can spotlight weaknesses in majority party initiatives and promote a wider range of
diverse policy ideas that might improve legislation. Stil , as a congressional scholar noted, today’s

moderate views, but the parties have become more polarized. See, for example, Fiorina’s book entitled Culture War?
The Myth of a Polarized Am erica (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007).
30 Frances E. Lee, “How Party Polarization Affects Governance,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 18 (2015),
pp. 263-264. Party unity scores have been compiled by CQ Weekly since 1956. For a compilation, see CQ Weekly,
February 24, 2020, p. 42.
31 Quoted in Kathy Kiely and Wendy Koch, “Committees Shaped By Party T ies,” USA Today, October 5, 1998, p. 2A.
32 Lee H. Hamilton, “We Need T o Embrace Compromise, Not Insult It,” The Center on Congress at Indiana
University, May 16, 2011, p. 2.
33 Alan I. Abramowitz, “Beyond Confrontation and Gridlock: Making Democracy Work for the American People,” in
Solutions to Political Polarization in Am erica , ed. Nathan Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.
198.
34 Peter Grier, “D.C. Decoder: ‘All Politics is Local’? Not Anymore,” Christian Science Monitor Weekly, September
10, 2018, p. 11.
35 James M. Curry and Frances E. Lee, “Non-Party Government: Bipartisan Lawmaking and Party Power in Congress,”
Perspectives on Politics, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 2019), p. 47.
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“House especial y seems more and more wil ing to pass major bil s with the support of only the
majority party.”36
Two recent examples of one-party governance in the House and Senate are the Democratic-
authored Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2009, 2010) and the GOP-sponsored Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (2017). Both measures passed on party-line votes. In both instances, there was
unified government (one party in charge of the elective branches) and cohesive party majorities.
As the Senate majority leader said in January 2017, “The only way you can achieve success in [a
polarized] environment like now, where there’s not much bipartisanship, is for us [Republicans]
to have our act together and to work out our differences among ourselves.”37 One-party
lawmaking is general y infrequent, however, because of factional and policy disputes within the
majority party, the frequency of divided government, and the Senate’s permissive rules (e.g., the
filibuster).
Public laws usual y require finding common ground through bipartisan compromises involving
the House, the Senate, the White House, and the two political parties more broadly.38 Today’s
partisan polarization also encourages the two parties to prepare “messaging” bil s and
amendments—measures that unite one party and divide the other. They are part of the “permanent
campaign” where the goal is often less on improving or making laws through bipartisan
deliberations and more on energizing electoral supporters and drawing sharp contrasts with the
other party.
Third, today’s closely divided and deeply polarized Congress has witnessed the emergence of a
pattern of lawmaking different from the traditional, committee-centric regular order. Increasingly,
House and Senate party leaders turn to nontraditional procedures for two key reasons: to
implement their governing agenda and to foil the opposition’s obstructive tactics. Unorthodox
procedures include, among other things, drafting legislation behind closed doors in leadership
offices and minimizing the use of conference committees to resolve bicameral differences.
Unconventional procedures are also utilized with the bipartisan support of each party; they can be
the best pathway for legislative decisionmaking, such as in crisis circumstances.
If minority party lawmakers take issue at what they perceive as the majority’s heavy-handed
procedural actions, they have their own arsenal of available parliamentary tools to stal the
legislative process. They may try to delay or defeat the majority’s proposals by forcing floor
votes, raising parliamentary objections, or appealing rulings of the chair. A frequent result:

36 Green, Underdog Politics, p. 187.
37 The Hill Staff, “How the T rump T ax Law Passed: Bipartisanship Wasn’t An Ingredient,” The Hill, September 27,
2918, online edition. T he Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader assumed major responsibility for shepherding the
Affordable Care Act into law with party-line voting the order of the day in both chambers. However, as Senator John
McCain, R-AZ, noted, the health measure was considered at length in committee and then debated and amended on the
Senate floor for 25 days. Most of the roll call votes in the chamber were party -line. Senator McCain concluded: “ [T ]his
was one of the most hard-fought and fair, in my view, debates that has taken place on the floor of the Senate in the time
I have been here.” See Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 159 (September 24, 2013), p. S6841. Senator
McCain’s comments underscore that a polarized legislative environment does not foreclose adherence to various
aspects of regular order legislating.
38 T here are occasions when the majority party believes, based on experience, that opposition party support for
measures is unlikely. As a lawmaker stated, “It would be wonderful to have [opposition party] votes. But we don’t start
with that as a working assumption. We have to write something [that majority party members] agree with.” Ezra Klein,
“4 Senate Dems Shaping the Future of Health Policy Explain What T hey Are T hinking,” Vox.com, August 28, 2019,
p. 3.
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interparty procedural (“tit for tat”) warfare. An example from the Senate about procedural
retaliation applies equal y wel to the House.
In today’s Senate, each party assumes that the other will fully exploit its procedural options:
the majority party assumes that the minority party will obstruct legislation, and the mino rity
assumes that the majority will restrict its opportunities to offer amendments. Leaders are
expected to fully exploit the rules. Senators of both parties are frustrated by what has
happened to their institution.39
The Textbook Model
It bears repeating that the textbook model has not disappeared in either chamber. Measures are
developed in committee and considered on the floor in a bipartisan manner. Every bil or issue
does not arouse legislative clashes between two ideological y polarized parties. The two parties
and their Members do collaborate to make policy. Cross-party coalitions are forged on measures
where there is shared consensus. And most bil s pass the House and Senate with bipartisan
majorities. As a congressional scholar determined, “Minority party support for enacted legislation
seldom fal s below 70 percent in the Senate or 60 percent in the House.”40
Senator Lamar Alexander, R-TN, made an observation about the Senate that applies broadly to
the other chamber. The Senate, he said, operates basical y on a two-track system. One track is
fil ed with conflict and controversy; the other is a legislative process replete with compromise and
cooperation. As he said,
Think of Washington, DC as a split screen television. Let’s take the 30 days between
September 4 and October 6, [2018]…. On one of the screens there was as much acrimony
as you could ever expect to see in the U.S. Capitol—protestors, Senators upset, Judge
Kavanaugh upset. It was a very difficult situation. That was on one side of the screen. But
on the other side of the television set was one of the most productive 30 days we have ever
had in the U.S. Senate, with 72 Senators working together—half Democrats, half
Republicans—to pass landmark opioids legislation to deal with the largest health crisis we
have today.41
The bottom line is this: lawmakers of diverse partisan and ideological viewpoints have the
capacity and competence to address national problems. Each chamber is “quite capable of
overcoming the differences among its members on measures of significant import without
descending into an endless debate characterized by ideological partisanship and irreconcilable
gridlock.”42 Lawmaking may not happen as soon as some people want because it can be a
convoluted, lengthy, chaotic, and uncertain process. The end result might even be policy
stalemate, a virtue perhaps rather than a vice if bad ideas are blocked from becoming law.
Fundamental y, Senator Alexander’s observation highlights how legislating gets done with
compromise and cooperation between Members and the two parties.

39 Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate (Norman,
OK: T he University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), p. 18.
40 Frances Lee, “Why Parties T hat Control Congress Can’t Always Deliver,” The Washington Post, July 23, 2017,
p. B2.
41 Sen. Lamar Alexander, “Senate Accomplishments,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.
164 (November 14, 2018), pp. S6954 -S6955.
42 James I. Wallner, The Death of Deliberation: Partisanship and Polarization in the United States Senate (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books, 2013), p. 4.
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A Sketch of Two Measures
Two traditional elements of legislating are opportunities for lawmakers of both parties to debate
and to amend bil s. Typical y, conventional lawmaking embraces both ingredients. Consider the
annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), authored by the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees with input from numerous entities (e.g., the Defense Department). Like
Congress itself, the work and role of the two military panels are shaped by numerous
contemporary developments, such as the end of the Cold War and the wider influence of
congressional party leaders.43 Consideration of the NDAA exemplifies what many would view as
conventional lawmaking by each chamber.
Consideration of the NDAA in both chambers typical y follows the regular order: committee
hearings and markups, floor debates and amendments by Members of both parties, the formal
convening of conference committees to resolve bicameral differences, and presidential
consideration (signature or veto). A Member of the House Armed Services Committee stated that
consideration of the NDAA in both chambers followed an “open and regular order process from
start to finish.”44 A chair of the committee underscored that the work of the panel is governed by
the principles of “regular order, transparency, and bipartisanship.”45 On occasion, some of the
parliamentary steps may be missed or abbreviated. Intense partisan and policy disagreements
occur, but since the early 1960s, the NDAA so far has been enacted into law 58 consecutive
times. The success of the legislation can be attributed to various factors, such as its vital mission
(the nation’s security), “must pass” character, and long history of bipartisanship that usual y
suffuses committee and chamber consideration of the NDAA.
A classic example of nontraditional lawmaking—sparked by a national emergency—occurred
during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Five days after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
inaugural address, a special session of Congress was convened on March 9, 1933. The new
Administration had sent Congress a bil to deal with the banking crisis, the panicked withdrawal
by customers of their bank deposits, which was triggering nationwide bank failures. As one
account noted, the banking bil was “read to the House at 1 p.m.” following its noon convening.
[S]ome new representatives were still trying to locate their seats. Printed copies [of the bill]
were not ready for its members. A rolled-up newspaper symbolically served. After thirty-
eight minutes of ‘debate,’ the chamber passed the bill, sight unseen, with a unanimous
shout. The Senate approved the bill with only seven dissenting votes ... and the president
signed the legislation into law at 8:36 [that] evening.46
Unsurprisingly, emergencies, crises, pandemics, deadlines, or other compel ing circumstances
have long triggered the use of nontraditional lawmaking procedures.47

43 See Chuck Cushman, “Defense and the T wo Congresses,” eds. Colton Campbell and David P. Auerswald
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), pp. 113 -126.
44 Rep. Bradley Byrne, “Providing for Consideration of the Conference Report on H.R. 2810, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 163
(November 14, 2017), p. H9191.
45 Andrew Clevenger, “Undeterred by Pandemic, Lawmakers Ready their NDAA Proposals,” CQ News, April 30,
2020.
46 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929 -1945 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 135 -136.
47 Worth noting is that the House and Senate use expedited procedures that constitute the regular order for certain
measures. Many statutes provide expedited procedures (e.g., debate and amendment restrictions) for the consideration
of measures deemed important for so-called “ fast track” consideration, such as trade bills. See Molly E. Reynolds,
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Summing Up
A one-size-fits-al lawmaking process is not suitable to the panoply of issues that comes before
the House and Senate. The regular order and an irregular order, or some hybrid of the two, are
hardy lawmaking perennials. Complexities and complications abound in either of these
approaches, especial y on major legislation that engages numerous actors and groups inside and
outside Congress. Case studies of lawmaking reveal that it can be a confusing and controversial
process, involving both traditional and nontraditional procedures.48 Representative Hamilton
observed, “The legislative process is far from mechanical or automatic. Instead, it is dynamic,
fluid, and unpredictable, with the outcome very much affected by the players: their goals, skil s,
ingenuity, and temperament.”49
Procedural improvisations are common to lawmaking. Departures from the regular order occur
frequently to meet unexpected chal enges and to achieve policy results. A proposed law might
“hitch a ride” as a floor amendment to “must pass” legislation headed to the White House; be
buried in omnibus legislation hundreds or thousands of pages in length; or added to a conference
report with scant discussion or notice by most lawmakers.50 Regular order might be followed
during floor consideration of a measure even though it was never referred for committee review.
A Senator cal ed this type of nontraditional lawmaking “regular-order lite.”51 Another Senator
pointed out, “If you want to get something done ... you have to figure out how to get there.
Sometimes it’s not a straight line. Sometimes it’s a circuitous path.”52
Selected Constitutional Provisions
Article I, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution states, “Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.” Fundamental y, this means that legislative rules and procedures are alterable. The
broad grant of constitutional authority to the House and Senate to write or rewrite their rules is
subject to few restraints. House and Senate rules cannot “violate fundamental rights,” as the U.S.
Supreme Court said in the 1892 case of United States v. Ballin (144 U.S. 1). Moreover, there
should be a “reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations al matters of
method are open to determination” by the House or Senate. In addition, said the Supreme Court,
the “power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,

Exceptions to the Rule (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017).
48 See, for example, Jeffrey M. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawm akers, Lobbyists and
the Unlikely Trium ph of Tax Reform (New York: Vintage, 1988); Ronald E. Elving, Conflict and Com prom ise: How
Congress Makes Laws (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1995); Steven Waldman, The Bill (New York: Viking, 1995);
Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Washington,
DC: Seven Locks Press, 1985); Paul C. Light, Forging Legislation (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992); and Robert
G. Kaiser, Act of Congress: How Am erica’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2013). T he Birnbaum and Murray book is about passage of the 1986 T ax Reform Act; Elving’s book is about
the Family and Medical Leave Act; the Whalen book’s title says it all; Waldman’s examines the creation of a national
service law; Light’s book focuses on the creation of the Department of Veterans Affairs; and Kaiser’s study analyzes
enactment of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation.
49 Hamilton, How Congress Works and Why You Should Care, p. 58.
50 Andreu Casas, Matthew Denny, and John Wilkerson, “More Effective than We T hought: Accounting for Legislative
Hitchhikers Reveals a More Inclusive and Productive Lawmaking Process,” July 12, 2018, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract:3098325.
51 Joe Williams, “Resolving DACA No Easy Lift for Senate,” Roll Call, February 12, 2018, p. 9.
52 David Nather, “Daschle’s Soft T ouch Lost in T ough Senate Arena,” CQ Weekly, July 20, 2002, p. 1921.
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always subject to be exercised” by the two legislative chambers.53 A House Parliamentarian
offered his view of the exercise of “continuous power”:
There is no static set of procedural settings called “the regular order” in the House. The
Constitution contemplates that the House may make its own rules. The House chooses
initially to adopt special rules [from the Rules Committee] that can vary those settings.
There is nothing irregular about those variances. One might earnestly believe that
unbounded debate under a five-minute rule and an unbridled amendment process are
essential to procedural regularity in perfecting legislative text. But that doesn’t make those
procedural settings ‘the’ regular order, nor does it make other settings irregular. Openness
might be an inherent good that deserves to be reflected in the default procedural settings of
the House. But that does not make it an exclusive prescription for procedural regularity,
nor does it make a less than fully open process irregular…. The most essential attribute of
regularity in the legislative practice of the House is its layered use of its Constitutional
authority to make its own rules.54
Each legislative chamber determines their procedural rules: a majority vote is sufficient in both
bodies, but a two-thirds vote in the Senate might first be required to invoke cloture (closure of
debate) on proposals to amend chamber rules. Moreover, each house has thousands of formal
precedents to guide legislative decisionmaking when formal rules or rulemaking statutes lack
clarity or fail to address specific parliamentary controversies that arise during chamber
proceedings. Two former House Parliamentarians stated, the great majority of the “rules of al
parliamentary bodies are unwritten law; they spring up by precedents and customs; these
precedents and customs are this day the chief law of both Houses of Congress.”55 Informal norms
and guidelines can also influence the actions and deliberations of the two chambers.
A limited number of provisions in the Constitution address decisionmaking procedures in the two
chambers. For example, treaties are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, “provided
two-thirds of the Senators present concur” (Article II, Section 2); measures raising revenue shal
originate in the House, “but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
Bil s” (Article I, Section 7). The Constitution states that “a Majority of each [House] shal
constitute a Quorum to do Business” (Article I, Section 5). The Framers did not define what
constitutes “business” for purposes of a quorum. “Business,” like many other constitutional
provisions, was left for each chamber to decide.
The brevity of constitutional provisions regarding legislative procedure requires the two
chambers to revise and update their rules, precedents, and practices to accommodate new

53 T he Ballin case concerned a major obstructive House tactic of the 19th century called the “disappearing quorum.” At
the time, the constitutional requirement that a majority “shall constitute a Quorum to do Business” was determined by
counting the number of Members actually voting. T hus, if a sufficient number of Members present in the chamber
refused to vote, they could block the conduct of public business. In 1889, Speaker T homas Reed, R-ME, ruled
successfully that Members present in the chamber who refused to vote would be counted to determine the presence of a
quorum. Speaker Reed’s ruling provoked three days of parliamentary tumult. However, the Justices in Ballin decided
that since the Constitution did not prescribe a method for determining a majorit y quorum, “ it is therefore within the
competency of the House to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain that fact.” For more on
Speaker Reed’s historical ruling, see Ronald M. Peters Jr., The American Speakership (Baltimore, MD: T he Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 62 -75; and William A. Robinson, Thom as B. Reed, Parliam entarian (New York:
Dodd, Mead, 1930), pp. 182-186.
54 T his view of the regular order was provided to the author by Charles W. Johnson, a House Parliame ntarian. T he
statement itself was prepared by John V. Sullivan, another House Parliamentarian.
55 Quoted in Deschler-Brown Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, vol. 1 (Washington DC: GPO,
1976), p. iv.
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contingencies and developments.56 Every two years, for instance, following the biennial
congressional elections, the House on the opening day of the new Congress adopts its formal
rules. Most of the rule book of the previous Congress is adopted anew, but amendments to the
rules of the House are regularly adopted, usual y by a party-line majority vote. The House can
amend its rules at any time during the two-year life of a Congress.
For example, the House amended its rules on May 15, 2020, to al ow remote voting during the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. A temporary rule—45 days but renewable—
authorized two major procedural changes: virtual committee proceedings, and, for the first time in
the House’s history, proxy voting during floor votes is permitted. “Any member attending a
House vote [can] cast as many as 10 votes on behalf of [absent] colleagues who have authorized
those votes by letter to the House clerk.”57 The remote voting rule provoked lawsuits over its
constitutionality—whether an official quorum of the House can be established by counting only
Members who are physical y present and those who might be virtual y present, as the new rule
al ows. The remote voting rule applies only to this declared health emergency due to the novel
coronavirus. In a larger sense, the temporary rule spotlights the long-standing issue of how the
House can function in person during national emergencies, such as terrorist attacks or pandemics.
Unlike the House, the Senate does not readopt its rule book at the start of every new Congress.
Senate Rule V states, “The rules of the Senate shal continue from one Congress to the next
Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.” The Senate considers itself a
“continuing body” because only one-third of the chamber’s membership competes for reelection
every two years. This means that the Senate can muster the majority quorum required by the
Constitution (Article I, Section 5) to conduct official business. Nonetheless, the Senate can revise
its rules and procedures at any time whenever enough Senators agree to the proposed revision(s).
Both chambers, as noted earlier, can exercise their constitutional rulemaking authority to enact
laws that revamp their respective parliamentary procedures (e.g., the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974).
Procedural alterations occur for various reasons. For instance, some rules may require
clarification or elimination. Presidents who chal enge the Article I prerogatives of Congress, such
as its power of the purse, can provoke the House and Senate to establish new budgeting
processes. National crises, the election of reform-oriented lawmakers, a growing workload, and
broader changes in society (e.g., use of technology) also can spur legislative change.
Interpretative Disagreements
Just as constitutional provisions can arouse controversy, each chamber’s formal rules and
precedents can be interpreted differently by individual Members and the two political parties.
Rules and precedents that appear plain in their practical or specific meaning might stil provoke
disagreements—especial y in high-stakes, party-charged situations—if they contravene past
practices and norms to achieve partisan objectives. Contemplate this specific case concerning
clause 4 of House Rule XX: “The minimum time for a record vote … shal be 15 minutes.”

56 For a detailed review of House and Senate parliamentary reference sources, see CRS Report RL30787,
Parliam entary Reference Sources: House of Representatives, by Gail E. Baitinger; and CRS Report RL30788,
Parliam entary Reference Sources: Senate, by Gail E. Baitinger.
57 Mike DeBonis, “House Adopts Historic Changes Allowing Remote Voting,” The Washington Post, May 16, 2020, p.
A6. See also Nicholas Fandos, “ 231Years In, a Need T o Redefine ‘Present’,” New York Tim es, May 16, 2020, p. A23.
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On November 22, 2003, during House consideration of the Republican majority’s top domestic
priority—expanding Medicare to provide senior citizens with prescription drug coverage—GOP
leaders kept the vote open nearly three hours. An early bal ot (216 ayes, 218 nays) demonstrated
that Republicans were losing their priority measure. The result was GOP leaders spent almost
three hours lobbying party colleagues, urging several to switch their initial vote from nay to yea.
Their persuasive skil s led to House passage of the prescription drug conference report.58
Did the three-hour vote constitute “regular order” or was it “irregular order”? The two political
parties came to different conclusions. Democrats viewed the three-hour vote as procedural abuse,
a nontraditional action that violated the rules and norms of the House. The vote was held open far
beyond a reasonable time, exclaimed many Democrats, for the sole purpose of pressuring certain
GOP lawmakers to change their vote so the majority party could win enactment of the
prescription drug measure. The Democratic House leader offered a privileged resolution to
declare the three-hour vote “one of the lowest moments in the history of this august institution.”59
The privileged resolution was tabled (kil ed) on a party-line vote.
In contrast, Republican lawmakers contended that the three-hour vote complied with House rules.
They pointed out that House Rule XX establishes a minimum—not a maximum—time limit for
the conduct of votes. “The Speaker did not violate a rule of the House,” said a Republican
lawmaker. “The Speaker is entitled to take as much time as he wishes for a vote. And in this case,
in this case, the stakes were high, the cause was great.”60 Another GOP lawmaker stated, “No
question. It was a long vote. And it did inconvenience Members.” However, the needs of senior
citizens were “urgent and immense,” and we “could not abandon our responsibility to pass real
prescription Medicare drug reform.. . And so, yes, we al owed ourselves to be masters of time.”61
Another “master of time” was Speaker Jim Wright, D-TX (1987 to mid-1989), who made a
decision that reverberated into 2003 and beyond. Speaker Wright held a vote open on October 28,
1987, for about 30 minutes to successfully lobby a Democratic colleague to change his vote to
pass a bil . Republicans were angry, perhaps none more than Minority Whip Dick Cheney of
Wyoming. He was scathing in his criticism of Speaker Wright’s action, cal ing it “the most
arrogant, heavy-handed abuse of power I have ever seen in the ten years I have been here.”62 The
House Parliamentarian, who was present in the chamber for both Speaker-ordered voting
extensions, stated that the 1987 controversy laid the groundwork for what occurred in 2003 and in
analogous circumstances thereafter.

58 “Medicare Revamp Cuts It Close,” CQ Almanac, 2003, vol. LIX (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
2004), pp. 113-118. President George W. Bush signed the prescription drug benefit measure into law.
59 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, “Privileges of the House—Circumventing the Will of the House by Holding
Votes Open Beyond a Reasonable Period,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149
(December 8, 2003), p. H12846. Questions of the privileges of the House (Rule IX) involve such matters as the
integrity of chamber proceedings. T he Democratic resolution denounced the three -hour vote and urged the Speaker “ to
take such steps as necessary to prevent any further abuse.”
60 Rep. Jim Greenwood, “Privileges of the House—Circumventing the Will of the House by Holding Votes Open
Beyond a Reasonable Period,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149 (December 8,
2003), p. H12849.
61 Rep. Nancy Lee Johnson, “Privileges of the House—Circumventing the Will of the House by Holding Votes Open
Beyond a Reasonable Period,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149 (December 8,
2003), p. H12847.
62 McKay and Johnson, Parliament & Congress, p. 218.
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In short, a general 15-minute period for voting prior to 1987 gave way to an irregular order of
longer voting times—if that was necessary—to win passage, for instance, of majority party-
preferred priorities. The House Parliamentarian at the time wrote the following:
[O]bserving the consistently more egregious relaxation of the fifteen-minute minimum
vote requirement [since the Speaker Wright] occasion, [one] could conclude that the
partisanship of contemporary Congresses has influenced the process to the point where
rules and traditions, which have as their basis a respect for comity among Members, [have]
become subservient to the [majority party’s] political determination to win votes and to
minimalize Minority party options.63
Settled Practice
Despite the clashes that occur regularly over procedural rules and how they are interpreted and
applied, there are many rules, precedents, and practices that are often taken for granted and
remain in continuous effect as “settled practice.” After more than 200 years of evolution,
Congress and its Members have retained, discarded, modified, or created diverse parliamentary
processes to address the constancy of change. Senator Robert C. Byrd, D-WV (1959-2010), made
a relevant observation, which also applies to the House:
The day-to-day functioning of the Senate [and House] has given rise to a set of traditions,
rules, and practices with a life and history of their own. The body of principles and
procedures governing many [legislative] obligations [e.g., attendance, quorums, or voting]
is not so much the result of reas oned deliberation as the fruit of jousting and adjusting to
circumstances in which the Senate [and House] found itself from time to time.64
Procedures and practices prove durable if they promote and serve a variety of important purposes,
such as fostering efficiency; providing predictability, stability, and orderliness in chamber
proceedings; protecting minority rights; and resolving conflicts. A noteworthy observation by
former Representative Clarence Cannon, D-MO—who served as the official House
Parliamentarian and then, during his electoral career, chaired the Appropriations Committee
during periods of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s—makes the following point:
A well-established system of procedure is essential to expedition.... The time of the House
[and Senate] is too valuable, the scope of its enactments too far-reaching, and the constantly
increasing pressure of its business too great to justify lengthy and perhaps acrimonious
discussion of procedures which have been authoritatively decided in former sessio ns.65
Procedural Routines: House
Sometimes people use the phrase “regular order” to mean wel -established procedures. Two
procedures underscore this point. House Members understand that the suspension of the rules
procedure—with its 40-minute limit on debate, prohibition on freestanding amendments, and
two-thirds vote for passage—expedites chamber action of broadly supported bil s. This procedure
is in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and sometimes on other days. Like so many
parliamentary rules, this procedure has been revised over the years, such as expanding the number

63 McKay and Johnson, Parliament & Congress. McKay and Johnson were decades-long Parliamentarians,
respectively, of the British House of Commons and the U.S. House of Representatives. Worth mention is that the
House authorizes shorter voting times, such as five minutes or two minutes.
64 Senate proceedings, Congressional Record, vol. 127, part 5 (April 8, 1981), p. 6871. Senator Robert C. Byrd is the
longest serving Senator in history (1959-2011).
65 Rep. Clarence Cannon, Cannon’s Procedure in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: GPO, 1959), p. iii.
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of suspension days. Yet its fundamental purpose and procedural framework have broadly stood
the test of time.
Major and controversial measures take a different route to possible floor consideration. They
obtain a “special rule”—drafted as a resolution, H. Res.—from the Rules Committee. If approved
by the House, special rules achieve two key things, among others: (1) they provide an avenue for
major and controversial bil s to be taken up that could not pass by unanimous consent or attract
the two-thirds vote required by the suspension procedure; and (2) they establish the conditions for
debating and amending (if al owed) measures.
In short, al roads lead to the Rules Committee for consequential and contested legislation.
Moreover, the procedural pattern for considering special rules is familiar to lawmakers. For
example, there is commonly one hour of debate on the special rule equal y divided between the
parties. Adoption of the special rule is followed by consideration of the measure made in order
and under the procedures specified in the special rule, such as a period of time for “general
debate” of the legislation. (The character of special rules has undergone significant change over
the decades, a topic to be discussed later in this report.66)
Noteworthy is that the House has a rule (XIV) titled “Order and Priority of Business,” but most of
its nine provisions are not obligatory requirements. In fact, only the first three occur every
legislative day: a Prayer to open the House (since 1789); approval of the constitutional y required
Journal (Article I, Section 5), the official record of daily proceedings; and the Pledge of
Al egiance to the Flag (a 1995 rule). The other six67 have been supplanted by different formal
rules and precedents that al ow measures to be taken up with the concurrence of the House. Is the
daily order of business the “regular order”? The first three provisions of Rule XIV are but not the
other six, for these reasons.
Rule XIV also states that the order and priority of business can be “varied by the application of
other rules” and by “matters of higher precedence.” Other rules permit, for example, “business in
order on special days,” such as the aforementioned suspension of the rules procedure. “Matters of
higher precedence” include procedural resolutions reported by the Rules Committee; they are
agreed to by majority vote of the House. These resolutions are widely used to interrupt the daily
order of business defined in Rule XIV.68
In addition, the Committee on Rules has jurisdiction over the “order of business of the House”
and the authority “to report [procedural resolutions] at any time.” These procedural resolutions, if
agreed to by the House, interrupt the regular order of business (i.e., Rule XIV) to al ow the
chamber to consider a specific measure(s) under debate and amendment procedures defined in the
special rule. The fundamental point is this: privileged interruptions of the order of business in the
House—by “rules” from the Rules Committee—have supplanted much of Rule XIV’s order of

66 Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty In the House of Representatives: Adaptation and
Innovation in Special Rules (Washington, DC: T he Brookings Institution, 1988).
67 T he basics of the other six are the following: Correction of reference of public bills; Disposal of business on the
Speaker’s table; Unfinished business; T he morning hour for the consideration of bills called up by committees; Motions
that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole; and Orders of the day.
68 T he first House rule on the order and priority of business was in 1811 (see the House Manual for the 116th Congress,
H.Doc. No. 115-177, p. 678). “ The rule was amended frequently to arrange the business of the House to give the House
as much freedom as possible in selecting for consideration and completing the consideration of the bills it deems most
important. The basic form of the rule has been in place since 1890.” T he technical use of the term “ regular order” was
evident following its initial adoption. When a lawmaker in 1822 offered a motion to resolve the House into the
Committee of the Whole to consider appropriations for the military, another legisla tor objected that the motion was not
in the regular order of business. See Annals of Congress, vol. 38 (January 3, 1822), p. 625.
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business. The parliamentary reality is that two procedures dominate decisionmaking in the House:
“special rules” for major legislation and suspension of the rules for less controversial measures.
Procedural Flexibility: Senate
The Senate is an institution quite unlike the House. House rules, precedents, and practices al ow a
majority, however constructed (partisan or bipartisan), to govern. In contrast, the Senate’s rules,
precedents, and practices grant one Senator, a smal group, or the minority party significant
parliamentary prerogatives under the chamber’s permissive rules and procedures. “The Senate is
a place where political minorities and individual members hold great power, resting on authority
drawn from Senate rules and more than two hundred years of related precedents and traditions.”69
Senator Tom Coburn, R-OK (2005-2015), added,
The magic number in the Senate is not 60, the number needed to end debate and it is not
51, a majority. The most important number in the Senate is one—one Senator. The Senate
has a set of rules that gives each individual member the power to advance, change or stop
legislation.70
Given these features of the Senate, what constitutes settled practice for legislating can be difficult
to determine. Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid of Nevada (1987-2015) once said, “[W]e as a
body can do anything we want to do. That is the way the Senate operates. We have the ability to
change the rules in a [matter] of minutes and move on to change what is before this body.”71 Even
so, there are long-standing “settled practices” observed in the Senate. They are employed to cal
up most bil s for Senate consideration.
First, there is an informal “wrap-up” period where numerous noncontroversial measures or
matters are cal ed up by unanimous consent, often at the end of daily sessions, and enacted with
minimal debate or none whatsoever. Senators are consulted in advance through an informal
process that “clears” the passage of these measures by unanimous consent.72 Second, major bil s
follow a different route to the floor for debate and amendment. One way is if the Senate agrees by
unanimous consent to take up a bil or resolution for floor consideration. The other way is by
adoption of a “motion to proceed” (MTP) to consider a measure. If a majority of the Senate votes
yes on that motion, then the measure is before the Senate for debate and amendment. Because the
MTP is debatable, 60 votes could be required to invoke a time-consuming procedure cal ed
cloture (closure of debate). Filibuster-threatened measures are often set aside by party leaders,
who might wait until fulsome Senate support is available to adopt the MTP.
There is a “technical” definition of regular order that merits brief mention. It concerns the right of
any Member to enforce certain rules and precedents of the chamber. Members who advocate a
return to the regular order are not referring to this technical form, as il ustrated by the following
example. A Senator who proposes a unanimous consent agreement (UCA)—a request that
dispenses with many of the chamber’s formal procedural rules (e.g., the filibuster) to permit
greater expedition and predictability in decisionmaking—might immediately hear a colleague say,
“Reserving the right to object.”

69 Martin B. Gold, Senate Procedure and Practice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p. xii.
70 Stephen Dinan and S.A. Miller, “Coburn Rankles Reid Once More Before Leaving Senate,” The Washington Times,
December 18, 2014, p. A6.
71 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 162 (July 13, 2016), p. S5048.
72 See, for example, David Lerman and Lindsey McPherson, “Sen ate T ries to ‘Hotline’ Small-Business Fund Fix,” CQ
News, May 21 2020.
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Typical y, the Senator who reserves wants to learn more from the requestor about the purpose and
intent of the consent request. Although Senate precedents state that UCAs are not debatable, it is
settled practice for the Senate to al ow some time for an exchange of views between or among
Senators. As Senate precedents states, “[I]t is the custom or practice of the Senate to indulge in a
reasonable interchange of views in hopes of reaching an agreement before cal ing for the regular
order.”73 If a Senator demands the “regular order,” the Member who reserved general y has two
choices: voice a dissent (“object”) or assent to the UCA. (A comparable House example is
provided in this footnote.)74
Informal Chamber Guidelines
Legislating in each chamber occurs in a vortex of numerous formal rules, precedents, and laws, as
wel as informal practices, customs, protocols, norms, and traditions. These informal processes
might be cal ed “informal guidelines.” They could influence decisionmaking for certain issues,
time periods, or political parties. They might remain in effect until no longer enforced because of
changed circumstances.
One such guideline was the so-cal ed “Hastert Rule,” named after former Speaker Dennis Hastert,
R-IL (1999-2007). This guideline could influence decisionmaking when Republicans control the
House. Proclaimed in 2003, Speaker Hastert said the following: “The job of the [GOP] Speaker is
not to expedite legislation that runs counter to the wishes of the majority of his majority.... I do
not feel comfortable scheduling any controversial legislation unless I know we have the votes on
our side first.”75
A consequence of the “majority of the majority” governing philosophy is to minimize the role of
the minority party, unless its Members might provide votes vital to the passage of consequential
legislation. For instance, the House minority leader was “cal ed on repeatedly to deliver the
majority of votes during [GOP Speaker John] Boehner’s tenure for debt-ceiling increases and
bipartisan spending deals.”76 Factional dissent within GOP ranks meant that a partisan majority
could not be mobilized to enact such significant legislation.77 Splits in Republican ranks could
recast the Hastert Rule as a “minority of the majority” that influences GOP legislating.
A top aide to Speaker Hastert explained why the guideline at the time was important to the GOP
leadership. The aide wrote that the job of the Speaker “is not to preside over [a committee-
centric] regular order... [Hastert] learned that the secret of staying in the Speaker’s chair is to

73 Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992),
p. 1336. Hereinafter Riddick and Frumin, Senate Procedure.
74 An example of technical regular order in the House was provided to this report’s author by a House Parliamentarian.
He wrote:
When Representative A asks unanimous consent to insert a letter in the [ Congressional Record]
Representative B may reserve the right to object and thereby seek recognition from the Chair.
When recognized under that reservation of objection, B may interrogate, or comment on the letter,
or whatever. But if B grows tiresome, any Representative may demand regular order, at which
point B may no longer reserve the right to object. B must either object or not unless A withdraws
his request.
T he chamber’s time is too vital a resource to allow a reservation to continue ad infinitum.
75 Speaker Dennis Hastert, “Reflections on the Role of the Speaker in the Modern Day House of Representatives,” The
Cannon Centenary Conference: The Changing Nature of the Speakership (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), p. 62.
76 Burgess Everett, John Bresnahan, and Seung Min Kim, “Behind the Secret Budget Deal T hat Dro ve Conservatives
Mad,” Politico Pro Budget and Appropriations, October 30, 2015, p. 5.
77 Matthew Green, Legislative Hardball (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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understand that you must please the majority of your majority or risk losing the confidence of
your members.”78
Subsequent GOP Speakers general y tried to follow the “majority of the majority” guideline.
They were not always successful given the aforementioned combination of fissures in GOP ranks
and the imperative of adopting “must pass” legislation. Observance of the “Hastert Rule” could
prevent issues from being subject to floor consideration, even if supported by a bipartisan
majority.79
The Senate has its own informal guidelines or customs. One is sometimes cal ed the “Thurmond
Rule” after Senator Strom Thurmond, R-SC, when he chaired the Judiciary Committee (1981-
1987). Occasional y, it is invoked on judicial nominations by majority party Senators.
Thurmond’s controversial “admonition holds that in presidential election years, the Senate should
stop processing judicial nominations around the time of its summer recess, perhaps with limited
exceptions for clearly noncontroversial nominees.”80 Sharp controversies can erupt in the
chamber if the informal Thurmond “rule” is invoked during periods of acute partisanship and
divided government (the Senate and White House controlled by different parties).81
Unanimous Consent Agreements: From Informal Practice to Formal Rule
The House and Senate have wide latitude to apply, modify, interpret, waive, or ignore procedural
practices and rules. Sometimes there is a pattern to parliamentary change: from informal practice
to formal rule of the House or Senate, as the case may be. A Senate example highlights the “from
practice to rule” transition concerning UCAs.
Recal that UCAs are a fundamental feature of Senate decisionmaking. Typical y negotiated by
party leaders and other interested Senators, UCAs dispense with the Senate’s cumbersome formal
rules, which permit extended debate (the filibuster) and the offering of nongermane amendments.
Instead, the Senate agrees to a tailor-made procedure, outlined in the UCA, for the consideration
of a specific measure or matter (e.g., limiting debate and identifying the amendments that are in
order). UCAs are commonly propounded on the floor by the majority leader. A single objection

78 John Feehery, “T he Myth of Regular Order,” The Hill, October 6, 2015, p. 21.
79 Ashley Parker and Jonathan Weisman, “After Deriding GOP on Immigration Bill, Boehner Shifts His Aim to
Obama,” New York Times, April 30, 2014, p. A16.
80 Russell Wheeler, The ‘Thurmond Rule’ and Other Advice and Consent Myths, T he Brookings Institution, May 25,
2016, p. 1. Another example of an informal guideline or custom concerns the Senate Judiciary Committee’s so -called
“blue slip” policy—a blue form sent by Judiciary chairs to home-state Senators soliciting their views of district and
circuit court judicial nominees from their state. T he thrust of the custom, implemented differently by Judiciary chairs,
allows Senators either to assent or to oppose judicial nominees from their home state by whether they return (yea) or do
not return (nay) their blue slip to the Judiciary Chair. In this partisan era, the Judiciary Committee has scheduled action
on these nominees even if neither home-state Senator returned a blue slip. Senate Majority Leader McConnell and
President T rump made swift Senate approval of judicial nominees a high priority. For further information about the
blue slip, see, for example, Mitchel A. Stollenberger, “T he Blue Slip: A T heory of Unified and Divided Government,
1979-2009,” Congress & the Presidency, May-August 2010, pp. 125-156; and CRS Report R44975, The Blue Slip
Process for U.S. Circuit and District Court Nom inations: Frequently Asked Questions, by Barry J. McMillion. A
somewhat related custom is called “senatorial courtesy,” which dates from the George Washington era. In general, it
means that home-state Senators of the President’s party would recommend to him candidates for federal positions in
their state. Presidents, as a matter of “courtesy,” would often—but not always—nominate that person to the Senate.
81 In February 2016, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia died. Soon thereafter, President Barack Obama nominated
Merrick Garland to fill the vacancy. No hearings or floor consideration occurred on the Garland nomination despite th e
urgings of the President, Senate Democrats, and others. T he Senate majority leader stated that America’s voters should
play the decisive role in this matter by their choice in November for President and party control of the Senate. In 2017,
President Donald T rump nominated and the GOP Senate confirmed Neil Gorsuch to fill the open Supreme Court seat.
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(“I object”) blocks adoption of the UCA. However, once the Senate approves the UCA, it is
bound by its parliamentary features, unless they are changed by another UCA. To summarize, a
UCA “changes al Senate rules and precedents that are contrary to the terms of the agreement”;
these agreements are “designed to suit each individual situation.”82
It is not clear when the Senate actual y began to employ UCAs to limit debate or to establish a
time for a vote on a measure.83 Two congressional scholars state that by the 1870s, UCAs “were
being used with some frequency.”84 However, these informal “gentlemen’s agreements” produced
a number of parliamentary controversies that led to the adoption in 1914 of a formal Senate rule.
Many of the controversies occurred because the early UCAs were viewed “as an arrangement
simply between gentlemen” and could, as a President pro tempore said, be “violated with
impunity by any member of the Senate.”85 The many controversies associated with these informal
agreements concerned questions such as the following:
 Could a UCA be changed or modified by another UCA?
 Are presiding officers authorized to enforce these accords?
 If Senators are absent when a UCA was proposed, could a colleague object on
their behalf?
 If a Senator in the chamber was momentarily distracted and failed to offer a
timely objection to a UCA, is the agreement valid?
To resolve such ambiguities and the controversies they evoked, the Senate on January 16, 1914,
adopted a formal rule (XII) to address some of these issues. The focus of the debate surrounding
the change was whether these compacts could be modified by another UCA. Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, R-MA, argued that to permit any subsequent changes to UCAs would only lead to delays
in expediting the Senate’s business. Another Senator, Charles Thomas, D-CO, argued
successfully that it is “the most il ogical thing in the world to say that the Senate of the United
States can unanimously agree to something and by act deprive itself of the power to agree
unanimously to undo it.”86 The new rule made two key changes: (1) UCAs are binding orders of
the Senate, and the presiding officer is charged with enforcing their terms; and (2) the Senate, by
unanimous consent, can modify or undo an existing UCA. Today, there are numerous precedents
that govern how UCAs “are to be interpreted and applied to various situations.”87

82 Riddick and Frumin, Senate Procedure, p. 1311.
83 T he first use of a unanimous consent agreement (UCA) may have occurred in 1846. Senator William Allen, D -OH,
pointed out that the Senate had been debating a joint resolution concerning the Oregon T erritory for two months. He
noted that it was the Senate’s habit to have a “conversational understanding that an end be put to protracted debate at a
particular time.” See Congressional Globe, vol. 15 (March 24, 1846), p. 540. A Senate colleague suggested that
Senator Allen delay making such a request. Finally, on April 13, 1846, a consensus had developed among Senators that
a final vote on the joint resolution should occur three days later. On April 16, after spending 65 days debating the
matter, the Senate enacted the joint resolution.
84 Gerald Gamm and Steven S. Smith, “Last Among Equals: T he Senate’s Presiding Officer,” in Esteemed Colleagues:
Civility and Deliberation in the U.S. Senate, ed. Burdett A. Loomis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2000), p. 124.
85 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 21, part 9 (August 26, 1890), p. 9144.
86 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 51, part 2 (January 16, 1914), p. 1757. By a 51 to 8 vote, the Senate
adopted Rule XII.
87 Riddick and Frumin, Senate Procedure, p. 1312.
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Regular Order: Multiple Perspectives
Prelude
Whether traditional, nontraditional, or a hybrid approach to lawmaking is utilized, the end result
could stil be gridlock, deadlock, or defeat of legislation. No procedural method guarantees
lawmaking success. A Senator lamented, “We’ve gotten back to regular order [on some bil s], but
we stil have gridlock.”88 Even so, lawmakers might prefer the regular order if that approach
serves their objectives, such as mobilizing broad Member and public support for legislation.
Contrarily, party leaders may have little choice but to set aside regular order and employ
unconventional lawmaking to deal with emergencies or to advance their agenda priorities if they
are stymied by the implacability of the opposition.
Selected Definitions
The diverse interpretations of the regular order offered by congressional experts reveal several
commonalities, such as an emphasis on an orderly, deliberative, and participatory policymaking
process that affords Members of al views and from al parts of the country broad opportunities to
participate in the policymaking process. Pressures of time (deadline lawmaking) or global and
national crises are factors that can upend the regular order. Implicit in the definitions is that how
Congress makes decisions can be as important as the policies themselves.
 Senate Majority Whip.
We are going to have committees consider legislation. We are going to have hearings
to figure out how to pass good legislation, which is going to be voted on in the
committee before it comes to the Senate so that we can see what pieces of legislation
have bipartisan support and thus might be able to be passed by the Senate. In the Senate
we call this regular order, but all it means is that everybody gets to participate in the
process ... [and] to debate and offer amendments both in committee and on the floor.89
 Former Staff Director, House Rules Committee. The “regular order can be
defined as those rules, precedents and customs of Congress that constitute an
orderly and deliberative policymaking process.”90
 A House Democratic Leader. “Regular order gives to everybody the opportunity
to participate in the process in a fashion which wil effect, in my opinion, the
most consensus and best product.”91
 Former House Armed Services Chair. “Over half the members here now don’t
know what a regular order is. They don’t know you’re supposed to pass a budget
[resolution] and then 12 appropriation bil s, and the Senate is supposed to [do the

88 Peter Kasperowicz, “We Need A New Senate of Urgency on Debt,” WashingtonExaminer.Com , January 11, 2016, p.
33.
89 Sen. John Cornyn, “Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 162 (February 3, 2016), p. S540.
90 Don Wolfensberger, “Regular Order Is a Political Rorschach,” RollCall.com , May 8, 2013, p. 12.
91 T ory Newmyer, “Pelosi’s Restless T eam Seeks Voice,” Roll Call, February 5, 2009, p. 21.
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same], and have conferences and work those out, and get the president to sign
[the appropriations bil s], al before Oct. 1.”92
 A Democratic Senator.
The truth is that we stopped following regular order. A lot of us only heard about
regular order. We have never actually governed by it.... This is what regular order is
supposed to look like. After receiving the President’s budgets ... Congress is supposed
to respond with our view of what the budget should look like. Then we work through
[the] appropriations committees and their subcommittees to develop 12 separate
appropriations bills. The entire body should then consider each individual bill and
make sure they meet the demands of our constituents while staying within the means
of our set budget [resolution]. We need to do that 12 separate times.93
 A Senate GOP Chair. “By ‘regular order,’ I mean [the measure] came to the floor,
it had an open amendment process, al 100 Senators had a chance to participate in
it, instead of just the 30 on the Appropriations Committee, and it was eventual y
voted on and approved.”94
 Senate Majority Leader.
Here is what we mean when we talk about returning to the regular order. We mean
working in committee and allowing Senators from both sides to have their voices
heard. We mean bringing bills to the floor and empowering more Members to offer
suggestions they think might make a good bill even better. We mean working through
hours of debate and deliberation, processing amendments from both sides, and then
arriving at a final bill that actually passes.95
There are also procedural y detailed definitions of what constitutes regular order legislating. An
example is this six-part proposal to amend House rules. It was offered on the opening day of the
Democratic-controlled 110th House (January 4, 2007). The sponsor was GOP Representative
David Dreier of California, the ranking lawmaker on the Rules Committee and the panel’s
previous chair. Representative Dreier entitled his recommendation “Regular Order for
Legislation.” Its fundamental aim was to alter House rules to protect and strengthen minority
rights during this hyperpartisan period. Reflect, for instance, on this recommendation:
“Legislation shal general y come to the floor under a procedure that al ows open, full, and fair
debate consisting of a full amendment process that grants the minority the right to offer its
alternatives, including a substitute [amendment].” It is usual, regardless of which party is in the
minority, for opposition lawmakers to propose amendments to the House rule book on the first
day of a new Congress. Invariably, as in this case, the majority party rejects minority-sponsored
amendments to the chamber’s rule book, in part because they are viewed as dilatory and
obstructive procedures.

92 Pat Morrison, “For ‘Buck’ McKeon, It’s Syria or the Sequester,” LATimes.com , September 18, 2013, online edition.
93 Sen. Joe Manchin, “Omnibus and T ax Extenders Legislation,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 161 (December 17, 2015), p. S8739.
94 Sen. Lamar Alexander, “Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016,” remarks
in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 162 (May 12, 2016), p. S2729.
95 Sen. Mitch McConnell, “T he Appropriations Process,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition,
vol. 162 (May 17, 2016), p. S2833.
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Regular Order Can Provoke Irregular Order
Ironical y, regular order can provoke nontraditional procedures and processes. For example,
newly elected House Speakers—from at least the mid-1990s speakership of Newt Gingrich, R-
GA, going forward—pledged to operate the House in a fair and open manner, unlike when the
other party was in charge.96 However, with the escalation of procedural partisanship, promises of
fairness and openness are difficult to keep, in part because of the divergent policy views of the
two parties. Brief examples highlight the clash between openness and timely policymaking, one
involving GOP control of the House, the other with Democrats in charge.
GOP Control
In November 1994, Republicans won a historic mid-term election, capturing majority control of
the 104th House (1995-1996). After 40 straight years (1955-1995) in the minority, many viewed
Republicans as the “permanent minority.”97 Gerald Solomon, R-N.Y., the new chair of the Rules
Committee, proclaimed that the GOP House would function in a more open, fair, and deliberative
manner compared with when Democrats were in charge. He reported that in the previous 103rd
Congress, Democrats adopted closed or restrictive special rules that limited or prevented
amendments 70% of the time. Chairman Solomon pledged instead that “we are going to have 70
percent open and unrestricted rules, if we possibly can.”98
Republicans soon experienced the downside of open rules, the ever-present tension between
debate and decision: balancing the right of al interested lawmakers to have a say in policymaking
against the governing party’s desire to advance its agenda priorities. For instance, after two weeks
of debating and amending the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (H.R. 5), which was considered
under an open rule, Republicans began to have second thoughts about openness.
During the 1994 mid-term election, Republicans promised that the House would act on their top
10 policy priorities (cal ed the “Contract with America”) during the first 100 days of the new
Congress. Granted the opportunity to offer numerous floor amendments, the Democratic minority
employed a filibuster-by-amendment strategy to foil the GOP’s 100-day plan. At this
development, Rules Chairman Solomon said, “It looks like we’re going to have to increasingly
[report restrictive rules] if the Democrats won’t cooperate.”99 Gradual y, rules that limited
Members’ amendment opportunities became the “new normal” in subsequent Congresses.
Democratic Control
When Democrats reclaimed control of the House (2007-2010), they encountered similar
difficulties with open rules. The Majority Leader stated the following: “[W]e went from open
rules which we started out with, to structured rules [restrictions on the amending process]
because, frankly, it was our perception that what we were having is filibuster by amendment—

96 Donald R. Wolfensberger, Changing Cultures in Congress: From Fair Play to Power Plays (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018), pp. 1-7.
97 William F. Connelly Jr. and John J. Pitney Jr., Congress’ Permanent Minority? Republicans in the U.S. House
(Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams, 1994).
98 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 141, January 5, 1995, p. H137.
99 Jonathan Salant, “Under Open Rules, Discord Rules,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 28, 1995, p.
277. See also Mary Jacoby, “T hree Quarters ‘Open,’ or T wo -Thirds ‘Closed’? Parties Can’t Agree on How to Define
Rules,” Roll Call, April 13, 1995, p. 7.
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amendment after amendment after amendment—from [the minority] side of the aisle.”100
“Regular order,” in short, provoked an “irregular order.” As a House Member once said, “I
believe in regular order, but I believe in sane regular order where members aren’t just given the
ability [to offer numerous amendments] for purely political reasons.”101
In today’s partisan-charged environment, majority party promises of openness and fairness are
hard to keep. Intense partisan polarization suggests that a return to regular order legislating
becomes problematic without substantial procedural and political forbearance and comity
between the two parties. Trade-offs, bargains, and compromises—hal marks of collective
problem-solving—require the accommodation of disparate views. As a former top Senate and
White House aide pointed out, “Bipartisanship is not the absence of partisanship; it is partisans
coming together to reconcile their competing political and policy objectives.”102
Nontraditional Lawmaking: Several Advantages
The process of “coming together” is difficult today. Partisan polarization—the ideological
distinctiveness of the two parties—is a prime reason. Its impact is evident in numerous legislative
proceedings: the intensity of the Senate’s confirmation process; the irregularity of congressional
budgeting and appropriating; or the parliamentary struggles to legislate on many issues.
Unconventional processes are sometimes the only way to achieve policy results. Consider the
procedural and political advantages of nontraditional lawmaking, such as these three.
First, nontraditional procedures work. They can produce policy results unachievable through the
“regular order.” This reality provides an incentive for their wider use. A congressional scholar
calculated that there is a relatively high success rate for major measures that employ one or more
unconventional procedures, such as bypassing committee review of legislation. “When the
legislative process on a bil in the House includes two or more special procedures or practices,”
said the scholar, “that legislation is considerably more likely to pass the House [96 percent] than
if it includes one [81 percent] or none [77 percent]. The same relationship holds in the Senate [72
percent for no special procedures; 90 percent for two or more].” Furthermore, of “measures
subject to two or more special procedures and practices in both chambers, 80 percent were
successful; at the other extreme, if subject to none in either chamber, only 61 percent were
successful.” The scholar concluded, “legislation is more likely to complete the legislative process
successfully if that process includes these special procedures and practices.”103
Second, unconventional procedural pathways can be more expeditious than traditional
lawmaking. Time is a critical element of lawmaking and often in short supply. Committee or
party leaders want to use it in ways they deem advantageous and productive. They may decide,
for instance, to avoid committee consideration (hearings and markups) of a measure. Why? They
do not want to provide the opposition with two opportunities—in committee and then again on

100 Rep. Steny Hoyer, “Legislative Reform,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 162 (June
16, 2016), p. H3954.
101 “High Hopes for ‘Regular Order’ End In Yet Anot her Midwinter Omnibus,” CQ Almanac, 2014 (Washington, DC:
CQ Roll, 2015), pp. 2-3.
102 John Hilley, The Challenge of Legislation: Bipartinsanship In A Partisan World (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2008), p. xi.
103 Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), p. 223. T he special
procedures and practices identified by the author include for the House, “multiple referral, omnibus legislation,
legislation that was the result of a legislative-executive summit, the bypassing of committees, post -committee
adjustments, and consideration under a complex or closed rule; for the Senate, all of the above except consideration
under a complex or closed rule.”
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the floor—to frustrate the majority and to showcase their political messages and policy priorities.
During committee proceedings, said a chair, opposition Members “get to offer al kinds of
embarrassing amendments and stuff in committee, and why do it twice. Do it once.”104
The strategic value of time, such as whether to move slowly or swiftly in lawmaking, is wel
understood by party leaders. They understand that “legislative timing [of floor action] plays a big
role in whether a bil wil pass because support can be fleeting;”105 or the majority leadership
might decide to use “end game” lawmaking as a way to achieve party and policy objectives. An
example would be the difficulties Congress encounters in trying to enact individual y the 12
annual appropriations bil s by the start of the fiscal year (October 1).
Unable to meet appropriating timetables because of conflicts between and among the parties,
chambers, and White House, party leaders assemble omnibus spending bil s consisting of several
outstanding appropriations measures. These bil s can be hundreds of pages in length. As an
analyst explained, “What usual y happens [when the October 1 fiscal deadline approaches] is a
high stakes game of chicken, with the result a huge omnibus bil , negotiated by a few leadership
aides and representatives from the White House, in a smal room, with the threat of a government
shutdown looming over the horizon.”106 Omnibus spending bil s may be “the wrong way to do
business,”107 stated Senator John McCain, R-AZ, but they might be the only way in the current
partisan environment for Congress to carry out its constitutional appropriating responsibility. In
sum, legislating without al owing Member participation is faster than conventional policymaking.
Third, the secrecy general y associated with nontraditional processes can facilitate lawmaking.
Closed-door sessions have certain advantages over public meetings. For example, they enable
Members to raise creative or “trial bal oon” ideas without worry of public condemnation from
partisan commentators for subverting party principles. A congressional aide said, “Regular order
is too messy and it’s covered instantly in the media and it can create lawmaking problems,” such
as the disintegration of Member support for a measure.108
In contrast, the presumption embedded in the “regular order” is the formal requirement for
transparency during committee and floor proceedings. Consider that C-SPAN (the Cable Satel ite
Public Affairs Network) provides coverage of numerous committee sessions and virtual y al floor
(gavel to gavel) proceedings. Today’s 24/7 media environment is replete with journalists,
analysts, and lobbyists who monitor and publicize Capitol Hil proceedings.
Nearly 100 years ago, a House lawmaker made an observation about legislative secrecy that
remains relevant to this day: “Behind closed doors compromise is possible; before spectators it is
difficult.”109 Recal from history, the many compromises reached during closed door proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.110

104 Fawn Johnson, “Democrats Bypass Committee on Minimum Wage Bill,” National Journal Daily, January 8, 2014,
p. 5.
105 Susan Ferrechio, “Congressional Leaders Right Against Posting Bills Online,” Washington Examiner, October 6,
2009, p. 14.
106 John Feehery, “A Spending Solution,” The Hill, October 6, 2016, p. 21.
107 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 162 (March 9, 2016), p. S1370.
108 T his quotation is from an analysis of the regular order by James M. Curry and Frances E. Lee, “What is Regular
Order Worth? Partisan Lawmaking and Congressional Processes,” paper presented at the Congressional Rules &
Procedures Conference, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, May 17 -19, 2018, p. 21.
109 Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922), p. 151.
110 After the 1787 Federal Convention, James Madison stated the following: “Had the members committed themselves
publicly at first …, consistency [would have] required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussions no
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Features of “New Normal” Legislating
The two legislative parties are more ideological y distinct and internal y united than they have
been in decades for reasons discussed at greater length in the next section (“The Rise of Partisan
Polarization”). That the two legislative parties disagree profoundly at times about what is best for
the country is no surprise. Nor is it unexpected that majority party leaders, if frustrated in
advancing their governing agenda, would use nontraditional procedures to enact their party’s
priorities. After al , it might be in the political interest of the minority party, regardless of party, to
use a “block and blame” strategy: foment policy gridlock and then blame the majority party for its
lack of performance (a “do nothing Congress”).
In seeking to advance their collective interests of winning elections and wielding power,
legislative partisans stir up controversy. They impeach one another’s motives and accuse
one another of incompetence and corruption, not always on strong evidence. They exploit
the floor agenda for public relations, touting their successes, embarrassing their opponents,
and generally propagandizing for their own party’s benefit. They actively seek out policy
disagreements that can be politically useful in distinguishing themselves from their partisan
opponents.111
The chal enges of modern-day governance have triggered significant legislative and procedural
changes. A brief review spotlights several of the most consequential parliamentary
transformations. They include changes to (1) the committee system; (2) “special rules” reported
from the Rules Committee; (3) Senate floor procedures (filibuster, cloture, the “nuclear option,”
and “fil ing the amendment tree”); and (4) the role of conference committees to resolve bicameral
differences on legislation.112
Congressional Committees
Committees are important in both chambers because they play a large role in processing the
business of Congress. Most measures are referred to committee; these panels may hold hearings,
conduct markups, and issue reports; and they oversee executive branch performance. Stil , in this
polarized period, “an increasing proportion of legislation has reached the House and Senate floors
without undergoing markups.” During the 2009-2011 period, over 40% of “al House bil s and
80% of al Senate bil s were deliberated outside committee.”113 To further il ustrate committee
changes in recent decades, this section discusses three developments: the increase of measures
considered by the House that were unreported by the committee(s) of jurisdiction; Senate Rule
XIV that permits any Senator to bypass the reference of legislation to committee; and the use of

man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was
open to the force of argument.” Cited in Adrian Vermeule, “T he Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure,”
Public Law and Legal T heory, Working Paper no. 39, Un iversity of Chicago Law School, February 2003, p. 39.
111 Frances E. Lee, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate (Chicago: T he University
of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 4.
112 T he congressional budget process has also undergone major changes from what it was like during the committee-
centric period. Scores of books, articles, legislative hearings, and more have assessed how budgeting has changed (e.g.,
omnibus appropriations bills) and what revisions might improve fiscal decisio nmaking. For a useful summary of
Member concerns with congressional budgeting, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, Legislative
History of the Joint Select Com m ittee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform , committee print, 115th Cong., 2nd
sess., December 19, 2018, 115-15 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2018).
113 William Bendix, “Bypassing Congressional Committees: Parties, Panel Rosters, and Deliberative Processes,”
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 3 (May 2016), pp. 690 -691.
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ad hoc legislative groups to assume the traditional policy formulation role of the standing
committees.
Unreported Bills Considered in the House
The 13-Member Rules Committee, as noted earlier, is the “Speaker’s committee” because he or
she effectively names the nine majority party lawmakers, including the chair. Accordingly, the
Rules Committee is responsive to requests of the Speaker to forward to the floor bil s not reported
from committee. During the committee-centric period, hearings, markups, and reports usual y
preceded floor consideration. Even in the early 1990s, “only about 9 percent of the bil s with
special rules were unreported” from the committee(s) of jurisdiction.
Fast forward to the 2010s. Unreported measures accounted “for 30 percent of al bil s with special
rules,” and most of those were considered by the House with rules that prohibited floor
amendments. An expert on House procedure concluded, “More bil s are being brought to the floor
without the benefit of committee hearings, amendments, or reports, primarily because they are
party-driven.” He added that although more than two-thirds of major measures are reported from
committee, “the deviations from regular order that do occur tend to exacerbate partisan warfare
and diminish committee authority.”114
Recognition that committees required strengthening, advocated by change-oriented Members, led
to adoption of new chamber rules (H.Res. 6) at the start of the 116th Congress (2019-2021).
Section 103(i) of H.Res. 6 is entitled “Requiring Committee Hearing and Markup on Bil s and
Resolutions.” For example,
it shall not be in order to consider a bill or joint resolution pursuant to a special order of
business reported by the Committee on Rules that has not been reported by a committee;
or has been reported by a committee unless the report includes a list of related committee
and subcommittee hearings and a designation of at least one committee or subcommittee
hearing that was used to develop or consider such bill or joint resolution.
One reason departures from committee review might occur is if the legislative branch, for
instance, must respond swiftly to address national or global emergencies, such as the COVID-19
pandemic. For instance, the House in 2020 enacted the $3 tril ion Health and Economic Recovery
Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act (Heroes Act) to address the coronavirus’ effect on the
economy, state and local governments, and other matters. The measure was unreported from
committee, considered under a closed rule (no amendments), contained controversial changes,
and, not unexpected for a bil of this significance, passed the House on May 15, three days after it
was introduced.115 There are other reasons why measures are taken up without committee review:
for instance, they passed the House in the previous Congress, or they are party priorities.

114 Don Wolfensberger, “Weak Committees Empower the Partisans,” Roll Call, November 8, 2011, p. 11.
Wolfensberger, a former staff director of the Rules Committee and a 30 -year veteran of the House, is now a
congressional scholar and author affiliated with the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, DC.
115 Urgent times, such as the pandemic, beget urgent measures. Another example is a special rule ( H.Res. 1017) that
was adopted by the House on June 25, 2020. One rule made in order six separate bills for House considerati on under a
closed rule. Upon the rule’s adoption, it also self-executed to House passage several leadership amendments, “avoiding
the need for separate floor votes.” Moreover, the special rule substituted for one of the six bills, “a 154 -page Rules
Committ ee print that bundled another 23 bills under the same bill number—eight of which had been previously
reported from committee as separate bills and 16 others that had not been reported by any committee.” See Don
Wolfensberger, “Floor Procedures T ightened in Pandemic’s Wake,” The Hill, June 28, 2020.
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Senate Rule XIV: Bypassing Bill Referral to Committee
Senate Rule XIV permits any Senator to employ the relatively easy process specified in the rule
to place a bil , at the time of introduction, directly on the legislative calendar of business—
bypassing any referral to committee.116 There is no guarantee that a Rule XIV measure pending
on the calendar would reach the floor. Although Rule XIV is not used for the vast majority of
measures, it has increased in use over time—from 3 in the 103rd (1993-1994) Congress to a
record-setting 57 in the 110th (2007-2008). The chamber’s agenda is set by the majority leader,
and, in most cases, the majority leader (or a designee) executes the Rule XIV process.
The majority leader may utilize Rule XIV to bypass committee referral for a number of reasons,
such as the lack of time for committee consideration or because the party leader wants an issue on
the legislative calendar that the leader can propose to the Senate at a time of his or her choosing.
Committee chairs, for their part, are not always happy when their panels are bypassed. A Senate
Finance chair once said, “Circumventing the committee process al owed this bil to come to the
floor full of many unanswered questions. Avoiding the committee process quashes any [real]
chance to improve this bil .”117 Even so, bypassing committee review also can occur with the
committee majority’s approval.
Ad Hoc “Gangs”
Partisan and policy conflicts may prevent standing committees, even party leaders, from forging
legislative agreements on major measures. If both committee and party leaders are stymied in
policymaking, bipartisan groups of lawmakers (sometimes cal ed “gangs” by the media) may
come together to draft compromise legislation. This development represents an innovative
response to institutional stalemate. As a political analyst wrote, “With polarization increasingly
clogging the conventional paths to agreement (either at the committee level or through
leadership), [lawmakers] convene a coalition of the wil ing to chart a bypass.”118 Bipartisan
groups may not be successful in creating law, but the theory is that they may have a better chance
than polarized committees to produce compromise bil s that can pass the House or Senate.
In 2013, for example, a bipartisan group of Senators—the “Gang of 8”—came together to write a
comprehensive reform bil on a controversial topic: immigration. Four Senate Democrats—
Charles Schumer, NY; Michael Bennet, CO; Richard Durbin, IL; and Robert Menendez, NJ—
joined four Senate Republicans—John McCain, AZ; Jeff Flake, AZ; Lindsay Graham, SC; and
Marco Rubio, FL—to draft a bil designed to win the support of the Senate. Their measure (S.
744) was referred to the Judiciary Committee, which reported the bil (13 to 5) on May 21 after
five days of markup. After several weeks of floor debate, S. 744 passed the Senate on June 27 by
a 68 to 32 vote, with the strong support of the Gang of 8. Senator Schumer stated, “Our pledge to
one another is not that we pledge to vote the same on [floor] amendments but that we keep the
core of the bil intact and don’t let attacks from one side or the other undo that.”119 A similar

116 Because the Senate has no general germaneness rule for amendments, a Senator could offer, for example, a school
education amendment to a solar research bill pending on the floor. T he school education amendment might be equivalent
to a comprehensive bill never considered by any Senate committee. A germaneness requirement for amendments can be
imposed in the Senate in four ways: by a unanimous consent agreement; by statutory requirement; if cloture is invoked;
and by Senate Rule XVI for general appropriations bills. See also Nicholas O. Howard and Mark E. Owen,
“Circumventing Legislative Committees: The U.S Senate,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, July 2020, pp. 495-526.
117 Sen. Max Baucus, “Marketplace Fairness Act ,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 159
(April 22, 2013), p. S2829.
118 Ronald Brownstein, “Gangmen Style,” National Journal, May 11, 2013, p. 9.
119 “Senate Passes Immigration Overhaul,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2013 (Washington, DC: CQ Roll Call,
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House group of four Democrats and four Republicans also tried to fashion a bipartisan
immigration reform bil acceptable to a majority of their colleagues. They were unsuccessful. The
House never took up S. 744.120
Creative “Rules” of the House Rules Committee
During much of the 20th century, the Rules Committee issued two basic rules: “open” (general y
germane amendments are in order) and “closed” (no amendments are in order). There were other
variations: rules waiving points of order or modified rules making some amendments in order but
not others. Most rules were open during this congressional era. For example, from 1935 to 1947,
there was “an average of only three closed rules per Congress.” During the 80th Congress (1947-
1949), nine measures “were brought to the floor under closed rules,” the highest “in any Congress
since the 73rd [1933-1935] when ten closed rules were granted, eight of which came during the
famous first one hundred days of the [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt presidency.”121 Between 1939
and 1960, “there were 1128 open rules and 87 closed rules granted by the committee.”122 Tax
measures, with infrequent exceptions, have long been brought to the floor under closed rules. A
key reason: concern that an open process would lead to the adoption of numerous special interest
amendments that would unravel the tax code. The complexity of the tax code also discourages an
open amendment process.
Today, closed or “structured” rules govern floor procedures on major legislation. Structured rules
limit floor amendments to those approved by the majority party; they are then specified in the
special rule itself or in the report of the Rules Committee accompanying the special rule. Open
rules are in steep decline because they al ow, in the view of the majority leadership, too many
opportunities for the minority party to offer amendments designed to undermine the majority’s
policy priorities. Closed and structured rules ensure certainty and predictability in floor
proceedings, prevent spontaneous and troublesome floor amendments, block unwanted minority
party proposals, and protect vulnerable majority Members from casting electoral y chal enging
“November” votes.
Whether the majority is Democratic or Republican, each party at times has been “intent on
restricting debates and minimizing undesirable votes, rather than following established general
rules or practices. In fact, the circumvention of … standing rules and practices in furtherance of
time and issue certainty has itself become established practice, regardless of the political
majority.”123 “Rules” that permit an open amendment and deliberative process are sometimes
discouraged by lawmakers who favor a high degree of certainty in the floor schedule because of
the many demands on their time (e.g., legislative and constituency).
In five recent Congresses, the percentage of open versus restrictive (closed and structured) special
rules is as follows:124
 111th Congress (2009-2010): 1% open, 99% restrictive
 112th Congress (2011-2012): 18% open, 82% restrictive

2014), pp. 9-8.
120 Alec MacGillis, “T he Gang T hat Failed,” The New York Times Magazine, September 18, 2016, pp. 53-57, 70, 80.
121 T he quoted material is from A History of the Committee on Rules, p. 95.
122 Lewis A. Froman Jr., The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1967), p. 55. See also James A. Robinson, The House Rules Com m ittee (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
123 McKay and Johnson, Parliament & Congress, p 429.
124 T he data source is Donald Wolfensberger, resident scholar, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC.
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 113th Congress (2013-2014): 8% open, 92% restrictive
 114th Congress (2015-2016): 5% open, 95% restrictive
 115th Congress (2017-2018): 0% open, 100% restrictive
Wider use of restrictive rules reflects the top-down, leadership-directed legislating common to the
contemporary House. Restrictive rules can also upset rank-and-file lawmakers of the majority
party. They, too, are barred from offering their freestanding amendments.
 Self-executing rules—include substantive, even nongermane, changes in the
legislation made in order for floor consideration by the special rule. Adoption of
the special rule automatical y makes these policy changes in the bil without any
opportunity for rank-and-file lawmakers to debate or to amend the “self-
executed” provisions. These rules also remove the need for the Rules Committee
to cite potential y embarrassing waivers of House rules in its report to accompany
the special rule. This procedural technique, wrote a House Parliamentarian, “has
taken hold more frequently in contemporary Congresses as measures emerging
from committees are sometimes extensively rewritten, often with additional and
nongermane matter, merely by vote on the special order of business resolution
and not by the traditional presentation and vote on separate amendments
following the standing committee stage.”125
 Queen-of-the-Hill rules—make several (e.g., three or four) major amendments,
the functional equivalent of separate bil s, in order for House consideration. Al
are voted on, but the one that wins is the “top vote getter.” If there are tie votes,
the last one voted upon is the winner.126
 Compound rules—provide that in one special rule, two or more different bil s are
made in order for House consideration. The single rule specifies an open,
structured, or closed amendment process for each discrete measure. This
procedure al ows the majority leadership to save the time of the House by
reducing the number of special rules. Otherwise, a separate rule for each bil
expends an hour of debate time, excluding accompanying votes. These rules also
eliminate multiple “previous question” votes, which would otherwise occur under
a “one bil , one rule” construct.127

125 McKay & Johnson, Parliament & Congress, p. 428.
126 A recent article pertaining to the Queen-of-the-Hill rule is Dara Lind, “Queen of the hill”: the Obscure House Rule
that Could Force the House to T ake up Immigration Bills,” Vox.com, April 19, 2018. T he “Queen” rule was a response
to a Democratic innovation during the early 1980s: the “ King of the Hill” rule. One of the features of this rule was
permitting the House to vote on an array of major policy alternatives—so-called substitutes that are equivalent to new
measures—that are voted upon one after the other. No matter the outcome, the special rule stipulated that only the vote
on the last substitute—the majority party’s preference—counted for purposes of accepting or rejecting a national
policy. In the minority, Republicans disliked this rule, in part because it provided political cover to majority party
lawmakers to vote however they wanted to satisfy constituency interests and then vote for their party’s policy
preference on the last vote in this procedural scenario. When the Republicans won control of the 104th House (1995-
1997), they dropped the “King of the Hill” and replaced it with their own preferred option: the “Queen of the Hill”
procedure.
127 Special rules are debated under the chamber’s one-hour rule. T hirty minutes are allocated to each party with the
Rules chair, or his or her designee, always in charge of offering the “previous question” motion. Its adoption by
majority vote of the House stops all debate, prevents the offering of amendments, and brings the House to an
immediate vote on the main question—the rule itself. Minority party lawmakers often highlight in advance of the vote
on the previous question motion that, if the motion is rejected, they plan to offer proposals that are attractive to many
voters but also likely to create policy fissures and electoral discomfort within majority party ranks.
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 Time-Structured rules—establishe an overal time limit (e.g., four or five hours)
for debating and amending the bil made in order by the special rule. The rule
itself might be cal ed “open,” but everything counts against the overal limit, such
as debating amendments, voting on amendments, making points of order, or
responding to parliamentary inquiries. This type of rule indirectly restricts the
amending process.
New and innovative special rules are responses by the Rules Committee to changing institutional
circumstances.128 As the Speaker’s committee, the Rules Committee’s mission general y is to
advance and advantage the majority party’s legislative agenda. This mission has varied over the
decades, but it is of major significance today and paral els a comparable perspective of a Speaker
from another historical era. In 1888, Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed, R-ME—one of the most
influential Speakers ever and a strong advocate of majority party governance—said, “If the
majority do not govern, the minority wil …. [House] rules, then, ought to be so arranged as to
facilitate the action of the majority.”129
The Senate
To reemphasize, the Senate is an institution unlike the House, a majoritarian body. House rules,
practices, and precedents al ow a majority, however constructed (partisan or bipartisan), to
govern. Recal that one Senator, a smal group, or the minority party has formidable
parliamentary prerogatives given the Senate’s permissive rules and procedures. In brief, the
“majority often struggles to govern at al ,” declared a Senate expert.130 A Senator stated, “[J]ust to
be clear, the only way the Senate functions and the only way the Senate has ever functioned is if
you deviate from what [lawmakers] cal regular order.” He added, “We need unanimous consent
on a daily and sometimes hourly basis to al ow the Senate to function,” which means “waiving of
the rules on a regular basis.”131
The combination of individual procedural prerogatives, partisan polarization, and the chamber’s
permissive rules underscores the policymaking chal enges that confront the Senate. Bipartisan
collaboration and compromise are especial y difficult to forge in an era of heightened partisanship
where the two parties compete vigorously to hold or take institutional power. The use of
nontraditional procedures by both political parties is common practice, so much so that many are

128 Special rules that limit the amendment process can mean that decisionmaking on contentious issues occurs behind-
the-scenes by party leaders, rather than through separate and public floor consideration by the wider membership.
Worth noting is that the Rules Committee may grant majority floor managers the authority “to ‘en bloc’ consideration
of amendments screened by [Rules] into one or more ‘managers’ amendments which are not amendable or divisible
into separate parts.” See MacKay and Johnson, Parliament & Congress, p. 428. Managers’ amendments are packages
of discrete measures that are commonly considered under the terms set by the special rule. T he special rule to govern
consideration of major transportation legislation (H.R. 2) in June 2020 is a good example of the wider use of the en
bloc procedure. As the Rules Committee’s floor manager of the special rule (H.Res. 1001) explained, “T he rule self-
executes a manager’s amendment offered by [T ransportation] Chair DeFazio, makes in order six en bloc amendments
in total, and makes in order three further amendments.” Rep. Joe Morelle, “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 2,
Investing in a New Vision for the Environment and Surface T ransportation in America Act,” remarks in the House,
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 166 (June 30, 2020), p. H2683. En bloc provisions can be viewed as time-
saving and expediting procedures.
129 William A. Robinson, Thomas Reed: Parliamentarian (New York: Dodd Mead, 1930), p. 182.
130 Martin B. Gold, Senate Procedure and Practice, p. xii.
131 U.S. Congress, House Committee on t he Budget, Legislative History of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and
Appropriations Process Reform , committee print, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., December 19, 2018, 115-15 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2018), p. 85..
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acknowledged as significant new features of contemporary lawmaking. Several major examples
are included below.
Filibusters
Filibusters, cloture, and 60 votes are three key interlocking components of Senate Rule XXII.
Consider the filibuster, perhaps the most famous feature of the Senate. Numerous books and
articles have been written about the filibuster, its history, diverse purposes, pros and cons, and so
on.132 Hollywood glamorized the filibuster in the 1939 movie classic Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington. The round-the-clock filibuster by a single Senator, as portrayed in the movie, has
almost disappeared from present-day Senate proceedings. The time demands and pressures on the
Senate—to consider numerous bil s and nominations—and on individual Senators (campaigning,
constituency service, and so on) are so large that no longer is a so-cal ed “war of attrition” (i.e.,
exhaustion) employed to end filibusters.133
Instead, the threat of a filibuster is often viewed today as equivalent to its exercise. In short, it is
not necessary to talk or take other actions on the floor to conduct a filibuster (a “silent filibuster”).
A former Senate Parliamentarian explained, “There is very little distinction between a filibuster
and a threat to filibuster. Any credible threat to filibuster is treated as if it were a filibuster
because the Majority Leader, who has limited time to move his party’s agenda, must regard it as
such.”134 Senators understand that filibuster threats provide them with bargaining leverage to
influence legislative policymaking; outside groups also encourage senatorial al ies to threaten
filibusters as a way to prevent unwanted Senate actions. Threats to filibuster are especial y potent
during certain times, such as the end-of-session rush to adjourn. (Filibuster threats are somewhat
akin to a long-standing Senate practice cal ed “holds,” which Senators of either party might use to
block or delay floor consideration of measures or nominations.135)
Cloture
For over a century, the Senate had no formal way to end talkathons. However, filibusters were
infrequent, and majorities usual y could be mustered to pass legislation. The norms and culture of
the times militated against using prolonged debate to frustrate or prevent Senate action on
measures or matters. Senators recognized that debates for dilatory purposes would occasional y
be used, but “they were not used frequently enough to give the Senate any trace of the notoriety
which the filibuster later attached to the Upper Chamber.”136

132 See, for example, Richard A. Arenberg and Robert B. Dove, Defending the Filibuster (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2012); Sarah A. Binder and Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States
Senate (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001); Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of
Obstruction in the House and Senate (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 20110); and Gregory J. Wawro and
Eric Schickler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawm aking in the U.S. Senate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2006).
133 See Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “Changing T ime Constraints on Congress: Historical Perspectives on the Use of
Cloture,” in Congress Reconsidered, 3rd ed., eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, (Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985).
134 Robert B. Dove, “Senate Rule XXII: T he Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” Roll Call, November 13, 2003, p. 20.
135 A hold permits any Senator to block (sometimes temporarily, sometimes permanently) chamber consideration of
legislation or nominations. As a Senator explained, a hold is “ a notice by a Senator to his or her party leader of an
intention to object to bringing a bill or nomination to the floor for consideration.” Senate debate, Congressional
Record, vol. 148 (April 17, 2002), p. S2850.
136 Roy Swanstrom, The United States Senate, 1787-1801, S. Doc. 99-19 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), p. 210. An
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In 1917, with World War I underway, the Senate adopted Rule XXII. The rule was provoked by a
filibuster of 11 Senators who blocked President Woodrow Wilson’s proposal to arm U.S.
merchant ships against German submarine attacks. Responding to this outcome, President Wilson
demanded successfully that the Senate adopt a new rule (Rule XXII) that could bring debate to a
close.
Rule XXII provided that extended debate could be ended by invoking cloture (closure of debate)
by a supermajority vote. Since 1975, the vote required to invoke cloture has been 60 of 100
Senators duly sworn and chosen; the support of two-thirds of those voting—usual y 67—is
required to end debate on proposals to change Senate rules. Cloture is also a time-consuming
process that can extend over several days—Day 1, file cloture on a pending matter; Day 2,
layover period; Day 3, vote on cloture. If cloture is invoked, Rule XXII permits a maximum of 30
hours of post-cloture consideration of the matter. A chal enge for majority party leaders is time
management. If cloture’s multiday process is employed, then less time is available for the Senate
to consider other measures or to engage in lengthy consideration of a consequential measure.
With its supermajority requirement, cloture was invoked sparingly from 1917 to 1970. For
example, successful filibusters blocked civil rights legislation dealing with the poll tax, literacy
tests, and employment discrimination. During the 84th and 85th Congresses (1955-1959), there
were no cloture motions filed. It merits mention that “the most remarkable feature of Senate
politics for much of its history is how often a slim majority of senators proved able to pass highly
controversial, major legislation over the opposition of a large minority of senators.”137
Fast forward to the polarized Senate of today: the number of cloture motions filed, voted upon,
and invoked have increased dramatical y. Consider these aggregate cloture numbers from the
eight most recent full Congresses, the 108th through the 115th (2003-2018): 1,102 cloture motions
filed, 888 voted upon, and 617 invoked. The 113th Congress (2013-2014), which detonated the
“nuclear option” (see below), saw 252 cloture motions filed, 218 voted upon, and 187 invoked.
The 108th Congress (2003-2004) witnessed the fewest cloture motions filed (62), with 49 voted
upon and 12 invoked. The 116th Congress (2019-2020), as of August 10, 2020, is the current
record setter: 265 cloture motions filed, 245 voted upon, and 223 invoked.
These figures underscore a significant change in senatorial behavior: cloture is being used much
more frequently, even multiple times on a measure or matter; on many more issues (controversial
or noncontroversial); and on measures where there is little partisan disagreement. Today,
filibuster threats are commonplace on al manner of legislation. If measures are to reach the floor,
majority leaders and like-minded Senators realize they may have to mobilize supermajority
support from among their Senate colleagues.
Cloture is often a useful parliamentary device for the majority leader. For example, he might file a
cloture motion immediately after a colleague objects to the leader’s unanimous consent request to
take up a bil . Minority lawmakers might then lament that cloture is filed before any debate has
begun. The majority leader’s cloture-filing objectives might be twofold: (1) to provoke private
discussions with the opposition on ways to move the bil forward, such as limits on the number of
amendments each party could offer; and (2) to protect party colleagues from casting nongermane,
electoral y problematic “poison pil ” amendments. If cloture is invoked, amendments during post-

analysis of Senate debate during the 19th and early 20th centuries, when there were no formal rules governing prolonged
debate, can be found in Wawro and Schickler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawm aking in the U.S. Senate.
137 Eric Schickler and Gregory J. Wawro, “What the Filibuster T ells Us About the Senate,” The Forum , vol. 9, no. 4
(2011), p. 1.
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cloture must be germane. The basic point is that cloture serves a number of purposes other than as
a debate-ending procedure. As a scholar of the Senate concluded, the increase in cloture votes
“documents the effort of majority parties and majority leaders to expand their control over the
Senate.”138
The 60-Vote Senate
In a Senate that is closely and deeply divided, it is difficult to muster the 60 votes to invoke
cloture on legislation. Partisan filibusters occur, and cloture votes regularly follow party lines.
Thus, a cohesive minority party of 41 Senators is wel -positioned to delay or derail consideration
of majority party initiatives.
For most of the Senate’s history, a majority vote was sufficient for approving most measures.139
Not so today. The 60 vote required to invoke cloture has morphed to become an institutionalized
de facto rule for winning passage of many bil s and amendments. As the Senate’s GOP leader
once said, “I think we can stipulate once again for the umpteenth time that matters that have any
level of controversy about it in the Senate wil require 60 votes.”140
UCAs often include the 60-vote threshold for adopting legislative matters. An advantage of an
agreement requiring 60 votes is that it could avoid the lengthy cloture process. Sixty votes also
serve some of the interests of both parties: majority lawmakers receive a direct vote on their
policy alternatives, and 41 united minority Senators can prevent adoption of proposals they
dislike. In sum, the filibuster was once infrequently used and typical y reserved for major issues;
its threatened or actual use today on scores of matters has transformed the Senate into a 60-vote
institution. This supermajority voting standard is now common practice in the Senate.
The “Nuclear Option” Is Detonated (2013, 2017, 2019)
On November 21, 2013, the Democratic Senate took a history-making procedural action: it
triggered the “nuclear option.” The Senate established a new precedent: majority cloture for
presidential nominations (executive and judicial), excepting only nominees to the Supreme Court.
No longer could the minority rely on the filibuster to block these nominations. Recal that the text
of Rule XXII states that a supermajority—“three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn”
(60 of 100)—is required to invoke cloture on most matters, with two-thirds of those voting
necessary to invoke cloture on proposals to amend Senate standing rules. The new precedent
reinterpreted Rule XXII to al ow majority cloture without making any changes to the text of the
Rule. A Senate scholar cal ed this “among the three or four most important events in the
procedural history of the Senate.”141
The precedential approach to overriding chamber rules has been available to the Senate from
1789 forward under its constitutional rulemaking authority. The 2013 use of the nuclear option for
al nominations, except to the Supreme Court, was its most contentious and consequential
application to that date.142 In short, a cohesive majority of Senators, if so inclined and under the

138 James Wallner, “Filibusters and Cloture, June 19, 2020, p. 4, at https://www.legbranch.org/.
139 See Wawro & Schickler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, p. 127. T hey found that
“policymaking in the pre-cloture Senate was generally majoritarian, with the exception that obstruction posed a
somewhat greater—but not absolute—threat late in a session.”
140 Quoted in David Herszenhorn, “How the Filibuster Became the Rule,” New York Times, December 2, 2007.
141 Smith, The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate , p. 265.
142 Sarah Binder, “Dodging the Rules in T rump’s Republican Congress,” The Journal of Politics, July 2018, pp. 1454-
1463.
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right procedural circumstances, is able to establish new precedents that override formal Senate
rules. The formal language of a Senate rule is untouched, but its application by the presiding
officer is now reinterpreted to comport with the new precedent. This technique is sometimes
cal ed “reform by ruling.”
Importantly, precedents are binding on the Senate. They occur by rulings of the presiding officer
or when the Senate votes either to sustain or reject the presiding officer’s rulings. The Senate’s
book of precedents authoritatively states the following: “Any ruling of the Chair not appealed or
which is sustained by vote of the Senate, or any verdict by the Senate on a point of order,
becomes as precedent of the Senate which the Senate follows just as it would its rules, unless and
until the Senate in its wisdom should reverse or modify that decision.”143
The 2013 precedent was created in large measure because of Democratic frustration with the
GOP’s blockage of President Barack Obama’s nominees, especial y judicial nominees, with their
lifetime appointment and ability to affect the ideological balance on the courts if confirmed by the
Senate. Worth noting is that in 2005, when the Senate was in GOP hands, Majority Leader Bil
Frist of Tennessee stated that he would use the nuclear option to break the Democratic minority’s
filibustering tactics that prevented approval of President George W. Bush’s judicial nominees.
Senator Frist’s promise never materialized, however. An informal Senate “Gang of 14”—seven
Senators from each party—devised a bipartisan plan that avoided use of the nuclear option. Eight
years later, given continuing conflict between the parties over presidential nominations, the
nuclear option was detonated.144
Briefly, the arguments of the two sides were as follows: Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada
contended that GOP Senators were undermining the President’s constitutional right to nominate
people to serve in executive and judicial positions. He said that Republicans have “turned ‘advice
and consent’ into ‘deny and obstruct.’”145 In response, the Senate minority leader stressed two
points: first, Democrats were “breaking the rules to change the rules”; second, Democrats would
soon regret their use of the nuclear option. In the end, the Senate voted to establish majority
cloture for presidential nominations, except to the Supreme Court.146
Once used, nontraditional procedures become part of the parliamentary toolkit of party leaders
and Members, to be utilized if the policy and political benefits outweigh the costs. This was the
case with the nuclear option. The November 2016 elections produced Republican control of the
Senate and White House, as wel as GOP retention of the House. Senate Republicans kept the

143 Riddick and Frumin, Senate Procedure, p. 987.
144 In brief, the “nuclear option” involved a series of five key procedural actions, all carefully scripted by Majority
Leader Harry Reid, D-NV. First, a second cloture vote on a judicial nominee was pending before the Senate. T he first
cloture vote did not attract the required 60 votes; however, a second cloture vote occurred on that nominee when
Senator Reid successfully offered a motion to reconsider, which is nondebatable in this circumstance. Reid’s
reconsideration motion was adopted (57 to 40). Second, Majority Leader Reid made a point of order (a parliamentary
objection) “that the vote on cloture under rule XXII for all nominations other than for the Supreme Court of the United
States is by majority vote.” T hird, the Chair (Senator Patrick Leahy, D-VT ) rejected the point of order on the advice of
the Senate’s Parliamentarian—Rule XXII requires three-fifths of the Senate to invoke cloture. Fourth, Majority Leader
Reid appealed the ruling of the Chair. (Appeals are usually debatable but, by Senate precedent, not in this type of
proceeding.) Fifth, 48 Senators voted aye to uphold the Chair’s ruling; 52 Senators voted nay to overturn the Chair’s
ruling, which established majority cloture for most presidential nominations except to the Supreme Court.
145 T his quotation is cited in William G. Dauster, “T he Senate In T ransition or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Nuclear Option,” New York University Journal of Legislation & Public Policy, vol. 19 (October 2016), p. 645.
Dauster was a long-time aide to the majority leader and well-versed in the workings and procedures of the Senate. See
also Mark E. Owens, “Changing Senate Norms: Judicial Confirmations in a Nuclear Age,” Political Science & Politics,
vol. 51, no. 1 (January 2018), pp. 119 -123.
146 See footnote 144 for a synopsis of the procedural details.
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2013 majority cloture precedent for presidential nominees and extended it to Supreme Court
nominees. President Trump named Neil Gorsuch to fil an outstanding vacancy on the Supreme
Court, which had occurred with the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. On April 6, 2017, after a
Democratic filibuster blockaded Senate action on Gorsuch, the Senate’s majority leader (Mitch
McConnel of Kentucky) used the nuclear option to establish majority cloture for al Supreme
Court nominees.
“Going nuclear” was also employed two years later (April 3, 2019) to expedite Senate
consideration of President Trump’s executive and judicial nominees. The GOP majority was
dismayed that Democrats were using the 30 hours of post-cloture debate time provided in Rule
XXII to slow-walk Senate action on most presidential nominations. Democrats argued that the
post-cloture change was unnecessary and would facilitate confirmation of unqualified candidates.
The GOP Senate disagreed. It employed a modified version of the nuclear option—overturning a
ruling of the chair on appeal (nondebatable) after cloture had been invoked—to reduce the 30
hours of post-cloture consideration to two hours for subcabinet and federal district judicial
nominations, retaining the 30-hour debate standard for the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and
cabinet-level positions.
The nuclear option increased the pace of confirmations. As one account noted, “the Senate can
process up to 15 district judges or sub-Cabinet executive branch positions in the time it used to
take to confirm one.”147 Over a six-year period, the usual y tradition-bound Senate employed the
nuclear option three times to fundamental y alter the import and meaningfulness of Rule XXII.
Repetitive use of the nuclear option sparked debate about whether it might at some point be used
on legislation in addition to nominations. A Senate committee chair said the following in response
to a question from a journalist: “The question is where does it stop, and that’s your question? It
might not stop.”148 The nuclear option has other implications, such as these two: it contributes to
the Senate becoming a more majoritarian body, mimicking the House to a degree; and, when the
same party controls the Senate and White House, partisan incentives bolster Senate approval of
presidential nominations.
“Filling the Amendment Tree”
Traditional y, Senators have enjoyed expansive opportunities, subject to few restrictions, to offer
amendments to pending legislation, including nongermane amendments. Freedom to amend is
one of the principal pil ars of Senate floor procedure. In today’s polarized Senate, that freedom
can be circumscribed by a procedure cal ed “fil ing the amendment tree.” The amendment “tree”
is a chart depicted in Senate Procedure, the chamber’s book of precedents.149 The tree determines
the number of amendments that may be pending to a measure at the same time. When the
“branches” or “limbs” of the tree are fil ed, the amendment process is frozen. No further
amendments can be offered until those pending are disposed of in some fashion (e.g., withdrawn

147 Alex Swoyer, “GOP Rapidly Pushing Judicial Picks T hrough Senate,” The Washington Times, August 2, 2019, p.
A3.
148 Niels Lesniewski, “Nuclear Fallout…Or Not?,” Roll Call, April 4, 2019, p. 8. In delivering the eulogy at the funeral
of Rep. John Lewis, D-GA, the civil rights hero, President Obama recommended eliminating the filibuster if that was
necessary to win passage of a revitalized Voting Rights Act. Emma Dumain, “Obama Calls for Ending Filibuster,”
Energy and Environm ent News, July 30, 2020, (eenews.net). See also Eric Mogilnicki and Drey Samuelson, “ It’s
Beyond T ime to Retire the Filibuster,” The Washington Post, September 8, 2020, p. A21.
149 T here are actually four charts based on the form (or purpose) of the first -offered amendment: Chart 1, amendment to
insert; Chart 2, an amendment to strike; Chart 3, an amendment to strike and insert; and Chart 4, an amendment that is
a complete substitute for a measure.
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or rejected or the Senate, by unanimous consent, agrees to set aside an amendment, which opens a
branch of the “tree” for further amendment).
The majority leader, by precedent, has special advantages in fil ing the tree. The leader receives
priority of recognition from the presiding officer. This recognition prerogative enables the
majority leader to offer amendment after amendment until the tree is fil ed. This procedure was
available to majority leaders for decades but infrequently employed. In contrast, tree-fil ing by
the majority leader has surged in this polarized era. Consider that there were a combined nine
fil ed amendment trees in the five Congresses from the 99th (1985-1987) through the 103rd (1993-
1995). By comparison, the five Congresses from the 110th (2007-2009) through the 114th (2015-
2017) witnessed 115 instances of tree-fil ing.150
Although tree-fil ing freezes the amending process, Senators may stil engage in prolonged
debate, an occurrence that could prompt the majority leader to file a cloture motion. Even so,
tree-fil ing provides a number of advantages to the majority leader. For example, tree-fil ing can
promote negotiations with the minority leader that unfreeze the fil ed “tree” through, for instance,
formulation of a UCA that limits debate and the number of amendments that each side may offer.
Tree-fil ing also blocks majority party lawmakers from offering amendments, which might upset
a number of these Senators.
Decline of Conference Committees
The U.S. Constitution requires the House and Senate to approve identical legislation before
measures can be sent to the President for his consideration. The founding document is silent on
how the House and Senate are to resolve their differences when they pass dissimilar versions of
the same bil . However, the very first lawmakers were quite familiar with conference committees
from their knowledge of the two-chamber British Parliament and their use by the bicameral
colonial legislatures (except unicameral Pennsylvania). Unsurprisingly, in April 1789, the first
rules of the House and Senate provided for the formation of conference committees.
These ad hoc joint panels, consisting of House and Senate members selected primarily from the
committee(s) that reported the particular bil in disagreement, are responsible for resolving the
bicameral differences. The majority party in each chamber is advantaged in the resolving process
because it selects more conferees than the minority party.
Instead of conference committees, another important method for ironing out bicameral
differences is through the exchange of amendments (the “ping pong”) between the two houses:
proposed amendments are sent back-and-forth between the chambers until a settlement is reached
on the outstanding matters in disagreement. A combination of the two methods is sometimes
employed to work out House-Senate policy dissimilarities. Informal discussions permeate these
methods of interchamber resolution.
For most of the 20th century, conference committees were the principal bargaining and negotiating
forum for reconciling bicameral disagreements on major bil s. Lawmakers even referred to them
as “the third house” of Congress. Explaining the role of conference committees during this era,
congressional scholar Richard Fenno wrote the following: Conference committees come into play
“in only 15 to 25 percent of al pieces of legislation. But included within that group are most al
of the consequential and highly publicized legislative enactments. And when a conference

150 Data provided by CRS analyst Christopher Davis.
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decides, ninety-nine times out of a hundred its decisions become law.”151 Conference committees
have long been a fundamental component of “regular order” lawmaking.
Today, that is no longer the case. There has been a precipitous decline in the convening of
conference committees and an increase in the exchange of amendment process. A number of
factors account for this change, but partisan polarization and the Senate’s permissive rules are
among the most compel ing explanations. Former Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, the Senate’s
longest serving GOP lawmaker (1977-2019), pointed this out. There is a concerted effort, he said,
“on the part of the minority to tie the Senate in procedural knots and then accuse the [GOP]
majority of being unable to govern.” We have witnessed “dilatory procedural maneuvering of the
like I have never witnessed before in the Senate,” including the “threat to filibuster the
appointment of conferees.”152
This threat is especial y potent because the traditional procedure for going to conference was
swift Senate approval of a three-part motion, which often went something like this: “Mr.
President, I move that the Senate insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House on
the disagreeing votes thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees.” For over
200 years, this three-part motion was a routine matter that won fast approval.
That began to change in the 1990s and 2000s with the rise of sharper partisanship in the Senate.
For example, minority party Senators were named as official conferees, but they were excluded
by the majority from participating in the bicameral negotiations. Their voices and votes were not
sought after or required by the majority’s conferees. In response, minority party Senators began to
object to routine approval of the three-part motion, which triggered the decline of the conference
process. A former Parliamentarian of the Senate explained why this was the case:
The three steps are usually bundled into a unanimous consent agreement and done within
seconds. But if some senators do not want a conference to occur and if they are determined,
they can force three separate cloture votes to close debate [on each discrete part], and that
takes a lot of time. It basically stops the whole process of going to conference.153
Thus, the number of conference committees plummeted from 62 (13% of 465 public laws) in the
103rd Congress (1993-1995) to 5 (1.5% of 329 public laws) in the 114th Congress (2015-2017)
and to 6 (1% of 442 public laws) in the 115th Congress (2017-2019). Conference committees are
stil utilized on legislation that attracts bipartisan and bicameral support, such as defense and
agriculture measures.154
The Senate adopted a new rule in the 113th Congress (2013-2014) to facilitate the convening of a
conference with the House. The new rule combined the aforementioned three parts (insist,
request, authorize) into one motion; however, the consolidated motion could stil be subject to a
cloture vote, but one rather than three. If cloture were invoked, the Senate would vote on the
consolidated motion without further debate. Unlike the Senate, the “majority rule” House seldom
encounters issues in arranging a conference with the other body.

151 Lawrence D. Longley and Walter J. Oleszek, Bicameral Politics: Conference Committees in Congress (New Haven,
CT : Yale University Press, 1989), p. viii.
152 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 146, part 1 (October 11, 2000), pp. S10197.
153 Carl Hulse and Robert Pear, “Feeling Left Out on Major Bills, Democrats T urn to Stallin g Others,” New York
Tim es, May 3, 2004, p. A18.
154 A recent study of the bicameral resolution process is by Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J.
VanderWielen, Politics Over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press, 2017).
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Given the Senate’s difficulty in creating conference committees, the two chambers turned to the
exchange of amendment process to resolve their bicameral differences. This change has important
consequences. For example, it strengthens the hand of the top House and Senate party leaders and
places them in the “driver’s seat” in negotiating bicameral agreements. They meet in secret, along
with other invited participants, to devise agreements acceptable to each chamber. Second, in the
“ping pong” process, the role of committees is minimized compared with that of House and
Senate party leaders. Third, minority party lawmakers are unlikely to have any role in the ping
pong process unless their input is necessary (e.g., to attract a supermajority vote in the Senate to
break filibusters). Fourth, formal House and Senate rules that apply to conference committees do
not apply to the ping pong process. For example, conferees from each chamber are made public;
there is no “identity” requirement for participants in the ping pong process.
In short, recent years have witnessed the gradual institutionalization of a leadership-directed
bicameral bargaining process whether through ping pong or conference. The Speaker has
exclusive authority to name the House’s conferees, including the right to remove or appoint
additional conferees. (The Speaker, so far as is known, has never been a conferee.) On some
occasions, top House and Senate party leaders are named as conferees. In the Senate, the
presiding officer official y names the conferees, but the respective party leaders make the
selection of majority and minority conferees.
Brief mention should be made of another contemporary change: conference committees have
increased in size, particularly in the House. A key reason: the House adopted a rule in 1975 that
empowered the Speaker to refer legislation to multiple committees. Members from these panels
are appointed as conferees to resolve bicameral differences on matters within their committees’
jurisdiction. The annual authorization for defense is a good example. Conferees from a dozen or
more standing committees are named besides those appointed from the principal jurisdictional
panel, the House Armed Services Committee. Although the House typical y has more conferees
than the Senate, that difference is largely inconsequential. Each chamber’s conferees
independently determine whether to accept, amend, or reject compromises proposed by the other
body.
Dynamics of Partisan Polarization
Overview
The shift from traditional to nontraditional lawmaking broadly reflects two interconnected
developments: (1) partisan polarization in Congress and (2) sharp political divisions in the
country, such as geographic, demographic, or electoral. This duality has significantly fostered the
unconventional legislating often seen today—two unified parties often wil ing to exploit
procedural rules to achieve their policy and political aims. This development makes legislating
difficult on pressing public issues; it al ows public problems to fester; and creates incentives for
“messaging” bil s to be taken up that have little or no chance of becoming law.
Even in a political y charged environment, there is bipartisan friendship and cooperation in
lawmaking. Nevertheless, “personal friendships struggle against the deep-seated animosities that
now permeate politics.”155 The chal enge of legislating is less about friendship or lawmakers
“getting along” with one another regardless of party; it is more about the parties’ profound

155 Dan Balz, “Americans Decry Partisanship While Fanning Its Flames,” The Washington Post, October 27, 2019, p.
A2. See James A. T hurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, eds., Am erican Gridlock: The Sources, Chara cter, and Im pact of
Political Polarization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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ideological and policy differences—intensified by outside Democratic or GOP activists and
reinforced by partisan media outlets. These conditions can thwart problem-solving by Congress.
Another factor heightening acrimonious partisanship is the “permanent campaign.” It is waged
constantly by each party either to hold or reclaim majority control of Congress. As former House
Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-GA, said to GOP campaign volunteers, “You’re fighting a war. It is a
war for power. Don’t try to educate. That is not your job. What is the primary purpose of a
political leader? To build a majority.”156
The hard-edged partisanship evident in both legislative chambers reflects the diverse and distinct
constituency bases of the two parties. A 42-year veteran of the House stated that the public has
become “more ideological y polarized. This is reflective of Congress, as Congress has become
more ideological y polarized as wel .”157 A scholar emphasized that when the nation is polarized,
“Congress reflects that image back to the American people.”158 Gradual y, the nation witnessed a
partisan and ideological realignment. Today, voters with liberal views and values largely support
Democratic candidates; conservative voters largely connect with Republican aspirants. A
consequence of this development: centrist lawmakers are a vanishing breed on Capitol Hil .
Party polarization accelerated with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan as President on a bold
conservative platform (e.g., cut domestic spending, strengthen defense, and devolve more
program authority to the states). The 1980 election also produced Republican control of the
Senate after 26 years in the minority and increased by 33 the number of House GOP minority
seats. Partisan polarization strengthened further when Republicans captured control of the House
after 40 years (1955-1995) in the minority. Newt Gingrich, R-GA, became Speaker and, much to
the chagrin of minority Democrats, won rapid House action on his 10-point policy agenda cal ed
the “Contract with America” (e.g., reforming welfare; cutting taxes).159 Speaker Gingrich was not
reluctant to use nontraditional means (e.g., bypassing committees) to expedite House action on
his legislative priorities. Rapid House action on the GOP’s 100-day agenda emulated legislative
governance by European parliaments.
The 1980 and 1994 elections widened the ideological and policy divergence between Democratic
and Republican lawmakers and their outside supporters. Subsequently, political, rhetorical, and
procedural confrontations suffused the decisionmaking process on Capitol Hil . As a Senator said,
“Ideology and partisanship dictate far too much of our conduct. Obstruction is too often
employed for its own sake. Base motives are impugned for reasonable policy differences,
al owing legitimate differences to evolve into bitter personal disputes.”160
Vigorous partisan disagreements, as history demonstrates, are not novel to Congress. What is
different today is how closely the identities (e.g., race and religion) and cultural values of the
national electorate align with one or the other congressional party. Ideological diversity
characterized the legislative parties of earlier generations; contemporary parties now exhibit

156 T he Rep. Gingrich quote is from John M. Barry, “T he House of Jim Wright,” Politico Magazine, May 7, 2015.
157 Alex Gangitano, “When T own Halls Heat Up,” Roll Call, June 11, 2018, p. 9.
158 T he quote is from Harvard Professor Joanne B. Freeman. See Jean B. Bordewich, “Shootout on Capitol Hill,”
Washington Monthly, January/February/March 2020, p. 44.
159 James G. Gimpel, Fulfilling the Contract: The First 100 Days (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996). See also Julian E.
Zelizer, Burning Down the House: Newt Gingrich, the Fall of a Speaker, and the Rise of the New Republican Party
(New York: Penguin Press, 2020).
160 Sen. Susan Collins, “Incivility and Hyperpartisanship: Is Washingto n a Symptom or a Cause,” Margaret Chase
Smith Lecture, University of Maine, Orono, ME, April 3, 2015, p. 3.
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significant ideological homogeneity. The most liberal Republican, for example, could be to the
right of the most conservative Democrat.
During the mid-20th century, it was common for many people to lament that there was not a
“dime’s worth of difference” between the two parties. That is not the case today. Individuals’
party identification suggests a range of issues and values they are likely to embrace and those
they are likely to oppose. Moreover, as the two congressional parties became intensely and
internal y united with pronounced policy and ideological differences—and in rough electoral
parity—this array of intersecting conditions strengthened partisan polarization in Congress and
the country. “Party wars” over what constitutes good public policy now occur with some
frequency.161
Sorting: Alignment of Political Ideology and Party Preference
A variety of forces contributed significantly to the party wars. Among several are the following:
“sorting” (geographic, demographic, residential, and social); electoral volatility; partisan media;
polarized interest groups; gerrymanders; and the dearth of bipartisan trust. This combination of
factors helps to explain why lawmakers and voters have such substantial differences on ways to
resolve many of the major issues confronting the nation.
Geographic Sorting
Geographical y, people in different regions of the country gradual y changed their political
leanings. The South is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. The “solid South” once
meant that for decades the states of the Confederacy, following Reconstruction, voted
overwhelmingly for Democratic officeholders. This pattern no longer exists. Change came with
various cultural, social, and political upheavals of the 1960s and after (e.g., civil rights struggles,
the Vietnam War, Woodstock, the feminist and environmental movements, Watergate, Roe v.
Wade, and the assassinations of major public leaders). Together, these forces repel ed many
conservative southerners with strong pro-evangelical, anti-government, or pro-military views.
GOP presidential candidates Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona in 1964 and Richard Nixon four
years later campaigned with a “southern strategy” that encouraged conservative Democratic
voters to support Republican candidates.
Over time, the GOP’s regional strategy gained traction across the South. Many conservative
Democrats became conservative Republicans. A congressional scholar explained as follows:
Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, a massive change in southern voting behavior
occurred. White southerners moved from voting heavily Democratic to voting heavily
Republican. Over this period, fairly conservative southern Democrats were replaced, often
when an incumbent retired, by very conservative southern Republicans in Congress. As a
result, the congressional Democratic Party became more liberal—by subtraction—and the
congressional Republican Party more conservative—by addition.162
Today, the South is largely a GOP bastion, electing mostly Republican lawmakers who represent
their constituents’ views, values, and interests.

161 Barbara Sinclair, Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2006).
162 Barbara Sinclair, “Is Congress Now the Broken Branch?” Utah Law Review, vol. 2014, no. 4 (August 2014), p. 708.
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Other states and regions also witnessed party sorting: for example, California and Maine, once
largely “red” are now predominately “blue.” In 2020, Senator Susan Collins of Maine serves as
the lone federal y elected GOP officeholder in the New England region. Twenty years ago, 10
Republican lawmakers represented New England in Congress.163 In 1999, California’s House
delegation was divided 27 Democrats to 25 Republicans; two decades later, it was 46 Democrats
and 7 Republicans. Geographic sorting also occurs in other areas, such as the partisan divide
among states’ suburban areas164 and the different economies of various “red” (e.g., agriculture and
mining) and “blue” (e.g., digital and financial) House districts.165
Residential Sorting
Residential self-segregation might be viewed as a component of geographic sorting. Studies have
shown that like-minded individuals and families prefer to live in communities where people share
similar lifestyles, values, interests, and political views.166 As two scholars noted, “Such
geographic polarization—where supporters of one or the other party cluster together in
homogeneous enclaves, producing localities with lopsided distributions of political preferences —
has been growing steadily in the United States since the 1970s.” They explained that political
polarization “manifests itself geographical y, in large part because partisan preferences are
strongly correlated with population density.”167 This relationship suggests why Republicans often
do better in rural areas than Democrats, with the reverse the case for urban areas.
Tel ingly, people who live in homogeneous neighborhoods are more engaged in political activities
than those who reside in diverse neighborhoods. “Political activism is much easier when you’re
surrounded by like-minded others” who share your views and biases, said a political scientist.168
These individuals might contribute to campaigns, vote in primaries, work on campaigns, and look
askance at the value of compromise. People in heterogeneous communities might steer clear of
political discussions with neighbors of different views to avoid provoking anger or hard feelings.
Demographic Sorting
Demographical y, American politics have undergone major changes. Consider the demographic
profile of the people who broadly identify or align with either the Democratic or Republican
parties. Voters who support Democratic views are likely to be younger (mil ennials); ethnical y
diverse (African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians); urban-centered; col ege-educated; secular;

163 Regions and states are constantly in some degree of flux for any number of reasons. Consider the southern region. A
“perennial Southern phenomenon,” wrote a historian, is “long decades of stasis followed by periods of rapid change,
nearly always compelled by national forces.” T oday, the information economy, along with many other developments
(e.g., the influx of millennials), is producing numerous “changes in patterns of work, politics and culture.” An
outstanding issue, wrote the historian, is whether “new blood and new jobs have turned large pockets of deep -red states
at least a shade of purple.” As T ennessee’s GOP governor stated, “Many of our most conservative citizens are people
who have come here from a more liberal state.” See Jon Meacham, “T he Many Souths,” Time, August 6-13, 2018, pp.
75-76.
164 Sabrina T avernise and Robert Gebeloff, “Are the Suburbs T urning Democratic? It Depends Which Ones,” New York
Tim es, October 26, 2019, A1.
165 Aaron Zitner and Dante Chini, “America’s Political Polarization Is Almost Complete,” Wall Street Journal,
September 20, 2019, p. A4.
166 Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded Americans Is Tearing Us Apart (New York: Mariner
Books, 2009).
167 Greg Martin and Steven Webster, “T he Real Culprit Behind Geographic Polarization,” The Atlantic, November 26,
2018.
168 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “You Want Compromise? Sure You Do,” New York Times, August 14, 2011, p. 5SR.
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and internationalist in outlook. Among GOP supporters are large numbers who are working-class
White males; elderly; rural and exurban residents; high school graduates; religiously oriented; and
nationalist in their viewpoints. Understandably, the demographic divergence of the two parties—
racially (ethnical y heterogeneous versus mainly White persons), culturally (e.g., support or
opposition to fraught issues such as abortion, gun control, or same sex marriage), and
ideologically (e.g., an activist national government versus greater reliance on the private
sector)—underscores why partisan polarization suffuses legislative decisionmaking.169 A “charged
political climate is in large part explained by how neatly demographics divide Democrats and
Republicans.”170
Partisan Social Sorting
Partisan social sorting adds another dimension to the pronounced divide between Democrats and
Republicans. This phenomenon indicates that peoples’ partisan preferences correlate closely with
their personal characteristics or identities, such as race, gender, religion, or age (e.g., most African
Americans are Democrats; most evangelicals are Republican). Beyond just policy differences,
partisan social sorting influences peoples’ attitudes, biases, and emotions toward the other party.
A consequence of this behavior is an identity-based polarization that foments a contentious “us”
versus “them” politics. Scholars and analysts refer to this as “affective” polarization: people who
harbor a deep-seated emotional animus toward the other party. A 2017 study by the Pew Research
Center highlights the partisan antipathy.
The shares of Republicans and Democrats who express very [in original] unfavorable
opinions of the opposing party have increased dramatically since the 1990s, but have
changed little in recent years. Currently, 44% of Democrats and Democratic leaners have
a very unfavorable opinion of the GOP; 45% of Republicans and Republican leaners view
the Democratic Party very unfavorably. In 1994, fewer than 20% in both parties viewed
the opposing party unfavorably.171
The partisan reality today is that “more Democrats and Republicans dislike each other more, and
more intensely, than in the past.”172 Partisans “are no longer fighting only for party victory. We
are also fighting for the victory of the racial, religious, geographical and gender-based groups that
win or lose with the party.”173 An analyst explained as follows:
Americans are increasingly taking opposition to their views as an assault on their way of
life. So issues such as gun control or climate disruption—instead of being matters requiring
debate and offering the possibility of compromise—become signifiers of cultural
identity…. The strongest and loudest political advocates tend to think their loss might end
America as they know it.174
As a congressional scholar concluded, “the large ideological differences between Democrats and
Republicans in Washington reflect the large differences between the characteristics and attitudes

169 See Alan I. Abramowitz, “T he Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 4 (December 2013), pp. 709 -731.
170 Sahil Chinoy, “Predicting Your Party,” New York Times, August 11, 2019, p. 2SR.
171 Pew Research Center, “T he Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider,” October 5, 2017, p. 5. See also
Elizabeth N. Simas, Scott Clifford, and Justin H. Kirkland, “How Empathic Concern Fuels Political Polarization,”
Am erican Political Science Review, vol. 114, no. 1 (February 2020), pp. 258 -269.
172 Mark S. Mellman, “Pew Study of Polarization is Incomplete,” The Hill, July 9, 2014, p. 13.
173 Lilliana Mason, “T he President’s ‘Winning’ Is Our Loss,” New York Times, June 7, 2018, p. A23. See also Lillian
Mason’s Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).
174 Michael Gerson, “A T rend T hreatening to Become a T ragedy,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2020, p. A21.
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of the voters represented by the two parties.”175 An alignment of the electorate into two
competing political teams compounds the difficulty of legislating. One result—policymaking
power shifts to House and Senate party leaders who may utilize unorthodox procedures to achieve
their objectives.176
Electoral Volatility
For much of the 20th century, it was common for either Democrats or Republicans to hold party
control of the elective branches (House, Senate, and White House) for extended periods of time.
For example, from 1901 until 1932, Republicans held the White House, except for the two terms
(1913-1921) of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency. Republicans mostly control ed the House and
Senate as wel during this time period. The Democratic resurgence started with the 1932 election
of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Democrats continued their control of the White House,
except for the Eisenhower presidency (1953-1961), until the end of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency
in 1969. The Nixon/Ford White Houses came after President Johnson’s, fol owed by Democrat
President Jimmy Carter’s occupancy of the White House (1977-1981). Throughout this period
(1932 to 1980), Democrats controlled the House and Senate, often by wide margins, with only
two exceptions (the 80th Congress, 1947-1949 and the 83rd Congress, 1953-1955).
This general pattern of Democrats or Republicans maintaining institutional power for lengthy
periods began to end with the 1980 election of Republican Ronald Reagan as President. The 1980
elections, as noted earlier, brought GOP control of the Senate and increased the number of House
Republican minority lawmakers. President Reagan’s large Electoral College victory (over 90% of
the electoral vote) produced several consequential developments, including these two: a
governing agenda much different from the New Deal or Great Society programs of previous
Democratic Presidents177 and a new era of heightened party competition for control of the elective
branches. In brief, the 1980 elections ushered in “a period of [party] parity in the contest for
control of American national institutions,” which continues to this day.178 No longer is either
congressional party the “permanent minority”;179 control of the House or Senate could flip every
election cycle.
Consider the 20 Congresses from the 97th (1981-1983) to the 116th (2019-2020). Each party held
the House 10 different times; for the Senate, Republicans have been in charge 11 different times;
Democrats, 9. A consequence of frequent shifts in party control, according to an analyst, is the
following: “Once a political party has decided the path to governing is winning back the majority,
not working with the existing majority, the incentives transform. Instead of cultivating a good
relationship with your colleagues across the aisle, you need to destroy them [political y], because
you need to convince the voters to destroy them, too.”180

175Abramowitz, “T he Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” p. 714.
176 Lee Drutman, “United We Fall,” Washington Monthly, July/August 2018, p. 56.
177 Recall President Reagan’s January 20, 1981, Inaugural Address, where he said the following: “Government is not
the solution to our problem [of numerous economic and social ills]. Government is the problem.” His agenda priorities,
as noted briefly in the t ext, included shrinking the domestic government’s size and scope, cutting taxes, reducing
federal regulations, and hiking defense expenditures.
178 Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign , p. 38.
179 William F. Connelly Jr. and John J. Pitney Jr., Congress’ Permanent Minority? Republicans in the U.S. House
(Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams, 1994).
180 Ezra Klein, “T he Political Scientist Donald T rump Should Read,” Vox.com, January 24, 2019, p. 4. Compare the
cited quotation with another by former Senate Majority and Minority Leader Harry Reid, D-NV, which highlights
today’s torn social fabric on Capitol Hill. Senator Reid stated the following: “Nobody lives here anymore. When I came
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Today’s fusion of more divided governments, slim partisan majorities, and highly competitive
electoral conditions has led to constant interparty struggles to maintain or to win legislative
control, not to mention command of the White House. This set of circumstances often means
there are few incentives for the minority party in Congress to work with the majority party to
enact major legislation. If consequential measures pass regularly with bipartisan majorities, why
would voters support the minority party’s “time for a change” campaign theme rather than the
majority’s “stay the course” message? “When control is always within reach,” wrote an analyst,
“the minority party loses the incentive to help mint legislative accomplishments that fortify the
brittle majority.”181 In short, congressional governance can be much harder when institutional
control is within each party’s grasp every electoral cycle.

Partisan Media
Numerous media and digital outlets al ow individuals to access liberal or conservative media
networks 24/7 where contrary views are commonly dismissed, ignored, or disparaged, often by
harsh and one-sided commentary. Gone is the post-World War II period when the anchormen of
the three major television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), such as Walter Cronkite, provided
viewers with a common base of knowledge for collective understanding of public issues. Today,
proliferation and fragmentation of the media environment is commonplace. The three major
networks have been joined by, among others, Fox News, cable TV, talk radio, Facebook, Twitter,
blogs, and numerous other social media platforms. Traditional sources—newspapers, magazines,
or books, for example—stil remain important sources of political and policy analysis and
information but less so than previously.
The goal of many contemporary news outlets is to provide partisan analysis, information, and
opinion to their niche audience. Political y engaged voters tend to self-sort to receive news that
comports with their partisan biases and policy preferences. This is a throwback to the partisan
press that characterized the nation’s early decades. “Newspapers controlled by the Federalists
branded Thomas Jefferson an ‘infidel,’ while the Democratic-Republican press cal ed George
Washington a ‘traitor.’”182 As in earlier times, many contemporary media outlets amplify party
conflicts to attract partisan viewers through false claims and misinformation.183 Modern
technology and the algorithms of social media also enable party organizations to target specific,
self-sorted audiences who support particular policies (e.g., gun rights or gun controls).
Typical y, people select media outlets that bolster, confirm, and reinforce their beliefs, prejudices,
and views rather than news sources that present contrary perspectives. A historian stated, “You
choose your reality by the paper to which you subscribe, or the channel which you watch.”184 A

[to Congress in 1983,] lawmakers lived here, they had their f amilies, but not anymore. We made friends not only of the
members, but of their families. It is so changed.” See Carl Hulse, “Senator’s Farewell: ‘I Just Shake My Head,’” New
York Tim es, March 24, 2018, p. A11.
181 Ronald Brownstein, “ T he Volatile Senate,” National Journal, September 20, 2014, p. 4.
182 Lee Drutman, “Learning to T rust Again,” The New Republic, March 2018, p. 5.
183 An MIT research study found that false news “spread further, faster, and deeper, and more broadly than the truth in
every category of information.” See Brian Resnick, “False News Stories T ravel Faster and Farther on T witter T han the
T ruth,” Vox.com, March 8, 2018, p. 4. See also Steve Lohr, “Why We’re Easily Seduced by False News,” New York
Tim es, March 9, 2018, p. B1. Advances in technology now allow the dissemination of a new form of disinformation in
the political process; it is called Deepfakes—“ altered video or audio [of public candidates and officeholders] that seems
convincingly real.” Dwight Weingarten, “Deepfakes Under Scrutiny Ahead of 2020 Vote,” The Christian Science
Monitor Weekly, November 4, 2019, p. 15.
184 Michael M. Grynbaum, “In the Fractured Lens of Cable News, T wo Impeachments for T wo Nations,” New York
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likely consequence of choosing your own reality, scholars report, is an “electorate that privileges
partisan purity and intransigence [and] elects representatives that eschew compromise and create
gridlock.”185 Stated differently, “polarized media doesn’t emphasize commonalities, it weaponizes
differences; it doesn’t focus on the best of the other side, it threatens you with the worst.”186
Interest Groups and Partisan Polarization
In 2019, there were over 11,000 registered lobbyists who represented the interests of numerous
businesses, groups, and organizations around the country.187 There are also an unknown number
of unregistered lobbyists—the “un-lobbyists”—who avoid federal registration requirements by
cal ing themselves strategic advisors, educators, or public relations specialists. James Thurber, a
professor at The American University, using a broader definition that includes “think-tanks,
shadow lobbyists, and other door-openers,” estimates that “Washington’s advocacy industry
probably employs about 100,000” people.188 (Think tanks, too, are affiliated with each party. As
the head of a partisan think tank said to a researcher, “This is your [party’s policy] objective.
Now go do your analysis.”)189
Many lobbying organizations self-sort to align or affiliate informal y with either the Democratic
Party or the Republican Party. Along with various media and think tanks, many lobbying firms
are part of the political infrastructure of each party. In the main, for example, environmental,
consumer, and gun control groups often advocate for Democratic candidates and policies;
business, farm, and gun rights groups often support GOP candidates and initiatives.
Interest groups, especial y single-issue organizations, monitor closely the ideological purity and
votes of lawmakers. If Members deviate too often from interest groups’ policy preferences or
cooperate too closely with the opposition, these lawmakers might see the withering away of the
group’s campaign support (votes, funds, services). The wayward lawmaker might even face the
threat of a primary chal enge. “In a partisan atmosphere,” remarked a Senator, “it’s hard to help
the other side without being accused [by various interest groups] of aiding and comforting the
enemy.”190 In sum, Democratic and Republican-leaning interest groups have become “more
closely and formal y intertwined and integrated in party organizations as wel as lawmakers’ own
political operations.”191
In a unique development, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, an organization long aligned with
Republicans, added for the first time in 40 years a new criterion for rating and supporting

Tim es, November 17, 2019, p. 23.
185 Markus Prior and Natalie Jomini Stroud, “Using Mobilization, Media, and Motivation to Curb Political
Polarization,” in Solutions to Polarization in America, ed. Nathaniel Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015), p. 191. Some analysts suggest that the decline of local newspapers has likely contributed to increased
polarization in the country. Absent local newspapers, people may turn to national outlets that often cover contentious
news that divide the two parties. See Dean DeChiaro, “No News Is Bad News,” CQ Weekly, November 4, 2019, pp. 60-
61.
186 Ezra Klein, “Why the Media is So Polarized—and How It Polarized Us,” Vox.com, January 28, 2020, p. 10. T his
article is a chapter from Klein’s new book, Why We’re Polarized (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).
187 Lobbying is a right of the people under Article I of the U.S. Constitution: the freedom of speech and the right of the
people “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
188 Barney Jopson and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, “Cohen Case Puts Spotlight on ‘Shadow Lobbying,’” Financial
Tim es, May 15, 2018, p. 5.
189 Bryan Bender, “Many DC T hink T anks Now Players in Partisan Wars,” The Boston Globe, August 11, 2013, p. 5.
190 Darren Samuelsohn, “Climate Bill Gets GOP Cold Shoulder,” Politico, June 28, 2010, p. 10.
191 Gary J. Andres, Lobbying Reconsidered: Under the Influence (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2009), p. 103.
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lawmakers of either party—Members’ wil ingness to engage in bipartisan compromises. The
Chamber’s objective is “to rebuild the governing-focused political center” by rewarding
lawmakers who reach across the aisle.192 The Chamber’s president stated, “We wil not base our
support solely on casting the right votes—though that remains essential. We wil give lawmakers
credit for showing leadership on good legislation—even if it doesn’t pass or even come up for a
vote. And we’re going to take bipartisanship into account.”193
Other Contributors to Partisan Polarization
Many other reasons are also said to account for partisan polarization in Congress and the country.
An analyst wrote, “Explanations come as grand as the absence of a geopolitical threat to bring
Americans together since the fal of the USSR. They come as smal as the deregulation of the
broadcast media in the 1980s” that ended the obligation of radio and television stations to present
opposing views on controversial issues.194 Consider two more reasons that could promote
excessive partisan polarization.
Gerrymanders
Following the constitutional y required decennial census, the 435 House seats—set by law—are
apportioned among the states according to their population. Some states gain House seats and
others lose seats based on how the U.S. population is distributed across the 50 states, as
determined by a mathematical formula. Each state is guaranteed at least one Representative. The
legislatures of most states redraw House districts of equal population—the “one person, one vote”
principle—as mandated by various U.S. Supreme Court decisions. (Several states assign the line-
drawing process to an outside, independent commission.)
Gerrymandering refers to the purposeful drawing of House district lines to maximize partisan
advantage. This type of gerrymandering occurs frequently in state legislatures controlled by one
political party. Partisan gerrymandering is sometimes cited by analysts and others as fostering
party polarization in the House of Representatives. A House lawmaker explained as follows:
When Members come here from these [partisan] districts that have been gerrymandered,
they have little incentive to really work across party lines in order to reach solutions. As a
matter of fact, they have a disincentive because if their district is skewed so heavily one
way or the other, then the election is really in the party primaries…. [S]o if one comes here
wanting to work across the aisle, one has to watch one’s back, because the highly charged
partisans [back home] don’t like [bipartisanship].195
Contrarily, congressional scholars suggest that gerrymandering has scant to modest effects in
fomenting partisan polarization in the House of Representatives.196 They often point to the
statewide Senate elections. The Senate is about as polarized as the House.

192 Kate Ackley, “In Major Shift, US Chamber to Rate Lawmakers on Bipartisanship,” CQ News, January 10, 2019.
193 Joe Williams, “U.S. Chamber’s 2019 Ambitions Collide with Harsh Political Realities,” Washington Examiner,
January 15, 2019, p. 47. See T imothy Cam a, “ U.S. Chamber Backing 23 Democrats for Reelection,” eenews.net,
September 3, 2020, pp. 1-2; and T imothy Cama, “ Oil Executive Quits Chamber Post Over Dem Endorsements,”
eenews,net, September 9, 2020, pp. 1-2.
194 Janan Ganesh, “Political Partisanship Sates the Lust for Belonging,” Financial Times, December 27, 2019, p. 15.
195 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 154 (July 29, 2008), p. H7285.
196 Sean M. T heriault, Party Polarization in Congress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 83.
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Dearth of Bipartisan Trust
Studies suggest that a dearth of bipartisan personal and social relationships contributes to
Congress’s sharp partisan polarization.197 Members’ hectic legislative schedules and workload
demands (e.g., often flying home weekly to meet with constituents and reconnecting with their
families who reside there)—make it harder than previously for lawmakers to become wel -
acquainted with colleagues from across the aisle or to socialize with them. The fraying of strong
personal and bipartisan relationships could contribute to a polarized legislative environment that
makes problem-solving hard. “A lack of social interaction means many Members and staff don’t
know each other wel , making it difficult for them to work together,” stated a former committee
staff aide with decades of legislative experience.198 Although the social comradeship “hypothesis
is compel ing,” wrote a scholar, “it has not been subject to systematic empirical tests.”199
Nonetheless, in the view of former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, the
absence of cross-party working relationships can produce legislative gridlock. “Because we can’t
bond, we can’t trust. Because we can’t trust, we can’t cooperate. Because we can’t cooperate, we
become dysfunctional.”200 Bolstering the views of Senator Daschle, a journalist wrote the
following:
[O]ne of the most important but least-talked-about factors [that encourage partisanship] is
the simple decline in personal relationships. Gone are the days when Members of Congress
lived in the Washington area bonding over their children’s school events, golf, or at parties.
Instead, they usually work an intense three days in DC and then travel to their home state.
The lack of social interaction has led to an erosion of deep, cross-party friendships, which
in turn feeds a deficit of trust—a crucial ingredient of legislating.201
Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana suggested a way out of this conundrum: “the more
interaction you have with others, even with your adversaries, the more common ground you can
find, and the more confidence you have in them—and the more likely you can move forward.”202
A similar recommendation was made by a House select reform panel in 2019. The panel proposed
bipartisan retreats for Members and their families at the start of each new Congress. The panel
also proposed bipartisan retreats for top committee staff. In addition, the House select committee
suggested the creation of “a members-only hangout space, where Republicans and Democrats
could randomly run into each other and chat.”203 An objective of the designated space was to

197 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, The Evolving Congress, committee print, 113th
Cong., 2nd sess., S.Prt. 113-30 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014). Specifically, two chapters are on point: “ Being a
Member of Congress: Some Notable Changes During the Last Half Century,” by Michael L. Koempel; and
“Collaborative Relationships and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate: A Perspective Drawn from Firsthand Accounts,” by
Mark J. Oleszek.
198 T estimony of Elise J. Bean, director of the Washington office of Wayne State University, in U.S. Congress, House
Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, Article One: Restoring Capacity and Equipping Congress to
Better Serve the Am erican People, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., January 14, 2020, pp. 2-3.
199 Michael J. Barber and Nolan McCarty, “Causes and Consequences of Polarization,” in Solutions to Political
Polarization in Am erica, ed. Nathaniel Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 38.
200 David Rogers, “T he Lost Senate,” Politico, October 9, 2009, p. 12.
201 Francine Kiefer, “Can the Center Hold? Susan Collins and the High Wire Act of Being a Moderate,” Christian
Science Monitor Weekly, July 23, 2018.
202 Lee H. Hamilton, “Why T rust Matters,” Comments on Congress, December 4, 2019, p. 2. T his publication is from
the Indiana University Center on Representative Government. See also Peter Baker, “In a Swelling of T ribalism, T he
T rust of a Country T eeters,” New York Times, December 10, 2019, p. A1.
203 Paul Kane, “A Bipartisan Committee Has Novel Ideas to Mak e Congress More Productive,” The Washington Post,
December 29, 2019, p. A4. See also Gabriella Munoz, “T ask Force Hammers Out Plans to Make Congress More
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encourage the development of cross-party working relationships that might over time increase the
opportunities for legislative problem-solving.
Remedial Proposals
In 1950, the American Political Science Association (APSA) issued a report entitled Toward a
More Responsible Two-Party System. The thrust of the report was to promote programmatic and
disciplined parties, one liberal and one conservative, each with the internal ideological cohesion
required to win enactment of their respective policy agendas.204 A major concern at the time was
that both political parties embraced the norms of collegiality, compromise, and centrist policies.
Their policy preferences overlapped many issues, which meant that it was a chal enge for the
engaged public to determine which party to hold accountable and responsible for legislative
action or inaction. More partisan polarization might simplify and clarify for voters the two
parties’ programmatic positions.
To an extent, the 1950 goals of the APSA reflect current conditions in Congress and the country.
“Each side’s congressional caucus,” wrote two analysts, “is now rooted in places that differ
enormously from the other side’s, in their demographic composition, cultural values, and attitudes
toward government.”205 An open question is whether today’s broadly cohesive legislative parties
are any more adept at making productive (“better”) public policy than the internal y divided
parties of earlier eras. A congressional scholar pointed out that in “evaluating the effects of party
polarization on gridlock, it is important to recognize that the ebbs and flows of legislative
productivity are simply not wel understood by political science.”206
If the lament of the 1950s reformers was that too much bipartisanship influenced lawmaking,
today’s concern is that there is too little cross-party cooperation because the two parties sorted
themselves into divergent ideological camps. Legislative gridlock can be the contemporary result.
Asked to comment on the biggest changes in Congress during his nearly 60 years of continuous
House service, Representative John Dingel said, “Lack of collegiality, refusal to compromise, an
absolute reluctance to work together, and I think, a total loss of understanding of the
traditions.”207 The erosion of these legislative norms makes it harder for the two parties to bridge
their policy and procedural differences.
A response of numerous lawmakers and analysts is to propose various reforms designed to
improve the governing capacity of the House and Senate. Their broad objectives are several: (1)
induce party and institutional changes that foster a consensus-oriented, participatory legislative
and political culture; (2) mitigate the adverse effects of party and ideological polarization, such as

Efficient,” The Washington Times, December 26, 2019, p. A3.
204 For an analysis of the political scientists’ report, see Austin Ranney, “T oward a More Responsible T wo -Party
System: A Commentary,” American Political Science Review, September 1951, pp. 488-499; Austin Ranney, The
Doctrine of Responsible Party Governm ent: Its Origins and Present State (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,
1954); and Sam Rosenfeld, The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2018), Chapter 1, “The Idea of Responsible Partisanship, 1945 -1952,” pp. 7-21.
205 Ronald Brownstein and Scott Bland, “Stairway to Nowhere,” National Journal, January 12, 2013, p. 12.
206 Frances E. Lee, “How Party Polarization Affects Governance,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 18 (2015),
p. 275. See also Frances E. Lee and Nolan McCarthy, eds., Can Am erica Govern Itself? (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2019). As the two authors state, this book is “organized around two themes: the changing nature of
representation in the United States and how changes in the political environment have affe cted the internal processes of
institutions, overall government performance, and policy outcomes.”
207 Don Wolfensberger, “Long-Serving Dingell Is a Master of House T raditions,” Roll Call, June 12, 2013, p. 14.
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those spotlighted by Representative Dingel ; and (3) support initiatives by change-oriented
lawmakers who want to restore regular order.208
Other reformist goals are to constrain excessive partisanship, curb procedural abuses, enhance
deliberative processes, strengthen committees, or boost congressional staffing. Stil others “have
focused on changing [specific] legislative procedures such as those related to the filibuster,
appropriations, and confirmation process to limit the opportunities for polarization to undermine
government.”209
An array of electoral reforms are also advocated, such as nonpartisan redistricting commissions to
curb gerrymandering; creation of a multiparty system to better represent the diversity of national
views through proportional elections; or revise party primary nomination systems to encourage
the selection of centrist congressional candidates who support collaboration, compromise, and
civility in lawmaking.
Each reform recommendation has probable strengths and weaknesses, as wel as the potential for
unforeseen or unwanted consequences. Rather than any single change, a combination of various
reform proposals is likely required to ameliorate the deep partisan divisions inside and outside
Congress. These divisions evolved over decades and transformed the traditional procedures of
earlier times to today’s wider use of unorthodox procedures for partisan and bipartisan
lawmaking.
Summary Observations
Change and innovation are part of Congress’s DNA. These qualities have enabled the House and
Senate from 1789 forward to adapt and respond to new circumstances and conditions. During
much of the 20th century, the “regular order” was a committee-centered, participatory model of
lawmaking that emphasized cross-party deliberation, policy specialization, and step-by-step
decisionmaking. This model is stil employed for measures that enjoy bipartisan support, but it
has often given way in this polarized era to a party-centered process of “irregular”
(unconventional) lawmaking. This change has augmented the authority of House and Senate
majority (and minority) party leaders. For example, today’s party leaders, not the committee
chairs, general y take the lead in battles over major legislation. In short, Congress operates
differently today compared with the earlier period.
A number of developments prompted the rise of unconventional lawmaking. Recal the deep and
intense policy and ideological divide between the two congressional parties; the electoral
volatility that promotes fierce competition between them to keep or capture majority control of
the House or Senate, often an open question on election day; and the divergent demographic
composition of the two parties, with Democrats ethnical y diverse and Republicans largely White
male. Add in the constitutional system (e.g., bicameralism and the President’s veto) of separate
institutions sharing powers, an observation by Representative Dingel becomes especial y
relevant: lawmaking is “hard, pick-and-shovel work.”210
Advocates of a “return to regular order” confront a number of chal enges, such as these five.
First, the parliamentary “rules of the game” change regularly in response to electoral, legislative,

208 Matthew Green and Daniel Burns, “What Might Bring Back Regular Order to the House?,” PS: Political Science
and Politics, April 2010, pp. 223-226.
209 Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, “Causes and Consequences of Polarization,” in Negotiating Agreement in
Politics, eds. Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 2013),
p. 19.
210 Margaret Kriz, “Still Charging,” National Journal, December 6, 1997, p. 2462.
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and societal developments (technology, globalization, the 24/7 media culture are examples.)
Lawmaking is not a one-size-fits-al procedural pathway. Instead, it is often a disorderly,
muddled, and unpredictable enterprise, especial y in this era of acrimonious partisanship.
Moreover, proposals can become law in ways not contemplated by the formal rule books.
Representative Lee Hamilton wrote, “There are ways for astute or powerful members to get
around nearly every stage in the traditional model of the legislative process, making those ‘How a
Bil Becomes Law’ charts of little value in predicting the path of legislation.”211 Parliamentary
pathways, said a Senate expert, can involve “exotic procedures that are basical y
incomprehensible” to most people.212
Second, the interpretation of regular order and its meaningfulness to Members can vary. Several
examples il ustrate these points. Different clusters of lawmakers may champion a specific form of
regular order legislating. For example, conventional lawmaking for Members who serve on the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees involves annual passage of the defense
authorization bil ; House and Senate appropriators want timely, yearly, and separate enactment of
the 12 spending bil s. “We plan to do these [appropriation] bil s in regular order,” said the House
Appropriations chair. “Wel , not-so-regular order, but as regular as we can.”213 Newly elected
Members, among others, often favor a “participatory” regular order that amplifies their voices
and views in legislative decisionmaking.
Situational factors also influence Members’ perspectives of regular order. In the minority,
lawmakers may advocate traditional lawmaking because that approach affords them larger
opportunities to influence policy outcomes and to publicize their agenda alternatives. However,
when the minority party reclaims institutional control, the new majority might reevaluate their
previous stance on regular order legislating when they confront unwanted dilatory tactics of the
opposition party. Speaker Ryan highlighted this tension when he said, “There’s a plus side and
downside of regular order. [Members] have got to take” tough votes and explain them “in difficult
situations.”214 Tough votes, or success at avoiding them, can influence which party attains or
retains majority control of the House or Senate.
Third, the textbook characterization of regular order emphasizes bipartisan participation,
transparency, and deliberation. This description conflicts with the reality of governing in a
political environment of hard-edged partisanship. A top aide to Speaker Hastert stated that the
regular order is a myth. The Speaker’s job, he said, is “not to preside over the regular order. The
Speaker’s job is to expedite the wil of the majority party, to keep the trains running on time and
to otherwise protect the power and prerogatives of the House of Representatives.”215 An expert on
the Senate stated that people who urge a return to regular order legislating “either want the
legislation to fail or are in denial with respect to the difficulty and extra effort that are required to
pass major legislation in the modern Congress.”216
Fourth, many contemporary lawmakers have little familiarity with textbook legislating. An
experienced journalist suggested that a “generational shift” in Congress “has left the vast majority

211 Hamilton, How Congress Works and Why You Should Care, p. 58.
212 Kane, “History Professor Landed a Privileged Perch to See How Harry Reid Works,” p. A17.
213 Quoted in Caitlin Emma, “Politico Pro’s Budget and Appropriations Brief: T he Health & Wealth Gap is Getting
Worse,” Politicopro.com, June 23, 2020, p. 1.
214 Daniel Newhauser, “From Reluctant Recruit to Happy Warrior,” NationalJournal.com, December 18, 2015, pp. 3-4.
215 John Feehery, “T he Myth of Regular Order,” The Hill, October 6, 2015, p. 21.
216 W. Lee Rawls, In Praise of Deadlock: How Partisan Struggle Makes Batter Laws (Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson Press, 2009), p. 17.
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of lawmakers unaware of how [lawmaking] is supposed to work.”217 A Senate party leader stated,
“I doubt that there are more than a handful of senators today who have real y experienced what
regular order feels like.”218 Asked why he wanted to accelerate chamber action on each of the
dozen appropriations measures, a House Appropriations chair said, “[T]o educate members about
[what] the regular order is [because] hardly anybody in the House was here when we last did
regular order [in 1994].”219 Unlike the previous practice of annual and separate consideration of
the dozen appropriations measures, common practice today is to assemble packages: combine
three or four appropriations measures into a “megabil ” hundreds or thousands of pages in length.
These measures are then brought to the floor under debate and amendment restrictions. The
regular order of previous eras is often set aside by today’s unconventional legislating.
Fifth, compared with nontraditional processes, the step-by-step textbook model of legislating is
time-consuming with its traditions of lengthy deliberation as wel as open committee and floor
processes. Contemporary lawmakers prefer certainty and predictability in the day-to-day schedule
of legislative business. They have huge legislative demands on their time: attending committee
and floor sessions, meeting with colleagues, or conducting oversight of the executive branch.
There is also the ever-present “permanent campaign” of fundraising, voting on “messaging” bil s
and amendments, or meeting with donors.
The many responsibilities of lawmakers have encouraged them to general y accept limits on
debating and amending legislation. The combination of reelection incentives, large
representational obligations, and a “Tuesday-Thursday” legislative schedule suggests that the
participatory ethos of regular order legislating could be a political liability for many legislators.
As a legislative scholar concluded, “Congress has evolved over the decades from a culture of
legislating to a culture of campaigning.”220
The regular order has not disappeared, however. Sometimes it is more evident during committee
consideration than on the floor of either chamber where the dynamics of lawmaking change and
majority party leaders exercise major influence. Even so, there are measures that broadly comport
with the fundamentals of regular order. A Senate committee chair, for instance, provided a
detailed review of the actions taken to develop a major energy modernization bil . It involved a
robust debate and amendment process in committee and on the floor, combined with bipartisan
“cooperation, collaboration, and conversation” throughout the measure’s development and
passage.221 Every step-by-step feature of the regular order might not have been followed, but
enough of the conventional process was used to attract bipartisan consensus and agreement.222
Cal s for the regular order go beyond lawmaking. Comments by Senate Budget Chairman Mike
Enzi, R-WY, underscore this point. His remarks focused on fiscal matters, but they apply equal y
wel to other subject areas and to the House. He emphasized the following:
Pushing Congress to adhere to regular order is essential because the budgetary and fiscal
dysfunction in Congress is why Americans have such dismal views of their elected leaders.

217 Paul Kane, “When Congress Forgets How to Legislate,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2018, p. A4.
218 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Nicholas Fandos, “In Congress, Only Gloom Is Bipartisan,” New York Tim es, January 28,
2018, p. 17.
219 David Rogers, “Appropriations and Baseball Are Back,” Politico, April 3, 2014, p. 14.
220 Wolfensberger, Changing Cultures in Congress: From Fair Play to Power Plays, p. 6.
221 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 162 (January 27, 2016), p. S217.
222 An outstanding question is how many steps in regular order legislating might be avoided before it becomes irregular
lawmaking. For example, if a committee bypasses the hearing stage but observes the other lawmaking steps, is this still
the regular order?
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The “Regular Order”: A Perspective

A well-functioning budget process that follows regular order strengthens democracy by
giving citizens a clear and transparent idea of government’s role and provides them with
the knowledge that their tax dollars are being spent wisely. When the process breaks down,
so does the people’s faith in government and their elected officials.223
If the “process breaks down,” a consequence is that other institutions—the White House, federal
courts, state and local governments, federal agencies, or the Federal Reserve—wil act to address
national problems if Congress cannot. History demonstrates that Presidents of both parties are not
reluctant to bypass a gridlocked Congress and use their executive authority to advance their
policy and political objectives.
To close: a prime factor that provokes unconventional lawmaking is the intensity of two-party
conflict inside Congress and outside in the broader political environment. This reality
reverberates throughout the lawmaking process, making bipartisan compromises on many issues
arduous to achieve. The result: unorthodox lawmaking is now a prominent feature of
policymaking on Capitol Hil . As a congressional scholar wrote, nontraditional lawmaking
procedures and processes, “whatever their origins, they have become flexible tools useful to
members and leaders under a variety of circumstances. For that reason, we should not expect a
return to what once was the regular order, at least not in the foreseeable future.”224 Put differently,
a seasoned legislative expert said, “Polarized procedure responds to the al -powerful force of
national political polarization and wil significantly change only if conditions do likewise.”225
Author Information

Walter J. Oleszek

Senior Specialist in American National Government

223 Matthew Nussbaum, “Politico Pro Q&A: Senate Budget Chairman Mike Enzi,” Politicopro.com , February 10, 2016,
p. 14.
224 Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress, 4th ed. (Los Angeles,
CA: CQ Press, 2012), p. 164.
225 T iefer, The Polarized Congress, p. 3. A different interpretation of governance in the 21 st century underscores the
role of crises in fostering a consensus-based process of legislative decisionmaking. T he author states that in this period
of emergency government, “congressional leaders [transcend] their mutual partisan animosity in order to massively
empower the appointed members of the executive branch.” He adds, “Leadership dominance is the organizing facto r
that underlies both of the alternating postures of 21 st-century American government: polarized stalemate in normal
times, and massive, rapid action in crisis.” See Philip Wallach, “Crisis Government,” National Affairs, summer 2020.
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