Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice




Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal
Authority and Historical Practice

Updated November 7, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45078




Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice

Summary
The U.S. Constitution expressly grants each house of Congress the power to “punish its Members
for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” Expulsion is
the process by which a house of Congress removes one of its Members after the Member has
been duly elected and seated. The Supreme Court has considered expulsion to be distinct from
exclusion, the process by which the House and Senate refuse to seat Members-elect. In so
concluding, the Supreme Court has held that exclusion cannot be used as a disciplinary tool, and
Congress, accordingly, cannot undertake disciplinary measures on Members until after those
Members have taken the oath of office.
The constitutional limits on the power of expulsion are informed by the Expulsion Clause’s text,
historical background, judicial precedent, and historical practice. Presently, the only explicit
standards for expulsion are the supermajority voting requirement and that the individual subject
to the expulsion has been formally seated as a Member of that body.
The history of the Expulsion Clause suggests that the expulsion power is broad and confers to
each house of Congress significant discretion as to the proper grounds for which a Member may
be expelled. Accordingly, courts generally have declined to adjudicate the standards by which
expulsions might be considered in the House or Senate. To date, 20 Members of Congress have
been expelled: 5 in the House and 15 in the Senate. A large majority of those expulsions were
predicated on Members’ behavior deemed to be disloyal to the United States at the outset of the
Civil War. Nonetheless, the two most recent expulsions followed Members’ convictions on public
corruption charges.
One significant area of debate is whether a Member can be expelled for behavior arising prior to
his or her election. The historical practice in each house of Congress is limited and mixed as to
whether such expulsions are appropriate—with debates centered on two general concerns that
may be in tension: maintaining the ability of each house of Congress to preserve the integrity of
the institution and overriding the will and right of constituents to choose their representatives.
This report discusses the power of each house of Congress to remove a Member, including the
historical background of the Clause, the implications of the limited judicial interpretations of the
Clause’s meaning, and other potential constitutional limitations in the exercise of the expulsion
power. The report then analyzes the potential grounds upon which a Member might be expelled,
including an overview of past cases resulting in expulsion and a discussion of the potential
exercise of the expulsion power for conduct occurring prior to the Member’s election or
reelection to Congress.
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Contents
Distinguishing Expulsion and Exclusion ......................................................................................... 1
Constitutional Understandings of the Expulsion Power .................................................................. 2
Text of the Constitution ............................................................................................................. 3
Historical Background .............................................................................................................. 3
Judicial Interpretations of the Expulsion Clause ....................................................................... 5
Possible External Constitutional Limitations ............................................................................ 7
Historical Practice Related to Grounds for Expulsion ..................................................................... 8
Instances of Expulsion of Members of Congress for Misconduct That Occurred While
in Office ................................................................................................................................. 9
Misconduct Occurring Prior to Election or Reelection as Potential Grounds for
Expulsion .............................................................................................................................. 11
Expulsion for Prior Misconduct in the House ................................................................... 14
Expulsion for Prior Misconduct in the Senate .................................................................. 16
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 19

Tables
Table 1. Expulsions in the House of Representatives .................................................................... 20
Table 2. Expulsions in the Senate .................................................................................................. 20

Appendixes
Appendix. Expulsions in the House and Senate ............................................................................ 20

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 21

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Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice

he U.S. Constitution expressly grants each house of Congress the power to “punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
T Member.”1 This report discusses the nature of this substantial power, including the
historical background of the Expulsion Clause, the implications of the limited judicial
interpretations of the Clause’s meaning, and other potential constitutional limitations in the
exercise of the expulsion power. The report then explores a number of issues of debate as to
Congress’s power to expel, including whether past practice is legally binding on a given body;
which acts may be sufficient to warrant expulsion; and whether acts that occurred prior to the
Member’s election or reelection to Congress are subject to the expulsion power.
Distinguishing Expulsion and Exclusion
Expulsion is the process2 by which a house of Congress may remove one of its Members, after
the Member has been duly elected and seated.3 Expulsion, which is expressly provided for in the
Expulsion Clause, is often confused with exclusion, which is an implied power of Congress that
stems from the Qualifications Clauses for the House and Senate.4 Exclusion occurs when a body
of Congress refuses to seat a Member-elect.5 Unlike the two-thirds majority requirement of the
expulsion power, a body of Congress may exclude a Member-elect with a simple majority.6
The Supreme Court has explained that while exclusion and expulsion both bar an individual from
holding a seat in Congress, the two actions exist for different purposes and occur at different
times. Specifically, in Powell v. McCormack, the Court explored the constitutionality of
Representative Adam Clayton Powell’s exclusion from the House of Representatives.7 The

1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (hereinafter “the Expulsion Clause”).
2 Expulsions generally begin with an investigation by the body’s ethics committee, which may follow the introduction
of a resolution proposing expulsion. See CHARLES W. JOHNSON ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES,
PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE, ch. 25, § 21 (2011). The ethics committees have jurisdiction to
investigate the conduct of Members that may be deemed to reflect upon the body of Congress in which they serve. See
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 115TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RULES OF PROCEDURE 24 (Comm. Print 2015),
https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=551b39fc-30ed-4b14-b0d3-1706608a6fcb.
3 Expulsion, as a form of legislative discipline, exists separate from any individual criminal or civil liability of
Members for particular actions. See United States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d 646, 649–52 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Because it
would thwart the constitutional separation of powers if Congress could shield its members from criminal prosecution
by the Executive Branch, we cannot read the Double Jeopardy Clause to include Congress’s disciplining its own
members.” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 189–90 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that separation
of powers doctrine does not preclude a Member of Congress from being subject to investigation by both legislative and
executive authorities). See also Punishment by the House of Representatives No Bar to an Indictment to the President
of the United States, 2 Op. Att’ys Gen. 655, 655–56 (1834). That is, Members of Congress are subject to both
legislative discipline by their respective body as well as potential criminal or civil prosecution of any misconduct that
constitutes a violation of federal, state, or local law.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State in which he shall be chosen.”); id. § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).
5 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 492–93 (1969).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 506. Prior to the Court’s decision in Powell, there are some examples in which Members-elect were expelled,
although commentators have observed that such classification may have been used because “no one [had] raised the
point that he had not been sworn in.” 3 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES CH. 12, § 13 (1979) (hereinafter “Deschler’s Precedents”) (citing ASHER C. HINDS, 2 HINDS’
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 1262 (1907) (hereinafter “Hinds’
Precedents”) and 1 Hinds’ Precedents § 476).
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impetus for the case was an investigation of expenditures authorized by Representative Powell
during the 89th Congress, which concluded that, as chairman of a House committee,
Representative Powell had engaged in improper activities, including deceiving House authorities
with regard to travel expenses and directing illegal payments to his wife.8 The House took no
formal action on those findings during that Congress but refused to administer the oath of office
to Representative Powell at the start of the 90th Congress the following year.9 Subsequently, a
Select Committee, which was appointed at the outset of the 90th Congress to determine
Representative Powell’s eligibility to be seated as a Member, recommended that Representative
Powell be sworn into office as a Member and subsequently disciplined.10 However, the House
rejected that recommendation and instead adopted a resolution that would exclude Representative
Powell by a vote of 307 to 116.11
Representative Powell sued to be reinstated, and on appeal the Supreme Court held that
Representative Powell’s exclusion was unconstitutional, explaining that “exclusion and expulsion
are not fungible proceedings.”12 While the Court recognized that the Constitution grants broad
authority to each of the houses of Congress regarding expulsion and other discipline,13 it
explained that Congress’s authority regarding exclusion was limited to the enumerated
qualifications requirements.14 Because of the distinct nature of each action, the Court emphasized
that the vote to exclude Representative Powell, despite exceeding a two-thirds majority, could not
substitute for his expulsion.15
Constitutional Understandings of the Expulsion
Power
Discerning the constitutional meaning of the Expulsion Clause requires an examination of the text
of the Clause, the historical background that undergirds the Clause, the limited judicial decisions
that have sought to interpret its text, and a brief evaluation of how the Clause may be subject to
limitation by other constitutional principles.16 In addition, and in light of the discretionary nature
of the power, an assessment of House and Senate practice is necessary for a full understanding of
the expulsion power.17

8 Powell, 395 U.S. at 489–90.
9 Id. at 490.
10 Id. at 492.
11 Id. at 492–93.
12 Id. at 512.
13 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972).
14 Powell, 395 U.S. at 522 (“[T]he Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any person, duly elected
by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.”).
15 Id. at 510.
16 See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 10 (2015) (concluding that “to determine” the meaning of the Constitution, one
must “examine[] the Constitution’s text and structure, as well as precedent and history bearing on the question.”).
17 See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (noting that “[l]ong settled and established practice is a
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer
, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon
them.”).
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Text of the Constitution
The Expulsion Clause states that “[e]ach House may [ . . . ] punish its Members for disorderly
Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”18 Thus, the sole textual
standard expressly imposed by the Constitution requires that expulsion of a Member of Congress
requires “the Concurrence of two-thirds”—thereby mirroring the supermajority vote threshold by
which the Senate may remove officials in the executive and judicial branches of government
through the impeachment process.19 While the Expulsion Clause does not specify the measure of
the two-thirds majority, the standard is generally understood to be assessed relative to the number
of Members of that body who are present and voting.20
Historical Background
Like other constitutional provisions relating to the powers and privileges of the Congress,21 the
origins of the Expulsion Clause lay with the practices of the English Parliament.22 The English
House of Commons historically exercised an inherent authority to expel members by a simple
majority vote.23 That power was viewed as one to be wielded at the body’s “absolute discretion”
with few recognized limitations, and as a result, it was historically utilized more liberally in
England than it has been used in the United States.24 Moreover, the expulsion power was used in
a relatively ad hoc manner with, for example, no established standards governing the type of
conduct warranting expulsion.25 As a result, hundreds of members were expelled from Parliament
prior to the turn of the 19th century on grounds ranging from publishing slanderous writings to
treason.26 Early parliamentary expulsions were motivated not only by a desire to preserve the
integrity of the legislative process, but also to expel unpopular or dissenting legislators for
political or religious reasons.27
One contemporary English expulsion case that influenced the members of the U.S. Constitutional
Convention was that of John Wilkes.28 Wilkes was a Member of Parliament who in 1763
criticized the King’s peace treaty with France.29 Wilkes was arrested, expelled from the House of
Commons, and fled into exile. He later returned to England and was reelected to Parliament in

18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
19 See GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power To Expel, To Exclude and To Punish,
41 FORDHAM L. REV. 43, 48 n.37 (1972) (citing JAMES C. KIRBY, JR., CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 204 (1st ed.
1970).
20 14 Deschler’s Precedents ch. 30, § 5.2; WILLIAM BROWN, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS,
AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE, ch. 58, § 28 (2011).
21 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (authorizing each house to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings”); id.
(authorizing each house to “punish its Members”); id. art. I, § 6, cl.1 (providing that “for any speech or Debate”
Members “shall not be questioned in any other Place”).
22 For a discussion of the exercise of the expulsion power by the House of Commons, see DORIAN BOWMAN & JUDITH
FARRIS BOWMAN, Article 1, Section 5: Congress’ Power to Expel-An Exercise in Self-Restraint, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1071, 1073–83 (1978).
23 See 1 JOSEPH S. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 837 (Cambridge: Brown,
Shattuck & Co. 1833) (hereinafter “STORY”); Benjamin Cassady, “You’ve Got Your Crook, I’ve Got Mine”: Why the
Disqualification Clause Doesn’t (Always) Disqualify
, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 209, 243 (2014).
24 BOWMAN & BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 1083.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1074.
27 Id. at 1073–78.
28 Cassady, supra note 23, at 222–49.
29 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527 (1969).
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1768, only to be convicted of seditious libel and again expelled from the House.30 Wilkes was
repeatedly reelected, but each time Parliament excluded him, prevented him from taking his seat,
and ultimately declared him ineligible for reelection.31 Wilkes was finally permitted to serve
following his election in 1774, after which the House of Commons expunged his expulsions and
exclusions, acknowledging that it had acted in a manner “‘subversive of the rights of the whole
body of electors of this kingdom.’”32
The English precedents and traditions concerning expulsion were incorporated into the
proceedings of the colonial legislatures, where legislators were expelled for an equally wide array
of reasons.33 But the Wilkes case had a “significant impact in the American colonies,” and after
the Revolution, “few expulsions occurred in the new state legislatures.”34 Indeed, the abuse of the
expulsion power by the House of Commons in the Wilkes case likely led to the two predominant
constitutional restrictions on each house’s authority to judge its membership and discipline its
members: constitutionally fixed qualifications for service in the House and Senate and a two-
thirds supermajority requirement to expel a Member.35
There was, however, no significant debate on the Expulsion Clause at the Constitutional
Convention.36 Some insight, however, can be gleaned from the drafting history. Early draft
versions of the Expulsion Clause, first arising from the Convention’s Committee of Detail,37
distinguished between the power to expel and the power to punish members for “disorderly
Behaviour.”38 Based on earlier draft versions, it appears that the “disorderly Behaviour” language
was entirely separate from, and therefore inapplicable to, the power to expel.39 It was not until
late in the Convention’s consideration of the provision that the body approved the two-thirds
requirement for expulsion. James Madison recommended the addition, noting that “the right of
expulsion was too important to be exercised by a bare majority . . . .”40 No mention was made at
the Convention in regards to the type of misconduct that would warrant expulsion.41 Accordingly,
it appears that the Founders viewed the chief barrier to the expulsion power’s abuse as the
procedural requirement of the approval of a supermajority of a house of Congress, as opposed to
any substantive requirement that defines what sort of conduct warrants expulsion.42

30 Id.
31 Id. at 528.
32 Id. (quoting 22 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1411 (William Cobbett ed., T.C. Hansard 1814)).
33 BOWMAN & BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 1083–85.
34 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 530 (characterizing Wilkes’ struggles as a “cause celebre” for the colonists); BOWMAN &
BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 1086.
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; id. § 5, cl. 2; Cassady, supra note 23, at 242–43.
36 JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 207 (2007).
37 The Committee of Detail was appointed to draft the Constitution based on previously adopted resolutions.
38 See BOWMAN & BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 1087–90.
39 A draft presented to that committee distinguished between the power to punish and the power to expel: “Each House
shall have authority . . . to punish its own Members for disorderly Behavior. Each House may expel a Member, but not
a second time for the same Offence.” 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 156 (1911).
40 Id. at 254 (remarks of James Madison). Madison’s view won out over that of Gouverneur Morris, who was
concerned that by imposing a supermajority requirement “a few men from factious motives may keep in a member who
ought to be expelled.” Id.
41 See BOWMAN & BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 1072.
42 See 1 STORY supra note 23, § 835 (noting that the expulsion power “might be exerted for mere purposes of faction or
party, to remove a patriot, or to aid a corrupt measure; and it has therefore been wisely guarded by the restriction, that
(continued...)
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Judicial Interpretations of the Expulsion Clause
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have not decided a case directly bearing on the
expulsion of a Member of Congress, although judicial discussions of the expulsion power have
developed in dicta.43 The Supreme Court has stated, for example, that Congress’s expulsion
power “extends to all cases where the offence is such as in the judgment of the Senate is
inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member.”44 The Court highlighted that a Member’s
conduct could be subject to legislative discipline even if “[i]t was not a statutable offence nor was
it committed in his official character, nor was it committed during the session of Congress, nor at
the seat of government.”45 The Court has also emphasized that the House and Senate may
exercise the expulsion power exclusively, such that any prosecution by the executive of related
offenses by the Member do not interfere with Congress’s power to expel.46 These relatively few
statements suggest a broad view of the expulsion power.
A likely explanation for the lack of judicial precedent directly addressing questions arising under
the Expulsion Clause may be found in the political question doctrine, a principle stemming from
the Constitution’s separation of powers.47 Courts have declined to decide cases involving
“political questions,” which are controversies where there is a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”48 In this vein, courts have been
cognizant that the expulsion power, as a form of legislative discipline, exists separately from civil
or criminal liability and empowers the respective houses of Congress to maintain the integrity and
dignity of the legislature itself and its proceedings.49
The Supreme Court has reflected this reasoning in some of the cases that have touched on the
Expulsion Clause. For example, in 1897, the Court discussed the Expulsion Power in a case of a
petitioner convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions during a congressional
investigation of potential misconduct of Members of Congress.50 The Court acknowledged the
broad power to discipline Members held by the houses of Congress and the discretion with which
they could exercise that power, ultimately declining to “encroach upon the province of that

there shall be a concurrence of two thirds of the members, to justify an expulsion”). The Expulsion Clause does not, for
example, contain explicit substantive limiting language similar to that found in the Constitution’s impeachment and
removal provisions, which restrict the exercise of that authority to only that conduct which amounts to “Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
43 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669–71 (1897) (discussing expulsion authority of Congress in the context of a
petitioner convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions during a congressional investigation);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506–11 (1969) (discussing the distinction between the exclusion of Members-
elect based on qualifications for office and the expulsion of seated Members based on misconduct).
44 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 669–70 (citing 1 STORY supra note 23 § 838). One scholar has examined the relationship
between the removal authority conferred by the Constitution for purposes of impeachment to the removal authority
conferred by the Expulsion Clause, discussing arguments for and against holding the separate branches of government
accountable to similar standards of conduct. See McLaughlin, supra note 19 at 50.
45 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 670.
46 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 368–70 (1906).
47 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of
the separation of powers.”).
48 Id. at 217.
49 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 668 (noting that the power of houses of Congress to discipline their Members
through expulsion or other means constitutes an exercise of their “inherent power of self-protection” that may be used
to prevent Members’ behavior from “destroy[ing] public confidence in the body”).
50 Id. at 664.
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body.”51 In another example, the Court recognized that the standards by which expulsion may
occur are at the “almost unbridled discretion” of Congress in a criminal case against a Senator
involving congressional privileges.52 The Court further noted that Members who are subject to
legislative discipline are “judged by no specifically articulated standards” that are applied by a
body “from whose decision there is no established right of review.”53 The Court also discussed
justiciability in Powell v. McCormack, after determining that the House’s attempt to bar a
Member’s service constituted an exclusion rather than expulsion.54 The Court generally
recognized that the exclusion at issue in the case was justiciable because “the Constitution leaves
the House without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets
all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.”55 In a concurring
opinion, however, Justice William O. Douglas noted that, “if this were an expulsion case I would
think that no justiciable controversy would be presented.”56
There have been no cases in which Members of Congress who were expelled challenged the
expulsion decision itself in court. Some Members who have faced disciplinary proceedings under
the Expulsion Clause have attempted to challenge the disciplinary measures through judicial
review, but the lower courts have consistently declined to consider the claims, citing separation of
powers concerns.57 For example, in United States v. Traficant, a Member of the House of
Representatives was both convicted by a jury of criminal charges related to his service in
Congress and subsequently found by the House Ethics Committee to have violated the House’s
internal rules of conduct, resulting in his eventual expulsion.58 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) rejected the Member’s claim that he could not be punished through
both a criminal trial and legislative discipline because of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
prohibition. According to the Member’s argument, “he was twice placed in jeopardy: first, when
the House of Representatives initiated hearings that included the possibility of his
imprisonment [ . . . ] and second, after Congress had already expelled him, when the district court
ordered his imprisonment.”59 The Sixth Circuit concluded that both branches have distinct
authority to punish behavior of Members that can be exercised independent of the other.60
Likewise, in Rangel v. Boehner, a Member of the House of Representatives who the House had
censured (a disciplinary action also authorized under the Expulsion Clause) for various ethical
violations sought judicial review of the House’s action, alleging procedural improprieties violated
House Rules and his due process rights.61 The court rejected the justiciability of the Member’s

51 Id. at 670.
52 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972).
53 Id.
54 Powell, 395 U.S. at 516.
55 Id. at 522.
56 Id. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting the difference in justiciability of a case of exclusion of a Member-elect
compared to a case of expulsion of a Member for misconduct).
57 See United States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2004); Rangel v. Boehner, 20 F. Supp. 3d 148, 167–68
(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 785 F.3d 19 (2015) (noting that the district court dismissed the complaint on
numerous jurisdictional grounds and recognizing that it needed only to affirm one of those grounds, relying upon the
Speech and Debate Clause as “the simplest ground” upon which to affirm).
58 Traficant, 368 F.3d at 648-49.
59 Id. at 649 (citation omitted).
60 Id. at 650–52 (noting Supreme Court precedent recognizing that the Expulsion Clause grants Congress exclusive
authority to discipline its members) (citing Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369 (1906)).
61 Rangel, 785 F.3d at 21–22.
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lawsuit.62 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the House’s decision to
discipline the Member for his conduct was a political question63 and concluded that such review
of Congress’s exercise of the discretion afforded it under the Expulsion Clause was “a classic
example of a demonstrable textual commitment to another branch of government” that is
synonymous with the political question doctrine.64
Possible External Constitutional Limitations
Despite the Court’s general view that the Expulsion Clause vests each house of Congress with a
broad and discretionary power to expel its own Members that federal courts generally will not
question, it could be argued that the Constitution imposes other constraints on the use of the
expulsion power that could raise justiciable matters.65
For example, it could be asserted that judicial review is proper with respect to exercises of the
expulsion power that conflict with other provisions of the Constitution. The most prominent
argument that has been made is that the expulsion power could conflict with the right of a
Member’s constituency to choose their own representative. Under Article I, the House “shall be
composed of Members chosen . . . by the People”66 and, under the Seventeenth Amendment, the
Senate “shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .”67
This argument has principally arisen when the House or Senate has considered expelling a
Member for misconduct that occurred prior to an election and was known to the Member’s
constituency when they elected him to office.68 To exercise the power of expulsion in such a
scenario, the body might, in the words of a House Report, “abuse its high prerogative, and []
might exceed the just limitations of its constitutional authority by seeking to substitute its
standards and ideals for the standards and ideals of the constituency of the Member who had
deliberately chosen him to be their Representative.”69 No court, however, has held that there are
external constraints to the expulsion power, and such a view may be in tension with the text and
intent of the Clause, which has generally been viewed as vesting broad power in both the House
and the Senate.70
Questions may also be raised as to whether the exercise of the expulsion power may be limited by
other external constitutional restraints, like the Constitution’s individual rights provisions. For
example, the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause could be
viewed to prevent both the House and the Senate from making discriminatory expulsion

62 Id.; Rangel v. Boehner, 20 F. Supp. 3d 148, 157 (D.D.C. 2013).
63 Rangel, 20 F. Supp. at 168 (citing United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)). See also id. (“[J]udicial intervention
in this context is only ‘appropriate where the rights of persons other than members of Congress are jeopardized by
Congressional failure to follow its own procedures.’”).
64 Id. at 168–69.
65 The political question doctrine has, at times, given way in light of claims that violations of fundamental rights would
otherwise go unresolved without judicial involvement. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 229; Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
538, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Judicial abstention on political question grounds has similarly been found inappropriate
when individual rights in domestic affairs are at stake . . . .”).
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
67 Id. amend. XVII (emphasis added).
68 See H.R. REP. No. 96-351, at 3 (1981) (noting that Member Diggs’ counsel argued that the “power to expel . . .
conflicted with the right of his constituency”).
69 H.R. REP. NO. 63-570, at 5 (1914).
70 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 669; BOWMAN & BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 1089–90; 1 STORY supra note 23 §
836.
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decisions, such as on the basis of the Member’s race.71 No court has previously considered this
precise question, but the Supreme Court has held that other discretionary internal congressional
powers are limited by the Constitution’s individual rights provisions.72
Other arguments could be made for judicial review of certain expulsions—for example a scenario
in which a house seats an elected Member and then immediately expels that individual—if the
expulsion functioned like an exclusion of a Member through the imposition of additional
qualifications in violation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Powell.73 For example, if the House
or Senate immediately expelled a new Member because he had a previous criminal conviction,
that action could be seen as adding a non-constitutional qualification for election to Congress, i.e.,
that a Member not have previously been convicted of a crime. Nonetheless, while it is true that
Powell prohibits the House or Senate from imposing upon Members additional qualifications
beyond those standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution with respect to exclusion, the
opinion also drew a rather formalist distinction between exclusions and expulsions that may cast
doubt on this argument.74 Specifically, the Court rejected the respondent’s “attempt to equate
exclusion with expulsion,” reasoning that “exclusion and expulsion are not fungible
proceedings.”75 The Powell Court largely deferred to the House in determining what
constitutional provision it was proceeding under, holding: The Speaker ruled that House
Resolution No. 278 contemplated an exclusion proceeding. We must reject respondents’
suggestion that we overrule the Speaker and hold that, although the House manifested an intent to
exclude Powell, its action should be tested by whatever standards may govern an expulsion.76
If the Court were unwilling to hold that an exclusion was in effect an expulsion, it would seem
reasonable to assert that it would be equally unwilling to accept that an expulsion was in effect an
exclusion.
Historical Practice Related to Grounds for Expulsion
In light of the scant evidence of the Expulsion Clause’s historical basis and the limited judicial
precedent in interpreting the Clause, Congress’s own treatment of its expulsion power may play
an important role in delineating the contours of the Clause. House and Senate practice has
interpretive import for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has suggested that “[i]n the
performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially
interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect
from the others.”77 Thus, it would seem that as a general matter, Congress’s view of the scope of
its own expulsion power is an important starting point for the proper interpretation of the

71 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72 In United States v. Ballin, the Court held that, while the House’s rulemaking power was broad, in exercising that
power, the House “may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.” 144 U.S. 1, 5
(1892). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135 (1966) (holding that an exclusion by a state legislature for comments
criticizing the Vietnam War violated the First Amendment). The same limit may be applicable to the expulsion power
if judicial review is not barred in a given case by the political question doctrine or the Speech or Debate Clause. See
generally McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 50–51.
73 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506–12 (1969). In Powell, the Court held that judicial review of the Powell
exclusion was not barred by the political question doctrine because the Constitution permits the House and Senate to
judge only those standing qualifications prescribed in Article I of the Constitution. Id. at 550.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 508, 512.
76 Id. at 512.
77 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
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Expulsion Clause.78 Second, the Supreme Court has often treated historical practice as an
“important interpretive factor” in construing constitutional provisions.79
However, it should be noted that the extent that practice provides an interpretive gloss on
constitutional text often varies depending on whether the practice is “long settled and
established.”80 As will be discussed in more detail below, little about the margins of the House
and Senate’s expulsion power is settled, especially, for example, with regard to the question of
whether each house may expel a Member for conduct occurring prior to an intervening election.81
While House and Senate practice may not necessarily constitute legal precedent, it nevertheless
may establish procedural and parliamentary norms, and—to the extent that a court has the
opportunity to evaluate the Clause—may have some influence on how a court construes the reach
of the expulsion power.82 Moreover, even if not legally binding, historical practice may guide
both the House and Senate in making their own decisions about how to wield their own
authority.83
Instances of Expulsion of Members of Congress for Misconduct
That Occurred While in Office
Although the expulsion power has been described as broad by the Supreme Court, expulsion
cases have been rare.84 In total, 20 Members of Congress have been actually expelled from their
respective bodies—5 in the House85 and 15 in the Senate.86 While the grounds for these
expulsions may illustrate the potential bases upon which the House or Senate may decide to expel
a Member, as historical practice, they are not necessarily the exclusive grounds for expulsion. The
grounds upon which the power may be exercised are left to the discretion of the respective bodies
of Congress, though legal commentary indicates that the bodies should act judiciously in

78 See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013) (interpreting Nixon as
holding that “each branch of government is empowered to interpret the Constitution in the first instance when defining
and performing its own constitutional duties, and that one branch’s interpretation of its own powers is due deference
from the others.”).
79 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014). See also House. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1259
(2022) (relying on historical legislative practice in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a censure issued by a local
board).
80 The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929).
81 See 1 STORY supra note 23 § 838 (noting that questions regarding what conduct may be punished and what
punishment may be applied “do not appear to have been settled by any authoritative adjudication of either house of
[C]ongress”); see also Timothy Zick, The Consent of the Governed: Recall of United States Senators, 103 DICK. L.
REV. 567, 596 (1999) (“There continues to be much confusion concerning the proper boundaries of the power to
expel.”). Moreover, Congress has, at times, disclaimed that its expulsion decisions have been based on constitutional
interpretation. See infra note 110.
82 Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126, 147 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting that “although the precedents are not uniform, the
history of the House of Representatives supports the conclusion that the House may act unilaterally to fix the role
Delegates are to play in the operation of this chamber.”).
83 See 1 Deschler’s Precedents, vi (noting that “the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its
precedents”).
84 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897).
85 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF CONDUCT CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1798–2004 (2004), https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/
Historical_Chart_Final_Version%20in%20Word_0.pdf.
86 SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, EXPULSION AND CENSURE https://www.cop.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm (last accessed Dec. 26, 2017).
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exercising that power.87 Expulsion, according to that understanding, is “‘in its very nature
discretionary, that is, it is impossible to specify beforehand all the causes for which a member
ought to be expelled; and, therefore, in the exercise of this power, in each particular case, a
legislative body should be governed by the strictest justice.’”88 Expulsion has not been
understood to apply automatically in cases of any particular conduct of Members.89
Thus, in light of historical practice, the predominant basis upon which both the House and Senate
have exercised their power to expel Members is disloyalty to the United States. In fact, 18 of the
20 expulsions in congressional history were based on the Members’ disloyalty to the United
States.90 The earliest expulsion case in 1797 involved a Senator who “concocted a scheme for
Indians and frontiersmen to attack Spanish Florida and Louisiana, in order to transfer those
territories to Great Britain” for his own financial gain.91 The Senate special committee that was
appointed to investigate the matter recommended expulsion, describing the Senator’s conduct as
“entirely inconsistent with his public trust,” and the full Senate subsequently voted to expel the
Member by a vote of 25–1.92
The majority of expulsion cases based on disloyalty to the United States—17 of the 18—arose in
the context of the secession of the Confederate states during the earliest years of the Civil War.93
In early 1861, the Senate considered the status of Members representing states that were
contemplating secession, ultimately expelling 10 Members in a single vote after the war had
begun.94 In those cases, the Members represented southern states that had seceded from the
Union, and the Members had not formally resigned from the Senate. The expulsion resolution
cited the Members’ failure to appear in the Senate and alleged that the Members “are engaged in
said conspiracy for the destruction of the Union and Government, or, with full knowledge of such
conspiracy, have failed to advise the Government of its progress or aid in its suppression.”95 Other
examples of Civil War expulsions involved Members who represented states that had not seceded,
but who themselves had supported secessionists.96
For more than a century following the Civil War expulsions, neither the House nor the Senate
expelled a Member. The two most recent expulsions—both Members of the House—concerned a
broader range of behavior, beyond disloyalty to the country, for which Congress would expel one

87 See 3 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 12, § 13.
88 Id. (quoting CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA § 625 (2d ed. 1866)).
89 Legislative discipline for Members who have been convicted of a crime requires the House or Senate to affirmatively
act in response to that Member’s behavior. See 3 Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 12, § 13 (noting that Congress normally
will wait “to consider expulsion until the judicial processes have been exhausted”). See also Burton v. United States,
202 U.S. 344, 369–70 (1906).
90 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF CONDUCT CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1798–2004 (2004), https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/
Historical_Chart_Final_Version%20in%20Word_0.pdf; SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, EXPULSION AND CENSURE
https://www.cop.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm (last accessed Dec. 26,
2017).
91 United States Senate: Election, Expulsion, and Censure Cases 1793–1990, S. DOC. NO. 103-33, at 13 (1995).
92 Id. at 13–14.
93 See generally SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, THE CIVIL WAR SENATE REACTS TO SECESSION,
https://www.cop.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/expulsion_cases/CivilWar_Expulsion.htm (last accessed
Dec. 26, 2017).
94 S. DOC. NO. 103-33, at 95–98. Prior to the beginning of the Civil War in April 1861, the Senate considered expelling
a number of Members representing southern states, but instead only declared those seats to be vacant. See id. at 89–90.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., id. at 102–107.
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of its Members. Those expulsions resulted after the Representatives were convicted of criminal
charges under various public corruption statutes.97 In 1980, a Member was expelled following a
criminal conviction on charges relating to receiving a payment in return for promising to use
official influence on legislation in the so-called ABSCAM98 investigation.99 The most recent
expulsion occurred in 2002, when the House expelled a Member who had been convicted of
various criminal charges relating to his official actions in Congress, including bribery, illegal
gratuities, obstruction of justice, defrauding the government, filing false tax returns, and
racketeering.100
It should be noted that in a number of cases, Members’ behavior has drawn public calls for
expulsion or preliminary proceedings by the respective house toward potential expulsion, but
ultimately resulted in the Member resigning prior to a formal decision to expel.101 It is unclear
how much weight should be given to such cases or what cases appropriately qualify as relevant to
consider the expulsion power.102 To the extent such cases are relevant, Members have resigned
facing formal expulsion inquiries or even recommendations for expulsion for conduct during their
time in office.103 In the Senate, one such example occurred in 1995 when the Select Committee on
Ethics recommended expelling a Member following its investigation of allegations of sexual
misconduct, misuse of official staff, and attempts to interfere with the committee’s inquiry.104 In
the House, for example, the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct recommended expelling
a Member for conduct violations related to activities that also resulted in the Member’s criminal
conviction for accepting illegal gratuities, illegal trafficking, and obstruction of justice.105
Misconduct Occurring Prior to Election or Reelection as Potential
Grounds for Expulsion
As discussed above, the text of the Expulsion Clause, its history, and subsequent historical
practice all support a broad, but not unlimited, power in both the House and Senate to expel
Members for conduct occurring during a Member’s term of office. However, whether the House
and Senate have authority to expel a Member for conduct that solely occurred prior to an
intervening election appears to be unresolved. House and Senate practice (drawn primarily from
committee reports relating to expulsion resolutions that were either not approved or not acted
upon by the full body) concerning expulsions for prior misconduct are relatively inconsistent and

97 H.R. 495, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 794, 96th Cong. (1980).
98 See HISTORY: FAMOUS CASES & CRIMINALS, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam (last visited Dec. 13,
2017).
99 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1387, at 1–5 (1980); H.R. 794, 96th Cong. (1980).
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 107-594, at 1–2 (2002); H.R. 495, 107th Cong. (2002); see also United States v. Traficant,
368 F.3d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 2004).
101 The House Rules note an example in which the Speaker of the House advised a Member who was facing
disciplinary proceedings that he should resign, but also note that “this is not usual.” H.R. DOC. No. 114-192, at 28
(2017). The House did not identify which case it was relying upon in this example.
102 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of
Powers,
105 GEO. L.J. 255, 262 (2017) (“Although courts and government officials commonly employ the historical
gloss approach . . . , the contours of the approach are not fully defined. There is no precise metric for knowing what
constitutes qualifying practice or how long it must be followed in order to be credited.”); Martin S. Flaherty, Post-
Originalism
, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (2001) (“As a theoretical matter, custom has its own problems. Not least
among these are the questions of what counts as the relevant custom, at what level of generality, and for how long.”).
103 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-137 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 100-506 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 97-110 (1981).
104 S. REP. NO. 104-137, at 1–2 (1995).
105 H.R. REP. NO. 100-506, at 1–2 (1988).
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do not appear to establish a clear and constant interpretation of whether prior conduct (i.e.,
conduct occurring before an intervening election)106 may form the basis for an expulsion.107 While
the reasoning underlying the House and Senate approach to expulsions for prior misconduct does
not appear to be uniform, and thus may have limited value in discerning the meaning of the
constitutional power,108 there is some evidence to suggest that both the House and the Senate
have, on occasion, “distrusted their power” to expel for such conduct.109 While there has been
some disagreement over the question, it would appear that when this “distrust” manifests itself
through the adoption of a more restrictive interpretation of the expulsion power, it is generally
grounded more in considerations of policy than of constitutional authority.110
On occasions in which House or Senate action appears to suggest that the body is reticent to expel
a Member for conduct that occurred prior to election, the cited justification generally relates to a
reluctance to supplant the judgment of the duly elected Member’s constituency with that of a
supermajority of the body. That justification is strongest when the Member’s constituency is fully
aware of the prior misconduct, but nevertheless chooses to elect the Member to represent them.111

106 Both bodies have, at times, distinguished between (1) conduct occurring during a Member’s previous term of office
and (2) conduct (either private or public) that occurred prior to the Member’s first election to Congress. See e.g., S.
REP. NO. 77-1010, at 6 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 42-81, at 13 (1872). However, to the extent that the justification for not
expelling a Member for conduct that occurred prior to his last election rests on a reluctance to overturn the decision of
the voters, this report treats the two groups of prior conduct similarly.
107 See Memorandum to Hon. Louis Stokes, Chairman, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, reprinted in H.R.
REP. NO. 97-110, at 156 (1981); 2 Hinds’ Precedents § 1283–89 (discussing precedents dealing with the question of
expulsion for conduct “committed before election.”).
108 See supra notes 77–83. But see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (noting that “this Court has treated
practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute”).
109 See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. DOC. NO. 96-398, at 27 (1981). The House Manual no longer
contains this statement. See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. DOC. No. 114-192, at 28–9 (2017). See also
H.R. REP. No. 56-85, at 4 (1900) (“Both Houses have many times refused to expel where the guilt of the Member was
apparent; where the refusal to expel was put upon the ground that the House or Senate, as the case might be, had no
right to expel for an act unrelated to the Member as such, or because it was committed prior to his election.”) Yet, it
appears that neither the House or the Senate has previously expelled a Member for conduct that solely occurred prior to
the Member’s election to Congress. It can, however, be difficult to identify the specific date that misconduct giving rise
to an expulsion occurred. For example, there is some ambiguity with regard to the timing of the conduct giving rise to
the expulsion of Senator William Blount. However, a subsequent Senate report determined the offending conduct to
have occurred after his first election, and also noted that “we have not been able to find a single case of expulsion
where the crime or gross impropriety occurred outside of the time of membership.” S. REP. No. 77-1010, at 6 (1942).
Similarly, the report recommending the expulsion of Senator Waldo Johnson, which was ultimately approved by the
Senate, made reference to that fact that “[p]revious to his election to the Senate Mr. Johnson was known in Missouri, as
entertaining secession proclivities,” but it does not appear that that statement represented the sole grounds for the
expulsion. S. REP. No. 37-5 (1862). In the case of Senator Robert Packwood, a Senate Committee recommended
expulsion on grounds that included prior misconduct, but the Senator resigned before the full Senate took action on
those recommendations. See S. REP. No. 104-137, at 9–11 (1995). Similarly, in the House, Raymond Lederer resigned
after a committee recommended his expulsion for conduct that occurred prior to his last election. H.R. REP. No. 97-110,
at 17 (1981).
110 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 63-570, at 4–5 (1914) (noting the distinction between questions of “power” and questions of
“policy” and concluding that, “[a]s a matter of sound policy, this extraordinary prerogative of the House, in our
judgment, should be exercised only in extreme cases”); H.R. REP NO. 96-351, at 4–5 (1981) (noting that “power is not
to be confused with policy or discretion”); S. REP. NO. 104-137, at 7–8 (1995) (noting that “[t]here have been
indications that the Senate, in an expulsion case, might not exercise its disciplinary discretion with regard to conduct in
which an individual had engaged before the time he or she had been a member.”).
111 See Memorandum to Hon. Louis Stokes, Chairman, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct reprinted in H.R.
REP. NO. 97-110, at 156–57 (1981) (noting that with regard to expulsion for prior conduct “the issue ultimately is one
of Congressional policy, and not Constitutional power”). “Indeed, the House precedents against punishment for prior
misconduct have sometimes been characterized as constituting a doctrine of ‘forgiveness,’ resting on the assumption
(continued...)
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In short, the body must balance its interest in “assur[ing] the integrity of its legislative
performance and its institutional acceptability to the people at large as a serious and responsible
instrument of government,”112 with a respect for the electoral decisions of the voting public and
deference traditionally paid to the popular will and choice of the people.113 This view is consistent
with James Madison’s statements in the Federalist Papers that “frequent elections” would be the
chief means of ensuring “virtuous” legislators.114 It also finds support in Justice Joseph Story’s
early view that although the expulsion power was both necessary and critical to the integrity of
each house, exercise of the power was “at the same time so subversive of the rights of the
people,” as to require that it be used sparingly and to be “wisely guarded” by the required
approval of a two-thirds majority.115
Congress’s attempt to balance the interests in preserving the integrity of the House and Senate
with the desire to avoid supplanting the will of the people, however interpreted and applied, does
not appear to be based on a clear constitutional prescription. This distinction was perhaps best
articulated in a frequently cited 1914 House Judiciary Report:
In the judgment of your committee, the power of the House to expel or punish by censure
a Member for misconduct occurring before his election or in a preceding or former
Congress is sustained by the practice of the House, sanctioned by reason and sound policy
and in extreme cases is absolutely essential to enable the House to exclude from its
deliberations and councils notoriously corrupt men, who have unexpectedly and suddenly
dishonored themselves and betrayed the public by acts and conduct rendering them
unworthy of the high position of honor and trust reposed in them . . . .
But in considering this question and in arriving at the conclusions we have reached, we
would not have you unmindful of the fact that we have been dealing with the question
merely as one of power, and it should not be confused with the question of policy also
involved. As a matter of sound policy, this extraordinary prerogative of the House, in our
judgment, should be exercised only in extreme cases and always with great caution and
after due circumspection, and should be invoked with greatest caution where the acts of
misconduct complained of had become public previous to and were generally known at the
time of the Member’s election.116
However, to confirm the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with congressional views on this
question, that same report then implicitly suggested that there may be some form of constitutional
limit at play. The report noted that to exercise the power of expulsion in a case in which the
misconduct was generally known at the time of the Member’s election, the House “might abuse
its high prerogative, and in our opinion might exceed the just limitations of its constitutional
authority
by seeking to substitute its standards and ideals for the standards and ideals of the
constituency of the Member who had deliberately chosen him to be their Representative.”117

that the electorate, knowing full well of the Member’s misconduct, has consciously chosen to forgive those acts and
return him to the House.” Id. at 157.
112 Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (McGowan, J., concurring).
113 See 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 257 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1836) (statement of Alexander Hamilton) (“After all, sir, we must submit to
this idea, that the true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.
Representation is imperfect proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government,
popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed.”).
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
115 1 STORY supra note 23 § 837.
116 H.R. REP. No. 63-570, at 4–5 (1914) (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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Expulsion for Prior Misconduct in the House
The question of whether the power to expel extends to misconduct that occurred prior to a
Member’s election (or reelection) has been explored more thoroughly in the House than in the
Senate.118 As early as 1884, Speaker John G. Carlisle responded to a proposed House
investigation of alleged misconduct that occurred prior to a Member’s election by stating that
“this House has no right to punish a Member for any offense alleged to have been committed
previous to the time when he was elected as a member of the House. That has been so frequently
decided in the House that it is no longer a matter of dispute.”119 It is not clear whether the Speaker
was referencing the expulsion power specifically, or the House’s power to discipline its members
more generally.
Regardless, there, in fact, has been some divergence of views on whether a Member can be
expelled for prior misconduct.120 The existing interpretations were highlighted in 1872 by the
opposing conclusions drawn by two House committees investigating Members Oakes Ames and
James Brooks for their role in the Credit Mobilier scandal.121 The alleged misconduct had
occurred “four or five years” prior to being brought to the attention of the House and before the
Members had been elected to Congress.122
A special committee found that the House had authority to expel a Member for conduct occurring
in a prior Congress, and before an intervening election, and recommended that the House exercise
that power with respect to Ames and Brooks.123 The report concluded that the Constitution placed
“no qualification [on] the [expulsion] power” and assigned no restriction as to when an offense
that warranted expulsion had to occur.124 The committee interpreted the expulsion power to have
no apparent limit, reasoning that although inappropriate, “[i]f two-thirds of the House shall see fit
to expel a man . . . without any reason at all . . . they have the power, and there is no remedy
except by appeal to the people.”125 The committee also addressed whether the expulsion power
authorized the House to override the will of a Member’s constituency, who, with full knowledge
of the questionable conduct, chose to elect him as their representative:
The committee have no occasion in this report to discuss the question as to the power or
duty of the House in a case where a constituency, with a full knowledge of the objectionable
character of a man, have selected him to be to their representative. It is hardly a case to be
supposed that any constituency, with a full knowledge that a man had been guilty of an
offense involving moral turpitude, would elect him. The majority of the committee are not
prepared to concede such a man could be forced upon the House, and would not consider

118 In addition to the examples discussed below, Hinds lists a number of precedents relating to the House’s power to
expel a Member for prior conduct. 2 Hinds’ Precedents §§ 1283–1289. For example, in 1799, the House declined to
expel Matthew Lyon for an offense which had been committed while he was a Member of the House but before his last
election. 2 Hinds’ Precedents § 1284. In 1858, the House laid on the table a committee report concluding that it was
“inexpedient” for the House to take action against O.B. Matteson for known misconduct prior to an election. 2 Hinds’
Precedents § 1285. In 1876, the House declined to take action against Members William S. King and John G.
Schumaker for violations of law committed in a preceding Congress. 2 Hinds’ Precedents § 1283.
119 H.R. REP. NO. 69-30, at 1–2 (1925).
120 The House and Senate power to discipline their members generally includes the authority to censure, reprimand,
fine, or expel. See CHAFETZ, supra note 36, at 210.
121 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 42-77 (1872), with H.R. REP. NO. 42-81 (1872). The Credit Mobilier scandal involved the
sale of shares of stock to Members at below market rates. See CHAFETZ, supra note 36, at 221.
122 H.R. REP. No. 63-570, at 3 (1914).
123 H.R. REP. No. 42-77, at XIX (1872).
124 Id. at XIV.
125 Id. at XVII.
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the expulsion of such a man any violation of the rights of the electors, for while the electors
have rights that should be respected, the House as a body has rights also that should be
protected and preserved.126
The House Judiciary Committee reached a different conclusion with respect to Ames and Oakes,
however, adopting a much narrower view of the expulsion power.127 According to the Committee,
so long as a Member “does nothing which is disorderly or renders him unfit to be in the House
while a member thereof . . . the House has no right or legal constitutional jurisdiction or power to
expel the member.”128 In support of this conclusion, the Committee also addressed the right of the
Member’s constituency, noting:
This is a Government of the people, which assumes that they are the best judges of the
social, intellectual, and moral qualifications of their Representatives whom they are to
choose, not anybody else to choose for them . . . .129
Ultimately, the House chose to censure, rather than expel, Ames and Brooks.130 However, in
adopting the censure resolution, the House specifically refused to agree to a preamble that
asserted that “grave doubts exist as to the rightful exercise by this House of its power to expel a
Member for offenses committed by such Member long before his election thereto and not
connected with such election.”131
Other House examples, however, suggest that the House has viewed itself, at times, as lacking the
power to expel a Member for misconduct occurring prior to the individual’s last election.132 The
House Rules Manual, for example, reflects different interpretations. The Manual previously
provided that “both Houses have distrusted their power to punish in such cases,” though it no
longer makes such a statement.133 Similarly, a House select committee investigating the possible
expulsion of John W. Langley stated in 1925 that “with practical uniformity the precedents in
such cases are to the effect that the House will not expel a Member for reprehensible action prior
to his election as a Member . . . .”134 A 1972 House report similarly noted that “[p]recedents,
without known exception, hold that the House will not act in any way against a Member for any
actions of which his electorate had full knowledge at the time of his election. The committee feels
that these precedents are proper and should in no way be altered.”135
The Supreme Court relied upon these and other House precedents in Powell.136 Although urged
by the House to view Powell’s exclusion as an expulsion, the Court would not assume that the
House would have voted to exclude Powell given that Members had “expressed a belief that such

126 Id. at XVI–XVII.
127 H.R. REP. No. 42-81, at 7–13 (1873).
128 Id. at 13.
129 Id. at 8.
130 H.R. REP. No. 63-570, at 4–5 (1914).
131 Id. at 4 (“The House ignored the recommendations of the Judiciary Committee and punished two of its Members by
censure and declined to express doubt as to its power and jurisdiction by refusing to adopt the preamble.”).
132 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 56-85, at 4 (1900) (“Both houses have many times refused to expel where . . . [the
misconduct] was committed prior to his election.”); H.R. REP. No. 94-1477, at 2 (1976) (recommending that a Member
not be expelled because a prior conviction did “not relate to his official conduct while a Member of Congress.”).
133 Compare Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. DOC. No. 96-398, at 27 (1981), with Rules of the House of
Representatives, H.R. DOC. No. 114-192, at 28–29 (2017).
134 H.R. REP. No. 69-30, at 1–2 (1925).
135 H.R. REP. No. 92-1039, at 4 (1972).
136 Powell, 395 U.S. at 508–10.
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strictures [on expelling a Member for prior conduct] apply to its own power.”137 The Court
specifically stated, however, it was not ruling on the House’s authority to expel for past
misconduct.138
Two additional, more recent examples may provide additional insight into the ambiguity of the
House’s various positions on the reach of the expulsion power. In 1979, a House committee
recommended the censure of Charles C. Diggs, Jr., when he was reelected to the House after
being convicted of a criminal kickback scheme involving his congressional employees.139 In
discussing the question of the House’s authority to punish a Member for known conduct that
occurred prior to an election, the Committee noted that “the House has jurisdiction under Article
I, Section 5 to inquire into the misconduct of a Member occurring prior to his last election, and
under appropriate circumstances, to impose at least those disciplinary sanctions that fall short of
expulsion
.”140 Although perhaps questioning whether expulsion can reach prior misconduct, the
committee did not conclude that it lacked the power to expel in such a case, instead deeming it
“unwise” to “express an opinion on the Constitutional issue of whether the House has the power
to expel” for prior misconduct.141 The report added that “the House cannot overlook entirely the
reelection of Rep. Diggs following his conviction and due respect for that decision by his
constituents is a proper element in the consideration of this case.”142
In 1981, a House committee recommended the expulsion of Raymond F. Lederer for misconduct
occurring while he was a Member, but prior to his reelection to Congress.143 A grand jury indicted
Lederer in connection with the ABSCAM inquiry before his reelection, but he was not convicted
until after the voters of his district had returned him to Congress.144 As a result of this timing, the
Special Counsel to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct concluded that “the
voters did not have full knowledge of the offenses he committed at the time they reelected him,
and there appears to be no constitutional impediment to the Congressional expulsion power under
such circumstances.”145
Expulsion for Prior Misconduct in the Senate
Senate consideration of expulsion for prior misconduct appears to be less developed than in the
House.146 Such limited practice suggests that the Senate does not appear to have a clearly

137 Id. at 510.
138 Id. at 507, n.27.
139 H.R. REP. No. 96-351, at 3–5 (1979).
140 Id. at 3.
141 Id. at 5.
142 Id.
143 H.R. REP. No. 97-110, at 16 (1981).
144 Id. at 157.
145 Id. at 145. Lederer resigned before the House took action on the expulsion recommendation.
146 This lack of precedent may be due to the fact that Senators face elections less frequently (thereby reducing the
possibility of misconduct occurring prior to an intervening election) and, prior to adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, were not directly elected by the people. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. But see 41 CONG. REC. 936 (Jan. 11,
1907) (statement of Sen. Hopkins) (asserting that the William N. Roach case “settled forever the question that the
Senate will not undertake to revise the judgment of a State in determining the character of a man whom the State shall
select as a United States Senator. The Senate will content itself with what occurs while such Senator is a member of
this body.”).
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established view on whether a Member may be expelled for conduct that occurred prior to the
Member’s election to the Senate.147
In 1807, John Quincy Adams provided an early, broad conception of the Senate’s expulsion
power, writing in a committee report that “[b]y the letter of the Constitution the power of
expelling a Member is given to each of the two Houses of congress, without any limitation other
than that which requires a concurrence of two-thirds.”148 The two-thirds requirement was, in the
opinion of the committee, “a wise and sufficient guard against the possible abuse of this
legislative discretion.”149 At the same time, the report suggested that whether the public was
aware of the misconduct was significant in asserting that expulsion was the appropriate remedy
when misconduct was “suddenly and unexpectedly revealed to the world.”150
Other Senate precedents suggest that the timing of the misconduct should be viewed as one of
many factors in determining whether expulsion is appropriate. For example, as Senator-elect
Arthur R. Gould prepared to take the oath of office after being elected in 1926, allegations were
made that he engaged in bribery in connection with a Canadian railroad contract that occurred in
1911—a full 15 years earlier.151 A Senate committee investigated and recommended that the
Senate disregard all charges.152 In the committee report, a question was raised as to whether,
under the circumstances, the Senate had the authority to expel.153 Although no opinion was
expressed by the committee on the “important constitutional questions touching the power of the
Senate,” the report nevertheless stated that “the expulsion of a Member of the Senate for an
offense alleged to have been committed prior to his election must depend upon the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the particular case.”154 The full Senate later adopted the committee’s
recommendation to disregard all charges.
Perhaps the most restrictive view taken by a Senate committee of the Senate’s expulsion power
occurred not in an expulsion case, but in the exclusion case of Senator William Langer.155 Shortly
after his election to the Senate in 1941, the Senate received allegations of the Senator’s
participation in a wide variety of misconduct, including a bribery and kickback scheme during his
time as a state official.156 A Senate committee investigated the matter and in its report
recommended that Langer be excluded on the grounds that he lacked the required “moral fitness”
to be a Senator.157 The report also discussed the absence of any authority to expel Langer from the

147 One commentator has described the Senate’s power in this area as existing in a “twilight zone of the Senate’s
jurisdiction.” GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 1892 (2d ed. 1960).
For a Senate floor debate on the topic, see CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 968 (1862). In addition to the examples
discussed below, Hinds lists two precedents relating to the Senate’s power to expel a Member for prior conduct.
2 Hinds’ Precedents §§ 1288–89. In 1796, the Senate declined to pursue action against Humphrey Marshall for alleged
criminal conduct that occurred prior to his election. 2 Hinds’ Precedents § 1288. In 1893, the Senate “discussed” its
power to take action against William N. Roach who was “charged with a crime alleged to have been committed before
his election,” but ultimately concluded to take no action. 2 Hinds’ Precedents § 1289.
148 See 2 Hinds’ Precedents § 1264.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 UNITED STATES SENATE: ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND CENSURE CASES 1793–1990, S. DOC. NO. 103-33, at 334–35
(1995).
152 S. REP. No. 69-1715, at 12 (1927).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 S. REP. No. 77-1010, at 9–13 (1942).
156 UNITED STATES SENATE: ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND CENSURE CASES 1793–1990, S. DOC. NO. 103-33, at 368–70
(1995).
157 Id. at 369.
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Senate. “This committee finds,” the report concluded, “that expulsion cannot occur unless the
offender is a member, at the time when the injury to the Senate insides.”158 The Committee did
qualify that blanket conclusion, however, by reserving the Senate’s right to expel a Member for
unknown prior misconduct, ultimately concluding that the Constitution “does not contemplate
expulsion for any crime or violation of rules, or Infraction of law, except such as occurred either
during membership or was first disclosed during membership to the impairment of the honor of
the Senate.”159
The recommended expulsion of Senator Robert Packwood in 1995 supports the conclusion that
the Senate retains the authority to expel a Member for conduct prior to election, at least when the
conduct was not previously known and occurred during the Member’s previous term in office. In
that instance, the Senate Ethics Committee voted unanimously to recommend that the Senate
expel Senator Packwood for various allegations, including acts of sexual misconduct stretching
back to 1969.160 Much of the Senator’s conduct, however, was not uncovered until after his 1992
reelection.161
The Committee report began by articulating a broad expulsion power, acknowledging that the
Supreme Court had “implied an unqualified authority of each House of Congress to discipline a
Member for misconduct, regardless of the specific timing of the offense.”162 The report also made
a distinction between the power of censure and the power to expel, similar to that which was
made by the House in the Diggs case, noting that “[h]istorically, neither House of congress has
abdicated its ability to punish a Member in the form of censure” for prior misconduct.163 With
regard to expulsion, the report noted only that “[t]here have been indications that the Senate, in an
expulsion case, might not exercise its disciplinary discretion with regard to conduct in which an
individual had engaged before the time he or she had been a member.”164 For this proposition, the
Senate report cited to a single past expulsion case in which the Senate did not act on a specific
charge “since it was to have been taken previously to the election” of the Senator.165
These House and Senate examples would appear to support the conclusion that both bodies have
been “less than consistent” in their views on the expulsion power’s application to conduct
occurring prior to a Member’s last election.166 However, in either house, the key factors for
consideration include whether the Member’s constituency had knowledge of the misconduct and
whether the misconduct, though taking place before an intervening election, nonetheless occurred
during one of the Member’s previous terms in office.167 On the other hand, as previously noted,

158 S. REP. No. 77-1010, at 6 (1942).
159 Id. at 13, n.4. (emphasis added). Senate votes to both exclude and expel Langer each failed. S. DOC. No. 103-33, at
370 (1995).
160 S. REP. No. 104-137, at 7–8 (1995).
161 Id. at 1–2.
162 Id. at 39–40.
163 Id. at 40.
164 Id.
165 Id. at n. 65. The Senate Ethics Committee has previously dismissed complaints against Senators at last partly on the
ground that the alleged misconduct occurred prior to a “Senate candidacy.” See Letter from the Senate Committee on
Ethics to David Vitter, U.S. Senator (May 8, 2008), https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/c656cd9f-332f-
4cbf-ad0b-82b72f634440/vitter-050808.pdf.
166 See Memorandum to Hon. Louis Stokes, Chairman, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 97-110, at 156 (1981).
167 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 42-81, at 7–13 (1872); S. REP. No. 77-1010, at 6–13 (1942).
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the exercise of restraint generally does not appear to be grounded in a constitutional restriction,
but rather a policy choice based on respect for the democratic system.168
Conclusion
Article I Section 5 of the Constitution provides the House and Senate with broad authority to
expel their own Members with the concurrence two-thirds of the body. In light of limited judicial
interpretations of the Clause and limited and inconsistent House and Senate practice, it is difficult
to define precisely the scope of the expulsion power, especially with regard to the nature and
timing of conduct that may justify expulsion. Nonetheless, historical practice suggests that the
chief and competing concerns that animate debates over the expulsion power are interests in
preserving the integrity of a given house versus the interest in preserving the results of a
democratic election.


168 See supra note 116.
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Appendix. Expulsions in the House and Senate
Table 1. Expulsions in the House of Representatives
Year
Name
Conduct Underlying Expulsion
1861
John B. Clark (MO)
Disloyalty to the Union
1861
John W. Reid (MO)
Disloyalty to the Union
1861
Henry C. Burnett (KY)
Disloyalty to the Union
1980
Michael J. Myers (PA)
Bribery, conspiracy and Travel Act violations
2002
James A. Traficant (OH)
Il egal gratuity, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, defrauding the
government, racketeering, and tax evasion violations
Source: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF CONDUCT CASES IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 1798-2004 (2004), https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/
Historical_Chart_Final_Version%20in%20Word_0.pdf.

Table 2. Expulsions in the Senate
Year
Name
Conduct Underlying Expulsion
1797
Wil iam Blount (TN)
Disloyalty to the United States
1861
James M. Mason (VA)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
Robert M.T. Hunter (VA)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
Thomas L. Clingman (NC)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
Thomas Bragg (NC)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
James Chesnut, Jr. (SC)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
Alfred O.P. Nicholson (TN)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
Wil iam K. Sebastian (AR)
Disloyalty to Uniona
1861
Charles B. Mitchel (AR)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
John Hemphil (TX)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
Louis T. Wigfall (TX)
Disloyalty to Union
1861
John C. Breckinridge (KY)
Disloyalty to Union
1862
Trusten Polk (MO)
Disloyalty to Union
1862
Waldo P. Johnson (MO)
Disloyalty to Union
1862
Jesse D. Bright (IN)
Disloyalty to Union
Source: UNITED STATES SENATE: ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND CENSURE CASES 1793–1990, S. DOC. No. 103-33
(1995).
a. The Senate posthumously reversed the decision to expel Wil iam K. Sebastian in 1877, citing the fact that he
“did not engage in confederate politics or military service” unlike the other Senators with whom he was
expelled, who “participated actively in the Confederacy as senators, military officers, or diplomats.” Id. at
98.

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Author Information

Todd Garvey

Legislative Attorney



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Congressional Research Service
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