The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

October 1, 2020 R46558

The Origination Clause of the U.S.
October 1, 2020
Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement
James V. Saturno
Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known as the Origination Clause because
Specialist on Congress and
it provides that “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”
the Legislative Process
The meaning and application of this clause has evolved through practice and precedent since the

Constitution was drafted.

The Constitution does not provide specific guidelines as to what constitutes a “bill for raising
revenue.” This report analyzes congressional and court precedents regarding what constitutes such a bill. The precedents and
practices of the House apply a broad standard and construe the House’s prerogatives broadly to include any “meaningful
revenue proposal.” This standard is based on a provision-by-provision review of whether the measure in question has
revenue-affecting potential and not simply whether it would raise or lower revenues directly. As a result, the House includes
within the definition of revenue legislation not only direct changes in the tax code but any fees not intended as payment for a
specific government service, as well as any change in import restrictions because of their potential impact on tariff revenues.
The precedents of the Senate reflect a similar understanding. The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination
Clause matters, adopting an independent understanding of what constitutes a revenue bill that is based on two central
principles: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure rather than an incidental effect and (2) the resulting
funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally rather than a single, specific purpose.
This report also describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating
revenue measures is the House’s prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most
frequently. The House’s primary method for enforcement is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the
term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is
done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action
on the disputed Senate measure or referring it to committee. The Senate may also address whether a measure contravenes the
Origination Clause, including raising a point of order against its consideration. As a question of constitutional interpretation,
the question would be submitted directly to the Senate for its determination. Su ch a question would be debatable and decided
by majority vote. As a question of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court may also have a role in enforcing the
Origination Clause.
Finally, this report looks at the application of the Origination Clau se to legislation concerning public debt and appropriations.
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

Introduction
Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known general y as the “Origination
Clause” because it requires that
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
As general y understood in both the House and Senate, this clause carries two kinds of
prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising
revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a
House-passed non-revenue measure. The Senate, however, may general y amend a House-
originated revenue measure as it sees fit. These prohibitions can be enforced in either the House
or the Senate, and there are ample precedents for both.
As with many provisions of the Constitution, the precise meaning and application of these few
words has been refined through practice and precedent since it was first ratified. This report
examines the historical record with regard to the origins of the clause and analyzes its evolution,
describing congressional and court precedents, to provide a summary of how the clause is
currently understood. This report also examines the various procedures by which disputes
concerning the Origination Clause have been resolved.
The Constitutional Convention and the Origination
Clause
Among the most significant issues debated at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia were
those relating to the respective roles for the proposed House of Representatives and Senate.
Vesting the authority to originate revenue measures in the House exclusively was one aspect of
the compromise whereby delegates from smal and large states agreed in principle to a bicameral
Congress. What role each chamber would play, and what authority each would exercise, was not
easily arrived at. In particular, how authority would be assigned with regard to legislation
concerning money was one of the more salient aspects of that debate.
The idea that some or al money bil s should originate in the popularly elected chamber of the
legislature was a product of British and colonial experience, an experience that had been
rekindled when the newly independent states adopted new constitutions in 1776 or shortly
thereafter.1 A number of delegates to the Philadelphia convention felt strongly that, for the federal
government, the power to originate money bil s should also reside solely in the House of
Representatives, because it, unlike the Senate, would be directly elected by people.2 In the words
of Elbridge Gerry, a delegate to the convention from Massachusetts:

1 J. Michael Medina, “T he Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey,” Tulsa Law
Journal, vol. 23 (Winter 1987), p. 168, fn 13. According to John Dickinson, a delegate to the constitutional convention
from Delaware, in 1787 eight of the states had some form of origination clause in their constitution s. Quoted in Max
Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 , revised edition in four volumes (hereinafter cited as
Farrand), vol. II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 278. T he proceedings of the convention with respect to
the Origination Clause are also discussed in Robert G. Natelson, “T he Founders’ Origination Clause and Implications
for the Affordable Care Act,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 636-639.
2 T he Members of the Senate were elected by the various state legislatures until ratification of the 17 th Amendment in
1913.
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

Taxation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they
will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses.3
As first proposed by Gerry on June 13, 1787, the convention rejected, 3-8, a proposal to add
language providing that “money bil s … shal originate in the first branch of the national
legislature.”4 The issue was addressed again by the Compromise Committee on Representation,
chaired by Gerry, on July 3. The committee’s report recommended:
All Bills for raising or appropriating money and for fixing the salaries of the Officers of
the Government of the United States, shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature,
and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch—and that no money shal be
drawn from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the
first Branch.5
This proposal was paired by the committee with one providing that “in the second Branch of the
Legislature each State shal have an equal Vote.”6 This time the convention voted, 5-3, to retain
the restriction.7 On August 8, the question was raised again on the grounds that the provision
unnecessarily restricted the legislative role of the Senate. Although George Mason of Virginia
feared that striking the provision could “unhinge the compromise of which it made a part,” the
convention voted, 7-4, to strike it.8
Edmund Randolph of Virginia subsequently suggested that the problem of the earlier language
was that it could be interpreted so broadly that it could apply to legislation that only incidental y
raised money, and he proposed modifying it.9 His proposal made the language more specific
regarding what legislation the Senate might originate, prohibiting only “bil s for raising money
for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the same.” However, the same proposal also
included language to restrict the Senate’s role in considering such legislation by providing that it
could not be “amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised, or
change the mode of levying it, or the object of its appropriation.”10 Randolph’s arguments
invoked the clause’s part in the compromise that had given the smal er states equal representation
in the Senate and cal ed on them to support the proposal. On August 11, he successfully moved
that the convention reconsider the question, but on August 13 the new language was rejected, 4-
7.11
On August 15, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts again raised the question of the original Gerry
language, this time altered to al ow the Senate to “propose or concur with amendments as in other
cases.” The convention postponed deciding the question that day12 and again on September 5.13

3 Farrand, vol. II, p. 275.
4 Farrand, vol. I, p. 224. Voting at the Philadelphia convention was by state, with each state’s delegation having one
vote. If a state’s delegation was evenly divided, that state’s vote was not counted in the tally. In cases where fewer than
six states voted on the winning side, the convention would sometimes vote to affirm the result.
5 Farrand, vol. I, p. 524.
6 Farrand, vol. I, p. 524.
7 Farrand, vol. I, p. 547.
8 Farrand, vol. II, pp. 224-225.
9 Farrand, vol. II, p. 263.
10 Farrand, vol. II, p. 273.
11 Farrand, vol. II, p. 280.
12 Farrand, vol. II, p. 298.
13 Farrand, vol. II, p. 510.
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Final y, on September 8, the language of Strong’s proposal was revised, and the Origination
Clause was adopted by the convention, 9-2, in the form that was later ratified.14
Interpreting the Origination Clause
Although the application of the Origination Clause was discussed at the Philadelphia convention,
the Constitution does not provide specific guidelines as to what constitutes a bil for raising
revenue. The meaning of bill for raising revenue is therefore a question of interpretation. As a
result, Congress and federal courts both have played roles in establishing the precedents that
guide interpretation and application of the Origination Clause.
The House
As it is the House that is most frequently cal ed upon to enforce the Origination Clause, its
precedents have played a primary role in defining what makes a bil for raising revenue.15
The rules and practices of the House use the concept of “revenue” in two separate but related
procedures, first in connection with enforcing House prerogatives under the Origination Clause
when considering a resolution to return a bil to the Senate (a “blue-slip resolution”) and second
when enforcing within the House the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Committee on Ways and
Means over al measures “carrying a tax or tariff.”16 The connection between the two uses is
made explicit when, at the beginning of each Congress, the Speaker of the House enunciates
certain policies with respect to several aspects of the legislative process. One of these policies
concerns “guidance concerning the referral of bil s, to assist committees in staying within their
appropriate jurisdictions … and to protect the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate
revenue bil s.”17
In both instances, the House applies a broad standard based on a provision-by-provision review of
whether the measure in question has revenue-affecting potential and not simply whether it would
raise or lower revenues directly. For example, any change in import restrictions may be regarded
by the House as fal ing within the purview of the Origination Clause, because it could have an
impact on tariff revenues. In 1992, the House returned to the Senate a bil (S. 884, 102nd
Congress) to require the President to impose economic sanctions, including a ban on certain
imports, against countries that fail to eliminate large-scale driftnet fishing.18 In 1999, the House

14 Farrand, vol. II, p. 552.
15 House precedents concerning the Origination Clause may be found in: Asher C. Hinds, Hinds’ Precedents of the
House of Representatives of the United States including references to provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and
decisions of the United States Senate (hereinafter cited as Hinds’ Precedents), vol. II, ch. XLVII (Washington: GPO,
1907); Clarence Cannon, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States including
references to provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and Decisions of the United States Senate (hereinafter cited as
Cannon’s Precedents), vol. VI, ch. CLXXX (Washington: GPO, 1935); and Lewis Deschler, Deschler’s Precedents of
the United States House of Representatives including references to provisions of the Constitution and laws, and to
decisions of the courts (hereinafter cited as Deschler’s Precedents), vol. 3, ch. 13, part C (Washington: GPO, 1977).
16 House Rule XXI, clause 5(a).
17 T his policy is articulated in “Policies of the Chair,” Congressional Record, vol. 137 (January 3, 1991), p. 66. Since
that time, t he Speaker’s announcements at the beginning of each Congress have provided that this policy would
continue to govern but that it need not be reiterated, “ as it is adequately documented as precedent in the Rules and
Manual.” T he most recent “ Announcement by the Speaker Pro T empore” appeared at Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 157 (January 3, 2019), pp. H198-H199.
18 “Privileges of the House—Returning to the Senate S. 884, Driftnet Moratorium Enforcement Act of 1991,”
Congressional Record, vol. 138 (February 25, 1992), p. 3377.
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returned to the Senate a bil (S. 254, 105th Congress) effectively banning the import of certain
assault weapon attachments.19
House precedent, as articulated by the policy of recent Speakers of the House, construes the
chamber’s prerogatives broadly to include “any meaningful revenue proposal” but may also
include other types of receipts that may not fal strictly within a technical definition of revenues.
This interpretation is framed by the Speaker in terms of House committee jurisdictions and
referrals, but it also informs the House’s understanding of what constitutes non-revenue receipts
that are not subject to the Origination Clause. While the House rules grant exclusive jurisdiction
over revenues to the Ways and Means Committee, they also al ow for various other standing
committees of the House to consider legislation concerning non-revenue receipts, such as:
user, regulatory and other fees, charges, and assessments levied on a class directly availing
itself of, or directly subject to, a governmental service, program, or activity, but not on the
general public, as measures to be utilized solely to support, subject to annual
appropriations, the service, program, or activity … for which such fees, charges, and
assessments are established and collected and not to finance the costs of Government
generally. The fee must be paid by a class benefitting from the service, program or activity,
or being regulated by the agency; in short, there must be a reasonable connection between
the payors and the agency or function receiving the fee.20
Therefore, the House regards non-revenue receipts to the government to be those based on some
type of voluntary or business transaction. In this context, civil and criminal penalties are not
regarded as revenue in the constitutional sense under the general premise that malfeasance is
elective and therefore does not involve a tax on involuntary behavior.
One example of the distinction between revenue and non-revenue receipts having an impact on
the House’s interpretation of the Origination Clause is the case of S. 104 (105th Congress). This
legislation purported to repeal one fee and replace it with another. It was the repeal of the original
fee, not Senate origination of a new fee, that triggered House action. The new fee was to be
limited to the amount appropriated to cover the cost of nuclear waste disposal. Due to the fact that
the new fee was tied to the actual cost of the activity and was to be borne by the entities directly
involved, the House did not question the Senate’s authority to originate it. Despite being
designated as a “fee,” however, the original fee was considered by the House to be revenue
because the proceeds were uncapped, and fees collected in excess of the associated costs were
deposited in the general fund in the Treasury to be used to finance activities of the federal
government general y. Repeal of the original fee was determined by the House to have a direct
impact on revenues and therefore subject to the Origination Clause, resulting in the measure
being blue-slipped.21
Overal , House precedents indicate a wide spectrum of tax and tariff actions that have been
excluded on the basis of the Origination Clause. In addition to the above, examples of measures
that the House has returned to the Senate include a concurrent resolution reinterpreting a
definition in the tariff act of 1922,22 bil s providing for a bond issue,23 amending the Silver

19 “Privileges of the House—Returning to the Senate the Bill S. 254, Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender
Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999 ,” Congressional Record, vol. 145 (July 15, 1999), pp. 16317-16320.
20 “Policies of the Chair,” Congressional Record, vol. 137 (January 3, 1991), p. 66.
21 “Privileges of the House—Returning to the Senate the Bill S. 104, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,”
Congressional Record, vol. 144 (March 5, 1998), pp. 2618-2619.
22 Cannon’s Precedents, §319.
23 Hinds’ Precedents, §1494.
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Purchase Act,24 exempting receipts from the operation of the Olympic Games from taxation,25 and
redetermining a sugar quota involving a combination of tariff duties and incentive payments.26
One recurring issue in recent years has been House concern that broadly framed trade sanction or
trade sanction waiver provisions could apply to restrictions on both exports and imports. Because
legislation al owing import restrictions to be imposed or lifted is considered to have revenue-
affecting potential, in order to avoid possible blue-slip issues, the House has routinely used or
insisted on the inclusion of language making explicit that authorities and requirements to impose
or lift sanctions authorized in the measure do not include the authority or requirement to impose
or lift sanctions on the importation of goods.27
It should also be noted that a projection of a change in revenues in a cost estimate for a measure is
not, by itself, necessarily dispositive for determining whether a measure might be considered a
revenue bil . House precedents regarding what would be considered a revenue provision are based
on potential changes in revenues directly attributable to the text of a provision rather than on
whether it encourages or discourages behaviors that could ultimately result in a change in
revenues. One example is H.R. 1735 (114th Congress). As passed by the House, Title VI, Subtitle
C, of the bil provided for the federal government to make matching payments for military
personnel participating in the federal TSP program. A cost estimate prepared by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) at the time the bil was reported from the House Armed Services
Committee included the following:
In addition, H.R. 1735 contains provisions that would affect revenues and direct spending.
Changes to the uniformed services retirement system would require DoD [the Department
of Defense]—beginning in 2018—to make matching contributions (using appropriated
funds) to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) on behalf of military personnel. Those matching
contributions would encourage members to contribute a larger portion of their pay to the
TSP, thereby reducing their taxable income. CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) estimate that enacting the bill would reduce revenues by about $1.3 billion
over the 2016-2025 period.28
As stated in the CBO estimate, the revenue effect is attributable to possible changes in behavior
due to the ability of participating service members to garner matching payments rather than a
change in the tax treatment of TSP contributions or withdrawals. As a consequence, H.R. 1735
was not considered to be a revenue measure when considered and passed by the House.
The Senate
Although the Senate’s role in determining what constitutes a bil for raising revenues is less
prominent than that of the House, its precedents have, nevertheless, also shaped the application of
the Origination Clause. The Senate’s practices have influenced the definition of revenues in two
ways: (1) when the Senate rules certain measures out of order and (2) when the Senate declines to

24 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §15.1.
25 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §15.3.
26 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §15.4.
27 For example, see H.R. 5515 (115th Congress) which was recommitted to the committee on conference by H.Res.
1019 (115th Congress) because such language had been deleted. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 164 (July 24,
2018), p. H7150.
28 CBO, Cost Estimate for H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 As reported by t he
House Committee on Armed Services on May 5, 2015 , May 11, 2015, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
hr1735hasc.pdf.
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take up certain measures absent a House-originated revenue bil . The primary impact of Senate
practices, however, has been to underscore the House’s interpretation of what constitutes revenue
in a constitutional sense. Some examples of this include the following:
 The Senate sustained a point of order against a bil that included revenues that
would be paid into the general fund of the Treasury rather than being set aside for
a specific purpose;29
 The Senate declined to sustain a point of order against a bil that included postal
rates on the grounds that postal charges are not considered revenue, even though
they would be deposited into the general fund, because the payments would be
made in exchange for specific services;30
 The Senate refused to consider a bil concerning international commerce in oil
and oil products on the grounds that import restrictions have a direct impact on
tariff revenues.31
Article I, Section 7, clause 1, provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments to
House-originated bil s raising revenues as on other bil s, but there have been occasions on which
either the House or Senate has debated the question of how expansively the Senate’s amending
authority should be interpreted. Some of the earliest precedents show that in the 19th century the
House sometimes exhibited a fairly restrictive view of the Senate’s authority to amend a revenue
bil and regarded the Origination Clause as limiting the Senate only to germane amendments. For
example, in 1807, the House objected to consideration of Senate amendments to a tariff bil that
went beyond the details of the bil ,32 and in 1872, the House tabled a Senate substitute to a House
revenue bil when it sought to expand significantly the scope of the underlying measure. In the
latter example, the House had passed H.R. 1537 (42nd Congress), which repealed duties on coffee
and tea, whereas the Senate amendment contained a general revision of various laws imposing
duties and internal taxes.33 In the House, James A. Garfield, stated:
I do not deny their [the Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an
amendment to our two lines. But I do insis t that their thousand pages must be on the subject
matter of our bill.34
In reaction to the House, the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections issued a report stating
that
it has been urged that to permit the Senate to ingraft, by way of amendment, a g eneral tariff
bill upon a bill of the House laying a duty on peanuts, is entirely to disregard the spirit of
the clause of the Constitution before quoted. In reply it may be said, however, that any
other construction of this constitutional provision would deny to the Senate the power to
amend a House bill laying a duty on peanuts so as to lay a duty upon English walnuts; that
is, would deny to the Senate the power of making to the bill anything more than mere
formal amendments.35
Furthermore, the report argued that the meaning of the phrase raising revenue as used in the
Origination Clause was not dependent on the relative levels of revenue provided in the House bil

29 Cannon’s Precedents, §316.
30 Cannon’s Precedents, §317.
31 Cannon’s Precedents, §320.
32 Hinds’ Precedents, §1481.
33 Hinds’ Precedents, §1489.
34 Congressional Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st sess., April 2, 1872, p. 2107.
35 S.Rept. 146, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., discussed in Hinds’ Precedents, §1489.
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or Senate amendment, and therefore the question of whether a Senate amendment would provide
more or less revenue than the House bil does not inhibit the Senate’s power to amend revenue
bil s:
Suppose the existing law lays a duty of 50 per cent upon iron. A bill repealing such law,
and providing that after a certain day the duty upon iron shall be only 40 per cent, is still a
bill for raising revenue because that is the end in contemplation. Less revenue will be raised
than under the former law, still it is intended to raise revenue, and such a bill could not
constitutionally originate in the Senate, nor could such provisions be ingrafted, by way of
amendment upon any House bill which did not provide for raising —that is, collecting—
revenue.36
The report, however, conceded that the Senate’s amendment authority is not unlimited: It cannot
propose an amendment raising revenue to any House-originated bil but only to a House-
originated bil for raising revenue.37
More recent precedents exhibit no general restriction on the Senate’s amendment authority,
leaving the Senate free to propose any amendment al owed under Senate rules to House-
originated revenue measures. For example, in 1968, the House refused to hold that a Senate
amendment to add a general surtax on income to a House-originated bil concerning excise tax
rates was a violation of the Origination Clause.38
As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue
bil s be germane, the constitutional provision al owing the Senate to “propose or concur with
amendments as on other Bil s” leaves open the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible
alternatives. In this way, the Senate may be said to “originate” specific tax provisions, even
though it may not originate tax measures.39
The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is not bound by congressional interpretation of the Origination Clause. As a
consequence, the Court has independently construed the phrase a bill for raising revenues. If a

36 S.Rept. 146, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., discussed in Hinds’ Precedents, §1489.
37 S.Rept. 146, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., discussed in Hinds’ Precedents, §1489.
38 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §16.1.
39 Federal courts have generally rejected claims that particular amendments exceeded the Senate’s amendment power
under the Origination Clause. For example, in Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914), Chief Justice Edward
White’s majority opinion quoted a lower court opinion that “it is not for this Court to determine wh ether the
amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.” A recent D.C. Circuit decision interpreting the
clause and Rainey concluded that the clause “ imposes no germaneness requirement on the Senate.” Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Services, 799 F.3d 1035, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Another circuit court compared a Senate
amendment to the measure being amended when rejecting an origination clause claim. T he T ax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248) involved the Senate acting on a House-originated measure concerning tariffs
that reduced revenues by amending it to include major revenue increases. T he law was subsequently the subject of over
50 court challenges (none of which were reviewed by the Supreme Court). In one such case, Texas Ass’n of Concerned
Taxpayers, Inc. v. U.S., 772 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit rejected a challenge based on whether the Senate
action was outside the range of amendments permitted under the Origination Clause as “ squarely foreclosed” by
Supreme Court precedent that the Fifth Circuit read to “merely require that both the amendment and the amended
portion address revenue collection.” For a detailed discussion of this example, see John L. Hoffer Jr., “T he Origination
Clause and T ax Legislation,” Boston University Journal of Tax Law, vol. 2 (May 1984), pp. 1-22; and T homas L.
Jipping, “T EFRA and the Origination Clause: T aking the Oath Seriously,” Buffalo Law Review, vol. 35 (Spring 1986),
pp. 633-692. In addition, the issue of the extent of the Senate’s power to amend revenue measures is addressed in
Rebecca M. Kysar, “T he ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause,” Washington University Law
Review, vol. 91, no. 3 (2014), pp. 659-720.
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party chal enges a statute’s enactment as conflicting with the Origination Clause, the federal
courts wil consider that chal enge for cases in which the House has either not objected or chosen
not to act with respect to a Senate action during the lawmaking process.40
Judicial interpretation of the Origination Clause’s meaning has roots in decisions dating back at
least to 1813. Sitting as a circuit justice, Justice Joseph Story wrote that the phrase revenue laws,
as used in a criminal statute of limitations, included those laws that
made for the direct and avowed purpose for creating and securing revenue or public funds
for the service of the government. No laws, whose collateral and indirect operation might
possibly conduce to the public or fiscal wealth, are within the scope of the provision.41
Later, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story applied this same understanding to
the Origination Clause, writing that that provision was
confined to bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood
to extend to bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue.42
The meaning of revenue was further discussed in United States ex rel. Michels v. James, where a
circuit court held that a bil to increase postage rates that had originated in the Senate did not
violate the Origination Clause because it did not fal within the definition of a revenue bil .
Certain legislative measures are unmistakably bills for raising revenue. These impose taxes
upon the people, either directly or indirectly, or lay duties, imposts or excises, fo r the use
of the government, and give to the persons from whom the money is exacted no equivalent
in return, unless in the enjoyment, in common with the rest of the citizens of the benefit of
good government.… A bill regulating postal rates for postal service, provides an equivalent
for the money which the citizen may choose voluntarily to pay.43
As discussed below, the Court’s understanding of the Origination Clause is based on two central
principles that contrast with the interpretation general y applied by the House. As described
above, the House distinguishes between non-revenue receipts that are “levied on a class directly
availing itself of, or directly subject to, a governmental service, program, or activity” and
revenues that finance the activities of government general y. For the Court to consider a measure
to be a revenue bil , (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an
incidental effect, and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the
government general y, rather than a single, specific purpose. These principles are il ustrated in
two often cited cases.
In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, the Supreme Court held that an act to establish a national currency
backed by United States bonds, which also imposed a “tax” on banks based on the average
amount of notes in circulation, did not violate the clause because it was not a revenue bil . In this
case, the Court ruled that the “main purpose” of the bil was to establish a national currency, and

40 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990) (“congressional consideration of constitutional questions
does not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny of the law’s constitutionality. On the contrary, this Court has the duty to
review the constitutionality of congressional enactments”). For more in relation to the Supreme Court and enforcement,
see discussion below.
41 United States v. Mayo, 26 Fed. Cas. 1230, 1231 (C. C. Mass. 1813) (No. 15,755).
42 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (Boston: Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833; reprint edition Littleton, CO:
Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1991) vol. 2, ch. XIII, §877, p. 343.
43 United States ex rel. Michels v. James, 26 Fed. Cas. 577, 578 (C. C. N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464) quoted in Hinds’
Precedents, §1494. Despite the Court’s decision, the House has subsequently maintained on occasion that postal rates
do fall within the scope of their prerogatives. See, for example, Cannon’s Precedents, §317.
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the “tax” on banks was “a means for effectual y accomplishing [that] great object.”44 “There was
no purpose by the act, or by any of its provisions, to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the
expenses or obligations of the government.”45
In Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bil to impose a tax on property in the District of
Columbia to raise money for the express purpose of providing railroad terminal facilities was not
a bil to raise revenue because the money raised was for a specific purpose—in the Court’s words,
the tax was only a “means to the purposes provided by the act.”46
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court addressed significant questions concerning the
application of these holdings and the meaning of the Origination Clause. In United States v.
Munoz-Flores, the Supreme Court heard a chal enge to a law that required federal courts to
impose a monetary “special assessment” on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor to be
deposited, along with other funds, in a Crime Victims Fund, which, in turn, would be available to
meet expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime, although amounts
collected in excess of an annual cap would be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury and
thus be available for any purpose for which Congress might make an appropriation.47
In the opinion of the Court, the fact that the special assessment could create new general fund
revenue for the federal government was not alone sufficient for the measure enacting the special
assessment to be considered a revenue bil . “Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there
is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an
excess in fact materialize.”48 Thus, the Court held that the case “fal s squarely within the holdings
in Nebeker and Millard” and the measure in question was not a revenue bil within the meaning of
the Constitution because “the special assessment provision was passed as part of a particular
program to provide money for that program.” Any general fund revenue the special assessment
provision created would be “incidental to the provision’s primary purpose.”49 In a footnote to the
opinion, however, the Court cautioned:
A different case might be presented if the program funded were entirely unrelated to the
persons paying for the program.… Whether a bill would be “for raising Revenue” where
the connection between payor and program was more attenuated is not now before us.50
In other words, the method by which funds are raised, the purposes for which they are raised, and
the connection between these two elements are issues that may affect the Court’s interpretation of
the Origination Clause’s application in a given case.
In 2014, Representative Dave Camp, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, raised
concerns about the potential for confusion arising from contrasting application of the Origination
Clause by the House and federal courts.51 Representative Camp stated that the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in Sissel v. HHS was at odds with House practice. More specifical y,

44 T win City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1897).
45 Ibid., 203.
46 Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 437 (1906).
47 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1990).
48 Ibid., 399.
49 Ibid., 398.
50 Ibid., 400-01, n 7.
51 “Origination Clause,” Congressional Record (daily edition), vol. 160 (December 12, 2014), Extension of Remarks, p.
E1812. Representative Camp was responding specifically to Sissel v. United States Dept. of Health and Hum an
Services, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc denied, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Representative Camp expressed concern with applying a standard for what constitutes a revenue
measure based on its “primary aim.” He went on to state that
Although some courts have taken a narrower view of what constitutes a “a bill for raising
revenue,” the “primary purpose” test articulated in Sissel presents heightened challenges
in interpretation that not only threaten the constitutional balance in Congress but invite
subjective judicial scrutiny of the legislative process. This analysis may lead to confusion
between the legislative and judicial branch on measures where the primary purpose is not
easily ascertainable, measures that contain multiple, competing purposes, and measures
that state a purpose that is in conflict with its content.
The House’s traditional provision-by-provision review of a measure and the effect of each
on revenue is the more sound approach. This interpretation has served the Congress wel
when resolving differences between the House and Senate on the Origination Clause.
It should also be noted that federal courts agree with Congress that the phrase a bill for raising
revenue includes those measure that collect or levy taxes. Federal courts have rejected a narrower
reading that would encompass only those measures that only increase taxes.52 According to one
federal court, to do otherwise would be an attempt to apply a “slippery and potential y
chameleonic” label to legislation that “may have an effect of increasing revenue under certain
economic conditions and decreasing revenue under others.”53
Enforcing the Origination Clause
The House
The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process
known as “blue-slipping.”54 Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate
a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination
Clause. The House takes this action by adopting a privileged resolution stating that a Senate bil
or Senate amendment(s) to a non-revenue House bil , “in the opinion of this House, contravenes
the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States
and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bil [or such bil with the
Senate amendment(s) thereto] be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message
communicating this resolution.” It is cal ed blue-slipping because historical y the resolution
returning the offending bil to the Senate is printed on blue paper. The consideration of questions
of privilege by the House is provided for under House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1),55 which states:
A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor
by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House,
or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution, shall have
precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn [emphasis added].
Any Member of the House may offer such a resolution. In most cases it is the chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee who would do so, based on the advice of the House Parliamentarian,

52 T exas Ass’n of Concerned T axpayers, Inc. v. U.S., 772 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the contention that
the phrase “raising revenue” means “increasing revenue” and explaining “that all contemporary courts have adopted the
construction … relating to revenue” (quotation marks omitted)).
53 Ibid.
54 T he term blue-slipping is also sometimes used in an unrelated sense by the Senate in connection with the nomination
of federal judges.
55 For additional information on the consideration of questions of privilege generally, see CRS Report R44005,
Questions of the Privileges of the House: An Analysis, by Megan S. Lynch.
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although another member of the committee may be designated to offer the resolution.
Consideration of the resolution takes place in the House of Representatives under the one-hour
rule. Clause 2(a)(2) of House Rule IX further provides:
The time allotted for debate on a resolution offered from the floor as a question of the
privileges of the House shall be equally divided between (A) the proponent of the
resolution, and (B) the Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, or a designee, as determined
by the Speaker.
There have been instances, however, where other Members have offered blue-slip resolutions
when the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee did not believe that the bil in question
violated the Origination Clause, and the resolution was subsequently tabled.56
Although blue-slipping is the primary method used by the House to enforce the Origination
Clause, the House may in its discretion also use a variety of less formal actions. For example, in
the past the House has occasional y chosen simply to ignore a Senate-passed bil and instead
taken action on a corresponding House bil .57 The House may also refer a questionable Senate
measure to a committee. In such instances, a committee may choose simply to report a House bil
rather than consider the Senate bil further.58 The House may also decide to use a conference
committee as a venue for deciding Origination Clause questions by having an offending provision
removed in conference without having to take the formal step of blue-slipping.59
If an effort to use an informal alternative does not result in the removal of an offending provision,
it would not prevent the House from later using a blue-slip resolution to enforce its prerogatives.
This is because the enforcement of the Origination Clause is based on a constitutional prerogative
of the House and is therefore distinct from enforcement of its standing rules, which require that
points of order must be raised in a timely manner.60 The House can assert its prerogative at any
time it is in possession of the bil and related papers (that is, any time the actual documents are
not physical y in the possession of the Senate or a conference committee).61
In addition, because enforcement of the Origination Clause raises a constitutional issue, the
House may not choose simply to waive its application in a manner that would foreclose later
judicial chal enges to the enacted law. Although the House is free to determine for itself whether
it believes that legislation passed by the Senate infringes on its prerogative to originate revenue

56 For example, when H.Res. 571 (97th Cong.), a blue-slip resolution, was offered by Representative John Rousselot,
Representative Dan Rostenkowski, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, offered a motion to table
it. Congressional Record (August 19, 1982), pp. 22127-22128.
57 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §§18.1-18.5.
58 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §18.5.
59 Such an accommodation was proposed by Representative David Obey, the chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, for dealing with a revenue provision inserted into the FY1995 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill ( H.R. 4554, 103rd Congress). During floor remarks
concerning this proposed accommodation, Representative Robert Walker stated that such an accommodation had
previously been made during consideration of the Senate-passed FY1995 Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations bill
(H.R. 4603, 103rd Congress). For details see the discussion during consideration of H.Res. 518 (103rd Congress) in
“Privileges of the House—Returning to the Senate the Senate Amendments to H.R. 4554,” remarks in the House,
Congressional Record, vol. 140 (August 12, 1994), pp. 21655-21658.
60 For more, see CRS Report 98-307, Points of Order, Rulings, and Appeals in the House of Representatives, by Valerie
Heitshusen.
61 For example, in the 111th Congress, the House adopted H.Res. 1653, a resolution to return to the Senate a group of
five Senate bills and the Senate amendment to a non-revenue House bill that had passed the Senate and been received
in the House at various times during the Congress.
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legislation, federal courts have occasional y been asked to rule on whether certain revenue
provisions may be unconstitutional as not having originated in the House.62
The Senate
According to Riddick’s Senate Procedure, when a question is raised in the Senate regarding the
constitutionality of a measure, including whether the measure contravenes the Origination Clause,
it is submitted directly to the Senate for its determination.63 Similarly, an amendment proposing to
raise revenues would be out of order on the same grounds if offered to a non-revenue measure. A
point of order against such an amendment would also be submitted by the presiding officer
directly to the Senate.64 Such a point of order would general y be debatable and decided by
majority vote.
Like the House, the Senate may employ less formal means for applying the Origination Clause.
For example, on June 27, 2019, the Senate passed S. 1790 (116th Congress). As passed, Title
LXIX of this measure (designated as the Otto Warmbier Banking Restrictions Involving North
Korea Act of 2019) included language amending waiver provisions in 22 U.S.C. Chapter 99.
After the House informal y raised concerns about the potential for such a waiver to have an
impact on imports, the Senate requested the return of the papers on September 12, 2019,
preempting formal action by the House.65 Upon receiving the papers the Senate agreed by
unanimous consent that “notwithstanding the passage of the bil , amendment No. 938 is agreed
to, and the measure wil be returned to the House.” The amendment deleted the change in the
waiver language and inserted new language to clarify that the “authorities and requirements to
impose sanctions authorized under this title or the amendments made by this title shal not include
the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.”66 The bil was then
returned to the House for further action.
The Supreme Court
In most instances in which the courts have ruled with regard to Origination Clause matters, they
have decided whether the particular measure was a revenue bil within the meaning of the clause.
Courts have not decided disputed questions of whether the measure originated in the House or in
the Senate.67
Historical y, the Court’s role in enforcing the Origination Clause has been limited. In most
circumstances, Supreme Court Justices have been reluctant to look behind a bil as enrolled to
determine its validity. That is, the Court has primarily limited its role to determining whether a
given measure fits the definition of a bill for raising revenue. Under this approach, the Court
would look to the measure’s designation as a House or Senate bil but would not examine the

62 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Report on the Legislative and Oversight Activities of the
Com m ittee on Ways and Means during the 115 th Congress, H.Rept. 115-1115, 115th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington:
GPO, 2019), p. 136. T he report cites United States v. Munoz-Flores as an example.
63 U.S. Congress, Senate, Riddick’s Senate Procedure, S.Doc. 101-28, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., by Floyd M. Riddick and
Alan S. Frumin (hereinafter cited as Riddick’s Senate Procedure) (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. 685, 1215. See also
CRS Report R40948, Constitutional Points of Order in the Senate, by Valerie Heitshusen.
64 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, pp. 52, 1215.
65 Congressional Record, daily edition (September 12, 2019), p. S5461.
66 Congressional Record, daily edition (September 12, 2019), p. S5466.
67 For example see United States ex rel. Michels v. James, Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, and Millard v. Roberts discussed
above.
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journals of the House or Senate to independently determine in which chamber the specific
revenue provision at issue may actual y have originated. This approach is similar to the “enrolled
bil rule” adopted in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, which general y precludes courts from
questioning the certification by the presiding legislative officers of the House and Senate68 that an
enrolled bil was passed in identical form by both the House and Senate as required under Article
I, Section 7, clause 2.69
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., the Court decided the Origination Clause issue on an undisputed view
of the legislative history of the measure and did not look beyond the designation of the underlying
measure as a House bil . In this case, a House bil that included inheritance tax provisions had
been amended by the Senate to contain corporate taxes instead. The Court held that the “bil
having properly originated in the House, we perceive no reason in the constitutional provision …
why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which it was in this case.”70
More recently, however, the Court has rejected the idea of ruling on cases arising under the
Origination Clause based on the application of the principle embodied in the enrolled bil rule. In
a footnote to the majority opinion in United States v. Munoz-Flores, Justice Thurgood Marshal
quoted from the decision in Marshall Field to state that in “the absence of any constitutional
requirement binding Congress” as to how enrolled bil s are to be authenticated, the courts must
accept as passed al bil s authenticated in the manner provided by Congress. Justice Marshal
continued, however, and wrote that when “a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not
apply.”71
The Court’s analysis of Marshall Field responded to the concurring opinion of Justice Antonin
Scalia, which stated that “the same principle [of Marshall Field], if not the very same holding,
leads me to conclude that federal courts should not undertake an independent investigation into
the origination of the statute at issue here.”72 Thus, Justice Scalia would have accepted the
designation of the bil as originating in the House because the bil bore the designation H.J.Res.
648 (98th Congress). Justice Scalia stated that this approach would not entirely insulate acts from
Origination Clause chal enges: “This disposition does not place forever beyond our reach the only
issue in this area that seems to me appropriate for judicial rather than congressional resolution:
what sort of bil s constitute ‘Bil s for raising Revenue.’”73 To do otherwise would “manifest a
lack of respect due a coordinate branch.” Further, the Court “should no more gainsay Congress’
official assertion of the origin of a bil than we would gainsay its official assertion that the bil
was passed by the requisite quorum.”74
The majority opinion’s response to Justice Scalia also stated that while a judicial finding that
Congress had passed an unconstitutional law might in some sense be said to entail a “lack of
respect” for Congress’s judgment, that was not sufficient to make a question nonjusticiable either
on the basis of the enrolled bil rule or as a political question.75 Furthermore:

68 T he Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, respectively.
69 143 U.S. 649 (1892). For an overview of the enrolled bill rule, see Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction, 5th ed. (Deerfield, IL: Clark, Boardman, and Callaghan, 1992), ch. 15, pp. 743-774.
70 Flint v. Stone T racy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911).
71 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391, n. 4.
72 Ibid., 409 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73 Ibid., 410 (Scalia, J., concurring).
74 Ibid.
75 In Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the Supreme Court identified the features that characterize a case rising
from a nonjusticiable political question, including “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
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If it were, every [italic in original] judicial resolution of a constitutional challenge to a
congressional enactment would be impermissible.… Congressional consideration of
constitutional questions does not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny.76
As a consequence, the Court held that the House was not the sole authority with respect to
determining the meaning or enforcement of its prerogatives under the Origination Clause.
Although the House certainly can refuse to pass a bill because it violates the Origination
Clause, that ability does not absolve this Court of its responsibility to consider
constitutional challenges to congressional enactments.… Nor do the House’s incentives to
safeguard its origination prerogative obviate the need for judicial review.… In short, the
fact that one institution of government has mechanisms available to guard against
incursions into its power does not require the judiciary remove itself from controversy by
labeling the issue a political question.77
The majority opinion further stated:
A law passed in violation of the Origination Clause would thus be no more immune from
judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both Houses and signed by the President than
would a law passed in violation of the First Amendment.78
Thus, the House may certainly determine for itself whether the Origination Clause does or does
not apply in a particular case, but a House determination that the clause does not apply does not
prevent a federal court from later reviewing that same question. As a consequence, unlike its
rules, which the House may choose not to enforce at its discretion, the House’s passage of a bil
does not foreclose later chal enges to the resulting act under the Origination Clause.
Other Legislation and the Origination Clause
Appropriations Legislation
Historical y, the House has asserted from time to time that the Origination Clause applies not only
to bil s to raise revenues but to bil s to spend revenues as wel .79 This principle is asserted by the
House as “immemorial custom” from which “there has been no deviation … since the
establishment of the Constitution.”80 Due to this interpretation, the House has insisted on
originating general appropriations bil s. The House and Senate disagree on this interpretation,
however.
Proponents of the House’s position have maintained that the phrase bills for raising revenues that
appears in the Constitution is synonymous with the more inclusive phrase money bills. This view
has its basis in the fact that when the Constitution was drafted, the British House of Commons
possessed the undivided authority to originate al types of money bil s. Proponents argue that

without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.”
76 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 390-391.
77 Ibid., 392.
78 Ibid., 397.
79 T he House does not appear to treat revenue measures and appropriations measures as equivalent, however. For
example, in the 111th Congress, t he House returned the Senate amendment to H.R. 5875, a supplemental appropriations
bill, to the Senate on the grounds that the Senate amendment contained a revenue provision. “ Retur ning Several
Measures to the Senate,” Congressional Record, vol. 156 (September 23, 2010), p. 16379-16380.
80 U.S. Congress, House, Cannon’s Procedure in the House of Representatives, H.Doc. 122, 86th Cong., 1st sess., by
Clarence Cannon (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 20.
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because the British Parliament was the model for much of the constitutional convention’s work,
the drafters intended to mirror this authority and grant control over al money bil s to the House.
They suggest that the debate at the convention concerned primarily whether the Senate should
have the authority to amend—not whether the House should have exclusive authority to
originate—money bil s, and they point to Federalist No. 58 (attributed to Madison), which states:
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies
requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse.… This power
over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effective weapon with
which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.81
In addition, they argue that the practice of the House to insist upon originating appropriations
dated back to the First Congress and therefore must have been deliberate rather than accidental. In
the words of Senator Wil iam H. Seward:
[W]hatever the Convention may have proposed, and however they may have understood
the Constitution which they have framed, the fact is a stubborn one that the Senate has
never originated an appropriations bill, but that it has always conceded to the House of
Representatives the origination of appropriations bills.82
Opponents counter that by specifical y rejecting more inclusive phrases, such as money bills or
bills for raising or appropriating money, the drafters were clearly deviating from the British
model.83 They argue that the custom of the House originating appropriations was an outgrowth of
mere practice and gradual y developed into a doctrine despite lacking specific constitutional
sanction.84
As with the question of the extent of the Senate’s authority to amend House-originated revenue
bil s, the historical record shows that Congress has examined this issue on several occasions with
sometimes conflicting results.
 In 1856, during a prolonged contest over election of the Speaker and the
organization of the House, the House was unable to transact any legislative
business. The Senate debated and adopted a resolution directing that, in the name
of expediency, the Committee on Finance should prepare and report
appropriations bil s rather than wait for House action. However, no
appropriations appear to have actual y been reported as a result.85
 In 1880, a Senate bil making an appropriation was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee with instructions that it inquire into the right of the Senate
to originate bil s making appropriations. The majority of the committee
concluded that the right to originate appropriations was not exclusive to the
House and recommended the House adopt a resolution supporting this position.
The minority filed dissenting views reaching the opposite conclusion and
recommended that the House adopt a resolution supporting their position and

81 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library,
1961), p. 359.
82 Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., February 7, 1856, p. 376.
83 For details on the evolution of the language of the Origination Clause, see the discussion of the constitutional
convention above.
84 Cannon’s Precedents, §321, describing the position of Senator Francis E. Warren in the Congressional Record, vol.
48 (April 11, 1912), p. 4577.
85 Hinds’ Precedents, §1500.
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return the Senate bil . The House took no action on either recommended
resolution nor on the Senate bil .86
 In 1885, the House again declined to investigate the authority of the Senate to
originate appropriations.87
The House, however, has never formal y acknowledged that the Origination Clause does not
apply to appropriations and has returned to the Senate appropriations bil s originated by that
chamber. In 1953, the House returned to the Senate a measure making appropriations for the
District of Columbia,88 and in 1962, the House returned a measure making appropriations for the
Department of Agriculture.89 In response to the latter episode, the Senate adopted a resolution
(S.Res. 414, 87th Congress) asserting its authority to originate bil s appropriating money and
requesting that the question be submitted either to the federal courts for a declaratory judgment or
a commission.90 The House took no action on this proposal.
The following year, during hearings on creating a joint committee on the budget, the Senate
Committee on Government Operations heard testimony regarding concerns that the proposal
might infringe on the House’s prerogatives under the Origination Clause.91 The committee
subsequently requested a study on the question that was published both with the hearing and
separately as a Senate document.92 The study reached the same conclusion as the 1881 House
Judiciary Committee study: that there was no constitutional basis for the practice of the House
originating appropriations. No further action was taken to incorporate this conclusion into
congressional practice, however.
Although the Senate has never adopted the House’s interpretation, in practice it has general y
deferred to the House’s insistence on originating appropriations measures while amending them
consistent with Senate rules, precedents, and practices, as they do with revenue bil s.
Debt Limit Legislation
Questions concerning the level of public debt are often closely related to questions of revenue,
because if receipts collected by the federal government are not sufficient to cover outlays, it may
be necessary for the Treasury to finance the shortfal through the sale of various types of debt
instruments to the public and federal agencies. In addition, legislative jurisdiction over these two
issues is exercised by the same committees that exercise jurisdiction over tax legislation in both
the House and Senate. Historical y, it has been the general custom for the House to originate
legislation to provide for the issuance of federal debt or to establish a limit on the level of federal
debt. Neither chamber, however, has asserted that public debt legislation is subject to the
Origination Clause or that questions concerning the purpose or usage of debt securities are

86 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Power of the Senate to Originate Appropriations Bills, 46th
Cong., 3rd sess., H.Rept. 147 (Washington: GPO, 1881). T his report is also discussed in Hinds’ Precedents, §1500.
87 Hinds’ Precedents, §1501.
88 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §20.4.
89 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §20.2.
90 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §20.1
91 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Create a Joint Committee on the Budget, hearings on
S. 537, 88th Cong., 1st sess., March 19 and 20, 1963 (Washington: GPO, 1963). See especially the testimony of Lucius
Wilmerding Jr., pp. 59-68.
92 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, The Authority of the Senate to Originate
Appropriation Bills, S.Doc. 17, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1963).
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subsumed under questions of origination of revenue bil s. The actions of the House since 1946
with regard to debt legislation have been consistent with this interpretation.
On the broad question of whether or not al legislation concerning public debt was subject to the
Origination Clause, the House concluded that it is not. In May 1946, the House debated what
course of action to take regarding S.J.Res. 138 (79th Congress). The proposed joint resolution
would have amended the Second Liberty Loan Act by adding to and expanding the purposes for
which the proceeds from the sale of federal debt could be used. In the course of debating House
action on the Senate measure, Representative John W. McCormack inserted a memorandum in the
Congressional Record that stated:
[I]t appears to be clear that a bill to raise funds through the sale of Government obligations
does not violate the privilege of the House as set forth in article I, section 7, clause 1 of the
Constitution. Even if it should be concluded, however, that a bill to raise funds by selling
Government bonds violates the privilege of the House, it would be necessary for the House
to reach the additional conclusion that Senate Joint Resolution 138 does provide for the
raising of funds through the sale of Government obligations.… [The resolution] merely
instructs the Secretary of the Treasury how to use funds he is already authorized to raise
… not increase the limit of public-debt issues.93
An unnumbered House resolution to return S.J.Res. 138 to the Senate on the grounds that it
infringed on the House’s prerogatives under the Origination Clause was subsequently referred to
the Judiciary Committee, which undertook no action with regard to the constitutional question.94
On the narrower question of whether legislation specifical y concerning the amount of federal
debt is subject to the Origination Clause, the House also concluded that it does not apply. In June
1946, the Senate passed a bil to lower the debt limit, which was received in the House and
referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. The committee voted not to recommend that the
House return the bil to the Senate but declined to report the bil to the full House for further
action. Instead, the committee reported a House bil on the same subject that was subsequently
passed by the House and Senate and became law.95 In more recent years, Congress has used a
Senate bil to increase or suspend the limit on the public debt on several occasions.96

93 “Privilege of the House,” Congressional Record, vol. 92 (May 14, 1946), p. 5004.
94 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §17.1.
95 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 13, §18.4.
96 S. 2578 (107th Congress), enacted as P.L. 107-199; S. 2986 (108th Congress), enacted as P.L. 108-415; S. 312 (112th
Congress), enacted as P.L. 112-25; and S. 540 (113th Congress), enacted as P.L. 113-83. For more on public debt
legislation, see CRS Report RS21519, Legislative Procedures for Adjusting the Public Debt Lim it: A Brief Overview,
by Bill Heniff Jr.
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

Table 1. Blue Slip Resolutions, 102nd-116th Congress (1991-2020)
Date
Resolution
Measure Returned to the Senate
102nd Congress

October 22, 1991
H.Res. 251
S. 1241 (The Violent Crime Act of 1991). This measure included
several provisions amending the Internal Revenue Code.
October 31, 1991
H.Res. 267
S. 320 (To reauthorize the Export Administration Act of 1979). This
measure included several provisions that would impose, or authorize
the imposition of, a ban on certain imports based on certain practices
by Iraq, including the proliferation and use of chemical and biological
weapons and the transfer of missile technology.
February 25, 1992
H.Res. 373
S. 884 (To amend the Driftnet Moratorium Enforcement Act of 1991).
This measure included a provision to require the President to impose
economic sanctions (including imposing a ban on certain imports)
against countries that fail to eliminate large-scale driftnet fishing.
103rd Congress

July 14, 1994
H.Res. 479
H.R. 4539 (Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriation Act, 1995). A Senate amendment would have prohibited
the Treasury from using appropriated funds to enforce an Internal
Revenue Code requirement.
July 21, 1994
H.Res. 486
S. 729 (To amend the Toxic Substances Control Act). This measure
included several provisions prohibiting the importation of specific
categories of products containing more than specified quantities of lead.
July 21, 1994
H.Res. 487
S. 1030 (Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 1994). This
measure included a provision that would exempt from taxation certain
payments made on behalf of participants in the Education Debt
Reduction Program.
August 12, 1994
H.Res. 518
H.R. 4554 (Agriculture and Rural Development Appropriation Act,
1995). A Senate amendment would have provided authority for the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to col ect fees in excess of the
costs of regulating products under their jurisdiction to be charged to a
broad cross-section of the public (rather than just those directly
connected to the regulated activities) in order to fund the cost of FDA
activities general y.
October 7, 1994
H.Res. 577
S. 1216 (The Crow Boundary Settlement Act of 1994). This measure
included a provision exempting certain payments and benefits from
taxation.
104th Congress

March 21, 1996
H.Res. 387
S. 1518 (To repeal the Tea Importation Act of 1897). This measure
included language changing import restrictions.
April 16, 1996
H.Res. 402
S. 1463 (To amend the Trade Act of 1974). This measure included
language that would have had the effect of changing the basis and
mechanism for import restrictions that could be imposed under
authority granted to the President.
September 27, 1996
H.Res. 545
S. 1311 (The National Physical Fitness and Sports Foundation
Establishment Act). This measure included a provision waiving the
application of certain rules governing recognition of tax-exempt status
for the foundation established in this measure.
September 28, 1996
H.Res. 554
H.R. 400 (The Anaktuvuk Pass Land Exchange and Wilderness
Redesignation Act of 1995). The Senate amendment included a
provision expanding the definition of actions not subject to Federal,
State, or local taxation under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

Date
Resolution
Measure Returned to the Senate
105th Congress

March 5, 1998
H.Res. 379
S. 104 (The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997). This measure included
language to repeal an existing revenue law (labeled a fee) and replace it
with a user fee.
October 15, 1998
H.Res. 601
S. 361 (The Tiger and Rhinoceros Conservation Act of 1998). This
measure included language that would have had the effect of changing
the basis and mechanism for applying import restrictions on products
containing any substance derived from tigers or rhinoceroses.
106th Congress

July 16, 1999
H.Res. 249
S. 254 (The Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and
Rehabilitation Act of 1999). This measure included a provision that
would have had the effect of banning the import of large capacity
ammunition feeding devices.
November 18, 1999
H.Res. 393
S. 4 (The Soldiers’, Sailors’, Airmen’s, and Marines’ Bil of Rights Act of
1999). This measure included a provision al owing members of the
Armed Forces to participate in the Federal Thrift Savings Program and
to avoid certain tax consequences.
107th Congress

September 20, 2001
H.Res. 240
H.R. 2500 (Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and related agencies Appropriations Act, 2002). The Senate
amendment included a provision banning the importation of diamonds
not certified as originating outside conflict zones.
111th Congress

September 23, 2010
H.Res. 1653
H.R. 5875 (Emergency Border Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010).
(returning six
The Senate amendment included a provision requiring certain
measures)
employers to pay a surcharge with respect to each application for
certain worker visas, with the additional amount to be deposited in the
general fund of the Treasury.
S. 3162. This measure included a provision amending the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
S. 3187 (Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010). This
measure included a provision extending fuel and ticket taxes that fund
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
S. 2799 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2009). This measure included a provision banning the
importation of goods from Iran.
S. 1023 (Travel Promotion Act of 2009). This measure included a
provision requiring users of the government’s visa waiver program to
pay a surcharge, with some of the proceeds to be used to pay for
program costs general y.
S. 951 (New Frontier Congressional Gold Medal Act). This measure
included a provision directing the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit
proceeds from the sale of certain commemorative coins into the
United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund.
112th Congress

December 12, 2012
H.Res. 829
H.R. 4310 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013).
The Senate amendment included provisions imposing sanctions,
including import sanctions, on persons conducting sanctionable
activities with Iran and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
114th Congress

Congressional Research Service
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

Date
Resolution
Measure Returned to the Senate
June 25, 2015
H.Res. 340
H.R. 1735 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016).
The Senate amendment would have changed the tax treatment of the
Military Retirement Fund.
Source: Congressional Research Service, including information from U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways
and Means, Report on the Legislative and Oversight Activities of the Committee on Ways and Means during the 114th
Congress, H.Rept. 114-887, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2016), pp. 130-33.
Notes: To date, there have been no blue-slip resolutions adopted since the 114th Congress. In addition to the
blue-slip resolutions identified in this table, however, it should be noted that during the 115th Congress, H.Res.
1019 was offered as a question of the privileges of the House and adopted on July 24, 2018. The privileged
resolution recommitted H.R. 5515 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019) to the committee
on conference as an infringement of the prerogative of the House to originate revenue measures. This marked
the first time the House had adopted a resolution that assessed a committee on conference had ‘ originated’ a
revenue measure, although the House had previously tabled a similar resolution during the 106 th Congress
(H.Res. 568, Congressional Record, July 27, 2000, p. 16565).

Congressional Research Service
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

Appendix. Select Bibliography
Cannon, Clarence. Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States
including references to provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and Decisions of the United
States Senate, vol. VI, chap. CLXXX. (Washington: GPO, 1935).
Deschler, Lewis. Deschler’s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives including
references to provisions of the Constitution and laws, and to decisions of the courts, vol. 3, chap.
13, part C. (Washington: GPO, 1977).
Evans, Michael W. ‘A Source of Frequent and Obstinate Altercations’: The History and
Application of the Origination Clause, Tax History Project, 2004 (http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/
readings.nsf/ArtWeb/8149692C128846EF85256F5F000F3D67?OpenDocument).
Farrel y, Marie T. “Special Assessments and the Origination Clause,” Fordham Law Review 58
(December 1989): 447-69.
Hoffer, John L. Jr. “The Origination Clause and Tax Legislation,” Boston University Journal of
Tax Law 2 (May 1984): 1-22.
Hinds, Asher C. Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States including
references to provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and decisions of the United States Senate,
vol. II, chap. XLVII. (Washington: GPO, 1907).
Jipping, Thomas L. “TEFRA and the Origination Clause: Taking the Oath Seriously,” Buffalo
Law Review 35 (Spring 1986): 633-92.
Kysar, Rebecca M. “The ‘Shel Bil ’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause,” Washington
University Law Review, 91, no. 3 (2014): 659-720.
Madara, F. G. “Annotation: Application of Constitutional Requirement that Bil s for Raising
Revenue Originate in Lower House.” In American Law Reports Annotated, 2d Series, editor-in-
chief Edwin Stacey Oakes, vol. 4, 973-990. Rochester, NY: The Lawyers Co-Operative
Publishing Co., 1949. Supp. 2002.
Medina, J. Michael. “The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative
Survey,” Tulsa Law Journal 23 (Winter 1987): 165-234.
Natelson, Robert G. “The Founders’ Origination Clause and Implications for the Affordable Care
Act,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 38, no. 2 (2015): 629-709.
Smyth, Daniel J. “The Original Public Meaning of Amendment in the Origination Clause Versus
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” British Journal of American Legal Studies 6, no.
2 (2017): 302-61.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Power of the Senate to Originate
Appropriations Bills, 46th Congress, 3rd session, 1881, H.Rept. 147.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Report on the Legislative and Oversight
Activities of the Committee on Ways and Means During the 111th Congress, 111th Congress, 2nd
session, 2011, H.Rept. 111-708.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Create a Joint Committee on the
Budget: Hearing before the Committee on Government Operations on S. 537. 88th Congress, 1st
session, March 19-20, 1963.
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The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. The Authority of the Senate to
Originate Appropriation Bills. 88th Congress, 1st session, 1963, S.Doc. 17.

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James V. Saturno

Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

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