The Fundamentals of Military Readiness

October 2, 2020 R46559

The Fundamentals of Military Readiness
October 2, 2020
Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) requests and Congress authorizes and appropriates
billions of dollars in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding to support what the DOD calls
G. James Herrera
readiness. Additionally, other types of defense appropriations may be used to contribute to
Analyst in U.S. Defense
producing, sustaining, or otherwise enabling readiness. DOD defines readiness as “the ability of
Readiness and
military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.” What precisely this means is
Infrastructure
a matter of ongoing discourse among congressional leaders and defense officials alike.

Despite disagreement over specific definitions of readiness, DOD retains statutory authorities and

responsibilities to produce and sustain ready military forces, and Congress has the constitutional
authority to resource and regulate military forces for the nation. For these reasons, many government officials and members
of the defense community agree that the focus of readiness is to generate “ready” military forces. The process of generating
these forces is complex, and differs across a range of various circumstances (e.g., branch of armed service, military
occupation, status of a servicemember [commissioned officer, warrant officer, or enlisted], and duty type/component [i.e.,
active or reserve]). Nonetheless, the military’s overall “readiness production process” can be broadly described in terms of
producing and sustaining ready military units over time, with the principal focus within these units being the “warfighter”
(i.e., the servicemember).
This report applies the analogy of a production line to explain the process. The readiness production process includes three
fundamental parts:
 Building initial readiness. This includes providing initial training and testing along with proper
resourcing, so that warfighters can progress to advanced training.
 Increasing readiness. This includes providing advanced individual and unit training, testing, and proper
resourcing, so that warfighters are qualified and resourced to deploy with their operational units.
 Sustaining readiness. This includes the continual training and resourcing of units, prior to and following
deployments, in order to ensure units remain ready for future assigned missions.
Related to the readiness production process are the assessment and reporting of military readiness. This report includes an
overview of selected readiness systems, assessments, and sample metrics used to inform military and congressional leaders.
These include
 the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS);
 the Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS);
 the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC);
 Mission Capable (MC) rates; and
 Aircraft Availability (AA) rates.
DOD has stated that readiness is principally funded through Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations provided
annually by Congress. For FY2021, DOD requested approximately $290 billion in O&M funding, amounting to
approximately 41% of the department’s overall discretionary budget request. In addition, both DOD and Congress have
acknowledged that other types of appropriations may also be used to contribute to readiness. An important consideration for
Congress is the oversight of readiness funding.
Another potential consideration for Congress is the establishment of common readiness metrics across DOD. Common
metrics based upon a common lexicon would allow for a more accurate comparison of unit readiness across the Services.
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Preface
This report was produced to help Members of Congress, congressional committees, and their staff
understand the fundamental aspects of what the United States military and the Department of
Defense (DOD) call “readiness.” In the absence of legislation that defines or describes the
features of readiness, this report relies largely on existing military doctrine, policies, and public
communications to frame and describe readiness and its major components. Although there may
be competing points of view of what constitutes military readiness—both in a broad sense and in
terms of more narrow definitions—this report does not analyze these other perspectives. Rather, it
begins the modern discussion of “what is readiness” by concentrating on the current DOD
perspective. The intent is to inform the congressional debate over what constitutes readiness by
providing a reference point. As a follow-on to this discussion, future Congressional Research
Service reports may focus on readiness management (i.e., how DOD manages the fundamental
components of readiness), and the impact of national strategy on readiness requirements (this
latter topic focusing on the question “ready for what?”).
Introduction
Readiness is a term regularly applied to the United States’ ability to produce, deploy, and sustain
military forces that will perform successfully in combat. The DOD—including its predecessors
the Departments of War and Navy—and Congress have used the word “readiness” since at least
the 1830s to discuss the state of military personnel, training, equipment, and other related
activities.1 Definitions for readiness have changed over time, and have varied in specificity.2 The
word has also been periodically adapted in DOD policies and congressional reports to apply to
specific military forces (e.g., “reserve readiness”), or to contributing factors to total readiness
(e.g., “individual medical readiness”).3
DOD’s current definition of readiness, published in joint doctrine, reveals a particularly broad
characterization of the concept (See section “DOD’s Definition of Readiness”).4 DOD also
permits several closely defined variants of the term to coexist (e.g., “operational readiness”).5 In

1 Earliest found congressional reference of the word “readiness” used in a military context was in 1836. It can be found
in House Report 785 of the House of Representatives, Committee on Naval Affairs. See
https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t47.d48.295_h.rp.785?accountid=12084; an 1857 reference
can be found in House Report 207 of the House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs. See
https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t47.d48.914_h.rp.207?accountid=12084.
2 For example, compare the definitions of “readiness” as defined by DOD in 1986, 1989, and in 2005. See Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publication 1, DOD, January 1986, p. 221, at
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa342.pdf; and JCS, The Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD, December 1989, p. 228, at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a258036.pdf#page=230; and also
JCS, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02, DOD, April 12, 2001 (as amended
through August 31, 2005), p. 444, at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA439918.pdf#page=452.
3 For a historical example of a modified definition of readiness, see “reserve readiness” as defined by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) in 1978: Congressional Budget Office, Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserve and
National Guard: A Framework for Debate, CBO (1978), p. 15, at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/95th-
congress-1977-1978/reports/1978_02_improving.pdfl; also see DOD Instruction (DODI) 6025.19, Individual Medical
Readiness (IMR), June 9, 2014, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/602519p.pdf.
4 See DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, As of January 2020, p. 180, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf#page=186.
5 See DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, As of January 2020, p. 161, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
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the absence of a published, official DOD readiness framework, each of these terms and their
relationship to each other can be confusing. However, what is common to all of these terms is the
process by which the military produces and sustains ready forces. This process can be complex,
and published materials explaining readiness generation are often not written for the general
public. Likewise, the different methods by which DOD assesses and reports the readiness of its
forces can also be a challenge to deconstruct.
Despite the challenges, military readiness remains a subject of high importance to Congress and it
is often at the heart of many defense budget debates. In particular, Congress frequently uses
DOD’s reported “readiness levels” (see section “Readiness Metrics and Reporting”) as a key
input to determining defense funding requirements.
Given the importance of readiness, it is useful for government officials who have policy,
resourcing, and/or oversight responsibility for the military, to share with the military a common
understanding of readiness and the fundamental elements that comprise it.6 For Congress, this
shared understanding could translate into more than just ensuring military forces are properly
resourced to accomplish missions, but also enable it to oversee DOD stewardship of federal
resources more effectively. It may also support congressional oversight of DOD compliance with
statutory requirements to regularly and accurately assess and report readiness.7
This report explains the fundamentals of military readiness and includes
 a discussion of what readiness is, both in general and for DOD;
 a general description of the process by which ready forces are generated;
 examples of readiness metrics commonly used by DOD;
 an overview of how readiness is reported within DOD and to Congress; and
 an explanation of how readiness is funded within defense budgets.
The report concludes with a set of considerations for Congress regarding DOD readiness metrics
and congressional oversight of readiness funding.
Readiness Broadly
Readiness is a term that is not statutorily defined and not exclusively used by the defense
community. During the past two decades, it has become increasingly common to see the word
readiness used as an alternative expression for preparedness throughout both the public and
private sectors. Outside of DOD, several federal departments and agencies, as well as state and
local governments, now use the word readiness commonly in their public statements and official
reports.8 This has largely been in the context of being prepared for a national emergency, natural
disaster, unexpected economic downturn, or other considerably threatening event.
Typically, readiness is applied to certain groups or communities of people at risk. For example, in
2017, Merrill Lynch published a financial study that “revealed major gaps in retirement
readiness” for pre-retiree Americans over age 50.9 However, when discussed at a national or

Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf#page=167.
6 See Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a
Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841 (September 2016), at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679556.pdf.
7 See 10 U.S.C. §117 and 10 U.S.C. §482.
8 For an example, see https://www.dhs.gov/coronavirus/overview-dhs-response.
9 Bank of America, Merrill Lynch Study Finds New Retirement Realities Usher in Opportunities and Challenges, Bank
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international level, readiness can also been applied to the entire population of a country or to
transnational populations. For example, in 2019, the United States Department of Agriculture
published a collaborative technical report on “Green Readiness, Response, and Recovery.”10 This
report was broadly directed at all U.S. communities, and discussed the practice of “greening” to
build readiness and resilience to environmental and man-made disturbances communities may
face.11
How someone uses the term “readiness” is often tied to the context in which it is applied, and the
focus of its application. For federal departments and agencies (hereafter “federal agencies”),
internal guidance, public policy statements, and official definitions for readiness may be issued
that help explain what the context and focus of readiness is for a particular federal agency.
DOD’s Definition of Readiness
DOD officially defines the term “readiness” in Joint Publication 1 (JP 1) as “the ability of military
forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.”12 DOD states that assigned missions
are undertaken in support of the fulfillment of the written national strategy of the United States of
America.13 From a military perspective, national strategy encompasses three strategic documents,
the: (1) National Military Strategy (NMS), (2) National Defense Strategy (NDS), and (3) National
Security Strategy (NSS).14 This intentionally broad definition of readiness highlights DOD’s
focus on military forces, and the general context is those forces’ ability to fight and win,
anywhere, and at any given time.
From Definition to Basic Framework
Although broad, DOD’s official definition of readiness encompasses several key words that have
a functional meaning within the military. Examining these words more closely allows for DOD’s
definition to be partially deconstructed and a basic framework for readiness to take form.

of America Newsroom, February 15, 2017, at https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-releases/global-wealth-and-
investment-management/merrill-lynch-study-finds-new-retirement.
10 Lindsay K. Campbell et al., Green Readiness, Response, and Recovery: A Collaborative Synthesis, United States
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 2019, at https://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/gtr/gtr_nrs-p-185.pdf.
11 Ibid.
12 JCS, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, DOD, incorporating change 1, July 12,
2017, p. GL-10, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf?ver=2019-02-11-174350-
967.
13 From discussions with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Also see 10 U.S.C. §117(a).
14 The NMS is a “document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying
military power to attain national security strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance objectives.” The NDS is a document
approved by the Secretary of Defense that “focuses on the Department of Defense’s role in implementing the
President’s National Security Strategy (NSS). It was officially put in place by Congress in Section 941 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), and in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, to
replace the Quadrennial Defense Review.” The NSS is a “document approved by the President of the United States for
developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to
national security.” See DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, DOD, June 2020, at https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf; and also DOD, “National Defense Strategy,” Office of the
Secretary of Defense Historical Office, accessed August 31, 2020, at https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/
National-Defense-Strategy/.
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 Ability indicates that some type of measurement must occur in order to know the
degree to which military forces can, or cannot, meet the demands of assigned
missions (see section “Readiness Metrics and Reporting”).
 Military forces is a commonly used term that is not defined in statute or DOD
doctrine, but generally refers to military units—which are composed of
warfighters (i.e., servicemembers) and their respective weapons systems (see
section “How is Readiness Generated?”).
 Assigned missions are those operational missions a unit may be tasked to
accomplish by a higher authority (see section “Missions, Tasks, and Forces”).15
Together, these words reveal that readiness from a doctrinal perspective is based on knowing the
degree to which a military unit, and collectively all units, can accomplish operational missions.
This inherently requires the military to self-assess, and measure through various means and
methods, the abilities of its forces. With this fundamental concept in mind, more narrow
definitions for readiness (i.e., readiness defined for only one component of what makes military
forces able) can then be understood as contributing (or an input) to the basic framework for
readiness (Figure 1).

15 DOD Directive 7730.65, Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), Incorporating Change 1,
Effective May 31, 2018, p. 10, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/773065p.pdf?
ver=2018-05-31-084047-687.
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Figure 1. Basic Readiness Framework

Source: CRS Graphics.
Notes: Derived from DOD definition of readiness.
This report makes use of DOD’s current definition of readiness to help explain readiness
generation, assessment, and reporting as it exists today. There may be other broad definitions of
readiness that could apply to the military, but those are not examined in this report.
Missions, Tasks, and Forces
The number of assigned missions encompassed within the DOD definition of readiness are
myriad and can change as new adversaries arise or old adversaries take new approaches. An
assigned mission can be conceptualized as “an operational requirement that a unit is formally
assigned to plan for, prepare for, or to execute.”16 These missions are generally received “through
a higher headquarters directive, plan, or order, which normally contains a mission statement and
command guidance or intent.”17 Assigned missions can include both “Named Operations” and
“Top Priority Plans.” These categories of assigned missions are defined by DOD below.

16 Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies, U.S.
Army, April 15, 2010, p. 92, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r220_1.pdf#page=101.
17 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.02B, Force Readiness Reporting, May 31, 2011,
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 Top Priority Plans. “Those designated as “level 4” in the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan” (JSCP), which are in the nature of anticipated missions.18 The
JSCP “provides military strategic and operational guidance from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the Combatant Commanders and the Service
Chiefs for preparation of plans to accomplish tasks and missions using current
military capabilities.”19
 Named Operations. “Those operations designated by the President, Secretary of
Defense, and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (e.g. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)).”20
These are in the nature of actual missions.
Following a mission analysis, a commander will specify which mission essential tasks, or METs,
will be used by a unit to accomplish an assigned mission(s).21 These essential tasks are “specified
or implied task[s] that an organization must perform to accomplish the mission.”22 METs are
typically associated with the “core” mission of the unit—i.e., the function for which the unit was
designed and trained to accomplish. A unit’s core mission is also called its designed mission, and
is the complete set of missions for which the unit was organized or designed to accomplish.23
Missions (both assigned and designed) are generally allocated by specific unit-level within the
command structures of operational forces (also “operating forces”).24 For example, operational
Army units’ missions include the collective missions that must be accomplished by all of the
Army’s organizational echelons from individual companies up through the battalion, brigade,
division, corps, and higher organizational levels.25 At a joint level, missions include those issued
by one or more combatant commanders (CCDRs) to their designated joint force commanders who
employ force elements that can operate within, or across, combatant commands (CCMDs).26

Enclosure C, p. C-18, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/3401_02.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-
175031-670#page=40.
18 Ibid, p. C-18.
19 U.S. Army War College, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),” accessed March 30, 2020, at
https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/documents/jsps/terms/jscp.cfm.
20 Ibid.
21 A MET is defined as “an event in which a unit or organization must be proficient to be capable of accomplishing an
appropriate portion of its wartime mission.” See U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), Commander’s Readiness Handbook,
USMC (April 2017), p. 9, at https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/CCSPW/
Commanders%20Readiness%20Handbook_2017.pdf?ver=2019-01-31-131133-860#page=15.
22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.02B, Force Readiness Reporting, May 31, 2011,
Enclosure C, p. GL-4, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/3401_02.pdf?ver=2016-02-
05-175031-670#page=50
23 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.02B, Force Readiness Reporting, May 31, 2011,
Enclosure C, p. C-18, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/3401_02.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-
175031-670#page=40; also see R. Derek Trunkey, Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting
System, CBO, Working Paper 2013-03 (May 2013), p. 7, at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/44127_DefenseReadiness.pdf#page=10.
24 For more on “operational” and “administrative” military forces, see Mark P. Levitt, The Operational and
Administrative Militaries, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository (2019), at
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2973&context=faculty_scholarship. Also see Army
Regulation (AR) 525-30, which defines for the Army operating forces as “Those forces whose primary missions are to
participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof.”
25 For more information on Army military units and their composition, see DOD’s “Military Units Army” website at
https://www.defense.gov/Experience/Military-Units/Army/#army.
26 A force element can be defined as a “doctrinally organized, distinguishable collection of people, materiel and
equipment, and facilities at a specified level of preparation (readiness) required to accomplish tasks and produce effects
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Separately, but intrinsically linked to the operational forces’ ability to complete their missions,
the military’s administrative (otherwise “institutional”) forces must also be able to accomplish
their distinct missions. For example, the institutional Army is responsible for recruiting,
organizing, supplying, training, and equipping operational forces for employment by Joint Force
commanders.27
Each Service’s administrative units are generally responsible for producing the initial ready
forces of the military (e.g., through Army Initial Entry Training units, Navy and Marine Corps
Recruit Training units and Fleet Replacement Squadrons, and Air Force Basic Military Training
squadrons and Formal Training Units). Administrative units also sustain military forces over time
(e.g., through DOD maintenance depots, Service installations commands, Joint Munitions
Command).28 The operational units in each Service also play a part in generating ready forces.
However, their role is largely to increase or sustain readiness before or after a deployment once
servicemembers are assigned to an operational unit. Operational units sustain and increase their
readiness through a combination of continuous combat training and exercises, field maintenance,
and planning and preparation to be able to rapidly mobilize, deploy, and redeploy.29 In general, it
is the operational units in the military whose levels of readiness are measured and reported in the
DOD’s official readiness reporting system (see section “Readiness Metrics and Reporting”).30
Because context is important to understanding unit readiness, it is helpful to know the general
mission assignments of the military units under discussion. It is also helpful to understand how
the ability or inability to perform those missions relate to a Service’s, or DOD’s, overall
estimation of their ability to accomplish national strategy. At the broadest levels—the readiness of
an entire Service or the military as a whole—achieving this understanding can be a significant
challenge. Accordingly, Congress requires testimony from DOD civilian and military leaders to
help inform its legislative decisions relating to readiness funding and oversight.

within a given time period.” At a Joint operational level, this can include single Service operational formations such as
a carrier strike group (CSG) or a brigade combat team (BCT), or a combination of formations from multiple Services,
such as a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) deployed together with Navy amphibious assault ships. Definition
extracted from Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Paper “Defense Governance & Management, Improving the
Defense Management Capabilities of Foreign Defense Institutions, Using a Relational Database (FOCIS) to Improve
Defense Force Planning and Budgeting, An Overview for Project Leaders,” NS P-5361, March 2017, at
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/d/de/defense-governance—management-improving-the-defense-
management-capabilities-of-foreign-defense-institutions—using-a-relational-database-focis-to-improve-defense-force-
planning-and-budgeting—an-over/p-5361.ashx.
27 For information on what is generally included in the “Institutional Army,” see Chapter Two of “What the Army
Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities” by the RAND Corporation, 2007, at
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG530.html. For information on the “Administrative” Navy, select “Get
Started” under “Military Units: Navy,” at https://www.defense.gov/Experience/Military-Units/Navy/. Also Army
Regulation (AR) 525-30, p. 10.
28 For more information on military organizations that sustain military forces, see CRS In Focus IF11466, Defense
Primer: Department of Defense Maintenance Depots, by G. James Herrera; and CRS In Focus IF11263, Defense
Primer: Military Installations Management, by G. James Herrera.
29 For more information on field maintenance vs. depot maintenance, see Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Sustainment, “Maintenance Overview,” DOD, accessed March 30, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/MPP/
field.html; and also Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, “Depot Maintenance,” DOD,
accessed March 30, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/MPP/depot.html.
30 Administrative units are generally not measured or reported in the DOD’s official readiness reporting system;
however, military leaders do to some degree assess those units’ readiness separately.
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Statutory Responsibilities for Readiness
The Service Secretaries and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (in areas
unique to special operations) have authority and responsibility under Title 10, United States Code
(U.S.C.) to generate and maintain military forces that can “fulfill the current and future
operational requirements of the unified and specified [CCMDs]” (i.e., assigned missions).31 These
include organizing, training, equipping, and mobilizing/demobilizing assigned forces.32 Also
included are responsibilities for recruitment, servicing and supply, maintenance, and the
construction and upkeep of military facilities. National Guard leadership has similar
responsibilities under Titles 10 and 32 U.S.C., and also the additional charge of generating forces
that can perform domestic operations.33
For example, an excerpt from Title 10 U.S.C. applicable to the Secretary of the Navy directs as
follows:
“The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct,
all affairs of the Department of the Navy, including the following functions:
(1) Recruiting
(2) Organizing
(3) Supplying
(4) Equipping (including research and development)
(5) Training
(6) Servicing
(7) Mobilizing
(8) Demobilizing
(9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)
(10) Maintaining
(11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment
(12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities
and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out
the responsibilities specified in this section”34
For each Service, USSOCOM, and the National Guard, select sections of Titles 10 and 32 U.S.C.
relating to general readiness responsibilities are as follows:
 10 U.S.C. §7013. Secretary of the Army.35
 10 U.S.C. §8013. Secretary of the Navy (includes the Marine Corps).36
 10 U.S.C. §9013. Secretary of the Air Force (includes the Space Force).37

31 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1–Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, DOD, March 25,
2013 (Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), p. ii, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/
jp1_ch1.pdf#page=4; and also 10 U.S.C. §7013(c), 10 U.S.C. §8013(c), 10 U.S.C. §9013(c), and 10 U.S.C. §167.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. National Guard leadership includes both civilian and military state leaders, such as Governors and state
Adjutant Generals (called “TAGs”), as well as DOD civilian and military leaders in the Army, Air Force, and National
Guard Bureau (NGB).
34 10 U.S.C. §8013.
35 10 U.S.C. §7013.
36 10 U.S.C. §8013.
37 10 U.S.C. §9013.
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 10 U.S.C. §167. Unified combatant command for special operations forces.38
 10 U.S.C. §10503. Functions of National Guard Bureau: charter.39
 32 U.S.C. §104. Units: location; organization; command40
 32 U.S.C. §501. Training generally.41
 32 U.S.C. §702. Issue of supplies.42
 32 U.S.C. §904. Homeland defense duty.43
These requirements are comprehensive and involve the development of many military capabilities
to meet the various readiness objectives set forth by each responsible military organization. Each
military service—using authorities delegated by its Secretary—develops and manages its own
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and
Policy (DOTMLPF-P) to achieve its Department’s stated objectives and to meet statutory
requirements.44
Branding Readiness: “Organize, Train, and Equip”
For several decades, multiple senior DOD civilian and military leaders have identified certain
Title 10 responsibilities as synonymous with generating readiness. Most frequently cited are the
tasks of organizing, training, and equipping military forces.45 These responsibilities have been
repeatedly described—in official doctrine and memoranda, congressional testimonies, and other
publicly available materials—as fundamental to producing readiness.46 Likewise, several non-
DOD organizations across the defense community have also repeatedly used the phrase
“organize, train, and equip” (or a similar variation) when describing how to build ready forces.47
The repeated branding of readiness in this manner over time has led several leaders in the defense

38 10 U.S.C. §167. Also see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
39 “The National Guard Bureau is responsible for ensuring that units and members of the Army National Guard and the
Air National Guard are trained by the states to provide trained and equipped units to fulfill assigned missions in federal
and non-federal statuses.” See Joint Publication 1, p. xiv, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf#page=16.
40 32 U.S.C. §104.
41 32 U.S.C. §501.
42 32 U.S.C. §702.
43 32 U.S.C. §904.
44 For more on DOTMLPF-P, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02E at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203010.02E.pdf?ver=2017-02-08-173223-657.
45 For a historical example, see Carl H. Builder, Theodore W. Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air
Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts, RAND Corporation, 1995, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR626.html; For a modern example, see Hawk Carlisle, “Unanswered Questions, Concerns Remain About the New
Space Force,” National Defense, January 27, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/1/27/
unanswered-questions-concerns-remain-about-the-new-space-force.
46 Former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, Administrative and Personnel Policies to Enhance Readiness and
Lethality, July 21, 2017, at https://ec.militarytimes.com/static/pdfs/mattismemo.pdf; C. Todd Lopez, “Cybercom Cites
Priorities Key to First-Year Success,” statement of Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Moore Jr., May 14, 2019, at
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1847835/cybercom-cites-priorities-key-to-first-year-success/.
47 David C. Gompert, Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty, RAND
Corporation, Issue Paper IP-250-OSD (2003), p.3, at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2005/
IP250.pdf; Admiral Patrick Walsh, USN (Ret.), “The Changing Battlefield.” George W. Bush Institute, Issue 06 (Spring
2017), at https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/modern-military/patrick-walsh-changing-battlefield.html.
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community to conclude that producing readiness entails simply organizing, training, and
equipping the force.48 Although it is true that these three functions contribute to generating
readiness, the mantra is both an oversimplification of a complex matter and incomplete in terms
of statutory responsibilities. Within DOD and each Service, these three identified Title 10
functions have specific meanings in terms of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution (PPBE) process (see CRS In Focus IF10429, Defense Primer: Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process, by Brendan W. McGarry).49
Accordingly, DOD readiness funding requests to Congress have largely focused on supporting
these three readiness responsibilities through operations and maintenance (O&M) appropriations
(see section “Readiness Funding”).50
What Does It Mean to Organize, Train, and Equip?
Organizing. Generally, arranging military forces into defined units with established command structures and
designated tasks and missions. There is no official DOD definition for this term.
Training. Defined in CJCSI 3500.01J as “instruction and applied exercises for acquiring and retaining knowledge,
skil s, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs) necessary to complete specific tasks.” The Services can also have their own
specific definitions. For example, Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1553.1B defines “training” for the Marine Corps as:
“The conduct of instruction, discipline, or dril ; the building in of information and procedures; and the
progressive repetition of tasks-the product of which is skil development and proficiency.”
Equipping. Generally, providing military forces the military equipment and commercial products needed to be
able to carry out assigned missions. 10 U.S.C. §2228 offers one definition for military equipment: “the term
"military equipment" includes all weapon systems, weapon platforms, vehicles, and munitions of the Department of
Defense, and the components of such items.” The Services can also have their own specific definitions of
equipping, such as in Army Regulation (AR) 525-30 which defines “equipping” for the Army as:
“The Army’s ability to provide equipment to organizations to meet the current and projected documented
requirements, and to meet surge demands in support of the NMS.”
However, several other Title 10 functions can also contribute to producing and sustaining ready
forces. For example, the construction of new buildings or the supplying (separate from equipping)
of military forces, can also contribute to the military’s ability to complete assigned missions.51
Some of these other readiness functions are not funded through O&M appropriations.

48 Carl H. Builder, Theodore W. Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and Lesser
Conflicts, RAND Corporation, 1995, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR626.html;
49 DOD states the PPBE process “supports the objective to provide the DOD with the most effective mix of forces,
equipment, manpower, and support attainable within fiscal constraints.” See DOD Directive 7045.14, The Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, January 25, 2013 (Incorporating Change 1, August 29,
2017), p. 2, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/704514p.pdf?ver=2017-08-29-
132032-353.
50 GAO has stated that O&M appropriations are “directly related to military readiness because they provide funds for
training troops for combat and for maintaining tanks, airplanes, ships, and related equipment. O&M accounts also fund
a wide range of activities that are less directly related to readiness. These include many day-to-day activities such as
civilian personnel management and payments, transportation, health, and child care.” See GAO/T-NSIAD-00-98, p. 1,
at https://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00098t.pdf.
51 Kari Hawkins, “Ensuring Readiness for Strategic Support: Installation Readiness,” Army Materiel Command Public
Affairs, June 5, 2019, at https://www.theredstonerocket.com/military_scene/article_af8344a0-87a2-11e9-a574-
cfd5f6fbde67.html.
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Rebranding for Comprehensiveness
Over the last decade, DOD has begun to change its approach to identifying essential readiness
functions for Congress. That is, DOD has become more inclusive in its descriptions of what is
required to generate readiness.52 This may have been a result of sequestration and the across-the-
board mandatory funding cuts that military leaders say have had a significant impact on readiness
(as well as on modernization).53 It may also be due to increased congressional interest in, and
public exposure of, certain vulnerabilities or cases of mismanagement across DOD that have been
linked to readiness. For example:
 Deteriorating facilities and infrastructure.54
 Mismanagement of family housing.55
 Supply chain vulnerabilities and challenges.56
A third contributing cause may be that the Services, through their own internal readiness studies
and force evaluations, have determined that a more holistic approach to assessing readiness is
needed to address reported low readiness levels and related force issues.57
A Service Example
As a Service example of the expansion of essential functions in the military’s concept of
readiness, the Army recently published a revised AR 525-30. In this regulation, the Army
describes its Strategic Readiness Tenets, or SRTs, which include manning, equipping, sustaining,
training, leading, maintaining installations, and fostering capacities and capabilities.58 The
regulation states that “each readiness tenet contains measureable objectives and qualitative
indicators which provide leading indicators of future changes in readiness.” AR 525-30 further

52 For an example, see Terri Moon Cronk, “Increased Funding Will Improve Military Readiness, Senior Officers Say,”
DOD News, February 15, 2018, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1442908/increased-funding-
will-improve-military-readiness-senior-officers-say/.
53 See for example: Jim Garamone, “Mattis Says DoD Needs Years to Correct Effects of Sequestration,” DOD News,
June 13, 2017, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1213034/mattis-says-dod-needs-years-to-
correct-effects-of-sequestration/; and Senate Hearing 113-173, The Impacts of Sequestration and/or a Full-Year
Continuing Resolution on the Department of Defense, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, February 12, 2013, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113shrg86707/html/CHRG-
113shrg86707.htm.
54 See Claudette Rollo, “Infrastructure Funding Level Poses Risk, Officials Say,” DOD News, March 18, 2015, at
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/604296/infrastructure-funding-level-poses-risk-officials-say/;
also see Jared Serbu, “After years of neglect, military facility upkeep gets attention in 2020 budget,” Federal News
Network, March 19, 2019, at https://federalnewsnetwork.com/dod-reporters-notebook-jared-serbu/2019/03/after-years-
of-neglect-military-facility-upkeep-gets-attention-in-2020-budget/; and DOD Inspector General, Fiscal Year 2020 Top
DOD Management Challenges, DOD, October 15, 2019.
55 See Karen Jowers, “Is anybody tracking health issues from mold and other military housing hazards?” Military
Times, March 19, 2019, at https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/2019/03/20/is-anybody-tracking-health-issues-
from-mold-and-other-military-housing-hazards/; and DOD Inspector General, Fiscal Year 2020 Top DOD
Management Challenges, DOD, October 15, 2019.
56 See DOD Inspector General, Fiscal Year 2020 Top DOD Management Challenges, DOD, October 15, 2019, p. 99;
and GAO, “DOD Supply Chain Management - High Risk Issue,” accessed July 1, 2020, at https://www.gao.gov/
key_issues/dod_supply_chain_management/issue_summary#t=0.
57 Joe Gould, “Military chiefs warn of force-readiness struggles,” Defense News, February 7, 2017, at
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2017/02/07/military-chiefs-warn-of-force-readiness-struggles/.
58 AR 525-30, p. 10, available at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
ARN15118_AR525_30_FINAL.pdf.
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states that “some indicators have relationships with others, either within the tenet, or across two
or more tenets ... [and] ... These relationships are based on the use of ... strategic levers” (see
Table 1).59 Strategic levers are defined as follows:
These are measures the Army can take, upon direction, to mitigate possible readiness
shortfalls.... Such actions include, but are not limited to, changes to policy, resourcing, and
funding.60
Table 1. Army Strategic Readiness Tenets
Leading indicators and strategic levers
Readiness Tenets
Leading Indicators
Strategic Levers
Manning
Personnel Structure
Accessions, retention, and
Acquire
recruitment policy
Employ
Regular Army/RC Manning
Guidance
Retain
Implementation or
cancelation/delay/reduction of
boards
Changes in force structure
Changes in civilian life cycle policies
Equipping
Equipment on Hand (EOH)
Strategic Portfolio Assessment and
Pacing Item Equipment on Hand
Review (SPAR) and POM process
(PI–EOH)
to prioritize limited funding
Equipment Readiness Code-P (ERC-
Relative priority of units as found in
P) Equipment Modernization
the Integrated Requirements
Prioritization List (IRPL)
Changes to Army organization
structure and locations
Sustaining
Maintain Army Readiness
Adjustments to policy and
Project the Force
legislative requirement
Set Theater Sustainment
Budgets or funding levels informed
through the POM/SPAR process
Sustain Unified Land Operations
Force structure adjustments
through the TAA process and
adjustments to AC/RC units
Training
Col ective training
Adjustments to operational tempo
Institutional training
(OPTEMPO) funding
Training support
Adjustments to training
strategies/training support system
Adjustments to policy and doctrine
Adjustments to priorities and
requirements

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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Readiness Tenets
Leading Indicators
Strategic Levers
Leading
Qualification
Adjustments to force structure,
Education
training, education, personnel, and
assignment policies
Experience
Adjustments to resourcing,
priorities, and requirements
Adjustments to individual and
col ective training opportunities,
education opportunities, and
implementation or modifications of
leadership or leader development
programs and initiatives
Installations
Mission readiness
Adjustments to installation policies,
Soldier and Family Readiness
regulations, and doctrine
Installation Capacity
Adjustments to Army facility or
service standards (quantity, quality,
or eligibility parameters)
Adjustments to Facility Investment
Strategy (FIS) and annual Facility
Investment Guidance (FIG)
Project prioritization
PPBE
Funding Allocations and
Reallocations at Mid-Year and End
of Year (Reviews)
Capacity and Capability
War Time Readiness
Adjustments to policy and doctrine
Force Generation
Adjustments to force structure
DODIN–A Readiness
Adjustments to resourcing,
priorities, and requirements
Adjustments to future
modernization, and science and
technology investments
Source: Army Regulation 525-30 (Effective May 9, 2020), pp. 17-18.
As DOD’s readiness discussion expands to include other Title 10 responsibilities, so too does the
designation of what constitutes “readiness funding.” DOD’s perspective has been that O&M
appropriations are the primary form of funding for readiness (see section on “Readiness
Funding”).61 However, DOD and Service officials testifying before Congress are increasingly
citing readiness concerns when requesting non-O&M appropriations (e.g., family housing or
military construction (MILCON) appropriations).62

61 DOD, Department of Defense Fact Sheet: Sequestration’s Impact to Regaining Readiness, DOD (2012), at
https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/DoD_Readiness_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf; Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “House Approps
Chair Promises Pentagon ‘Flexibility’ On O&M Funds,” Breaking Defense, March 7, 2018, at
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/house-approps-chair-promises-pentagon-flexibility-on-om-funds/; DOD, Fiscal
Year (FY) 2020 Annual Performance Plan & FY 2018 Annual Performance Report, FY 2018-FY 2022, DOD (February
22, 2019), p. B-3, at https://cmo.defense.gov/Portals/47/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Performance%20Plan/
FY%202020%20Annual%20Perf%20Plan%20and%20FY%202018%20Annual%20Perf%20Report.pdf?ver=2019-03-
28-155655-073.
62 For an example, see Terri Moon Cronk, “DoD’s Underfunded Maintenance Backlog Exceeds $116 Billion, Official
Says,” DOD News, April 18, 2018, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1497582/dods-
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How is Readiness Generated?
DOD generates readiness by producing and sustaining military forces that are able to fight and
accomplish assigned missions, but what is a military force? The term is not officially defined in
joint doctrine or in statute.63 However, it is generally discussed across the defense community in
terms of military units, which may include both a unit’s personnel (i.e., its “warfighters”) and its
associated major weapons systems (e.g., fighter jets).64 These units typically have a role in
fighting an adversary (i.e., they are part of the operating force), and can be individually or
collectively deployed by CCDRs, depending on the mission(s) to be accomplished (see
“Missions, Tasks, and Forces” section). Though seemingly a straightforward understanding of a
military force, this general characterization leaves some questions. For example, each Service
distinguishes between combat units and noncombat units and these delineations have changed
over time.65 Additionally, as technology advances, these differences can diminish or disappear
altogether.66 This is particularly apparent as unmanned and automated weapons systems begin to
change the roles of warfighters.67
In this report, the term “military force” applies equally to all types of units within the operating
forces of the military. Also, within this report, readiness generation is focused primarily on the
process of producing and sustaining warfighters (i.e., people) rather than weapons systems.68
Weapons systems are treated in this report as dynamic instruments employed by, or with, military
personnel. In other words, weapons systems are inputs to generating readiness. This is not to say
weapons systems are not an important readiness factor for units; they are. However, weapons
systems are produced and maintained separately from warfighters, and their condition and
availability is also measured and reported separately (see section “Readiness Metrics and
Reporting”). It is important to acknowledge that some weapons systems are exceptionally

underfunded-maintenance-backlog-exceeds-116-billion-official-says/.
63 Although what a military force is has not been defined in statute, 18 U.S.C. §2331 does state what a military force is
not in the context of international terrorism: “the term “military force” does not include any person that-(A) has been
designated as a-(i) foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); or (ii) specially designated global terrorist (as such term is defined in section 594.310
of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations) by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury; or (B) has been
determined by the court to not be a “military force”.”
64 Adapted from conversations with the Joint Staff.
65 For example, a recent change to Army branch designations saw Cyber units re-designated from combat support to
combat arms. See Brandon O’Connor “West Point grads get assignments through new branching system,” DOD,
November 18, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/229826/. Note, the term “combat arms” is doctrinally no longer
used by the Army, however, it is still used in Army regulations and in public discourse. See Army Field Manual (FM)
3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Vol. 1, March 22, 2013, p. xi, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/
web/fm3_90_1.pdf.
66 For a related commentary, see Lieutenant Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, “Combat Service Support and Combat
Arms: Avoiding a Cultural Chasm,” U.S. Army War College, at https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct00/MS538.htm.
67 See Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (W.W. Norton & Company, New
York), April 24, 2018.
68 DOD defines a “weapon system” as “A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials,
services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.” See Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations, DOD, January 17, 2017 (Incorporating Change 1, October 22,
2018), p. GL-17, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-
910#page=221. The DOD definition combines the material with the non-material by incorporating the human operator.
This allows for DOD to designate an infantry squad as a “weapons system” in the same manner as an F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter is considered a weapon system. CRS is not making a determination as to the validity of this definition, but
rather has chosen to separate the human from the material in order to simplify the readiness generation process.
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important to the readiness of certain unit types (e.g., the availability of aircraft for aviation units
or ships for surface fleets). Thus, when measuring and assessing overall unit readiness, it is useful
to assess units holistically, including all the elements that contribute to the unit’s capabilities.
Producing and Sustaining Ready Forces
Each of the Services is responsible for producing and sustaining ready military forces for use by
joint force commanders. They accomplish this by using the administrative organizations in each
Military Department and the operational units in each Service that must continuously build upon
existing readiness.69 Although the specific requirements to produce ready forces in each Service
are different, the basic concept of readiness production can be described across all the Services
using the analogy of a production line (Figure 2). This production line begins with untrained
personnel and ends with a final product that is a capable military force (i.e., a military unit) in the
form of ready warfighters. This linear “readiness production process” can be broken into three
fundamental parts: (1) building initial readiness, (2) increasing readiness, and (3) sustaining
readiness.
Figure 2. Unit Readiness Production Process

Source: CRS graphic based on DOD interviews and reference material.

69 Each Service has different ways in which it distinguishes its operating forces from its institutional (otherwise
administrative or generating forces), but in terms of readiness production, both types of forces are essential to
producing and sustaining military readiness.
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1. Building initial readiness. The process begins by receiving untrained personnel
(i.e. recruits) and providing them with some degree of entry-level training. These
recruits must be properly resourced to complete their accession.70 Likewise, the
administrative units providing this training must also be properly resourced in
order to provide adequate training. In due course, recruits are tested to ensure
proficiency in the basic requirements of their profession. If they pass, they
continue along the production line. If they do not pass, depending on the
circumstance, some may be recycled—meaning they will have another
opportunity to train, test, and pass.
2. Increasing readiness. Personnel who have completed their entry-level training
must then receive advanced training from additional training units. At some
point, recruits who complete their advanced training will be awarded an
occupational specialty, and become fully qualified to join operational units.71
Next, the service’s operational forces assume the responsibility of producing
ready forces (i.e., producing ready units). Operational units integrate new
personnel and provide them—along with existing unit personnel—unit-specific
training that increases both individual and total unit readiness.72 Operational units
will test their warfighters’ proficiency regularly (both as individuals and
collectively) to ensure units are maintaining or increasing their readiness.73 It is
important to remember that in order to produce ready forces, each unit in the
production line—be it an administrative unit or an operational unit—must be
properly resourced in order to be able to perform their functions.
3. Sustaining readiness: preserving or strengthening the ability to complete
assigned missions.74 After operational units have achieved a determined level of

70 Resourcing in this context is broad, and includes all material goods and supplies (e.g., food, clothing, and
ammunition), equipment (including weapons systems), infrastructure (e.g., training ranges, dining facilities, and living
quarters), and the personnel necessary to provide adequate training.
71 The amount of advanced training a person receives from administrative training units is typically associated with the
specific military profession the person is entering, the role the person will play in their operational unit (e.g.,
commissioned officer, warrant officer, enlisted person), and the specific Service the person is in. For example, an Air
Force fighter pilot (a commissioned officer) may go through multiple training units to become fully qualified in their
profession before entering an operational unit, and it may take on average 2-5 years to complete this training,
depending on the type of aircraft. Conversely, an enlisted Army infantry soldier might go through a single training unit
that combines initial entry training with advanced individual training to become qualified as an infantryman. It takes
typically 22 weeks to become qualified as an enlisted Army infantryman. See Thomas Brading, “22-week infantry
OSUT set to increase lethality, with more career fields to follow,” Army News Service, November 5, 2019, at
https://www.army.mil/article/229272/
22_week_infantry_osut_set_to_increase_lethality_with_more_career_fields_to_follow.
72 Ideally, the integration of new personnel into operational units serves to increase the total readiness of a unit as they
become trained to higher degrees of proficiency. However, there must be maintained a careful balance between the
absorption and attrition of unit personnel into a unit.
73 Similar to other performance tests, the degree to which proficiency is tested reflects how much of a change in
readiness has occurred from an established baseline. In other words, if you train a military force, and then test and pass
that force at a minimum requirements level, you’ll get a force that is qualified to deploy, but perhaps only ready to
deploy and perform at a minimum level. Conversely, if you increase the level of training for a military force, making it
more multifaceted and greater in scope, and then test and pass that force at a higher degree of difficulty, that military
force will have a higher level of readiness to perform assigned missions. In the end, the mission requirements may be
the same for all similar operational units, but the manner in which the mission is executed will likely be more effective.
74 The Army provides a definition for “sustainable readiness,” which is closely related to the concept of “sustaining
readiness” described in this report. The Army defines sustainable readiness as: “The building and preservation of the
highest possible overall unit and strategic readiness posture for the Army over time, given the resources available, so
that the Army is ready to meet known and emergent operational demands, while being optimally postured to meet
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readiness, they are then considered “ready units.”75 That is, the warfighters and
their operational units are qualified and properly resourced to be able to deploy
and perform assigned missions. We are now at the end of a single production line.
However, across the military several production lines operate simultaneously, and
some units complete the production process faster than others. This is important
to joint force commanders, both in terms of the availability of operational units
for deployments (i.e., are all the units of a desired force element ready to deploy
at a given time?), and the need to sustain readiness until operational units are
called upon to perform their assigned missions. For those ready units that have
completed the production process but are not scheduled to deploy, their next step
is to maintain the readiness they have achieved.76 This can be interpreted as
reentering the production line as a whole or in parts, to receive further training
and testing, thus preserving or enhancing the unit’s capabilities until called upon
to deploy for an assigned mission.77 Unit commanders must consider several
aspects of unit readiness once a unit has completed the production process. For
example, how much absorption and attrition has the unit experienced? If a unit
has deployed, for how long, and how much readiness has it “consumed” or
“expended”? Is the unit being directed to change its organization and mission
(e.g., transitioning from an Armored Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade
Combat Team)? These factors inform unit commanders of how much training and
testing is necessary to sustain unit readiness.
Sustaining ready forces, like the production of ready forces, involves several DOD organizations
and stakeholders (see Appendix A). This includes the warfighters themselves, who are
individually and collectively responsible for maintaining and increasing their own readiness,
whether through improved performance, staying healthy and fit, or maintaining their equipment.78
A production line is just one simplified way of illustrating how ready forces are produced (for an
alternative illustration, see Appendix B).
Expending Readiness
In the defense community, the deployment of military forces to accomplish assigned missions is
often viewed as the expenditure of readiness.79 What is commonly understood across the military

contingency surge demand.” See Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, Force Generation – Sustainable Readiness, U.S.
Army, October 1, 2019, p. 72, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
ARN9412_AR525_29_FINAL.pdf#page=78.
75 The exact requirements to be considered “ready” depend on the specific operational unit, its design, its training and
resourcing requirements, and other requirements that may be mission-specific.
76 Many operational units do not regularly deploy, thus they are in a constant process of preparation to sustain and
enhance their readiness.
77 Alternatively, one could view the readiness production line as only ending when a unit deploys, and upon a unit’s
redeployment, deployed forces would reenter the production line once again to regenerate unit readiness.
78 See Col. Ron Rondeau, “Medical readiness is an individual responsibility,” U.S. Air Force, May 18, 2009, at
https://www.march.afrc.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/168833/medical-readiness-is-an-individual-
responsibility/.
79 For an example, see Kathleen H. Hicks, Heather A. Conley, Lisa Sawyer, Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force
Posture in Europe: Phase II Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2016), p. 53, at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
160712_Samp_ArmyForcePostureEurope_Web.pdf#page=65.
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is that certain skills are perishable and health and wellness—both physical and mental—can
decrease over time; thus, they must be regularly maintained. When a unit deploys, the ability to
maintain these skills and health and wellness conditions can become extremely difficult,
particularly when the assigned mission is in an austere environment and/or requires constant
operational activity. Examples of skills and health and wellness conditions that can perish over
time include weapons proficiency (i.e., marksmanship), physical fitness (including nutritional
health), and mental health resilience (i.e., “psychological health” and “behavioral health”).80
When operational units return from a deployment, some degree of readiness has been consumed,
or otherwise expended, thus operational units must reenter the production line in order to
regenerate lost readiness.81 Exact levels of readiness consumption are difficult to determine.
However, it is generally established that lengthy military deployments involving high operational
tempos (OPTEMPOs) consume a greater amount of readiness than shorter deployments with
lower OPTEMPOs, though some noncombat deployments may not follow this OPTEMPO
principle if training for assigned missions is incorporated into the deployment.82
Readiness Metrics and Reporting
The Services and USSOCOM report the readiness of military units—operational units and, to a
certain extent, administrative units—to DOD senior leaders using two interrelated systems:
 The Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRSS).
 The Chairman’s Readiness System (the CRS).
These two systems report the capability of the armed forces to complete missions necessary to
execute national strategy (See section “DOD’s Definition of Readiness”).83 Generally, this
includes assessing the resources of units and their ability to complete essential tasks, whether as
an individual unit (e.g., an Army company, Air Force squadron, or Navy submarine squadron),
Service, CCMD, or other DOD component/agency, or a combination thereof.84 Each Service,

80 The term “mental health” used in this report is synonymous with the DOD terms “behavioral health” and
“psychological health.” For more on psychological health, see DOD Instruction 6490.05, Maintenance of
Psychological Health in Military Operations, Incorporating Change 2, Effective May 29, 2020, at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/649005p.pdf.
81 In this report, readiness regeneration has been included within “Part 3 – Sustaining readiness” of the readiness
production process.
82 GAO states that OPTEMPO “refers to the rate at which military units are involved in all military activities, including
contingency operations, exercises, and training deployments.” See GAO, Military Readiness: Clear Policy and
Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home, GAO-18-253, April 2018,
p. 2-3, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691459.pdf#page=6; also Laura J. Junor, Managing Military Readiness,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, February 2017, pgs. 42-43, at
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-23.pdf; and Kathleen H.
Hicks, Heather A. Conley, Lisa Sawyer, Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Europe: Phase II Report,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 53, at https://csis-
website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160712_Samp_ArmyForcePostureEurope_Web.pdf#page=65.
Kathleen H. Hicks, Heather A. Conley, Lisa Sawyer, Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Europe: Phase II
Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 53, at
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160712_Samp_ArmyForcePostureEurope_Web.pdf#page=
65; also see Mark F. Cancian and Seamus P. Daniels, “The State of Military Readiness: Is There a Crisis?,” CSIS, April
18, 2018, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-military-readiness-there-crisis.
83 CJCS Guide 3401D.
84 DOD defines an essential task as a “specified or implied task an organization must perform to accomplish the
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CCMD, or other DOD component can use additional assessment processes and systems to help
determine readiness at different management levels (e.g., strategic vs. operational vs. tactical/unit
readiness), and to help inform DRRS and the CRS.85 However, DOD has only one authoritative
readiness reporting system—DRRS—and one Joint Force readiness assessment system—the
CRS—that together provide DOD leaders the necessary information to determine overall defense
readiness.
In general, DRRS is built for all DOD components to assess and report unit readiness (i.e., “unit
reporting”). The CRS was built for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and is
focused on assessing and reporting the readiness of the Joint Force, which includes at a minimum
considering unit, operational, and strategic readiness assessments jointly.86
Within these systems, not all units in the military assess and report their readiness to the same
degree. In terms of readiness reporting, DOD uses two categories: registered units and measured
units. Only those designated a measured unit are assessed and report their readiness in DRRS.87
Registered Units.
At a minimum, all units and organizations that are assigned in the “Forces For Unified
Commands” document or have the potential to support, by deployment or otherwise, a
directed Operation Plan (OPLAN), Concept Plan (CONPLAN), contingency operation,
homeland security operation, or provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) will
be registered. This includes units such as Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine
Expeditionary Units, Brigades, Battalions, Regiments, Ships, Squadrons, Groups, Wings,
Regional HQs, Bases, Stations, Installations, Hospitals, Training Units, and Schools. The
Navy will register Coast Guard units. The Joint Staff and [combatant commands] will
register selected joint units not having a Service affiliation organized under an approved
joint manning document.88
Measured Units.
All combat, combat support, combat service support units of the operating forces, including
Active, National Guard, and Reserve and units apportioned to or allocated in support of an
OPLAN, CONPLAN, Service war planning document, Named Operation, or Forces For
Unified Commands are designated as measured units. Provisional, task-organized and “ad
hoc” combat, combat support, and combat service support units of each Service and
[combatant command] are also measured units. Measured units will provide capability
assessments to DRRS-S and their status of training and resources in ... DRRS-S.89
DRRS and the CRS employ separate assessment processes consisting of multiple readiness
assessments that employ a variety of measures and metrics to determine outputs (i.e., “readiness

mission.” See DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 76.
85 For an example, see AR 525-30.
86 CJCS Guide 3401D states “Readiness from the strategic perspective focuses on the ability of the joint force to
perform missions and provide capabilities to achieve strategic objectives as identified in strategic level documents....
Assessing strategic readiness requires a global perspective to account for demands between regional and functional
responsibilities.” DOD defines the joint force as “A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more
Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.” See DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, p. 116, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf#page=122.
87 The Services may also establish their own additional categories of reporting that include a portion of the full
reporting requirements. For an example, see AR 220-1, p. 1.
88 CJCS Guide 3401D.
89 CJCS Guide 3401D.
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levels”).90 Some of these measures and metrics are integral to these system’s assessments and are
used together with a commander’s judgment of a unit’s ability to complete essential tasks to
determine outputs. There can also be “stand-alone” metrics or measures that may be formally
reported through an assessment system (e.g., part of a DRRS assessment), but also reported
separately from the assessment process due to their importance to unit commanders and senior
DOD leaders. Stand-alone metrics and measures may affect commanders’ assessment decisions,
and can be included in official readiness reports to DOD and Congress. Two common stand-alone
metrics used to assess unit readiness are Mission Capable (MC) rates and Aircraft Availability
(AA) rates. These are maintenance metrics used to assess certain military weapons systems’
availability (see section “Mission Capable (MC) and Aircraft Availability (AA) Rates”).

What Is a Measure? What Is a Metric?
Measure. Generally, an amount derived from taking a measurement (e.g., 10 grams, 100 degrees, and 1000 miles).
Individual Services may also have their own specific definition or variant of a definition for a “measure” or
“measurement.” For example, Army Regulation (AR) 525-30 defines a measurement as: “A status assessment that
is objective because it is calculated from authoritative data.”
Metric. A derivative of two or more measures generally expressed as a ratio or percentage (e.g., 12/15, 83%, 1:5)
Individual Services may also have their own specific definition or variant of a definition for “metric.” For example,
AR 525-30 defines a metric as: “A quantitative, objective, or empirical data point that supports a standard of
measurement.”

Sections 117, 153, and 193 of Title 10 U.S.C. require that DOD uniformly establish these
readiness systems across the Services, Joint Staff, and combatant commands, and provide to
Congress “a report regarding the military readiness of the active and reserve components” each
calendar quarter.91 This report to Congress is known as the Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress, or QRRC (see section “The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)”). In
addition to the QRRC, Congress may also receive ad hoc readiness reports and briefings from
DOD and the Services.92
The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
Title 10 U.S.C. §117 requires the Secretary of Defense to “establish a comprehensive readiness
reporting system” for DOD that will:
measure in an objective, accurate, and timely manner the capability of the armed forces to
carry out-(1) the National Security Strategy prescribed by the President in the most recent
annual national security strategy report under section 108 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043); (2) the defense planning guidance provided by the Secretary of
Defense pursuant to section 113(g) of this title; and (3) the National Military Strategy
prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.93

90 Outputs from DRRS do inform assessments that are part of the CRS, thus DRRS is viewed as part of the CRS from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff perspective. See CJCS Guide 3401D, p. 7.
91 10 U.S.C. §117; 10 U.S.C. §153; 10 U.S.C. §193; 10 U.S.C. §482.
92 R. Derek Trunkey, Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, CBO (May 2013), p. 13,
at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44127_DefenseReadiness.pdf#page=16.
93 10 U.S.C. §117.
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Another statutory requirement is that the reporting system be a “single authoritative readiness
reporting system for the Department, and that there shall be no military service specific
systems.”94
DOD meets these requirements through the Defense Readiness Reporting System, or DRRS.
DRRS represents a single authoritative readiness reporting system for DOD, but the term is also
commonly used to refer to one or more DRRS-related components, including Service-specific
data input and reporting systems (i.e., DRRS Service “variants” also called “increments”95),
DRRS-related web-based services, and associated DRRS readiness assessments. DRRS can then
be viewed as a “family of systems” and assessments that form a “DRRS Enterprise.” Each of
these DRRS components connect in the form of a single, secure, web-based information system
called DRRS Strategic, or DRRS-S (see Figure 3). DRRS-S provides a centralized electronic
reporting system for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and other
senior DOD officials.
DOD states DRRS-S is a “top level collection of approved hardware and software components
culminating in a web-based user interface. It provides the only strategic tool able to access
readiness data and information across the DRRS Enterprise.”96

94 Ibid.
95 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2015 Annual Report, January 2016, p. 31.
96 DOD, DRRS Primer for Senior Leaders, OUSD(P&R), 2011, Appendix A, p. 33, at
http://www.highgroundconsulting.net/uploads/3/0/0/4/3004662/drrs_psl_final_-_4_mar_11.pdf#page=41.
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Figure 3. DRRS Enterprise and DRRS-S

Source: DOD, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) FY 2016 Annual Report, The office of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, December 2016, p. 37, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/
reports/FY2016/dod/2016drrs.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-105334-057.
DRRS-S operates on DOD’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and receives
and processes readiness reports and data from several sources.97 These include the Service-
specific variants of DRRS, which are DRRS-A (Army), DRRS-N (Navy), and DRRS-MC
(Marine Corps).98 Air Force units, CCDRs and their subordinate units, and other DOD
components report directly to DRRS-S.99 Additionally, the Air Force uses the Air Force Input
Tool (AF-IT) to report certain data to DRRS-S.100 Figure 4 provides a simplified illustration of
the various readiness data sources to DRRS-S (the Service variants of DRRS-S, the AF-IT, Joint
data sources, etc.) from both a “command-level” (i.e., warfighter rank) and associated
“management level” (i.e., tactical, operational, strategic) perspective.

97 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2015 Annual Report, January 2016, p. 31.
98 DOD changed its original DRRS implementation plan “to accommodate the Services’ desire to identify and correct
reporting errors and problems of interpretation within their own systems before transmitting their data to the central
system” (i.e., DRRS-S). These changes included each Service maintaining its own version of DRRS. See R. Derek
Trunkey, Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, CBO, Working Paper 2013-03 (May
2013), p. 7, at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44127_DefenseReadiness.pdf#page=10.
99 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2015 Annual Report, January 2016, p. 31.
100 AF-IT is not considered a variant of DRRS-S.
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Figure 4. DRRS-S Data Sources and Command Levels

Source: DRRS Primer for Senior Leaders, OUSD(P&R), 2011.
In general, the DRRS Enterprise and its integrated readiness assessments (hereafter referred to as
“DRRS” in the singular) comprise a single comprehensive reporting system that allows unit
commanders to assess and report the readiness of their units to perform both their designed and
assigned missions (see section “Missions, Tasks, and Forces”). For more detailed information on
DRRS, to include readiness assessments, metrics, and unit ratings, see Appendix C.
The Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS)
The CRS is a system that allows the CJCS and the Joint Staff to assess and determine the
readiness of the Joint Force. According to CJCS Guide 3401D:
The CRS “provides a common framework for conducting commanders’ readiness
assessments, blending unit-level readiness indicators with combatant command, Service,
and Combat Support Agency (CSA) (collectively known as the C/S/As) subjective
assessments of their ability to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS) ... [T]he CRS
provides the C/S/As a readiness reporting system measuring their ability to integrate and
synchronize combat and support units into an effective joint force ready to accomplish
assigned missions.”101
To determine Joint Force readiness, the CJCS and Joint Staff assess readiness from at least three
different perspectives: (1) strategic readiness, (2) operational readiness, and (3) tactical or unit
readiness.102 There can be additional perspectives of readiness, however these three are the ones
currently associated with the CRS in CJCS Guide 3401D.103 Each of these draws on outputs from

101 CJCS Guide 3401D.
102 Additional information on these perspectives can be found in CJCS Guide 3401D.
103 Examples of the pervasiveness of these three perspectives can also be seen in AR 525-30, Military Operations -
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DRRS and other readiness assessments. The CRS uses a combination of these outputs as the basis
for three strategic-level assessments that are collectively called the Joint Combat Capability
Assessment (JCCA). As the INSS states, the “JCCA is not a reporting system; rather, it is a
collection of near-term analyses depicting the force’s ability to execute required priority plans.”104
The JCCA is composed of the following three assessments.
 The Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR).
 Plan Assessments.
 Readiness Deficiency Assessment (RDA).
The JCCA also includes a readiness report that is used as an input to the QRRC.105 The 2017
INSS report provides the following general descriptions for each JCCA assessment:
JFFR.
The JFRR is conducted quarterly and combines readiness input from a variety of
perspectives including individual units, CCDRs, the military Services, and combat support
agencies to assess the DOD ability to conduct missions corresponding to the National
Military Strategy (NMS).106
Plan Assessments.
Plan assessments are comprehensive evaluations of the DOD ability to successfully execute
a specific contingency plan or a set of bundled plans. The assessment includes evaluations
of force flow and the likelihood of meeting objectives and timelines. Plan assessments ...
are only done on a quarterly basis. They may be done out of cycle to assess the risk of a
plan that is deemed likely to be executed. The product of these assessments is a detailed
narrative of the ability to execute the plan, including details of likely problems, potential
failures, consequences, and mitigation discussions.107
RDA.
The Joint Staff submits the RDA each year as a culminating assessment of the impact of
reported deficiencies on the ability to conduct the NMS. The RDA includes a strategic
assessment that focuses on readiness trends in each of the Joint Capability Areas.108 It also

Army Strategic and Operational Readiness, April 9, 2020, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/
web/ARN15118_AR525_30_FINAL.pdf; and U.S. Navy, Strategic Readiness Review, Department of the Navy, 2017,
at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=806464; and also the following news article from Senior Airman Vernon R.
Walter III, “Cannon AFB Assessed on Operational Readiness,” U.S. Air Force, 27th Special Operations Wing Public
Affairs, November 27, 2019, at https://www.cannon.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2028768/cannon-afb-
assessed-on-operational-readiness/.
104 Laura J. Junor, Managing Military Readiness, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
February 2017, p. 33, at https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-
23.pdf.
105 Details regarding the current methodologies and inputs of some JCCA assessments are not publicly available. The
only official unclassified CJCS publications regarding the JCCA—CJCS Guide 3401D and CJCSI 3401.01E—were
first published in 2010 and last made current in 2013 and 2014 respectively. The Joint Staff has indicated that certain
JCCA assessments and CRS processes contained within these publications have since changed. For example, Readiness
Assessment (RA) levels used in the CRS to synthesize METL assessments, plan assessments, and readiness
deficiencies were scheduled to be eliminated from the CRS, therefore they are not included in this report. See CJCS
Guide 3401D. From the author’s interviews with the Joint Staff.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Joint Capability Areas, or JCAs, are “Collections of like DOD capabilities functionally grouped to support
capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability requirements portfolio management,
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includes an operational assessment that considers the consequences of CCDR/combat
support agency deficiencies on top-priority plans, named operations, and mission
assignments.109
The JFRR is not only a part of the CRS, but is also a written report required to be submitted to
Congress every first and third calendar quarter. Additional requirements for the JFFR can be
found in 10 U.S.C. §482.
SEMI-ANNUAL JOINT FORCE READINESS REVIEW.-(1) Not later than 30 days after
the last day of the first and third quarter of each calendar year, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall submit to Congress a written report on the capability of the armed
forces, the combat support and related agencies, operational contract support, and the
geographic and functional combatant commands to execute their wartime missions based
upon their posture and readiness as of the time the review is conducted.110
The process for how JCCA inputs and unit reporting assessment outputs are collectively used to
determine overall readiness of the Joint Force can be found in CJCSI 3401.01E. The general
framework for the CRS has been illustrated by DOD and can be found in Figure 5.
Figure 5. DOD Depiction of the CRS
Relevant Publications and Assessments

Source: CJCSI 3401.01E (current as of May 19, 2014) and CJCS Guide 3401D (current as of November 25,
2013).

and capabilities-based force development and operational planning.” See CJCSI 5123.01H, Charter of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS), August 31, 2018, p. E-1, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/
CJCSI%205123.01H.pdf?ver=2018-10-26-163922-137#page=89.
109 Ibid.
110 10 U.S.C. §482.
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Mission Capable (MC) and Aircraft Availability (AA) Rates
Two “stand-alone” readiness metrics frequently used by DOD for major weapons systems are
Mission Capable (MC) rates and Aircraft Availability (AA) rates, which assess the availability of
certain major weapons systems to perform assigned missions. A discussion on these metrics is
included in this report because they are often cited independently in official readiness reports and
in the media.111 These readiness metrics can also be frequently characterized in the media as a
measure of the overall readiness of a unit that relies upon a major weapons system. This can be
sometimes misinterpreted as representing the overall readiness of all units that rely upon the same
weapons system (e.g., the readiness of all aviation units in a Service using the same aircraft). 112
Such a narrow explanation of unit readiness omits other key readiness elements. For example, an
aviation unit may report a high MC rate (e.g., 90% MC rate) for their fighter aircraft, but lack a
certain number of qualified pilots, maintenance personnel, or equipment necessary to carry out an
assigned mission. In this example a high MC rate is not a good indicator of the unit’s readiness.
In a 2019 Air Force Magazine interview, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein stated:
The fastest way for me as chief and for us as the Air Force to increase the MC rate is to
stop flying ... If I gave that airplane to maintenance, bought them the parts, they’re going
to get that MC rate high. But I’m not going to have people trained, I’m not going to have
folks airborne, so my overall performance is going to go down.113
The Air Force Magazine article also reported:
Pentagon leaders want to move away from using MC rates as a major readiness metric.
Their argument: there’s more to getting a fleet ready for combat than simply knowing how
many fighters can fly on a given day.114
Although not a substitute for more comprehensive readiness assessments, these two metrics still
provide useful insights into the readiness of certain units; thus, it is important to understand how
they differ. The two metrics are broadly defined as follows.
 MC rate. Definitions or formulas for the rate may vary by Service. However, one
commonly accepted definition is the ratio of “uptime” to “uptime plus
downtime:”115
𝑀𝐶 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

111 These metrics are also included in existing DOD readiness assessments (e.g. MC rates are part of determining R-
levels in DRRS). DOD, MV-22 Squadrons Could Improve Reporting of Mission Capability Rates and Readiness
(Report No. DODIG-20 14-00 I) (U), DOD Inspector General, Report No. DODIG-2014-001, October 23, 2013, p. 3,
at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/12/2001965081/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2014-001%20(REDACTED).PDF#page=10.
112 For an example, see https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/07/26/aircraft-mission-capable-rates-
hit-new-low-in-air-force-despite-efforts-to-improve/.
113 Brian W. Everstine, “USAF Wants to Find New Ways to Discuss Fleet Readiness,” Air Force Magazine, September
25, 2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/usaf-wants-to-find-new-ways-to-discuss-fleet-readiness/.
114 Ibid.
115 Roy Rice, “Downtime per Flying Hour as a Metric for Aircraft Availability: An Alternative to Mission Capable
Rate,” Phalanx, Military Operations Research Society (MORS), Vol. 52, No. 2 (June 2019), pp. 64-67 (4 pages), at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26727134?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
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“Uptime” includes the time that a weapons system is operating at a unit or location and
the time it is inactive, but still available to be operated by a unit.116 “Uptime plus
downtime” can be considered the total time that a unit possesses a weapons system.117
Another common way of expressing this rate is in terms of hours:118
𝑀𝐶 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
 AA rate. This readiness metric applies to military aviation units, mainly in the
Air Force, and has been used as an alternative for, or in addition to, the MC rate.
It is the ratio of mission capable hours to total aircraft inventory (TAI) hours. TAI
hours differ from a unit’s total possessed hours. This difference is based largely
on the inclusion of aircraft categorized as non-available (i.e., in a certain status
that takes the aircraft out of a unit’s possession) in the summation of TAI hours.
The AA rate is a metric that can be applied to the entire fleet of like aircraft at a
unit, a specific location, for an aggregated fleet type (e.g., bombers, fighters), or
for an entire Service, at a given time.
𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝐴𝐼 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
This example from an Air Force research report illustrates the differences between the two rates
(i.e., the differences in denominators).
Base X has 20 TAI, three of those aircraft are at depot getting repaired, and two are in
depot status awaiting engineer advice on a fix at the local base (i.e., five aircraft are not
possessed by the base). In addition, one aircraft is in phase for regular maintenance and
two are in scheduled time changes (i.e., they need work but are still possessed by the base).
The AA for this base is 15/20 or 75% and the MC rate is 12/15 or 80%.” This example
gives a good idea of how these statistics can differ. USAF leadership for war planning does
not care if the base is 80% MC if they only have 15 aircraft available and 18 are needed
for a real world tasking.119
The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)
Title 10 U.S.C. §482 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a readiness report
for the Total Force not later than 30 days after the end of each second and fourth calendar
quarter.120 The statute also requires the Secretary of Defense to provide Congress a briefing

116 Ibid.
117 Possessed by a unit means the major weapons system is not in a “depot status” (i.e., needing repairs, replacements,
supplies, or other maintenance the unit itself cannot provide) and is capable of performing at least one assigned
mission. See Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005, Hearing Before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 108th Congress, Second Session on S.2400, Part 3 Readiness and
Management Support, p. 49.
118 Lt Col Jeff Meserve, “USAF Maintenance Metrics: Looking Forward with Aircraft Availability (AA),”
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 2007, at https://www.sae.org/events/dod/presentations/2007LtColJeffMeserve.pdf.
119 Ibid., p. 3.
120 The term “Total Force” refers to both the Active Components (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) of the armed
forces (together AC/RC). See The Reserve Forces Policy Board, Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard
and Reserves, RFPB Report FY17-01, November 1, 2016 at https://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents/
Improving%20the%20Total%20Force%20using%20the%20National%20Guard%20and%20Reserves_1%20November
%202016.pdf?ver=2016-11-17-142718-243; and D.H. Gurney, “Validating the Total Force: Executive Summary,”
Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, at https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-
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regarding the military readiness of the Total Force not later than 30 days after the end of each first
and third calendar quarter.121 These congressional briefings are intended to provide updates to the
submitted readiness reports from the previous quarter. There are 10 elements required to be
included in these readiness reports and briefings to Congress:
“(1) A description of each readiness problem or deficiency that affects the ground, sea, air,
space, cyber, or special operations forces, and any other area determined appropriate by
the Secretary of Defense.
(2) The key contributing factors, indicators, and other relevant information related to each
identified problem or deficiency.
(3) The short-term mitigation strategy the Department will employ to address each
readiness problem or deficiency until a resolution is in place, as well as the timeline, cost,
and any legislative remedies required to support the resolution.
(4) A summary of combat readiness ratings for the key force elements assessed, including
specific information on personnel, supply, equipment, and training problems or
deficiencies that affect the combat readiness ratings for each force element.
(5) A summary of each upgrade or downgrade of the combat readiness of a unit that was
issued by the commander of the unit, together with the rationale of the commander for the
issuance of such upgrade or downgrade.
(6) A summary of the readiness of supporting capabilities, including infrastructure,
prepositioned equipment and supplies, and mobility assets, and other supporting logistics
capabilities.
(7) A summary of the readiness of the combat support and related agencies, any readiness
problem or deficiency affecting any mission essential tasks of any such agency, and actions
recommended to address any such problem or deficiency.
(8) A list of all Class A, Class B, and Class C mishaps that occurred in operations related
to combat support and training events involving aviation, ground, or naval platforms,
weapons, space, or Government vehicles, as defined by Department of Defense Instruction
6055.07, or a successor instruction.
(9) Information on the extent to which units of the armed forces have removed serviceable
parts, supplies, or equipment from one vehicle, vessel, or aircraft in order to render a
different vehicle, vessel, or aircraft operational.
(10) Such other information as determined necessary or appropriate by the Secretary of
Defense.”122
These readiness reports and briefings have been both individually and collectively referred to as
the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, or QRRC.123 The purpose of each QRRC is to help

43.pdf#page=16.
121 10 U.S.C. §482.
122 Ibid.
123 Occasionally, the phrase “Quarterly Readiness Review to Congress” has also been used by DOD as an alternate
labeling of the “Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress.” Neither expounded variation of the acronym QRRC has been
established in statute, rather, they are terms of reference set by DOD. See for example Department of Defense, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview, United States
Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, February 2020 (Revised May 13, 2020), p. 3-1, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf#page=30; and also Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jonathan
Woodson, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Surgeons General of the Military Departments,
Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, June 11, 2015, p. 6, at
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Congress maintain proper oversight of DOD by tracking readiness levels to determine if the
military is properly funded.124
The DASD(FR) describes the content of quarterly reports as follows:
The January-March and July-September QRRCs will include the standard readiness format
(e.g., mission assessments and top concerns) while the April-June and October-December
QRRCs will focus on mitigation efforts being employed to generate improved
readiness.”125
The second and fourth quarterly reports are sometimes referred to as the semi-annual mitigation
QRRC.126 According to the Army, each QRRC is a comprehensive report that “consists of CCDR,
Service, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) readiness assessments.”127 The QRRC can
be hundreds of pages long and include several assessment summaries with multiple annexes
containing both unit and joint force readiness outputs.128 DOD also states that the QRRC
“contains several unique subsections not found in other readiness assessments addressing the risk
of dependence on contractor support and major exercises.”129 Many sections of the QRRC are
formed from classified Service and joint force readiness data held on secure DOD networks,
making the QRRC itself a largely classified report.130 As an example of more Service-specific
inputs to the QRRC, AR 525-30 states:
Army input to the QRRC includes the following readiness indicators: Personnel Strength;
Personnel Turbulence; Other Personnel Matters (accessions and recruiting quality
benchmarks); Training (to include Unit Readiness and Proficiency); Logistics (Equipment

https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/testimony/Documents/2015/June%202015/061115ediger.pdf#page=6.
124 Leon Panetta et al., The Building Blocks of a Ready Military: People, Funding, Tempo, Bipartisan Policy Center,
January 2017, p. 8, at https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Defense-Military-Readiness.pdf.
125 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness, Military Readiness, DOD, February 2019, p. 4.
Unclassified reference booklet provided directly to congressional offices, congressional committees, and the
Congressional Research Service.
126 DOD, FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan FY 2019 Annual Performance Report, Chief Management Officer
(CMO), DOD, January 29, 2020, Appendix B, p. 7, at https://cmo.defense.gov/Portals/47/Documents/Publications/
Annual%20Performance%20Plan/FY%202021%20Annual%20Perf%20Plan%20&
%20FY%202019%20Annual%20Perf%20Report.pdf#page=188.
127 AR 525-30, p. 5.
128 “For example, the July through September 2012 Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress totaled 443 pages and the
January through March 2013 report is 497 pages long.” See GAO-13-678, p. 5.
129 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness, Military Readiness, DOD, February 2019, p. 4.
Unclassified reference booklet provided directly to congressional offices, congressional committees, and the
Congressional Research Service.
130 Note that 10 U.S.C. §482(e) states: “A report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form. To the
extent the Secretary of Defense determines necessary, the report may also be submitted in classified form.” Since the
statute’s enactment in 1996, DOD has submitted increasingly classified QRRCs to Congress—beginning in May 1996
with an unclassified quarterly report that was less than 20 pages and included one classified appendix, to May 2013
where a report contained unclassified summaries with three classified annexes that provided more detailed readiness
information, to September 2016 where GAO’s review of the QRRC indicated most of the report was now classified.
See Mark E. Gebicke, Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details on Deficiencies and Solutions,
GAO/NSIAD-98-68, March 1998, p.17, at https://books.google.com/books?id=uQYNAAAAIAAJ&printsec=
frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=classified&f=false; and R. Derek Trunkey,
Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, CBO, Working Paper 2013-03 (May 2013), p.
13, at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44127_DefenseReadiness.pdf#page=16; and also
GAO, Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan, GAO-
16-841, September 2016, p. 4, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679556.pdf#page=8.
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Fill, Equipment Maintenance, and Supply); and Readiness of National Guard to Perform
Civil Support Missions.
Within OSD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, or
OUSD(P&R), assembles and produces the quarterly report to Congress.131 To do so, OUSD(P&R)
compiles information from the Joint Staff, the Services, and other DOD components and
integrates its own collected information to prepare a draft report to Congress.132 The office then
sends a draft report out to relevant DOD components to review for accuracy, then coordinates and
resolves any comments or edits, finalizes the report, and provides a finalized report to the
congressional defense committees.133 This process is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Overview of the QRRC Process

Source: 2013 GAO Report (GAO-13-678).
Note: The “Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics” has been
reformed into the “Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment.”
The Readiness Recovery Framework (R2F)
In addition to those elements of the QRRC previously mentioned, a DOD effort known as the
“Readiness Recovery Framework,” or R2F, forms the basis of the semi-annual mitigation
QRRC.134 The R2F is a DOD action plan that
contributes to increasing the readiness of the Military Services and creating a more lethal
Joint Force by improving the Department’s ability to measure, assess, and understand

131 GAO-13-678, p. 5.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 DOD, FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan FY 2019 Annual Performance Report, Chief Management Officer
(CMO), DOD, January 29, 2020, p. 7.
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readiness. More specifically, this effort will refine and improve readiness metrics for each
Military Service that will be used over time as a way to track readiness improvements.135
The R2F assesses and analyzes readiness metrics and measures on a semi-annual basis.136
According to the FY2021 DOD Annual Performance Plan, the R2F is updated semi-annually and
“will undergo continued validation as conditions and readiness levels evolve, to include
expansion of Major Force Elements (MFE) and readiness metrics where required.”137 DOD
further states: “Each Military Service is responsible for its readiness recovery goals and recovery
dates per this initiative. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
(USD(P&R)) shall ensure compliance with the R2F goals in order to align Military Service and
Department efforts.”138
QRRC Reform
Over the past decade congressional committees, CBO, GAO, and other defense community
organizations have voiced concerns over the effectiveness of the QRRC in informing Congress of
the state of military readiness. These concerns have largely revolved around the ability of
Congress to correlate QRRC summaries and readiness data (such as DRRS outputs) with the
necessary amount of defense funding required to address both specific and across-the-board
readiness issues.

Selected Examples of Legislative Branch Concerns over QRRC Effectiveness
CBO statement from May 2013:
The QRRC has many different users within the Congress, and so it must provide
different levels and types of information.... Many new readiness metrics in DRRS are
not included or even summarized in the QRRC, and the report does not give a
quantitative overall view of readiness trends. Some charts aggregate all units within a
service, but interpreting those charts can be difficult. Also, the QRRC simply does not
systematically address many readiness questions, such as the pace of operations and its
effect on readiness or morale and psychological well-being.139
GAO statement from July 2013:
DOD has taken steps to improve its quarterly readiness reports to Congress, but
additional contextual information would provide decision makers a more complete

135 James N. Stewart, PTDO Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Force Readiness: Improve the
Department’s ability to measure, assess, and understand readiness, Fiscal Year 2019, Quarters 4, at
https://www.performance.gov/defense/2019_dec_DOD_Force_Readiness.pdf.
136 Ibid.
137 DOD, FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan FY 2019 Annual Performance Report, Chief Management Officer
(CMO), DOD, January 29, 2020, Appendix B, p. 7, at https://cmo.defense.gov/Portals/47/Documents/Publications/
Annual%20Performance%20Plan/FY%202021%20Annual%20Perf%20Plan%20&
%20FY%202019%20Annual%20Perf%20Report.pdf#page=188.
138 James N. Stewart, PTDO Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Force Readiness: Improve the
Department’s ability to measure, assess, and understand readiness, Fiscal Year 2019, Quarters 4, at
https://www.performance.gov/defense/2019_dec_DOD_Force_Readiness.pdf.
139 R. Derek Trunkey, Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, CBO, Working Paper
2013-03 (May 2013), p. 13, at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
44127_DefenseReadiness.pdf#page=16.
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picture of DOD’s readiness. Over time, based on its own initiative and congressional
requests, DOD has added information to its reports, such as on operational plan
assessments. In its most recent report, DOD added narrative information detailing the
impact of readiness deficiencies on overall readiness and a discussion of how the
services’ budgets support their long-term readiness goals.140
Excerpt from the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) For Fiscal Year 2017 Report
(S.Rept. 114-255):
The committee remains very concerned that the QRRC’s delivery to Congress lacks
timeliness, remains hampered by parallel processes, and contains overlapping
assessments which are then collectively hindered by unnecessarily prolonged approval
processes within the Department of Defense.... The committee remains unsatisfied with
the content reported in Annex F—Risk assessment of dependence on contractor
support—as required by section 482(g) of title 10 United States Code. The committee
strongly urges the Department to significantly improve the reporting quality in the next
iteration of the QRRC.141

Although some of these concerns have been resolved to various degrees through subsequent
iterations of the QRRC, a number of issues have persisted. In particular, those issues related to
readiness metrics and the utility of DRRS-based assessments remain under continued evaluation.
The aforementioned R2F is a DOD effort developed in part to address some of these QRRC
shortcomings. Congress has also continued to revise statutory requirements related to the QRRC
in order to improve readiness reporting.
For example, in a 2018 written response to Congress, then-nominee for Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Readiness (ASD(R)), Veronica Daigle, stated:
Congress included several key reforms in the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) that will directly contribute to readiness, including provisions related to the
Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and the Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress (QRRC). I know the Reform Management Group (RMG), which is co-chaired
by the Department’s Chief Management Officer (CMO) and the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), is exploring further reforms and the
Department will work with Congress as those reforms mature.... The QRRC has evolved
over time, and the way it displays readiness has changed.... However, the QRRC is a
classified document, which limits its distribution.142
Former ASD(R) Daigle was also quoted in 2019 stating the following regarding the R2F:143
Through the R2F, my office is looking to improve the quality and utility of our readiness
data. We want to identify leading indicators to readiness improvements and increase our
ability to accurately measure and track readiness recovery.... One of the challenges we have
in the readiness community is how we measure readiness outcomes with the budget

140 See GAO-13-678.
141 S.Rept. 114-255, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Report, p. 81-82.
142 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Policy Questions for Veronica Daigle Nominee for Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Readiness,” written response provided by Veronica Daigle, August 21, 2018, at
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Daigle_APQs_08-21-18.pdf.
143 Former ASD(R) Veronica Daigle resigned her position on January 31, 2020. Currently the position is held by Acting
ASD(R) Mr. Thomas A. Constable. See https://prhome.defense.gov/Leadership/thomasConstable/.
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resources; readiness measures are often income based and the way we budget resources—
whether it be in a subactivity group or in a budget line item—does not always align with
how we report readiness.144
Readiness Funding
In general, DOD makes its own determination as to what it considers “readiness funding” and
Congress decides what appropriations will support readiness, or readiness-related activities, based
on DOD officials’ testimony, DOD budgetary categorizations, and current force concerns.145
However, Congress and DOD officials both generally consider O&M appropriations as being for
readiness.146 These appropriations are provided through the annual defense appropriations act and
are normally available for obligation for one fiscal year (FY).147 According to DOD’s Defense
Acquisition University (DAU), O&M appropriations:
fund expenses such as maintenance services, civilian salaries, travel, minor construction
projects, operating military forces, training and education, depot maintenance, working
capital funds, and base operations support. O&M follows the Department’s Annual
Funding budget policy.148
In total, O&M appropriations account for approximately 41% of the defense budget request for
FY2021.149 Table 2 shows a breakdown of the O&M appropriations request by military
department, excluding emergency-related funding.
Table 2. O&M Appropriations by Military Department
in billions of discretionary dollars (Base + OCO)
Military Department
FY2020 Enacted
FY2021 Requested
Percentage Change
Army
$75.0
$73.0
-2.7%
Navy (includes Marine
$67.2
$70.6
+5.1%
Corps)

144 Lauren C. Williams, “How DOD plans to link readiness needs to budgets,” Federal Computer Week (FCW),
November 21, 2019, at https://fcw.com/articles/2019/11/21/dod-links-readiness-to-budgets.aspx.
145 See for example: House Committee on Appropriations, “Chairwoman Wasserman Schultz Statement at Hearing on
the Impact of PFAS Exposure on Servicemembers,” Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and
Related Agencies (116th Congress), March 11, 2020, at https://appropriations.house.gov/news/statements/chairwoman-
wasserman-schultz-statement-at-hearing-on-the-impact-of-pfas-exposure-on.
146 See for example Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / Chief Financial Officer, Operation and
Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Estimates, DOD (March 2019), p. 3, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_OM_Overview.pdf#page=6; and
House Committee on Appropriations, “Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2020 Defense Funding Bill,”
Press Release, May 14, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/appropriations-committee-releases-
fiscal-year-2020-defense-funding-bill.
147 See DOD, Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Version 5,
April 2017, p. 52, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/DCC_Handbook_v.5_April2017.pdf#page=54.
148 Defense Acquisition University, “Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Funds,” DAU, accessed July 1, 2020, at
https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!339.
149 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense
Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, February 2020, Table A-1,
p. A-1, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf#page=114.
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Military Department
FY2020 Enacted
FY2021 Requested
Percentage Change
Air Force (includes Space
$63.7
$65.9
+3.5%
Force)
Defense-Wide
$82.7
$79.4
-4.0%
Total
$288.6
$288.9
-0.1%
Source: DOD, Overview – FY2021 Defense Budget, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
February 2020 (Revised May 13, 2020), Appendix A: Resource Exhibits.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. OCO refers to “Overseas Contingency Operations” funds, which
DOD has used for base budget O&M activities. FY2020 enacted amounts exclude emergency-related O&M
funding such as supplemental appropriations to combat the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (i.e., COVID-19).
For management purposes, DOD divides O&M appropriations into four budget activities (BAs)
with associated budget codes and accounts.150
 BA-1 Operating Forces.
 BA-2 Mobilization.
 BA-3 Training and Recruiting.
 BA-4 Administrative and Service-wide Activities.
DOD further subdivides these BAs into activity groups within each Service and for Defense-Wide
spending, and then in turn into several Subactivity Groups (SAGs), each of which have their own
associated budget code (e.g., 011M is the SAG for “Depot Purchase Equipment Maintenance” in
the Air Force).151 SAGs are the lowest level budgeting categorization that DOD submits to
Congress to provide insight into the use of O&M appropriations (see Appendix C),152 and
Congress authorizes and appropriates money for readiness within O&M appropriations at the
SAG level.
O&M appropriations cover a wide range of DOD programs and activities, some of which are
considered to have a direct impact on readiness. However, there are certain O&M-funded
activities that may not directly affect readiness. Instead, these spending categories are seen as

150 A “budget activity” is defined by DOD as “Categories within each appropriation and fund account which identify
the purposes, projects, or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund.” See DOD Financial Management
Regulation (7000.14-R), Volume 2A, Chapter 1, October 2008, p. 1-10, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/
documents/fmr/Volume_02a.pdf#page=12; also see DAU, “Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Funds,” DOD,
accessed March 1, 2020, at https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!339.
151 GAO reports “For some O&M accounts, the budget activities are then divided into activity groups. For example, the
defense-wide budget justification materials for O&M are divided by activity group, which represent a defense agency.
For other O&M accounts, the budget activities are further divided into subactivity groups.” See GAO, Defense Budget:
DOD Needs to Improve Reporting of Operation and Maintenance Base Obligations, GAO-16-537 (August 2016), p.5,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679081.pdf#page=9; also see DOD Financial Management Regulation (7000.14-R),
Volume 2A, Chapter 3, Operations and Maintenance Appropriations, p. 3-22 – 3-249, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/Volume_02a.pdf#page=370.
152 DOD further breaks down SAGs into program element (PE) codes. A PE code is “a unique alphanumeric code that
identifies functional or organizational entities and their related resources. PEs may have a narrow focus (such as Navy
F/A-18 squadrons) or broad focus (such as Air Force long-range strategic planning).” See CRS In Focus IF10831,
Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and Heidi M. Peters; also see
Sharon A. Cekala, DOD Budget: Budgeting for Operation and Maintenance Activities, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-222, GAO
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security, House of
Representatives, July 22, 1997, pgs. 4-5, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-NSIAD-97-222/
pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-NSIAD-97-222.pdf#page=6.
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being “readiness-related” (i.e., indirectly supporting readiness).153 Additionally, there are some
O&M-funded activities that may not be associated with generating readiness at all.
For example, funding that supports Civilian Personnel (CIVPERS), which includes paying DOD
civilian salaries, is part of annual O&M appropriations.154 While some CIVPERS funding may go
to activities that are considered readiness-related, or in direct support of producing and sustaining
readiness (e.g., paying salaries for civilian depot-level maintenance personnel), other CIVPERS
funding may be viewed by some as supporting activities completely unrelated to generating
readiness (e.g., salaries for museum curators).155 In regards to DOD civilian personnel, DOD
states:
Civilians perform functions in intelligence, equipment maintenance, medical care, family
support, base operating services, and other activities that directly support the military
forces and readiness. The DOD civilian workforce possesses capabilities, expertise, and
skills that directly impact DOD’s operational warfighting capabilities, and employs those
skills at depots and shipyards; child care centers and schools; at airfields, ranges, and
armories, and in theater in direct support of military operations.156
As a result of this complexity in labelling, DOD continues to provide Congress its list of O&M
SAGs that are considered direct funding for readiness, or otherwise “core” readiness SAGs (see
Appendix C).157 These lists change over time, and their titles and descriptions can be broadly
written and can vary across the Services and DOD.158 In addition, readiness-related SAGs that are
sometimes designated as readiness “enablers” have also been provided to Congress (see
Appendix C).159
Non-O&M Appropriations for Readiness
In addition to O&M appropriations, other DOD appropriations may also be used to fund
readiness. This is because the task of producing and sustaining ready forces involves multiple
stakeholders from across DOD, some of which may be involved in one or more programs or
activities that are funded through non-O&M appropriations. Whatever the program or activity, if
it provides inputs (see Appendix A) to the readiness production process (see section “Producing
and Sustaining Ready Forces”), then funding for that program or activity could be considered
“readiness funding.” This has been acknowledged by both DOD and Congress when funding for

153 See GAO, Defense Budget DOD Needs to Improve Reporting of Operation and Maintenance Base Obligation,
GAO-16-537, August 2016, p. 9, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679081.pdf#page=13.
154 CIVPERs is civilian personnel funding that includes compensation and benefits for DOD civilians. “Most DOD
civilian salaries, including those of personnel supporting or managing acquisition programs, are funded with O&M”
appropriations. DAU, “Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Funds,” DAU, accessed March 1, 2020, at
https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!339.
155 The position of Museum Curator is a DOD civilian job in the OPM job family series 1015. For an example of O&M
funding for Military Museums, see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Secretary’s Report to Congress - DoD Operation and Financial Support for Military Museums - Fiscal Year
2013, DOD, April 2014, p. B-2, at https://denix.osd.mil/cr/military-museums/unassigned/report-to-congress-on-
department-of-defense-operation-and-financial-support-for-museums-for-fiscal-year-2013/#page=81.
156 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview, DOD
(February 2020), p. 2-7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf#page=28.
157 See GAO/T-NSIAD-00-98, p. 2.
158 See Appendix C.
159 Ibid.
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certain programs or activities have been deemed essential to ensuring the United States has ready
and capable military forces. Examples are provided below.
DOD readiness argument for MILCON appropriations.
FY2019 Statement of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense for Energy, Installations and
Environment before the Senate
The continued support of Congress, and in particular, this subcommittee, allow us to use
the resources provided to enhance the agility, resilience, readiness, and lethality of our
forces around the world. With a clear understanding of the Secretary’s intent.... We
continue to advocate for adequate funding for installation and infrastructure accounts to
meet mission requirements and to address risks to safety and readiness.160
Congressional readiness argument for MILCON appropriations.
FY2020 MILCON-VA Appropriations Act (Explanatory Statement)
The Committees recognize that other countries are utilizing infrastructure to enhance
national interest at a higher rate of investment than the Department of Defense. Military
construction is vital to current and future force readiness and can be a strategic asset to
deter near-peer competitors, particularly in nations that support U.S. posture in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific, such as Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.161
Considerations for Congress
Standardization of Readiness SAGs
For decades, DOD and Congress have concurrently determined which SAGs within O&M
appropriations are to be considered for readiness. Accordingly, both have presented lists of
readiness SAGs through budget justification documents and other materials, and these lists have
changed periodically.162 This includes DOD designating certain SAGs within each Service as
either “core” or “enabler” SAGs (see Appendix C) to differentiate between those that directly
impact readiness, and those that indirectly impact readiness (see section “Readiness Funding”).
This also includes Congress making determinations as to which SAGs should be considered for
readiness, or even “high-priority” readiness (particularly with regard to enabler SAGs).163
Differences in readiness SAG lists, including which types of programs and activities should be
funded within each SAG, have resulted in some congressional oversight challenges, for example
 understanding the parameters for what is included in a readiness or readiness-
related SAG;

160 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs,
and Related Agencies, Statement of Honorable Lucian Niemeyer Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Energy, Installations
and Environment), 115th Cong., 2nd sess., April 26, 2018, p. 3, at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/042618%20-%20Niemeyer%20Testimony.pdf.
161 U.S. Congress, Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on
Appropriations Regarding H.R. 1865, Division F Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, And Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2020, p. 4, at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HR%201865%20-
%20SOM%20FY20.pdf#page=598.
162 See GAO/T-NSIAD-00-98.
163 Ibid.
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 discerning what readiness or readiness-related activities are being funded within
certain Service SAGs; and
 Comparing spending for readiness across the Services at a SAG level.
One possible way to improve oversight of readiness funding could be for Congress to legislate the
standardization of readiness (including readiness-related) budget categories within O&M
appropriations across the Services and for Defense-Wide spending. This might include (1)
establishing a standardized list of readiness and readiness-related SAGs common to all Services
and defense agencies; (2) defining the parameters of what can be included in a readiness or
readiness-related SAG; and (3) regularly providing a report to Congress comparing spending for
readiness across the Services at the SAG-level.164 Once approved, this standardized list would not
be changed unless directed by Congress. Alternatively, Congress could direct DOD to standardize
its readiness budget SAGs internally, brief the congressional committees of jurisdiction, then
come into agreement with Congress on the standardization of these SAGs for a set period of time.
The standardization of readiness SAGs could have several significant impacts to defense
spending and to the overall framework for readiness. By setting in law what constitutes defense
funding for readiness, future defense spending analyses could include more accurate and
authoritative assessments of readiness spending. This could help to inform senior leaders of the
return on investment for increased readiness funding, which may also lead to more spending
accountability for DOD. Additionally, the standardization of readiness SAGs would require DOD
and congressional leaders to determine and agree upon the specific parameters for what
constitutes readiness funding. This could potentially have the inverse effect of defining what does
not constitute readiness funding. Potentially, this may lead to a redefining of readiness for DOD
(or perhaps a further scoping of the broad doctrinal definition of readiness).
Common Readiness Metrics
Across DOD, each Service, CCMD, and DOD agency use a variety of metrics and measures to
assess the readiness of its forces. Depending on what is being assessed (people, equipment,
processes, etc.), different metrics are used and different measurements taken.
As DOD readiness assessments gradually become more comprehensive through initiatives like
R2F, new metrics and new ways of producing more accurate measurements of a unit’s readiness
are being developed and employed.165 An issue that has been persistent, and may continue if not
addressed, is the lack of commonality and uniformity of readiness metrics used across similar
military units.
Using MC rates as an example, each Service has a different method for calculating the rate and
also for interpreting the rate when used in larger maintenance assessments, dashboards, or other
tools that inform DOD readiness reporting. This makes it difficult to compare similar unit types
across different Services. The MC rate for an F-35A at an Air Force squadron might not be
comparable to the MC rate of an F-35C at a Navy squadron, even though the aircraft are similar
and the units’ assigned missions may also be similar. Further, some Services may choose to
abandon certain metrics in favor of newer ones. For example, the Air Force may choose to use

164 For a historical example of this type of O&M budget category standardization, see CBO, Paying for Military
Readiness and Upkeep: Trends in Operations and Maintenance Spending, CBO (September 1997), Appendix B, at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/milready.pdf#page=87.
165 For an example, see Megan Eckstein, “Mission Capable: How the Navy Harnessed Its Data to Achieve 80% Fighter
Readiness,” U.S. Naval Institute News, April 22, 2020, at https://news.usni.org/2020/04/22/mission-capable-how-the-
navy-harnessed-its-data-to-achieve-80-fighter-readiness?mc_cid=4e88312171&mc_eid=b041440dc2.
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AA rates while the Marine Corps decides to use MC rates for aviation units. The general purpose
of these metrics remains the same—assess the operability of aircraft in the unit—however, the
rates are calculated differently. As a consequence, the impact of certain metrics on readiness
assessments may change. Commanders performing unit assessments may see one metric as being
more effective or accurate than another, thus having an impact on the commander’s final rating.
To aid DOD and Congress in understanding the overall readiness of military units, and to allow
for a better comparison of similar unit types, Congress may consider directing DOD to implement
common readiness metrics across all DOD components for those units that must report their
readiness in DRRS. These would include readiness metrics that go beyond, or inform, those used
in DRRS. These common readiness metrics would be calculated in only one way for all similar
unit types, as determined by DOD and briefed to Congress. Additionally, these metrics would be
applied in the same manner in readiness assessments used by official DOD reporting systems.
Though seemingly a minor requirement for Congress to direct, the impacts of requiring common
readiness metrics across DOD are exponential. At each command level—from the smallest unit to
the CCMD—commanders would be able to equally compare the readiness of their warfighters,
major weapons systems, and other important inputs to readiness for similar types of units, and at
parallel command levels. When aggregated, DRRS outputs and other stand-alone metrics
provided to Congress would be more accurate and comparable, enabling Congress to make more
informed funding decisions.
Inputs to Generating Readiness
The figure below provides an example of some of the many inputs and factors required to
produce and sustain ready forces. For each input, there are numerous organizations across DOD
that are involved. Note that there are other inputs that are not captured in this illustration, such as
those associated with military construction, medical and dental health, or military housing. It is
also important to acknowledge that any activity associated with an input must be harmonized
within the constraints of the military’s available time to perform all other required activities.
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Figure 7. Inputs to Generating Readiness

Source: CRS Graphics.
Note: Graphic produced by former CRS Specialist Lynn M. Wil iams.

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DOD Illustration of the Readiness
Process
The figure below provides one example of how DOD and other defense community experts
attempt to explain the highly complex readiness process (i.e., the process by which ready units are
produced and sustained).
Figure A-1. DASD(FR) Readiness Process Diagram

Source: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness, Military Readiness, February 2019, p. 7.
Unclassified reference booklet provided to congressional offices, congressional committees, and the
Congressional Research Service.
Note: This il ustration is one of many DOD has produced to help il ustrate the complex process of generating
ready military forces.
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DOD’s Readiness Subactivity Groups
The figures below display DOD’s “core” and “enabler” readiness Subactivity Groups, or SAGs,
within O&M budget activities for January 2018.166 DOD has changed which SAGs are considered
for readiness periodically, and Congress may also develop differing lists for certain purposes.167
Figure B-1. “Core” Readiness SAGs
Direct funding for readiness

Source: DOD.
Note: SAGs are the lowest level O&M funding categorization submitted by DOD to Congress that provide
insight into the use of O&M appropriations

166 SAG information provided by DOD directly to CRS.
167 For an example, see https://budget.dtic.mil/pdfs/FY2018_pdfs/APPROP/OM_Appr_Report_2018.pdf. Also, see
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-98, p. 6, at https://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00098t.pdf.
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Figure B-2. “Enabler” Readiness SAGs
Readiness-related funding

Source: DOD.

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DRRS Assessment Processes, Metrics,
and Ratings
DRRS broadly employs two separate, but connected, readiness assessment processes that
incorporate several discrete assessments, each of which employ different metrics and measures to
determine overall unit readiness. There is also an overall mission capability assessment
(otherwise called a “rating system”) that unit commanders use to bridge the two assessment
processes and to support OSD information requirements (see subsection “Three-Tiered
Assessment”).168 Together these provide a multifaceted view of a unit’s readiness status.169
DRRS/SORTS
The first assessment process is “input- or resourced-based” and resembles the older Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS) that DRRS was intended to replace.170 SORTS, or
otherwise Global SORTS (GSORTS) focused on unit resources and was to be fully incorporated
into the newer DRRS. The current “DRRS/SORTS” process lets unit commanders determine the
ability of their units to accomplish designed missions based on the unit’s available resources. This
assessment process evaluates resource deficiencies and reports overall unit readiness in the form
of “C-level ratings” (see subsection “Assessing Resources”).
DRRS/METs
The second assessment process is “output- or mission-/task-based.”171 It lets unit commanders
assess the ability of their units to accomplish both designed and assigned missions based on the
unit’s ability to complete tasks.172 The process centers on the mission-essential task list (METL)
construct—where commanders assess a unit’s ability to accomplish a list of METs that the unit
was designed to complete (see subsection “Assessing Missions”).173 This “DRRS/METs”
assessment process includes the conditions under which each task is to be executed, and a set of
standards that reflect success.174 The DRRS/METs process is generally the same for all DOD, but
some Services do internally rate MET/METL outcomes separately prior to reporting in DRRS-S
(e.g., the Army uses “A-level” ratings).175 All MET/METL unit reporting is eventually
incorporated into a single rating system used by the Services, OSD, and the Joint Staff (see
subsection “Three-Tiered Assessment”).

168 See Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies, AR 220-
1, U.S. Army, April 15, 2010, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r220_1.pdf.
169 Laura J. Junor, Managing Military Readiness, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
February 2017, pgs. 31-33, at https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-
Perspectives-23.pdf.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 METs can be assembled uniquely to assess assigned missions.
174 Ibid.
175 Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies, AR 220-1,
U.S. Army, April 15, 2010, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r220_1.pdf.
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Assessing Resources
The SORTS-derived process within DRRS revolves around four categories of resource inputs
(called “resources areas” in DOD doctrine), each of which is first assessed separately, then
collectively: personnel (P), equipment availability (S), equipment readiness (R), and training (T).
The DRRS/SORTS evaluation process is led by unit commanders, who assess readiness levels
within the parameters specified by Service regulations.176 Sometimes the regulations require the
commander to apply professional military judgment to a significant degree (most notably in the
case of training assessments); in other areas the commander’s discretion is much more limited.
Personnel (P-level)
The three principal metrics of personnel readiness for units are as follows:
1. The ratio of unit personnel available for deployment in comparison to the total
number of personnel the unit is authorized to have.
2. The ratio of unit personnel who are both available for deployment and qualified
in their assigned duty position in comparison to the total number of personnel the
unit is authorized to have.
3. The ratio of available “senior personnel” in comparison to the total number of
senior personnel the unit is authorized to have.
Ratios in each of these metrics generate a rating between one (highest) and four (lowest), and the
lowest of these three ratings is used to determine the overall “P-rating” of the unit.177 In essence,
units with a full or nearly full complement of warfighters by specialty and grade are assessed as
P-1, while those with substantial shortages in one or more of the measured areas are assessed as
P-2, P-3, or P-4. This aspect of readiness is relatively objective and therefore requires limited
application of a commander’s professional judgment.
Equipment Availability (S-level)
The availability or supply of key equipment is called the “S-level,” and it is based on two metrics:
1. The ratio of the number of designated critical equipment items (known as pacing
items) currently in the unit’s possession, under its control, or available within 72
hours to the number the unit is authorized to have (a pacing item for an Army
armor unit would be an M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank).178
2. The ratio of the number of other mission essential equipment items currently in
the unit’s possession, under its control, or available within 72 hours to the
number the unit is authorized to have (equipment might include radios, machine
guns, and night vision devices).179
Like the P-level, ratios in each of these metrics generate a rating between one and four, and the
lower of these two ratings is used to determine the overall “S-rating” of the unit.180 S-levels are

176 For an example, see Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated
Policies, AR 220-1, U.S. Army, April 15, 2010, at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
r220_1.pdf.
177 That is, if the three personnel metrics are rated as 1, 1, and 2, respectively, the P-level will be P-2.
178 Pacing items are designated as “Equipment Readiness Code P” or ERC P.
179 Other mission essential equipment items are designated as “Equipment Readiness Code A” or ERC A.
180 That is, if the two equipment metrics are rated as 1 and 3, respectively, the S-level will be S-3.
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readily measured. Equipment availability is heavily influenced by whether there is sufficient
funding to procure the required equipment for a given unit, and by how senior policy makers
chose to allocate equipment among units.
Equipment Readiness (R-level)
The third assessed resource area for units is equipment readiness or “serviceability”—that is,
whether the unit’s equipment is fully functional or not. A unit could have all of its authorized
equipment by type and numbers, but still suffer from poor equipment readiness if much of the
equipment does not work. The “R-level” is determined by calculating the percentage of each
pacing item that is fully mission capable, and the aggregate percentage of certain designated
equipment (“maintenance reportable equipment”) in the unit’s possession that is fully mission
capable. Each of these categories is rated between one and four according to a published scale
and the lowest of these ratings becomes the overall R-level.
The R-level is heavily influenced by appropriations. If there is not enough funding for spare parts
or to send a vehicle into depot level maintenance, equipment readiness can suffer. Unit manning
can also affect equipment readiness. If there are not enough of the right skill level of trained
mechanics and supply personnel, repairs can be delayed.
Training (T-level)
The final assessed resource area—training—allows for the most subjectivity. Training readiness
does not lend itself to quantifiable evaluation as easily as personnel and equipment readiness; it
relies more heavily on the commander’s professional military judgment. In assessing training
readiness as a resource area, unit commanders evaluate how well a unit performs certain METs.
Commanders evaluate training proficiency in each MET as trained (T), needs practice (P), or
untrained (U). Based on these ratings, a specified calculation methodology, and a published scale,
the unit receives a T-level rating of between one and four.181
The data on which the commander’s judgments are based can vary substantially. For example,
variations may exist between units in the frequency of training, the ranges and resources available
for the training, and the number and type of units represented in a training exercise. Operational
deployments may also be used when evaluating a unit’s training proficiency, so the commander
of a recently deployed unit may be able to more accurately assess his or her unit’s training status.
Overall Resource Readiness (C-level)
The C-level rating—or overall DRRS/SORTS readiness assessment—is derived from the ratings
of the four resource areas previously discussed (P, S, R, & T), and is equivalent to the lowest of
these four levels. However, commanders have some ability to upgrade or downgrade the rating
based on their professional military judgment.182 The C-level rating is meant to reflect the unit’s

181 The methodology assigns a weight of 3 to each “T,” 2 to each “P,” and “1” to each U. These figures are summed
and then divided by the product of 3 multiplied by the number of METs. The resulting quotient is multiplied by 100 to
produce a percentage, which is interpreted according to a published scale. As an example, if a unit had 5 METs, which
the commander evaluated as T, P, T, U, and P this would be converted to 3, 2, 3, 1, and 2. The sum of these numbers
(3+2+3+1+2=11) would then be divided by 3 times the number of METs (3x5=15). The resulting percentage would be
73.3% (11/15*100). If the unit had no untrained tasks (U), this percentage would result in a T-2 rating. However, since
the unit has an untrained task, the result is a T-3 rating.
182 That is, if the unit was evaluated as P-1, S-1, R-1, and T-3, it would receive a C-3 rating, subject to the possible
upgrade or downgrade by the commander.
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ability to accomplish its core functions, provide its designed capabilities, and complete its
designed missions based on the cumulative assessment of resources.183 The meaning of each C-
level is described in Table C-1.
Table C-1. Understanding Readiness Ratings in DRRS
“C-Level” Ratings
C-1
C-2
C-3
C-4
C-5*
The unit possesses
The unit possesses the The unit possesses the The unit
The unit is
the required
required resources
required resources
requires
undergoing a
resources and is
and is trained to
and is trained to
additional
Service,
trained to undertake
undertake most of
undertake many, but resources or
Combatant
the full wartime
the wartime
not all, portions of
training to
Commander,
missions for which
missions for which it
the wartime
undertake its
Defense Agency,
it is organized or
is organized or
missions for which it
wartime
or other DOD-
designed.
designed.
is organized or
missions, but it
directed
designed.
may be directed
resource
to undertake
action and is not
The status of
The status of
The status of
portions of its
prepared, at this
resources and
resources and training
resources and training
wartime missions
time, to
training in the unit
in the unit may
in the unit will result
with resources
undertake the
will not limit
cause isolated
in significant
on hand.
wartime missions
flexibility in
decreases in
decreases in
for which it is
methods for
flexibility in
flexibility for mission
organized or
mission
methods for mission
accomplishment
designed.
accomplishment.
accomplishment.
However, the
The status of
The status of
The status of
unit may be
resources and
resources and training
resources and training
capable of
training in the unit
in the unit will not
in the unit will
undertaking
will not increase
increase the
increase the
nontraditional,
vulnerability of unit
vulnerability of the
vulnerability of the
non-wartime
personnel and
unit under most
unit under many,
related
equipment.
envisioned
but not all,
missions
operational
envisioned
scenarios
operational
scenarios.
The unit does not
The unit would
The unit would
require any
require little, if any, require significant
compensation for
compensation for
compensation for
deficiencies.
deficiencies.
deficiencies.
Source: CJCSI 3401.02B (May 31, 2011). Emphasis added to highlight the differences between ratings.
Note: *There are several C-5 unit restrictions listed within CJCSI 3401.02B.
Assessing Missions
Unlike DRRS/SORTS, which was built to assess designed missions, the DRRS/METs process
helps commanders assess both designed and assigned missions. DRRS/METs is a two-stage
assessment process that begins with individual MET assessments and ends with the assessment of
a unit’s METL.184 METs form the basis for METL assessments reported monthly, or within 24

183 AR 220-1, para4-4(a).
184 At the joint level, a METL is called a “Joint Mission Essential Task List,” or JMETL. A METL for a Combat
Support Agency (CSA) is called an “Agency Mission Essential Task List,” or AMETL. See CJCS Guide 3501, The
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hours of a significant change in readiness status.185 A 2017 report by the Institute for National
Strategic Studies (INSS)—an institute within DOD’s National Defense University—states:
A unit commander assesses missions in three categories. The first, core tasks, reflects the
unit’s designed missions. The second and third categories (named operations and top-
priority level 4 plans) correspond to the assigned missions of the unit. Not every reporting
unit will have missions in each of these categories. For those that do, reporting across the
spectrum of assigned and designed missions allows force and readiness managers to
understand those capabilities that are currently ready and those that have atrophied ... the
capabilities corresponding to each mission are articulated according to its METL, complete
with conditions and standards. The unit commander begins his or her assessment by
individually depicting whether the unit met the conditions and standards for each task.186
Commanders use a three-tiered assessment to rate each MET and METL for inclusion in DRRS.
Commanders may also use their Service’s own established rating system to determine the
readiness of a unit to perform its assigned mission(s), then use that system’s rating in conjunction
with other metrics and measures to determine an overall three-tiered readiness rating for input to
DRRS (for an example, see “Determining and Reporting the Assigned Mission Level (A-level)”
in AR 220-1).187
Three-Tiered Assessment
According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness (DASD(FR)):
Combatant Commanders, Military Services, Combat Support Agencies, and the National
Guard Bureau assess the ability of their organization to accomplish a task under conditions
specified in the Joint Mission Essential Task List [JMETL]/Agency Mission Essential Task
List [AMETL].188
Both designed and assigned missions are included in MET/METL assessments for DRRS.189 The
“three-tiered assessment” is used to first rate a unit’s individual METs, and then subsequently the
unit’s METL, JMETL, or AMETL, depending on the position of the commander determining the
rating and the type of unit/component being evaluated (see Table C-2).190 Unit commanders give
each MET a rating of “Yes” (Y), “Qualified Yes” (Q), or “No” (N), and then aggregate MET
ratings to determine a single METL rating for a unit (see Figure C-1).
According to AR 220-1:

Joint Training System: A Guide for Senior Leaders, May 5, 2015, p. A-3, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/
Library/Handbooks/g3501a.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175743-020.
185 DOD, DRRS Primer for Senior Leaders, OUSD(P&R), 2011, at http://www.highgroundconsulting.net/uploads/3/0/
0/4/3004662/drrs_psl_final_-_4_mar_11.pdf.
186 Laura J. Junor, Managing Military Readiness, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
February 2017, pgs. 32, at https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-
23.pdf.
187 See AR 220-1, Appendix C.
188 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness, Military Readiness, DOD, February 2019, p. 11.
Unclassified reference booklet provided directly to congressional offices, congressional committees, and the
Congressional Research Service.
189 DOD, DRRS Primer for Senior Leaders, OUSD(P&R), 2011, at http://www.highgroundconsulting.net/uploads/3/0/
0/4/3004662/drrs_psl_final_-_4_mar_11.pdf.
190 These MET/METL ratings along with DRRS/SORTS readiness outputs are included in Unit Status Reports (USRs)
submitted to DRRS by unit commanders (also called a “commander’s unit status report” (CUSR) in the Army).
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The Y/Q/N overall assessment for the unit’s core functions/designed capabilities is based
upon the Y/Q/N assessments for the associated METs, and the Y/Q/N overall assessment
for the unit’s assigned missions, if any, are based upon the Y/Q/N MET assessments
associated with that specific assigned mission.... To meet OSD’s reporting requirements
assigned missions must be identified by plan number or operation name.191
Table C-2. DRRS Three-Tiered Readiness Assessment
Rating
Definition
Y
Unit can accomplish task to established standards and conditions.
Unit can accomplish all or most of the task to standards under most conditions. The
Q
specific standards and conditions, as well as the shortfalls or issues impacting the unit’s
task, must be clearly detailed in the MET assessment.
N
Unit cannot accomplish the task to prescribed standards and conditions at this time.
Source: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness, Military Readiness, DOD, February 2019.
Unclassified reference booklet provided directly to congressional offices, congressional committees, and the
Congressional Research Service.
Note: This rating is considered a measure of unit readiness.
Rating determinations by unit commanders can be influenced by several factors, including C-
Ratings, Service-specific MET assessments and ratings, new metrics or measures recently
developed by a Service, or the deployment status of a unit. According to the INSS report: “There
is no algorithmic rule that maps [mission essential] task assessments to mission assessments. This
is up to the unit commander; however, the commander’s assessment must be supported by
qualitative data and be visible to higher headquarters.”192

191 AR 220-1, para4-4(c).
192 Laura J. Junor, Managing Military Readiness, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
February 2017, p. 33, at https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-
23.pdf.
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Figure C-1. Determining METL Ratings

Source: Army Regulation 220-1.
To reconcile the two DRRS assessment processes discussed in this report, unit commanders
generally abide by established Service regulations, policies and procedures when determining a
unit’s overall three-tiered readiness rating. The following examples of rating reconciliation are
taken from AR 220-1 for the Army.193
Overall Y/Q/N assessment for designed missions.
It would be inconsistent and illogical for a unit to report C4 due to resource or training
constraints while concurrently reporting “Yes” or “Qualified Yes” for this overall
assessment since the C4 assessment indicates that necessary resources are not available to
the unit for its core functions/designed capabilities. Commanders who report both C4 and
“Yes” for this overall assessment are required to explain why the resource or training
shortfalls indicated by the C4 assessment do not impede the ability of the unit to accomplish
its core functions/designed capabilities.194
Overall Y/Q/N assessment for one assigned mission.
It would be inconsistent and illogical for a unit to report A-level 4 due to resource or
training constraints while concurrently reporting “Yes” or “Qualified Yes” for this overall
assessment, since the A-level 4 assessment indicates that necessary resources are not
available to the unit for the assigned mission. Commanders who report both A-level 4 and

193 For another example of a Service-specific policy related to rating reconciliation—in this case the assessment of
more than one assigned mission—see Marine Corps Order 3000.13A, Marine Corps Readiness Reporting, July 18,
2017, p. 1-3 to 1-4, at https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCO_3000.13A.pdf?ver=2017-07-19-090232-
970.
194 AR 220-1, para4-4(c).
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“Yes” for the assigned mission assessment are required to specifically explain why the
resource or training shortfalls indicated by the A-level 4 assessment do not impede the
ability of the unit to accomplish the assigned mission. Note that an A-level is determined
and reported only for one assigned mission.
Overall Y/Q/N assessment for more than one assigned mission.
When exceptional circumstances require that units determine and report overall capability
status for more than the one assigned mission, the units will determine and report an overall
Y/Q/N assessment based on the Y/Q/N assessments of the METs that are specifically
associated with each additional assigned mission. Only overall Y/Q/N assessments (three
tier metrics) are available for use to assess unit capability for any additional assigned
missions.
Other Inputs to DRRS
Beyond those metrics and measures integrated into DRRS, commanders can use other metrics and
measures to inform their readiness ratings. For example, Service databases may provide
information on personnel turnover rates, additional skill qualifications, language qualifications,
and professional military education completion. Other measures of readiness—for example,
discipline, morale, and certain aspects of leadership and experience—while typically considered
important aspects of unit readiness, are not formally integrated into the readiness assessment
process. However, commanders may take these factors into account in their readiness assessment
upgrade or downgrade decisions.

Author Information

G. James Herrera

Analyst in U.S. Defense Readiness and
Infrastructure

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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