China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress

July 29, 2020 – August 3, 2020 R46473

China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong:
August 3, 2020
Issues for Congress
Susan V. Lawrence
On June 30, 2020, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed a
Specialist in Asian Affairs
national security law (NSL) for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Hong

Kong’s Chief Executive promulgated it in Hong Kong later the same day. The law is widely seen
Michael F. Martin
as undermining the HKSAR’s once-high degree of autonomy and eroding the rights promised to
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Hong Kong in the 1984 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, an international treaty

between the People’s Republic of China (China, or PRC) and the United Kingdom covering the
50 years from 1997 to 2047.

The NSL criminalizes four broadly defined categories of offenses: secession, subversion, organization and perpetration of
terrorist activities, and “collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security” in relation
to the HKSAR. Persons convicted of violating the NSL can be sentenced to up to life in prison. China’s central government
can, at its or the HKSAR’s discretion, exercise jurisdiction over alleged violations of the law and prosecute and adjudicate
the cases in mainland China. The law apparently applies to alleged violations committed by anyone, anywhere in the world,
including in the United States.
The HKSAR and PRC governments have already begun implementing the NSL, including setting up the new entities the law
requires. China’s central government has opened its “Office for Safeguarding National Security” in Hong Kong; the Office
and its staff are not subject to Hong Kong law when conducting their work. The HKSAR government has formed its
“Committee for Safeguarding National Security,” as well as created a new national security department in the Hong Kong
Police Force (HKPF) and a new division in the HKSAR Department of Justice for prosecution of national security cases. The
HKPF arrested at least 10 people for alleged violations of the national security law on the day after the law went into effect.
The NSL has received a mixed response in Hong Kong, where views about the PRC’s treatment of Hong Kong are polarized.
Supporters of the HKSAR government in the city’s Legislative Council (Legco) welcomed the new law, while Legco’s pro-
democracy coalition condemned the law. Tens of thousands of Hong Kong residents participated in a largely peaceful
demonstration on July 1, 2020, in opposition to the law, despite efforts by the HKPF to stop them turning out. On July 11 and
12, 2020, the pro-democracy political parties held an informal primary to select candidates for Legco elections originally
scheduled to be held on September 6, 2020. (Citing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, the HKSAR government has
postponed the election until September 2021.) More than 610,000 people, over 13% of eligible voters, participated. The
HKSAR government has initiated an official investigation to determine, among other things, if holding the primary violated
the national security law. The HKSAR government has also threatened to disqualify candidates who participated in the
primary. The response to the NSL from Hong Kong’s business community has varied from statements of support to
expressions of serious concerns about the implications of the law for the city’s economic future.
On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (P.L. 116-149), which authorizes the imposition of
sanctions on PRC and HKSAR officials, as well as “foreign financial institutions” that provide financial services to
designated individuals. On the same day, President Trump signed Executive Order 13936, declaring that “the situation with
respect to Hong Kong, including recent actions taken by the PRC to fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy,
constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”
The Executive Order authorizes the Secretaries of State and the Treasury to impose sanctions on persons “involved in
developing, adopting, or implementing” the NSL or involved in or responsible for actions that undermine Hong Kong’s
autonomy, “undermine democratic processes or institutions” in Hong Kong, or limit the rights of Hong Kong residents. The
Executive Order also suspends many of Hong Kong’s special treatments under U.S. law, including in immigration matters.
Bills pending in Congress could potentially authorize additional sanctions on the PRC and HKSAR governments, or provide
preferential treatment for Hong Kong residents who wish to relocate to the United States. They include The Hong Kong Be
Water Act (H.R. 5725, S. 2758), The Hong Kong Freedom Act (H.R. 6947), The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice
Act (H.R. 7428, S. 4229), The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act (H.R. 7415, S. 4110), and The Hong Kong Victims of
Communism Support Act (S. 3892).
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China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress

Overview
At 11:00 p.m. Hong Kong time on June 30, 2020, a new national security law went into effect in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR, or Hong Kong) of the People’s
Republic of China (China, or PRC). Critics of the law, including many Members of Congress and
the Trump Administration, view the law as violating obligations the PRC undertook in the 1984
Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, a treaty signed with the United Kingdom and
registered with the United Nations.1 Such critics charge that the law erodes the “high degree of
autonomy” the PRC promised the HKSAR for 50 years, from 1997 to 2047. They also assert that
it undermines the human rights of Hong Kong residents, calls into question the city’s continued
viability as a global financial and trading hub, and signals the effective end of the PRC’s “one
country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong.2 The PRC and HSKAR governments portray the law
as a necessary measure to close national security “loopholes” in HKSAR law, to move Hong
Kong from “turmoil to stability” after a year of sometimes violent protests, and to rebalance the
“one country, two systems” formula to emphasize “one country.”3
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (national security law, or NSL) criminalizes four broadly defined
categories of offenses: secession, subversion, organization and perpetration of terrorist activities,
and “collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security” in
relation to the HKSAR.4 A May 28, 2020, decision by China’s legislature, the National People’s
Congress (NPC), paved the way for the legislation by authorizing the NPC’s Standing Committee
(NPCSC) to implement laws “to establish and improve the HKSAR legal system and enforcement
mechanisms for the protection of national security.”5 Among other provisions, the NSL directs the
PRC central government to establish a national security office in Hong Kong and authorizes the
office to exercise jurisdiction over certain national security cases, which are to be prosecuted and
tried in mainland China. It also mandates the HKSAR government to establish national security
bodies and outlines procedures for their work. Article 38 provides that the NSL applies to
“offences ... committed against the HKSAR from outside the Region by a person who is not a
permanent resident of the Region.” Its scope thus apparently extends to alleged offenses

1 “Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (with annexes). Signed at Beijing on 19 December 1984,” in
Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations,
vol. 1399, nos. 23389-23396, 1985, pp. 33-87, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=
08000002800d4d6e&clang=_en.
2 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “On Beijing’s Imposition of National Security Legislation on Hong
Kong,” statement by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, June 30, 2020, https://www.state.gov/on-beijings-
imposition-of-national-security-legislation-on-hong-kong/.
3 Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR, “Speech At The Launch Ceremony Of Events
Marking The 23rd Anniversary of Hong Kong’s Return To The Motherland,” July 1, 2020, http://www.locpg.gov.cn/
jsdt/2020-07/01/c_1210684535.htm.
4 Hong Kong added an English version of the law to the HKSAR Gazette (similar to U.S. Code) on July 3, 2020. “The
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region,” Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, vol. 24, no. 48, July 3, 2020,
https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/english/gazette/volume.php?year=2020&vol=24&no=48&extra=1&type=0. The
document includes a preamble stating that the translation “is published for information.” The Gazette translation
appears to be identical to that published by China’s Xinhua News Agency “for reference” on July 1, 2020, available at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/c_139178753.htm.
5 “Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement
Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security,” unofficial English
translation, May 28, 2020, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A215.
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committed against the HKSAR anywhere, including in the United States, by anyone, including
U.S. citizens.
Since China first signaled its intention to pursue such legislation on May 21, 2020, the
international community has registered strong concern about its potential chilling effect on
freedoms in the HKSAR. On May 30, after the NPC adopted its May 28 decision, President
Trump announced that Hong Kong was “no longer sufficiently autonomous to warrant the special
treatment that we have afforded the territory” since 1997.6 He added that his Administration
would “begin the process of eliminating policy exemptions that give Hong Kong different and
special treatment.”
On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA, P.L. 116-149,
H.R. 7440), which requires the President to impose sanctions on foreign individuals and entities
he identifies as materially contributing to China’s failure to preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy, as
well as on “foreign financial institutions that conduct significant transactions” for persons
designated for sanctions under the law. Other pending legislation seeks to sanction the PRC and
HKSAR governments and/or provide assistance to Hong Kong residents. On the same day he
signed the HKAA, President Trump issued Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization,
which cites the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA, P.L. 116-76) and the
HKAA, as well as other laws, as providing authority (see “Response of the Trump
Administration”).7
Brief Recent History of the HKSAR
The United Kingdom transferred sovereignty over Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, under
the provisions of the 1984 China-United Kingdom Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong
Kong, an international treaty registered with the United Nations. In the Joint Declaration, China
declared that among its “basic policies” toward Hong Kong was that the HKSAR “will enjoy a
high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of
the Central People’s Government,” a reference to the PRC government based in Beijing.8 China
pledged that all “basic policies” toward Hong Kong to which it committed in the Joint
Declaration—including vesting Hong Kong with “independent judicial power, including that of
final adjudication”—would “remain unchanged for 50 years,” or until July 1, 2047. While China
has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Annex I of the
Joint Declaration states, “The provisions of the [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.” China
refers to its arrangement for Hong Kong as “one country, two systems.”
In 1990, in preparation for the handover of sovereignty from the UK to China and as required by
the Joint Declaration, the NPC passed the Basic Law of the HKSAR. The Basic Law is a “mini-
constitution” that the Hong Kong government describes as legally enshrining “the important
concepts of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ ‘a high degree of autonomy,’ and ‘Hong Kong People
administering Hong Kong.’”9 The Basic Law established an executive-led government, headed by

6 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on Actions Against China,” May 30, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-actions-china/.
7 Executive Office of the President, “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization,” 85 Federal
Register 43413, July 17, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-
executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization.
8 Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, HKSAR, “The Joint Declaration,” https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/
jd2.htm.
9 HKSAR, “Some Facts About the Basic Law,” https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/facts/index.html.
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a Chief Executive; a local legislature, the Legislative Council (Legco); and an independent
judiciary, including a separate Court of Final Appeal.
Two articles of the Basic Law are of particular relevance to China’s decision to impose national
security legislation on Hong Kong. The first, Article 23, states:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any
act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or
theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting
political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the
Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.10
The second, Article 39, states:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions
as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as
prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions of the preceding
paragraph of this Article.
Successive HKSAR governments have been unsuccessful in passing the national security
legislation required by Article 23. The HKSAR’s 2003 effort to do so prompted an estimated
500,000-person protest in the city and the subsequent resignation of then-Hong Kong Secretary of
Security and now Legco member Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee.11 Also, when then-Hong Kong Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa resigned in 2005, citing health reasons, many in Hong Kong saw his
departure as related to the failure to pass the national security legislation.12 No subsequent Chief
Executive has submitted legislation to Legco to fulfill the requirements of Article 23 of the Basic
Law.
Over the last 20 years, Hong Kong residents have organized other demonstrations and protests
over their perception of an erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy, threats to their human rights, and a
lack of progress on democratic reforms.13 In 2014, an NPCSC decision setting new conditions on
the selection of the HKSAR Chief Executive sparked the Umbrella Movement, an occupation of
major streets in three locations across the city for more than 10 weeks. During those protests, the
Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) used tear gas, rubber bullets, and pepper spray against the
largely peaceful demonstrators, an approach nearly without precedent in Hong Kong.14
In March 2019, the HKSAR government proposed legislation that would have permitted the
extradition of alleged criminals from Hong Kong to other jurisdictions, including mainland
China.15 The proposal—later withdrawn—set off another round of large-scale demonstrations in

10 The full text of the Basic Law, as amended, and the various decisions and interpretations issued by the PRC
government, is available online at https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html.
11 Keith Bradsher, “Security Laws Target of Huge Hong Kong Protest,” New York Times, July 2, 2003; Keith Bradsher,
“2 Top Officials in Hong Kong Resign in Wake of Protests,” New York Times, July 17, 2003.
12 “Hong Kong Leader Resigns,” CNN, March 10, 2005.
13 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Crisis in Hong Kong: A Review of U.S.
Policy Tools, Written Testimony of Dr. Michael F. Martin, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 4, 2020.
14 For more about the Umbrella Movement, see CRS In Focus IF10005, Protests in Hong Kong: The “Umbrella
Movement” (Update), by Michael F. Martin.
15 Legislative Council of the HKSAR, “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (Papers),” https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/rescindedbc/b201903291/
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early June 2019, as Legco considered the legislation.16 The protests continued for the rest of 2019
and into 2020. Public opinion surveys indicated relatively strong opposition to the extradition
law, rising disapproval of Chief Executive Lam and the HKPF, and general support for the
protesters.17 While the demonstrations were largely peaceful, some protesters vandalized what
they considered pro-government or PRC-affiliated businesses. Hong Kong police responded by
donning riot gear and deploying water cannons, tear gas, and other non-lethal weapons. In
contrast to the situation during the Umbrella Movement, some of the protesters confronted the
police and some protesters and HKPF officers were seriously injured.18
China’s Justifications for Imposing National
Security Legislation
In a May 22, 2020, explanation of the NPCSC’s request for authorization to formulate new
national security legislation for Hong Kong, NPC Vice Chairman Wang Chen cited growing risks
to China’s national security in the city since the outbreak of the anti-extradition bill protests in
June 2019. Wang asserted that forces that were “anti-China” and wanted to “bring chaos to Hong
Kong,” were calling for Hong Kong’s independence from China, for self-determination, and for a
referendum on Hong Kong’s future. He charged that protesters
openly insulted and defaced the national flag and emblem, incited Hong Kong people to be
anti-China and anti-Communist Party, besieged the Central People’s Government’s
institutions stationed in Hong Kong, discriminated against and excluded people from
mainland China in Hong Kong; deliberately undermined social order in Hong Kong,
violently confronted police enforcing the law, damaged public facilities and public
property, and paralyzed the governance of the government and the operation of the
Legislative Council.19
Wang also noted Hong Kong’s failure for more than two decades to pass the local national
security legislation required under Article 23 of the Basic Law. He blamed “strong obstruction
and interference from anti-China forces disrupting Hong Kong and external hostile forces.”
Authorizing the NPCSC to formulate national security legislation was necessary, Wang argued, to
“safeguard Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability.”20

papers/b201903291_ppr.htm. “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation
(Amendment) Bill 2019,” March 29, 2019, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/bills/b201903291.pdf.
16 For more about the 2019 protests, see CRS In Focus IF11295, Hong Kong’s Protests of 2019, by Michael F. Martin
and Susan V. Lawrence.
17 See Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, Anti-extradition Bill Movement: Public Sentiment Report, March
31, 2020; and Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Research
Report on Public Opinion During the Anti-Extradition Bill (Fugitive Offenders Bill) Movement in Hong Kong, May
2020.
18 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Crisis in Hong Kong: A Review of U.S.
Policy Tools, Written Testimony of Dr. Michael F. Martin, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June 4, 2020.
19 “(两会受权发布）王晨作关于《全国人民代表大会关于建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和
执行机制的决定（草案）》的说明” (“(Authorized for Release) Wang Chen Gives Explanation on ‘Draft’ Decision
of NPC on Establishment of Sound Legal System, Implementation Mechanism for Safeguarding of National Security in
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”), Xinhua, May 22, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-05/22/
c_1126019468.htm.
20 Ibid.
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In her written testimony for a House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing held on July 1, 2020,
University of Hawaii legal scholar Carole J. Petersen questioned that need for national legislation,
noting:
Hong Kong has legislation prohibiting violence and those laws are being enforced against
those who allegedly committed acts of violence during the recent protests. Hong Kong also
has its own statutes prohibiting most of the activities specified in Article 23, as well as laws
prohibiting terrorism. The legal gap, if there was one, was small and there is no reason why
the local legislature could not have completed the process of implementing Article 23 in a
manner that complies with the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].21
PRC statements and commentary have suggested that part of the motivation for China’s decision
to impose national security legislation on Hong Kong was a desire to push back against U.S.
“interference” in Hong Kong. In November 2019, when Congress passed and the President signed
the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA; P.L. 116-76), China’s Foreign
Ministry issued a Ministry Statement—the only one it issued in all of 2019—accusing the United
States of having “openly backed violent criminals who rampantly smashed facilities, set fire,
assaulted innocent civilians, trampled on the rule of law, and jeopardized social order.” The
statement declared the HKHRDA would “only further expose the malicious and hegemonic
nature of U.S. intentions to the Chinese people, including our Hong Kong compatriots.”22 The
day before the NPCSC passed the new national security law, Global Times, a nationalist state-run
Chinese tabloid affiliated with the Communist Party Central Committee’s paper of record,
People’s Daily, asserted in an editorial, “When the national security law for Hong Kong confronts
the U.S.’ so-called Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, the latter will be immediately
overwhelmed.”23
Other possible PRC motivations for passing the NSL when it did include
 to interrupt the momentum of the pro-democracy movement and undermine
popular support for the ongoing protests in Hong Kong.
 to mark the 99th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party on July 1,
2020, and the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to China, also on July
1. At a July 1, 2020, press conference, Zhang Xiaoming of the PRC’s State
Council Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO) stated, “On the 23rd
anniversary of the establishment of the HKSAR, we have sent Hong Kong a
‘birthday present’ in the form of this law.”24
 to allow Chinese leader Xi Jinping to claim he has strengthened PRC control
over Hong Kong ahead of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the
Communist Party of China in 2021—the first of two “centenaries” for which the
Communist Party has set itself ambitious targets—and ahead of Xi’s expected bid

21 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The End of One Country, Two Systems?: Implications of
Beijing’s National Security Law in Hong Kong, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 1, 2020, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings?ID=878C9D04-7712-47A7-BC92-86E4C028F749.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” November 28, 2019,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1719774.shtml.
23 “National Security Law Will Be New Start for HK: Global Times Editorial,” Global Times, June 29, 2020.
24 State Council Information Office of the PRC, “SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020,
http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2020-07/04/content_76236573.htm.
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for a third term as Communist Party General Secretary at the Party’s 20th
National Congress in 2022.25
 to head off the massive protest held annually in Hong Kong on the July 1
anniversary of the handover. (A large protest nonetheless went ahead on that
day.) (See “HKSAR Government Implementation” below.)
 to provide the HKSAR legal tools to disqualify certain members of the pro-
democracy camp from running in upcoming Legco elections. Asked about this
possibility, the HKMAO’s Zhang insisted on July 1, 2020 that the NSL “doesn’t
target the opposition or the ‘pan-democratic’ camp in the HKSAR as a
hypothetical enemy. This is not our point.” The NSL, he said, “targets only a very
few criminals that seriously undermine national security, and does not focus on
the entire opposition camp.”26
China’s Legislative Process Leading to the Law’s
Promulgation
The legislative process by which China imposed its national security law on Hong Kong involved
unusual speed and secrecy. After the law went into effect, the Hong Kong Bar Association issued
a statement declaring itself “gravely concerned with both the contents of the NSL and the manner
of its introduction.” On the latter point, the statement noted,
Nobody in the HKSAR had seen so much as a draft or accurate summary of the NSL before
its entry into force. In addition to the total absence of meaningful consultation, lawyers,
judges, police and Hong Kong residents were given no opportunity to familiarise
themselves with the contents of the new law, including the serious criminal offences it
creates, before it came into force.27
The path to the NSL officially began with an October 2019 meeting of the Communist Party’s
Central Committee—the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee—at which committee
members agreed on the need to “modernize” China’s “governance system and governance
capacity.”28 Included in a decision adopted at the end of the session was language on the need “to
establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for the maintenance of

25 The Communist Party defines its two centenary goals as being “to finish building a moderately prosperous society in
all respects by the time the Communist Party of China marks its centenary and to build China into a modern socialist
country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious by the time the People’s Republic
of China celebrates its centenary.” Footnote 1, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society
in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Xi Jinping
report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017.
26 State Council Information Office of the PRC, “SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020,
http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2020-07/04/content_76236573.htm.
27 “The Law of the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (‘HKSAR’): Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Association,” July 1, 2020,
https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/
20200701%20HKBA%20statement%20on%20Safeguarding%20National%20%20Security%20in%20HKSAR.pdf.
28 “(受权发布）中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大
问题的决定” (“(Authorized for Release) Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Concerning
Upholding and Improving the System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Advancing the Modernization of
China’s System and Capacity for Governance”), Xinhua, November 5, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-
11/05/c_1125195786.htm.
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national security in special administrative regions”—a reference to Hong Kong and neighboring
Macao, a former Portuguese colony over which the PRC assumed sovereignty in 1999.29
At the time of the Fourth Plenum, according to a senior NPC official’s later account, China had
not decided to write new national-level legislation for Hong Kong. Other options included having
the NPC or NPCSC amend or issue a fresh interpretation of existing legislation—presumably the
Basic Law—or having the central government issue a directive.30 In the subsequent months,
however, China’s cabinet, the State Council, worked in secret to draft a “Report on Maintenance
of National Stability in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” which made the case for
the combination of an NPC decision and new national legislation. China did not disclose the
existence of the State Council report until May 22, 2020.31
On May 18, 2020, the 171-person NPCSC secretly reviewed the State Council report and agreed
on the need “to establish a sound legal system and enforcement mechanism at the national level to
safeguard national security in the HKSAR.”32 The official report on the NPCSC meeting by
China’s state news agency, Xinhua, made no mention of the report or of Hong Kong.33 The first
time the Hong Kong public learned about the NPCSC’s Hong Kong-related work was on May 21,
when the government released the agenda for the annual full session of China’s parliament, the
NPC, which ran from May 22 to May 28. The agenda included consideration of a draft NPCSC
decision on “Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security.”34
On May 28, 2020, the NPC passed the Decision by a vote of 2,878 to one, with six abstentions.35
Among other things, it emphasized the HKSAR’s responsibility to safeguard national security,
authorized “national security agencies of the Central People’s Government” to “set up agencies in
the HKSAR,” and required the HKSAR’s Chief Executive to carry out national security
education. It also “entrusted” the NPCSC to formulate national security legislation for Hong
Kong.36 The NPCSC, which normally meets every two months, reconvened twice in June (on
June 18-20 and June 28-30) to review and then unanimously pass The Law of the People’s

29 Ibid.
30 Shen Chunyao, Director of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC, speaking at State Council Information
Office of the PRC, “SCIO briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020.
31 “(两会受权发布）王晨作关于《全国人民代表大会关于建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和
执行机制的决定（草案）》的说明” (Authorized for Release) Wang Chen Gives Explanation on ‘Draft’ Decision of
NPC on Establishment of Sound Legal System, Implementation Mechanism for Safeguarding of National Security in
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), Xinhua, May 22, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-05/22/
c_1126019468.htm.
32 Ibid.
33 “十三届全国人大常委会第十八次会议在京闭幕栗战书主持并讲话” (“The 18th Meeting of the 13th National
People’s Congress Closed in Beijing; Li Zhanshu Presided and Made Remarks”), Xinhua, May 18, 2020,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-05/18/c_1126001926.htm.
34 “(两会受权发布）第十三届全国人民代表大会第三次会议议程” “(Two Meetings Authorized for Release)
Agenda for the 3rd Session of the 13th National People’s Congress”), Xinhua, May 21, 2020,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-05/21/c_1126016350.htm.
35 Lu Zhenhua, “China’s Legislature Approves Hong Kong Security Resolution,” Caixin Global, May 28, 2020,
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-05-28/chinas-legislature-approves-hong-kong-security-resolution-101560312.html.
36 “Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement
Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security,” unofficial English
translation, May 28, 2020, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A215. See also CRS In Focus IF11562, China Moves to
Impose National Security Law on Hong Kong, by Michael F. Martin and Susan V. Lawrence.
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China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress

Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The legislation was not on the initial public agenda for either meeting, but was each time
added at the last minute.37
On June 20, China’s Xinhua News Agency published an excerpt of an official explanation of the
law presented to NPCSC members on June 18. That excerpt, though, withheld details about the
four categories of criminal offenses at the center of the legislation.38 The law is only the second
since 2008 for which the NPCSC did not first release a draft for public comment.39 It is the first
law to be passed without a public comment period since a 2015 amendment to the Legislation
Law of the PRC mandated a public comment period for all legislation unless an NPC
chairpersons’ meeting proactively chooses to withhold the draft text.40 The senior NPC official
said the 16-person NPC Council of Chairpersons decided not to release the text for public
comment because the legislation “was considered very special and sensitive.”41
Immediately after the NPCSC passed the law on June 30, Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a
presidential order to promulgate it in mainland China and the NPCSC listed it in Annex III of the
HKSAR Basic Law, so that it could be applied in Hong Kong.42 At 11 p.m., Hong Kong time, the
same day, Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam promulgated the law in the HKSAR Gazette
under Article 18 of the Basic Law.43 Then authorities in China and Hong Kong released the
Chinese-language text of the law.44
Although both Chinese and English are official languages in Hong Kong, when China’s Xinhua
News Agency released an English translation of the law nearly two hours after the law went into
effect, it labeled the translation as being “for reference only.”45 On July 3, 2020, the HKSAR

37 For the initial agenda for the 19th Meeting of the 13th NPCSC on June 18-20, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/
2020-06/09/c_1126093980.htm. For the initial agenda for the 20th Meeting of the 13th NPCSC on June 28-30, see
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-06/21/c_1126140876.htm.
38 For an English translation of the excerpt of the explication made public, see http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/
draftcontent-of-national-security-law. The Chinese text is at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-06/20/
c_1126139511.htm.
39 Tweet by NPC Observer (@NPC_Observer), June 30, 2020, https://twitter.com/NPC_Observer/status/
1277914562235424769. The other new law passed without the draft text having been released for public comment was
the Military Personnel Insurance Law, promulgated on April 27, 2012.
40 Article 37 of the Legislation Law of the PRC, as amended in March 2015, states, “For a bill on the agenda of a
session of the Standing Committee, the draft law and an explanation of the drafting and amendment thereof, among
others, shall, after the end of the session of the Standing Committee, be released to the public to solicit opinions, unless
a decision not to release the same is made at the Chairmen’s Meeting. The period during which public opinions are
solicited on the same shall not be less than 30 days. Information on the solicitation of opinions shall be released to the
public.” Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015 Amendment) [Effective], March 2, 2017,
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-03/02/content_4774201.htm.
41 Shen Chunyao, Director of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC, speaking at State Council Information
Office of the PRC, “SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020.
42 “China’s Top Legislature Adopts Law on Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong, Adds It to Basic Law
Annex,” Xinhua, June 30, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/30/c_139178097.htm.
43 Government of the HKSAR, “Promulgation of National Law 2020,” Government of the HKSAR Gazette, June 30,
2020, https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20202444e/es220202444136.pdf.
44 “(受权发布）中华人民共和国香港特别行政区维护国家安全法” (“Authorized Release: PRC Law on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”), Xinhua, June 30, 2020,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/gangao/2020-06/30/c_1126179649.htm.
45 “English Translation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region,” Xinhua, July 1, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/
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government added the Xinhua English translation of the law to its official Gazette, but noted that
the text “is published for information,” suggesting that it is not considered an official
translation.46 Discrepancies exist between the official Chinese text and English translation.47
Major Provisions of the National Security Law
The NSL consists of six chapters with a total of 66 articles. (See Table 1.) It defines four
categories of crimes, states the relationship of the national security law to Hong Kong laws, sets
standards for jurisdiction of national security criminal cases, and creates new PRC and HKSAR
governmental bodies responsible for implementing the law. Penalties for offenses under the law
range from “short-term detention or restriction” to life in prison.
According to the HKMAO’s Zhang, the law reflects “the growing importance the central
authorities attach to the top-level design of the system for the governance of Hong Kong,” as well
as the importance they attach to “better utilizing the rights provided to the central authorities by
China’s Constitution and the HKSAR Basic Law.” With respect to “one country, two systems,”
Zhang says, the NSL “intends to move closer to the side of ‘one country.’”48 Critics assert that
some of the law’s provisions conflict with provisions of the International Covenant on Political
and Civil Rights (ICCPR).49 As noted above, both the 1984 Joint Declaration that China signed
with the United Kingdom and the 1990 Basic Law that China wrote for Hong Kong provide for
the ICCPR to remain in force in Hong Kong at least until 2047.
Table 1. Select Provisions of the PRC Law on Safeguarding National Security in the
HKSAR
PRC explanations drawn from July 1, 2020, State Council Information Office Press Conference featuring
Shen Chunyao, Director, Legislative Affairs Commission, National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, and Zhang Xiaoming, Deputy Director, State Council Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
Relationship
Article 62: “This Law shall prevail where provisions of the Article 62 leaves the NSL’s relationship
to local
local laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
to Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the
HKSAR laws
are inconsistent with this Law.”
Basic Law, unclear. Both are national

laws. Some of their provisions appear
inconsistent, particularly with regard to
implementation of the ICCPR.

c_139178753.htm.
46 “The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region,” Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, vol. 24, no. 48, July 3,
2020, https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/english/gazette/volume.php?year=2020&vol=24&no=48&extra=1&type=0.
47 In Article 20(3), for example, where the Chinese text refers to “transferring the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region or any other part of the People’s Republic of China to rule by a foreign country,” the unofficial English text
refers to “surrendering” the HKSAR or any other part of the PRC to a foreign country. In Article 9, where the Chinese-
language text refers to measures to be taken related to “schools” (xuexiao), the unofficial English text refers not only to
“schools” but also to “universities.”
48 State Council Information Office of the PRC, “SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020,
http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2020-07/04/content_76236573.htm.
49 Donald Clarke, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law: An Assessment,” China Leadership Monitor, July 13, 2020,
http://www.prcleader.org/clarke. Human Rights Watch, “China: New Hong Kong Law a Roadmap for Repression,”
July 29, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/china-new-hong-kong-law-roadmap-repression.
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
Power of
Article 65: “The power of interpretation of this Law shall
Article 65 does not indicate whether
interpretation be vested in the Standing Committee of the National
Hong Kong courts may also interpret
People’s Congress.”
the law.
Retroactivity
Article 66: “This Law shall come into force on the date of The HKMAO’s Zhang states, “the law
its promulgation.”
is not retroactive.” He notes, however,
that existing HKSAR laws, including the
Crimes Ordinance, Official Secrets
Ordinance, the Public Order
Ordinance, and the Societies
Ordinance, contain national security-
related provisions. According to Zhang,
“These provisions shall be applied to
punish crimes that have already been
committed which endanger national
security.”
Jurisdiction
Article 38: “This Law shall apply to offences under this
Article 38 provides for the NSL to
Law committed against the [HKSAR] from outside the
apply to alleged violations committed
Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the by anyone, anywhere in the world.
Region.”
Human rights
Article 4: “Human rights shall be respected and
Legal observers suggest other
protections
protected in safeguarding national security in the [HKSAR]. provisions of the NSL appear to
The rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, undermine some of the rights provided
of the press, of publication, of association, of assembly, of
for in Articles 4 and 5—such as
procession and of demonstration, which the residents of
freedom of speech, presumption of
the Region enjoy under the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] and
innocence, and the right to a fair trial—
the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
in certain situations. The NPC’s Shen
Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on
Chunyao states, “Rights and freedoms
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong
should be ful y exercised, but within the
Kong, shall be protected in accordance with the law.”
scope of the law and in accordance
Article 5: “A person is presumed innocent until convicted
with legal requirements.” According to
by a judicial body. The right to defend himself or herself
Shen, “In safeguarding national security,
and other rights in judicial proceedings that a criminal
human rights must be respected. To
suspect, defendant, and other parties in judicial
respect human rights, national security
proceedings are entitled to under the law shall be
must be maintained. These two are
protected. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished
basically consistent and complement
again for an offence for which he or she has already been
each other.”
finally convicted or acquitted in judicial proceedings.”
Crime of
Article 20: “A person who organises, plans, commits or
Article 20 appears to criminalize
secession
participates in any of the following acts, whether or not by
peaceful actions or speech related to
force or threat of force, with a view to committing
the political status of Hong Kong, and
secession or undermining national unification shall be guilty also of Tibet, Xinjiang, and such
of an offence: (1) separating the [HKSAR] or any other
jurisdictions as Taiwan and disputed
part of the People’s Republic of China from the People’s
maritime territories over which China
Republic of China; (2) altering by unlawful means the legal
claims sovereignty.
status of the [HKSAR] or of any other part of the People’s

Republic of China; or (3) surrendering the [HKSAR] or any
other part of the People’s Republic of China to a foreign
country.”
Article 21: “A person who incites, assists in, abets or
provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property
for the commission by other persons of the offence under
Article 20 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence.”
Crime of
Article 22: “A person who organises, plans, commits or
The law may restrict the right of
subversion
participates in any of the following acts by force or threat
assembly, procession, and
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
of force or other unlawful means with a view to subverting
demonstration guaranteed by Article 27
the State power shall be guilty of an offence:
of the Basic Law and the ICCPR.
“(1) overthrowing or undermining the basic system of the
People’s Republic of China established by the Constitution
of the People’s Republic of China;
“(2) overthrowing the body of central power of the
People’s Republic of China or the body of power of the
[HKSAR];
“(3) seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the
performance of duties and functions in accordance with
the law by the body of central power of the People’s
Republic of China or the body of power of the [HKSAR]; or
“(4) attacking or damaging the premises and facilities used
by the body of power of the [HKSAR] to perform its duties
and functions, rendering it incapable of performing its
normal duties and functions.”
Article 23: “A person who incites, assists in, abets or
provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property
for the commission by other persons of the offence under
Article 22 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence.”
Crime of
Article 24: “A person who organises, plans, commits,
Article 24 appears to make vandalizing
terrorism
participates in or threatens to commit any of the following
public property an act of terrorism.
terrorist activities causing or intended to cause grave harm
With phrases such as “other dangerous
to the society with a view to coercing the Central People’s
activities which seriously jeopardise
Government, the Government of the [HKSAR] or an
public health, safety or security,”
international organisation or intimidating the public in
Article 24 also appears to make a broad
order to pursue political agenda shall be guilty of an
range of political activities potentially
offence:
vulnerable to a charge of terrorism.
(1) serious violence against a person or persons;
(2) explosion, arson, or dissemination of poisonous or
radioactive substances, pathogens of infectious diseases or
other substances;
(3) sabotage of means of transport, transport facilities,
electric power or gas facilities, or other combustible or
explosible facilities;
(4) serious interruption or sabotage of electronic control
systems for providing and managing public services such as
water, electric power, gas, transport, telecommunications
and the internet; or
(5) other dangerous activities which seriously jeopardise
public health, safety or security.”
Article 26: “A person who provides support, assistance or
facility such as training, weapons, information, funds,
supplies, labour, transport, technologies or venues to a
terrorist organisation or a terrorist, or for the commission
of a terrorist activity; or manufactures or illegally possesses
substances such as explosive, poisonous or radioactive
substances and pathogens of infectious diseases or uses
other means to prepare for the commission of a terrorist
activity, shall be guilty of an offence.”
Article 27: “A person who advocates terrorism or incites
the commission of a terrorist activity shall be guilty of an
offence.”
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
Crime of
Article 29: “A person who steals, spies, obtains with
Article 29 appears to criminalize
col usion
payment, or unlawfully provides State secrets or
peaceful advocacy, including of the sort
intelligence concerning national security for a foreign
practiced by human rights defenders.
country or an institution, organisation or individual outside
The first part of Article 29, Zhang
the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s
explains, covers misdeeds “similar to
Republic of China shall be guilty of an offence;
what we usually call espionage.” The
a person who requests a foreign country or an institution,
second part involves deliberately
organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong “committing criminal acts with a foreign
and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, or conspires
country or with external elements.”
with a foreign country or an institution, organisation or
As an example of an action that might
individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of
be covered under Article 29(4), Zhang
the People’s Republic of China, or directly or indirectly
recalls how during the anti-extradition
receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of
bil protests, “some people went
support from a foreign country or an institution,
abroad to implore foreign governments
organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong to enact laws or impose sanctions on
and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, to commit
the Chinese government.” He states,
any of the following acts shall be guilty of an offence:
“This was intentional, and can be
(1) waging a war against the People’s Republic of China, or punished as a crime if it causes serious
using or threatening to use force to seriously undermine
consequences.”
the sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity of the
With regard to Article 29(5), Zhang
People’s Republic of China;
states, “a general sense of ‘hatred’ wil
(2) seriously disrupting the formulation and
not constitute a crime,” but provoking
implementation of laws or policies by the Government of
hatred in such a way as to “cause
the [HKSAR] or by the Central People’s Government,
serious consequences” may constitute a
which is likely to cause serious consequences;
crime. Zhang cites the example of a
(3) rigging or undermining an election in the [HKSAR],
false 2019 rumor that the Hong Kong
which is likely to cause serious consequences;
Police had kil ed protesters at a Hong
Kong subway station, a rumor that he
(4) imposing sanctions or blockade, or engaging in other
said “led to social discontent against the
hostile activities against the [HKSAR] or the People’s
Hong Kong police.”
Republic of China; or
(5) provoking by unlawful means hatred among Hong
Kong residents towards the Central People’s Government
or the Government of the Region, which is likely to cause
serious consequences.”
Requirements Article 6: “A resident of the Region who stands for
Zhang notes that Article 6 applies to
for public
election or assumes public office shall confirm in writing or
“all public servants,” broadening the
servants and
take an oath to uphold the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] and
requirement for oath-taking beyond the
candidates for swear allegiance to the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] in
limited set of office holders covered in
election
accordance with the law.”
Article 104 of the Basic Law of the
Article 35: “A person who is convicted of an offence
HKSAR, and beyond those assuming
endangering national security by a court shall be
office to those standing for election,
disqualified from standing as a candidate in the elections
too. Zhang adds that the language of
of the Legislative Council and district councils of the
allegiance to the HKSAR “undoubtedly
[HKSAR], holding any public office in the Region, or serving include[s] the meaning of allegiance to
as a member of the Election Committee for electing the
the country.”
Chief Executive.”
Article 35 likewise applies to all public
servants. This provision may have
implications for future Legco elections.
Powerful new Article 48: “The Central People’s Government shall
Zhang notes that the Office is
Central
establish in the [HKSAR] an office for safeguarding
established on the basis of both the
Government
national security.... The staff of the Office shall be jointly
NSL (Article 48) and the NPSC’s May
Office for
dispatched by relevant national security authorities under
28 Decision (Provision 4).
Safeguarding
the Central People’s Government.”
Article 49 assigns the Office a role
National
Article 49: The office’s mandate includes, “(2)
“overseeing” and “guiding” the
Security and
overseeing, guiding, coordinating with, and providing
HKSAR’s national security work,
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
its handling of support to the Region in the performance of its duties for
making it directly involved in the
national
safeguarding national security; (3) collecting and analysing
governance of Hong Kong.
security cases intelligence and information concerning national security;
The NPC’s Shen says the Office and the
and (4) handling cases concerning offence endangering
PRC authorities wil “only exercise
national security in accordance with the law.”
jurisdiction over a very small number of
Article 54: The Office, the Office of the Commissioner of
cases that may leave the country’s
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the HKSAR, and the
national security in grave peril.” Shen
HKSAR government shall “take necessary measures to
portrays the provision as a “low-
strengthen the management of and services for organs of
intensity approach” to save the central
foreign countries and international organisations in the
government from having to invoke
Region, as well as non-governmental organisations and
Article 18(4) of the Basic Law. That
news agencies of foreign countries and from outside the
provision gives the NPCSC the power
mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic to declare a state of emergency in the
of China in the Region.”
HKSAR and the Central Government
Article 55: The Office “shall, upon approval by the
to “issue an order applying the relevant
Central People’s Government of a request made by the
national laws in the Region,” effectively
Government of the [HKSAR] or by the Office itself,
ending any autonomy for Hong Kong.
exercise jurisdiction over a case concerning offence
Article 56 mandates that in cases in
endangering national security under this Law, if: (1) the
which the Office assumes jurisdiction,
case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign
the Office initiates investigation, the
country or external elements, thus making it difficult for
PRC’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate
the Region to exercise jurisdiction over the case; (2) a
designates a (mainland China) entity to
serious situation occurs where the Government of the
prosecute the case, and the PRC’s
Region is unable to effectively enforce this Law; or (3) a
Supreme People’s Court designates a
major and imminent threat to national security has
(mainland China) court to try it.
occurred.”
Article 57 mandates that procedures in
Article 56: “In exercising jurisdiction over a case
such cases wil be dictated by PRC
concerning offence endangering national security,” the
national laws, including the PRC’s
Office “shall initiate investigation into the case, the
Criminal Procedure Law, and that
Supreme People’s Procuratorate shall designate a
everyone must comply with the Office’s
prosecuting body to prosecute it, and the Supreme
measures, with no apparent restrictions
People’s Court shall designate a court to adjudicate it.”
on the Office’s power to require such
Article 57: “The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s
compliance.
Republic of China and other related national laws shall
Article 59 could potentially require
apply to procedural matters, including those related to
journalists to testify about
criminal investigation, examination and prosecution, trial,
conversations with confidential sources.
and execution of penalty, in respect of cases over which
Article 60 makes the office and its staff
jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law.”
explicitly unaccountable to Hong Kong
Also, “The institutions, organisations and individuals
authorities. Zhang says, “Because the
concerned must comply with measures taken by the Office
power exercised by the office extends
for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s
beyond the autonomy of the HKSAR,
Government in the [HKSAR] in accordance with the law.”
and many of the cases the office wil
Article 59: In cases over which the Office exercises
investigate involve state secrets, it’s
jurisdiction, “any person who has information pertaining to
entirely reasonable that the exercise of
an offence endangering national security under this Law is
its legal duties should not be subject to
obliged to testify truthfully.”
the jurisdiction of the HKSAR.”
Article 60: “The acts performed in the course of duty by
the Office ... and its staff in accordance with this Law shall
not be subject to the jurisdiction of the [HKSAR].”
“In the course of performing duty, a holder of an
identification document or a document of certification
issued by the Office and the articles including vehicles used
by the holder shall not be subject to inspection, search or
detention by law enforcement officers of the Region.”
New HKSAR
Article 12: “The [HKSAR] shall establish the Committee
Article 12 gives the Committee
Committee
for Safeguarding National Security. The Committee shall
“primary responsibility” for national
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
for
be responsible for affairs relating to and assume primary
security in the HKSAR, but “under the
Safeguarding
responsibility for safeguarding national security in the
supervision of and accountable to the
National
Region. It shall be under the supervision of and
Central People’s Government.”
Security
accountable to the Central People’s Government.”
Article 13 provides for the Central
Article 13: “The Chief Executive shall be the chairperson
Government to appoint the
of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Committee’s Secretary General, who
[HKSAR].... A secretariat headed by a Secretary-General
wil presumably oversee day-to-day
shall be established under the Committee. The Secretary-
work of the Committee.
General shall be appointed by the Central People’s
Article 14 makes the Committee’s
Government upon nomination by the Chief Executive.”
work secret and not subject to judicial
Article 14: “... No institution, organisation or individual in
review.
the Region shall interfere with the work of the Committee.
Article 15 requires that a National
Information relating to the work of the Committee shall
Security Advisor designated by the
not be subject to disclosure. Decisions made by the
Central Government advise the
Committee shall not be amenable to judicial review.”
committee and attend its meetings.
Article 15: “The Committee for Safeguarding National
Security of the [HKSAR] shall have a National Security
Adviser, who shall be designated by the Central People’s
Government and provide advice on matters relating to the
duties and functions of the Committee. The National
Security Adviser shall sit in on meetings of the Committee.”
New Hong
Article 16: “The Police Force of the [HKSAR] shall
Article 16 requires Hong Kong’s Chief
Kong Police
establish a department for safeguarding national security
Executive to seek the written opinion
Force
with law enforcement capacity.
of the Central Government’s Office for
Department
“The head of the department for safeguarding national
Safeguarding National Security before
for
security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be appointed
appointing the head of the HKPF’s new
Safeguarding
by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive shall seek in
Department for Safeguarding National
National
writing the opinion of the Office established under Article
Security. The provision for recruitment
Security
48 of this Law before making the appointment.”
from outside the HKSAR is widely
interpreted as authorizing recruitment
The department “may recruit qualified professionals and
from mainland China.
technical personnel from outside the [HKSAR] to provide
assistance in the performance of duties for safeguarding
Article 43 gives the police sweeping
national security.”
new powers, including related to search
and seizure. It could also potentially
Article 43: When handling national security cases, the
require journalists to disclose
department “may take measures that law enforcement
conversations with confidential sources.
authorities, including the Hong Kong Police Force, are
The HKSAR issued implementation
allowed to apply under the laws in force in the [HKSAR] in
rules for Article 43 on July 7, 2020.
investigating serious crimes, and may also take the
following measures:
(1) search of premises, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other
relevant places and electronic devices that may contain
evidence of an offence;
(2) ordering any person suspected of having committed an
offence endangering national security to surrender travel
documents, or prohibiting the person concerned from
leaving the Region;
(3) freezing of, applying for restraint order, charging order
and confiscation order in respect of, and forfeiture of
property used or intended to be used for the commission
of the offence, proceeds of crime, or other property
relating to the commission of the offence;
(4) requiring a person who published information or the
relevant service provider to delete the information or
provide assistance;
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
(5) requiring a political organisation of a foreign country or
outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the
People’s Republic of China, or an agent of authorities or a
political organisation of a foreign country or outside the
mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s Republic
of China, to provide information;
(6) upon approval of the Chief Executive, carrying out
interception of communications and conducting covert
surveillance on a person who is suspected, on reasonable
grounds, of having [been] involved in the commission of an
offence endangering national security; and
(7) requiring a person, who is suspected, on reasonable
grounds, of having in possession [sic] information or
material relevant to investigation, to answer questions and
furnish such information or produce such material.”
New HKSAR
Article 18: “The Department of Justice of the [HKSAR]
Under Article 18, Hong Kong’s
Department
shall establish a specialised prosecution division responsible Department of Justice must also set up
of Justice
for the prosecution of offences endangering national
a specialized division for national
division for
security and other related legal work. The prosecutors of
security cases. The HKSAR’s
prosecution
this division shall be appointed by the Secretary for Justice
Committee for Safeguarding National
of national
after obtaining the consent of the Committee for
Security, with its central government-
security cases Safeguarding National Security of the [HKSAR].”
designated National Security Advisor
“The head of the specialised prosecution division of the
and its central government-appointed
Department of Justice shall be appointed by the Chief
Secretary General, must consent to the
Executive, who shall seek in writing the opinion of the
appointment of the division’s
Office established under Article 48 of this Law before
prosecutors. The Chief Executive is
making the appointment.”
required to seek the written opinion of
the Central Government’s Office for
Safeguarding National Security before
appointing the head of the new division.
Procedures
Article 40: The HKSAR “shall have jurisdiction over cases
Article 41 allows for all or part of such
for national
concerning offences under this Law,” except when the
trials to be closed to the public in
security trials
Central Government’s Office for Safeguarding National
certain circumstances, such as trials
in Hong Kong Security assumes jurisdiction.
“involving State secrets or public
courts
Article 41: “When circumstances arise such as the trial
order.”
involving State secrets or public order, all or part of the
Article 42, which makes denial of bail
trial shall be closed to the media and the public but the
the rule, appears to be inconsistent
judgment shall be delivered in an open court.”
with Article 9 of the ICCPR, which
Article 42: “No bail shall be granted to a criminal
states, “It shall not be the general rule
suspect or defendant unless the judge has sufficient
that persons awaiting trial shall be
grounds for believing that the criminal suspect or
detained in custody.” By denying bail
defendant will not continue to commit acts endangering
“unless the judge has sufficient grounds
national security.”
for believing that the criminal suspect
or defendant wil not continue to
Article 44 stipulates that the Chief Executive shall
commit acts endangering national
designate the magistrates and judges who will preside over
security,” Article 42 also appears to be
these trials.
inconsistent both with the NSL’s
Article 5, and with the ICCPR’s Article
14, which states, “Everyone charged
with a criminal offence shall have the
right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.”
Article 44 appears to break down the
previous “firewall” between the
HKSAR’s executive and judicial
branches, and may not be consistent
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Topic
Legal Provisions
Comments and PRC Explanations
with provisions in the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law. Zhang states, “It wil
not affect the independent exercise of
judicial power by court judges.”
Requirement
Article 7: The HKSAR “shall complete, as early as
Shen notes that Article 23 of the Basic
that the
possible, legislation for safeguarding national security as
Law of the HKSAR requires the
HKSAR pass
stipulated in the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] and shall
HKSAR to pass legislation covering
its own
refine relevant laws.”
seven types of crimes, including two
national
addressed in the NSL: secession and
security
subversion. The “relevant laws” subject
legislation
to “refinement” appear to include the
HKSAR ordinances on Crimes, Official
Secrets, Public Order, and Societies.
Sources: “The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region,” English translation as “published for information,” Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Gazette, vol. 24, no. 48, July 3, 2020. State Council Information Office of the PRC,
“SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020, http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2020-07/04/
content_76236573.htm.
Initial Implementation
Both the PRC and the HKSAR governments have moved quickly to implement the NSL. The
PRC government has appointed officials to serve in two new entities established by the law, and
opened an office for one of those entities, the Office for Safeguarding National Security. The
HKSAR government has formed the new entities required by the NSL and released new
implementation rules for the law. The HKPF made its first arrests under the law on the first full
day it was in effect.
Central Government Implementation
On July 3, 2020, China’s cabinet, the State Council, announced that Luo Huining, the head of the
central government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong, would serve concurrently as National
Security Advisor to the Hong Kong government’s new Committee for Safeguarding National
Security.50 It also announced the appointment of a head and two deputy heads of the newly
established Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the
HKSAR.51 (See Table 2 below.) On July 8, the Office officially opened in a converted hotel in
Causeway Bay, overlooking Victoria Park, the starting point for many of Hong Kong’s largest
demonstrations. Hong Kong’s current Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, and her two predecessors,
Tung Chee-hwa and Leung Chun-ying, were on hand for the opening ceremony.52
The personnel announcements clarified the relative power of the new positions for mainland
officials created under the NSL. Luo is a member of the Communist Party of China’s 204-
member Central Committee and, in his capacity as head of the Central Government’s Liaison
Office in Hong Kong, is the top mainland Chinese official in the HKSAR. His concurrent

50 “China Appoints Adviser to Committee for Safeguarding National Security of HKSAR,” Xinhua, July 3, 2020,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/03/c_139185564.htm.
51 “State Council Appoints Officials for Central Government National Security Office in HKSAR,” Xinhua, July 3,
2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/03/c_139185578.htm.
52 “Office for the New Security Law Agency Inaugurated,” RTHK, July 8, 2020.
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appointment as national security advisor to the HKSAR national security committee makes that a
more senior position than that of the director of the Central People’s Government’s national
security office. Likely out of deference to the letter, if not the spirit, of the “Hong Kong people
administering Hong Kong” principle that has been an important element of China’s “one country,
two systems” approach to Hong Kong, the National Security Advisor is not a full member of the
HKSAR’s national security committee. By law, he does, however, attend all meetings and provide
“advice on matters relating to the duties and functions of the Committee.” Some in Hong Kong
now view Luo as the region’s most powerful official, with his power outstripping that of Hong
Kong’s Chief Executive.
Prior to passage of the NSL, the central government operated three “organs” in the HKSAR, the
Liaison Office, an Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a People’s
Liberation Army Garrison. None had a formal role in the day-to-day governance of Hong Kong.
The NSL creates a fourth central government organ, in the form of the Office for Safeguarding
National Security, which does reach into governance.
Table 2. Top Central Government Officials in Hong Kong
As of July 2020
Name
Position(s)
Luo Huining (骆惠宁)

Director, Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR
(since January 2020)

National Security Advisor, Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the
HKSAR (since July 2020)

Member, Communist Party of China Central Committee (since 2012)

Deputy Director, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council
(since 2020; Luo is one of three Deputy Directors)
Zheng Yanxiong (郑雁雄)

Director, Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s
Government in the HKSAR (since July 2020)
Xie Feng (谢锋)

Commissioner, Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the PRC in the HKSAR (since 2017)
Chen Daoxiang (陈道祥)

Commander, People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison (since April 2019)
(Major General)
Cai Yongzhong (蔡永中)

Political Commissar, People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison (since
(Major General)
August 2018; previously served as the Garrison’s Deputy Political Commissar
from 2015 to 2018)

Member, Communist Party of China Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (since 2017; the body is equivalent in rank to the Party’s Central
Committee)
Source: Xinhua News Agency reports.
Notes: Officials’ names are listed in Chinese style, with family names preceding given names. The 19th Party
Congress’ Central Committee has 204 ful members. The 19th Party Congress’ Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has 133 members. Cai, a member of the Li ethnic group, is one of four ethnic
minority CCDI members.
HKSAR Government Implementation
On July 3, the HKSAR formally established the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of
the HKSAR. (See Figure 1 below.) On the same day, the government announced Edwina Lau
Chi-wai, a HKPF officer since 1984, as Deputy Police Commissioner and head of the HKPF’s
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new Department for Safeguarding National Security. It also announced the establishment of the
Department of Justice’s new division for prosecution of national security cases, and the Chief
Executive’s designation of six unnamed serving magistrates as judges to hear national security
cases.53
Chief Executive Lam convened the first meeting of the Committee for Safeguarding National
Security of the HKSAR on July 6, 2020.54 It approved implementing regulations for Article 43 of
the NSL, which went into effect the next day.55 They stipulate the conditions under which
 an HKPF officer may obtain a search warrant or conduct covert surveillance of
any person or entity that may be violating the NSL (private properties can be
searched without a warrant);
 a person may be required to surrender their travel documents to HKSAR
authorities and be prohibited from exiting Hong Kong;
 the HKSAR government can confiscate the property of a person who allegedly
violated the NSL;
 the HKPF can require a service provider to remove electronic content, identify a
user, or assist in the decryption of messages or content distributed by the service
provider (internet service providers must remove information identified by the
HKPF as violating the NSL);
 foreign and Taiwan “political organizations or agents” must provide the HKSAR
government information about their “activities concerning Hong Kong.”
The rules apply within and outside of Hong Kong. Per Article 60 of the NSL, the Office for
Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR is not bound
by the rules. In addition, Rule 4 stipulates:
The Chinese text of these Implementation Rules is an authentic text, and these
Implementation Rules are to be construed accordingly. The English translation text is for
reference only.
This provision appears to continue a pattern by the PRC and HKSAR governments to move away
from Hong Kong’s bilingual legal and judicial system, as seemingly recognized in Article 9 of the
Basic Law:
In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official language by
the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.

53 HKSAR Government, “Establishment of Committee for Safeguarding National Security of HKSAR (with photos),”
July 3, 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202007/03/P2020070300653.htm.
54 The Committee is chaired by Chief Executive Lam, and includes Lam’s Chief Secretary for Administration,
Financial Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Security, Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Commissioner
of the HKPF, Director of Immigration, Director of the Chief Executive’s Office, and the head of the HKPF department
for safeguarding national security established by Article 13 of the national security law.
55 Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR, Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region , L.N.
139 of 2020, July 6, 2020, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A406A; Kelly Ho, “Hong Kong Security Law: Police
Handed Power to Do Warrantless Searches, Freeze Assets, Intercept Comms, Control Internet,” Hong Kong Free
Press, July 6, 2020.
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Figure 1. Official Photo of Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the
HKSAR

Source: HKSAR Government.
Notes: Front Row (L-R): Financial Secretary Paul Chan Mo-po, Director of the Liaison Office of the Central
People’s Government in Hong Kong Luo Huining (National Security Advisor), Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng
Yuet-ngor, Chief Secretary of Administration Matthew Cheung Kin-chung, Secretary of Justice Teresa Cheng
Yeuk-wah; Back Row: Head of the Hong Kong Police Force Department for Safeguarding National Security
Edwina Lau Chi-wai, Commissioner of Customs and Excise Hermes Tang Yi-hoi, Secretary of Security John Lee
Ka-chiu, Commissioner of Police Chris Tang Ping-keung, Director of Immigration Au Ka-wang, Director of the
Chief Executive’s Office Eric Chan Kwok-ki. The flag on the left is that of the People’s Republic of China. The flag
on the right is that of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Questions About the Legality of Certain Speech
HKSAR Secretary of Justice Teresa Cheng Yuek-wah and Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung Kin-
chung have warned that some of the more common slogans used by demonstrators, such as
“restore Hong Kong; revolution of our times” (光復香港, 時代革命), may constitute violations
of the NSL.56 (See textbox below.) The first person to appear in a Hong Kong court facing
charges for alleged violations of the NSL was a motorcyclist who purportedly drove his vehicle
into a group of police officers while holding a flag displaying the slogans.57

56 “Don’t Test Law by Using Protest Slogan: Teresa Cheng,” RTHK, July 4, 2020; and “Mixed Signals on Legality of
Protest Slogan,” RTHK, July 5, 2020, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1535736-20200704.htm. The slogan
is sometimes translated as “liberate Hong Kong; revolution of our times.”
57 “Man, 23, Charged with Terrorism and Secession,” RTHK, July 3, 2020, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/
1535625-20200703.htm.
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Vague Provisions Create Uncertainty About the Legality of Slogans and Songs
Critics of the national security law fault the vagueness of its provisions for creating uncertainty about what actions
and activities are il egal and who has the authority to adjudicate such questions. This issue has arisen in the
context of slogans and songs used by people during legal and il egal demonstrations.
In 2019, demonstrators against a proposed HKSAR extradition law and the excessive use of force by the Hong
Kong Police Force (HKPF) frequently chanted or displayed signs bearing the slogan, “restore Hong Kong;
revolution of our times” (光復香港, 時代革命). Demonstrators also sang the song, “Glory to Hong Kong” (願榮
光歸香港), which became the anthem of supporters of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the protection of the rights of
Hong Kong residents.
The PRC and HKSAR government have indicated they view the slogan and the song as associated with a separatist
movement in Hong Kong. Fol owing demonstrations on July 1, 2020, against the national security law, the HKSAR
government issued a “solemn statement” regarding the use of slogans by demonstrators:
The slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, the revolution of our times” nowadays connotes “Hong Kong
independence,” or separating the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) from the People’s
Republic of China, altering the legal status of the HKSAR, or subverting the State power.58
The statement noted that “secession, subversion of state power and other acts and activities which endanger
national security” are il egal under the national security law, and “call[ed] upon members of the public not to defy
the law.” An unnamed HKSAR official declined to answer a reporter’s question about the legality of the song,
“Glory to Hong Kong.”59
The HKPF has arrested people who held up signs displaying the slogan or sang “Glory to Hong Kong” in shopping
malls. The first person arrested for alleged violation of the national security law was a man standing behind a
banner that read, “No to Hong Kong Independence.” The words “no to” were written in small print, while the
rest of the statement was in large print. HKPF officers also have arrested people holding up blank sheets of white
paper, alleging that they are violating the national security law.60
Hong Kong Bar Association Chairman Philip Dykes argues that it was “premature” for the HKSAR government to
declare the slogan il egal, and that it is up to Hong Kong courts to make a binding determination on the legality of
the slogan.61 Maria Tam Wai-chu, Hong Kong’s sole representative on the NPCSC, expressed her skepticism that
use of the slogan alone would be sufficient to prove a person had violated the national security law.62 On July 4,
Justice Secretary Cheng conceded that the HKSAR government’s statement of July 1 on the matter was not legally
binding, but reiterated the HKSAR government’s warning not to test the national security law.63
Initial Arrests
On July 1, 2020, tens of thousands of Hong Kong residents demonstrated against the NSL in
various locations across Hong Kong. The HKPF said it made “around 370 arrests,” including 10
for alleged violations of the national security law.64 (See Table 3.) Several times during the
demonstration, the HKPF held up new, purple warning banners stating that the participants in the
demonstration were at risk of arrest for violating the new national security law.65 (See Figure 2.)

58 HKSAR government, “Government Statement,” press release, July 2, 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/
202007/02/P2020070200869.htm.
59 Kelly Ho, “Gov’t Refuses to Say If Protest Anthem ‘Glory to Hong Kong’ Is Illegal, Despite Ban in Schools,” Hong
Kong Free Press, July 10, 2020.
60 Tom Grundy, “Security Law: Hong Kong Police Arrest 8 at ‘Blank Placard’ Silent Protest,” Hong Kong .Free Press,
July 6, 2020.
61 Jeffie Lam, Sum Lok-kei, and Kimmy Chung, “National Security Law: Is Chanting ‘Liberate Hong Kong;
Revolution of Our Times’ Now Illegal? City’s Lawyers Aren’t So Sure,” South China Morning Post, July 3, 2020.
62 Ibid.
63 “Don’t Test Law by Using Protest Slogan: Teresa Cheng,” RTHK, July 4, 2020.
64 Tweet by Hong Kong Police Force (@hkpoliceforce), July 1, 2020, 14:40 (UTC).
65 Christy Leung, “Hong Kong National Security Law: Flags, Banners, and Slogans Advocating Independence,
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Table 3. Status of 10 People Arrested on July 1, 2020, for Alleged Violations of
National Security Law
Description of Person and Circumstances of
Alleged Criminal
Arrest
Activity
Status
23-year-old man riding motorcycle and holding flag with
Inciting secession and
Remanded, awaiting trial
the slogan, “Restore Hong Kong. Revolution of Our
terrorism
in prison
Times”
15-year-old girl waiving flag with the words “Hong Kong
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
Independence”
further enquiries
38-year-old man in possession of a flag with the words
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
“Hong Kong independence”
further enquiries
36-year-old woman in possession of publications printed
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
with “One Nation, One Hong Kong”
further enquiries
36-year-old woman in possession of publications printed
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
with “One Nation, One Hong Kong”
further enquiries
67-year-old woman holding sign saying “Hong Kong
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
Independence,” as well as national flags of the United
further enquiries
States and the United Kingdom
25-year-old man wearing shirt with the slogan, “Restore
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
Hong Kong. Revolution of Our Times”
further enquiries
19-year-old man in possession of stickers printed with the Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
slogan, “Restore Hong Kong. Revolution of Our Times”
further enquiries
26-year-old man in possession of a flag with the words
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
“Hong Kong Independence”
further enquiries
22-year-old man wearing a T-shirt with the words “Free
Inciting secession
Released on bail pending
Hong Kong”
further enquiries
Source: Hong Kong media reports.

Liberation, or Revolution Now Illegal,” South China Morning Post, July 1, 2020. The HKPF are supposed to display
banners warning people of illegal activities, and the risk of HKPF action. These banners are color-coded.
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Figure 2. New HKPF Purple Warning Banner
In English and Chinese

Source: Apple Daily.
On July 29, the Hong Kong Police Force announced the arrest of four students, aged 16 to 21, for
allegedly inciting Hong Kong’s secession from the PRC.66 The four students—Chan Wai-yin,
Tony Chung Hon-lam, Ho Nok-hang, and Yanni Ho—were members of Studentlocalism, an
organization that advocated Hong Kong independence, but disbanded before the NSL went into
effect.67 Under the provisions of the NSL, the four students, if convicted, could be sentenced to
life in prison.

66 “Student Members of Hong Kong Pro-Independence Group Arrested Under National Security Law,” South China
Morning Post, July 29, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/yp/discover/news/hong-kong/article/3095269/student-members-
hong-kong-pro-independence-group.
67 Rachel Wong, “4 Ex-Members of Pro-Independence Student Group Arrested on Suspicion of ‘Inciting Secession’
Under Hong Kong’s Security Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 29, 2020.
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Hong Kong Police Issue Wanted Notices for Overseas Activists
On July 31, China Central Television (CCTV) announced that the HKPF had formally issued
warrants for six political activists suspected of inciting secession and colluding with foreign or
external forces.68 The six activists—Wayne Chan Ka-kui, Simon Cheng Man-kit, Samuel Chu
Muk-man, Lau Hong (also known as Honcques Laus), Nathan Law Kwun-chung, and Ray Wong
Toi-yeung—face possible arrest if they return to Hong Kong, as well as possible extradition.69
Washington, D.C.-based Chu, who was born in Hong Kong, but has been a naturalized U.S.
citizen for almost 25 years, is the first foreign national to be accused of violating the NSL. He
observed, “The Hong Kong police is issuing an arrest warrant against an American citizen for
advocating and lobbying my own government.” Chu added, “If I am targeted, any American and
any citizen of any nation who speaks out for Hong Kong can, and will be, too.”70
Investigation of Pro-Democratic Political Parties’ Primary
On July 11 and 12, 2020, the pro-democratic political parties held an informal open primary to
select candidates for the Legco elections originally scheduled for September 6, 2020.71 On July
31, 2020, Chief Executive Lam postponed the Legco election until September 5, 2021. She cited
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and denied making the decision for
political reasons.72 The intent of the primary was to narrow the field of pro-democracy candidates
and increase the coalition’s chances of winning a majority of the 70 Legco seats. The organizers
of the primary had hoped that at least 170,000 of the HKSAR’s 4.2 million eligible voters would
participate in the primary; more than 600,000 people, over 13% of all eligible voters,
participated.73
In an interview published three days before the primary, Secretary for Constitutional and
Mainland Affairs Erick Tsang Kwok-wai stated that the primary might violate the national
security law if a pro-democracy majority sought to use Legco to destabilize the HKSAR
government.74
The day before the primary, the HKPF raided the offices of Hong Kong Public Opinion Research
Institute (PORI), an independent public opinion surveying company that was helping pro-
democracy political parties.75

68 “涉违反香港国安法香港警方正式通缉罗冠聪等 6 名逃往海外乱港分子” (“Suspected of Violating Hong Kong
National Security Law: Hong Kong Police Formally Issue Wanted Notices for Nathan Law and Five Other Turn-Hong
Kong-Into-Chaos Activists Who Have Fled Abroad,” Chinese Central Television Customer Channel, July 31, 2020,
http://m.news.cctv.com/2020/07/31/ARTIMeZveH3hehoCF8Vo5yHj200731.shtml.
69 Clifford Lo, Kanis Leung, and Stuart Lau, “National Security Law: Hong Kong Police Seek Activist Nathan Law and
5 Others for Inciting Secession and Collusion, Insider Says,” South China Morning Post, August 1, 2020.
70 Facebook post by Samuel Chu, “DC4HK—Washingtonians Supporting Hong Kong,” August 1, 2020,
https://www.facebook.com/DC4HK/posts/328361271866467?comment_id=328450291857565.
71 For more about the primary and its implications for Legco’s next elections, see CRS In Focus IF10500, Hong Kong’s
Legislative Council (Legco), by Michael F. Martin.
72 HKSAR Government, “LegCo General Election Postponed for a Year,” July 31, 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/
general/202007/31/P2020073100898.htm.
73 Rachel Wong, “‘Hong Kong People Made History Again’: Over 600,000 Vote in Democrats’ Primaries as Co-
organiser Hails ‘Miracle’ Turnout,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 12, 2020.
74 Rachel Wong, “Hong Kong Legislative Primaries May Violate National Security Law, Mainland Affairs Minister
Warns,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 9, 2020.
75 Tom Grundy, “Hong Kong Police Raid Office of Pro-democracy Camp Primary Election Co-organisers PORI; Seize
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On July 13, 2020, following the primary, a spokesperson for the HKSAR’s Constitution and
Mainland Affairs Bureau stated that the HKSAR government was conducting “an in-depth
investigation” of the primary. The spokesperson said one focus of the inquiry was a statement by
an organizer of the primary indicating a desire to win a Legco majority—more than 35 seats in
the 70-seat chamber—in order to be able to veto the government’s budget. The spokesperson said
the statement “may constitute a breach of the offence of subversion under Article 22” of the
NSL.76 At a press conference, Chief Executive Lam stated:
If this so-called primary election’s purpose is to achieve the ultimate goal of delivering
what they call a 35-plus with the objective of objecting to or resisting every policy initiative
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, then it may fall into the
category of subverting the state power, which is now one of the four types of offences
under the new national security law.77
A spokesperson for China’s HKMAO supported such an investigation, stating, “Relevant
departments of the SAR Government have already received many related complaints and should
investigate them according to law, with no leniency in punishment.”78
If the HKSAR government decides the organizers and participants in the primary violated the
NSL, according to Article 6 and Article 35 of the NSL, they could potentially be disqualified in
the upcoming Legco elections, and, if convicted, permanently prohibited from running for office.
Other Forms of Implementation
In an apparent effort to comply with Article 10 of the NSL, which states that the HKSAR “shall
promote national security education in schools and universities,” the Hong Kong Education
Bureau issued a notice to all schools, including pre-schools, reminding them of their obligations
under the NSL, including helping students develop a “correct” understanding of China.79
Education Secretary Kevin Yeung Yun-hung told Legco on July 8, 2020, that “no political
propaganda activities should be allowed in schools, and no one, including students, should play,
sing and broadcast songs which contain political messages or hold any activities to express their
political stance.” He specifically barred playing, singing, or broadcasting “Glory to Hong Kong,”
which, he said, “contains strong political messages and is closely related to the social and
political incidents, violence and illegal incidents that have lasted for months.” Children’s right to
free expression, he said, “is not absolute.”80
Article 6 of the NSL states that those who stand for election or assume public office “shall
confirm in writing or take an oath to uphold the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] and swear allegiance

PCs,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 10, 2020.
76 HKSAR Government, “CMAB Follows Up Election-Related Complaints in Serious Manner,” July 13, 2020,
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202007/13/P2020071300830.htm.
77 HKSAR Government, “Primaries May Breach Security Law,” July 13, 2020, https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2020/07/
20200713/20200713_205128_252.html. “CE Announces Investigation into Weekend Primaries,” RTHK, July 13, 2020.
78 “国务院港澳办：绝不允许操控香港立法会选举” (State Council Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office: Primaries
Manipulating Hong Kong Legislative Council Absolutely Not Permitted), Xinhua, July 14, 2020,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-07/14/c_1126236724.htm.
79 “教育局通知全港學校包括幼稚園特殊學校均須教國安法,” (“Education Bureau Notifies All Hong Kong
Schools, Including Pre-Schools and Special Schools, of Common Obligations to Educate about National Security
Law”), Stand News (Hong Kong), July 4, 2020.
80 “Outright Ban Placed on Protest Anthem in Schools,” RTHK, July 8, 2020; HKSAR Government, “LCQ22:
Restricting Students’ Freedom of Expression,” July 8, 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202007/08/
P2020070800306.htm.
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to the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] in accordance with law.” The HKMAO’s Zhang Xiaoming
indicated on July 1, 2020, that the provision applies to all public servants.81 Accordingly, the
HKSAR government has proposed that all civil servants be required to take such an oath.82
Secretary for the Civil Service Patrick Nip Tak-kuen told Legco on July 10, 2020, that HKSAR
authorities had “agreed in principle” that staff members of publicly funded institutions, including
universities, schools and hospitals, should also be required to take oaths.83 Previously, Article 104
of the Basic Law required a narrower class of people—“Chief Executive, principal officials,
members of the Executive Council and of the Legislative Council, judges, of the courts at all
levels and other members of the judiciary in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”—to
swear to uphold the Basic Law and allegiance to the HKSAR.
Secretary Nip told Legco that under the proposed regulations, civil servants may also be
prohibited from participating in “anti-government protests.” Legco members raised a number of
questions in response to Nip’s comments, including about the rights of civil servants, particularly
their freedom of speech. Nip responded:
Civil servants shall uphold political neutrality, meaning that they should support the
administration and implement government policies. Any participation in anti-government
protests will surely go against [the new requirements].84
Secretary Nip did not directly address what form of punishment a civil servant might face for
non-compliance with the oath requirement, alleged violations of their oaths, or participation in
“anti-government” demonstrations.
In addition, Hong Kong public libraries have suspended the circulation of several books written
by pro-democracy advocates, such as Legco member Tanya Chan Suk-chong and Joshua Wong,
to determine if the books contain text forbidden by the NSL.85 Hong Kong schools have
reportedly been told to check their books for volumes that may violate the NSL.86
Remaining Steps for the HKSAR to Take
The NPC’s May 28 decision requires that the HKSAR government enact the local national
security legislation required by Article 23 the Basic Law “at an earlier date.” (See “Brief Recent
History of the HKSAR.”) Article 7 of the NSL re-states the requirement:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall complete, as early as possible,
legislation for safeguarding national security as stipulated in the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and shall refine relevant laws.87

81 State Council Information Office of the PRC, “SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020,
http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2020-07/04/content_76236573.htm.
82 “Govt Proposes Oaths for All Civil Servants,” RTHK, July 8, 2020, Civil Service Bureau, Government of HKSAR,
“Progress of the Study on the Proposal on Oath-taking by Civil Servants and Political Neutrality of Civil Servants,”
draft for Legco discussion, July 10, 2020, https://www.csb.gov.hk/english/info/files/
20200710_Oathtaking_and_PoliticalNeutrality_e.pdf.
83 Natalie Wong, “National Security Law: Hong Kong Civil Servants Not Allowed to Join Anti-government Protests
Under New Proposals, City Minister Warns,” South China Morning Post, July 10, 2020.
84 Ibid.
85 “Libraries Pull Off Some Books by Political Figures,” RTHK, July 4, 2020.
86 “Hong Kong Gov’t Tells Schools to Remove Books Breaching Security Law,” AFP, July 6, 2020.
87 “The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
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Speaking on July 1, 2020, NPC official Shen Chunyao reinforced that the HKSAR must both pass
new Article 23 legislation—covering five types of crimes not specifically addressed in the NSL—
and update its existing national security-related legislation. The latter includes the Crimes
Ordinance, the Public Order Ordinance, the Official Secrets Ordinance, and the Societies
Ordinance. All local national security-related legislation must be consistent with the NPC’s May
28 Decision and the NSL.88
In addition, the May 28 NPC decision instructs Hong Kong’s Chief Executive to “effectively
prevent, stop, and punish acts and activities endangering national security,” carry out national
security education in Hong Kong, and report regularly to Beijing about Hong Kong’s national
security work.89
Reaction in Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s response to the national security law has ranged from active support to active
opposition, largely along political divisions in the city. Chief Executive Lam, senior HKSAR
officials, and pro-establishment Legco members and their parties praised the new law; Legco’s
pro-democracy coalition criticized it. Various professional associations in Hong Kong, including
the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) and the Hong Kong Journalist Association (HKJA),
raised concerns about the law. Some members of the local and international business communities
have issued statements supportive of the new law, while others have indicated that they are
reevaluating their operations in Hong Kong.
Statements by the HKSAR Government
In a video statement to the U.N. Human Rights Council following the NPCSC’s passage of the
NSL, Chief Executive Lam said the law was justified due to escalating violence “fanned by
external forces” and the “threat of terrorist acts.”90 On July 7, 2020, she told reporters:
I’m pleased to say that in the last few days, I notice—you may dispute that—but I notice
that there has been an increasing appreciation of the positive effect of this national security
legislation, particularly in restoring stability in Hong Kong as reflected by some of the
market sentiments in recent days. Surely this is not doom and gloom for Hong Kong. I’m
sure with the passage of time and efforts and the facts being laid out, confidence will grow
in “One Country, Two Systems” and in Hong Kong’s future.91

Administrative Region,” Government of the HKSAR Gazette, G.N. (E.) 72 0f 2020, July 6, 2020.
88 State Council Information Office of the PRC, “SCIO Briefing on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020,
http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2020-07/04/content_76236573.htm. The HOSAR’s Crimes Ordinance is available
online at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap200. It includes provisions on treason, “assaults on the Queen,”
incitement to mutiny, incitement to disaffection, and “seditious intention,” which may be contrary to the provisions of
the national security law.
89 “Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement
Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security,” unofficial English
translation, May 28, 2020, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A215.
90 Elson Tong, “Respect Beijing’s Right to Protect National Security in Hong Kong, Leader Carrie Lam Tells UN
Rights Council,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 2020.
91 HKSAR Government, “Transcript of Remarks by CE at Media Session Before ExCo Meeting,” press release, July 7,
2020.
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Chief Executive Lam also responded to what she referred to as “unfounded allegations” about the
NSL. Rather than constituting the death of “one country, two systems,” Lam said, “The National
Security Law aims to affirm and improve the implementation of ‘One country, Two systems.’”
She also stated, “[I]nstead of undermining people’s freedom, the National Security Law will
restore stability and help ensure the great majority of Hong Kong people could exercise their
rights and freedoms, without being intimidated or attacked.”
Response from the Legislative Council (Legco)
Legco President Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen and the 41 other pro-establishment Legco members
issued a joint statement on June 30, 2020, before the text of the law was released, welcoming the
new law, which they said plugs loopholes in the city’s national security laws.92 Leung said the
law “can safeguard Hong Kong’s long-term stability and prosperity, and protect according to law
the rights and freedoms long enjoyed by the vast majority of law-abiding citizens.”93 Pro-
democracy Legco members held a press conference after the law was approved, but before its
release, stating their opposition to the law.94 Tanya Chan, convener for the group, said the lack of
transparency and the rushed manner in which the law was approved indicated that the PRC
government no longer trusts the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong.95
Response of Hong Kong’s Pro-democracy Coalition
The initial response from participants in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy coalition was a mix of
expressions of continued commitment to their cause and pragmatic acts to protect themselves
from possible prosecution under the new national security law. Although some of their earlier
concerns about the dangers of the NSL to human rights do not appear to be borne out in the final
text (see discussion below), other threats appear to be real.
Some activists had feared the national security law would include the penalty of capital
punishment. It does not, although Secretary of Justice Cheng appeared to leave open the
possibility that a person could be remitted to mainland China and face a possible death sentence.96
Some activists also had feared the law would be effective retroactively, making past actions and
activities illegal. Article 66 of the NSL seemingly dispels that concern. The law does not,
however, explicitly prevent previous events being introduced as evidence to demonstrate a pattern
or behavior. On July 30, 2020, the Hong Kong Electoral Affairs Commission disqualified 12
candidates for the Legco elections, in part because of their past statements in support of the
preservation of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, their opposition to the NSL, and their
lobbying on behalf of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (P.L. 116-149) and the Hong Kong Human
Rights and Democracy Act (P.L. 116-76).97

92 “HKSAR LegCo President, Members Support Passage of Law on Safeguarding National Security in HK,” Xinhua,
June 30, 2020.
93 Legislative Council of the HKSAR, “Transcript of Remarks by LegCo President on the Passage of The Law on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” June 30, 2020,
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr19-20/english/press/pr20200630-2.html.
94 Legco members are informally organized into two coalitions, pro-democracy and pro-establishment, based on their
general attitudes towards the policies of the PRC and HKSAR government. For more information, see CRS In Focus
IF10500, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (Legco).
95 “Beijing showing its disregard for HK: opposition,” RTHK, June 30, 2020.
96 “Not for us to say who could get death penalty: govt,” RTHK, July 1, 2020.
97 HKSAR Government, “HKSAR Government Supports Returning Officers’ Decision to Invalidate Certain
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The Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), the organizers of most of Hong Kong’s largest protests,
held its annual July 1 pro-democracy march on Hong Kong Island, despite the HKPF banning the
event.98 Tens of thousands of people attended the prohibited demonstration. In congressional
testimony, Lee Cheuk-yan, former Legco member and one of the organizers of Hong Kong’s
annual June 4 Tiananmen memorial rally, expressed concern over promulgation of the NSL,
under which shouting the slogans “down with Carrie Lam” or “defund the Police” could be
considered acts of subversion.99
Several groups responded to the new law by disbanding. Demosisto, the political organization
started by leading democracy activists Agnes Chow Ting, Nathan Law Kwun-chung, and Joshua
Wong Chi-fung, dissolved itself on June 30, although some of its former members said they
would continue the struggle for human rights in Hong Kong.100 Pro-independence groups, Hong
Kong National Front and Studentlocalism, also announced they were disbanding in Hong Kong,
but would continue to operate outside of Hong Kong.101 Other political activists have removed
statements from the internet and cancelled accounts on various social media platforms out of fear
of prosecution under the national security law.102
As they did in 2014 during the Umbrella Movement and during the demonstrations of 2019,
protesters have responded with creative and innovative techniques to try to avoid violating the
letter of the law, in this case the NSL. For example, rather than writing the possibly illegal slogan,
“restore Hong Kong; revolution of our times,” some are using the initial letters of the phrase in
Cantonese—”GFHG, SDGM”—or rendering the Chinese characters into recognizable abstract
shapes. Other protesters are holding up blank pieces of white paper referring obliquely both to the
censorship under the national security law, and the “white terror” created by the law.103
Response of Hong Kong Professional Associations
Two of Hong Kong’s prominent professional associations, the Hong Kong Bar Association
(HKBA) and the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), have expressed grave concerns
about the implications of the national security law for key attributes of the city’s socio-economic
system that have contributed to Hong Kong’s success and prosperity. On July 1, 2020, the HKBA
released a statement saying that the provisions of the NSL
operate to erode the high degree of autonomy guaranteed to the HKSAR under the Basic
Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and to undermine core pillars of the One
Country Two Systems model including independent judicial power, the enjoyment of

Nominations for Legislative Council General Election,” July 30, 2020, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202007/30/
P2020073000481.htm; Tony Cheung, Kimmy Chung, and Natalie Wong, “Hong Kong Elections: Mass
Disqualification of Opposition Hopefuls Sparks Political Storm,” South China Morning Post, July 30, 2020.
98 Rachel Wong, “‘Ready for the Battle’: Hong Kong Protesters Vow Action as National Security Law Passed,” Hong
Kong Free Press, June 30, 2020.
99 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The End of One Country, Two Systems?: Implications of
Beijing’s National Security Law in Hong Kong, Testimony of Lee Cheuk-yan, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 1, 2020.
100 Kelly Ho and Tom Grundy, “Joshua Wong’s Pro-democracy Group Demosisto Disbands Hours After Hong Kong
Security Law Passed,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 30, 2020.
101 Sum Lok-kei, “Hong Kong National Security Law: Future of City’s Localist Movement Hangs in Balance as Groups
Disband, Activists Quit or Flee City,” South China Morning Post, June 30, 2020.
102 Jennifer Creely, “Hongkongers Purge Social Media, Delete Accounts as Beijing Passes National Security Law,”
Hong Kong Free Press, July 3, 2020.
103 “Blank Paper, Graphic Cards Become Noon Protest Signs,” RTHK, July 6, 2020.
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fundamental rights and liberties, and the vesting of legislative and executive power in local
institutions.104
The HKBA asserts that provisions of the national security law conflict with provisions in the
Basic Law, and that the NSL permits mainland officials not subject to local judicial review to
operate in Hong Kong. Moreover, the HKBA states, the definitions of the crimes of succession,
subversion, and terrorist acts and activities “are capable of being applied in a manner that is
arbitrary, and that disproportionately interferes with fundamental rights, including the freedom of
conscience, expression and assembly.”105 The HKBA also notes, “The omission of a
contemporaneous authentic English version of the law is unusual given that a bilingual legal
system operates in Hong Kong.”106 The lack of an official English version of the law may make it
difficult for judges who do not read Chinese to serve on national security law cases, and put
defendants who do not read Chinese at a disadvantage during their trials. Of the 22 judges who
are members of Hong Kong’s highest court, the Court of Final Appeal, at least 15 are foreign
nationals, including citizens of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.107
On July 1, 2020, the HKJA issued a statement expressing its “deep regret” about the law, saying:
We urged the Standing Committee to adopt a “minimalist approach” in legislating. It turned
out to be the opposite. The law enacted is much harsher; its scope much broader. Worse,
there was no prior consultation.108
On July 7, 2020, the HKJA released its annual report on media freedom in Hong Kong, entitled,
“Freedom in Danger.”109 The report focused on several developments that it sees as threatening
freedom of the press in Hong Kong over the past year, including
 physical and verbal assaults on journalists by the HKPF;
 unwarranted restrictions on journalists trying to cover news events;
 inadequate mechanisms to address alleged HKPF misconduct;
 alleged withholding of information and the dissemination of misinformation by
the HKPF and the HKSAR government; and
 alleged HKSAR efforts to undermine the independence of Radio Television Hong
Kong (RTHK), a government-funded public broadcasting service that delivers
educational, entertainment, and public affairs programming. Since 1954, RTHK
(and its predecessor, Radio Hong Kong) have operated as independent agencies
within the Hong Kong government.
The HKJA points to several articles in the national security law that could be used to undermine
freedom of the press and the ability to protect journalists’ sources. While acknowledging that

104 Hong Kong Bar Association, “The Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) on Safeguarding National
Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”): Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Association,”
press release, July 1, 2020, https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/
20200701%20HKBA%20statement%20on%20Safeguarding%20National%20%20Security%20in%20HKSAR.pdf.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, “Hong Kong Non-Permanent Judges,” accessed July 29, 2020,
https://www.hkcfa.hk/en/about/who/judges/npjs/index.html.
108 Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Statement Issued by the Hong Kong Journalists Association [on] the Hong
Kong National Security Law”” press release, July 1, 2020.
109 Hong Kong Journalists Association, Freedom in Danger, 2020 Annual Report, July 7, 2020,
https://www.hkja.org.hk/en/publication/hkja-annual-report-2020-freedom-in-danger-2/.
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Articles 4 and 5 of the law reiterate the basic rights of Hong Kong residents, including freedom of
the press, the HKJA is concerned that news reports could be interpreted as “inciting, aiding and
abetting” actions and activities that allegedly violate the national security law.110 The HKJA
suggests that Article 9 of the NSL, which authorizes the HKSAR government to “take necessary
measures to strengthen public communication, guidance, supervision and regulation over matters
concerning national security,” could be used to limit internet access and restrict research and
reporting by journalists. In addition, it says, Articles 43 and 59 of the law could be used to compel
journalists to testify in cases involving alleged national security law violations both in Hong
Kong and in mainland China, and divulge the identity of confidential sources.
On July 2, 2020, Hong Kong’s Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC) wrote its second letter to
Chief Executive Lam requesting guarantees regarding the freedom of the press in Hong Kong
under the NSL. Asked about the letter during a press briefing on July 7, 2020, Chief Executive
Lam said:
If the Foreign Correspondents’ Club or all reporters in Hong Kong can give me a 100 per
cent guarantee that they will not commit any offences under this piece of national
legislation, then I can do the same. It is not a question of me standing here to give you a
guarantee of what you may or may not do in the days and weeks and years ahead. The law
has clearly defined the four types of acts and activities which we need to prevent, curb and
punish in accordance with the law.111
Commenting on Lam’s statement, FCC President Jodi Schneider said, “So obviously, that doesn’t
sound terribly reassuring about press freedom.”112
Response from the Hong Kong Business and Finance Community
The response of the Hong Kong business community to the NSL has been cautious and mixed.
Some business associations and companies have expressed their support for the law. Others,
including the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong (AmCham HK), have been more
reserved. Several social media companies have stated that they have suspended their cooperation
with HKSAR authorities and at least one company, TikTok, owned by mainland China-based
ByteDance, has ended service to Hong Kong due to the enactment of the national security law.113
Prior to the NSL’s promulgation, outward flows of capital and deposits in Hong Kong bank
accounts reportedly increased, suggesting an effort by Hong Kong residents and businesses to
hedge against possible negative effects of the law. At the same time, mainland companies and
investors reportedly moved capital into Hong Kong to support the local economy and reduce the
potential negative economic effects of the NSL under a PRC government initiative called “Wealth
Management Connect.”114 Between June 30 and July 10, 2020, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index

110 Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Statement Issued by the Hong Kong Journalists Association [on] the Hong
Kong National Security Law,” press release, July 1, 2020, https://www.hkja.org.hk/en/statements/statement-issued-by-
the-hong-kong-journalists-association-the-hong-kong-national-security-law/.
111 HKSAR Government, “Transcript of Remarks by CE at Media Session Before ExCo Meeting,” press release, July 7,
2020.
112 “Threat Grows for Hong Kong’s Press, Judiciary,” Asia Sentinel, July 7, 2020.
113 “TikTok Halts Hong Kong Access After Security Law,” BBC, July 10, 2020.
114 Weizhen Tan, “As China Tightens Its Grip on Hong Kong, It’s Also Paving the Way for Money to Flow into the
City,” CNBC, July 6, 2020.
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rose 5.3%, but the economy remains in a recession largely brought about by the COVID-19
pandemic.115
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce issued a statement on July 1, 2020, supporting
the law as “instrumental in helping to restore stability and certainty to Hong Kong.”116 United
Kingdom-based banks HSBC and Standard Chartered, two of the three banks that issue currency
in Hong Kong (the third is Bank of China), released statements on June 4, 2020, supporting the
unseen national security law, reportedly after facing sustained pressure from both the PRC and
HKSAR governments to do so.117 U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and UK Foreign
Secretary Dominic Raab separately criticized HSBC for supporting the national security law.118
AmCham HK issued a statement following the promulgation of the NSL, indicating:
We remain committed to Hong Kong as a home base for international business. It will take
time for the business community to digest details of the law, but we hope it will not impact
the dynamism and benefits of this great city, which continues to serve as an important
gateway between East and West.119
The organization also stated that it looks forward to communicating with the HKSAR
government “to seek further clarity on how the law will be interpreted and implemented, and the
implications for American businesses operating and investing in Hong Kong.” In a July 2020
survey of its members, AmCham HK reported 41% of the surveyed companies were “extremely
concerned” and 36% were “somewhat concerned” about the NSL, but 64% said the company had
no plans to relocate from Hong Kong.120 Most of the surveyed companies indicated that they were
mostly concerned about the ambiguity of the scope and enforcement of the law, and were
adopting a “wait and see” approach. According to one study, the withdrawal of U.S. companies
from Hong Kong could result in a 30% decline in rents for commercial real estate.121
Social media companies operating in Hong Kong have expressed concern about Article 43 of the
national security law, which requires these companies to turn over to the HKSAR government
and its courts any information relevant to a national security law investigations and cases. In
cases being heard by mainland courts, Article 59 states, “any person who has information
pertaining to an offence endangering national security under this Law is obliged to testify
truthfully.” Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Telegram, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Zoom

115 The Hang Seng Index closed at 24,427.19 on June 10, 2020, and 25,727.41 on July 10, 2020. On July 6, 2020, it
closed at 26,339.16, up 7.8% over June 30, 2020.
116 “HK General Chamber of Commerce Welcomes Security Law,” RTHK, July 2, 2020.
117 “HSBC and StanChart Back China Security Laws for HK,” BBC, June 4, 2020.
118 “Mike Pompeo Criticises HSBC for Backing Hong Kong Security Law,” BBC, June 10, 2020. “HSBC Gets Veiled
Rebuke from UK Government over Hong Kong,” BBC, June 10, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “On China’s
Attempted Coercion of the United Kingdom,” June 9, 2020, https://www.state.gov/on-chinas-attempted-coercion-of-
the-united-kingdom/.
119 AmCham HK, “Press Release: AmCham Statement on National Security Law,” press release, July 2, 2020.
120 AmCham HK, AmCham Temperature Survey Findings: National Security Law, July 13, 2020,
https://www.amcham.org.hk/uploads/media/default/0001/08/a5e14d30d0931649e870629c1e282f9d93ba6309.pdf. The
survey involved 183 companies, or 15 of AmCham HK’s members.
121 Cheryl Acribal, “Exodus of US Firms from Hong Kong to Avoid Sanctions Imposed in Wake of Security Law
Would Hit Office Market Already Hurt by Unrest, Coronavirus,” South China Morning Post, July 9, 2020.
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have temporarily stopped responding to HKSAR government requests for user information.122 As
noted above, TikTok has withdrawn from the Hong Kong market in response to the NSL.123
U.S. companies have expressed particular concern about Article 29, which prohibits “collusion
with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security.”124 Among the
prohibited acts is receiving support to “commit” the imposition of sanctions or “other hostile
activity” against the HKSAR or the PRC. Companies are reportedly worried that compliance with
U.N. or U.S. sanctions against China or the HKSAR could be considered a violation of the
national security law, and subject the company’s Hong Kong office or staff to criminal
prosecution. Similarly, Article 29’s prohibition on the sale or possession of “State secrets or
intelligence” is sufficiently broad and vague to possibly prohibit otherwise legitimate commercial
activities. Businesses have raised parallel concerns about Article 26, which could expose social
media companies to charges of supporting terrorist activities.125
A number of banks in Hong Kong are reportedly conducting internal audits to determine their
exposure to possible compliance issues related to the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (P.L. 116-149),
which could place restrictions on providing financial services to PRC and HKSAR officials if any
are designated for sanctions by the U.S. government.126 The banks face a conundrum as Article 29
of the national security law includes in the definition of collusion, “imposing sanctions or
blockade, or engaging in other hostile activities against” the HKSAR or the PRC. The
contradictions between the two laws may force banks to choose between doing business with
sanctioning states or doing business with China and the HKSAR. Such a choice would leave
unresolved the matter of compliance with sanctions requirements imposed by the U.N. Security
Council.
Response of the Trump Administration
Prior to passage of the NSL, the Trump Administration made statements and announcements
seeking to dissuade the PRC government from promulgating the NSL, including threatening to
revoke Hong Kong’s special treatment and impose sanctions on selected PRC and HKSAR
officials. After the NSL went into effect, the Administration made additional statements and
announcements expressing its disapproval. On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed the Hong
Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA; P.L. 116-149) and issued Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong
Normalization, which implements some of the measures the Administration had previously
threatened to take and establishes the means to impose sanctions.127

122 Paul Mozur, “In Hong Kong, a Proxy Battle over Internet Freedom Begins,” New York Times, July 7, 2020; and
Kelly Ho, “Zoom Suspends Data Requests from Hong Kong Gov’t over National Security Law Concerns,” Hong Kong
Free Press, July 7, 2020.
123 Ina Fried, “TikTok to Pull Out of Hong Kong,” Axios, July 7, 2020; “TikTok Halts Hong Kong Access After
Security Law” BBC, July 10, 2020.
124 Wendy Wu, “Foreign Firms in Hong Kong face ‘Huge Insecurity’ over National Security Law,” South China
Morning Post, July 7, 2020.
125 Tom Grundy, “Exclusive: Telegram to Temporarily Refuse Data Requests from Hong Kong Courts amid Security
Law ‘Terrorism’ Fears,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 5, 2020.
126 Primrose Riordan and Leo Lewis, “Banks in Hong Kong Audit Clients for Exposure to US Sanctions,” Financial
Times, July 9, 2020.
127 Executive Office of the President, “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization,” 85 Federal
Register 43413, July 17, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-
executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization.
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Select Administration Statements and Actions
On May 27, 2020, Secretary Pompeo informed Congress, under the United States-Hong Kong
Policy Act of 1992 (USHKPA; P.L. 102-383, 22 U.S.C. 5701–5732), of his certification that Hong
Kong does not continue to warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as before its
handover to China on July 1, 1997.128 On May 30, 2020, President Trump stated that his
Administration would eliminate “different and special treatment” for Hong Kong. He said the
United States’ new approach would “affect the full range of agreements we have with Hong
Kong, from our extradition treaty to our export controls on dual-use technologies and more, with
few exceptions.” He also said the State Department would revise its travel advisory for Hong
Kong “to reflect the increased danger of surveillance and punishment by the Chinese state
security apparatus.”129
Other recent Administration actions include the following:
 On June 12, 2020, the State Department amended the existing COVID-19 travel
advisory for Hong Kong, adding language stating U.S. travelers to Hong Kong
should “Exercise increased caution in Hong Kong due to civil unrest, risk of
surveillance, and arbitrary enforcement of laws other than for maintaining
law and order” [bold text is in the original].130
 On June 17, Secretary Pompeo joined his counterparts from the other members of
the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom) plus the
High Representative of the European Union in a statement on the NSL. It
declared that China’s decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong
“is not in conformity with the Hong Kong Basic Law and its international
commitments under the principles of the legally binding, U.N.-registered Sino-
British Joint Declaration.”131
 On June 26, 2020, Secretary Pompeo announced the imposition of visa
restrictions on unnamed “current and former” Chinese officials “who are
believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining Hong Kong’s high
degree of autonomy, as guaranteed in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, or
undermining human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong,” and their
family members.”132 China responded by threatening visa restrictions of its own
on unnamed “U.S. individuals who have acted viciously on issues related to
Hong Kong.”133
 On June 29, 2020, Secretary Pompeo announced the United States was ending
exports of U.S.-origin defense equipment to Hong Kong and would “take steps

128 U.S. Department of State, “PRC National People’s Congress Proposal on Hong Kong National Security
Legislation,” May 27, 2020. Section 205 of the USHKPA (as amended) states the Secretary of State, on “at least an
annual basis, and in conjunction with the report required under section 301, shall issue a certification to Congress that
indicates whether Hong Kong continues to warrant treatment under United States law in the same manner as United
States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997.”
129 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump on Actions Against China,” May 30, 2020.
130 Department of State, “Hong Kong Travel Advisory,” June 12, 2020.
131 Department of State, “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Hong Kong,” press release, June 17, 2020.
132 Department of State, “U.S. Department of State Imposes Visa Restrictions on Chinese Communist Party Officials
for Undermining Hong Kong’s High Degree of Autonomy and Restricting Human Rights,” June 26, 2020.
133 “China to Impose Visa Restrictions on U.S. Individuals Acting Viciously on HK-Related Issues,” Xinhua, June 29,
2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/29/c_139175407.htm.
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toward imposing the same restrictions on U.S. defense and dual-use technologies
to Hong Kong as it does for China.”134 It was not clear from Secretary Pompeo’s
statement if this action is part of the enforcement of the provisions of P.L. 116-
77, which requires a curtailment of commercial export licenses for certain
munitions items to the HKPF.135
 Also on June 29, 2020, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross suspended his
department’s “regulations affording preferential treatment to Hong Kong over
China, including the availability of export license exceptions.” Ross stated that
“further actions to eliminate differential treatment are also being evaluated.”136
 On June 30, Secretary Pompeo stated, “The Chinese Communist Party’s decision
to impose draconian national security legislation on Hong Kong destroys the
territory’s autonomy and one of China’s greatest achievements,” and repeated
President Trump’s pledge to “eliminate policy exemptions that give Hong Kong
different and special treatment, with few exceptions.”137
 On July 6, U.S. Consul General to Hong Kong Hanscom Smith referred to the
national security law as “a tragedy for Hong Kong.”138 He also said the law was
creating “an atmosphere of coercion and self-censorship” in the city and that the
U.S. government was considering imposing additional sanctions.
 On August 1, 2020, Secretary Pompeo condemned the one-year postponement of
the Legco elections, stating, “There is no valid reason for such a lengthy
delay.”139
Hong Kong Autonomy Act and Executive Order 13936
On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA, P.L. 116-
149). The act passed the House and the Senate by unanimous consent and was delivered to the
President on July 2. The act authorizes the President to impose sanctions on “foreign persons”
who are responsible for the erosion of China’s fulfilment of its obligations under the Joint
Declaration. In addition, the HKAA authorizes the President to impose sanctions on “foreign
financial institutions that conduct significant transactions” with persons designated for sanctions
under this act.
China responded to the President’s signing of the HKAA by issuing a flurry of statements,
including a Foreign Ministry statement, the fourth it had issued since December 2019 and the
fourth in a row condemning the United States. The statement said, “The Chinese government
firmly opposes and strongly condemns this move by the United States.” It vowed, “China will
make necessary response and sanction the relevant individuals and entities of the United States.”

134 Department of State, “U.S. Government Ending Controlled Defense Exports to Hong Kong,” June 29, 2020.
135 P.L. 116-77 is scheduled to sunset on November 27, 2020, in accordance with Section 3 of that act (133 Stat. 1174).
136 Department of Commerce, “Statement from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross on Revocation of Hong Kong
Special Status,” June 29, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/06/statement-us-secretary-
commerce-wilbur-ross-revocation-hong-kong.
137 Department of State, “On Beijing’s Imposition of National Security Legislation on Hong Kong,” press release, June
30, 2020.
138 “Security Law a Tragedy for Hong Kong: U.S. Envoy,” RTHK, July 6, 2020.
139 Department of State, “On the Postponement of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council Elections,” press release, August
1, 2020, https://www.state.gov/on-the-postponement-of-hong-kongs-legislative-council-elections/.
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The statement also urged the United States to “stop interfering in Hong Kong and other internal
affairs of China in any way.”140
Also on July 14, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13936 on Hong Kong
Normalization. In the E.O., the President declared a national emergency based on his
determination that, “the situation with respect to Hong Kong, including recent actions taken by
the PRC to fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, constitutes an unusual and
extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.”141 Among other provisions, the E.O.
 states that, “It shall be the policy of the United States to suspend or eliminate
different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong to the extent permitted by
law”;
 authorizes the imposition of visa restrictions and economic sanctions on “any
foreign person” that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, in
joint consultation, determine was involved in or responsible for actions that
undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, “undermine democratic processes or
institutions” in Hong Kong, or limit the rights of Hong Kong residents, or was
responsible for or complicit in the extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or
torture of any person in Hong Kong or other gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights or serious human rights abuse in Hong Kong, as well as
on “any foreign person” who was “involved in developing, adopting, or
implementing” the national security law;
 orders the executive branch to suspend the Agreement with Hong Kong for the
Surrender of Fugitive Offenders and the Agreement with Hong Kong for the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, and “take steps to end the provision of training to
members of the Hong Kong Police Force or other Hong Kong security services at
the Department of State’s International Law Enforcement Academies”;142
 suspends differential treatment for Hong Kong under the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) and the Arms Export Control
Act (P.L. 94-329; 22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
 orders the executive branch “to eliminate the preference for Hong Kong passport
holders as compared to PRC passport holders” with respect to the duration of
nonimmigrant visas, and end treatment of Hong Kong as a separate “foreign
state” from China for the purposes of the Diversity Visa program and per-country
numerical limitations on immigration;
 orders the executive branch to reallocate refugee admissions within the ceiling
set by an annual Presidential Determination “to residents of Hong Kong based on

140 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” July 15, 2020,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1797857.shtml.
141 Executive Office of the President, “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization,” 85 Federal
Register 43413, July 17, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-
executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization. For analysis of the Executive Order, see Cleary Gottlieb, “Executive
Order Eliminates Differential Treatment for Hong Kong,” July 21, 2020, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/
alert-memos-2020/executive-order-eliminates-differential-treatment-for-hong-kong.pdf.
142 Agreement with Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders, Treaty Document 105-3, ratification agreed to
by the Senate on October 23, 1997, https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/105th-congress/3; Agreement with
Hong Kong for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Treaty Document 105-7, ratification agreed to by the Senate on
October 21, 1998, https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/105th-congress/7.
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humanitarian concerns, to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law”;
and
 orders the executive branch to “take steps to terminate” Fulbright Program
educational and cultural exchanges with both mainland China and Hong Kong.
The Executive Order cites authorities provided in the USHKPA, the HKHRDA, the HKAA, the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; IEEPA), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; NEA), Section 212(f) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. It
does not indicate which provisions are invoking which authority. The sanctions provisions, for
example, include elements similar to those stated in the HKHRDA and the HKAA, as well as
other elements not included in those laws.
Responses of Select Governments
At the U.N. Human Rights Council
On June 30, 2020, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the World Trade Organization and the
United Nations in Geneva delivered a joint statement on Hong Kong at the U.N. Human Rights
Council on behalf of 27 countries, not including the United States.143 (See Table 4 below.) The
statement expressed “deep and growing concerns” about the NSL and urged the PRC and Hong
Kong governments to “reconsider” and “to engage Hong Kong’s people, institutions and judiciary
to prevent further erosion of the rights and freedoms that the people of Hong Kong have enjoyed
for many years.”144
Cuba’s Ambassador to the United Nations delivered a counterstatement on behalf of 53 countries.
It welcomed the national security legislation and stated, “Hong Kong affairs are China’s internal
affairs that brook no interference by foreign forces.” The statement urged “relevant sides to stop
interfering in China’s internal affairs by using Hong Kong related issues.”145

143 It is not clear why the United States was not among the letter’s signatories. Although the United States withdrew
from the Human Rights Council in 2018, the signatories included other U.N. Member states that are similarly not
members of the Council.
144 Government of the United Kingdom, “UN Human Rights Council 44: Cross-Regional Statement on Hong Kong and
Xinjiang,” June 30, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights-council-44-cross-regional-
statement-on-hong-kong-and-xinjiang.
145 Permanent Mission of the PRC to the U.N. Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland,
“Joint Statement delivered by Permanent Mission of Cuba at the 44th session of Human Rights Council,” June 30, 2020,
http://www.china-un.ch/eng/hom/t1793804.htm.
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Table 4. Countries Expressing Either Criticism or Support for China’s Handling of
Hong Kong at the U.N. Human Rights Council
27 Countries Expressed Criticism; 53 Expressed Support
Countries Joining Joint Statement Criticizing
Countries Joining Joint Statement Supporting
China’s Actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang (27)
China’s Action in Hong Kong (53)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Denmark,
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Burundi,
Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Germany,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the
Comoros, Congo-Brazzavil e, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Kingdom of the
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Slovakia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos,
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom Lebanon, Lesotho, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, People’s
Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria,
Tajikistan, Togo, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela,
Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
Source: Government of the United Kingdom, “UN Human Rights Council 44: Cross-Regional Statement on
Hong Kong and Xinjiang,” June 30, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights-council-44-
cross-regional-statement-on-hong-kong-and-xinjiang. Dave Lawler, “The 53 Countries Supporting China’s
Crackdown on Hong Kong,” Axios, July 2, 2020.
Australia
On July 9, 2020, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that his government is
taking steps to suspend the nation’s extradition agreement with the HKSAR.146 He also indicated
that Australia would extend the visas of Hong Kong residents to up to five years and allow Hong
Kong residents to apply for permanent residency.147 Australia provided a similar special
immigration arrangement for Chinese nationals following the June 1989 Tiananmen Square
crackdown.148
Canada
On July 3, 2020, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francois-Philippe Champagne, announced
a change to Canada’s export controls policy, saying, “Effective immediately, Canada will treat
exports of sensitive goods to Hong Kong in the same way as those destined for China. Canada
will not permit the export of sensitive military items to Hong Kong.” Champagne also announced
that Canada was “suspending” its extradition treaty with Hong Kong and updating its travel
advice for Hong Kong “to advise Canadians of the potential impacts of the new national security
legislation.”149

146 Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, “Extradition Treaty with Hong Kong,” press release, July 9, 2020.
147 “Australia Warns Citizens in HK, Suspends Extradition,” RTHK, July 9, 2020.
148 Sue Green, “Chinese Students Win Right to Stay in Australia,” South China Morning Post, November 2, 1993.
149Government of Canada, “Canada Takes Action Following Passage of National Security Legislation for Hong Kong,”
July 3, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2020/07/canada-takes-action-following-passage-of-
national-security-legislation-for-hong-kong.html.
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Japan
Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga called the law “regrettable,” and said, “The
enactment of the national security law undermines the credibility of the ‘one-country, two-
systems’ principle.”150 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party approved a
resolution calling for the Japanese government to cancel Chinese President Xi’s planned visit to
Japan.151 The visit was originally scheduled for the spring of 2020, but was indefinitely postponed
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Taiwan
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council on June 18, 2020, launched a “Hong Kong Humanitarian Aid
Project.”152 It aims to provide assistance to those arriving in Taiwan from Hong Kong and
“demonstrate the government’s unwavering determination to care for Hong Kong citizens and its
support for the transfer of Hong Kong capital and talent to Taiwan to participate in Taiwan’s
economic development.” On July 1, 2020, the council opened a Taiwan-Hong Kong Office for
Exchanges and Services, tasked with providing consultation services and assistance for Hong
Kong residents arriving in Taiwan for “education, employment, investment, entrepreneurship,
immigration, and settlement.” The office also offers assistance to Hong Kong-based international
companies exploring relocating their operations to Taiwan.153
United Kingdom
On July 1, 2020, British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab told Britain’s House of Commons that
the NSL “constitutes a clear and serious breach of the Joint Declaration” signed between the
United Kingdom and China in 1984. He added that
having committed to apply the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
to the people of Hong Kong, China has now written into law wide-ranging exemptions,
which cannot credibly be reconciled with its international obligations, or indeed its
responsibilities as a leading member of the international community.
Raab announced that Hong Kong residents who hold British National Overseas (BN(O)) status
and their dependents—an estimated 2.9 million of Hong Kong’s population of eight million—will
be allowed to live and work or study in the United Kingdom for five years.154 At the conclusion of
the five-year period, those eligible for the scheme will be allowed to apply for “settled status”—
permanent residence—and, 12 months later, to apply for full British citizenship. Raab described

150 Jesse Johnson and Satoshi Sugiyama, “Tokyo Toughens Tone After Beijing Passes Hong Kong Security Law,”
Japan Times, June 30, 2020.
151 Mari Yamaguchi , “Japan’s Ruling Party Calls for Government to Cancel Xi Visit,” Washington Post, July 7, 2020.
152 Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Public Information on the Hong Kong Humanitarian Aid
Project,” June 18, 2020, https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/297/relfile/8012/75961/2bccf36c-71a9-427c-a66d-
e6c0dba51015.pdf
153 Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), “MAC Minister Chen Ming-tong and THEC Chairperson
Chang Hsiao-yueh Jointly Inaugurate the Taiwan-Hong Kong Office for Exchanges and Services and Hope for Support
and Advice from All Sides,” July 1, 2020, https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&
sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=E266426CF88E5963.
154 According to the UK’s Home Office, “Someone who was a British overseas territories citizen by connection with
Hong Kong was able to register as a British national (overseas) before 1 July 1997,” the date that the UK transferred
sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. U.K. Home Office, “Media Factsheet: Hong Kong BN(O)s,” May 29, 2020,
https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2020/05/29/media-factsheet-hong-kong-bnos/.
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the program as “a special, bespoke, set of arrangements developed for the unique circumstances
we face and in light of our historic commitment to the people of Hong Kong.”155
On July 20, 2020, Raab announced two new measures. First, he stated that the UK would be
extending to Hong Kong the arms embargo it has had in place against mainland China since
1989. Henceforth, he said, the UK will not export to Hong Kong “potentially lethal weapons,
their components or ammunition.” It will also bar exports of equipment that “might be used for
internal repression, such as shackles, intercept equipment, firearms and smoke grenades.” Second,
noting that NSL had “significantly changed key assumptions underpinning our extradition treaty
arrangements with Hong Kong,” Raab said the UK was suspending its extradition treaty with
Hong Kong. He raised particular concerns about Articles 55 to 59 of the NSL, which allow for
cases to be prosecuted and tried in mainland China, stating that the NSL “does not provide legal
or judicial safeguards in such cases.” He also raised concerns about “the potential reach of the
extra-territorial provisions” of the law, a reference to Article 38.156
Other Parliamentary Entities
In a July 1, 2020 statement, the European Union (EU) called on the PRC and HKSAR
governments to fully comply with the ICCPR, and urged “China to avoid any act which
undermines Hong Kong’s autonomy in the legal field, including in terms of human rights.” 157 On
July 24, 2020, the Council of the European Union announced a decision to endorse “a
coordinated package responding to the imposition of the national security law, to be carried out at
EU and/or Member State level, as deemed appropriate,” in nine fields. They are asylum,
migration, visa, and residence policies; controls on the export of “sensitive equipment and
technologies for end-use in Hong Kong,” particularly those related to “internal repression”;
scholarships for Hong Kong residents; support for Hong Kong civil society; observations of trials
of the Hong Kong trials of pro-democracy activists; discussing risks to EU citizens presented by
the NSL; “monitoring the extraterritorial effect” of the NSL; reviewing extradition agreements
with Hong Kong; and “not launching any new negotiations with Hong Kong.”158
The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), comprised of over 150 lawmakers from 16
countries and the European Parliament, has launched two Hong Kong-related campaigns.159 One
urges governments that have an extradition agreement with the HKSAR government to review
and consider suspending such agreements.160 Another advocates for legislation “to audit and

155 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “National Security Legislation in Hong Kong: Foreign
Secretary’s Statement in Parliament,” July 1, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-
statement-on-national-security-legislation-in-hong-kong. The U.K.’s Home Office announced details of the scheme on
July 22, 2020. UK Home Office, “Home Secretary Announces Details of the Hong Kong BN(O) Visa,” July 22, 2020,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces-details-of-the-hong-kong-bno-visa.
156 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Hong Kong and China: Foreign Secretary’s Statement in
Parliament, 20 July 2020,” July 20, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hong-kong-and-china-foreign-
secretarys-statement-in-parliament.
157 European Council, “Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the adoption by
China’s National People’s Congress of a National Security Legislation on Hong Kong,” press release, July 1, 2020.
158 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Hong Kong,” July 24, 2020,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45222/council-conclusions-on-hong-kong.pdf.
159 Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, “Team,” accessed July 29, 2020, https://www.ipac.global/team. Members of
the U.S. Congress identified as IPAC members are Senators Bob Menendez and Marco Rubio, who serve as co-chairs,
Senators Chris Coons and Mark Warner, and Representatives Joaquin Castro, Mike Gallagher, Anthony Gonzalez,
Darin LaHood, Tom Malinowski, and Ted Yoho.
160 Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, “No Extradition to Hong Kong,” accessed July 29, 2020,
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reduce strategic dependency on China,” for protections for Hong Kong citizens in danger of
persecution, and for the U.N. Secretary General to designate a U.N. Special Envoy “to monitor
and report on Hong Kong.”161
Possible Implications for Taiwan
The NSL appears to have given many in Taiwan new cause for concern about a January 2019
statement by Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposing a “one country, two systems” approach for
Taiwan, a democracy of 23 million over which China claims sovereignty, and with which it has
vowed to unify, but which it has never controlled. The United States terminated diplomatic
relations with Taiwan in 1979, when the United States established relations with the PRC. The
1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) states, however, that it is U.S.
policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan.”
The PRC originally developed its “one country, two systems” governance approach as an
inducement to Taiwan to consider unification with mainland China. In 1981, then-NPCSC
Chairman Ye Jianying offered a “nine-point proposal” for unification with Taiwan, including,
“After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special
administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not
interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.”162 Although Taiwan has expressed no interest in such an
arrangement, as China implemented its “one country, two systems” approach in Hong Kong after
1997, it made clear that it was doing so with an eye on Taiwan.
In January 2019, Chinese leader Xi suggested the time had come to “explore a Taiwan plan for
‘one country, two systems.’” Xi stated:
The specific form to realize “one country, two systems” in Taiwan will give full
consideration to Taiwan’s real situation.... Under the premise of ensuring national
sovereignty, security, and development interests, the social system and life styles of Taiwan
compatriots will be fully respected after the peaceful unification, and the private property,
religious beliefs, and legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots will be fully
guaranteed.163
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen responded to Xi’s 2019 remarks by stating, “I want to reiterate
that Taiwan absolutely will not accept ‘one country, two systems.’” She added, “The vast majority
of public opinion in Taiwan is also resolutely opposed to ‘one country, two systems,’ and this
opposition is also a ‘Taiwan consensus.’”164 In response to passage of the NSL, Tsai issued a

https://www.ipac.global/campaigns/no-extradition. Kelly Ho, “Security Law: Global Coalition of Legislators Campaign
to Axe Extradition Treaties with Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 7, 2020.
161 Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, “Campaign: Hong Kong,” accessed July 29, 2020, https://www.ipac.global/
campaigns/hong-kong.
162 “Ye Jianying on Taiwan’s Return to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification,” interview with Xinhua News Agency,
September 30, 1981, http://www.china.org.cn/english/7945.htm.
163 “习近平：在《告台湾同胞书》发表 40 周年纪念会上的讲话” (“Xi Jinping: Speech on the 40th Anniversary of
the ‘Message to Taiwan Compatriots’”), January 2, 2020, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0102/c64094-
30499664.html.
164 Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan, “President Tsai Issues Statement on China’s President Xi’s ‘Message to
Compatriots in Taiwan,’” January 2, 2019.
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statement declaring that China had broken its promise to Hong Kong and “proven that ‘one
country, two systems’ is not viable.”165
Select Pending Legislation
Pending legislation in the 116th Congress to address the situation in Hong Kong includes the
following.
 The Hong Kong Be Water Act (H.R. 5725, S. 2758) would require the President
impose Global Magnitsky sanctions (visa bans and economic sanctions) on PRC
or HKSAR government officials who have “knowingly suppressed or facilitated
the suppression of the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, procession, or
demonstration of the people of Hong Kong.”166
 The Hong Kong Freedom Act (H.R. 6947) would allow the President to
recognize Hong Kong as an independent country.
 The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act (H.R. 7428, S. 4229)
would expedite the admission of Hong Kong’s high-skill community and offer
residency for Hong Kong residents who have fled to or found refuge in the
United States.
 The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act (H.R. 7415, S. 4110) would designate the
people of Hong Kong as Priority 2 refugees, streamlining their admission process
to the United States, and opening up an asylum route for frontline activists in
immediate danger, while ensuring “that the United States Government continues
to treat Hong Kongers as distinct from mainland China—despite the elimination
of some autonomy for trade purposes.”167
 The Hong Kong Victims of Communism Support Act (S. 3892) would prohibit
the denial of a request for asylum from a Hong Kong resident “primarily on the
basis of the applicant’s subjection to politically motivated arrest, detention, or
other adverse government action.” It would also require the Secretary of State to,
“develop a strategy for providing support and technical assistance to the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of China (Taiwan),
the countries surrounding Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and any
other country offering to provide migration services and asylum to eligible
Permanent Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”
 The PROTECT Hong Kong Act (Placing Restrictions on Teargas Exports and
Crowd Control Technology to Hong Kong Act) (H.R. 4270) would prohibit the
export of certain defense items and services to the HKPF or the Hong Kong
Auxiliary Police Force until the President certifies to Congress that the covered
Hong Kong forces have not engaged in gross human rights violations for the one-

165 Tsai Ing-wen, “Taiwan Supports Freedom in Hong Kong,” statement released on Twitter, Tsai Ing-wen (@iingwen),
June 30, 2020, https://twitter.com/iingwen/status/1277889561440337923. “Beijing’s Move Shows ‘One Country, Two
Systems’ Not Feasible: Tsai,” Focus Taiwan, June 30, 2020, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202006300009.
166 The bill title refers to a quote attributed to martial arts master Bruce Lee that was used by protesters in 2019 to
describe their flexible approach to organizing demonstrations, allowing for last minute changes in plans, or “flowing
like water.” For more Global Magnitsky sanctions, see CRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act, by Dianne E. Rennack.
167 Office of Congressman Tom Malinowski, “Representative Malinowski Introduces the Hong Kong People’s
Freedom and Choice Act,” press release, June 30, 2020.
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China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress

year period leading up to the certification; there has been an independent
examination of human rights concerns related to the covered forces’ crowd-
control tactics; and the Hong Kong government has adequately addressed such
concerns.
Issues for Congress
United States relations with Hong Kong are governed primarily by the United States-Hong Kong
Policy Act of 1992 (USHKPA; P.L. 102-383; 22 U.S.C. 5701–5732), which commits the United
States to treating the HKSAR as separate from the rest of China in political, economic, trade, and
other areas so long as the HKSAR remains “sufficiently autonomous.” The act also states, “the
human rights of the people of Hong Kong are of great importance to the United States and are
directly relevant to United States interests in Hong Kong [and] serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s
continued economic prosperity.”
In November 2019, Congress passed both the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act
(HKHRDA), which amended the USHKPA, and P.L. 116-77, which prohibited the export of tear
gas, rubber bullets, handcuffs, and other riot-control equipment and munitions to the Hong Kong
Police Force and the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force for one year after enactment (in effect
through November 26, 2020). The HKHRDA authorizes the President to impose sanctions on any
“foreign person that the President determines is responsible for the extrajudicial rendition,
arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong; or other gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong.” The act also requires the President to
submit to Congress a report “[n]ot later than 30 days after the President determines that
legislation proposed or enacted by the Government of Hong Kong would put United States
citizens at risk of extradition or rendition to the People’s Republic of China or to other countries
that lack protections for the rights of defendants.” The report is to include “a strategy for
protecting United States citizens and businesses in Hong Kong” in light of Article 38 of the
National Security Law providing for, extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In formulating its possible responses to the NSL, Congress may consider its goals and objectives
with respect to the situation in Hong Kong. In accordance with the USHKPA, Congress may
consider whether it seeks restoration of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy or the rights of
Hong Kong residents. Congress may also consider whether to provide for the safety of Hong
Kong residents who risk prosecution and imprisonment for expressing their political views, as
well as for Hong Kong residents who no longer wish to live in the city as a result of the
imposition of the NSL. Congress may consider, too, whether it seeks to provide support for those
U.S. citizens and companies that wish to remain in Hong Kong, or assistance to those that wish to
leave the city.
In crafting its response, Congress might consider the probable response of the PRC and HKSAR
governments. Given the statements released by China’s Central Government and the HKSAR
government, punitive measures directed at the PRC and HKSAR governments may not elicit the
responses Congress seeks. Congress might consider whether it seeks to support indirect measures
aimed at non-governmental supporters of the national security law, such as key business leaders
in Hong Kong and mainland China. Consideration of how other nations are responding to the
situation in Hong Kong may be useful not only to learn about additional options, but also for
possible multi-party coordination.
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China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress

Witnesses at a July 1, 2020, House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on Hong Kong raised a
number of questions for Congress.168
 Should the United States provide immigration options for Hong Kong political
activists or for Hong Kong residents who no longer feel safe in the city? If so,
should the United States designate Hong Kong residents as Priority 2 refugees, or
consider some other status? Should the United States consider preferential
treatment for residents with special skills or who own technology companies?
Should the United States extend any safe harbor protections to Hong Kong
residents with criminal records, mindful that a number of Hong Kong’s leading
democracy advocates have histories of arrest for their activities? To what degree
should Congress factor in the protections offered by other countries, such as the
United Kingdom?
 Should the United States join or lead efforts to persuade members of the U.N.
General Assembly to seek a non-binding advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice on whether China has breached the terms of the U.N.-registered
China-UK Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong?169
 Should the United States consider supporting a recent call from 50 U.N. special
rapporteurs, independent experts and working Groups for “[t]he establishment of
an impartial and independent United Nations mechanism” to monitor and report
annually on human rights in China, including in the HKSAR? The experts
propose that such a mechanism could take the form of a U.N. special rapporteur,
a panel of experts appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council—from which
the United States withdrew in 2018—or a Secretary General Special Envoy.170
 To what degree, if at all, should the United States engage with the U.N. Human
Rights Committee’s review of Hong Kong’s fourth periodic report on its
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
informed by submissions by civil society organizations?171 The review was
originally scheduled for Session 129 of the Committee, which concluded on July
24, 2020, but due to COVID-19, the Human Rights Committee has postponed
examination of Hong Kong’s report until a later session.172

168 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The End of One Country, Two Systems?: Implications of
Beijing’s National Security Law in Hong Kong, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 1, 2020, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings?ID=878C9D04-7712-47A7-BC92-86E4C028F749.
169 In congressional testimony, Carole J. Petersen noted, “in 2019, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on whether
decolonization was lawfully completed with respect to the Chagos Islands. And, although the U.K. wasn’t very happy
that that request was made; it was made because the majority of the General Assembly voted for it.”
170 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN Experts Call for Decisive Measures to
Protect Fundamental Freedoms in China,” June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E.
171 U.N. Human Rights Committee, “Fourth Periodic Report Submitted by Hong Kong, China Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Due in 2018,” September 19, 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/
TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTypeID=45&DocTypeID=29.
172 The website of the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states, “Due to COVID-19, the
examination of the state parties’ reports (constructive dialogues) have been postponed to the 130th and future sessions,”
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx.
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China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress

The Trump Administration has announced its intention to eliminate Hong Kong’s “different and
special treatment,” with details provided in Executive Order 13936. The USHKPA and the
HKHRDA, as well as other laws, such as the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(P.L. 114-328; P.L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or the anti-corruption and
human rights measure enacted annually in the Department of State, Foreign Operations
appropriations at Section 7031(c), provide the Administration with various authorities to
implement such a policy. Beyond considering one or more of the bills already introduced, or
additional legislation that may be introduced, Congress may also explore why the Administration
has refrained from using some of the authorities provided to it in the USHKPA, the HKHRDA,
and the HKAA.

Author Information

Susan V. Lawrence
Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Asian Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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