Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

October 8, 2020 – October 27, 2022 R46565

Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked
October 27, 2022
Questions
Sarah J. Eckman
States, territories, and the District of Columbia administer federal elections. Each of
Analyst in American
these jurisdictions has its own process for counting votes and declaring election winners, National Government
though al follow similar steps. These processes have drawn renewed congressional and

public attention during recent election cycles.
R. Sam Garrett
Specialist in American
The results that voters see reported on election night are the culmination of several steps
National Government
in the election administration process, but are not the end of that process. Finalizing

federal election results typical y can occur days or weeks after election day. Among
Karen L. Shanton
other steps, state, territorial, and local election officials canvass votes to ensure that
Analyst in American
bal ots are valid and counted correctly. Election observers, audits, and other processes
National Government
are designed to help ensure transparency and accuracy.

For a copy of the ful report,
This report addresses frequently asked questions on these and related subjects. The
please cal 7-5700 or visit
discussion emphasizes the period between the time a voter casts a bal ot and when
www.crs.gov.
election officials certify, or finalize, the results.
Congressional Research Service

Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

Introduction
The results voters see reported on election night are the culmination of several steps in the
election administration process, but are not the end of the process. States, territories, and the
District of Columbia administer federal elections. Each of these jurisdictions has its own process
for counting votes and declaring winners, but al follow similar steps. Election administrators,
political officials, and members of the public continue working after election night to finalize
official results. This process typical y takes several days or even weeks. State-or territorial-level
federal election results in the United States are never official on election night.
Events in recent election cycles have generated renewed interest among some Members of
Congress, other public officials, and voters about how election officials count votes and
determine election results. This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about
the processes for counting, documenting, and ensuring transparency after votes are cast. It
addresses federal elections, although the discussion herein also general y applies to elections for
state or local offices.
Professional election administrators manage most or al of the bal ot-counting process.1 Members
of the public, the media, or credentialed observers typical y monitor most or al of the bal ot-
counting process.2 Specific practices and requirements vary by jurisdiction. Election officials
have developed standard practices to document the chain of custody for bal ots, ensure
transparency, and generate accurate results.
Scope of the Report
The frequently asked questions below are designed to provide a resource for Members of
Congress and congressional staff as they conduct oversight and consider legislation related to
federal elections. The discussion emphasizes the period between when voters cast bal ots and
election officials certify election results for federal elections. Because states, territories, and
localities administer federal elections, the report contains general discussion of law, policy, and
practice in those jurisdictions, but does not attempt to do so comprehensively.3 The report briefly
discusses recounts and contested elections, but those topics are largely beyond the scope of this
report. Other CRS products provide information on related topics concerning contested U.S.

1 See, for example, Natalie Adona et al., Stewards of Democracy: The Views of American Local Election Officials,
Democracy Fund, report, June 26, 2019, https://democracyfund.org/idea/stewards-of-democracy-the-views-of-
american-local-election-officials/. For additional information on recent issues related to election workers, see CRS
Insight IN11831, Election Worker Safety and Privacy, by Sarah J. Eckman and Karen L. Shanton ; and CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB10781, Overview of Federal Crim inal Laws Prohibiting Threats and Harassm ent of Election Workers, by
Jimmy Balser.
2 National Conference of State Legislatures, Policies for Election Observers, October 13, 2020, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx; and National Conference
of State Legislatures, Post-Election Audits, September 22, 2022, at htt ps://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/post -election-audits635926066.aspx.
3 Federal law typically has relatively little effect on the process of counting and finalizing election results. As noted
elsewhere in this report, other CRS products provide additional information about federal and constitutional provisions
regarding contests, recounts, and certifying electoral college results.
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Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

House elections,4 the electoral college,5 the congressional role in verifying and counting
presidential election results,6 and election workers.7
The report is intentional y brief to make the content more accessible. It does not discuss
legislation or identify specific requirements and processes in individual jurisdictions. As such, the
general information presented in this report does not assess any election jurisdiction’s processes
for or performance at administering elections. Similarly, the report does not provide specific
compliance information, legal analysis, or policy analysis about critical infrastructure issues.
Other CRS reports provide additional information about elections policy issues general y.8
Brief Background: Ballot Submission to Election Results
Election jurisdictions around the country use various processes and terminology to count bal ots and obtain
election results. The information noted below is general y applicable and abbreviated. Additional detail appears in
the questions and answers in the text of this report. State, territorial, and local election jurisdictions document
and publicize their individual requirements.

Submitting Bal ots. Voters deposit completed (also cal ed “marked”) bal ots in a bal ot box or scanner at in -
person pol ing places. Mail and early in-person bal ots are received at designated sites across a precinct or at
a central location.

Tabulating Bal ots. Bal ots are counted, or tabulated, where they are cast, at centralized election offices, or
both. These tabulations may occur multiple times to verify the accuracy of the total bal ot count.

Canvassing Bal ots. Election officials aggregate bal ot totals and document and reconcile questions about bal ot
validity through a process known as the canvass.

Certifying Results. Final election results are cal ed certified results. State-level certification occurs after the
canvass (and, if required in that state, after audits).
As discussed in the questions and answers in the text of this report, a combination of professional election
administrators, volunteers, and members of the public may be involved in these steps, depending on jurisdiction.
Documenting chain of custody for bal ots, fol owing established procedures for observing elections and chal enging
bal ots, and auditing results also help ensure transparency and accuracy.

4 See CRS In Focus IF11734, The Federal Contested Elections Act: Overview and Recent Contests in the House of
Representatives, by R. Sam Garrett, L. Paige Whitaker, and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report RL33780,
Procedures for Contested Election Cases in th e House of Representatives, by L. Paige Whitaker.
5 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11641, The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline, by T homas
H. Neale; CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform : Contem porary Issues for Congress, by T homas H. Neale;
and CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and
Contem porary Analysis, by T homas H. Neale.
6 See CRS Report RL32717, Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of Procedures at the Joint Session, Including
Objections by Mem bers of Congress, coordinated by Elizabeth Rybicki and L. Paige Whitaker .
7 See CRS Insight IN11831, Election Worker Safety and Privacy, by Sarah J. Eckman and Karen L. Shanton; and CRS
Legal Sidebar LSB10781, Overview of Federal Crim inal Laws Prohibiting Threats and Harassm ent of Election
Workers, by Jimmy Balser.
8 Congressional readers may contact the coauthors of this report for additional information on elections policy. See, for
example, CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Cam paigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett ; CRS
Report R45549, The State and Local Role in Election Adm inistration: Duties and Structures, by Karen L. Shanton;
CRS Report R46146, Cam paign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developm ents for Congress,
coordinated by R. Sam Garrett ; CRS Report R46455, COVID-19 and Other Election Em ergencies: Frequently Asked
Questions and Recent Policy Developm ents, coordinated by R. Sam Garrett ; CRS In Focus IF11477, Early Voting and
Mail Voting: Overview & Issues for Congress, by Sarah J. Eckman and Karen L. Shanton ; and CRS Report R46646,
Election Adm inistration: Federal Grant Funding for States and Localities, by Karen L. Shanton.
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Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between returns reported on
election night and final results?
Federal election results at the state or territorial levels are never official in the United States until
after election day. Results appearing in media reports or that election jurisdictions release on
election night are unofficial and preliminary. These initial y reported (either by the media or
election officials) totals do not necessarily include al bal ots submitted in the jurisdiction, have
not been subject to the canvassing process, and could change. Consequently, it is normal and
expected that final election totals differ from those announced on election night. It is also
common that the candidates in various races can trade leads throughout election night and after,
as additional bal ots are counted.9 Typical y, it takes several days or weeks to finalize election
results through the canvass (and audits, where applicable) and certify a winner. State or territorial
law sets deadlines for how and when these processes occur.
How do states finalize election results?
Although individual procedures vary by state, finalizing election results typical y involves two
major steps, the canvass and certification. The canvass involves assembling and verifying al
validly cast bal ots so that they can be aggregated into the final official election results (general y
cal ed certified results).10 As an Election Assistance Commission publication explains, “The
purpose of the canvass is to account for every bal ot cast and ensure that every valid vote cast is
included in the election totals. This involves accounting for every absentee bal ot, every early
voting bal ot, every bal ot cast on Election Day, every provisional bal ot, every chal enged bal ot,
and every overseas and military bal ot.”11 Depending on jurisdiction, groups of professional
election officials, appointed canvassing boards, or both conduct the canvass.
Typical steps in the canvass include reconciling any discrepancies in the number of bal ots issued
versus those cast; duplicating damaged bal ots that scanners cannot read, documenting that
process, and counting the duplicated bal ots; if applicable, addressing discrepancies in signatures
or cast bal ots (e.g., questions about voter intent based on bal ot markings); and reconciling the
number of bal ots cast with the number of voters who voted in person at the polling place.12 These

9 See, for example, Nathaniel Persily and Charles Stewart III, “Actually, We’ll Know a Lot on Election Night,” The
Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2020, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/actually-we-will-know-a-lot-on-election-
night -11600959867; and Clara Hendrickson, Louis Jacobson, and Amy Sherman, “ Not all results will be known on
election night 2022. T hat’s normal,” Politifact, October 3, 2022, at https://www.politifact.com/article/2022/oct/03/not-
all-results-will-be-known-election-night -s-nor/.
10 For example, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Voluntary Voting System Guidelines define the canvass as a
“Compilation of election returns and validation of the outcome that forms the basis of the official results by a political
subdivision.” See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Vol. 1, Version 1.1
(2015), p. A-5.
11 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Quick Start Management Guide: Canvassing and Certifying an Election,
October 2008, p. 3. See also U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Quick Start Managem ent Guide: Canvassing and
Certifying an Election, May 1, 2022, at
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Canvass_and_Certification_EAC_Quick_Sta
rt_Guide_508.pdf. For additional discussion of military and overseas citizen voting, see, for example, CRS In Focus
IF11642, Absentee Voting for Uniform ed Services and Overseas Citizens: Roles and Process, In Brief, by R. Sam
Garrett .
12 See, for example, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Management Guidelines, pp. 133-138. T he
Election Managem ent Guidelines document is available on t he EAC website at https://www.eac.gov/
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Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

processes may be repeated multiple times as precincts and vote centers compile their results and
bal oting information is consolidated at subsequently higher levels of election administration
(e.g., precinct, county, and state).
In some jurisdictions, statistical data and written reports accompany the certified results and
provide additional information about the canvassing process and how discrepancies were
addressed. Similarly, in some cases, the certification is the final step in the canvassing process. In
others, the governor or chief state election official (e.g., secretary of state) issues certified results
based on information provided in the canvassing authority’s final report or meeting.
In some states, very close election margins during the canvass trigger recounts, discussed at the
end of this report. Some jurisdictions also conduct postelection audits, which are intended to
check the accuracy of the election outcomes reported by the voting system.13 These audits involve
comparing the results generated by the voting system against a sample of paper records of the
vote, such as paper bal ots or the voter-verifiable paper audit trails generated by direct-recording
electronic voting machines.14
What procedures might election jurisdictions use to
provide transparency and demonstrate that the
canvass is conducted correctly?
Election officials work to ensure that the certified election results they provide are general y
perceived to be fair, accurate, and legitimate. One way they do so is by having consistent,
reliable, and transparent bal ot collection and canvass procedures, which are typical y established
wel before the election. To ensure that individual voters can cast their bal ots privately and
securely, and that those bal ots are handled and counted correctly, multiple election administrators
and/or public witnesses, representing multiple political parties, general y are involved at various
stages of the vote-collecting and-counting processes.
Certain categories of individuals can serve as election observers, as defined by state laws; these
observers typical y include individuals serving on behalf of various political parties and can also
include individuals from nonpartisan civic or legal organizations, as wel as academics or
unaffiliated individuals. States may require potential observers to obtain certain accreditation.15

election_management_resources/election_management_guidelines.aspx.
13 National Institute of Standards and T echnology, Election Terminology Glossary – Draft, https://pages.nist.gov/
ElectionGlossary/.
14 Exactly how jurisdictions that use postelection audits conduct them varies, but postelection audits generally can be
grouped into two categories: (1) traditional postelection audits, which review records from a fixed percentage of voting
districts or machines, and (2) risk-limiting audits, which use statistical methods to determine how many r ecords have to
be reviewed to achieve a specified level of confidence that the election outcomes reported by the voting system are the
outcomes officials would get if they conducted a full hand count of the paper records. For more information about
postelection audits in general or risk-limiting audits in particular, see CRS In Focus IF11873, Election Adm inistration:
An Introduction to Risk-Lim iting Audits, by Karen L. Shanton; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine, Securing the Vote: Protecting Am erican Dem ocracy, Washington, DC, 2018, pp. 93-96,
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy; National Conference of State
Legislatures, Post-Election Audits, September 22, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
post -election-audits635926066.aspx; and Mark Lindeman and Philip B. Stark, “ A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting
Audits,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 10, no. 5 (September-October 2012), pp. 42-49.
15 National Conference of State Legislatures, Policies for Election Observers, October 13, 2022, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx. T his CRS report does not
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An important role for observers under some state laws is monitoring in-person voting on election
day for indications of voter coercion, intimidation, or fraud, as wel as technological issues and
administrative errors or misapplication of election protocols.16
States that utilize drop boxes for mail bal ots often have video surveil ance or trained election
staff monitoring the drop box site during voting and have mechanisms in place for bal ot retrieval
and chain of custody,17 such as deploying two individuals to collect bal ots from each box.18
Other elements of the voting process, including signature verification for mail bal ots, typical y
also involve multiple individuals.19
In many states, canvassing boards and processes include participants who were not directly
involved in the administration of the election itself to help provide impartial review.20 Most states
also al ow some election observers or members of the media to access certain postelection
procedures,21 such as counting absentee bal ots or conducting postelection audits or logic and
accuracy tests.22 Some jurisdictions may also provide a canvass livestream and al ow the public to

address federal election observers or monitors that may be deployed under the Voting Rights Act. For brief additional
discussion, see CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Cam paigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett .
16 National Conference of State Legislatures, Poll Watchers and Challengers, October 1, 2020, at https://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx. Federal provisions in criminal law, the Voting
Rights Act, or both also could be relevant. See for example, CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Cam paigns and
Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett ; and CRS T estimony T E10033, History and Enforcem ent of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, by L. Paige Whitaker.
17 National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 9: Ballot Drop Box Laws, February 14, 2022, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-9-ballot -drop-box-definitions-design-features-
location-and-number.aspx.
18 For example, see Arizona Secretary of State’s Office, Elections Services Division, Arizona Elections Procedures
Manual, December 2019, p. 61, at https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/
2019_ELECT IONS_PROCEDURES_MANUAL_APPROVED.pdf ; and California Secretary of State, Vote-by-Mail
Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations, California Code of Regulations T itle 2, div. 7, ch. 3, §20137,
Ballot Collection Procedures and Chain of Custody, at https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current -
regulations/elections/vote-mail-ballot-drop-boxes-and-drop-locations.
19 For example, see William Janover and T om Westphal, “Signature Verification and Mail Ballots: Guaranteeing
Access While Preserving Integrity—A Case Study of California’s Every Vote Counts Act,” Election Law Journal:
Rules, Politics, and Policy, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2020), p. 329; and “ How are Ballots Processed?” articles
available from Grand County, Colorado, Clerk & Recorder’s Office, Ballots & Processing, at
https://www.co.grand.co.us/1093/Ballots-Processing.
20 For example, see Florida Supervisors of Elections, 2020 FSASE Canvasing Board Manual, at
https://www.myfloridaelections.com/portals/fsase/2020%20Canv%20Board%20Manual%20FINAL_reduced.pdf ;
Minnesota Secretary of State, Canvassing Boards, at https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/how-elections-work/
canvassing-boards/; and Washington Secretary of State, Introduction to County Canvassing Boards, at
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/introduction-to-county-canvassing-boards.pdf.
21 National Conference of State Legislatures, Policies for Election Observers, October 13, 2020, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx; National Conference of
State Legislatures, Post-Election Audits, September 22, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx.
22 Logic and accuracy tests, which are typically conducted prior to an election but may also be conducted after the
election in some jurisdictions, are used to check that election equipment is functioning correctly and that it is
programmed and calibrated correctly for the current election. T hey involve running a test deck of ballots through the
election equipment and may be conducted by a team of representatives of multiple political parties, open to the public,
or both. See, for example, T exas Secretary of State, Electronic Voting System Procedures, https://www.sos.texas.gov/
elections/laws/electronic-voting-system-procedures.shtml.
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view the process online.23 Postelection audits may be conducted by an independent audit board,
rather than state or local administrators.24
What processes help election officials determine
voter eligibility and the validity of ballots cast?
State and local election officials use various mechanisms to ensure that only eligible voters cast
bal ots and that each voter only votes once in an election. The specific processes vary by state and
can further vary based on the type of bal ot cast (e.g., in-person or by mail).
Election officials primarily use voter registration data to determine whether or not an individual is
eligible to vote in a given election, regardless of whether the voter chooses to vote in-person or
via a mail (or absentee) bal ot.25 Election officials use state-level voter registration requirements
and procedures,26 as wel as verification requirements under the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA),27 to confirm a registrant’s identity and eligibility to vote, often by comparing
information on voter registration applications with other government agency records.
Once a voter is on a state’s list of eligible voters, this information is used by election officials to
monitor how, and if, voters have received a bal ot, to ensure that each eligible voter can cast a
vote and that no voter casts multiple bal ots in the same election.28 When voting in-person, poll
books, or lists of eligible voters, are used by local election administrators to confirm that
individuals are currently registered voters and are at the correct voting location for their precinct

23 For example, see “Live Stream of County Ballot T abulation Centers,” section from Arizona Secretary of State,
Voting Equipm ent, at https://azsos.gov/elections/voting-election/voting-equipment ; and Montgomery County,
Maryland, Board of Elections, 2020 Presidential General Election Ballot Canvass, at
https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/Elections/2020PrimaryElection/primary-ballot-canvass.html.
24 National Conference of State Legislatures, Post-Election Audits, September 22, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/post -election-audits635926066.aspx.
25 With the exception of North Dakota, all states and territories require individuals to register to vote prior to casting
their ballots in federal elections; for more information, see CRS Report R46406, Voter Registration: Recent
Developm ents and Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R45030, Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent Developments. North Dakota does maintain a Central Voter File and
requires voters to provide identification; see North Dakota Century Code, ch. 16.1 -02, at https://www.legis.nd.gov/
cencode/t16-1c02.html, and North Dakota Secretary of State, ID Required for Voting, at https://vip.sos.nd.gov/
IDRequirements.aspx?ptlhPKID=103&ptlPKID=7.
26 For more information, see National Conference of State Legislators, Voter Registration List Maintenance, October 7,
2021, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-list-accuracy.aspx.
27 Under HAVA, for example, voter registration applicants must provide a current and valid driver’s license number or
the last four digits of t heir Social Security number, if they have them. Voters who have not been issued a current and
valid driver’s license or Social Security number are assigned an alternate, unique identifying number by the state for
voter registration purposes (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(5)(A)(i-ii)). HAVA also requires that states coordinate their voter
registration lists with state agency records on felony status and death (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(2)(A)(ii)), and directs state
DMV officials to enter into agreements with the Social Security Administration and the chief state election official to
verify and match certain voter registration applicant information (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(5)(B)). HAVA also requires that
new voters who submit a voter registration application by mail, and have not previously voted in a federal election in a
state, must provide a current and valid photo identification or present “ a current utility bill, bank statement, government
check, paycheck, or ot her government document that shows the name and address of the voter,” along with their
registration application or when they vote for the first time (52 U.S.C. §21083(b)); individuals who fall into this
category and are unable to provide documentation when voting for the first time may cast a provisional ballot.
28 National Conference of State Legislatures, Double Voting, June 16, 2021, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/double-voting.aspx.
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or election district. Electronic poll (or e-poll) books are commonly used today and may be able to
provide more recently updated voter information or some voter data in real time.29 In jurisdictions
that use centralized vote centers, e-poll books can help election administrators verify that a voter
has not previously voted at another location. In addition to identifying voters from poll book
records, 35 states also have some form of voter identification requirement in effect for in-person
voting during the 2022 election.30
In circumstances where voters can vote by mail, some jurisdictions automatical y send bal ots to
voters and others require voters to request a mail bal ot.31 States that automatical y send bal ots or
bal ot request forms to voters general y rely upon address information on file in state voter
registration records.32 In the voter records, election administrators typical y note which persons
have requested and cast absentee bal ots. Bal ot tracking measures often al ow an individual voter
to check the status of his or her mail bal ot, following it from the time it is sent out by election
administrators to when it is returned and cast.33 These mail bal ot tracking measures, in
conjunction with in-person voting records, also help election officials to ensure that only a single
bal ot is counted for each voter; for example, election officials can void a mail bal ot if it has not
yet been cast by a voter who decides to vote in-person instead or if officials receive a mail bal ot
from a voter after he or she has voted in-person.34
States employ a number of measures to verify that a mail bal ot is completed by the intended
voter.35 Many jurisdictions require voter signatures to accompany completed mail bal ots. The
voter’s signature often accompanies a legal attestation, asserting the voter’s identity and
eligibility. Election officials, computer software, or both may be used to match the signature(s)
submitted by the voter to a known signature on file from the voter’s registration records or other
government agency records, if applicable, via a process known as signature verification.36 If there

29 National Conference of State Legislatures, Electronic Poll Books | e-Poll Books, October 25, 2019, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-pollbooks.aspx.
30 National Conference of State Legislatures, Voter ID Laws, October 18, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx.
31 National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at
Hom e Options, July 12, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-
voting.aspx.
32 If a voter must request a mail ballot, he or she can often provide a different mailing address for ballot delivery.
33 Vote.Org, “T rack Your Ballot,” at https://www.vote.org/ballot -tracker-tools/.
34 See, for example, California Secretary of State, Voting at a Polling Place after Applying to Vote by Mail, at
https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/voting-california/if-you-applied; and “ Michigan’s Absentee Voting
Process,” in Michigan Bureau of Elections, Election Officials’ Manual, October 2020, ch. 6, at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/VI_Michigans_Absentee_Voting_Process_265992_7.pdf . Some jurisdictions
may allow a voter who had previously requested a mail ballot to cast a regular in -person ballot. Other jurisdictions may
require a voter who had previously requested a mail ballot to cast a provisional ballot in -person, to allow election
administrators to confirm that the mail ballot has not been cast; a provisional ballot may be requir ed, for example, if a
voter cannot provide the blank mail ballot to officials at the polling site. For additional discussion, see, for example,
Associated Press, “ States Have Checks in Place to Prevent Voters From Voting T wice,” August 26, 2020, at
https://apnews.com/article/9308770212; and Nick Corasaniti and Stephanie Saul, “ Is Voting T wice a Felony?” The
New York Tim es, September 9, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/article/voting-twice.html.
35 Some states may waive certain requirements to make accommodations for individuals with disabilities who need
assistance completing their ballots on a case-by-case basis. For further discussion of these issues, see Maggie Astor,
“What It’s Like to Vote With a Disability During a Pandemic,” The New York Times, September 25, 2020, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/us/politics/voting-disability-virus.html.
36 For additional discussion on registration, see CRS Report R46406, Voter Registration: Recent Developments and
Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R45030, Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act
of 1993 and Subsequent Developments. For additional discussion of signature verification, see, for example, William
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Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

is a missing, mismatched, or ambiguous signature, some states contact the voter and may provide
an opportunity for the voter to correct the issue through processes known as signature curing,
which may include an affidavit, a copy of additional identification, or both.37 States may also
have requirements for witness signatures or notarization of mail bal ots, and voters may need to
submit a copy of their photo identification with a mail bal ot in certain circumstances.38 Election
officials may also check to ensure that the return address on a mail bal ot matches that of the
voter.39 Some states require that a voter return his or her own bal ot or limit who, aside from the
voter, can return an absentee bal ot.40
When do states count ballots and certify
election results?
The timeline for counting votes can vary, depending on when states and localities al ow voters to
cast their bal ots41 and when election officials are al owed to begin processing and counting those
bal ots. The window available for voters to cast bal ots varies by state, as jurisdictions have
different polling place hours on election day, as wel as different policies regarding the
availability and duration of in-person early voting and mail voting.42 In several states, mail bal ots
are sent, and early in-person voting may begin, at least 45 days ahead of election day.43
Depending on state law, early voting might end several days before election day or continue until

Janover and T om Westphal, “ Signature Verification and Mail Ballots: Guaranteeing Access While Preserving
Integrity—A Case Study of California’s Every Vote Counts Act,” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy,
vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2020), pp. 321 -343; National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 14: How States Verify
Voted Absentee/Mail Ballots, March 15, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/-table-14-
how-states-verify-voted-absentee.aspx; Joint COVID Working Group; and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency [CISA], Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council, Sector Coordinating Council, Signature
Verification and Cure Process, Version 1.0, available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/signature-
verification_cure_process_final_508.pdf.
37 National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 15: States With Signature Cure Process, January 18, 2022, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-15-states-that-permit -voters-to-correct-signature-
discrepancies.aspx.
38 National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 14: How States Verify Voted Absentee Ballots, March 15, 2022, at
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-14-how-states-verify-voted-absentee.aspx.
39 Darrell M. West, “How does vote-by-mail work and does it increase election fraud,” Brookings Institute, June 22,
2020, at https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-does-vote-by-mail-work-and-does-it-increase-election-
fraud/.
40 National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 10: Ballot Collection Laws, May 17, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-10-who-can-collect-and-return-an-absentee-ballot -other-than-the-
voter.aspx.
41 For information on early and mail voting timelines in each state, see National Association of Secretaries of State,
Dates and Deadlines for Early and Absentee Voting in the Novem ber 8 th General Election, August 2020, at
https://www.nass.org/node/2452.
42 T he Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA; 52 U.S.C. §§20301 -20311) specifies
separate requirements for citizens abroad and members of the uniform ed services (primarily military members). For
brief additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11642, Absentee Voting for Uniform ed Services and Overseas Citizens:
Roles and Process, In Brief, by R. Sam Garrett .
43 National Conference of State Legislatures, Early In-Person Voting, August 30, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx; and National Conference of State Legislatures,
Table 7: When States Mail Out Absentee/Mail Ballots, July 12, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/vopp-table-7-when-states-mail-out-absentee-ballots.aspx.
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8

Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

the day before election day. For mail bal ots, states vary in whether the bal ots must be received
on election day or postmarked by election day.44
In many states, election officials can begin “processing” absentee bal ots they have received
before election day, though what “processing” means varies by state. Processing often can
involve scanning the tracking barcode on a return bal ot envelope and conducting signature
verification, where the signature required on the outside of the bal ot envelope is compared with a
voter’s known signature from state registration records. Some states also al ow early bal ots to be
counted before election day, whereas other states prohibit bal ots from being counted before polls
close on election day.45 States also vary in how and when they count provisional bal ots cast on
election day.46 Some states begin counting provisional bal ots immediately after polls close, with
statutory deadlines ranging from two days to weeks after an election, whereas other states
examine provisional bal ots as part of the canvass process.47 Some states do not specify a deadline
for their certified election results, and other states, for example, had deadlines ranging from
November 10 to December 16 for the 2022 general election.48
What processes are available if disputes remain after
election results are certified?
Different terminology applies to various scenarios surrounding disputed election results. The term
recount refers to retabulating bal ots to ensure that the certified count was accurate (although, in
some jurisdictions, recounts might occur before certification).49 Election officials general y
conduct recounts when elections result in very close margins of victory to confirm that the
certified results are accurate, or if there is evidence that counting equipment malfunctioned.50
There are two kinds of recounts: automatic and requested. Typical y, a narrow margin of victory
in an individual race (e.g., less than one-half percent in some states) triggers an automatic recount
as specified in state statutes. In other cases, candidates or voters may request recounts (sometimes
cal ed initiated recounts), often at their expense and under processes specified in state statutes.51

44 National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 11: Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for Absentee Ballots, July 12,
2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-11-receipt-and-postmark-deadlines-for-
absentee-ballots.aspx.
45 National Conference of State Legislatures, Table 16: When Absentee/Mail Ballot Processing and Counting Can
Begin, May 17, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-16-when-absentee-mail-
ballot-processing-and-counting-can-begin.aspx.
46 Provisional ballot is a general term used to describe a ballot provided to a voter when there is uncertainty
surrounding the voter’s eligibility, under circumstances described in HAVA or state law.
47 National Conference of State Legislatures, Provisional Ballots, October 11, 2022, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx; Ballotpedia, State by State Provisional Ballot Laws, at
https://ballotpedia.org/State_by_Stat e_Provisional_Ballot_Laws.
48 Ballotpedia, Election Results Certification Dates, 2022, at
https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results_certification_dates,_2022; and National Association of Secretaries of State,
State Election Canvassing Tim efram es and Recount Thresholds, September 2022, at https://www.nass.org/node/2455.
49 For example, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Voluntary Voting System Guidelines define recount as
“[r]etabulation of the votes cast in an election.” See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines, Vol. 1, Version 1.1 (2015), p. A-16.
50 See, for example, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Management Guidelines, p. 147. T he Election
Managem ent Guidelines document is available on the EAC website at https://www.eac.gov/
election_management_resources/election_management_guidelines.aspx.
51 For example, as the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has explained, “although post -election audits
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Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

Relevant state, territorial, or local election statutes specify which recount options are available in
particular jurisdictions, if any, and under what circumstances.
States or other election jurisdictions conduct recounts either by rescanning bal ots or by hand
counting, depending on circumstances and relevant requirements, and may address al or part of
the certified results. Recounts also may involve a recanvass—in some states a separate process—
to reexamine the validity of the bal ots included in the certified results. Election officials, recount
boards, or both typical y conduct recounts.
Although timing varies by state, statutes typical y limit the period during which recounts may
occur. Election officials can face particularly tight deadlines for conducting recounts if they occur
shortly before officeholders-elect are to be sworn in. In addition, for presidential elections, a
federal “safe harbor” deadline may affect how long states have to conduct their recounts in
presidential elections.52
Election contests focus on the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the election. As with
recounts, contests follow processes addressed in relevant state law. General y, contests are
resolved through litigation that is beyond the scope of this report. The Federal Contested Election
Act (FCEA) provides procedures for resolving contested U.S. House elections.53 Ultimately,
Article I, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution specifies that each chamber of Congress “shal be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” Other CRS products
provide information on related topics concerning contested U.S. House elections,54 the electoral
college,55 and the congressional role in verifying and counting presidential election results.56

can lead to a full recount if errors are detected, they differ from a recount in that they are conducted regardless of the
margins of victory. Recounts are most often triggered or requested if there is a tight margin of victory.” See National
Conference of State Legislatures, “Post -Election Audits,” September 22, 2022, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx.
52 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11641, The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline,
by T homas H. Neale; and CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress:
Perspectives and Contem porary Analysis, by T homas H. Neale.
53 2 U.S.C. §§381-396. For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11734, The Federal Contested Elections Act:
Overview and Recent Contests in the House of Representatives, by R. Sam Garrett, L. Paige Whitaker, and Christopher
M. Davis; and CRS Report RL33780, Procedures for Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives, by L.
Paige Whitaker.
54 See CRS In Focus IF11734, The Federal Contested Elections Act: Overview and Recent Contests in the House of
Representatives, by R. Sam Garrett, L. Paige Whitaker, and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report RL33780,
Procedures for Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives, by L. Paige Whitaker.
55 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11641, The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline, by T homas
H. Neale; CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform : Contem porary Issues for Congress, by T homas H. Neale;
and CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and
Contem porary Analysis, by T homas H. Neale.
56 See CRS Report RL32717, Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of Procedures at the Joint Session, Including
Objections by Mem bers of Congress, coordinated by Elizabeth Rybicki and L. Paige Whitaker .
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Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

Author Information

Sarah J. Eckman
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American National Government
Analyst in American National Government

R. Sam Garrett

Specialist in American National Government

Acknowledgments
Tyler Wolanin, Research Assistant at the Congressional Research Service, contributed to research for this
report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
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