COVID-19 and Other Election Emergencies: Frequently Asked Questions and Recent Policy Developments

July 16, 2020 R46455

COVID-19 and Other Election Emergencies:
July 16, 2020
Frequently Asked Questions and Recent Policy R. Sam Garrett,
Developments
Coordinator
Specialist in American
This report addresses frequently asked questions and policy developments surrounding election
National Government
emergencies. For the purposes of this report, election emergencies are defined as unexpected,

rapidly developing, external events that could substantially interrupt normal voting, election
Sarah J. Eckman
administration, or campaigning. Examples include sustained natural disasters, major disease
Analyst in American
outbreaks, or certain attacks on election systems.
National Government

There appears to be no modern precedent for a nationwide emergency in the United States, such
as COVID-19, affecting elections and voting. Election administrators do, however, routinely
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American
prepare for various contingencies. Prominent examples of recent election emergencies in the
National Government
states include the 2001 terroris t attacks; Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005-2006; and an H1N1

(swine flu) pandemic in 2009. Effects from each episode varied substantially.

Thus far in 2020, some election jurisdictions have changed their voting processes in response to
COVID-19. These changes have included postponing elections; expanding early voting options; expanding mail voting
options; and modifying in-person voting procedures to minimize health risks to voters and election workers.
The federal government plays a supporting role in U.S. election administration , which remains primarily the responsibility of
states, territories, and localities. Congress has responded to COVID-19, in part, by appropriating additional funding for
payments to states, territories, and the District of Columbia (DC) to support election administration. The Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136) provided $400 million for payments to states “to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to coronavirus” during the 2020 federal election cycle. In addition, some of the funding Congress
has previously provided for election administration-related payments to states, territories, and DC can be used for certain
costs incurred as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic has produced some agreement among policymakers about the need for certain elections policy
actions, particularly providing funding for states, territories, and DC. Disagreement continues about whether Congress should
require states to adopt mail voting or other forms of absentee balloting, and if so, how. In May 2020, the House passed (208-
199) H.R. 6800, the Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (HEROES) Act. The legislation would
provide additional funding for grants to states, territories, and DC and set additional requirements for the administration of
federal elections. Other legislation introduced during the 116th Congress that could be relevant for election emergencies
includes H.R. 6202, H.R. 6379, H.R. 6512, H.R. 6673, H.R. 6777, H.R. 6807, H.R. 6847, H.R. 6853, H.R. 7068, H.R. 7118,
S. 3440, S. 3529, S. 3725, S. 3778, S. 3822, S. 3961, and S. 4033; at the time of this writing, none of these other bills has
advanced beyond introduction.
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Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 26

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COVID-19 and Election Emergencies: FAQs and Policy Developments

Introduction
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak has affected significant aspects of
American life—including political campaigns, elections, and voting. In a matter of weeks, several
states postponed primary elections; campaigns increased their online presences in lieu of in-
person events; and voters faced changes in voting processes.
Election administrators around the country began preparing for how to assemble bal ots and
administer elections amid new requirements for “social distancing,” a term that had been
unfamiliar for many just weeks previously.1 Many political campaigns abandoned traditional
door-to-door voter outreach and began hosting online events, including fundraisers, in lieu of
ral ies. Some candidates also began filming political advertisements themselves at home.2
Cancel ed events and government agency closures prevented certain conventional voter
registration opportunities.3 In some places, voters requested mail bal ots in record numbers as
some jurisdictions expanded access to mail voting.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a recent example of what this report cal s election emergencies, but
it is, by no means, the only such example. Natural disasters, for example, have disrupted or
threatened to disrupt elections throughout American history.
This report responds to frequently asked questions that appear to be most relevant for Congress as
the House and Senate consider whether or how to pursue legislation, conduct oversight, or
appropriate federal funds to respond to or anticipate election effects of emergencies, especial y
COVID-19. The following pages
 address the policy context by defining election emergencies and providing brief
historical examples;
 summarize recent legislative developments;
 summarize policy issues that might confront Congress; and
 review selected state, territorial, and local responses to previous or anticipated
election emergencies resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Scope of Report
This report addresses frequently asked questions and policy developments surrounding election
emergencies. As used in the report, election emergencies refers to unexpected, external events,

1 For a sample of COVID-19 contingency planning around the country, see, for example, discussion at U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, “Public Hearing: Election Response to COVID-19, Administering Elections During the
Coronavirus Crisis,” April 22, 2020, https://www.eac.gov/events/2020/04/22/public-hearing-election-response-covid-
19-administering-elections-during.
2 See, for example, Emma Dumain, “‘No Manual’: How SC Campaigns are Adapting in the Age of Coronavirus,” The
State online, April 16, 2020; Connor Radnovich, “ Campaigns Upended by COVID -19, Going Digital,” Salem
Statesm an Journal, April 19, 2020, p. A3; Michael Scherer, “ Stumping Via Webcam: Politicking is T ransformed,”
Washington Post, April 28, 2020, p. A1; and Emily Wilkins, “ DIY T V Ads Keep Candidates Connected With Voters
Stuck at Home,” Bloomberg Government , April 27, 2020.
3 See, for example, Pam Fessler, “Pandemic Puts A Crimp On Voter Registration, Potentially Altering Electorate,”
NPR, May 26, 2020, at https://www.npr.org/2020/05/26/860458708/pandemic-puts-a-crimp-on-voter-registration-
potentially-altering-electorate; and Michael Wines, “ Covid-19 Changed How We Vote. It Could Also Change Who
Votes,” The New York Times, June 14, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/us/voter-registration-
coronavirus-2020-election.html.
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COVID-19 and Election Emergencies: FAQs and Policy Developments

such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, civil unrest, or sustained attacks on election systems
like ransomware or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, that have affected or could
affect standard election operations. These emergency situations often necessitate a rapid response
from election officials to prevent or mitigate damaging effects.4 The COVID-19 pandemic is the
most recent example of such an election emergency. As such, this report focuses in particular on
the effects of COVID-19 on U.S. federal elections and voting issues in 2020.
Use of the terms emergency5 and disaster in the report is not intended to imply policy-specific
definitions that occur in areas that are beyond the scope of the report, such as emergency
management, disaster preparedness, and homeland security policy areas.6 Other issues that are
beyond the scope of the report include constitutional or legal issues, such as federal authority to
postpone elections.7 The report also does not address homeland security or critical infrastructure
issues not directly related to voting and elections issues covered herein. Several other CRS
products cited throughout the report address elections and other policy issues that are beyond the
scope of this report, including general discussion of issues such as the federal and state roles in
elections and voter registration. Election emergencies may be closely related to broader and
typical y longer-term election security issues, such as foreign interference in U.S. elections. For
additional discussion of election security, see CRS Report R46146, Campaign and Election
Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress, coordinated by R. Sam
Garrett.
Policy Context
What are election emergencies?
Election emergencies, as used in this report, refers to unexpected, rapidly developing, external
events that could substantial y interrupt normal voting, election administration, or campaigning.
These election emergencies can include sustained natural disasters, disease outbreaks, or certain

4 Election officials typically engage in contingency planning to address a variety of scenarios, which may include
preparations for certain common emergency situations. Other emergency situations, however, may be beyond the scope
of the preparations made. Whether to respond to these situations, and if so, when and how, are policy decisions for
Congress and the states, territories, and DC, on which this report takes no position.
5 In using the term emergency generally rather than as in other policy contexts, this report relies on common usage of
the term. For example, Webster’s New World Dictionary defines em ergency as “ a sudden, generally unexpected
occurrence demanding immediate action.” See Webster’s New World Dictionary, ed. Victoria Neufeldt, Warner Books
Paperback ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 195. T he Oxford English Dictionary similarly defines modern
usage for em ergency as “ A juncture that arises or ‘turns up’; esp. a state of things unexpectedly arising, and urgently
demanding immediate action.” See Oxford English Dictionary online, https://oed.com/view/Entry/61130?
redirectedFrom=emergency#eid.
6 For selected additional discussion beyond the elections and voting topics discussed here, see, for example, CRS
Report R44669, Departm ent of Hom eland Security Preparedness Grants: A Sum m ary and Issues, by Shawn Reese;
CRS In Focus IF11529, A Brief Overview of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program , by Erica A. Lee; CRS In Focus
IF10683, DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview, by Chris Jaikaran; CRS Report R45809, Critical
Infrastructure: Em erging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress, by Brian E. Humphreys; and CRS In Focus
IF10677, The Designation of Election System s as Critical Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys.
7 For additional legal discussion, including on questions of federal authority to postpone elections, see, for example,
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10425, Postponing Federal Elections and the COVID-19 Pandem ic: Legal Considerations, by
Jacob D. Shelly.
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COVID-19 and Election Emergencies: FAQs and Policy Developments

attacks on election systems (e.g., cyberattacks). Election emergencies are distinct from contested
elections, which typical y involve chal enges to election results (often under state law).8
Classifying an event as an election emergency does not necessarily mean that election
administrators are unprepared for it or that it wil disrupt an election. Typical election contingency
plans account for a number of possible circumstances and might include, for example, provisions
for
 backup polling sites;
 backup poll workers, including expanded recruiting efforts (e.g., to college
students);
 additional options to register to vote or cast bal ots, such as mail voting or early
voting;
 chain-of-custody and other bal ot-security matters;
 educational campaigns to alert political campaigns and voters to election
changes; and
 financial planning to purchase new equipment or open additional vote centers
where voters may cast absentee bal ots in person before Election Day.9
Where does COVID-19 fit in the current elections policy
environment in Congress?
Before the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in the United States, campaign and election security,
particularly foreign interference, were the most prominent election policy issues facing the House
and Senate.10 These issues remain prominent topics of debate, oversight, and legislative activity.
Congress and election administrators are thus now facing potential foreign and domestic
chal enges to voting and elections in the United States.
The COVID-19 pandemic has produced some agreement among policymakers about the need for
certain elections policy actions, particularly regarding funding to states and territories. At the
same time, disagreement continues about whether additional policy changes should be made, and,
if so, how those changes should be achieved. For example, several states have created at least
some additional mail voting opportunities. However, some Members of Congress continue to
disagree about topics such as whether Congress should require states to permit mail voting for al
eligible voters; whether additional voting flexibility, if created, should be permitted only during
the 2020 election cycle or permanently; how much Congress should regulate the availability of

8 For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Report RL33780, Procedures for Contested Election Cases in the
House of Representatives, by L. Paige Whitaker; CRS Report RL32717, Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of
Procedures at the Joint Session, Including Objections by Mem bers of Congress, coordinated by Elizabeth Rybicki and
L. Paige Whitaker; CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress:
Perspectives and Contem porary Analysis, by T homas H. Neale; and CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S.
Cam paigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett .
9 For examples of state-specific contingency considerations, see, for example, National Association of Secretaries of
State, State Laws & Practices for the Em ergency Managem ent of Elections, T ask Force on Emergency Preparedness for
Elections summary report, April 2017 update, https://www.nass.org/node/1692, pp. 6-7.
10 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11456, Disrupted Federal Elections: Policy Issues for Congress, by R. Sam
Garrett ; and CRS Report R46146, Cam paign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developm ents for
Congress, coordinated by R. Sam Garrett .
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in-person voting options; and similar issues.11 There also is debate in Congress about whether or
to what extent responding to COVID-19 requires examining voting rights and voter access issues,
topics that are otherwise beyond the scope of this report.12
In addition to the issues described above, several more traditional campaign finance, election
administration, and voting issues also have received attention in hearings and have been the
subject of legislation throughout the 116th Congress. Other CRS products cited throughout this
report provide additional detail on those topics.
What are some historical examples of election emergencies?
For more than a century, states and localities have administered elections during unusual
circumstances. The 1918 pandemic flu, for example, affected voting throughout the country.13
There appears to be no modern precedent for a pandemic or other widespread il ness affecting
U.S. elections on the nationwide scale that has occurred to date with COVID-19. Perhaps the
closest modern example occurred in 2009, when some states held “off-year” nonfederal elections
during the H1N1 swine flu outbreak, but effects were far more limited than for COVID-19.
Selected recent examples appear below.14 The facts surrounding specific cases of election
emergencies—which this report does not attempt to address in detail or uniformly—vary
significantly. In general, jurisdictions typical y have responded to these previous situations with
some combination of postponing elections and providing additional flexibility to voters (e.g.,
expanded access to mail voting or early voting), depending on state-specific authorities
permitting them to do so. In some cases, state, territorial, or local governmental responses have
been controversial.
Because these examples concern past instances of election emergencies, and because response
options vary across jurisdictions, the examples do not necessarily il ustrate how these or other
jurisdictions would respond to other scenarios. As the examples below show, state-level (e.g.,
gubernatorial) authority to postpone primaries has been invoked in some previous cases. Federal
statute sets federal general election dates based on provisions in the U.S. Constitution.15 As noted
previously, this report does not address legal issues surrounding congressional or state-level
authority to postpone elections.16

11 On how these and similar issues are affecting litigation that is beyond the scope of this report, see, for example, CRS
Legal Sidebar LSB10470, Election 2020 and the COVID-19 Pandem ic: Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting,
by L. Paige Whitaker.
12 See, for example, differing policy proposals in legislation; and various witness and Member statements
accompanying the oversight hearings noted in the “ Recent Legislative Developments” section of this report.
13 See, for example, Jason Marisam, “Judging the 1918 Election,” Election Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 2 (2010), pp. 141-
152.
14 In addition to the cited sources, some information in this section is adapted from archived CRS Report RS22436,
Elections in States Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita , by Kevin J. Coleman and Eric A Fisher; archived CRS
Report R42808, Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Election: Fact Sheet, by Eric A. Fischer and Kevin J. Coleman; and
archived CRS Report RL32654, Safeguarding Federal Elections from Possible Terrorist Attack: Issues and Options for
Congress, coordinated by Eric A. Fischer. Messrs. Coleman and Fischer, and some of their coauthors on archived
Report RL32654, have retired from CRS. Congressional requesters may contact R. Sam Garrett, coordinator of this
report, for additional information about these archived CRS products.
15 See U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, §4; and Art. II, §1; and 2 U.S.C. §7 and 3 U.S.C. §1.
16 For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10425, Postponing Federal Elections and the
COVID-19 Pandem ic: Legal Considerations, by Jacob D. Shelly.
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COVID-19 and Election Emergencies: FAQs and Policy Developments

CNMI, Super Typhoon Yutu, 2018
Super Typhoon Yutu devastated the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), a
U.S. territory, approximately 10 days before Election Day 2018.17 That election included one
federal contest, for U.S. House Delegate. Governor Ralph DLG. Torres issued an executive order
postponing the general election from November 6 to November 13. The order also postponed the
start of early voting.18 This episode appears to be the only case of a postponed federal general
election in modern history resulting from the kinds of emergencies described in this report.19
Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, Hurricane Sandy, 2012
Hurricane Sandy made landfal north of Atlantic City, NJ, on October 29, 2012.20 The 2012
general elections were scheduled for November 6.21 The storm was more than 1,100 miles wide,
and affected jurisdictions on the East Coast from Florida to Maine, and west to Wisconsin.22 A
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mitigation assessment found that Sandy
ultimately affected 24 states and the District of Columbia.23 New Jersey and New York suffered
the most significant damage, including from flooding, wind, and power outages.24
A National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) report explained:
As Hurricane Sandy approached the U.S. coastline in the days leading up to the 2012
presidential election, many officials were concerned about the potential impact of the storm
on election administration efforts. While the storm’s impacts on the election were not as
serious as initially feared in most jurisdictions, it did interfere with voting process [sic] in
several states, including interruptions to early voting and damaged or destroyed polling
places.25

17 Super T yphoon Yutu was declared a major disaster on August 5, 2018. See Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Soudelor (DR-4235), June 19, 2019 update, https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/4235. CRS Analyst Bruce R. Lindsay provided consultations on disaster declarations cited in this section.
18 Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Ralph DLG. T orres), Executive Order No. 2018-
19, October 29, 2018.
19 Archived CRS Report RL32654, Safeguarding Federal Elections from Possible Terrorist Attack: Issues and Options
for Congress, coordinated by Eric A. Fischer, found no cases of postponed federal general elections, based on review of
Washington Post and New York Tim es coverage from 1860 to 2002. In addition, research for the current report found
no cases of federal election emergencies as described in this report that resulted in postponed federal general elections,
other than the CNMI example. Research for the current report is based on sourc es cited throughout the report and on a
review of various media, scholarly, and historical congressional sources.
20 Several states were issued emergency and major disaster declarations for Hurricane Sandy. In the case of New
Jersey, an emergency was declared on October 28, 2012. Based on extensive damage, the emergency declaration was
superseded by a major disaster declaration on October 30, 2012. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, New
Jersey Hurricane Sandy (EM-3354), October 16, 2014, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/3354; and
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4086.
21 For additional discussion, see Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Election: Fact Sheet, by Eric A. Fischer and Kevin J.
Coleman. Messrs. Coleman and Fischer have retired from CRS. Congressional requesters may contact R. Sam Garrett,
coordinator of this report, for additional information about these archived CRS products.
22 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Fact Sheet: Mitigation Assessment T eam Results—Hurricane
Sandy,” https://www.fema.gov/mat-results-hurricane-sandy.
23 T he storm caused few or no disruptions in some jurisdictions, but caused substantial problems in others. See, for
example, Danny Yadron and Naftali Bendavid, “Election 2012: Campaigns T rack Pace of Early Voting,” The Wall
Street Journal, November 3, 2012, p. A5.
24 See, for example, Danny Yadron and Naftali Bendavid, “Election 2012: Campaigns T rack Pace of Early Voting,”
The Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2012, p. A5.
25 National Association of Secretaries of State, State Laws & Practices for the Emergency Management of Elections,
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COVID-19 and Election Emergencies: FAQs and Policy Developments

Election officials responded by relocating polling places where possible, extending early voting
options, and, in some cases, permitting additional absentee voting. New Jersey, for example,
extended federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) protections
to affected voters.26 Some of the New Jersey actions generated controversy, particularly a
decision by the chief state election official to permit some voters to return bal ots by fax or email.
While some election officials and scholars praised the efforts to provide bal ot access in
extraordinary circumstances, others argued that the actions were impermissible under state law,
generated security risks, or both.27
Various States, H1N1 Flu Pandemic, 2009
As another CRS product explains, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an H1N1
(swine flu) pandemic in June 2009.28 Because few states hold major “off-year” elections, H1N1
appears to have had a limited impact on U.S. elections.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) reportedly requested that states provide the
agency with information about H1N1 contingency plans.29 At least two election authorities—
those in Virginia and Wisconsin—issued statewide H1N1 elections guidance.30 Many of the
recommendations in these documents were similar to those issued more recently for COVID-19.31
Then as now, election administrators were encouraged to, for example, review their contingency
plans; consult with state and local health authorities; prepare for poll worker absences; clean
voting equipment; and require social distancing. Some election jurisdictions reportedly also
encouraged mail voting.

T ask Force on Emergency Preparedness for Elections summary report, April 2017 update, https://www.nass.org/node/
1692, p. 8.
26 For additional UOCAVA discussion, see CRS Report RS20764, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act: Overview and Issues, by R. Sam Garrett . Retired CRS analyst Kevin Coleman originally authored this
report.
27 A Rutgers-Newark Law School study, which gained publicity when it was issued in 2014, questioned whether some
of the New Jersey voting changes were permissible under state law, a topic that is beyond the scope of this report. For
additional discussion and background supporting and opposing the state’s response, see, for example, Penny Venetis et
al., The Perfect Storm : Voting in New Jersey in the Wake of Superstorm Sandy, Rutgers School of Law-Newark,
Constitutional Rights Clinic report, October 2014; Michael T . Morley, “Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of
Natural Disast ers and T errorist Attacks,” Em ory Law Journal, vol. 67 (2018), pp. 563-570; Ginger Gibson, “ N.J. to
Allow Voting by E-mail and Fax,” Politico, updated Nov. 6, 2012, https://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/nj-to-
allow-voting-by-e-mail-and-fax-083282; and T ed Sherman, “ Post -Sandy Voting Moves Broke the Law, Study Says,”
Newark Star-Ledger, October 24, 2014, p. 1.
28 See archived CRS Report R40554, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: An Overview, by Sarah A. Lister and C. Stephen
Redhead.
29 See, for example, Avana Harry, “H1N1 and Election Day: What States are Doing to Keep Voters Flu-Free,” ABC
News online, November 3, 2009, https://abcnews.go.com/Health/SwineFlu/h1n1-election-day-protecting-voters/story?
id=8987234.
30 See Board of Elections, Stat e of Virginia, “SBE H1N1 Preparedness for November 3, 2009,” agency statement; and
Government Accountability Board, State of Wisconsin, Guidance: H1N1 Flu Pandem ic and Possible Im pact on the
Conduct of Elections, memorandum to election clerks and commissio ns, September 18, 2009. Both documents are
available on the EAC website, “CORONOVIRUS (COVID-19) RESOURCES,” https://www.eac.gov/election-
officials/coronavirus-covid-19-resources.
31 See, for example, various federal, state, and nongovernmental resources on the EAC website, “CORONOVIRUS
(COVID-19) RESOURCES,” https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/coronavirus-covid-19-resources.
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Gulf Coast, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 2005-2006
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in August and September, respectively,
2005. Both hurricanes reached Category 5 status and devastated parts of Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.32 Katrina kil ed approximately 1,200 people.33 Katrina and
Rita affected elections throughout the Gulf Coast in 2005 and 2006.34 Hundreds of thousands of
voters were displaced, and voting locations and equipment were damaged.
National attention focused on New Orleans. Katrina and Rita had dramatical y changed the city’s
electorate and demographics as 22 candidates vied to be the next mayor. 35 According to media
reports, polling places and voting equipment were damaged throughout the city.36 Citing the
desire to “ensure maximum citizen participation in the electoral process” and the Secretary of
State’s determination that elections could not be held safely, Governor Kathleen Blanco issued an
executive order on December 9, 2005, postponing municipal primaries and runoffs, and extending
candidate qualifying periods.37 Those elections were original y scheduled for February 4 and
March 4, 2006, respectively.
The governor’s order specified only that the postponed elections should be rescheduled “as soon
as practicable.” 38 Amid voting rights litigation (a topic that is beyond the scope of this report),
and after a U.S. District Court judge reportedly stated during a hearing that he was prepared to
order an election date, state election officials rescheduled the dates for April 22 and May 20,
respectively.39 State election officials also reportedly conducted a public education campaign

32 Several emergencies and major disaster declarations were issued in response to the 2005 hurricane season. For
example, an emergency was declared August 27, 2005, for Louisiana in response to Hurricane Katrina. Due to
extensive damages, the emergency declaration was superseded by a major disaster declaration on August 29, 2005. See
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Louisiana Hurricane Katrina (EM-3212), September 28, 2010,
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/3212; and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Louisiana Hurricane Katrina (DR-
1603), November 1, 2005, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/1603.
33 U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center and Central Pacific Hurricane
Center, Hurricanes in History, “ Hurricane Katrina 2005,” https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/#katrina. For
discussion of the federal government’s role in disaster recovery, see, for example, CRS Report R43139, Federal
Disaster Assistance After Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilm a, Gustav, and Ike, coordinated by Bruce R. Lindsay and
Jared C. Nagel.
34 For additional historical discussion, see archived CRS Reports RS22436, Elections in States Affected by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, by Kevin J. Coleman and Eric A Fisher. Messrs. Coleman and Fischer have retired from CRS.
Congressional requesters may contact R. Sam Garrett, coordinator of this report, for additional information about these
archived CRS products.
35 For discussion of voter turnout and campaign implications in New Orleans mayoral elections, see, for example, Brian
Brox, “Elections and Voting in Post -Katrina New Orleans,” Southern Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal of the
South, vol. 16, no. 2 (2009), pp. 1-23; Betsy Sinclair, T had E. Hall, and R. Michael Alvarez, “ Flooding the Vote:
Hurricane Katrina and Voter Participation in New Orleans,” American Politics Research, vol. 35, no. 9 (2011), pp. 921-
957; and James Vanderleeuw, Baodong Liu, and Erica Williams, “ T he 2006 New Orleans Mayoral Election: T he
Political Ramifications of a Large-Scale Natural Disaster,” PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 41, no. 4 (2008), pp.
795-801. For candidates and election results, see Louisiana Secretary of State, Election Results—Voter Portal,
https://voterportal.sos.la.gov/static/.
36 See, for example, Bruce Eggler, “Blanco Postpones N.O. Elections,” Times-Picayune, December 13, 2005, Metro
Section, p. 1. For additional discussion of Voting Rights Act issues, see, for example, CRS T estimony TE10033,
History and Enforcem ent of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 , by L. Paige Whitaker.
37 Governor of the State of Louisiana (Kathleen Blanco), Executive Order KBB 05-96, Dec. 9, 2005,
https://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/kbb05-96.htm.
38 Governor of the State of Louisiana (Kathleen Blanco), Executive Order KBB 05-96, Dec. 9, 2005,
https://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/kbb05-96.htm.
39 For additional discussion, see, for example, Bruce Eggler, “April 22 Favored as N.O. Election Date, ” Times-
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throughout Louisiana and in 11 other states to alert displaced voters to their options to cast
bal ots.40 These included in-person voting at a limited number of New Orleans polling places on
Election Day and at other early voting sites in Louisiana. Voters also could return bal ots by mail
or fax. Some such decisions required federal approval because, at the time, the Voting Rights Act
(VRA) required that the U.S. Department of Justice (or the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia) approve or “preclear” election changes such as alterations to polling place locations
and hours in certain “covered” jurisdictions, including Louisiana. In its 2013 Shelby County
opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the formula that triggered the preclearance
requirement.41
New York, Terrorist Attacks, 2001
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks coincided with primary Election Day in New York.42
Perhaps most notably, this included the New York City mayoral primary. On the morning of the
11th, Governor George Pataki issued an executive order “declaring a disaster emergency” in the
state. At noon on the 11th, the governor amended the initial executive order to “temporarily
suspend” primary elections in the state.43 On September 13, the state legislature enacted Senate
Bil 5791, in which the assembly determined that conducting the primary as scheduled on
September 11 had been “impossible owing to the imminent risk then posed to the health, safety,
and welfare of New York’s citizens.” 44Among other provisions, the legislation rescheduled the
primaries for September 25. It also specified that bal ots cast at polling places on September 11
“shal not be counted,” but that valid absentee bal ots could be counted.45
Staging the rescheduled elections required substantial adaptation and coordination across the
state, especial y by state and local election boards and their staffs. New York City’s Election
Board office was inaccessible in the days following September 11. In addition, power failures

Picayune, December 13, 2005, National Section, p. 1; and Michael T . Morley, “ Election Emergencies: Voting in the
Wake of Natural Disasters and T errorist Attacks,” Emory Law Journal, vol. 67 (2018), pp. 559-563. Incumbent Ray
Nagin eventually won the mayoral election.
40 According to media reports, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided the Louisiana Secretary
of State with a list of more than 900,000 evacuees, although many of the names were thought to be duplicates. See, for
example, Staff and wire reports, “ New List From FEMA Satisfies Officials,” Tim es-Picayune, December 28, 2005,
Metro Section, p. 1. On media outreach, see, for example, Associated Press, “FEMA Won’t Pay for New Orleans
Election,” April 16, 2006.
41 VRA issues are otherwise beyond the scope of this report. On Shelby County and preclearance, see, for example,
CRS T estimony T E10033, History and Enforcem ent of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 , by L. Paige Whitaker. On post -
Katrina preclearance in Louisiana, see, for example, Peter Whoriskey, “ Election Plan for New Orleans Approved,” The
Washington Post, March 17, 2006, p. A3; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act’s Tem porary Provisions: Policy
Perspectives and Views From the Field, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 21, 2006, S.Hrg. 109-822 (Washington: GPO,
2007), pp. 140-142; and Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, “ T he Flexibility of Section 5 and the Politics of Disaster in Post -
Katrina New Orleans,” Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice, vol. 16, no. 3 (2013).
42 Several emergencies and major disaster declarations were issued in response to 9/11. New York was issued a major
disaster declaration on September 11, 2001. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, New York Terrorist Attack
(DR-1391), March 5, 2019 update, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/1391.
43 Governor of the State of New York (George E. Pataki), Executive Order No. 113 and Executive Order No. 113.1,
September 11, 2001, in New York State Register, vol. 23, issue 39, September 26, 2001.
44 T his legislation was Senate Bill 5791, the Emergency Primary Election Rescheduling Act of 2001; see New York
Advance Legislative Service, in 2001 N.Y. Laws 298.
45 On the September 25 primary date, see Section 1; on voting eligibility and previously cast ballots, see Sections 3-5;
in Senate Bill 5791, the Emergency Primary Election Rescheduling Act of 2001; see New York Advance Legislative
Service, in 2001 N.Y. Laws 298.
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damaged the board’s computer equipment. The agency also incurred other costs to remove and
redeploy voting machines, among other expenses.46 The State Board of Elections also had to
reproduce poll books and poll lists.47
Florida, Hurricane Andrew, 1992
Category 4 Hurricane Andrew was one of the most powerful storms in U.S. history.48 Andrew
kil ed 23 people in the United States in late August 1992. Wind gusts estimated at approximately
170 miles per hour occurred in Dade County, Florida.49 The storm damaged property and
buildings—including polling places for September primary voting—throughout the county. This
damage disrupted the county’s ability to administer statewide and federal primaries original y
scheduled for September 1, 1992.
According to media reports, Governor Lawton Chiles determined that he did not have authority to
postpone the election.50 At the request of county election officials, state courts ordered the
elections postponed by one week, until September 8, in Dade County but not elsewhere in the
state.51 The rescheduled primary occurred on the 8th, reportedly amid reduced voter turnout and,
in some cases, with the U.S. military setting up tents for polling places but not taking a role in
election administration.52
How have states changed their election administration procedures
in 2020 in response to COVID-19?
In addition to preparing for the November general election amid ongoing COVID-19 concerns,
many states have prepared for and conducted federal primary or special elections scheduled for
the spring and summer months.53 Many of the initial administrative changes announced by states

46 T he Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided $7.9 million to assist the board with these costs. See
Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA T o Reimburse New York City For Cancelled And Rescheduled 9/11
Primarily Elections,” press release, September 6, 2002, press release no. 1391 -148, https://www.fema.gov/news-
release/2002/09/06/fema-reimburse-new-york-city-cancelled-and-rescheduled-9/11-primarily.
47 On these points and other details, see, for example, T estimony of T homas Wilkey in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, Hearing on Election Contingency Plans: What Have
We Learned and Is Am erica Prepared? 110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 15, 2008 (Washington: GPO, 2008), pp. 6-19. On
September 11, 2001, Wilkey was Executive Director of the New York State Board of Elections. At the time of his cited
testimony, he was the first Executive Director of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC).
48 A major disaster declaration was issued in response to Hurricane Andrew on August 24, 1992. See Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Florida Hurricane Andrew (DR-955), June 2, 2009, update, https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/955.
49 See U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center and Central Pacific
Hurricane Center, Hurricanes in History, “ Hurricane Andrew 1992,” https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/
#andrew.
50 See, for example, William Claiborne, “Hurricane T akes T oll on T urnout,” The Washington Post, p. A14.
51 See, for example, T om Fiedler, “Storm or No, Election Will be Held,” The Miami Herald, August 27, 1992, B1,
accessed via CRS Lexis subscription; William Claiborne, “Hurricane T akes T oll on T urnout,” The Washington Post, p.
A14; and Reuters, “September Election Delayed a Week in Storm-Hit County,” The New York Times, August 30, 1992,
p. 22.
52 See, for example, Charles Strouse, Dexter Filkins, and Patrick May, “Apathy, Confusion are Victors in Post -Storm
Election,” The Miami Herald, September 9, 1992, p. A1. Federal law prohibits the presence of U.S. troops at polling
places in federal general and special elections. See 18 U.S.C. §§592-593. Some states have assigned their National
Guard units to election duties, especially those concerning election security.
53 T he scope of this report is limited to federal elections; a number of states have had to prepare for and conduct state or
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addressed plans for these spring and summer elections, but some states have also announced
policy decisions affecting the November election.54
Some of the changes state election officials have announced for voting processes in these
elections address the current, or anticipated, health risks associated with preparing for and
conducting in-person voting, whereas others expand the options for when or where voters can
vote.55 The scope of changes considered varies across states, depending on a variety of factors,
including the capacity of existing election practices to sufficiently al eviate concerns related to
COVID-19; the legal authority and practical ability to implement certain election practices; and
the projected effects of COVID-19 in different jurisdictions and at different points in time.
Options state election officials have considered broadly involve
 postponing a primary or special election;56
 expanding early voting options;57
 expanding mail voting options, including conducting an election primarily or
entirely by mail;58

local elections amid COVID-19 concerns, and these elections are beyond the scope of this discussion. For additional
details on announced election changes related to COVID-19, see Ballotpedia, “ Changes to election dates, procedures,
and administration in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020,” at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020.
54 For additional details on announced election changes related to COVID-19, see Ballotpedia, “ Changes to election
dates, procedures, and administration in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020,” at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020.
55 For more details on these actions, see Ballotpedia, “Changes to election dates, procedures, and administration in
response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020,” at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_ and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020.
56 As noted previously, federal statute sets federal general election dates based on provisions in the U.S. Constitution.
See U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, §4; and Art. II. §1; and 2 U.S.C. §7 and 3 U.S.C. §1. For discussion of legal issues that
are beyond the scope of this report, see, for example, CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10425, Postponing Federal Elections and
the COVID-19 Pandem ic: Legal Considerations, by Jacob D. Shelly. See also Nick Corasaniti and Stephanie Saul, “ 16
States Have Postponed Primaries During the Pandemic. Here’s a List,” New York Times, May 27, 2020, at
https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-coronavirus.html/.
57 See CRS In Focus IF11477, Early Voting and Mail Voting: Overview & Issues for Congress; CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB10470, Election 2020 and the COVID-19 Pandem ic: Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting; National
Conference of State Legislatures, COVID-19 and Elections, June 1, 2020, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/state-action-on-covid-19-and-elections.aspx; and Ballotpedia, “ Absentee/mail-in voting procedure
changes,” in “ Changes to election dates, procedures, and administration in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic, 2020,” at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020#Absentee.2Fmail-in_voting_procedure_changes.
58 See CRS Insight IN11356, Mail Voting and COVID-19: Developments and Potential Challenges; CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB10470, Election 2020 and the COVID-19 Pandem ic: Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting; National
Conference of State Legislatures, COVID-19 and Elections, June 1, 2020, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/state-action-on-covid-19-and-elections.aspx; and Ballotpedia, “ Absentee/mail-in voting procedure
changes,” in “ Changes to election dates, procedures, and administration in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic,” 2020, at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020#Absentee.2Fmail-in_voting_procedure_changes.
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 modifying in-person voting processes, including offering curbside or drive-
through voting, relocating polling places from senior facilities or to larger spaces,
or reducing the number of polling places or poll workers;59 and
 establishing additional cleaning and social distancing protocols for election
facilities, including sanitizing voting equipment, providing personal protective
equipment to election workers, and encouraging voters to wear face coverings.60
Primary election dates were postponed in 16 states and two territories due to COVID-19
concerns.61 At least 29 states with primaries during the spring and summer months have
announced changes for these elections that would expand access to mail voting.62 The approaches
these states have taken have varied, broadly addressing ways voters may receive or cast mail
bal ots. Announced changes have included suspending mail voting qualifications or modifying
them to include COVID-19; automatical y sending bal ot request forms or mail bal ots to al
registered voters; and providing prepaid postage for bal ot return envelopes or enabling certain
individuals (such as family members) to submit voters’ bal ots on their behalf.63

59 See, for example, Alexa Ura, “T exas Recommends People Bring T heir Own Hand Sanitizer to Vote T his Summer,”
The Texas Tribune, May 26, 2020, at https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/26/texas-coronavirus-voting-procedures/;
Margaret Stafford, “Coronavirus brings changes to polling places in Missouri,” Associated Press, June 1, 2020, at
https://apnews.com/273686445245b27c43c7384e1078b2c4; and T eri Weaver, “ 2020 NY elections: Did your polling
place change? It’s a coronavirus precaution,” The Post-Standard, June 13, 2020, at https://www.syracuse.com/politics/
cny/2020/06/2020-ny-elections-did-your-polling-place-change-its-a-coronavirus-precaution.html.
60 See, for example, T exas Director of Elections Keith Ingram, “Voting In Person During COVID-19,” Election
Advisory No. 2020-19, June 18, 2020, at https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2020-19.shtml; Indiana
State Department of Health, “COVID-19 Guidance for Election Polling Station Locations,” June 26, 2020, at
https://www.sos.ms.gov/About/Pages/Press-Release.aspx?pr=1110; and Lauren Irwin and John Frank, “ How Colorado
Will Run an Election Amid the Coronavirus and What it Means for the June Primary,” The Colorado Sun, June 23,
2020, at https://coloradosun.com/2020/06/23/colorado-june-primary-election-coronavirus/.
61 Nick Corasaniti and Stephanie Saul, “16 States Have Postponed Primaries During the Pandemic. Here’s a List,” New
York Tim es, May 27, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-coronavirus.html/.
62 See Ballotpedia, “Changes to election dates, procedures, and administration in response to the coronavirus (COVID-
19) pandemic, 2020,” at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020.
63 See CRS Insight IN11356, Mail Voting and COVID-19: Developments and Potential Challenges.
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Four special elections to fil vacant U.S. House seats have been held to date amid COVID-19
concerns, in Maryland,64 California,65 Wisconsin,66 and New York.67 For three of these elections
(in Maryland, California, and New York), officials provided expanded access to mail voting while
maintaining some options to submit a bal ot in person; the fourth state, Wisconsin, general y
provides no-excuse mail bal ots, by request, for eligible voters in any election.68
For these primary and special elections, states and localities have also general y made additional
modifications, or issued guidance, related to voting processes that involve interpersonal contact.69

64 Maryland’s 7th congressional district special election was held on April 28. On March 17, the governor of Maryland
announced that the State Board of Elections would mail ballots to all voters. Maryland also provided limited in-person
voting opportunities for those who could not vote by mail or who chose to vote in person. See Emily Opilo and T alia
Richman, “Maryland primary moves to June amid coronavirus pandemic; voters to pick Cummings’ repla cement by
mail in April,” Baltimore Sun, March 17, 2020, at https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-pol-coronavirus-
primary-election-hogan-plan-20200317-x5ppxxzyrjbyvnmj3dw2ygxnd4-story.html; Emily Opilo, “ Limited in-person
voting to be offered April 28 for Maryland’s 7th Congressional District special election,” Baltimore Sun, April 13,
2020, at https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-pol-coronavirus-election-7th-district-vote-center-
20200413-ugbabb4j65aazgozvyl2cf4upq-story.html; and Maryland State Board of Elections, “ Special Congressional
District 7 Election Information April 28, 2020,” at https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2020/
special_election_CD7.html.
65 California’s 25th congressional district special election was held on May 12. On March 20, the governor of California
issued an executive order requiring counties to mail every voter a ballot for the special election. Some in-person voting
centers for early voting were also available, in keeping with the state’s existing early voting practices. See Ballotpedia,
“California’s 25th Congressional District special election, 2020,” at https://ballotpedia.org/
California%27s_25th_Congressional_District_special_election,_2020 ; Governor Gavin Newsom, Executive Order N-
34-20, March 20, 2020, at https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.20.20-N-34-20.pdf; T ammy Murga,
“Vote-by-mail ballots mailed for 25th special election,” The Santa Clarita Valley Signal, April 15, 2020, at
https://signalscv.com/2020/04/vote-by-mail-ballots-mailed-for-25th-special-election/; Jennifer Medina, “ A Bitter Battle
for a California House Seat Unfolds in Quarantine,” New York Times, May 6, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
05/05/us/politics/california-christy-smith-mike-garcia-trump.html; Los Angeles County Registrar-Record/County
Clerk, “ May 12, 2020: Congressional District 25 Special General Election,” at https://lavote.net/docs/rrcc/media/
Factsheet -05122020.pdf; and National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Governing Early Voting, August 2,
2019, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx.
66 Wisconsin’s 7th congressional district special election was held on May 12, 2020. T he governor of Wisconsin
announced on April 29 that there would not be any significant election administration changes for this race, which was
held as scheduled with in-person and mail voting opportunities for voters. See “ Seventh Congressional District Election
to Proceed as Planned,” WSAU—Wisconsin Radio Network, April 29, 2020, at https://wsau.com/news/articles/2020/
apr/29/seventh-congressional-district -election-to-proceed-as-normal/1012673/; and Ballotpedia, “ Wisconsin’s 7th
Congressional District special election, 2020,” at https://ballotpedia.org/
Wisconsin%27s_7th_Congressional_District_special_election,_2020. The governor reportedly had previously
considered moving the date of the election; see Associated Press, “Governor Evers might move date of May 12 special
election,” April 10, 2020, at https://fox6now.com/2020/04/10/gov-evers-might-move-date-of-may-12-special-election/.
Wisconsin also held a primary election on April 7; see Elena Moore, “Wisconsin Election Held Amid Virus Fears:
Here’s What You Need T o Know,” NPR, April 7, 2020, at https://www.npr.org/2020/04/07/828055678/wisconsin-
election-held-amid-virus-fears-heres-what -you-need-to-know.
67 New York’s 27th congressional district special election was held on June 23, postponed from April 28, due to
COVID-19 concerns. For this special election and the primary held the same day, New York suspended requirements
for mail voting, automatically sent mail ballot ap plications to all voters, and allowed ballot submission to occur by mail
or in person through the date of the election. See Governor of the State of New York (Andrew M. Cuomo), Executive
Order No. 202.12, March 29, 2020, at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-20212-continuing-temporary-suspension-
and-modification-laws-relating-disaster-emergency; and New York State Board of Elections, “ Executive Orders—
COVID-19,” at https://www.elections.ny.gov/Covid19ExecOrders.html.
68 See Wisconsin Elections Commission, “I want to vote absentee,” at https://elections.wi.gov/voters/absentee.
69 For examples of these, see state press releases compiled in National Association of Secretaries of State, “Issue
Briefing: Election Emergencies & COVID-19,” at https://www.nass.org/resources/issue-briefing-election-emergencies-
covid-19.
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has also issued recommendations for
election workers and voters, including providing signage or floor markings to encourage social
distancing, disinfecting surfaces and voting equipment, and providing protections for people at
increased risk for il ness.70 To provide for social distancing at voting sites, some jurisdictions
have expanded early voting options, relocated voting sites to larger facilities, or offered voting
options that reduce interpersonal contact, such as curbside voting. For example, Texas provided
10 days of early voting instead of 5 in its primary runoff election, and election officials
encouraged use of curbside voting.71 Louisvil e, KY, used a single voting location at the state fair
ground exposition center building for its primary election.72 Some states, including Florida and
Ohio, have also relocated polling places from nursing homes or senior centers to new locations.73
In addition to personal safety measures, some states have also expanded poll worker recruitment
efforts to ensure that available voting sites have a sufficient number of election workers. In
Wisconsin, for example, 250 Wisconsin National Guard members were available to serve at
polling places during the special election, and the state worked with municipalities to provide
personal protective equipment for poll workers and cleaning supplies.74 Some states are also
expanding efforts to recruit poll workers, particularly among high school or college students.75
States have general y taken steps to provide personal protective equipment and other supplies to
help ensure the health and safety of voters and election workers for the remaining 2020
elections.76 Selected examples of other state actions to date related to voting in the November
2020 general election are provided below.

70 See, generally, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Considerations for Election Polling Locations and
Voters,” June 22, 2020, at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html.
71 Shaun Rabb, “T exans shatter early voting record numbers for primary runoff election,” Fox 4—KDFW, July 11,
2020, at https://www.fox4news.com/news/texans-shatter-early-voting-record-numbers-for-primary-runoff-election; and
Wes Rapaport, “ Could T exas see increase in curbside voting as primary runoff voting period begins?” KXAN NBC,
June 29, 2020, at https://www.kxan.com/news/your-local-election-hq/texas-may-see-increase-in-curbside-voting-as-
primary-runoff-voting-period-beings/.
72 Phillip M. Bailey and Joe Sonka, “A historic Kentucky primary defied the naysayers. T hen in the last 5 minutes,
chaos struck,” Louisville Courier Journal, June 24, 2020, at https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/
elections/kentucky/2020/06/23/kentucky-primary-election-day-marked-covid-19-suppression-claims/3244169001/.
73 For example, see Benjamin Siegel, Meg Cunningham, and Luke Barr, “Polling places moved from nursing homes;
other changes amid coronavirus concerns,” ABC News, March 13, 2020, at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/states-
scramble-move-polling-places-nursing-homes-stock/story?id=69587292.
74 Brenda Ordonez, “Over 69,000 Wisconsin voters return absentee ballots for May 12 Special Election,” WFRV-T V
CBS Local 5, May 8, 2020, at https://www.wearegreenbay.com/coronavirus/more-than-69000-wisconsin-voters-return-
absentee-ballots-for-may-12-election/; and T odd Richmond, “ Wisconsin clerks ready for special congressional
election,” AP News, April 17, 2020, at https://apnews.com/8b01e819253b20ef032b5f6ea7de8cf4.
75 For example, see comments from Director of Hamilton County [Ohio] Board of Elections Sherry Poland at the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission, Public Hearing: U.S. Election Assistance Com m ission Lesso ns Learned from the
2020 Prim ary Elections, July 8, 2020, at https://www.eac.gov/events/2020/07/08/public-hearing-us-election-assistance-
commission-lessons-learned-2020-primary; and Al Pefley, “ Places normally used as polling precincts cancel as
coronavirus cases spike,” CBS12—WPEC, June 30, 2020, at https://cbs12.com/news/local/supervisor-of-elections-
needs-polling-places-for-august -primary.
76 See, for example, New Hampshire Secretary of State Bill Gardner, “Re: Personal Protective Equipment, September
8, State Primary; November 3, General Election,” at https://www.nhpr.org/sites/nhpr/files/202007/
election_officials_on_ppe_july_6__2020__005_.pdf.
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 Arkansas and New Hampshire officials have stated that COVID-19 concerns
could serve as a reason to request an absentee bal ot, and Massachusetts and
Missouri have extended eligibility for mail voting to al qualified voters.77
 Missouri waived the notarization requirement for mail voting-eligible voters who
have contracted or are at risk of contracting COVID-19, and North Carolina
reduced the requirement for witness signatures for mail bal ots from two to one.78
 Connecticut, Delaware, Il inois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and
Wisconsin announced that al voters would automatical y receive mail bal ot
applications, and New Mexico authorized county clerks to automatical y send
mail bal ot applications.79
 Il inois and Massachusetts also announced that they would expand early voting
hours, and Il inois wil permit curbside voting.80
 California’s governor signed legislation requiring al counties to mail voters
bal ots and issued an executive order permitting counties to consolidate polling
places under certain conditions.81

77 John Moritz, “Virus OK as excuse for voting absentee in Arkansas, Hutchinson says,” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,
July 3, 2020, at https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/jul/03/virus-ok-as-excuse-for-voting-absentee/; New
Hampshire Secretary of State William M. Gardner and New Hampshire Attorney General Gordon J. MacDonald,
“Elections Operations During the State of Emergency,” memorandum, April 10, 20 20, at https://www.nhpr.org/sites/
nhpr/files/202004/covid-19_elections_guidance.pdf; Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
“COVID-19 Elections Updates,” at https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/covid-19/covid-19.htm; Governor Mike Parson,
“Governor Parson T akes Security Measures to Safeguard Election Process, Protect Missouri Voters During COVID-
19,” press release, June 4, 2020, at https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-takes-security-
measures-safeguard-election-process-protect .
78 Governor Mike Parson, “Governor Parson T akes Security Measures to Safeguard Election Process, Protect Missouri
Voters During COVID-19,” press release, June 4, 2020, at https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-
parson-takes-security-measures-safeguard-election-process-protect; and Associated Press, “ North Carolina Gov.
Cooper signs law making mail-in absentee ballots easier, elections safer because of COVID-19,” June 12, 2020, at
https://www.wxii12.com/article/north-carolina-cooper-law-mail-in-absentee-ballots-election/32855736#.
79 Connecticut Secretary of State Denise W. Merrill, “ Secretary Merrill Releases Connecticut ’s Election Plan in the
Face of COVID-19,” press release, May 4, 2020, at https://portal.ct.gov/SOT S/Press-Releases/2020-Press-Releases/
Secretary-Merrill-Releases-Connecticuts-Election-Plan-in-the-Face-of-COVID19; Governor John Carney, “ Governor
Carney Signs Vote By Mail Legislation,” press release, July 1, 2020, at https://news.delaware.gov/2020/07/01/
governor-carney-signs-vote-by-mail-legislation/; Associated Press, “ Massive expansion of vote-by-mail approved in
Illinois,” June 16, 2020, at https://wgntv.com/news/massive-expansion-of-vote-by-mail-approved-in-illinois/; Governor
Larry Hogan, “Governor Hogan Directs State Board of Elections to Conduct November General Election With
Enhanced Voting Options,” press release, July 8, 2020, at https://governor.maryland.gov/2020/07/08/governor-hogan-
directs-state-board-of-elections-to-conduct -november-general-election-with-enhanced-voting-options/; Massachusetts
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “COVID-19 Elections Updates,” at https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/
covid-19/covid-19.htm; Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, “ Benson: All voters receiving applications to vote
by mail,” press release, May 19, 2020, at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-127-93094-529536—,00.html; Adam
Levy and Chandelis Duster, “Wisconsin approves measure to send absentee ballot applicat ions to voters,” CNN, May
28, 2020, at https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/wisconsin-absentee-voting-applications/index.html; and
Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, “ Governor establishes Civil Rights Commission; signs election protections,
solvency measures into law,” press release, June 26, 2020, at https://www.governor.state.nm.us/2020/06/26/governor-
establishes-civil-rights-commission-signs-election-protections-solvency-measures-into-law/.
80 Office of Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker, “Gov. Pritzker Signs Legislation to Expand Vote by Mail, Promote Safe
Participation in the 2020 Election,” press release, June 16, 2020, at https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/news-item.aspx?
ReleaseID=21690; and Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “ COVID-19 Elections
Updates,” at https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/covid-19/covid-19.htm.
81 Governor Gavin Newsom, “Governor Newsom Signs Legislation 6.18.20,” press release, at https://www.gov.ca.gov/
2020/06/18/governor-newsom-signs-legislation-6-18-20/; and Governor Gavin Newsom, Executive Order N-67-20,
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 South Carolina wil provide prepaid return postage for absentee bal ots.82
As states have implemented or announced election administration changes related to COVID-19,
a number of legal chal enges have also been filed and are pending in various states.83 Such
litigation is beyond the scope of this report.
What are some of the challenges that have emerged for voters and
election administrators in 2020 to date?
In jurisdictions that have chosen to expand mail voting in response to COVID-19, election
administrators and voters have had to respond quickly to new procedures for distributing, casting,
and counting bal ots—or at least to a larger number of mail bal ots than normal. The increased
volume of mail bal ots, and, in some cases, bal ots that did not reach voters before the election,
posed high-profile disruptions in some jurisdictions.
Pennsylvania, for example, reported that 1.8 mil ion voters applied for and were approved for
mail and absentee bal ots for its June 2, 2020, primary elections, 17 times greater than
commensurate figures for the 2016 presidential primary.84 Similar chal enges occurred elsewhere.
In the District of Columbia and Maryland, for example, although many voters cast bal ots by mail
successfully, there also were widespread reports of delayed bal ots. In the District, according to
media coverage, the Board of Elections “struggled to fulfil more than 92,000 requests for mail-in
bal ots, instead of the 6,000 or so it receives in most elections. Then, thousands of people turned
out to vote in person” at a reduced number of polling places after their bal ots did not arrive.85
Board officials decided to hand deliver bal ots to some voters who had not received requested
mail bal ots and permit some voters to cast their votes by email.86
In Georgia, the secretary of state’s office reported before the June 9 primary election that “more
than 800,000 Georgians [had] submitted absentee bal ots by mail so far, more than 20 times the
37,000 who voted that way in 2016 [and] another 223,561 have cast their bal ots in person”
before Election Day.87 According to media reports, some voters who appeared at polling places

June 3, 2020, at https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/6.3.20-EO-N-67-20-text.pdf.
82 Jamie Lovegrove, “ SC election officials agree to provide prepaid postage for absentee ballots,” The Post and
Courier, July 9, 2020, at https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/sc-election-officials-agree-to-provide-prepaid-
postage-for-absentee-ballots/article_5fbc3fc2-c1ed-11ea-a66c-835742fd1988.html.
83 For a discussion of some of these issues, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10470, Election 2020 and the COVID-19
Pandem ic: Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting. For additional examples of pending litigation, see “ Relevant
litigation,” Ballotpedia, at
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(
COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020#Relevant_litigation .
84 Pennsylvania Department of State, “Secretary of State Reports Smooth Election Amid Historic Circumstances,”
press release, June 2, 2020, https://www.media.pa.gov/Pages/State-Details.aspx?newsid=388.
85 Julie Zauzmer, Jenna Portnoy, and Erin Cox, “Anger at Vote Problems in D.C., Md.,” The Washington Post, June 4,
2020, p. B1. T he quoted material appears on p. B4. See also Julie Zauzmer and Fenit Nirappil, “Mail-In Ballot Woes
Snarl D.C. Primary Vote,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2020, p. B1.
86 Julie Zauzmer, “Voters report difficulty getting mail-in ballots for D.C.’s T uesday primary,” The Washington Post,
June 1, 2020, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/voters-report-difficulty-getting-mail-in-ballots-for-
dcs-tuesday-primary/2020/06/01/cfc78bda-a3fe-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html; and Alexa Corse, “ D.C. Lets
Voters Submit Ballots by Email After Mail Problems,” The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2020, at https://www.wsj.com/
articles/d-c-letsvoters-submit-ballots-by-email-after-mail-problems-11591211518.
87 See Office of the Georgia Secretary of State, “Georgia Voting Adapts: Surges Past 1 Million Vote Milestone,” press
release, June 4, 2020, https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/
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encountered hours-long voting lines in the state, problems with a new voting system, and poll
worker absences due to COVID-19 concerns. Other states with June 9 primaries also reportedly
encountered problems related to changes in election procedures responding to COVID-19.88
In addition to COVID-19 disruptions, protests concerning race and policing, and related curfews,
affected some June 2020 primaries. In the District of Columbia, for example, Mayor Muriel
Bowser imposed curfews in Washington, DC, including on Election Day. Although the curfew
began at 7:00 p.m. on June 2, those voting until 8:00 p.m., or working the polls, were exempt.89 In
Pennsylvania, Governor Tom Wolf issued an executive order extending the deadlines for mail
bal ots to be postmarked and received for voters in six counties. Wolf determined that “the
volume of applications in the six counties caused by the COVID-19 crisis combined with the
recent civil disturbance make it necessary to extend the deadline for the counties to receive
completed civilian absentee and mail-in bal ots. Curfews, travel restrictions and other unforeseen
circumstances have made returning ballots more difficult in these counties.”90
Recent Legislative Developments
What has happened most recently in Congress?
As explained below, as of this writing, two 116th Congress bil s relevant for election emergencies,
particularly the response to COVID-19, have become law. The House has passed a third bil . Both
chambers also have considered other legislation.
Enacted Legislation
 The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-
136, H.R. 748) was enacted on March 27, 2020, and provides $400 mil ion for
payments to states, territories, and DC. This funding is “to prevent, prepare for,
and respond to coronavirus” during the 2020 federal election cycle.
 Following reports of attempted foreign interference in the 2016 elections,
Congress included $425 mil ion in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020
(P.L. 116-93) for payments to states, territories, and DC for general
improvements to the administration of federal elections. Guidance issued by the
EAC clarified that this funding—as wel as $380 mil ion Congress provided for
similar payments in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141)

georgia_voting_adapts_surges_past_1_million_vote_milestone.
88 For media coverage of June 9 primary election administration, see, for example, Amy Gardner et al., “Stumbles in
Ga. Fuel Fears About Nov. Vote,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2020, p. A1; and Mark Niesse, “Vote Counting
Continues After Problems in Georgia’s Primary,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution online, June 10, 2020,
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt —politics/vote-counting-continues-after-problems-georgia-primary/
fKGdKvpG5Y93iKCwguzamJ/.
89 Bowser made the announcement at a June 1, 2020, press conference. See, for example, Rachel Kurzius, “D.C.
Imposes 7 P.M. Curfew T onight and T omorrow in Prep aration for More Protests,” wamu.org, June 1, 2020,
https://wamu.org/story/20/06/01/mayor-bowser-says-d-c-is-preparing-for-more-protests/.
90 Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania, “Gov. Wolf Signs Executive Order Extending Mail Ballot Deadline in Six
Counties to June 9,” press release, June 1, 2020, https://www.governor.pa.gov/newsroom/gov-wolf-signs-executive-
order-extending-mail-ballot-deadline-in-six-counties-to-june-9/. See also Governor of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (T om Wolf), Extension of Deadline for Receipt of Absentee and Mail-In Ballots in Certain Counties,
executive order 2020-02, June 1, 2020, https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-cont ent/uploads/2020/06/20200601-EO-
Deadline-Extention.pdf.
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and some other funds previously appropriated for election administration-related
payments—may be used to cover certain elections costs incurred as a result of
the COVID-19 pandemic. 91
Legislation That Has Passed One Chamber
The Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (HEROES) Act (H.R.
6800),92 passed by the House (208-199) on May 15, 2020, contains two sets of elections
provisions:
 Title III would provide $3.6 bil ion for “contingency planning, preparation, and
resilience of” federal elections and revise some elections-related provisions of the
CARES Act, such as the requirements that CARES Act payment recipients
provide a 20% match for federal funds and report on their spending within 20
days of each election in the 2020 federal election cycle.
 Division P of the bil contains the American Coronavirus/COVID-19 Election
Safety and Security (ACCESS) Act, which would set certain requirements for
states related to elections contingency planning, voter registration, early voting,
and mail voting and authorize payments to help states, territories, and DC meet
those requirements and conduct risk-limiting audits.
Other Introduced Legislation
Other legislation that would require certain changes to federal election administration in 2020 and
for subsequent emergency situations has been introduced in Congress in response to COVID-19.
To date, none of these bil s has advanced beyond introduction and committee referral. These bil s
include
 H.R. 7118 (introduced June 4, 2020), Vote From Home America Act of 2020 (see
also H.R. 6847 [introduced May 12, 2020]);
 H.R. 7068/S. 3725 (introduced June 1, 2020, and May 13, 2020), VoteSafe Act of
2020 (see also H.R. 6807 [introduced May 12, 2020]);
 H.R. 6853 (introduced May 13, 2020), Undertaking National Initiatives to Tackle
Epidemic (UNITE) Act;
 H.R. 6777 (introduced on May 8, 2020), Secure Our Elections Act;
 H.R. 6673 (introduced May 1, 2020), Federal Election Failsafe Act;
 H.R. 6512 (introduced on April 14, 2020), Voter Notification of Timely
Information about Changes in Elections (NOTICE) Act;
 H.R. 6379 (introduced on March 23, 2020), Take Responsibility for Workers and
Families Act, which, in Division L, contains the American Coronavirus/COVID-
19 Election Safety and Security (ACCESS) Act (see also Division P of H.R. 6800
noted above);

91 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Guidance on Use of HAVA Funds for Expenses Related to COVID-19,
https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/guidance-use-hava-funds-expenses-related-covid-19. See also CRS In Focus
IF11356, Election Security: States’ Spending of FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA Paym ents, by Karen L. Shanton.
92 HEROES is a widely used acronym referring to the bill, although it is not capitalized as an acronym in bill text as
passed by the House.
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 S. 4033 (introduced on June 22, 2020), Natural Disaster and Emergency Bal ot
Act of 2020 (see also S. 3529 [introduced on March 18, 2020]);
 S. 3961 (introduced on June 15, 2020), Pandemic Democracy for Al Act;
 S. 3822 (introduced on May 21, 2020), DemocracyCorps Act;
 S. 3778 (introduced on May 20, 2020), State Elections Preparedness Act; and
 S. 3440/H.R. 6202 (introduced on March 11, 2020), Resilient Elections During
Quarantines and Natural Disasters Act of 2020.
Several other election-related bil s have been introduced in the 116th Congress, beginning with
H.R. 1 in January 2019. These bil s address a range of topics related to election security,
accessibility, and administration that some Members may find relevant in the current context.
Oversight Hearings Focusing on Elections and COVID-19
The Committee on House Administration and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee are
the primary committees of jurisdiction in federal elections policy. The House and Senate
Judiciary Committees have primary jurisdiction over voting rights issues.93 These and other
congressional committees have held several oversight hearings related to elections issues during
the 116th Congress. Table 1 highlights hearings devoted specifical y to elections and COVID-19.
Thus far in the 116th Congress, committees have not held oversight hearings focusing on non-
COVID election emergencies issues as discussed in this report.94
Table 1. 116th Congress Oversight Hearings Focusing on Elections and COVID-19
Chamber
Committee
Hearing Title
Date
House
Judiciary; Subcommittee on the
“Protecting the Right to
06/03/2020
Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Vote During the COVID-19
Civil Liberties
Pandemic”
House
House Administration;
“The Impact of COVID-19
06/11/2020
Subcommittee on Elections
on Voting Rights and Election
Administration: Ensuring Safe
and Fair Elections”
House
Intel igence
“Emerging Trends in Online
06/18/2020
Foreign Influence
Operations: Social Media,
COVID-19, and Election
Security”
Sources: CRS analysis of 116th Congress hearing activity; and of hearing results from CRS Proquest
Congressional keyword searches for the 116th Congress.
Notes: See the “Scope of Report” section of this report for additional discussion of the election emergencies
definition used herein. Hearings devoted primarily to other topics also could contain relevant discussion. The
table does not reflect closed hearings. It also excludes appropriations, legislative, and nominations hearings. For
additional discussion of the related issue of campaign and election security, including written committee reports,
see CRS Report R46146, Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress,
coordinated by R. Sam Garrett.

93 For additional information, see T able 3 in CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An
Overview, by R. Sam Garrett .
94 On election security legislative activity, including hearings, see CRS Report R46146, Campaign and Election
Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developm ents for Congress, coordinated by R. Sam Garrett .
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What does current legislation addressing COVID-19 and elections,
or other elections emergencies, propose?
Bil s related specifical y to elections and COVID-19, or to elections and emergencies that could
include COVID-19, vary in scope, but to date would general y require states (or territories) to
provide voters with additional options for casting bal ots in federal elections. This legislation
typical y has included expanding access to mail voting. The bil s introduced to date differ in the
extent to which they would
 apply proposed changes to only specific circumstances, such as declared
emergencies, or to al federal elections;
 authorize or appropriate federal funding to assist federal agencies, states, and
territories in complying with the new requirements;
 specify the number and details of required voting methods, such as mail voting
versus early voting (e.g., at polling places, especial y centralized ones known as
“vote centers”), and the dates or times of such voting;
 require states to proactively send mail bal ots to al registered voters or only to
those who were active during recent elections or who request bal ots;
 specify the degree of discretion afforded to states regarding voter eligibility and
election processes, such as registration requirements, voter identification, and
timelines for bal ot processing; and
 address other elections issues (e.g., foreign interference).
Potential Policy Considerations for Congress
What are some of the overarching issues that Congress might find
relevant when considering legislation related to election
emergencies?
Some disagreement exists within and outside Congress about whether additional legislation such
as that described above, or otherwise, is needed. Specific policy options range, for example, from
maintaining the status quo, to expanding or restricting mail voting, to expanding or restricting
voter identification requirements for new voter registrations. The discussion below provides an
overview of some of the overarching factors that could affect how or whether Congress decides to
pursue legislation, whatever the specifics of that legislation might be. Additional discussion of
specific policy proposals appears elsewhere in this report and in other CRS products cited herein.
Federalism
The scope of the federal role in any new requirements or funding surrounding election
emergencies could play a significant role in the debate over which options Congress chooses, if
any, and how states, territories, and localities react to those choices. States, territories, and the
District of Columbia have primary responsibility for administering elections in the United States,
but Congress retains authority over the time, place, and manner of federal elections. Congress
could, therefore, choose to require through legislation that states undertake certain actions, such
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as expanded mail voting requirements.95 States, territories, and the District of Columbia general y
favor additional federal funding to support federal election administration, but might reject new
federal requirements as an infringement on their authority to conduct elections or new funding
that comes attached to such requirements. As noted above, some Members of Congress could
support placing such requirements on states or providing funding, whereas other Members could
prefer to maintain the status quo or otherwise defer to states and territories to determine their own
needs and provide their own funding.
In addition, as noted in the “Gulf Coast, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 2005-2006” example above,
the absence of the VRA preclearance requirement could make it faster for election officials to
make administrative and voting changes to respond to election emergencies. The lack of
preclearance also removes a VRA safeguard for protecting racial and language minority groups
from discrimination at the polls.96
Participation and Security
Even in routine elections, policymakers can face competing, but not necessarily mutual y
exclusive, participation and security goals.97 Election emergencies can heighten these concerns as
policymakers and election officials determine how to ensure that voters can access the bal ot even
when their health or safety might be at risk. Voter participation general y is a shared policy goal,
but debate typical y concerns whether expanded registration or voting options are neutral
accommodations during extraordinary circumstances or whether they would unfairly advantage or
disadvantage particular parties, candidates, or groups of voters.98 Advocates for voters with
disabilities, for example, although not necessarily opposing alternative forms of voting, have
raised concerns about whether mail bal ots could compromise the ability of voters with visual
impairments to vote privately and independently.99 In addition to privacy concerns, some scholars
and election officials have raised questions about established or potential security breaches with
any form of voting other than bal ots cast in person at the polls.100

95 For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An
Overview, by R. Sam Garrett ; CRS Report R45549, The State and Local Role in Election Adm inistration: Duties and
Structures, by Karen L. Shanton; and CRS Report RL30747, Congressional Authority to Direct How States Adm inister
Elections, by Kenneth R. T homas.
96 For additional discussion, see CRS T estimony T E10033, History and Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
by L. Paige Whitaker.
97 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R46146, Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent
Developm ents for Congress, coordinat ed by R. Sam Garrett .
98 See, for example, Natasha Korecki and Christopher Cadelago, “Democrats Fear for November After Wisconsin
Voting Spectacle,” Politico, April 13, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/13/democrats-fear-november-
wisconsin-voting-spectacle-179585?nname=playbook-pm&nid=0000015a-dd3e-d536-a37b-dd7fd8af0000&nrid=
0000014e-f0ed-dd93-ad7f-f8edf56c0000&nlid=964328.
99 See, for example, the written statement of Michelle Bishop, Disability Advocacy Specialist, National Disability
Rights Network, “Protecting the Rights of Voters with Disabilities During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” accompanying
her testimony at U.S. Congress, House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties, Protecting the Right to Vote During the COVID-19 Pandem ic, June 3, 2020. As of this writing, the hearing
record has not been published. Prepared testimony and video are available on the committee website,
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2964.
100 See, for example, David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Matthew Rosenberg, “Amid Pandemic and Upheaval, New
Cyberthreats to the Presidential Election,” The New York Times, June 7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/
us/politics/remote-voting-hacking-coronavirus.html?smid=tw-nytpolitics&smtyp=cur.
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Timeliness
If Congress determined that federal legislation would be beneficial to prepare for or respond to
election emergencies, the calendar affects how useful such legislation might be. Congress may
need time to debate legislation; and federal agencies and state, territorial, or local election
jurisdictions may need time to implement any new requirements or prepare to utilize any new
federal assistance. There is no “offseason” for election administration, as voting and elections
occur throughout the year in one jurisdiction or another. Nonetheless, the spring and fal of even-
numbered years (2020, 2022, etc.) are especial y busy for federal primaries and general elections,
which often coincide with state and local contests. If Congress is responding to an ongoing
emergency, such as the aftermath of a natural disaster or pandemic, Members might elect to limit
short-term assistance to options such as federal funding or support from federal agencies if the
House and Senate determine that states do not have time to implement more expansive changes.
On the other hand, Congress also could determine that more expansive changes, even if
chal enging to implement, are necessary to adequately respond to or prevent elections
emergencies.
What funding has Congress appropriated recently for grants to
states to assist with election emergencies?
Congress has provided funding in three recent appropriations acts for elections-related grants to
states, territories, and DC, as shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Recent Appropriations for Elections-Related Grants to States
Funding Type
Appropriations Act
Federal Appropriations
State Match Requirement
FY2018 Grants
Consolidated
$380 mil ion
5%
Appropriations Act, 2018
(P.L. 115-141)
FY2020 Grants
Consolidated
$425 mil ion
20%
Appropriations Act, 2020
(P.L. 116-93)
CARES Act Grants
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
$400 mil ion
20%
Economic Security (CARES)
Act (P.L. 116-136)
Source: CRS, based on review of appropriations measures
As Table 2 shows, as of this writing, Congress has appropriated funding for election
administration-related grants to states, territories, and DC three times since FY2018. Congress
specified different purposes for some of the grants than for others, but al could be used to
respond to election emergencies of some kind. The FY2018 and FY2020 grants, which were
funded following reports of attempted foreign interference in the 2016 elections, may be used for
general improvements to the administration of federal elections. That might include measures to
address both attacks on election systems and, fol owing the emergence of the COVID-19
pandemic, COVID-19. The CARES Act grants are available specifical y for preventing, preparing
for, and responding to COVID-19 for the 2020 federal election cycle. For more on how each type
of grant may be used, see the “What kinds of election emergency-related expenses might states
cover with the FY2018, FY2020, and CARES Act grants?” section of this report.
Al three of the above sets of grants are administered by the EAC and were available to the 50
states, DC, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The 2020 grants
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and CARES Act grants were also available to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI).101 Funding for each grant was al ocated according to a voting-age population-
based formula specified in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),102 with each eligible
recipient guaranteed a minimum payment amount—$3 mil ion for each of the 50 states and DC
and $600,000 per eligible territory—for each grant.103
Grants for more general emergency and disaster preparedness and response may also be available
for elections-related use in some cases. For example, New York received $7.9 mil ion under
FEMA’s Public Assistance program for costs associated with canceling and rescheduling
elections in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,104 and applicants for certain
FY2020 homeland security grants from FEMA are required to include election security projects
in their proposals.105 For more on FEMA’s Public Assistance program and homeland security
grants, respectively, see CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to and
Recovering from Major Disasters and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay and Elizabeth M.
Webster; and CRS Report R44669, Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants: A
Summary and Issues, by Shawn Reese.
What kinds of election emergency-related expenses might states
cover with the FY2018, FY2020, and CARES Act grants?
Funding for the FY2018, FY2020, and CARES Act grants was appropriated under provisions of
HAVA that authorize payments to states, territories, and DC for general improvements to the
administration of federal elections.106 Language in the CARES Act limits its grants to uses
intended “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the coronavirus, domestical y or international y,
for the 2020 Federal election cycle.” The FY2018 and FY2020 consolidated appropriations acts
do not set similar limits on the FY2018 and FY2020 grants, although explanatory statements
accompanying the acts list the following as possible purposes for which recipients may use the
funds:
 replacing paperless voting machines;
 conducting post-election audits;
 addressing cyber vulnerabilities in election systems;
 providing election officials with cybersecurity training;

101 T he provisions of HAVA under which the funding for the grants was appropriated authorize payments to states.
HAVA’s definition of “state” does not include the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which did not have
federal elections when HAVA was enacted, but language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 and the
CARES Act extended eligibility for the FY2020 and CARES Act grants to the territory.
102 52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145.
103 52 U.S.C. §20901.
104 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA T o Reimburse New York City For Cancelled And Rescheduled
9/11 Primarily Elections,” press release, September 6, 2002, press release no. 1391 -148, https://www.fema.gov/news-
release/2002/09/06/fema-reimburse-new-york-city-cancelled-and-rescheduled-9/11-primarily.
105 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), April 20, 2020, p. 6, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1587400512465-
c969296a8971db7ef27513cfb5448393/FY_2020_HSGP_FAQ_4_20_508AB.pdf.
106 T he relevant provisions of HAVA refer to payments to the 50 states, DC, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. Language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 and the CARES Act extended
eligibility for the FY2020 and CARES Act grants to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
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 instituting election system cybersecurity best practices; and
 making other improvements to the security of federal elections.107
Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EAC issued guidance clarifying that the
FY2018 and FY2020 grants—as wel as some other funds previously appropriated under
HAVA108—may be applied to certain expenses associated with the pandemic.109 Examples of such
expenses, according to the EAC, include costs related to the health and safety of voters and
election workers, such as cleaning supplies and training on polling place sanitization procedures,
and costs related to increased demand for mail voting, such as printing and mailing extra bal ots
and upgrading state or local databases to accommodate online mail bal ot requests. Additional
specifics about permissible uses of the funds are available in the EAC guidance, a frequently
asked questions document on the agency’s website, and other grants documentation issued by the
EAC.110
Select information about how recipients have used or planned to use the FY2018, FY2020, and
CARES Act grants is also available from the EAC. The CARES Act requires recipients to report
on their use of CARES Act grants within 20 days of an election in the 2020 federal election cycle,
and the EAC asked recipients of al three sets of grants to submit spending plans with their grant
funding requests. Those spending plans and reports, as wel as annual spending reports for al of
the grants, are general y posted on the EAC’s website as they become available.111
How might the policy options under consideration in Congress
affect state or local election administration?
Federal policy options related to state and local election administration typical y can be broadly
categorized as requirements, funding, or guidance (or a combination thereof). Traditional y, most
aspects of election administration in the United States have been governed by state or local law,
and a variety of practices exist across election jurisdictions as a result. States, for example,

107 Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen, “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen, Chairman of the House
Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H.R. 1625,” explanatory
statement, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 164, part 50 (March 22, 2018), p. H2519; and U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Appropriations, Com m ittee Print of the Com m ittee on Appropriations, U.S. House of
Representatives, on H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93, committee print, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., January 2020, H. Comm. Prt. 38-
678 (Washington: GPO, 2020), p. 645.
108 HAVA authorized a number of grant programs, including the general improvements grant program under which the
funding for the FY2018, FY2020, and CARES Act grants was appropriated and a program to provide “ requirements
payments” to help recipients meet certain federal requirements for election administration. Congress provided funding
under both of those grant programs prior to the FY2018 grants. T hat funding did not come with a spending deadline
and recipients could keep and use any interest it generated, so some recipients still have some of the funds remaining.
109 As noted in the guidance, expenses must generally follow federal grant regulations, such as the general cost
principles for federal grants set out in 2 C.F.R. 200.400, Subpart E, Cost Principles. U.S. Election Assistance
Commission, Guidance on Use of HAVA Funds for Expenses Related to COVID-19, https://www.eac.gov/election-
officials/guidance-use-hava-funds-expenses-related-covid-19.
110 U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), Guidance on Use of HAVA Funds for Expenses Related to COVID-
19; EAC, 2018 HAVA Funds, https://www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/2018-hava-funds; EAC, 2020 HAVA Funds,
https://www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/2020-hava-funds; EAC, 2020 CARES Act Grants, https://www.eac.gov/
payments-and-grants/2020-cares-act-grants; and EAC, 2020 HAVA Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Econom ic Security
(CARES) Act Grants, April 6, 2020, p. 3, https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/paymentgrants/cares/
CARESAwardInstructions.pdf.
111 Some of the spending plans recipients have submitted might have been amended since they were submitted. For
example, some states might have chosen to redirect some of the FY2018 or FY2020 grant funds they originally
intended for other purposes to COVID-19 preparedness and response. T he plans available on the EAC’s website do not
generally reflect such updates.
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determine whether to have voter registration and, if they choose to have it, can opt for different
voter registration requirements, deadlines, and methods. With regard to voting, jurisdictions can
make decisions about when and how voters cast their bal ots by setting polling hours and
locations on Election Day, establishing voter identification requirements, and procuring certain
types of voting equipment, as wel as by providing early or mail voting options for some or al
eligible voters.
Given this variation, federal election administration requirements placed on states or localities
would likely be easier for certain jurisdictions to implement than others. Federal policy options
related to election administration often mirror options already in use by certain states or localities;
jurisdictions with similar existing election policies may find it easier to comply with federal
requirements than other states or localities with no similar experiences. States also vary in how
election policy is created; some changes in certain states may require state constitutional
amendments, whereas other changes could be implemented through state statutes or executive or
administrative decisions. Required changes to state or local election administration may also
require certain states to change other, related election policies.
Federal funding for election administration has sometimes been made available to states,
territories, and DC as grants under HAVA provisions authorizing a program to provide payments
for general improvements to federal election administration, as discussed in the section above on
“What funding has Congress appropriated recently for grants to states to assist with election
emergencies?” This type of funding typical y al ows some flexibility for states or localities to
spend election funds on areas they identify as needs. To provide incentives to states to adopt
certain practices, Congress might specify particular uses for federal funding in legislative
language or make adopting or rejecting certain election practices a condition or criterion for
eligibility for federal grant funding.
What other funding issues might be part of the policy debate in the
2020 election cycle?
Funding issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic might be expected to continue to be part of the
elections policy debate in the lead-up to the 2020 general election. Additional funding beyond the
amounts provided to date has been proposed for grants to states, territories, and DC for elections-
related COVID-19 preparedness and response and for appropriations to federal agencies, such as
the United States Postal Service, that play a role in such preparations and responses.112 Congress
might consider whether to provide such funding, keep funding at existing levels, or defer
decisions about funding pending additional information about funding use and needs.
Congress might also consider whether to provide further funding to help address other potential
election emergencies, such as foreign attacks on state election systems. Interference efforts like
the ones reported in the 2016 election cycle are ongoing, according to the U.S. Intel igence
Community.113 Congress might consider whether to provide new funding to address such threats.

112 See, for example, the T ake Responsibility for Workers and Families Act (H.R. 6379) and the Health and Economic
Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (HEROES) Act ( H.R. 6800). See also, for example, CRS Insight IN11384,
U.S. Postal Service Financial Condition and Title VI of the CARES Act, by Meghan M. Stuessy and Raj Gnanarajah;
and CRS Report R44603, Reform ing the U.S. Postal Service: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by
Michelle D. Christensen.
113 See, for example, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and
CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections,” press release, November 5, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/
press-releases/joint -statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-2020-elections; and
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The FY2021 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bil ordered reported by
the House Appropriations Committee on July 15, 2020, for example, would provide $500 mil ion
for payments to states, territories, and DC for replacing direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting
machines and other elections-related purposes.
Congress might also consider assessing whether there is a need to replace any previously
appropriated funding. As noted in the “What funding has Congress appropriated recently for
grants to states to assist with election emergencies?” section of this report, Congress provided
funding for elections-related grants to states, territories, and DC following reports of efforts to
interfere in the 2016 elections. Grant recipients initial y reported planning to use most of those
FY2018 and FY2020 grants to help secure their election systems against further interference
efforts,114 but some have since redirected some of the funds to COVID-19 preparedness and
response.115 Congress might consider assessing how much of the funding provided in response to
the 2016 interference efforts has been used for COVID-19-related costs and, if significant funds
have been redirected, whether the remaining funding is sufficient to meet the election
interference-related needs it was initial y intended to address.116
Questions about the structure of existing or proposed grant programs might also be part of the
policy debate in the 2020 election cycle. The elections-related grants funded by the CARES Act
came with requirements to provide a 20% match for federal funds, report on grant spending
within 20 days of an election in the 2020 federal election cycle, and obligate or spend grant funds
by December 31, 2020. The National Association of Secretaries of State has said that such
provisions might make it difficult for some states to access the funds,117 and proposals have been
offered to waive some or al of the requirements.118 Trade-offs like the one il ustrated by this
example—between cost-sharing and oversight on one hand and time-sensitivity and
administrative burdens on the other—might continue to be subjects of debate as Members
develop or evaluate election emergency-related funding proposals.

Olivia Gazis, “ T op U.S. Election Security Official Says Adversaries Have ‘Sharpened’ Interference T ools Ahead of
2020,” CBS News, January 14, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/top-u-s-election-security-official-says-
adversaries-have-sharpened-interference-tools-ahead-of-2020/.
114 For more information on proposed spending of t he FY2018 grants, see CRS In Focus IF11356, Election Security:
States’ Spending of FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA Payments, by Karen L. Shanton. T he initial spending plans grant
recipients submitted with their requests for FY2018 and FY2020 grant funding are available at https://www.eac.gov/
payments-and-grants/2018-hava-funds and https://www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/2020-hava-funds, respectively.
115 Matthew Vann, “ Some Cash-Strapped States T urn to Election Security Funds to Fight COVID-19,” ABC News,
April 6, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/cash-strapped-states-turn-election-security-funds-fight/story?id=
69940136.
116 See, for example, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and
CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections,” press release, November 5, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/
press-releases/joint -statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-2020-elections; and
Olivia Gazis, “ T op U.S. Election Security Official Says Adversaries Have ‘Sharpened’ Interference T ools Ahead of
2020,” CBS News, January 14, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/top-u-s-election-security-official-says-
adversaries-have-sharpened-interference-tools-ahead-of-2020/.
117 Letter from Paul Pate, President of the National Association of Secretaries of State, to Rep. Zoe Lofgren and Rep.
Rodney Davis, April 2, 2020, https://republicans-cha.house.gov/sites/republicans.cha.house.gov/files/documents/
4.2.20%20NASS%20CARES%20Funding%20Letter%20to%20House%20Admin%5B4%5D.pdf .
118 See, for examples, the HEROES Act, the Secure Our Elections Act, and the State Elections Preparedness Act.
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COVID-19 and Election Emergencies: FAQs and Policy Developments

Concluding Comments
Although several aspects of the 2020 cycle are unique, others remain unchanged. Perhaps most
notably, as Congress considers whether or how to pursue legislation or oversight, the federal
government may continue to play a supporting role to states, territories, and localities. In addition,
during any election, the basic task of election administration remains ensuring that al eligible
voters can cast valid bal ots and that those bal ots wil be counted accurately. Political campaigns
stil face familiar tasks of mobilizing voters, and those voters stil decide whether and how to
participate. Election emergencies can make each of those tasks more difficult. State and local
election jurisdictions retain most responsibility for choosing whether to retain the status quo or
implement policy changes, and if so, which ones. As is always the case, the more substantial the
policy change, the more likely it wil take time and money to implement, perhaps with
controversy.
The COVID-19 pandemic’s policy implications arise amid a unique combination of events that
have the potential to disrupt normal elections operations. These include, for example, potential
foreign attacks on election systems or domestic cyberattacks; COVID-19; and effects from civil
unrest in some jurisdictions during the June 2 primary. COVID-19 also affects the entire
country—albeit with varying severity—unlike typical natural disasters. As noted previously, any
substantial change in election processes or participation that increases the volume of participation
or how that participation occurs can make administering elections more chal enging.

Author Information

R. Sam Garrett, Coordinator
Karen L. Shanton
Specialist in American National Government
Analyst in American National Government

Sarah J. Eckman

Analyst in American National Government

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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