The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations

January 5, 2017 – January 6, 2021 R44725

The Position of Secretary of Defense:
Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military
Relations
Updated January 6, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44725

Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations

Summary
The position of Secretary of Defense is unique within the United States government; it is one of
two civilian positions within the military chain of command, although unlike the President, the
Secretary of Defense is not elected. Section 113 of the United States Code states that the
Secretary of Defense is to be “appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.” The section goes on to elaborate a key mechanism by which
civilian control of the armed forces is maintained:
A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from
active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.
The proposed nomination of General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin, United States Army, who retired from
the military in 2016, to be Secretary of Defense may lead both houses of Congress to consider
whether and how to suspend, change, or remove that provision.
This provision was originally contained in the 1947 National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), which
mandated that 10 years pass between the time an officer is relieved from active duty and when he
or she could be appointed to the office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2007, Section 903 of the
FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), Congress changed the period of time
that must elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to the position of Secretary of
Defense to seven years.
Two exceptions to this provision have been made. Enacted on September 18, 1950, at the special
request of President Truman during a time of conflict, P.L. 81-788 authorized the suspension of
statutory requirements otherwise prohibiting General of the Army George C. Marshall from
serving as Secretary of Defense. In 2017, President Trump nominated James Mattis, a retired
United States Marine Corps General, to serve as Secretary of Defense. As his retirement from
military service was within the seven year window, Congress subsequently deliberated, and
ultimately agreed, to waive the statutory requirement otherwise prohibiting Mattis from serving in
that capacity (P.L. 115-2).
As a waiver requires separate legislation, both houses of Congress would potentially be involved
in the consideration of Austin for the role of Secretary of Defense, should he be officially
nominated. There are at least four possible options that Congress may pursue as it considers the
nomination of a retired military officer within the seven years after relief from active duty:
 suspending the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief from
active duty and appointment to position of Secretary of Defense;
 eliminating entirely or reducing the statutory requirement that seven years elapse
between relief from active duty and appointment to position of Secretary of
Defense;
 changing statute to increase the length of time that must elapse between relief
from active duty and appointment to position of Secretary of Defense; and
 choosing not to pass legislation that would suspend the provision in Title 10 that
seven years elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to position of
Secretary of Defense.
Related to the latter, the Senate might also choose to consider Austin’s nomination, regardless of
whether or not Congress passes legislation designed to suspend or remove the relevant provision
in Title 10 of the United States Code. Should the Senate choose to pursue this option, it is not
clear what the legal implications might be.
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Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations

Historically, the restriction relating to the prior military service of the Secretary of Defense
appears to be a product of congressional concern about preserving the principle of civilian control
of the military, a fundamental tenet underpinning the design and operation of the American
republic since its inception in 1776, if not before. At the conclusion of World War II, some
observers believed that the operational experience during the war pointed to the need for better
integration of the military services, and therefore argued for the establishment of what would
become the Department of Defense. Others, however, voiced concern that this greater degree of
integration might overly empower the military, and thus threaten civilian control of the military.
Accordingly, as the 81st Congress considered whether, and how, it should create a National
Military Establishment, it determined to enact several provisions to mitigate the risk that greater
military integration would come at the expense of civilian control. These included restrictions on
military servicemember eligibility for the position of Secretary of Defense and limitations on the
powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The nomination of Mattis in 2017 generated a debate among policymakers, scholars, and
practitioners regarding what civilian control of the military means in a contemporary context, and
how to best uphold that principle. Today, the proposed Austin nomination has prompted a similar
discussion regarding the health of contemporary civil-military relations and whether, and to what
extent, the principle of civilian control of the military might have been eroded over the past four
years. An added dimension of the current debate is the extent to which a nominee, if confirmed,
might help begin to address longstanding concerns some observers have raised about minority
underrepresentation, particularly at senior levels of the Department of Defense. This report serves
as a guide to help Congress engage with the debates surrounding the “waiver” requirement as
applied to Austin’s proposed nomination.

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Introduction
This report is designed to assist Congress as it considers how to proceed with the proposed
nomination of General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin to be Secretary of Defense. After exploring the history
of the statutory restriction and its evolution over time (see “Preserving Civilian Control of the
Military in the 1947 Act and Restricting the Position of Secretary of Defense”), it touches upon
some of the broader questions that have recently been raised in the public debate on whether, and
how, this proposed nomination might impact civilian-military relations and the principle of
civilian control of the military.
The Principle of Civilian Control of the Military
How to advance the nation’s security while at the same time ensuring that instruments of force do
not undermine the practice of American democracy has been a central question since the founding
of the United States, if not before. The principle of civilian control of the military places ultimate
authority over U.S. armed services in the hands of civilian leadership, with civilian responsibility
and control of the military balanced between the executive and legislative branches of the
government. In some ways, the relationship between the military and the civil society it serves
can be thought of as a paradox: the military, by its very nature, has coercive power that could
threaten civil society. Yet without a sufficiently strong and capable military, civil society becomes
vulnerable to attack, and the former might not be able to defend the latter. The United States has
balanced this tension through formulating and promulgating the principle of civilian control of
the military.1 The fact that this principle has remained relatively unchallenged over the course of
American history is, by most accounts, remarkable.2 This section briefly outlines the history of
the principle of civilian control of the military, and how it influenced legislation over time.
Civilian Control of the Military vs. “Civil-Military Relations”
Austin’s proposed nomination, similar to Mattis’s nomination in 2017, has brought up two separate but related
concepts. Civilian control of the military refers to the principle upon which the United States founded its relationship
between the military and the civil society it serves. In the United States, the military is ultimately subordinate to
civilian authority.
By contrast, “civil-military relations” is an umbrella term that refers to the discussion and exploration of issues
associated with how a military interacts with society and its governing institutions. Issues that students of civilian-
military relations explore include, but are not limited to, who controls the military; how influential should a
military be within society; what is the appropriate role of the military; what behavioral patterns and processes best
ensure military effectiveness and the preservation of civilian control; and who serves in the military. While
scholars have explored various tensions and stresses in civil-military relations over the course of U.S. history,
those tensions have not resulted in a meaningful, direct threat to the principle of civilian control of the American
military. Some scholars have expressed concern about growing military influence in policy debates.

1 See Mackubin Thomas Owens, U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain
(New York: Continuum International Publishing Group) 2011, and Rosa Brooks, “Civil-Military Paradoxes,” as found
in Jim Mattis and Kori N. Schake (eds), Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 2016), pp. 21-68.
2 While there have been tensions and differences of view between the military and its civilian counterparts, none have
resulted in a direct threat to the civilian leadership of the United States, such as a coup or a putsch. Arguably one
instance where it was a close call was President Lincoln’s dismissal of General McClellan during the early stages of the
Civil War. Although McClellan’s troops threatened to throw leaders in Washington into the Potomac for dismissing
McClellan, McClellan himself encouraged his men to support his successor.
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Origins of the American Principle of Civilian Control of
the Military3
The designers of the Constitution were deeply skeptical of a standing military as, much like
Oliver Cromwell demonstrated in 1653 when he used his army to disband Parliament, such a
military instrument could also overthrow the government it professed to serve. Consternation
regarding the British deployment of its military to the American colonies without the consent of
local governing officials was among the key grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence
and helped inform the Third Amendment of the Constitution.4 Applied to the context of a new,
experimental, and democratic Republic, the military to the authority of civil masters was
considered critically important in order to prevent the emergence of a new form of tyranny or
dictatorship.5
The principle was put to the test even before the American state was founded. During the
Revolutionary War, particularly, upon the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, the prestige of the
American military was at its height, while regard for the Continental Congress—the civilian
authority to which General George Washington reported—was dwindling. Had Washington, a
popular figure at the time, been any less devoted to democratic principles, a New World variety of
despotism might have been established. There were ample opportunities for General Washington
to install himself as a dictator—which would likely have had the end result of swapping one form
of monarchical rule for another. As the war drew to a close, a group of his associates, cognizant of
the impotence of the American Confederation, begged him to set himself up as the authoritarian
head of a new government.6 Washington refused, arguably preventing the emergence of a
military-authoritarian government in the process.7
Subsequent to the Revolutionary War, the fragility of the Confederation government was
highlighted by the 1786 Shays rebellion, the first armed rebellion in the post-Revolutionary
United States. The Shays Rebellion was a local uprising in Massachusetts in response to high
taxes and difficult economic conditions. In September 1786, Captain Daniel Shays, along with

3 Much of the material used in this section is drawn from a report authored by David E. Lockwood, A Brief History and
Analysis of Civilian Control of the Military, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 20, 1974.
4 The Declaration of Independence, in cataloging the tyrannical acts of George III, argued that “[h]e has kept among us,
in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the military
independent of and superior to the Civil Power.”
5 The June 12, 1776, Virginia Declaration of Rights, which influenced the Declaration of Independence, states “That a
well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a
free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the
military should be under strict subordination to, and be governed by, the civil power.” https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/
treasures/tr00.html#obj6.
6 Ralph H. Gabriel, “Chapter XIV: Laying the Foundations of the American Nation,” in School of the Citizen Solider:
Adapted from the Education Program of the Second Army, Lieutenant General Ben Lear, Commanding, ed. Robert A.
Griffin (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), p. 187. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000314517.
7 Washington also played a critical role in preventing the 1783 Newburgh conspiracy from taking root. Revolutionary
officers, frustrated with overall deprivation and the Continental Congress’s seeming unwillingness to pay their salaries
or post-war pensions, threatened to (1) not fight if the war continued and (2) not to demobilize after the war until their
accounts were settled. Washington interceded at a meeting of these potentially insubordinate officers, pleading to their
patriotism. As a result, a compromise was struck between the military and the Continental Congress regarding pay;
however, the incident also created further fears that a standing army might be a threat to a civilian government. See
Richard W. Steward (ed), American Military History Volume 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation,
1775-1917, (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2005) p. 109. http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V1/
ch05.htm
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other Massachusetts leaders, led several hundred armed men to close some local courts in order to
prevent the execution of foreclosures and other debt processes. In January 1787, Shays led
approximately 1,200 men in an attack on the federal arsenal at Springfield, MA. The local
Massachusetts government put down the rebellion in February 1787. While the rebellion itself
was small, and was quickly suppressed, for some it became a compelling argument for why the
United States needed a stronger national-level government, including a standing army and militia.
The challenge was how to do so while at the same time preventing the emergence of a national
military that could threaten the new Republic.8
Civilian Control of the Military: Congressional and Executive
Branch Responsibilities9
Accordingly, the Founding Fathers designed a system of civilian control of the military in a
manner that conformed with its overall architecture of checks and balances. An elected President
was designated the Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s armed forces.10 This had the dual
advantage of ensuring that an elected civilian leader presided over the nation’s army while at the
same time enhancing unity of command over the military. The President was also granted the
ability to commission military officers, authority to appoint Secretaries to preside over military
services, and the responsibility to regularly report to Congress on the state of the union.11
Many of the Founding Fathers also expressed concern about unitary executive control of the
military. The desire to ensure that the military reflected, and was subordinate to, the will of the
people also led to considerable congressional powers on matters concerning the armed services.
Congress was granted the power to lay and collect taxes for the common defense.12 Congress was
also given the sole power to declare war, the ability to raise and support armies, advise and
consent on appointments, establish rules and regulations for the army, navy, and militias when in
service of the United States.13 Also, to hamper the establishment of a permanent, standing
military, a provision was made specifying that no appropriation of money could be made for the
army for a period longer than two years.14
The Military Culture of Respecting Civilian Control
This governance architecture was necessary, but not sufficient, to ensuring civilian control of the
military. Here again, George Washington played a vital role in establishing the norms and culture
that formed the foundation for American relationships between the military and the civilian

8 The Encyclopedia Britannica, “The Shays Rebellion,” December 9, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Shayss-
Rebellion
9 A further aspect of checks and balances in this area concerns the raising of militias, which were arguably viewed at
the time as the centerpiece of the new American military establishment. As Steward writes, “... authority over the
militia was a shared power. Congress could provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and governing
“such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,” but the Constitution specifically reserved
to the states the authority to appoint militia officers and to train the militia “according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress,” pp. 112-113.
10 CRS In Focus IF10535, Defense Primer: Congress’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, by
Jennifer K. Elsea.
11 Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.
12 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
13 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
14 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
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leadership it served (also referred to as “civil-military” or “civilian-military” relations). For
example, in putting down the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania,15 President
Washington ensured that his subordinates understood the importance of upholding civil rule of
law while doing so.16 Despite disagreements—sometimes vehement—between military and
civilian leaders throughout the nation’s history, contemporary scholars of civil-military relations
have noted that these norms, inculcated and promulgated by Washington and his successors,
remain robust, even though the details of their implementation have evolved over time.17
Keeping the Standing Army Small
Another reflection of American skepticism towards a standing army—and the desire to ensure
that it remained under civilian control—was a general policy to keep the peacetime active duty
army relatively small.18 Indeed, from the founding of the nation to the Cold War era, the bulk of
force structure was maintained in the reserve component (especially the militia/National Guard),
except in times of major conflicts. When major conflicts arose—such as the Civil War, World War
I, and World War II—the comparatively small active component was expanded through the
activation of militia and federal reserves, recruitment of additional volunteers for the active
component, and the use of conscription. At the end of the conflict, active force levels were
dramatically reduced. For example, in 1916, the end strength of the active duty military was
approximately 179,000 personnel; over the course of World War I, this grew to nearly 2.9 million.
After the war’s conclusion, U.S. military end strength decreased to approximately 250,000.19
Similarly, in 1939, there were fewer than 350,000 active duty personnel in all branches of the
U.S. armed forces. During World War II, this number grew, reaching over 12 million
servicemembers on active duty by 1945.20

15 The Whiskey Rebellion was an insurrection against a federally imposed excise tax on distilled spirits. By 1794, the
rebellion threatened the viability of the newly established United States. After several attempts to resolve the dispute
peacefully, President Washington himself led the U.S. militia to western Pennsylvania to put down the rebellion. See
Peter Kotowski, “Whiskey Rebellion,” George Washington’s Mount Vernon Digital Encyclopedia of George
Washington Website, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/whiskey-rebellion/.
16 President Washington wrote, “It has afforded me great pleasure to learn, that the general conduct and character of the
Army [of militia sent against the Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion insurrectionists] has been temperate and indulgent;
and that your attention to the quiet and comfort of the western inhabitants has been well received by them. Still, it may
be proper constantly and strongly to impress upon the Army that they are mere agents of Civil power; that out of camp,
they have no other authority, than other citizens that offences against the law are to be examined, not by a military
officer, but by a Magistrate; that they are not exempt from arrests and indictments for violations of the law; that officers
ought to be careful, not to give orders, which may lead the agents into infraction of law; that no compulsion be used
towards the inhabitants in the traffic, carried on between them and the army; that disputes be avoided, as much as
possible, and be adjusted as quickly as may be, without urging them to an extreme; and that the whole country is not to
be considered as within the limits of the camp.” Letter from President George Washington to Major General Daniel
Morgan, as found in George Washington, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources,
1745-1799, volume 34, Edited by John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1944,
p. 159.
17 Before his nomination to be Secretary of Defense, James Mattis directed a YouGov public opinion survey of military
and civilian attitudes—the first of its kind produced in over a decade, and one of the more comprehensive looks at these
“norms” that help guide military attitudes and behavior toward civil society and civilian leaders. See Jim Mattis and
Kori N. Schake, “A Great Divergence?,” in Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, ed. Jim Mattis and
Kori N. Schake (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), p. 289.
18 President Jefferson could not see a need for a permanent military body during peacetime, instead believing that state
militias could be called upon to repel invasions, if necessary.
19 Data prepared by Kristy Kamarck, Analyst in Military Manpower, Congressional Research Service.
20 CRS Report R43808, Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and
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While this approach to organizing for military campaigns generally suited the preferences of the
American people and its leaders—and in particular, their overall skepticism towards a standing
army—it was also seen to have come at the expense of preparedness.21 At the time, some experts,
along with President Truman, argued that underpreparedness resulted in the expenditure of more
American blood and treasure during wartime than would have happened if there had been greater
peacetime investment in the armed forces, an issue that was apparently not of great concern until
World War II.22
World War II and the National Security Act of 1947
For the first century and a half of the United States’ history, the architecture designed at the
Constitutional Convention, combined with the American military cultural norm of respecting
civilian control of the military and the preference to disband the military after cessation of
hostilities, served to largely circumscribe the armed forces and prevent them from becoming
overly dominant within the U.S. government. After World War I, the concept of a single defense
establishment was considered around Washington, but the military services opposed such
proposals and blocked their serious consideration.23 Yet it was the experience of World War II—
the surprise of Pearl Harbor, America’s initial lack of preparedness, and a deficiently structured
military organization to wage the campaign—that resulted in a serious reconsideration of the
design of U.S. institutions associated with national security, and in particular, the military.24 The
old way of doing business was no longer viewed as sufficient by most observers at the time.25 To
that end, Congress began considering how to restructure its national security institutions as early
as 1944, although it did not entertain serious recommendations and proposals until after the
conclusion of the war.26
On December 6, 1945, President Truman submitted a letter to Congress arguing that the existing
War and Navy Departments should be combined into a single Department of National Defense.
Until that time, the Departments of War and Navy operated separately, each headed by a cabinet-
level Secretary, with the effective execution of military operations relying on voluntary
coordination between the departments. President Truman contended that such voluntary

Options for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp.
21 David E. Lockwood, A Brief History and Analysis of Civilian Control of the Military, Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, January 20, 1974.
22 David E. Lockwood, A Brief History and Analysis of Civilian Control of the Military, Congressional Research
Service Library of Congress, January 20, 1974; “President Truman’s Message to the Congress,” December 19, 1945, as
found in Alice Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, and Rudolph A Winnacker, The Department of Defense:
Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office,
October 23, 1979.
23 Between 1921 and 1945, some 50 bills were considered by Congress on the subject of unifying the military
departments; because of military service opposition, only one of those bills reached the floor of the House of
Representatives, where it was defeated. Congress, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization
and the Need for Change. Staff Report, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1985. p. 49.
24 House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, Post-War Military Policy, H. Rept. 1765, 78th Congress, 2nd
Session.
25 Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense 1947-1997 Organization and Leaders,
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office) 1997 pp. 3-4. http://history.defense.gov/
Portals/70/Documents/other/DOD1947-1997OrgLeaders.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-093417-610
26 House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, Post-War Military Policy, H. Rept 1765, 78th Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 3.
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coordination was inadequate and argued for the integration of the military services into a single
department, which would report to a new cabinet-level advisor on matters of national defense.27
The merits and risks of creating a new Department headed by a single individual were therefore
vigorously debated by the military services, the executive branch, and Congress between 1944
and 1947.
“One of the lessons which have most clearly come
Opposition to a New
from the costly and dangerous experience of this war is
that there must be unified direction of land, sea and air
Department of National
forces at home as well as in other parts of the world
Defense28
where our Armed Forces are serving. We did not have
that kind of direction when we were attacked four
years ago—and we certainly paid a high price for not
Although the United States has utilized a
having it.”
variation of Truman’s proposed system of
President Harry S. Truman, “Message to Congress,”
military governance for the past 60 years,
December 19, 1945.
there was, at the time, considerable pushback
against his ideas. The proposal was controversial for at least three reasons. First, while
demobilization of the Armed Forces took place at a rapid pace,29 peacetime force levels after
1947 were still at around 1.5 million—considerably higher than the 1939 end strength of less than
350,000. Although the public tended to support a standing military of this size, this larger
standing military, combined with Truman’s proposal for universal military training, cultivated a
sense of unease about departing from the
“We can now begin I think, to see the pattern intended
country’s tradition of peacetime mobilization
by our forefathers. They were unwil ing to limit the
as a component of maintaining civilian control
Army to a specific number ... but they did want a small
of the military.30 This sense was compounded
army. Therefore they gave Congress the power of the
purse which they deemed a sufficient control. . the
in the wake of the use of atomic weaponry,
framers of the Constitution were unwil ing to give the
which highlighted the notion that future wars
Federal Government control of the general manpower-
might not be decided by armies in the field.
militia-in time of peace, but they would give it the right
to call forth the militia in wartime. It was their opinion
The second concern about this new military
that a large standing army or force which could be
organization was the notion of centralization
called for other purposes than to repel invasion would
of military governance, especially considering
invite attack. This policy, of avoiding aggressive war or
the enormous popularity of the military and its
excuse for attack, was sound then and is sound now."
senior U.S. general and flag officers at the
Statement of Theodore Paulin, Assistant Professor of
conclusion of World War II. Five-star officers
History, Swarthmore Col ege, before the House of
Representatives, Select Committee on Postwar Military
such as the Army’s George C. Marshall,
Policy, Tuesday, June 5, 1945
Douglas MacArthur, Henry (Hap) Arnold and
Fleet Admirals William D. Leahy, Ernest
King, Chester Nimitz, and William F. (Bull) Halsey, Jr. had commanded millions of men and
thousands of tanks, airplanes, and ships—both U.S. and allied—in an unprecedented endeavor to

27 President Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of a Department of
National Defense,” December 19, 1945, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=508&st=&st1=.
28 The Department of National Defense eventually became the “National Military Establishment” in the 1947 Act. In
1949, the title of the new department was amended to become the Department of Defense.
29 President Truman noted that the demobilization was proceeding at the rate of 1,500,000 per month.
30 Truman himself was anxious not to over-militarize American society, which was one reason for the rapid
demobilization which, in the view of some, proceeded too quickly. See Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S.
Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.
71-72.
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defeat the Axis powers. In addition to field command, they played a central role in formulating
both U.S. and allied grand strategies and military strategies in Washington and abroad. These men
enjoyed a heroic reputation and were treated to ticker tape parades, addressed joint sessions of
Congress, and some were even considered as presidential contenders.31
By contrast, outside Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, few if any senior Administration officials
or Members of Congress enjoyed a similar status among the American people, during or after the
war. At a personal and political level, these current and future senior general and flag officers
might have been viewed as being a bit too powerful—not unlike the proconsuls of the Roman
Empire. Given these concerns, legislators might have considered a ten year gap in service as
ample time for their “stars to fade” as well as for their influence to diminish to an acceptable
level.32
Mixed in with the debate on how to best design a new military organizational structure were
service rivalries which translated into deep differences of opinion between the Departments of
War and the Navy about whether to reorganize under a single department. While the Army argued
for bringing the departments together under a single civilian authority, the Navy maintained that
doing so—thereby removing the cabinet-level status of Service secretaries—would overly
empower a single individual.33 Ultimately, as 1947 approached, it became clear that President
Truman’s preference for a single civilian Secretary of National Defense would prevail, against the
protests of the Department of the Navy. Subsequently, debates about the new Secretary of
National Defense were occasionally peppered with concerns about whether, under this new
construct, the Department of the Navy might have primacy over the Department of War (or vice-
versa), especially if the new Secretary had served in one service or the other.34
Taken together, these three factors appear to have raised concerns that one byproduct of World
War II might be the over-militarization of American society—a development that Truman himself
feared. Added to this, the creation of a new Department of National Defense, under a single
Secretary, caused many to wonder whether doing so might make the new defense establishment
too powerful relative to the rest of the U.S. government, thereby undermining the principle of
civilian control of the military. Yet several key post-war developments, in particular the rise of
Soviet aggression, the belief that occupation and reformation of Germany and Japan was
necessary to produce long-term peace, and the near-collapse of the British empire, underscored to
many American leaders that the United States would need to assume a greater share of the burden

31 Discussion with Andrew Feickert, CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces.
32 Discussion with Andrew Feickert, CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces.
33 Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders, U.S.
Department of Defense, Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense) 1997. See also Testimony of Brig.
Gen. Merritt A. Edson, United States Marine Corps, on Wednesday, May 7, 1947 in which he states, “ Another thing
which I would like to point out is that in my opinion, if we set up a joint staff, at the head of all the armed forces, which
again in my opinion follows the footsteps of those nations which have become militaristic, that there will immediately
ensue within that staff, a struggle for supremacy, Army, Navy, or Air, and eventually one of them will come out on top.
Normally it is the ground forces who predominate because the ground forces in war, through sheer weight of numbers
and the fact that decision is made on the ground, gain that control. In my opinion, sir, it would be just as bad to have
any other branch dominate your national general staff. It makes no difference whether it is the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, or the Air Force, no single service, especially in a nation like ours, which is a maritime and an insular nation,
should gain supremacy over all of the armed forces.” p. 634; “National Defense Establishment (Unification of the
Armed Services): Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session, on S
. 758, Part 3, various dates in April and May 1947.
34 See ibid. p.8; Alice C. Cole et al (eds), Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization,
1944-1978 (Washington, DC, 1978, pp. 17-21.; Ed Cray,. General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and
Statesman. Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
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for promoting international stability than ever before. Greater U.S. involvement in the world
therefore necessitated more serious consideration of how the institutions governing the military
might be better organized. The problem of peacetime military and national security organization
could no longer be ignored. The question then became how to establish this new, overarching
department in a manner that addressed the concerns of the day—in particular, managing inter-
service rivalry—while preserving the principle of civilian control of the military.
Preserving Civilian Control of the Military in the 1947 Act and
Restricting the Position of Secretary of Defense
The overall intention of the 1947 National Security Act was to ensure that the American
instruments of national security and defense might be better prepared and organized in order to
meet the challenges presented by the post-war period and the dawn of the Cold War. As such, in
designing a new National Military Establishment (which would subsequently be redesignated as
the Department of Defense), Congress sought to create greater unity of command while at the
same time ensuring that the institution they were creating—and the individuals they would be
empowering to lead it—would not threaten the principle of civilian control of the military.35
As enacted in 1947, Section 202 of the National Security Act (later codified as 10 U.S.C. §113)
stipulated that a person “who has within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer
in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary
of Defense.” This provision emerged from conference negotiations—while both the House and
Senate bills required the Secretary of Defense to be a civilian appointed by the President, the
House bill specified that the Secretary of Defense “shall not have held a commission in a Regular
component of the armed services.” Historic congressional documentation is silent on the specific
reasons for arriving at this compromise. However, one can infer from the statements made by
Members of Congress as they debated the 1947 act, as well as the historical context at the time,
that some viewed a break between military service and a Secretary of Defense appointment as
desirable. This would help ensure that no one military service dominated the newly established
Defense Department; ensure that the new Secretary of Defense was truly the President’s (rather
than a service’s) representative; and, again, preserve the principle of civilian control of the
military at a time when the United States was departing from its century-and-a-half long tradition
of a small standing military.
Suspending the Restrictions on Prior Military Service of the
Secretary of Defense: The Appointment of General Marshall
The new national security apparatus—and the restrictions imposed upon the new Secretary of
Defense position—were quickly put to the test as the United States became involved in the
Korean War. Increasingly displeased with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, and
recognizing the need to “choose a person of great national prestige to head the Department of
Defense” in light of the “controversy surrounding Johnson’s performance” and U.S. military
readiness deficits exposed by the first months of the Korean War, President Truman approached

35 Other measures designed to ensure that the principle of civilian control was upheld included preserving the civilian
service secretaries and ensuring that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a relatively weak position compared
to the other service chiefs, and out of the chain of command.
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General Marshall in early September 1950 to ask if he would “act as Secretary of Defense
through the crisis [of the Korean War] if [President Truman] could get Congressional approval.”36
By 1950, General Marshall already had a distinguished career, having served in senior civilian
and military positions, both in and out of the U.S. government. General Marshall was one of four
World War II-era Army generals first temporarily designated as a five-star General of the Army in
1944, retiring in 1947 from that rank.37 In November 1945, Truman sent Marshall to China in an
unsuccessful attempt to mediate the civil war between Nationalists and Communists. He returned
to the United States in January 1947 to become secretary of state for two years, a position without
statutory restrictions. In that capacity, he presided over the formulation of the Truman Doctrine,
the Marshall Plan, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and negotiation of the
NATO pact. After he left the State Department he achieved further distinction as president of the
American Red Cross.38
In 1949, General Marshall was returned by his request to “the active [duty] list of the Regular
Army on March 1, 1949.”39 For administrative purposes following his restoration to the Army
active duty list, General Marshall was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.40
In this role, General Marshall had no official position in the Army command structure, and had
minimal official military duties and responsibilities.
General Marshall accepted President Truman’s request to nominate him as Secretary of Defense,
on the condition that if confirmed, his tenure would be limited to a period of six months to a
year.41 Accordingly, on September 13, 1950, President Truman forwarded a legislative proposal to
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that addressed two restrictions in statute that
would otherwise prevent Marshall’s nomination. These included 10 U.S.C. §113 (described
earlier in this report) and 10 U.S.C. §576, which, at the time, barred officers on the active list of
the Army from holding civil office, either by election or by appointment, and stipulated that

36 As reported in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 422; see
also Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders,
(Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), p. 64. A full analysis of the
circumstances contributing to Johnson’s removal as Secretary of Defense is outside the scope of this report—for a brief
discussion of Johnson’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, see the biographical overview provided by the Historical Office
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense at http://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/
571265/louis-a-johnson/.
37 In addition to Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Henry H. “Hap” Arnold were all
designated as a five-star General of the Army in December 1944. Through P.L. 81-59, in following with the
establishment of the U.S. Air Force as a separate and distinct military service branch through the National Security Act
of 1947, Arnold’s rank and grade as a five-star General of the Army was re-designated, making him the first (and to
date only) five-star General of the Air Force.
38 Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders,
(Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), p. 64; see also “Harry S. Truman
Administration: George C. Marshall,” at http://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/
571266/george-c-marshall/.
39 See P.L. 79-333, sec. 1. Section 4 of P.L. 78-482 specified that individuals appointed under the act “shall, while on
active duty, receive the same pay and allowances as a rear admiral of the upper half, plus a personal money allowance
of $5,000 per annum.” Section 5 of P.L. 78-482 specified that those officers serving in the grade or rank of Fleet
Admiral or General of the Army “shall, upon retirement or revision to the retired list, as the case may be, have on the
retired list the highest grade or rank held by him on the active list or active duty: Provided, That each officer shall be
entitled to retired pay equal to 75 per centum of the active-duty pay provided herein for an officer.”
40 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appointment of General of the Army George C.
Marshall as Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 15, 1950, H.Rept. 81-3094, p. 2.
41 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 422.
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officers who accepted or exercised the functions of a civil office had to vacate their commissions,
thereby ceasing to be an officer of the Army. In a cover letter accompanying the proposal, the
President addressed the committee heads, Truman noted:
Attached is a draft of legislation which would permit General George C. Marshall to serve
as Secretary of Defense. I request that you lay this matter before your committee with a
view of obtaining early and favorable action by the Congress. I am a firm believer in the
general principle that our national defense establishment should be headed by a civilian.
However, in view of the present critical circumstances and General Marshall’s unusual
qualifications, I believe that the national interest will be served best by making an exception
in this case.42
While the measure had the support of many Members, it also encountered significant opposition
from other Members, both at the committee and floor levels in each chamber. Supporters of the
bill contended that the crisis of the ongoing Korean War justified making an exception to the
relevant statutes for General Marshall, who was viewed as uniquely and exceptionally qualified
for the position. Opponents of the measure asserted that the principle of civilian control over the
military superseded all other considerations, including General Marshall’s personal qualifications
and the pressure of external circumstances. (For a detailed legislative history, see the Appendix.)
As enacted, P.L. 81-788 suspended, for General Marshall’s nomination only, those two statutory
provisions preventing his consideration for the position of Secretary of Defense. P.L. 81-788 also
included a nonbinding section outlining congressional intent in providing President Truman with
the authority to nominate General Marshall:
It is hereby expressed as the intent of the Congress that the authority granted by this Act is
not to be construed as approval by the Congress of continuing appointments of military
men to the office of Secretary of Defense in the future. It is hereby expressed as the sense
of the Congress that after General Marshall leaves the office of Secretary of Defense, no
additional appointments of military men to that office shall be approved.
President Truman submitted the nomination of General Marshall to be Secretary of Defense to the
Senate on September 18, 1950.43 The Senate Armed Services Committee held a confirmation
hearing for General Marshall on September 19, 1950, and favorably reported the nomination to
the Senate on the same day.44
While the question of civilian control of the military was discussed during the confirmation
hearing, it was not the only issue raised, as General Marshall was also asked to address questions
on a variety of other topics. When asked by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson if he had made any
public statements “on the necessity for ... civilian control” of the Department of Defense,
Marshall replied:
I just made one reference, not with respect to the Secretary of Defense himself, but in
connection with representation on the National Security Council, that I objected in writing,
when I was Secretary of State, to having three representatives of the fighting services on
that Council.45 I thought that representation was out of balance. It ought to be more civil

42 As reproduced in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Report of Proceedings: Presentation of Scroll
to Senator Gurney, 81st Cong., September 13, 1950, pp. 4-5.
43 Congressional Record, September 18, 1950, pp. 15026.
44 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall to be
Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 19, 1950.
45 Marshall is referencing the National Security Act of 1947, which originally placed the secretaries of the military
departments on the National Security Council. 1949 amendments to the National Security Act removed the secretaries
of the military departments from the National Security Council.
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and less military. I made that representation about the second week I was Secretary of State.
I also suggested, although I do not think that it was done in writing, that the Council should
have two or three men, civilians you might say without portfolio, sitting on it. I thought
that would be a very valuable contribution.
Now, to go directly to your question, the only statement I recall having made was when as
a second lieutenant, that I thought we would never get anywhere in the Army unless a
solider was Secretary of War. As I grew a little older and served through some of our
military history, particularly the Philippine Insurrection, I came to the fixed conclusion that
he should never be a solider.46
The Senate voted to confirm General Marshall’s nomination to the office of Secretary of Defense
on September 20, 1950, by a vote of 57-11, with 28 Senators not voting.
Statutory Changes to the Restriction on Secretary of Defense
Eligibility in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
110-181)
Since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the statutory qualification provision
associated with prior military service of the Secretary of Defense has been modified once.
In January 2007, Representative Walter B. Jones JR. introduced H.R. 417, which would have
reduced the eligibility requirement to three years. The provision was adapted and included in the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman’s mark of H.R. 1585, the initial House
committee version of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).47 As reported to
the House on May 11, 2007, by the HASC, H.R. 1585 contained a provision (Section 903) that
would amend sections 113, 132, and 134 of Title 10 of the United States Code, to reduce from 10
years to 5 years the period of time following active duty military service before a commissioned
officer of a regular component could be appointed as Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In a May 2007 press release, Representative
Jones described the language as “[reducing] an outdated prohibition and [enabling] the President
to choose from a greater pool of qualified candidates with relevant military expertise.”48
As the Senate amendment to the House bill contained no similar provision, a compromise was
reached during conference committee negotiations. As enacted, Section 903 of the FY2008
NDAA (P.L. 110-181) reduced from 10 to 7 years the required interval between an individual’s
retirement from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of the armed
services and eligibility for service as Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, or
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Congress and Civilian-Military Relations
Federalist Papers 46 and 59 show that the Founding Fathers were also concerned about unitary executive control
of the military. The desire to ensure that the military reflected, and was subordinate to, the wil of the people
therefore led to considerable congressional powers on matters concerning the armed services. These include the

46 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall to be
Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 19, 1950, p. 10
47 CRS Report RL33999, Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations, by Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and
Amy Belasco.
48 Office of Congressman Walter Jones, “Defense Bill Passes Committee, Jones Authors Several Provisions for
Military,” press release, May 10, 2007, https://jones.house.gov/press-release/defense-bill-passes-committee-jones-
authors-several-provisions-military-1.
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power to lay and col ect taxes for the common defense, the sole power to declare war, the ability to raise and
support armies, and the authority to establish rules and regulations for the army, navy, and militias when in service
of the United States. To further strengthen civilian control of the military, a provision prohibited the appropriation
of money for the army for a period longer than two years. In the post-World War II era, Congress has exercised
this constitutional authority in a number of ways, including (but not limited to) the fol owing:

Annual strategy and posture hearings overseeing the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) plans and programs.

Annually authorizing the scope and priorities for the military’s budget and appropriating monies accordingly.

Establishing new service branches of the U.S. military, such as the U.S. Space Force in 2019 (P.L. 116-92).

Establishing new components of the U.S. military, such as U.S. Special Operations Command (P.L. 99-661).

Setting key DOD strategy production requirements, such as the National Defense Strategy (P.L. 114-328).

Consenting upon the nominations of senior leaders to DOD civilian and military positions.

Cancellation of weapons systems, as with the MBT-70 Supertank in 1971.

Establishing authorities for DOD’s noncombat cooperative activities with other nations’ military and security
establishments (Title 22 U.S. Code; Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 16).

Organizing the military chain of command, for example through the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-
433).

Requiring reporting on key issues and areas of interest to Congress, such as the semi-annual Report on
Stability and Progress in Afghanistan (P.L. 110-181).

Setting criteria for military promotions, for example by requiring military staff in a “joint” position before
becoming eligible for a General or Flag Officer position in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-433).

Setting personnel policies, including repealing DOD’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy toward gay
servicemembers in the military (P.L. 111-321).

Granting specific authorities for the legal conduct of military operations, such as the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40).
Source: CRS In Focus IF11566, Congress, Civilian Control of the Military, and Nonpartisanship, by Kathleen J. McInnis.
The Nomination of Then-General Mattis
Similar to the debates surrounding the nomination of General Marshall in 1950, many observers
agreed that General Mattis was qualified to take on the role of Secretary of Defense. The key
contrast between the debates in the early 1950s and 2017 was that the public discussion
surrounding the proposed nomination of Mattis was less about preserving the principle of civilian
control of the military (although that was certainly debated), and more about civilian-military
relations more generally. Few observers, if any, appeared to express concern that Mattis, if
appointed to the position of Secretary of Defense, would compromise the longstanding American
tradition of ensuring that the military remains subordinate to the authority of civilian
leaders. Instead, the debate surrounding the appointment of Mattis was a more wide-ranging
discussion on a key question he raises in his own book: whether over 40 years of an all-volunteer
force—of which, the last 15 had seen continuous war—significantly altered the ways in which the
U.S. military, civil society, and civilian leaders relate to each other.49 Several observers
maintained that after the end of the Cold War, but particularly since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, frictions and unhealthy tensions emerged between the military and its
civilian leadership, although few contended at the time that these tensions might meaningfully
challenge the principle of civilian control.50 Some of those issues and tensions were discussed

49 Jim Mattis and Kori S. Schake (eds), Warriors and Citizens: American Views of our Military, (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press) 2016.
50 Richard H. Kohn “Out of control: the crisis in civil-military relations.” The National Interest 35 (1994): 3-17.
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during a January 10, 2017, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on civilian control of the
armed forces.51 Views raised during that hearing include the following:
 Concerns Regarding Possible Politicization of the Military.
Senator Jack Reed: During this past presidential election cycle, both Democrats and
Republicans came dangerously close to compromising the non-partisan nature of our
military when the nominating conventions featured speeches from recently retired general
officers advocating for a candidate for President. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, stated shortly after the conventions, “If senior military
leaders, active and retired, begin to self-identify as members or supporters of one party or
another, than the inherent tension built into our system of government between the
executive branch and the legislative branch will bleed over into suspicion of military
leaders by Congress and a further erosion of civilian-military relations.52
Kathleen Hicks: Were recently retired or Active Duty military officers routinely selected
for Secretary of Defense or to widely populate senior civilian positions in government, it
would risk furthering incentives for Active Duty officers to politicize their speech and/or
actions and for civilians to seek to ascertain the political viewpoints as part of the
recruitment and hiring process for political positions.53
 Concerns Regarding Establishing Precedent.
Senator Jack Reed: Finally, if Congress provides an exception for General Mattis, a
question this committee must address is the precedent this action sets for such waivers in
the future. The restriction was enacted into law for good reason. General George Marshall
is the only retired military officer to receive this exception. I personally believe such
waivers would destroy the principle that is so critical to the central tenet of our civil-
military relations.54
 Concerns regarding Diversity of Opinion in National Security Policymaking.
Eliot Cohen: … there is a breadth of view and perspective essential to running the military
and making war that is not likely to be found in someone who has spent 30 or 40 years in
uniform. The Armed Forces are what one sociologist has called a ‘total institution,’
comparable in some ways to the priesthood in the Catholic Church. A career of military
service affects every feature of one’s life, down to how one wears one’s hair. Living in
such an institution and removed from civil society through the prime of one’s life can be a
narrowing as well as a broadening experience, and it certainly leaves an indelible mark. It
is one reason why, in a certain sense, generals never retire.55
Senator Perdue: … I think we’re facing a very unique and dangerous global security crisis
today. I can’t compare it to 1950. It’s different. They didn’t have cyberwarfare back then.
They didn’t have a nuclear North Korea. They didn’t have an arms race in space. I think
the need for integration between diplomacy and development and military capability has

51 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of the Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 10, 2017.
52 Senator Jack Reed, Opening Statement, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of
the Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
53 Kathleen Hicks, Opening Statement, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of the
Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
54 Senator Jack Reed, Opening Statement, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of
the Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
55 Eliot Cohen, Opening Statement, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of the
Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
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never been greater or more complicated. Because of that unique circumstance, I think, like
General Marshall, General Mattis offers us a unique combination of skillsets and mindsets
that make him an ideal candidate…56
Eliot Cohen: … countries that have routinely installed generals as Ministers of War or
Defense have often had problematic patterns of civil-military relations, and suffered
military failures as well.57
 Impact on Department of Defense Politics.
Eliot Cohen: Having a recently retired general officer as Secretary of Defense poses all
kinds of practical problems. Would they be inclined to favor the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
military, over the Office of the Secretary of Defense, civilian? Would they be inclined to
favor their own service over the others? Would they bypass the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as the senior military advisor to the President? Would they allow the normal
rivalries or close friendships of their military career to affect their position of civilian head
of the Department? Even the appearance of such biases, let alone the reality, would make
effective leadership of the Department of Defense difficult or indeed impossible.58
 The dynamic nature of civilian-military relations.
Senator John McCain: Indeed, the separation between civilian and military positions has
not always been so clear. Twelve of our Nation’s Presidents previously served as generals
in the Armed Forces. Over the years, numerous high-ranking civilian officials in the
Department of Defense have had long careers in military service… The proper balance in
civil-military relations is difficult to achieve and, as history has taught us, achieving that
balance requires different leaders at different times.59
Ultimately, many in Congress at that time, despite expressing some concern with the possible
negative impacts upon civil-military relations, did not block passage block passage of “waiver”
legislation allowing Mattis to serve as Secretary of Defense. The House of Representatives voted
268-151 and the Senate recorded 60 votes in the affirmative in favor of the waiver legislation
(S.84). P.L. 155-2 was passed on January 20, 2017.
Recent Tensions in the U.S. Civil-Military
Relationship
According to many observers, the strategic and political context in which Austin’s nomination
may be considered is one that is markedly different from that of four years ago.
Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities
In particular, some contend that civil-military relations have experienced such significant tensions
and setbacks in recent years as to require a recalibration of the roles of civilian and military
positions and organizations within the Department of Defense. For example, the National Defense

56 Senator David Perdue, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of the Armed Forces,
115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
57 Eliot Cohen, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of the Armed Forces, 115th
Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
58 Ibid.
59 Senator John McCain, Opening Statement. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of
the Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 2017.
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Strategy Commission, a congressionally mandated bipartisan group of external experts charged
with reviewing the National Defense Strategy, argues in its 2018 report that “civilian voices have
been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy,
undermining the concept of civilian control.”60 At issue are concerns regarding military
dominance over defense policy decisions and an attendant view that the civilian components of
DOD have been diminished in recent years. Observers point to both policy and human capital
dimensions of the issue. With respect to the former, some maintain that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as well as the organization that supports him, have been assigned—or
taken on—tasks that are inappropriate given the Chairman’s role as a military advisor. The CJCS
is a position that was initially designed to be a neutral arbiter between the military services and
the principal military advisor to the President rather than an operationally focused one; this is
why the Chairman is not in the military chain of command. Yet recent augmentations to the
statutory role of the Chairman to lead joint force development and global force integration have
led to concerns by some that CJCS may be becoming more an inherently more directive position
(and therefore more political) than initially envisioned in statute.61 According to this view, the
cumulative result of these actions is “weakening significantly” the civilian oversight of key DOD
posture and planning decisions.62 The NDSC, for its part, pointed to insufficient civilian oversight
of DOD’s force management as argued for the need to improve civil-military relations:
The implementation of the NDS must feature empowered civilians fulfilling their statutory
responsibilities, particularly regarding issues of force management. Put bluntly, allocating
priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter.
It is an inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the proper
competency and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders. Unless global force
management is nested under higher-order guidance from civilians, an effort to centralize
defense direction under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may succeed
operationally but produce profound strategic problems. It is critical that DOD—and
Congress—reverse the unhealthy trend in which decision-making is drifting away from
civilian leaders on issues of national importance. 63
A (Very) Brief History of the U.S. Military Chain of Command
The division of labor between military and civilian leaders in the way that the United States commands and
controls its forces is in large part a product of an inherent tension between improving the effectiveness of U.S.
forces, on the one hand, and preserving civilian control of the military, on the other. The experience of World
War II convinced President Truman, among others, that a greater degree of coordination and integration between
the U.S. military services was necessary to improve the conduct of military operations. Yet there was concern at
the time that integrating these institutions might result in an overly powerful military staff element that could
threaten the principle of civilian control of U.S. forces.
The resulting compromise was to create a Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprising all the military service chiefs, and
headed by a Chairman, serving as an advisory body only. As a corporate body, it was specifically not designed to
exercise command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) had no command authority. The Secretary of
Defense remained the only civilian in the chain of command besides the President of the United States.

60 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National
Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute for Peace, November 2018.
61 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3050.1, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design,
December 3, 2019. Mara Karlin, Alice Hunt Friend and Loren Dejonge Schulman, “Two Cheers for Esper’s Plan to
Reassert Civilian Control of the Military,” Defense One September 9, 2019.
62 Mara Karlin, Alice Hunt Friend and Loren Dejonge Schulman, “Two Cheers for Esper’s Plan to Reassert Civilian
Control of the Military,” Defense One September 9, 2019.
63 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National
Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute for Peace, November 2018, p. xi.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff did, however, have responsibility for establishing “unified combatant commands,” which
were charged with executing military operations in different parts of the world and combining the capabilities of
two or more military services. Different service chiefs were assigned executive and administrative responsibilities
for these combatant commands, which gave them a de facto mechanism through which they could influence
ongoing military operations. By 1953, the authority to establish Combatant Commands (COCOMs) was assigned
to the Secretary of Defense, although the relative ambiguity of the chain of command remained a feature of DOD
operations until 1986.
Perceived shortcomings in the U.S. chain of command led to demonstrable failures during several incidents in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. The military services, in the view of many observers, failed to effectively plan or
conduct operations jointly due to confusion over whether the military services or unified combatant commanders
were ultimately in charge of operations. These incidents include the operation in Grenada, the Iranian hostage
rescue attempt (often referred to as “Desert One”), and the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.
In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act (P.L. 99-433), which mandated clarifications
to the chain of command. The current command and control architecture for DOD is a product of these
congressionally mandated changes.
The Chain of Command in Statute
Title 10 U.S.C. §162 specifies that the chain of command goes from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to
Commanders of Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as an intermediary,
transmitting orders between the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of Combatant Commands. Each
Combatant Commander is a four-star Flag or General Officer, whose appointment is confirmed by the Senate.
Source: CRS In Focus IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, by Kathleen J. McInnis.
With respect to the personnel dimensions of recent civil-military tensions, some express concern
regarding departure of key civilian mid- and senior-level positions in DOD, as well as the overall
declining health of the DOD civil service, have contributed to a shift away from robust civilian
oversight, practically speaking. 64 Some of these trends have spanned multiple Administrations.
According to one observer, “Budget cuts under the Budget Control Act of 2011 led to a series of
hiring freezes and cuts to the civil service, which depleted the workforce and contributed to poor
morale.”65 Another observer argues that “civilian oversight of the military was already weakening
in the last administration, and I think it basically fell off a cliff.…”66 Others point to the Trump
Administration’s frequent description of civil servants as the “deep state” with their own agenda
as further compounding issues of low morale—and relatively low workforce retention—in the
national security civil service.67
Overreliance Upon Military Servicemembers on Policy Matters?
One criticism many scholars and practitioners raise with respect to then-Secretary Mattis’s tenure
as Secretary of Defense: an overreliance upon advice from uniformed military colleagues at the
expense of that of civil servants. This issue has both structural and personality-oriented
dimensions. With respect to the former, concepts like “Best Military Advice”—a term that has
become more frequently used in recent years—are viewed by some as inherently problematic, as
the term has come to connote that military advice on strategic matters is more valuable than
comparable guidance formulated and promulgated by civilian leaders.68 With respect to the latter,

64 Lara Seligman, “How the Generals are Routing the Policy Wonks at the Pentagon,” Foreign Policy, November 15,
2018.
65 Brian McKeon, as quoted in ibid.
66 Loren Dejonge Schulman, Managing the National Security Workforce Crisis, Center for a New American Security,
May 15, 2019.
67 Loren Dejonge Schulman, as quoted in Lara Seligman.
68 As Mara Karlin and Jim Golby note, “First, the emphasis on ‘best’ in best military advice creates an impression,
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some observers contend that Secretary Mattis exacerbated these structurally misalignments in the
civilian-military relationship by delegating key civilian policymaking and other tasks to the Joint
Staff rather than empowering his civilian leaders.6970 According to some, these tendencies were
arguably exacerbated by the Trump Administration’s reliance on acting officials and delays in
civilian appointments, and continued after Mattis departed office.71 Some observers contend,
however, that these aspects of Mattis’s tenure are overshadowed by his overall successful
management and leadership of the Department of Defense, particularly given complex national
security crises such as the 2017 North Korean test of an intercontinental ballistic missile thought
capable of reaching the continental United States.72
Military Involvement in Domestic Politics?
Some scholars have argued that the appointment of recently retired generals to civilian political
positions further blurs the lines between appropriate civilian and military roles, and between
foreign and domestic politics. A recent study notes that large numbers of Americans could not
differentiate whether Secretary Mattis had retired or whether he was still on active duty, which
some say was exacerbated by President Trump’s frequent referring to Mattis by his military
rank.73 Further, there is an ongoing debate about whether blurred lines between active duty
military officers and partisan politics are influencing societal perceptions about the military’s role
in domestic and electoral politics.
The possible use of federal armed forces as part of the U.S. executive branch’s response to
incidents of violence during June 2020 protests and unrest also raised questions about how the
military is controlled by domestic political institutions and the U.S. military’s relationship with
American society. For example, the June 1, 2020, photographing of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Milley in Lafayette Square immediately after protestors had been forcibly removed from
the area was seen by some (including, on June 11, Milley himself) to have created a perception of

perhaps unintentionally, that military advice is superior to civilian perspectives. Given that there is no civilian corollary
to this term, its use suggests that military voices should carry more weight than civilian voices during policy debates. It
also suggests that military advice is both more certain, and more unified, than it often is in reality. These perceptions
often serve to undermine trust with civilian leaders and interagency counterparts, and they call into question
professional norms related to humility and selfless service.” Mara Karlin and Jim Golby, “Why ‘Best Military Advice’
is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civilians” Orbis, vol. 62, issue 1, 2018, pp. 137-153.
69 Jim Golby, “In the Wake of Chaos: Civil-Military Relations Under Secretary Jim Mattis,” War on the Rocks,
February 4, 2019.
70 In the American system of civilian control of the military, the relationship between civilian and military leaders is
intended to be unequal in that the military is subordinate to civilian leadership and direction. Some observers contend,
however, that an unintended consequence of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reform Act, the Joint Staff has been
empowered and strengthened relative to their civilian counterparts. See, for example: Luke Strange, “The Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs: An Unequal Dialogue in Which Direction?” The Strategy Bridge, January
15, 2019.
71 Jim Golby, “In the Wake of Chaos: Civil-Military Relations Under Secretary Jim Mattis,” War on the Rocks,
February 4, 2019.
72 CRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated
by Kathleen J. McInnis; Peter Feaver, “Mattis Was the Best Secretary of Defense Trump Could Have Had,” Foreign
Policy, February 12, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/12/mattis-was-the-best-secretary-of-defense-trump-
could-have-had/.
73Heidi Urben, “Generals Shouldn’t Be Welcome At These Parties: Stopping Retired Flag Officer Endorsements,” War
on the Rocks, July 27, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/generals-shouldnt-be-welcome-at-these-parties-
stopping-retired-flag-officer-endorsements/.
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the military’s involvement in domestic politics.74 In the wake of June 1, several retired senior
military leaders, including former Secretary of Defense Mattis, voiced their concern about the use
of National Guard personnel in a manner that appeared to infringe on Americans’ constitutional
right to free assembly. General Milley and then-Secretary of Defense Esper also subsequently
expressed regrets at being perceived as part of a partisan political act and affirmed that the U.S.
military remains a nonpartisan institution.75 In retrospect, most observers contend that the
incident itself was an unfortunate misstep. Still, questions regarding the appropriate—and
inappropriate—use of the military to respond to domestic political unrest by senior political
leaders is now a factor in the discourse surrounding civilian control of the military.
The Proposed Nomination of General Lloyd Austin
(Ret.), U.S. Army
As was the case when General Mattis was nominated, perceptions regarding the wisdom of
nominating a recently retired military officer to the position of Secretary of Defense tend to be
largely predicated upon one’s opinions on the overall health of the broader civilian-military
relationship. In the view of some, overreliance upon recently retired generals to fill key national
security and government leadership positions—including that of the Secretary of Defense—is
“dangerous,” as doing so might upset the balance between the military and the rest of the
government.76 To others, focusing on whether an individual has had prior military experience
obfuscates a more important and substantive conversation on the meaning of the principle of
civilian control of the military today, and that there are more, and more effective, mechanisms for
underscoring civilian control than the statutory “cooling off” period.77 Others have maintained
that rigid adherence to a formal, and superficial, interpretation of civilian-military relations is
“dangerous” in an era when both state and non-state actors possess means of coercion and the
lines between “civilian” and “military” spheres is increasingly blurred.78 Still others contend that
the possibility of addressing longstanding, societal-wide civilian-military issues associated with
inadequate racial diversity and inclusion in the Department of Defense outweigh the drawbacks
associated with placing another recently retired General Officer in the position of Secretary of
Defense.
Another school of thought suggests that the process for considering a recently retired military
officer for the position of Secretary of Defense is just as important—if not more so—than the
appointment itself. Civilian control of the military in the United States can be thought of as a set
of norms that are, at least in part, underpinned by legal requirements.79 As norms are a social

74 CRS In Focus IF11566, Congress, Civilian Control of the Military, and Nonpartisanship, by Kathleen J. McInnis.
75 General Mark Milley, “Statement on Lafayette Square,” as linked by Helene Cooper, “Milley Apologizes for Role in
Trump Photo Op: ‘I Should Not Have Been There,’” The New York Times, June 11, 2020.
76 Loren DeJonge Schulman and Phillip Carter, “Trump is Surrounding Himself with Generals. That’s Dangerous,” The
Washington Post, November 30, 2016.
77 Mark Nevitt, “Important Context Missing from the Austin Nomination,” Just Security, December 17, 2020.
78 Rosa Brooks, “Don’t Freak Out About Trump’s Cabinet Full of Generals,” Foreign Policy, December 2, 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/02/the-founding-fathers-wouldnt-freak-out-about-trumps-cabinet-full-of-generals/. It
should be noted that in recent commentary on the possible appointment of Austin, Ms. Brooks has argued that a waiver
ought not be granted. See Rosa Brooks, “The Pentagon Needs More Civilian Control Over The Military, Not Less,”
The Washington Post, December 9, 2020.
79 According to one scholar, norms are “beliefs shared by a community about who they are, what the world is like, and
given these two things, what they can and should do in given circumstances…. Norms function to regulate behavior by
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construct that can be difficult to pinpoint, a measure by which some analysts gauge the existence
and strength of a norm is by the discussions surrounding their possible violation. In other words,
absent the existence of norms, actors would not feel compelled to mention the issue at all.80
Applied to the issue at hand, some might maintain that the vibrancy of the public debate
surrounding Austin’s proposed nomination is an indication that the norm of civilian control of the
military remains healthy. According to this view, ensuring appropriate ventilation of the issues
and risks associated with the appointment of a recently retired general to the position of Secretary
of Defense is a key aspect of underscoring the importance of the norm for American democracy.
Relatedly, some others also contend that the norm of civilian control of the military could be
strengthened by a public commitment by Austin to healthy civilian-military relations, should he
be confirmed.81
Civilian Control of the Military
Some questions Congress may explore when considering the overall health of civil-military
relations today, and whether to waive statutory provisions associated with Mr. Austin’s
nomination, include the following:
 Might the appointment of a recently retired General create the risk of
politicizing the military? Overall, the military, as a profession, takes great pains
to ensure that it stays nonpartisan so as to help ensure that the Commander-in-
Chief has respect for the integrity of the military advice provided to them.82 In
taking a senior cabinet-level position such as that of Secretary of Defense, might
this change the President’s view regarding whether the advice they are receiving
from their military advisors is truly nonpartisan? Kori Schake, citing her book on
civil-military relations that she co-edited with James Mattis, finds that political
elites are increasingly viewing the military as “just another actor in political
debates.”83 Somewhat related, what are the messages that the military forces
more broadly are taking from this appointment? Might it suggest to some that
affiliation with a political party is key to advancement to senior levels of the
government, especially given the 2017 appointment of retired General Mattis to
the position of Secretary of Defense?84
 Has U.S. foreign policymaking been over-militarized, and would the
appointment of another recently retired General make it even more so?

defining the rules of the game.” See Theo Farrell, The norms of war: cultural beliefs and modern conflict (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).
80 Finnemore M, Sikkink K. “International norm dynamics and political change,” International Organization, 1998
October 1:887-917.
81 Peter Feaver, “Why Generals Shouldn’t Be a Lock to Lead the Pentagon—And How Lloyd Austin Can Ease Those
Concerns” Politico, December 9, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/09/generals-pentagon-
defense-secretary-military-civilian-norm-443989; letter from Elissa Slotkin, Member of Congress, Colin Allred,
Member of Congress, and Salud Carbajal, Member of Congress, et al. to Lloyd Austin, Secretary-Designee, December
18, 2020, http://www.slotkin.house.gov/sites/slotkin.house.gov/files/wysiwg_uploaded/FILE_7387.pdf.
82 General Martin Dempsey (USA, Ret), “Keep your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals and Admirals,” Defense
One, August 1, 2016. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/keep-your-politics-private-my-fellow-generals-and-
admirals/130404/.
83 Kori Schake, “All the President’s Generals,” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/author/
kori-schake/.
84 Michael Robinson, Risa Brooks and Heidi Urben, “How Biden’s Pick for Defense Secretary Might Shake Up Civil-
Military Relations,” Political Violence at a Glance, December 8, 2020.
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Particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many scholars and
practitioners have argued that U.S. foreign policy has become more
“militarized.”85 As evidence, these observers point to (among other things) the
growth of DOD’s role in security cooperation,86 the heightened stature and power
of combatant commanders relative to ambassadors,87 and the dominance of
defense spending relative to other international affairs spending.88 According to
this view, the militarization of foreign policy also represents an ends-ways-means
disconnect, as many of the security challenges the United States faces requires
comprehensive, “whole-of-government,” rather than solely military, solutions.89
Some therefore maintain that the appointment of a recently retired General to the
position of Secretary of Defense might further exacerbate that trend.90
 In formulating and executing national security policy, what are the appropriate
roles and responsibilities between civilian leaders and the military? Four years
ago, a number of observers shared the view that civilian leaders and institutions
in the U.S. national security community, particularly in the National Security
Council, were “micromanaging” the Department of Defense. This led the
Congress to pass a provision in P.L. 114-328, the FY2017 National Defense
Authorization Act, limiting the size of its professional staff to 200 persons.91

85 See, for example, Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray (eds), Mission Creep? The Militarization of U.S Foreign Policy,
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press) 2014; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearing
on Department of Defense and Department of State Partnership, 110th Cong., April 15, 2008; Rosa Brooks, How the
Pentagon Became Walmart,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2016.
86 John R. Deni, “Obama’s Failure to Demilitarize U.S. Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks, October 30, 2015,
https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/obamas-failure-to-demilitarize-u-s-foreign-policy/; Nina M. Serafino, “Foreign
Assistance in Camouflage? Measuring the Military Security Cooperation Role,” as found in Gordon Adams and Shoon
Murray (eds), Mission Creep? The Militarization of U.S Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press) 2014.
87 See, for example, Charles Ray, “Defining Lines of Authority,” Armed Forces Journal, February 1, 2009. Available at
http://armedforcesjournal.com/defining-lines-of-authority/. Shoon Murray and Anthony Quintain, “Combatant
Commanders, Ambassadorial Authority, and the Conduct of Diplomacy,” as found in Gordon Adams and Shoon
Murray (eds), Mission Creep? The Militarization of U.S Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press) 2014. On pp. 185-186, the authors argue, “If the question is whether the role of the combatant commander has
become so expansive that it fundamental challenges the traditional role of the Ambassador as the principal interlocutor
between the US government and a foreign government, the answer is ‘No.’... But if the question is whether the
combatant commanders and the activities of the COCOMS influence US relations at the country level, in some cases
playing an agenda-setting role, or more often, pushing a focus on security issues, then our answer is ‘Yes.’”
88 See Micah Zenko, “Don’t Gut the Foreign Operations Budget,” Politics, Power and Preventive Action Blog, Council
on Foreign Relations, August 6, 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/08/06/dont-gut-the-foreign-operations-budget/;
Charles B. Cushman, Jr., “Congress and the Politics of Defense and Foreign Policy Making,” as found in Gordon
Adams and Shoon Murray (eds), Mission Creep? The Militarization of U.S Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press) 2014.
89 Clark A. Murdock, Michéle A. Flournoy, et al. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for
a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005; James R. Locher, “Forging a
new shield,” Project on National Security Reform. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency (2008).
90 Loren DeJonge Schulman and Phillip Carter, “Trump is Surrounding Himself with Generals. That’s Dangerous,” The
Washington Post, November 30, 2016.
91 The conference report for S. 2943, Section 1089, notes that “a larger NSC staff has created bureaucratic
inefficiencies, incentivized staff involvement in operational and tactical national security decisions, weakened national
security prioritization, and undermined strategic guidance that the country’s national security apparatus requires to
integrate and implement policy successfully.” Chairman Thornberry put forward a similar provision in H.R. 4909,
noting in a press release that, “reforming the National Security Council (NSC) In recent years, the NSC has been
repeatedly criticized for micromanagement. It has evolved from an advisory and coordinating body to a large,
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Today, the overriding concern appears to be the lack of personnel in key roles to
perform civilian oversight over plans, priorities and other DOD activities. Are
responsibilities, authorities and resources appropriately aligned between
governmental civilian and military institutions, both within DOD and between the
Department of Defense and the broader interagency national security
community?
 Relatedly, does the U.S. military’s all-volunteer force, in which a relatively
small proportion of the population has served, make it harder for the public
to understand the military as an institution, and vice-versa? Is it making it
more difficult for civilian leaders to understand the military as a profession
and the utility of force in accomplishing national security objectives?
 Might the appointment of a recently retired General favor one service above
others in key decisions? Most key leaders bring their own networks of
colleagues and subordinates into their organization and rely upon them to
accomplish their strategic priorities. According to some observers, this aspect of
DOD leadership can become problematic when a Secretary of Defense is reliant
upon members of their former service in this manner.92 This is because many of
the key political debates within DOD are between military services as they
advocate for resources; in that context, a neutral Secretary of Defense who can
adjudicate disputes is generally thought to be advantageous.
 What is the role of Congress in the civilian-military relationship? Debates
and discussions on civil-military relations have tended to focus on the military’s
relationship with civil society broadly, or with the commander-in-chief and their
political appointees. The Constitution, by providing that key responsibilities for
the raising and maintenance of U.S. armed forces were granted to the legislative
branch, arguably intends for Congress to also play a role in exercising civilian
control of the military which, in turn, can influence the overall health of civil-
military relations. Some policymakers and observers have said the manner and
process through which Congress considers this appointment may have a bearing
on whether the principle of civilian control of the military is upheld.93
Diversity, Inclusion, and the Proposed Nomination
Some observers contend that an insufficiently diverse and inclusive national security workforce is
a significant challenge to the overall health of the Department of Defense.94 Related, some
maintain that the above civilian-military issues, although important, should be weighed against
larger, societal, race-oriented civilian-military issues that might begin to be addressed by a

operational bureaucracy with no oversight or accountability. The NDAA restores the NSC to its original purpose by
capping its staff at 200 people,” https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/
wysiwyg_uploaded/NDAA%20final%20passage%20Summary%20FINAL.pdf.
92 Jim Golby, “Sorry, Gen. Lloyd Austin, A Recently Retired General Should Not Be Secretary of Defense,” The New
York Times, December 7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/opinion/biden-defense-secretary-dod.html.
93 Mark Nevitt, “Important Context Missing from the Austin Nomination Debate,” Just Security, December 17, 2020.
94 Trevor Sutton and Carolyn Kenney, “Diversifying and Strengthening Our National Security Workforce,” Center for
American Progress, January 10, 2017, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2017/01/10/296300/
diversifying-and-strengthening-our-national-security-workforce/. See also H.R. 6395 National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Sections 551-558.
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Secretary of Defense nominee, should he or she choose to prioritize diversity and inclusion within
DOD.95 In announcing Austin’s proposed nomination, President-Elect Joseph R. Biden argues
And the next secretary of defense will have to make sure that our armed forces reflect and
promote the full diversity of our nation. Austin will bring to the job not only his personal
experience, but the stories of the countless young people he has mentored. If confirmed, he
will ensure that every member of the armed forces is treated with dignity and respect,
including Black, Latino, Asian American, Native American, women, and LGBTQ service
members.96
One national security expert, Bishop Garrison, asserted
Since the official announcement on Dec. 8, the nomination of retired Gen. Lloyd Austin
for secretary of defense has elicited a wide range of responses. Many in the national
security community have, rightfully, raised concerns about nominating a general officer so
recently out of uniform, potentially weakening proper civilian oversight of the department
and bringing the military deeper into partisan politics. However, as this dialogue continues,
we cannot and should not lose sight of what Austin’s selection also means for a country
that finds itself engulfed in societal discourse and upheaval focused largely on race in a
way the United States has not engaged the topic, arguably, since the 1960s Civil Rights
Movement.97
For many observers, the 2020 George Floyd protests highlighted the disparate treatment by
security institutions (in that instance, local police forces) of Black citizens. The protests, in turn,
prompted DOD and other government agencies and departments to reflect on issues related to
systemic racism, racial issues, and racial/ethnic representation.98 Statistics from the Department
of Defense show that as of May 2018, racial minorities made up 30.9% of the Active Duty force
yet 12.5% of the General/Flag officer Corps.99 Of those, Black servicemembers composed 16.8%
of the total Active Duty force and 8.1% of the General/Flag Officer Corps. White Americans
composed 87.5% of the General/Flag Officer Corps at that time.100 In June 2020, of the 41 four-
star level officers in the U.S. military, 2 were Black.101
Similarly, according to the Office of Personnel Management’s data on the federal civilian
workforce, of the 721 persons who served at the General Schedule (GS-15) level in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense in September 2019, 142 were minorities; of those, 61 were Black
Americans.102 With respect to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the entire Department of
Defense, 87.3% of the SES-level personnel in 2013 were White; 6.2% of that workforce were

95 See, for example, Press Release: House Armed Services Vice Chair Anthony Brown: “Gen Lloyd Austin Has the
Character and Competence Necessary to Lead the Department of Defense,” December 8, 2020,
https://anthonybrown.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1124.
96 Joe Biden, “Why I Chose Lloyd Austin as Secretary of Defense,” The Atlantic, December 8, 2020.
97 Bishop Garrison, “Representation At The Top: The Importance of Race in the Austin Nomination Debate,” Just
Security, December 11, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/73833/representation-at-the-top-the-importance-of-race-in-
the-austin-nomination-debate/.
98 Helene Cooper, “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military But Nearly Invisible At the Top,” The New
York Times, June 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities-leadership.html.
99 CRS Report R44321, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Kristy N. Kamarck.
100 Ibid.
101 Helene Cooper, “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military But Nearly Invisible At the Top,” The New
York Times, June 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities-leadership.html.
102 Office of Personnel Management, “Diversity Cube,” FedScope Data Set, accessed December 28, 2020.
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Black.103 In 2019, DOD reported that 6.6% of the SES workforce was Black American.104 As
national security expert Bishop Garrison notes, “No Black person has ever served as deputy
secretary of defense or undersecretary of defense for policy.”105 Meg Guliford, another national
security expert, writes, “But the further I progressed in my career, the less diverse it became. I
have never had a Black or Brown boss and have rarely had Black or Brown co-workers who were
not in purely administrative or support roles.”106
Some contend that this absence of representation at senior levels of DOD has led to blind spots
when it comes to race-related issues in the military.107, 108 Some observers refer to the testimony of
General John Hyten in July 2019:
When I came into the military, I came in from Alabama, into Alabama, and racism was a
big problem in the military. Overt racism. It’s still a systemic problem in our society, but I
watched commander after commander after commander take charge, own that, and anytime
they saw it, eliminated it from the formation…Now when I'm in uniform, I—I feel
colorblind, which is amazing.109
This characterization arguably contrasts with recent polling conducted by the Military Times,
which reports that
[t]he 2019 survey found that 36 percent of troops who responded have seen evidence of
white supremacist and racist ideologies in the military, a significant rise from the year
before, when only 22 percent—about 1 in 5—reported the same in the 2018 poll... Poll
participants reported witnessing incidents including racist language and discriminatory
attitudes from peers, but also more specific examples like swastikas being drawn on service

103 Department of Defense Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, DOD Diversity and Inclusion
Summer 2013 Report, B6, https://web.archive.org/web/20200606192308/https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/
Documents/ODMEO%20Diversity%20and%20Inclusion%20Summary%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
104 Department of Defense, “Portrait of Black /African American Active Duty Service Members,” available at
https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Images/AA%202020_ACC.pdf?ver=2020-02-18-072209-043.
105 Bishop Garrison, “Representation At The Top: The Importance of Race in the Austin Nomination Debate,” Just
Security, December 11, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/73833/representation-at-the-top-the-importance-of-race-in-
the-austin-nomination-debate/.
106 Meg Guliford, “What Lloyd Austin’s Nomination Really Reveals And What It Means For Me,” Inkstick Media,
December 23, 2020.
107 Helene Cooper, “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military But Nearly Invisible At the Top,” The New
York Times, June 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities-leadership.html.
108 Similar statements were made in the 1970s by senior DOD leaders. A Navy Z-Gram from December 17, 1970,
written by Admiral Zumwalt notes, “Last month, Secretary Chafee and I, along with other senior officials of the Navy
Department, met on one occasion with Representative Black Navy Officers and their wives and later with a
representative group of Black Enlisted men and their wives. Prior to these meetings, I was convinced that, compared
with the civilian community, we had relatively few racial problems in the Navy. However, after exploring the matter in
some depth with these two groups, I have discovered that I was wrong—we do have problems… What struck me more
than anything else was the depth of feeling of our Black personnel that there is significant discrimination in the Navy.
Prior to these meetings, I sincerely believed that I was philosophically prepared to understand the problems of our
Black Navymen and their families, and until we discussed them at length, I did not realize the extent and deep
significance of many of these matters.” U.S. Department of the Navy Library, Z Gram #55; dated December 17, 1970,
“Equal Opportunity,” https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-
alphabetically/z/list-z-grams/z-gram-66.html.
109 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the
Nomination of John Hyten to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 2019. This
hearing excerpt was also cited by Helene Cooper (above).
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members’ cars, tattoos affiliated with white supremacist groups, stickers supporting the Ku
Klux Klan and Nazi-style salutes between individuals.110
Participants in the Military Times poll are self-selecting; that is, respondents chose to be part of
the polling sample and are therefore subject to self-selection bias. In their description of survey
methodology, researchers note that they accounted for that aspect of the data in accordance with
routine social science survey practice, although this is difficult to verify using the publicly
available information released by the Military Times. By comparison, a survey conducted by
DOD in 2017 reports that 17.9% of active duty members experienced racial/ethnic harassment or
discrimination in the previous year. It further notes that “Black (31.2%) and Asian (23.3%)
[service] members were more likely to indicate experiencing racial/ethnic harassment and/or
discrimination than other active duty members, whereas White members (12.7%) were less
likely.”111
Possible Legislative Options
In considering the nomination of a recently retired military officer to be Secretary of Defense,
Congress may pursue a number of legislative options, including choosing to (1) suspend the
statutory limitation, (2) eliminate entirely or reduce the limitation, (3) increase the statutory
limitation, or (4) take no action regarding the statutory limitation.
 Suspend the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief
from active duty and appointment to position of Secretary of Defense. This
would require the enactment of legislation similar in nature to P.L. 81-788, which
created a one-time suspension of statutory requirements for General Marshall.
Proponents of this option believe this would enable the Senate to proceed with
confirming a recently retired military officer while at the same time upholding
the principle of civilian control of the military by requiring participation of the
House of Representatives in the process. Opponents might suggest that the
provision is, itself, outdated.
 Eliminate entirely or reduce the statutory requirement that seven years
elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to position of
Secretary of Defense. Much like the discussion surrounding the FY2008
National Defense Authorization Act, proponents of this option would likely
maintain that the provision in Title 10 of the United States Code is outdated, and
that the President should have maximum flexibility to appoint whomsoever they
might wish to the position. Opponents to this course of action might maintain that
doing so could risk the politicization of the military.
 Increase the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief
from active duty and appointment to the position of Secretary of Defense.
During the Mattis confirmation process, several observers argued that increasing
the statutory “cooling off” period to a length of time beyond seven years would

110 Leo Shane III, “Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again in Poll of Active-Duty Troops,” The Military
Times, February 6, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-
supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/.
111 U.S. Department of Defense Office of People Analytics, 2017 Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active
Duty Members Executive Report, Defense Technical Information Center, August 2019, p. 14.
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strengthen the norms of civilian control over the armed forces and enhance
civilian-military relations.112
 Choosing not to pass legislation that would remove statutory barriers to the
appointment of a recently retired General as Secretary of Defense, thereby
“blocking” his nomination. Proponents of this option might contend that a
recently retired military officer serving in the position of Secretary of Defense
might undermine the principle of civilian control of the military. Opponents
would likely maintain that, much like the nominations of Marshall and Mattis, a
nominee like Austin may be exceptionally qualified and supports the principle of
civilian control of the military.
 Relatedly, should Congress choose not to pass relevant legislation, the Senate
may choose to allow the nomination of a recently retired military officer to
proceed, regardless. It is currently unclear what the legal implications of
pursuing this option might be. Still, proponents of this option might contend
that the language contained within Title 10 United States Code. is
unconstitutional, as it restricts the ability of the President to nominate
whomsoever they might wish to their cabinet.113 Opponents maintain that the
Constitution gives Congress considerable authority over military matters, and
that the provision has been in statute since 1947.114

112 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Control of the Armed Forces, 115th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 10, 2017.
113 Shannon W. Coffin, “On the Legality of the Mattis Nomination,” National Review, December 1, 2016,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/442657/trump-can-nominate-whoever-he-wants-secdef.
114 Andrew C. McCarthy, “Trump Needs a Congressional Waiver to Appoint Mattis as Defense Secretary,” National
Review, December 3, 2016, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/442734/trump-needs-waiver-appoint-mattis-
defense-secretary.
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Appendix. Legislative History of the Appointment
of General George C. Marshall to the Position of
Secretary of Defense115
This appendix provides the legislative history associated with the September 18, 1950, enactment
of P.L. 81-788 (“An act to authorize the President to appoint General of the Army George C.
Marshall to the office of Secretary of Defense”), which authorized the suspension of certain
statutory requirements otherwise prohibiting General of the Army George C. Marshall from
serving as the Secretary of Defense.
P.L. 81-788 was introduced at the request of President Harry Truman, and it was considered by
the House and Senate over a period of four days in September 1950. While the measure had the
support of many Members, it encountered significant and, at times, heated opposition by other
Members, both at the committee and floor levels in each chamber.
Background
Increasingly displeased with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, and recognizing the need to
“choose a person of great national prestige to head the Department of Defense” in light of the
“controversy surrounding Johnson’s performance” and U.S. military readiness deficits exposed
by operations during the first months of the Korean War, President Truman approached General
Marshall in early September 1950 to ask if he would “act as Secretary of Defense through the
crisis [of the Korean War] if [President Truman] could get Congressional approval.”116 General
Marshall accepted, on the condition that if confirmed, his tenure as Secretary of Defense would
be limited to a period of six months to a year.117
President Truman informally requested Johnson’s resignation in a private meeting on September
11:
Although Truman initially granted Johnson’s request for a few days to think it over, the
president called [Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen T.] Early on 12 September to urge
that Johnson resign immediately and recommend George C. Marshall as his successor.
Resigning forthwith himself, Early gathered a small [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
group to help compose a letter of resignation for Johnson to take to the Cabinet session that
afternoon. Still hoping for a reprieve, Johnson took the unsigned letter with him, but when
the two men met alone, Truman told the reluctant and distraught Johnson that he would
have to sign.118

115 This section was authored by Heidi Peters, Research Librarian, Congressional Research Service.
116 As reported in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 422; see
also Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders,
(Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), p. 64. A full analysis of the
circumstances contributing to Johnson’s removal as Secretary of Defense is outside the scope of this report—for a brief
discussion of Johnson’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, see the biographical overview provided by the Historical Office
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense at http://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/
571265/louis-a-johnson/.
117 Ibid.
118 Doris M. Condit, The Test of War: 1950-1953. Vol. 2 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, edited by
Alfred Goldberg. (Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), pp. 33-34.
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As instructed, Johnson’s resignation letter recommended that General Marshall should succeed
him as Secretary of Defense:
it is my recommendation that [you] name as my successor a man of such stature that the
very act of naming him to be Secretary of Defense will promote national and international
unity. Such a man, in my opinion, is General George Marshall.... I recognize, of course,
that many will argue that one of our great Generals should not be Secretary of Defense. I
do not believe that this argument has validity in the case of General Marshall, who has
already rendered distinguished service to his country, in a civilian capacity, as Secretary of
State. I recognize also that an amendment to the National Security Act will be necessary,
in order to make it legally permissible for General Marshall to serve as Secretary of
Defense—but I believe that Congress will speedily amend the law in General Marshall’s
case, if you should so recommend.119
Johnson’s letter references Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253), which
specified that the Secretary of Defense was to be “appointed from civilian life by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” and provided that “a person who has within
ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed
services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense.”
George Catlett Marshall, General of the Army
General Marshall was
born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on 31 December 1880. He entered the Virginia Military
Institute in 1897, graduated in 1901, and took a commission as second lieutenant in the
United States Army in 1902.... Marshall had extensive combat experience in Europe during
World War I, and between 1919 and 1924 he was aide-de-camp to General John J.
Pershing. After three years in China (1924–27), he served for the next dozen years at posts
in the United States.... He became a brigadier general in 1936. In 1939 just as World War
II began in Europe, President Roosevelt appointed Marshall Army Chief of Staff. In that
position and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff beginning in 1942, Marshall labored
unceasingly to build up U.S. defenses.... President Truman later described him as the
‘architect of victory’ in World War II.
…in November 1945 Truman sent him to China [as the Special Representative of the
President to China] in an unsuccessful attempt to mediate the civil war between the
Nationalists and Communists and to establish a coalition government. He returned to the
United States in January 1947 to become secretary of state [during two years] marked by
the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, and negotiation of the NATO pact. After he left the State Department he
achieved further distinction as president of the American Red Cross.120

119 U.S. President (Truman), “Letter Accepting Resignation of Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense,” September 12,
1950, as provided by the American Presidency Project at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13618.
120 Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders,
(Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), p. 64; see also “Harry S. Truman
Administration: George C. Marshall,” http://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571266/
george-c-marshall/.
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General Marshall’s Status as a Five-Star General of the Army
General Marshall was also one of four World War II-era Army generals first temporarily
designated as a five-star General of the Army in 1944.121
First authorized on December 14, 1944, as a temporary wartime grade by P.L. 78-482, the grade
of General of the Army was made permanent on March 23, 1946, by P.L. 79-333. As established
by P.L. 79-333, upon retirement General Marshall was entitled to continue to receive the same
pay and allowances he had received while on active duty as General of the Army:
The officers appointed under the provisions of this section ... shall receive the pay and
allowances prescribed by section 4 of [P.L. 78-482].... Any officer on the active list, or any
retired officer, who is appointed under the provisions of this section and who has been or
may hereafter be retired or relieved from active duty, shall be entitled to have his name
placed on the retired list with the highest grade or rank held by him on the active list or
while on active duty, and shall be entitled to receive the same pay and allowances while on
the retired list as officers appointed under this section are entitled to receive while on active
duty.122
General Marshall retired in the grade of General of the Army on February 28, 1947, but was
returned by his request to “the active [duty] list of the Regular Army on March 1, 1949” through
P.L. 80-804, which provided that the
laws requiring retirement of Regular Army and Regular Air Force officer because of age
shall not apply to officers of the Regular Army or Regular Air Force appointed in the grade
of General of the Army pursuant to the Act of March 23, 1946 … the President may, in his
discretion, upon the request of the officer concerned, restore to the active list of the Regular
Army or Regular Air Force any officer of the Regular Army or Regular Air Force on the
retired list who was appointed in the grade of General of the Army pursuant to the Act of
March 23, 1946.123
For administrative purposes following his restoration to the Army active duty list, General
Marshall was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.124 In this role, General
Marshall had no official position in the Army command structure, and had minimal official
military duties and responsibilities.125

121 In addition to Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Henry H. “Hap” Arnold were all
designated as a five-star General of the Army in December 1944. Through P.L. 81-59, in following with the
establishment of the U.S. Air Force as a separate and distinct military service branch through the National Security Act
of 1947, Arnold’s rank and grade as a five-star General of the Army was redesignated, making him the first (and to date
only) five-star General of the Air Force.
122 See P.L. 79-333, sec. 1. Section 4 of P.L. 78-482 specified that individuals appointed under the act “shall, while on
active duty, receive the same pay and allowances as a rear admiral of the upper half, plus a personal money allowance
of $5,000 per annum.” Section 5 of P.L. 78-482 specified that those officers serving in the grade or rank of Fleet
Admiral or General of the Army “shall, upon retirement or revision to the retired list, as the case may be, have on the
retired list the highest grade or rank held by him on the active list or active duty: Provided, That each officer shall be
entitled to retired pay equal to 75 per centum of the active-duty pay provided herein for an officer.”
123 Letter from Colonel R.C. Bing, Chief of the Legislative Liaison Office, to the Hon. William F. Knowland, United
States Senate, September 15, 1950, as reproduced in the Congressional Record, September 15, 1950, pp. 14922; see
also P.L 80-804, sec. 1.
124 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appointment of General of the Army George C.
Marshall as Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 15, 1950, H.Rept. 81-3094, p. 2.
125 David T. Zabecki, “Appendix B: Military Ranks,” in The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and
Military History (2nd ed, vol. 4), ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), p. 1685.
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Legislative Consideration of P.L. 81-788
Tuesday, September 12, 1950
Presidential Activities
After President Truman accepted Johnson’s resignation, contemporary press accounts report that
the President telephoned General Marshall late in the afternoon on September 12, 1950, and
formally asked him to serve as Secretary of Defense.126 General Marshall is reported to have
immediately accepted the President’s call to service.127
Johnson’s letter of resignation, together with an acceptance letter from President Truman, was
made public that evening.128
Wednesday, September 13, 1950
Presidential Activities
On September 13, 1950, as press reports regarding Johnson’s resignation and the President’s
selection of General Marshall to serve as Secretary of Defense circulated, President Truman
forwarded a legislative proposal to Representative Carl Vinson (Georgia-6th District), then
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Senator Millard Tydings (Maryland),
then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In a cover letter accompanying the
proposal, the President addressed the committee heads:
Attached is a draft of legislation which would permit General George C. Marshall to serve
as Secretary of Defense. I request that you lay this matter before your committee with a
view of obtaining early and favorable action by the Congress. I am a firm believer in the
general principle that our national defense establishment should be headed by a civilian.
However, in view of the present critical circumstances and General Marshall’s unusual
qualifications, I believe that the national interest will be served best by making an exception
in this case.129
The text of President Truman’s draft legislation was not preserved in electronically available
House or Senate committee documents.

126 See for example Joseph H. Short, “Truman Drops Johnson from Post in Cabinet: The Latter’s Feud with Acheson is
Called Factor in Change,” The Baltimore Sun, September 13, 1950, p. 1 and Robert J. Donovan, “Johnson Resigns,
Attacks His ‘Enemies;’ Truman Picks Marshall to Head Defense,” New York Herald Tribune, September 13, 1950,
p. 1.
127 U.S. President (Truman), “The President’s News Conference,” September 14, 1950, as provided by the American
Presidency Project at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13624.
128 See Walter Trohan, “Marshall is Defence [sic] Boss: Truman Drops Johnson as Member of Cabinet,” Chicago Daily
Tribune, September 13, 1950, p. 1.
129 As reproduced in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Report of Proceedings: Presentation of Scroll
to Senator Gurney, 81st Cong., September 13, 1950, pp. 4-5.
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House Activities
Meeting of the House Armed Services Committee
While Senate Armed Services Committee documents and the Congressional Record make
reference to a meeting of the House Armed Services Committee during the morning of September
13, 1950—presumably to review and discuss the President’s legislative proposal—this meeting
appears to have taken place as an executive session, with no record of the committee’s
discussions or debate preserved through electronically available committee documents.130
In floor remarks on September 15, 1950, Representative Paul J. Kilday (Texas-20th District),
seeking to correct the “impression that ... [Representative Vinson] had attempted to rush this
matter through the committee without an opportunity for everyone to be heard,” noted that “[on
the 13th] this matter was brought up and thoroughly discussed. Not only was each Member given
an opportunity to speak upon it, but [Representative Vinson] called upon each member of the
committee individually to state his views.”131
Floor Activity and Introduction of H.R. 9646
During the September 13, 1950, House session, Representative John McSweeney (Ohio-16th
District) made floor remarks generally supporting General Marshall’s reported nomination, while
Representative John E. Rankin (Mississippi-1st District) made floor remarks criticizing General
Marshall’s record of service during World War II and as Secretary of State.132 Representative
Rankin characterized General Marshall’s appointment as Secretary of Defense as a “serious
mistake,” and called for the nomination to be withdrawn.133
Representative Vinson also introduced H.R. 9646 (“A bill to authorize the President to appoint
General of the Army George C. Marshall to the office of Secretary of Defense”), which was
referred to the House Armed Services Committee.134
Legislative Provisions of H.R. 9646
As introduced, H.R. 9646 waived certain requirements associated with two statutory provisions
specifically and only for General Marshall’s nomination to the office of Secretary of Defense.
These requirements would have automatically made General Marshall ineligible for the position
due to an insufficient period of time elapsing between his military service and appointment as
Secretary of Defense (Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, which stipulated that a
person who had, within 10 years, served on active duty as a commissioned officer in the regular
armed services was ineligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense). Other statutory
requirements would have forced him to relinquish his commission as an active duty Army officer
in order to serve as Secretary of Defense (10 U.S.C. §576, which then barred officers on the
active list of the Army from holding civil office, either by election or by appointment, and

130 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Report of Proceedings: Hearing held before Committee on
Armed Services on S. 4147, 81st Cong., September 13, 1950, pp. 4-5. See also the Congressional Record, September 15,
1950, pp. 14957.
131 Congressional Record, September 15, 1950, pp. 14957.
132 Congressional Record, September 13, 1950, pp. 14750-14751.
133 Ibid.
134 Congressional Record, September 13, 1950, pp. 14771.
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stipulated that officers who accepted or exercised the functions of a civil office vacated their
commissions, thereby ceasing to be an officer of the Army).135
H.R. 9646 further provided that, so long as he held the office of Secretary of Defense, General
Marshall would retain his rank and grade as a General of the Army, would continue to receive the
pay and allowances to which he was entitled by virtue of such rank and grade, and would be
authorized to receive any difference between such pay and allowances and the salary prescribed
by law for the office of the Secretary of Defense.136
H.R. 9646 also specified that General Marshall would be subject to “no supervision, control,
restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to
him if he were not an officer of the Army” in the performance of his duties as Secretary of
Defense.137
Senate Activities
Meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee
At 11:30 a.m. on September 13, 1950, the Senate Armed Services Committee convened for a brief
public meeting. After the meeting, Senator Tydings read out President Truman’s letter to the
committee “so that the press will have the information that has been sent up” by the President.
Following a short question and answer period with members of the press in attendance, the Senate
Armed Services Committee recessed and immediately reconvened in a closed executive
session.138
Although the committee was in executive session, the Senate Armed Services Committee
preserved a transcript of session discussion and debate in committee documents.139 Senator
Tydings opened the executive session by noting that upon hearing the news of General Marshall’s
potential nomination, he had requested the “Legislative Counsel to draw different bills touching
the matter different ways.”140 As General Marshall was still considered to be on active duty status,
Senator Tydings noted that a legislative approach was quickly discarded that would have
modified the existing law to “[make] it so that if a man was out of the service on the retired list
for three or four years” he could be nominated to the office of Secretary of Defense.
Senator Tydings then presented two potential legislative options to the committee:

135 While a full legislative history of 10 U.S.C. §576 is outside the scope of this report, similar statutory provisions are
now codified as 10 U.S.C. §973 (“Duties: officers on active duty; performance of civil functions restricted”).
136 As later clarified in the Congressional Record by Representative Vinson, General Marshall then received annual pay
and allowances totaling $18,771 in his rank and grade as General of the Army. The annual salary of the Secretary of
Defense at that time was $22,500—meaning that as Secretary of Defense, Marshall would continue to receive the
annual sum of $18,771 from the Department of the Army, and would further receive the annual sum of $3,729 from the
Department of Defense. See Congressional Record, September 15, 1950, pp. 14958.
137 During House floor debate on September 15, 1950, Representative Vinson described this provision as “completely
[divorcing] General Marshall from the military altogether. The language is intended for that purpose, so that he will not
be subject to court-marshal, and he cannot be ordered around. He gets completely free of all military attachments, as far
as the statute is concerned.” See Congressional Record, September 15, 1950, pp. 14969.
138 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Report of Proceedings: Presentation of Scroll to Senator
Gurney, 81st Cong., September 13, 1950, pp. 4-5.
139 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Report of Proceedings: Hearing held before Committee on
Armed Services on S. 4147, 81st Cong., September 13, 1950.
140 Ibid., p. 1
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 modifying the existing statute to insert the phrase “except in time of war”; or
 passing legislation making an exception to the relevant statutes for General
Marshall “alone, so that the law will remain intact and nobody else can get in,
even in time of war, unless we pass a special act.”141
The first proposal received little attention during the recorded committee discussion.
Committee attention chiefly focused on the second proposal, with many Senators, including
Senator Tydings, contending that the present “time of great crisis” justified making a specific,
personal exception to the relevant statutes for General Marshall, who was viewed as having a
record of service and leadership that made him uniquely and exceptionally qualified to take up
the duties and responsibilities of the office of Secretary of Defense. General Marshall was further
seen as having “the confidence of the people” to lead the Department of Defense during wartime,
with one Member asserting that his appointment would “spread confidence throughout our [allies
and would] cause our enemies to be a great deal more cautious before they make any overt
movements right at this time.”142 Other Senators looked beyond General Marshall’s qualifications
to support the procedural approach taken by the second proposal—one Member stated that
providing a specific exception for General Marshall alone “indirectly serves notice to the people
that this bill is designed for only one man, for only one appointment, and to meet an
emergency.”143
However, others objected, with Senator William F. Knowland (California) pointing to the
“fundamental question” of civilian control of the military establishment raised by General
Marshall’s proposed nomination, especially in light of his status as an active duty military
officer.144 On a procedural level, Senator Knowland objected to Truman “asking, upon twenty-
four hours’ notice, without prior consultation with this Committee or with the Congress, a change
in the fundamental law of the land,” and further charged that the committee was being
rushed off its feet, without a chance to explore all of the implications of this suggested
change ... in less than one day’s notice we are being asked to waive [the relevant section of
the National Security Act of 1947], and I believe, regardless of the fact that you write this
in for one man, it is the old story of the camel getting his head in under the tent. Once
having waived the law, it is going to be far easier for the President or any President to ask
for its waiver a second time.... I think it is a very serious step we are being asked to take.
The committee may in its judgement—and apparently is prepared to go ahead and approve
this and send it to the floor. But I want to emphasize that I think we are taking an
unprecedented step and one that may rise to plague this nation in the years ahead, when it
may not be George Marshall who is being suggested for the position.145
Senator Knowland, while acknowledging General Marshall’s qualifications, contended that
equally well qualified candidates could be identified whose service as the Secretary of Defense
would not require the suspension or alteration of existing United States law. Senator Harry P.
Cain (Washington), in voicing his support for Senator Knowland’s views, further objected to the

141 Ibid., p. 2.
142 Ibid., selected quotations drawn from remarks by Senator Tydings on p. 4 and Senator Richard B. Russell (Georgia)
on p. 14.
143 Ibid., selected quotation drawn from remarks by Senator Lester C. Hunt (Wyoming) on p. 10.
144 Ibid., p. 6.
145 Ibid., pp. 7-10.
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“pre-merchandising” of the appointment by Truman to the public, describing Truman’s actions as
placing the committee in an “impossible situation.”146
By a vote of 10 to 2, with one member not voting, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to
proceed in reporting the committee’s original bill to the Senate. Although Senator Tydings
pressed for unanimous support of the bill, both Senator Knowland and Senator Cain refused to
vote in support of the measure. Procedural and administrative remarks made by Senator Tydings
during the session also call attention to his view that the committee and the Senate should
expedite passage of the measure, with an eye to confirming General Marshall’s appointment in
the Senate before the September 23 congressional recess for the 1950 elections.147
Floor Activity and Reporting of S. 4147
The bill was reported as S. 4147 during the afternoon Senate session, accompanied by a
committee report including the minority views of Senator Knowland and Senator Cain.148
Legislative Provisions of S. 4147
Using legislative text identical to H.R. 9646, S. 4147 waived certain statutory requirements
specifically and only for General Marshall’s nomination to the office of Secretary of Defense.
Thursday, September 14, 1950
House Activities
Committee Activity
During the morning of September 14, 1950, the House Armed Services Committee conducted a
full committee hearing on two pending pieces of legislation—S. 4135, which would have
authorized the President to appoint General Omar N. Bradley as a General of the Army, and S.
4136, which would have included the Coast Guard within the provisions of the Selective Service
Act of 1948, and would have further authorized the President to extend enlistments in the Coast
Guard.
In concluding the hearing, Representative Vinson noted that the Committee’s consideration of the
two bills “[disposed] of everything that I know of that is on our calendar up to this hour, except
the bill that we will vote on tomorrow, the bill in regard to General Marshall.”149

146 Ibid., p. 17.
147 Senator Tydings sought to avoid a recess appointment of Marshall, which would see “General Marshall appointed
without the right of confirmation by the Senate,” which he saw as not being “a good way to do business.” See ibid., p.
19.
148 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorizing the President to Appoint General of the Army
George C. Marshall to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 13, 1950, S.Rept. 81-
2564.
149 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Full Committee Hearings on S. 4135 and 4136, 81st Cong., 2nd
sess., September 14, 1950, H.Hrg. 81-220.
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Floor Activity
During the afternoon House session, Representative Clare E. Hoffman (Michigan-4th District)
made floor remarks characterizing General Marshall’s nomination to serve in the office of
Secretary of Defense as a “tragic mistake.” Representative Hoffman’s remarks outlined his stance
against General Marshall’s appointment, questioning General Marshall’s World War II service
record, his physical capability to assume the duties and responsibilities of the office of Secretary
of Defense, and his view of General Marshall as “[favoring] the Communist policy of the
conquest of China” through his actions as Special Representative of the President to China in
1945 and 1946.150
Also during the afternoon House session, Representative Jacob K. Javits (New York-21st District)
briefly mentioned General Marshall’s nomination in the context of extended remarks on the
Korean War. While Representative Javits expressed his view that General Marshall would do an
“effective job” if confirmed, he noted the “troublesome problems involving the continued civilian
control of the military” invoked by General Marshall’s nomination.151
Senate Activities
Floor Activity
Although the Senate briefly considered S. 4147 during its September 14, 1950, session, Senator
Walter F. George (Georgia) requested that action on a motion to reconsider a vote by which the
Senate voted to disagree to a House amendment to Senate amendment 191 to the Revenue Act of
1950 (H.R. 8920) be given precedence in order to expedite the work of a conference committee
for the measure. Senator Harry F. Byrd (Virginia), who was serving as floor manager for S. 4147
in Senator Tydings’ absence, agreed—provided that S. 4147 would be the next order of business
following Senate action on the motion to reconsider.
However, due in part to the Senate’s consideration of the motion to reconsider consuming more
time than had been anticipated, the Senate ultimately moved to stand in recess until the next day,
with S. 4147 considered to be pending business for the next legislative day.152
Friday, September 15, 1950
House Activities
Meeting of the House Armed Services Committee
At 10 a.m. on September 15, 1950, the House Armed Services Committee met in executive
session to consider H.R. 9646. In opening the session, Representative Vinson noted that it was the
“first time” he had “ever heard of the House of Representatives having an opportunity to pass
upon an executive appointment ... [ordinarily] the Senate has that right, but this bill is so drafted
that we, for the first time, act on the question of confirmation by repealing a law.”153

150 Congressional Record, September 14, 1950, pp. 14835-14836.
151 Congressional Record, September 14, 1950, pp. 14867.
152 Congressional Record, September 14, 1950, pp. 14810-14828.
153 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Executive Session Regarding H.R. 9646, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.,
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During the session, discussion and debate was limited to an extended statement from
Representative Dewey Short (Missouri-7th District) objecting to the pending legislation.154 Among
other objections, Representative Short questioned General Marshall’s physical capability to serve
as Secretary of Defense, and advocated for the principle of civilian control of the military
establishment. Following Representative Short’s remarks, the House Armed Services Committee
voted 18 to 7 to proceed in reporting H.R. 9646 to the House.
Floor Debate
Representative Vinson reported H.R. 9646, together with a committee report, back to the House
during the afternoon House session.155
After the conclusion of routine House business, H.R. 9646 was brought to the floor after a two-
thirds vote in favor of adopting standard procedural considerations outlined by H.Res. 853.156
The ensuing floor debate was contentious and at various times strongly supportive or sharply
critical of General Marshall. Opposition to the bill in light of General Marshall’s personal
qualifications focused on questioning General Marshall’s physical capability to assume the duties
and responsibilities of the office of Secretary of Defense; challenging General Marshall’s record
of service as Special Representative of the President to China and as Secretary of State; and
allegations that General Marshall would be unable to set aside any prior “special attachments” to
the U.S. military establishment and effectively lead the combined military and civilian elements
of the Department of Defense.
Most representatives voicing opposition for the bill strongly advocated for holding the principle
of civilian control of the military establishment above the personal qualifications of General
Marshall, with some charging that the bill represented a “[weakening] of the Constitution” and a
“first step toward a military state.”157 Some further contended that Marshall was not the
“indispensable” man to serve in the office of Secretary of Defense at that time, as equally well
qualified candidates could be identified whose service as the Secretary of Defense would not
require the suspension or alteration of existing United States law.158
Supporters of the bill, such as Representative Vinson, argued that in light of the “[critical] present
international situation,” and the need for “[restoration of] confidence in our military leadership,”
General Marshall’s record of service and leadership would allow him to
undertake this vast responsibility and, without the slightest postponement of urgently
needed defense programs now under way, get the defense effort on a steady keel and carry
it through with efficiency and dispatch.... The Nation cannot afford to take out time to
educate a new Secretary of Defense. At least a year would pass before a new person could

September 15, 1950, p. 2.
154 Ibid., pp. 2-9. Short also advocated for Representative Vinson’s service as Secretary of Defense.
155 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appointment of General of the Army George C.
Marshall as Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 15, 1950, H.Rept. 81-3094.
156 As reported by the House Committee on the Rules and accompanied by H.Rept. 81-3089, H.Res. 853, among other
procedural considerations, limited general debate on the bill to a period of two hours, which was to be equally divided
and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee.
157 Remarks from Representative Herbert A. Meyer (Kansas-3rd District), Congressional Record, September 15, 1950,
pp. 14962.
158 Congressional Record, September 15, 1950, pp. 14961. Several Representatives advocated for the service of House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson as Secretary of Defense.
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be truly effective. The Nation cannot now afford to indulge itself in a year of indecision
and delay.159
Representative Vinson also addressed the issue of civilian control of the Department of Defense:
With General Marshall as Secretary of Defense there can be no sensible case made that he,
as a military man is likely to perform dangerously as regards our national institutions. Not
only does his own background and personal convictions and public record shout the denial
to that, but just what is the practical situation in the Government? We still have the
President, a civilian.... We still have the National Security Council which formulates the
Nation’s military and foreign policies, headed by the President and composed of civilians
outnumbering the Secretary of Defense. And of course we still have…the Senate and the
House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court as well, all of which exercise civilian
control over the Armed Forces and over the Secretary of Defense. So, while I subscribe to
the principle set out in the Unification Act, the fact remains that this temporary suspension
of the law cannot and assuredly will not have any hurtful impact on our governmental
processes ... the question before the committee remains ... whether or not the pressure of
time is such that the Nation should resort to a draft of General Marshall.160
Amendments Proposed
Two procedural motions that would have returned H.R. 9646 to committee were introduced and
defeated, while four amendments to H.R. 9646 were offered during floor debate.
Representative James G. Fulton (Pennsylvania-31st District) offered an amendment that would
have authorized the appointment of Representative Vinson to the office of Secretary of Defense
instead of General Marshall—Representative Vinson then made a point of order that the
amendment was not germane to the bill. The House Chair sustained the point of order, and the
amendment was dismissed.
Representative Vinson offered an amendment that would insert a new section to the bill
expressing the intent and sense of the Congress in granting the President the authority to appoint
General Marshall as Secretary of Defense:
It is hereby expressed as the intent of the Congress that the authority granted by this Act is
not to be construed as approval by the Congress of continuing appointments of military
men to the office of Secretary of Defense in the future. It is hereby expressed as the sense
of the Congress that after General Marshall leaves the office of Secretary of Defense, no
additional appointments of military men to that office shall be approved.
In offering the amendment, Representative Vinson stated that he wished it to be
distinctly understood that this bill shall not be a continuing precedent for the appointment
of military men. We want to adhere to the viewpoint expressed in the President’s letter,
civilian control. For that reason I want the sense of the Congress affirmatively expressed
not only in the committee report but also in the very heart of the bill.161
Representative Javits then offered a substitute amendment to Representative Vinson’s amendment
that would state that

159 Ibid., pp. 14954.
160 Others argued that General Marshall had effectively retired after stepping down as Army Chief of Staff in
November 1945, meaning that Congress had only been asked to determine if there was “anything sacred” about the
requirement for 10 years to elapse between an individual’s military service and appointment as Secretary of Defense.
See ibid., pp. 14954-14955, and 14966.
161 Ibid., pp. 14969-14970.
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[i]t is the intent of Congress that the authority granted to the President by this act shall not
constitute a precedent or reversal of the policy of our Government that there shall be
civilian control of the National Military Establishment.
Representative Javits’s substitute amendment was rejected by voice vote; Representative
Vinson’s amendment was agreed to by voice vote.
Representative Short offered an amendment that would have inserted a sunset clause into the
legislation: “This bill shall terminate 1 year after its enactment.”
Representative Short’s amendment was defeated by a vote of 136 to 61.
Vote and Passage
By a vote of 220-105, with 101 representatives not voting and three representatives answering
“present” to the roll call, H.R. 9646 passed the House and was sent to the Senate.
Senate Activities
Floor Debate
On September 15, 1950, the Senate resumed consideration of S. 4147. Senator Byrd, continuing
to act as floor manager for the bill in Senator Tydings’s absence, offered an extended explanation
of the bill, which summarized the Senate Armed Services Committee’s consideration of the
legislation, and advocated for the passage of the measure in light of the “crisis” of the Korean
War and General Marshall’s “supreme qualifications” to take up the duties and responsibilities of
the office of Secretary of Defense.
As in the House, the ensuing floor debate was contentious, extensive, and at various times
strongly supportive or sharply critical of General Marshall.162 Debate brought up many of the
same issues raised in committee meetings, and chiefly focused on the question of holding the
principle of civilian control of the military establishment above the personal qualifications of
General Marshall.
Substitution of House Bill
As the Senate debate continued, a message from the House Clerk to the Senate announced that
the House had passed H.R. 9646.163 By unanimous consent, the Senate accordingly substituted
H.R. 9646 for S. 4147, and resumed its consideration of the measure.

162 Senator William E. Jenner (Indiana) delivered a series of highly personal attacks against General Marshall,
including making assertions that General Marshall was “eager to play the role of a front man for traitors”; that General
Marshall was “a living lie”; and that he acted as an “errand boy, a front man, a stooge, or a coconspirator for this
administration’s crazy assortment of collectivist cutthroat crackpots and Communist ... appeasers.” See ibid., pp. 14914
and 14917. These allegations were immediately repudiated by other senators, including Senator Leverett Saltonstall
(Massachusetts), who rose following Senator Jenner’s remarks to state that he wished he had the “words and the voice
to express how strongly I disagree ... if there is any man in America who is decent and clean it is General George C.
Marshall.... I wish I had the vocabulary to answer the statement that General Marshall’s life is a lie, because if there
ever was a life spent in the interest of our country, a life that is not a lie, it is the life of George C. Marshall.” See ibid.,
pp. 14917-14918.
163 Ibid., pp. 14924.
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Vote and Passage
By a vote of 47-21, with 28 Senators not voting, H.R. 9646 passed the Senate.
Enactment of H.R. 9646 and Confirmation of General Marshall
H.R. 9646 was signed into law by President Truman on September 18, 1950, as P.L. 81-788.
Following a confirmation hearing held on September 19, 1950, the Senate voted to confirm
General Marshall’s nomination to the office of Secretary of Defense on September 20, 1950, by a
vote of 57-11, with 28 Senators not voting.164
General Marshall took office as the third Secretary of Defense on September 21, 1950, and would
serve in that role until September 12, 1951.

Author Information

Kathleen J. McInnis

Specialist in International Security

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164 See U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall To
Be Secretary of Defense, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., September 19, 1950, and Congressional Record, September 20, 1950, pp.
15182.
Congressional Research Service
R44725 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED
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