Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy

March 30, 2017 – January 4, 2021 R44804

Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy
Updated January 4, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44804

Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy

Summary
Despite a campaign pledge in 2015 that they “would not arrest anyone as political prisoners,”
Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have failed to fulfil this
promise since they took control of Burma’s Union Parliament and the government’s executive
branch in April 2016. While presidential pardons have been granted for some political prisoners,
people continue to be arrested, detained, tried, and imprisoned for political reasons. According to
the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a Thailand-based,
nonprofit human rights organization formed in 2000 by former Burmese political prisoners, there
were 590 “individuals oppressed due to political activity”—including 35 sentenced to prison—as
of the end of November 2020.
During its five years in power, the NLD government has provided pardons for Burma’s political
prisoners on seven occasions. The latest was on April 17, 2020, when President Win Myint
pardoned nearly 25,000 prisoners, of which 10 were considered political prisoners by AAPP(B).
Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, as well as the Burmese military, however, also have
demonstrated a willingness to use Burma’s laws to suppress the opinions of their political
opponents and restrict press freedoms. In April 2020, several reporters were charged under Article
50 (a) and Article 52 (a) of the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law for publishing interviews with
representatives of the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed organization that the NLD government has
officially declared a terrorist group.
The Union Parliament has repealed or amended a few of the various laws that authorities use to
arrest and prosecute people for political reasons, but has also passed new laws that some
observers see as limiting political expression and protection of human rights. In addition, the
Tatmadaw, which either directly or indirectly controls all of the nation’s security forces (including
the Myanmar Police Force), has not demonstrated an interest in ending Burma’s history of
political imprisonment. Tatmadaw leaders have brought multiple defamation cases against
journalists who publish stories critical of Burma’s military.
The Burma Political Prisoners Assistance Act (H.R. 2327, S. 2069) would have made it U.S.
policy to support the immediate and unconditional release of “all prisoners of conscience and
political prisoners in Burma,” and require the Secretary of State to “provide assistance to civil
society organizations in Burma that work to secure the release of prisoners of conscience and
political prisoners in Burma.”
Congress may consider if and how to integrate concerns regarding political imprisonment into
overall U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may also choose to assess how other important issues in
Burma should influence U.S. policy, including efforts to end the nation’s ongoing low-grade civil
war, the forced deportation of more than 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State in 2017, and
prospects for constitutional and legal reform designed to establish a democratically elected
civilian government that respects the human rights and civil liberties of all Burmese people.
Congressional Research Service

Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy

Overview
The existence and treatment of political prisoners in Burma (Myanmar)1 has been a central issue
in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Burma for more than 25 years. The arrest, detention,
prosecution, and imprisonment of Burmese political prisoners—including Aung San Suu Kyi2—
frequently were cited as reasons for imposing political and economic sanctions on Burma and the
leaders of its ruling military junta. The release of political prisoners was often listed as a
necessary condition for the repeal of those sanctions.3 When announcing waivers of existing
sanctions, the Obama Administration often cited progress on the release of political prisoners as
evidence for why the waiver was warranted.4
During a discussion of the human rights situation in Burma during the 34th session of the U.N.
Human Rights Council in March 2017, William J. Mozdzierz, Director of the Office of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the State Department’s Bureau of International
Organization Affairs, stated that the U.S. government was “concerned by new political arrests
under the current [Burmese] government,” and urged “the [Burmese] government to immediately
and unconditionally release all political prisoners, and to drop charges against individuals for
taking part in protected political activities.”5 In January 2020, the State Department listed the
release of the “remaining political prisoners” as one the five “major institutional and political
challenges” in Burma.6 What actions, if any, the 117th Congress may take with respect to U.S.
policy toward Burma may hinge, in part, on the issue of political prisoners in Burma.

1 According to the country’s 2008 constitution, its official name is “the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,” or
“Myanmar.” The U.S. government continues to officially refer to the nation as “the Union of Burma,” or “Burma,” but
uses “Myanmar” inside the country and at multilateral fora where the host refers to the nation as “Myanmar.”
2 Between 1989 and 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest or in prison for 15 of the 21 years, including a
short stay in Insein Prison following an assassination attempt in the town of Depayin. For more about her years as a
political prisoner, see Human Rights Watch, Burma: Chronology of Aung San Suu Kyi’s Detention, November 13,
2010.
3 Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-382) requires the President to “impose such economic
sanctions upon Burma as the President determines to be appropriate until certain conditions are met, including
“Prisoners held for political reasons in Burma have been released.” The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003
(P.L. 108-61) stipulates as one condition for the termination of the act’s sanctions, “The SPDC has made measurable
and substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government, including—(i) releasing all political prisoners;
…” The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act; P.L. 110-286)
sets as one of the conditions for the termination of its sanctions that “the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the SPDC has—(1) Unconditionally released all political prisoners,
including Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy; …”
4 For example, in Executive Order 13742 issued on October 7, 2016, which waived the economic sanctions imposed by
Section 5(b) of the JADE Act and terminated and revoked Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 13448, 13464, 13619, and
13651, President Obama mentioned “the release of many political prisoners” among the evidence of “Burma’s
substantial advances to promote democracy.” Similarly, Presidential Determination No. 2017-04, which terminated
restrictions on bilateral assistance to Burma contained in Section 570(1) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208), President Obama citied “the new civilian [sic]
government released 63 political prisoners and dropped charges against almost 200 individuals facing trial on political
grounds” as evidence of “measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices and implementing
democratic government,” as required by that act.
5 U.S. Mission in Geneva, “Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America as Delivered by William J.
Mozdzierz,” press release, March 13, 2017, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/03/13/interactive-dialogue-with-the-
special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-myanmar/.
6 Department of State, U.S. Relations with Burma, January 21, 2020.
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Ten years have passed since Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), transferred power over to a newly reconstituted hybrid civilian/military Union
Government under the terms of a 2008 constitution largely written by the SPDC. The SPDC’s last
Prime Minister, General Thein Sein, was chosen as the Union Government’s first President,
leading the civilian side of the government. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was chosen as
Commander-in-Chief of Burma’s Defense Services, commanding the military side.7
In 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) assumed control over
the Union Parliament after the NLD’s landslide victory in the 2015 parliamentary elections.8
Barred from serving as President by the 2008 constitution, Aung San Suu Kyi became the new
government’s de facto civilian leader after her appointment to the newly-created position as State
Counsellor.9 In the November 2020 parliamentary elections, the NLD increased their number of
seats in the Union Parliament, an outcome that is likely to see Aung San Suu Kyi continuing as
Burma’s de facto civilian leader. Although both the Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi-led
governments periodically pardoned political prisoners, authorities continue to arrest, detain,
prosecute, and imprison people for peacefully expressing their political opinions.
One reason that controversy over political imprisonment persists in Burma is the lack of
agreement on the definition of “political prisoner.” Some in Burma would restrict the definition to
“prisoners of conscience”; others prefer a broader definition that would include persons who took
up arms against the SPDC and the Burmese military (see “Definition of Political Prisoners”).
Efforts by the Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also known as the Political Prisoner
Scrutiny Committee), set up by former Burmese President Thein Sein to forge an official
definition for political prisoners, were unsuccessful. So far, Aung San Suu Kyi has refused to
reconstitute the PPRC.
A second reason the issue of political imprisonment persists in Burma is the existence of many
laws—some dating back to the time of British colonial rule and some passed since 2011—that
restrict freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. Various human rights
organizations have identified Burmese laws that violate international standards on these
freedoms. Because these laws remain in force, Burmese security personnel can arrest, detain, and
prosecute people for their political views. Burma’s courts have also shown a willingness to
convict people for their political views. During the Thein Sein government, the Union Parliament
made some progress on legal reform, but also passed new laws that some observers maintain
restrict political expression. Since the NLD took control of the Union Parliament, little progress
has been made on repealing or revising Burma’s questionable laws.
A third reason the issue of political imprisonment persists in Burma has to do with who holds
administrative authority over Burma’s criminal cases. All security forces in Burma—including
the military (or Tatmadaw), the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), the Border Guard Police (BGP),
and local militias—directly or indirectly report to the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services,
and not to the President or the Union Parliament. As a result, people will continue to be arrested
for political expression, in accordance with existing Burmese laws, so long as Min Aung Hlaing

7 For more about Burma’s transition from military rule to the Union Government, see CRS Report R41971, U.S. Policy
Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress, by Michael F. Martin and Derek E. Mix.
8 For information about Burma’s 2015 parliamentary elections and the NLD’s landslide victory, see CRS Report
R44436, Burma’s 2015 Parliamentary Elections: Issues for Congress, by Michael F. Martin.
9 Because her two children are British citizens, section 59(f) of the 2008 constitution prohibits her serving as President.
On April 6, 2016, the Union Parliament established the position of State Counsellor, with power similar to a Prime
Minister. Former President Htin Kyaw then appointed Aung San Suu Kyi to serve as State Counsellor. The term of
office for the State Counsellor is five years.
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supports such a policy. Burma’s President does have authority over the prosecution of criminal
offenses and the power to grant amnesty to convicted criminals.
If addressing political imprisonment remains a priority in U.S. policy toward Burma, then the
117th Congress could consider several options. Such options include re-imposing sanctions and
restrictions that were previously waived, or providing assistance in repealing or revising
problematic laws or provisions in the 2008 constitution. However, it may be useful for such
options to be evaluated in the context of their possible impact on other priorities in U.S. relations
with Burma, including:
 ending the nation’s longstanding civil war;
 creating a democratically elected civilian government in Burma;
 protecting the human rights of the people of Burma;
 promoting greater economic prosperity for the people of Burma;
 establishing direct civilian control over the Tatmadaw and the rest of Burma’s
security forces; and
 How such policies would affect U.S. geopolitical interests relative to India, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the region.
Current Status of Political Prisoners in Burma
The number of political prisoners in Burma fluctuates over time, depending on the termination of
prison sentences, the status of pending trials, and the arrest and detention of new alleged political
prisoners by Burma’s security forces. The number also varies depending on which definition of
“political prisoner” is used when categorizing cases.
The figures released by the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), in
its monthly report on political prisoners are widely used by the Burmese media, the international
press, and the State Department as a comparatively reliable estimate of the number of political
prisoners in Burma. The AAPP(B) is a nonprofit human rights organization formed in 2000 by
former Burmese political prisoners.
For over a decade, the AAPP(B) has released a monthly report on the number of political
prisoners in Burma, based on its definition of political prisoner (see “Definition of Political
Prisoners” below) and its network of researchers who monitor Burma’s security system for
information on alleged political prisoner arrests, detentions, trials, and incarceration. The monthly
reports include a description of related events of the past month and a detailed list containing the
names, alleged violation, prison (where applicable), sentence (where applicable), and political
affiliation (if any) of each political prisoner.
According to the AAPP(B), there were 590 “individuals oppressed due to political activity” in
Burma as of the end of November 2020.10 Of those, 35 were serving prison sentences, 199 were
being held in detention awaiting trial, and 356 were awaiting trial outside of prison (see Figure
1). The number of political prisoners in Burma declined sharply after the NLD-led government
took power in April 2016, but has been gradually increasing since June 2017, setting aside the
anticipated downturn following the annual Myanmar New Year’s presidential pardons (see
“Prisoner Releases”). The number of political prisoners serving sentences or being detained while
awaiting trial gradually increased in 2019, declined in the first half of 2020, before rising again.

10 Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), November Chronology 2020, December 10, 2020.
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Figure 1. Political Prisoners in Burma
By Status; Since March 2016

Source: AAPP(B) data.
Political Prisoners and the NLD-Led Government
The success of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma’s
2015 parliamentary elections raised the hopes of many in Burma that the arrest and detention of
political prisoners would soon come to an end. During his term in office (2011-2016), former
President Thein Sein promised to release all “prisoners of conscience” and at one point pledged
that there would be no more “prisoners of conscience” in Burmese prisons by the end of 2014.
According to most observers, he failed to fulfill his pledge.
In January 2016, an NLD spokesperson told the press that the new government once in power
would adopt an official definition of “political prisoner” and “would not arrest anyone as political
prisoners.”11 The spokesperson also stated that the NLD-led government “can control the
arresting of political prisoners in accordance with existing laws,” but did not elaborate on how
that would be accomplished.12
Burma’s New Year—Thingyan—is a traditional day for pardoning prisoners, dating back to pre-
colonial times.13 Burma’s military juntas (1962-2011) would sometimes follow the tradition, but

11 Ye Mon, “NLD Pledges No More Political Prisoners,” Myanmar Times, January 6, 2016.
12 Ibid.
13 The granting of pardons to prisoners is related to the form of Theravada Buddhism practiced in Burma. As part of the
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in some years, prohibited the celebration of Thingyan. Since 2011, presidential pardons have been
issued around Thingyan in some years, but not in others.
Prisoner Releases Since 2016
Soon after assuming office in April 2016, former President Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Aung
San Suu Kyi took steps to secure the release of political prisoners.14 On April 7, 2016, the Office
of the State Counsellor announced that “releasing prisoners of conscience who are behind bars for
their involvement in peaceful political activities is one of the priorities of the new government.”15
According to the BBC, Aung San Suu Kyi indicated that new government’s goal was to release
all political prisoners within two weeks.16
Table 1. Presidential Prisoner Pardons
Total Number of
Total Number of
Political Prisoners
Date
Prisoners Pardoned
Pardoned
April 8, 2016
115
115
April 16, 2016
83
83
April 12, 2017
1,883
0
May 24, 2017
259
89
April 17, 2018
8,451
36
April 17, 2019
9,535
2
April 26, 2019
6,948
3
May 7, 2019
6,520
20
April 17, 2020
24,896
10
Source: AAPP(B).
The following day, Aung San Suu Kyi ordered that charges be dropped for 115 people facing
prosecution for their participation in a peaceful protest against a proposed National Education
Bill. On April 16, 2016—Burma’s traditional New Year—President Htin Kyaw issued Order
33/2016 granting amnesty to 83 political prisoners. The amnesty was reportedly granted to “make
people feel happy and peaceful, and (promote) national reconciliation during the New Year.”17

Thingyan festivities, people release fish into lakes and rivers, while reciting the prayer, “I release you once, you release
me ten times,” to ask forgiveness for their sins.
14 The newly elected members of the Union Parliament took office in January 2016; President Htin Kyaw and State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were appointed to their offices by the Union Parliament in March 2016, and were sworn
into office in April 2016.
15 President Office, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, “State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to strive for the
granting of presidential pardon to political prisoners, activists, students,” press release, April 11, 2016.
16 “Myanmar Political Prisoners to Be Freed—Aung San Suu Kyi,” BBC, April 7, 2017.
17 “Myanmar President Pardons 83 Political Prisoners; Official,” AFP, April 18, 2016.
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According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, between April and mid-August 2016, the NLD-led
government released 457 people facing trial for political activity, and 274 political cases were
closed.18
On April 12, 2017, 1,883 prisoners were released as part of the traditional New Year prisoner
pardon, but according to AAPP(B), none were political prisoners. On May 23, 2017, former
President Htin Kyaw granted amnesty to 259 prisoners in recognition of the second 21st Century
Panglong Peace Conference, held on May 24-29, 2017, including 89 political prisoners.
Current President Win Myint pardoned 8,541 prisoners on April 17, 2018, including 36 political
prisoners.19 In its comments on the April 2018 pardons, AAPP(B) stated the following:
In light of the Presidential pardons, persecuting journalists for seeking the truth and others
for speaking leaves a bitter taste in the mouth, particularly considering NLD’s broken
promise, made in 2016, that it would release all political prisoners when it came to power.20
President Win Myint issued three separate prisoner pardons in 2019. On April 17, 2019, he
granted amnesty to 9,551 prisoners, of which 2 were considered political prisoners by AAPP(B).
On April 26, 2019, 6,948 additional prisoners received a presidential pardon. On May 7, 2019,
President Win Myint pardoned 6,520 prisoners, bringing the total for the year to 23,019.
According to AAPP(B), the three releases in 2019 included a total of 25 political prisoners.21
The most prominent among those released in 2019 were the journalists Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa
Lone (see text box, “The Case of Kyaw Soe Oo, Wa Lone, and the Massacre at Inn Din”). The
released political prisoners also included six individuals imprisoned under the Unlawful
Associations Act for their alleged association with one of Burma’s ethnic armed organizations
(EAOs), five people sentenced for violations of the Telecommunications Law, and four persons
convicted of violating Penal Code 505(b). These three laws are among a number of Burmese laws
that have been identified as unduly restricting human rights and civil liberties (see “Problematic
Laws”).
On April 17, 2020, President Win Myint pardoned 24,896 prisoners, of which 10 were considered
political prisoners by AAPP(B). On the day of the pardon, the AAPP(B) issued a statement,
welcoming the release of the prisoners. In its press statement, AAPP(B) called for the immediate
and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and urged the government to release more
prisoners amidst health risks in prisons due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Continuing Arrests and Trials of Political Prisoners
In between the episodic presidential pardons, the NLD-led government has continued to arrest,
detain, try, and convict individuals for political reasons using various laws, some of which date
back to British colonial rule, as well as laws passed after the SPDC transferred power to the
hybrid civilian/military government in 2011 (see “Problematic Laws”). The State Department has
noted this pattern with some concern:
Despite the transition to a civilian-led government, we continue to see a troubling use of
colonial and military-era government laws to restrict freedom of expression, peaceful
assembly, religion or belief, and association. While some of these cases have been brought

18 “NLD Government has Released 457 Political Prisoners,” Democratic Voice of Burma, August 18, 2016.
19 “President Grants General Amnesty for 8541 Prisoners,” Eleven Myanmar, April 18, 2018.
20 Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), April Chronology 2018, May 15, 2018.
21 CRS correspondence with AAPP(B), May 12, 2020.
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by the military, others have been brought by civilian leaders. This includes cases of the
government or military prosecuting journalists for doing their jobs, including recent
charges against journalists for covering violence in Rakhine State and/or interviewing the
Arakan Army.22
According to the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Burma and other State Department
officials “regularly elevate troubling cases to the highest levels of the Burmese government,
outreach that has in some cases led to the release of such individuals.”23
Three political prisoners’ cases in particular garnered strong international responses. The first
case involves a former child soldier, Aung Ko Htwe, who was arrested and convicted in March
2018 for violation of Section 505(b) of the Penal Code. The second concerns the arrest and
conviction of members of the Peacock Generation Thangyat troupe for their satirical
performances about government officials and the Tatmadaw. The third case pertains to the arrest
of several journalists who published news accounts of the war between the Arakan Army and the
Tatmadaw in Chin and Rakhine State that included interviews with Arakan Army representatives.
The Case of Aung Ko Htwe
Aung Ko Htwe claims he was kidnapped and enlisted in the Burmese Army in 2005 at the age of
10.24 In 2008, he deserted, but was soon arrested and charged with murder; he was convicted and
sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to 10 years by Commander-in-Chief Senior
General Min Aung Hlaing.25 Following an August 10, 2017, interview with Radio Free Asia
(RFA) in which he recounted his alleged kidnapping and enlistment, he was arrested and charged
with violating Section 505(b) of the Penal Code that makes it illegal to “cause fear or alarm to the
public.” On March 28, 2018, Aung Ko Htwe was convicted and sentenced to two years
imprisonment with hard labor. In addition, he was sentenced to six months in prison in February
2018 for criticizing the judge presiding over his trial. On October 30, 2018, he was acquitted of
subsequent charges arising from his trial. Aung Ko Htwe was granted a pardon on September 6,
2019.
The Case of the Peacock Generation Thangyat Troupe
The Peacock Generation Thangyat Troupe is a group of artists who give satirical performances in
the traditional Burmese Thangyat style.26 Seven members of the troupe—Kay Khine Tun, Nyein
Chan Soe, Paing Phyo Min, Paing Ye Thu, Su Yadanar Myint, Zaw Lin Htut, and Zayar Lwin—
were arrested in April and May 2019 for allegedly violating Penal Code 505(a) and the
Telecommunications Law of 2013 (Section 66(d)). Kay Khine Tun, Paing Phyo Min, Paing Ye
Thu, Zaw Lin Htut, and Zayar Lwin were convicted in October 2019 in a court in Yangon’s
Mayangone Township, and sentenced to two years in prison. Su Yadanar Myint was also
convicted, and sentenced to one year in prison. In November 2019, the six were convicted in a
court in Yangon’s Botataung Township, and sentenced to an additional one year in prison. In June

22 CRS communication with State Department, May 15, 2020.
23 CRS communication with State Department, May 15, 2020.
24 “Burma: Ex-Child Soldier Sentenced to Jail, Hard Labour for Talking to Press,” Asian Correspondent, March 29,
2018.
25 Aung Kyaw Min, “Former Child Soldier Faces Court for Talking to Media,” Myanmar Times, September 4, 2017.
26 Thangyat is a performance art that combines traditional folk songs with dances and poetry, often performed at major
festivals. The Peacock Generation Thangyat Troupe’s performances are known for the satirical and political content,
often poking fun at the political leaders and the Tatmadaw.
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2020, Paing Pyoe Min, Paing Ye Thu, and Zayar Lwin were sentenced to an additional year in
prison under Article 505(a) of the penal code for criticizing the military in their Thangyat
performances.27 On December 15, 2020, Zayar Lwin had another six months added to his prison
sentence for violating Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law, based on defamation
charges filed by a high-ranking military officer.28
The Case of Khaing Mrat Kyaw, Nay Myo Lin, and Tha Lun Zaung Htet
Khaing Mrat Kyaw is editor in chief of Narinjara, a news agency first established in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, by Arakanese democratic activists in exile, but now located in Sittwe, the capital of
Rakhine State. Nay Myo Lin is the editor in chief of Voice of Myanmar, and Tha Lun Zaung Htet
is editor in chief of Khit Thit Media. All three were arrested in March 2020 for alleged violations
of Burma’s Counter-Terrorism Law of 2014. After their release, all three went into hiding.
The charges stem from the publication of interviews with leaders of the Arakan Army, an ethnic
armed organization (EAO) that is fighting the Tatmadaw in Chin and Rakhine States. On March
23, 2020, President Win Myint issued a notice that the Arakan Army, and its affiliated political
party, the United League of Arakan, were unlawful associations, and Minister of Home Affairs
Lieutenant General Soe Htut, legally declared both organizations as “terrorist groups.”29 By
publishing the interview, the three editors allegedly violated Article 50(a) and Article 52(a) of the
2014 Counter-Terrorism Law. They each face up to 10 years in prison, if convicted.
The arrest of the editors came after months of harassment of news agencies that provide coverage
of the fighting between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw, particularly stories featuring
interviews with Arakan Army representatives. According to AAPP(B), eight other journalists are
awaiting trial for political reasons.30 Burmese authorities have blocked access to the websites of
Narinjara and Development Media Group (DMG), another Sittwe-based news agency, following
the arrest of the three editors. In January 2020, an officer in the Myanmar Police Force filed a
defamation suit against Reuters after it ran a story alleging Tatmadaw artillery had killed two
Rohingya women.31 In May 2019, an arrest warrant was issued under the Unlawful Associations
Act for DMG founder Aung Marm Oo for his alleged ties to the Arakan Army. He has gone into
hiding since the warrant was issued; he faces up to five years in prison if convicted.
Definition of Political Prisoners
One factor complicating the end of political prisoners in Burma is a lack of agreement on the
definition of a political prisoner. While the concept of political prisoner has a long history, there is
no single international standard for defining political prisoners. Prisoners detained for political
reasons are afforded some protection by international agreements, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

27 Zaw Zaw Htwe, “Satirical Troupe Face Extra Prison Terms for Ridiculing Myanmar’s Military,” Irrawaddy, June 11,
2020.
28 “Myanmar Satire Performer Gets Six Months Added to Sentence for Mocking Army,” Radio Free Asia, December
15, 2020.
29 Nyein Nyein, “Myanmar Govt Declares Arakan Army a Terrorist Group,” Irrawaddy , March 24, 2020.
30 The other eight are: Aung Thu, Myat Thit, Naw Norin, Naw Khine Khine Aye Cho, Nay Tun Naing, Than Htut
Aung, Thein Myint, and Wai Phyo. Five of them have been charged with defaming the Ministry of Information, and
three were arrested for covering a farmers’ protest in Kayah State.
31 “Myanmar Army Files Criminal Defamation Complaint Against Reuters over Rohingya Killing Report,” Committee
to Protect Journalists, March 10, 2020.
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The Case of Kyaw Soe Oo, Wa Lone, and the Massacre at Inn Din
Reuters reporters Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone conducted an extensive investigation into allegations that
Tatmadaw soldiers had murdered 10 Rohingya from Inn Din vil age on September 2, 2017, during the “clearance
operation” in Rakhine State. On February 8, 2018, their story (coauthored with Simon Lewis and Antoni
Slodkowski) was published under the headline, “Massacre in Myanmar.” The story recounted how Tatmadaw
soldiers, local paramilitary police, and local Rakhine vil agers kil ed 10 Rohingya men and buried their bodies in a
mass grave outside the vil age of Inn Din. The reporters also obtained photos of the 10 men when they were
under custody and tied up, and their 10 bodies in the mass grave.
According to the Reuters story, members of the 33rd Light Infantry Battalion and the 8th Security Police Battalion,
under orders, attacked and burned down Rohingya vil ages near Inn Din. The accounts describe indiscriminate
shooting and kil ing of Rohingya, as well as the rape and sexual assault of Rohingya women and girls.
On December 17, 2017—two months before their story was published—Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were
arrested for allegedly violating the Official Secrets Act of 1923. The next day, Acting President Myint Swe granted
Lieutenant Colonel Yu Naing the authority to press charges under the Official Secrets Act. Burma’s Information
Ministry subsequently announced their arrest for “possessing important and secret government documents related
to Rakhine State and security forces (with the intent) to send them to a foreign news agency.”32
On January 20, 2018, the Tatmadaw issued a statement, confirming portions of what Kyaw Soe Oo, Wa Lone, and
their col eagues were preparing to report, and acknowledging that 10 Rohingya men were kil ed in the vil age. The
statement also confirmed that Buddhist vil agers attacked some of the men with swords. On April 10, 2018, the
Tatmadaw convicted seven soldiers for their participation in the murders in Inn Din, sentencing them to seven
years in prison. Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing reportedly granted the convicted soldiers a
pardon in November 2018, seven months after their conviction. The Tatmadaw refused to provide details on the
precise day or circumstances of the pardon.
The trial of Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone lasted over eight months and was full of conflicting and unusual
testimony.33 On February 6, 2018, a police lieutenant informed the court that he burned all his notes pertaining to
the case. On April 20, 2018, prosecution witness Captain Moe Yan Naing testified that police Brigadier General
Tin Ko Ko ordered him and other police officers to entrap the two reporters by giving them “secret documents”
as part of a sting operation. After his testimony, Captain Moe Yan Naing was arrested and sentenced to one year
in prison for violating the Police Disciplinary Act.34
On September 3, 2018, Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were convicted of violating the Official Secrets Act and
sentenced to seven years in prison—the same amount of time as the soldiers convicted of committing the
murders. On April 23, 2019, Burma’s Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences imposed on Kyaw Soe
Oo and Wa Lone. Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were among the 6,520 prisoners granted a pardon on May 7, 2019.
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor considers someone a
political prisoner if
1. the person is incarcerated in accordance with a law that is, on its face,
illegitimate; the law may be illegitimate if the defined offense either
impermissibly restricts the exercise of a human right; or is based on race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group;
2. the person is incarcerated pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, where
the incarceration is based on false charges where the underlying motivation is
based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular group; or
3. the person is incarcerated for politically motivated acts, pursuant to a law that is
on its face legitimate, but who receives unduly harsh and disproportionate
treatment or punishment because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion,

32 Ministry of Information, “Two Reporters, Two Policemen Arrested in Yangon,” press release, December 17, 2017.
33 “Reuters Case Timeline,” Irrawaddy, September 3, 2018.
34 Naw Betty Han, “Whistle-Blower Police Officer Gets One-Year Jail Sentence,” Myanmar Times, May 1, 2018.
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or membership in a particular group; this definition generally does not include
those who, regardless of their motivation, have gone beyond advocacy and
dissent to commit acts of violence.35
In applying this definition, the State Department recognizes that being accused of violent acts and
committing violent acts are two different matters, and considers the circumstances pertaining to a
particular person when determining whether she or he is to be considered a political prisoner.
Following a human rights dialogue with the Thein Sein government in January 2015, the State
Department issued a press release that included the statement, “The United States [government]
expressed the need to adopt consensus definitions of ‘prisoner of conscience’ and ‘political
prisoner’ as a basis to review cases.”36
In Burma, one of the more critical issues in defining political prisoners is whether or not to
include individuals who have been detained for their alleged association with Burma’s ethnic-
based militias or their associated political parties. Because these militias periodically have been
involved in armed conflict with the Burmese military, some analysts exclude detainees allegedly
associated with the militias from their estimates of Burma’s political prisoners.
Ex-President Thein Sein consistently confined his definition to include only “prisoners of
conscience,” and generally used that phrase when discussing the issue. He repeatedly stated that
individuals who have committed criminal acts are not considered “prisoners of conscience,” and
are expected to serve out their prison sentences. Similarly, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s
military leaders prefer to restrict the definition of political prisoner to only include “prisoners of
conscience.” Some international groups, such as Amnesty International (AI), also use a narrower
definition that emphasizes so-called “prisoners of conscience.”37
The AAPP(B) uses a broader definition of political prisoner. The AAPP(B) defines a political
prisoner as “anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real involvement in or
supporting role in opposition movements with peaceful or resistance means.”38 The AAPP(B)
rejects the limitation of political prisoners to “prisoners of conscience” for several reasons. First,
the AAPP(B) maintains that Burmese security forces frequently detain political dissidents with
false allegations that they committed violent or nonpolitical crimes. Restricting the definition to
“prisoners of conscience” would exclude many political prisoners. Second, the AAPP(B)
maintains that the decision to participate in armed resistance against the government in
Naypyidaw should be “viewed with the backdrop of violent crimes committed by the state,
particularly against ethnic minorities.”39 In short, the AAPP(B) views armed struggle as a
reasonable form of political opposition given the severity of the violence perpetrated by the
Burmese military and police.

35 Definition originally provided to CRS by the State Department in July 2016, and reconfirmed by State Department in
May 2020.
36 State Department, “Myanmar and United States Conclude Successful Second Human Rights Dialogue,” press
release, January 16, 2015.
37 Amnesty International’s definition is “people who have been jailed because of their political, religious or other
conscientiously-held beliefs, ethnic origin, sex, color, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth, sexual
orientation or other status, provided that they have neither used nor advocated violence.” (http://www.amnestyusa.org/
our-work/issues/prisoners-and-people-at-risk/prisoners-of-conscience).
38 AAPP(B), “The Recognition of Political Prisoners: Essential to Democratic and National Reconciliation Process,”
press release, November 9, 2011.
39 AAPP(B), “The Recognition of Political Prisoners: Essential to Democratic and National Reconciliation Process,”
press release, November 9, 2011.
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The Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also known as the Political Prisoner Scrutiny
Committee), set up by former Burmese President Thein Sein, reportedly attempted to develop a
consensus definition of political prisoners. Bo Kyi, the committee’s AAPP(B) representative, told
the press in May 2013 that the 19 members had agreed to a definition, but that the Thein Sein
government did not formally adopt the definition.40
On August 17 and 18, 2014, AAPP(B) and the FPPS held a workshop in Rangoon to discuss a
common definition of political prisoners and to open a discussion with the Thein Sein
government and Burma’s Union Parliament on the topic.41 Representatives of various Burmese
organizations and political parties, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
attended the workshop. The attendees at the conference agreed to the following definition of
political prisoner:
Anyone who is arrested, detained, or imprisoned for political reasons under political
charges or wrongfully under criminal and civil charges because of his or her perceived or
known active role, perceived or known supporting role, or in association with activities
promoting freedom, justice, equality, human rights, and civil and political rights, including
ethnic rights, is defined as a political prisoner.42
The adopted statement of the conferees further explained
The above definition relates to anyone who is arrested, detained, or imprisoned because of
his or her perceived or known active role, perceived or known supporting role, or in
association with political activities (including armed resistance but excluding terrorist
activities), in forming organizations, both individually and collectively, making public
speeches, expressing beliefs, organizing or initiating movements through writing,
publishing, or distributing documents, or participating in peaceful demonstrations to
express dissent and denunciation against the stature and activities of both the Union and
state level executive, legislative, judicial, or other administrative bodies established under
the constitution or under any previously existing law.
Following the workshop, a Member of Parliament from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy (NLD) reportedly said that the NLD would submit a proposed definition of political
prisoner to the Union Parliament.43
After the NLD assumed power, different voices called for establishment of a legal definition of
political prisoners. In their May 2016 report cited above, the AAPP(B) and FPPS recommended
that the NLD-led government adopt an internationally recognized definition of political
prisoners.44 On June 2, 2016, Pe Than, an Arakan National Party (ANP) member of the Union
Parliament’s lower house, spoke on the chamber’s floor in support of adopting legal definitions of
“political prisoners” and “political offenses” to protect political activists.45 Then-Deputy Minister
of Home Affairs General Aung Soe voiced his ministry’s opposition to Pe Than’s proposal,

40 “Burma Releases Political Prisoners Ahead of US State Visit,” Irrawaddy, May 17, 2013.
41 “Myanmar Still Seeks Definition of Political Prisoner,” Eleven Myanmar, August 18, 2014.
42 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), AAPP & FPPS Press Release About the Definition of a
Political Prisoner, September 2, 2014, http://aappb.org/2014/09/aapp-fpps-press-release-about-the-definition-of-a-
political-prisoner/.
43 “NLD Moving to Recognise Myanmar’s ‘Political Prisoners,’” Eleven Myanmar, August 20, 2014.
44 AAPP(B) and FPPS, “After Release I Had to Restart My Life from the Beginning,” May 25, 2016, http://aappb.org/
2016/05/after-release-i-had-to-restart-my-life-from-the-beginning-the-experiences-of-ex-political-prisoners-in-burma-
and-challenges-to-reintegration/.
45 “Union Government Urged to Adopt Political Prisoner Definition,” Global New Light of Myanmar, June 3, 2016.
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stating that providing special treatment to political prisoners would discriminate against other
people arrested for alleged violations of the law.46
In addition, human rights abuses by the government against two segments of Burmese society
also have been raised in association with the issue of political prisoners. First, allegations of
corruption among local Burmese officials are fairly common, with officials reportedly frequently
using their official power to detain people on falsified charges in order to confiscate property
(particularly land) or otherwise exact revenge on their opponents. In addition, officials have
reportedly used provisions in old and new laws to arrest and detain people protesting alleged
violations of their legal rights by those very same officials. These reported abuses of power by
officials have been portrayed as creating a special group of “political prisoners.”
Second, past governments in Burma singled out the Rohingya, a predominately Muslim ethnic
minority residing in northern Rakhine State along the border with Bangladesh, and allegedly
subjected them to more extensive and invasive political repression, including restrictions on
movement, employment, education, and marriage. The NLD-led government has done little to
reverse the previous practice of discrimination against the Rohinyga. Tens of thousands of
Rohingya who remain in northern Rakhine State after the forced exodus of more than 700,000
Rohingya in 2017 continue to face oppressive measures by the Burmese government and military,
as well as danger from the ongoing fighting between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw.
Problematic Laws
Burma’s 2008 Constitution provides for the continued authority of any laws promulgated prior to
the adoption of the Constitution, unless they contravene provisions in the Constitution or are
superseded by laws passed by the Union Parliament. As a result, many comparatively repressive
laws, including some dating back to British colonial rule, remain in force in Burma. Over the last
six years, the Union Parliament has repealed or amended some of the more problematic laws, but
has also passed new laws that some observers view as being similarly repressive of human rights.
Burma’s security forces, and in particular, the Myanmar Police Force, have used these laws to
suppress the voices of political opposition in Burma.
According to the State Department, “U.S. foreign assistance [to Burma] through USAID [U.S.
Agency for International Development] and DRL [State Department’s Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor] works with civil society to support efforts to repeal, amend, or
decriminalize laws used to stifle freedom of expression, religion, and press, as well as provide
psychosocial and rehabilitation support to current and former political prisoners.”47
In its monthly report on political prisoners, the AAPP(B) includes information on which laws
were allegedly violated. The following laws are those most frequently cited in the AAPP(B)
monthly reports:
 The Unlawful Associations Act of 1908—Section 17(1) states that association
with any organization that the President declares illegal is punishable by two to
three years’ imprisonment, along with a possible fine. Under Section 17(2),
managing an unlawful association or promoting its meetings is subject to three to
five years of imprisonment, and a possible fine. This law has been frequently
used to declare ethnic armed organizations and their militias “unlawful
associations.” According to the AAPP(B), as of April 30, 2020, 19 of the 50

46 Tin Htet Paing, “Calls to Legally Define Political Prisoners Rebutted in Parliament,” Irrawaddy, June 2, 2016;
47 CRS communication with State Department, May 15, 2020.
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political prisoners serving sentences were convicted for violations of the
Unlawful Associations Act.
 The Telecommunications Law of 2013 (as amended)—Section 66(d) subjects
anyone found “[e]xtorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming,
disturbing, causing undue influence or threatening to any person by using any
Telecommunications Network” to up to two years in prison and/or a fine. This
law is being used to arrest and try political commentators and journalists who
criticize government policy, government officials, or the Tatmadaw on social
media. According to the AAPP(B), 6 of the 50 political prisoners serving
sentences as of April 30, 2020, were convicted for violations of the
Telecommunications Law.
 The Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act of 2011 (as
amended in 2016)—The law places restrictions on the freedom of assembly and
expression that experts argue are inconsistent with international human rights
laws and standards.48 Violators of the law are subject to up to two years in prison
and/or a fine. This law has reportedly been used to arrest and try people
protesting against alleged illegal land confiscations by local officials and the
Tatmadaw, as well as individuals rallying in opposition to other actions by the
Burmese government and the military. As of April 30, 2020, none of the 50
political prisoners in jail were convicted for violating this law, according to
AAPP(B).
 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens—Enacted in March 2017,
section 9(f) states that “no one shall unlawfully interfere with a citizen’s personal
or family matters or act in any way to slander or harm their reputation.” Violation
of the law carries a penalty of up to three years in prison and a fine of up to 1.5
million kyat (US$1,100). This law has been used to bring charges against
journalists who publish articles critical of government or military officials.49 Of
the 50 political prisoners serving sentences as of April 30, 2020, 1 was convicted
for violating this law.
 The Farmland Law of 2012—Under the 2008 constitution, all land in Burma
belongs to the government, but people can have use rights to the land. This law,
passed along with the Virgin, Fallow, Vacant Management Law, provides the
legal basis under which the government can confiscate land from those who have
use rights.50 Burmese officials have charged some farmers of illegally cultivating
land to which they previously had use rights. According to the AAPP(B), as of
April 30, 2020, 8 of the 50 convicted political prisoners are serving time for
violating the Farmland Law.
 Sections 505(a) and 505(b) of the Penal Code—These sections make it illegal
to publish or circulate statements that either cause or is likely to cause “any
officer, soldier, sailor, or airman, in the Army, Navy or Airforce to mutiny or
otherwise disregard or fail in his duty” [Section 505(a)] or “fear or alarm to the
public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to
commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility” [Section

48 For more information on how the law violates international human rights laws and standards, see Human Rights
Watch, Burma: Proposed Assembly Law Falls Short, May 27, 2016.
49 Human Rights Watch, Burma: Privacy Law Used to Prosecute Critics, January 12, 2018.
50 For more about the issue of land confiscation in Burma, see Human Rights Watch, Nothing for Our Land, July 17,
2018.
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505(b)]. This law is frequently used against journalists who publish stories that
contradict or question official accounts of events in Burma, particularly those
associated with the nation’s ongoing low-grade civil war. As of April 30, 2020, 8
of the 50 convicted political prisoners identified by AAPP(B) were serving
sentences for violating one or both of these sections of the Penal Code.
In April 2016, Burma’s Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission, a governmental
body established by Burma’s Union Parliament, recommended that 142 laws be repealed or
amended, including some that have been used to suppress political opposition and expression.51
The commission recommended abolishing the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950 (which made it
illegal to engage in activities that hindered the ability of the government or the military to
perform their duties) and Section 505(b) of the Penal Code (which makes it illegal to circulate,
make, or publish any statement, rumor, or report “with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause,
fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to
commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility”), as well as amend Article
18 of the Peace Assembly and Processions Act.
In January 2016, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), a federation of over 180
international human rights organizations, called on the incoming Union Parliament to repeal or
amend several laws enacted by the outgoing Union Parliament. The laws identified by FIDH
included the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act of 2011; the
Telecommunications Law of 2013; the Printing and Publications Act of 2014; the Media Act of
2014; and the four so-called “Race and Religion Protection Laws” of 2015 (the Interfaith
Marriage Law, the Monogamy Law, the Population Control Law, and the Religious Conversion
Law), which are seen as discriminating against Burma’s Muslim population. Human Rights
Watch issued a report in 2016, entitled “They Can Arrest You at Any Time: The Criminalization
of Peaceful Expression in Burma,” that also cited these laws as tools of political oppression, as
well as several others, including the Electronic Transactions Act of 2004; the Official Secrets Act
of 1923; and various sections of the Penal Code (Sections 124A, 130B, 141-147, 153A, 295A,
298, 503, 405, 505(b), 505(c), and 509).52
Since taking office in January 2016, the NLD-led Union Parliament has made some efforts to
repeal or amend a few of the problematic laws. In May 2016, the Union Parliament revoked the
State Protection Act of 1975, which allowed the government to declare a State of Emergency and
to suspend citizens’ basic rights.53 In October 2016, it repealed the Emergency Provisions Act of
1950, which effectively prohibited criticism of the Tatmadaw or the government.54 In August
2017, the Union Parliament passed some minor amendments to the Telecommunications Law,
reducing the maximum sentence from three to two years.55

51 San Yamin Aung, “Legal Commission Recommends Scrapping 142 Laws,” Irrawaddy, April 8, 2016.
52 Human Rights Watch, They Can Arrest You at Any Time: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Burma,
June 2016.
53 Htoo Thant, “Hluttaws Revoke Oppressive State Protection Law,” Myanmar Times, May 26, 2016.
54 For example, Section 5(b) made it illegal “to depreciate, pervert, hinder, restrain, or vandalise the loyalty,
enthusiasm, acquiescence, health, training, or performance of duties of the army organisations of the Union or of civil
servants in a way that would induce their respect of the government to be diminished, or to disobey rules, or to be
disloyal to the government.” Wai Moe, “Myanmar Repeals 1950 Law Long Used to Silence Dissidents,” New York
Times, October 5, 2016.
55 For more about the 2017 amendments, see Wendy Zeldin, Burma: Telecom Law Amended but Key Defamation
Provision Remains Unchanged, Library of Congress Law Library, September 6, 2017.
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Civilian Government Authority over Criminal Cases
Under Burma’s 2008 constitution, the President has limited authority over the arrest and detention
of people for alleged criminal activity; the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services controls the
security forces that make arrests. In part as a result, people in Burma continue to be arrested and
convicted for their political activities. The President, however, can direct that pending cases be
dropped, as well as grant pardons and amnesties once people have been convicted.
Burma’s 2008 constitution stipulates: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the
command of the Defence Services” (Article 338) and “The Defence Services shall lead in
safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers” (Article 339). The Commander-
in-Chief is to be appointed by the President, “with the proposal and approval of the National
Defence and Security Council” (Article 342).56 Article 20(c) states, “The Commander-in-Chief of
the Defence Services is the Supreme Commander of all armed forces.”
Burma’s Defence Services includes the Myanmar Armed Forces (or Tatmadaw), the Border
Guard Forces, and the Myanmar Police Force.57 The Myanmar Armed Forces and the Border
Guard Forces are part of the Ministry for Defence; the Myanmar Police Force are part of the
Ministry for Home Affairs. Article 232(b)(ii) of the 2008 constitution requires the President
“obtain a list of suitable Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of
the Defence Services for Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs,” thereby
requiring that those Ministers be active military personnel and giving the Commander-in-Chief
authority over who is selected as Minister of Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. As a
result, the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services has authority over Burma’s security forces
and, by extension, over the arrest and detention of persons who allegedly have violated the law.
Once arrests have been made, the cases are directed to Burma’s Attorney General, who is
appointed by the President (subject to the approval of the Union Parliament) and reports directly
to the President. Public prosecutors, appointed at the local level and under the attorney general’s
authority, are responsible for prosecuting criminal cases. As such, the President does have the
authority to direct the Attorney General and the public prosecutors to drop charges considered
political in nature. In April 2016, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi exercised such authority to
secure the release of over 100 people being detained for participation in peaceful protests.
Article 204 of the constitution gives the President the power to grant pardons and amnesties (in
accord with the recommendation of the National Defence and Security Council). In addition,
Section 401(1) of Burma’s Code of Criminal Procedures states the following:
When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the President of the
Union may at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person
sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of
the punishment to which he has been sentenced.
The authority to grant pardons and amnesties was used several times by former Presidents Thein
Sein and Htin Kyaw, as well as by current President Win Myint.

56 The National Defence and Security Council includes the President, two Vice Presidents, the Speakers of each
chamber of the Union Parliament, the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of
Defence Services, and the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Border Affairs, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
the Minister for Home Affairs.
57 In addition, there are various local militias organized and supported by the Tatmadaw. For more about the militias of
Burma, see John Buchanan, Militias in Myanmar, Asia Foundation, Policy Dialogue Brief #13, July 2016.
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Legislation in the 116th Congress
In the 116th Congress, the Burma Political Prisoners Assistance Act (BPPAA, H.R. 2327, S. 2069)
called for immediate release of Kyaw Soe Oo, Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, Wa Lone, and Zau Jet (all
five have been released or granted pardons since the bill’s introduction). The legislation would
also have stated that it is U.S. policy that (1) all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in
Burma be “unconditionally and immediately released”; (2) the Administration and the
Department of State “should use all their diplomatic tools” to ensure such a release occurs; and
(3) the NLD-led government should “repeal or amend all laws that violate the rights to freedom
of expression, peaceful assembly, or association.”
In addition, the BPPAA would have required that the Secretary of State provide assistance to civil
society organizations in Burma that “work to secure the release of prisoners of conscience and
political prisoners in Burma,” as well as assistance to current and former prisoners of conscience
and political prisoners in Burma. The bill stipulated that the assistance shall include
 support for documentation of human rights violations with respect to prisoners of
conscience and political prisoners;
 support for awareness and advocacy in Burma on the issue of political prisoners;
 support for efforts to repeal or amend laws that “are used to imprison individuals
as either prisoners of conscience or political prisoners”;
 travel costs and legal fees for families of prisoners of conscience or political
prisoners;
 post-incarceration assistance—including mental health and other health care,
access to education and employment assistance, and other forms of reparation—
for former prisoners of conscience or political prisoners; and
 the creation of an independent prisoner review mechanism in Burma.
The BPPAA would also have included definitions for prisoners of conscience and political
prisoners. The legislation’s definition of prisoners of conscience is similar to that used by
Amnesty International. It would define political prisoners as any person
who is arrested, detained, or imprisoned for political reasons under political charges or
wrongfully under criminal and civil charges because of his or her perceived or known
active role in, perceived or known supporting role in, or perceived or known association
with activities promoting freedom, justice, equality, human rights, or civil and political
rights, including ethnic rights.
Issues for U.S. Policy
Some of the options that the 117th Congress may consider to address issues of political
imprisonment in Burma include the following:
 Providing technical and other forms of assistance to the Union Parliament and the
Ministry of Justice in identifying and revising those laws that have been or could
be used to arrest and prosecute people for political reasons;
 Pressuring the NLD-led government to reevaluate and consider repealing laws or
regulations that declare any of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) illegal
under the Unlawful Associations Act of 1908;
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 Supporting the reestablishment of a Political Prisoners Review Committee or a
similar body to identify alleged political prisoners and develop an official
definition of political prisoners;
 Imposing suitable restrictions on relations with Burma until all political prisoners
have been unconditionally released;
 Conditioning the provision of certain types of assistance to the NLD-led
government and/or the Tatmadaw contingent on the adoption of an official
definition of political prisoner, and on the release of political prisoners;
 Imposing suitable restrictions on relations with Burma until sufficient reforms of
Burma’s security forces, including the Myanmar Police Force, have been
undertaken to preclude or reduce the likelihood people will be arrested or
prosecuted as political prisoners; and
 Including the absence of political prisoners in Burma as a criteria for determining
that a democratic civilian government that respects human rights and civil
liberties has been established in Burma, and that certain restrictions on bilateral
relations can be removed.
The presence of political prisoners in Burma is only one of several possible issues to be
considered when examining U.S. policy toward Burma. Other key issues may be as follows:
 The Low-Grade Civil War: Burma has endured a low-grade civil war between
the Tatmadaw and up to 20 ethnic armed organizations for over 50 years.58 Aung
San Suu Kyi has made the peace process a high priority for the NLD-led
government, but the four “21st Century Panglong Peace Conferences” (held on
August 31-September 3, 2016; May 24-29, 2017; July 11-16, 2018; and August
19-21, 2020, respectively) have made little progress toward ending the long-
standing conflict. Fighting between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw in Chin
and Rakhine States escalated in 2019 and 2020, resulting in more than 200,000
internally displaced persons, and an unknown number of civilian casualties.
Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing announced a unilateral
ceasefire in eastern Burma for most of 2019 and 2020, but periodic skirmishes
between the Tatmadaw and several EAOs continued to be reported.
 Violence in Rakhine State and the Rohingya Refugee Crisis: On August 25,
2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 security
outposts along Burma’s border with Bangladesh. The Tatmadaw responded with
a “clearance operation” that resulted in the flight of over 700,000 Rohingya into
Bangladesh.59 The Burmese government and military are facing genocide charges
in the International Court of Justice, and are being investigated by the
International Criminal Court for possible charges of forced deportation of the
Rohingya. In December 2018, the Arakan Army began a campaign to establish
bases in northern Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw responded by deploying heavily-
armed troops into the region. Frequent fighting between the Arakan Army and the
Tatmadaw continues to occur, complicating any plans for the safe and voluntary
return of the Rohingya. Relations between the two major ethnic minorities

58 For more about Burma’s civil war and its current peace process, see CRS In Focus IF11081, Burma’s Prospects for
Peace in 2019, by Michael F. Martin.
59 For more information, see CRS Report R45016, The Rohingya Crises in Bangladesh and Burma, coordinated by
Michael F. Martin.
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residing in Rakhine State—the Rakhine (also known as Arakan) and the
Rohingya—have been problematic for decades. In 1982, Burma’s military junta
stripped the Rohingya of their citizenship, and began portraying the vast majority
of them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and India.60 Violent unrest broke
out in Rakhine State in 2012, resulting in the deaths of at least 57 Rohingya and
31 Rakhine, and the displacement of an estimated 90,000 people, mostly
Rohingya.61 In October 2016, after a group of assailants attacked three police
outposts, the Tatmadaw began a “clearance operation” in northern Rakhine State
that, according to the U.N. Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights
(OHCHR), resulted in the murder, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, arbitrary
detention, and forced deportation of hundreds of Rohingya.62
 Constitutional and Legal Reform: During the parliamentary campaign, the
NLD stated that it would seek to implement both constitutional and legal reforms
aimed at establishing a more democratic government and protecting the human
rights of the people of Burma. Some analysts note that, since taking office in
April 2016, the NLD has made little progress on either campaign pledge.
Attempts to amend the 2008 constitution in the Union Parliament in March 2020
were blocked when the military members unanimously voted against the
amendments proposed by the NLD.63
 U.S. Relations with India, the PRC, and the Region: Because of its location as
the nexus of South and Southeast Asia, Burma is a country of interest for India
and the PRC in the region. India views Burma as playing an important role in its
“Act East” and “Neighborhood First” policies.64 The PRC sees Burma as a
valuable partner in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including a trans-Burma
multi-modal transportation corridor that will provide China with direct access to
the Indian Ocean, which will generate significant economic and security
benefits.65 As a result, Burma may factor in U.S. relations with India, the PRC,
and in U.S. policies in the region.

60 As part of the effort to delegitimize the Rohingya, the military junta began referring to them as “Bengalis,” a
reference to their alleged origin from Bangladesh and India.
61 For a study of the 2012 Rakhine riots and their aftermath, see Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do Is Pray: Crimes
Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State, April 22, 2013.
62 U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights, Interviews with Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar Since 9 October
2016, Report of the OHCHR Mission to Bangladesh, February 3, 2017.
63 For more about the failed attempt to amend the 2008 constitution, see CRS In Focus IF11481, Burma’s Military
Blocks Constitutional Amendments, by Michael F. Martin and Kirt Smith.
64 Archana Atmakuri and Mustafa Izzuddin, “Why Myanmar Should Matter to India,” The Diplomat, January 8, 2020.
65 Lucas Myers, The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and China’s Determination to See It Through, Wilson
Center, May 26, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

18

Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy

Figure 2. Map of Burma
Showing States and Regions

Source: CRS.

Author Information

Michael F. Martin

Specialist in Asian Affairs

Congressional Research Service

19

Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
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