Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

December 28, 2016 – June 6, 2024 R44721

Political Status of Puerto Rico:
June 6, 2024
Brief Background and Recent Developments
R. Sam Garrett
for Congress
Specialist in American
National Government
Puerto Rico lies approximately 1,000 miles southeast of Miami and 1,500 miles from

Washington, DC. Despite being far outside the continental United States, the island has played a
significant role in American politics and policy since the United States acquired Puerto Rico

from Spain in 1898.
Puerto Rico’s political status—referring to the relationship between the federal government and a territorial one—is an
undercurrent in virtually every policy matter on the island. Puerto Rico has held several popular votes (referenda or
plebiscites) on the island’s relationship with the United States. Most recently, plebiscites were held in 2012, 2017, and 2020.
In 2020, 52.5% of voters answered affirmatively when asked a single ballot question of whether Puerto Rico should
immediately be admitted to the union as a state.
In some cases, the results of previous plebiscites have been controversial, as political parties on the island debated ballot
wording and voter participation. If Congress chose to alter Puerto Rico’s political status, it could do so through statute.
Ultimately, the Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad discretion over Puerto Rico and other
territories. Although Congress may authorize a popular vote on status, Puerto Rico may hold, and has held, such votes
without congressional preapproval.
As of this writing, there have been no major status or legislative developments during the 118th Congress. Legislation
substantially similar to some of the bills introduced in the 117th Congress has been reintroduced. The 118th Congress bills
share the Puerto Rico Status Act title, but not all contain the same provisions. In April 2023, Representative Grijalva
reintroduced his version of the Puerto Rico Status Act as H.R. 2757. The legislation is substantially similar to the version of
Representative Grijalva’s legislation that passed the House during the 117th Congress (H.R. 8393). The 118th Congress bill
proposes a November 2, 2025, plebiscite date and a March 8, 2026, runoff date. Senator Heinrich’s S. 3231 appears to be a
companion measure to Representative Grijalva’s H.R. 2757. In September 2023, Senator Wicker reintroduced his status bill,
which is also called the Puerto Rico Status Act but takes a different approach than other bills of the same name. Senator
Wicker’s bill also proposes a plebiscite, but, unlike the other two 118th Congress bills, it would include consideration of a
“commonwealth” option on the plebiscite ballot.
Congress has not enacted any recent legislation devoted specifically to status. However, even in seemingly unrelated federal
policy debates, Puerto Rico status often arises at least tangentially. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187; 48 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.), enacted during the 114th Congress, does not explicitly
affect territorial status, although some Members have suggested that economic issues on the island should be addressed
before considering political status, while others contend that the two topics are inherently linked. This report does not provide
economic or legal analysis of topics that may provide context for considering political status; instead, it provides policy and
historical background for understanding status and its potential relevance for Congress.
This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative or status developments.

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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

Introduction
This report provides policy and historical background about Puerto Rico’s political status—
referring to the relationship between the federal government and a territorial one.1 Congress has
not altered the island’s status since 1952, when it approved a territorial constitution. Status is the
lifeblood of Puerto Rican politics, spanning policy and partisan lines in ways that are unfamiliar
on the mainland.
Because the U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad discretion over territories, the House and
Senate may choose to reexamine Puerto Rico’s political status, or to decline to do so. If Congress
chose to alter Puerto Rico’s political status, it could do so through statute regardless of whether a
plebiscite were held or what sentiment such a vote revealed.
Scope of the Report
As with all CRS reports, this product provides background information and analysis for Congress.
It emphasizes those facets of the status policy debate that historically have been most relevant for
House and Senate consideration, and that appear to remain most relevant for Members and staff
who are considering those issues. It emphasizes the recent status debates in Puerto Rico
specifically rather than examining status in all U.S. territories.
This report is not intended to substitute for a comprehensive analysis of the complex and
culturally sensitive issues surrounding Puerto Rico’s more than 100-year affiliation with the
United States. The report also is not intended to be an analysis of the various legal, economic, or
social issues that might arise in considering Puerto Rico’s political status or a change in its
relationship with the United States. Parts of this report are adapted from another CRS product,
which provides additional discussion of the 2012 plebiscite.2
Brief General Background
Puerto Rico has been the subject of strategic and political attention for more than 500 years.3
Spain was the first colonial power to claim the island. Christopher Columbus landed on the west
coast of the main island of present-day Puerto Rico on November 19, 1493. There, he
encountered native Taíno Indians, who called the island “Borinquén” (or, in some spellings,
“Borinkén”).4 As one scholar has noted, “[a] permanent foothold was finally established in 1508,
when Juan Ponce León led a group of settlers from Hispaniola.”5 Spanish colonizers forced the
Taíno into servitude, and “[b]y 1521, the Indian Borinquén had become another Spanish

1 For a brief overview of territorial political status and statehood, see CRS In Focus IF11792, Statehood Process and
Political Status of U.S. Territories: Brief Policy Background, by R. Sam Garrett. On historical statehood admission, see
CRS Report R47747, Admission of States to the Union: A Historical Reference Guide, by Ben Leubsdorf, Kathleen E.
Marchsteiner, and Carol Wilson.
2 See CRS Report R42765, Puerto Rico’s Political Status and the 2012 Plebiscite: Background and Key Questions, by
R. Sam Garrett.
3 For additional discussion of the topics discussed in this paragraph, see, for example, Arturo Morales Carrión, Puerto
Rico: A Political and Cultural History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 3-8; Robert M. Poole, “What Became of
the Taino?,” Smithsonian, October 2011, p. 58; and Manuel Maldonado-Denis, Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic
Interpretation, trans. Elena Vialo (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 13-16.
4 Columbus called the island “San Juan Bautista.”
5 Arturo Morales Carrión, Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 6.
Hispaniola lies west of Puerto Rico and includes present-day Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
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settlement in an expanding empire.”6 For the next 400 years, Puerto Rico served as a Spanish
agricultural and mining outpost in the Caribbean.
When the United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States
acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines from Spain via the Treaty of Paris.7 Puerto Rico
provided the United States with a central location from which to exercise military and strategic
power in the Caribbean, particularly before World War II.8 The U.S. military briefly administered
the island until Congress established a civilian government in 1900.
Figure 1. Puerto Rico and Surrounding Area

Source: CRS figure using data from Map Resources (2012).
Today, Puerto Rico is both deeply integrated into American society and insulated from it. On one
hand, the American flag has flown over San Juan, the capital, for more than 100 years. In
addition, those born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens. Many live and work on the mainland and
serve in the military. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1, the island is geographically
isolated from the mainland United States;9 it lies approximately 1,500 miles from Washington,
DC, and 1,000 miles from Miami. Residents of Puerto Rico lack full voting representation in
Congress, typically do not pay federal income taxes on income earned on the island, do not have

6 Arturo Morales Carrión, Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 8.
7 Treaty of Paris, Art. II; 30 Stat. 1754-1755.
8 For a brief overview of the historic U.S. military presence in and around Puerto Rico, see, for example, Humberto
García Muñiz, “U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico: Controlling the Caribbean,” in Colonial Dilemma: Critical
Perspectives on Contemporary Puerto Rico, ed. Edwin Meléndez and Edgardo Meléndez (Boston: South End Press,
1993), pp. 53-65.
9 Despite consisting of three major islands, Puerto Rico is typically referred to as “the island,” as a reference to the
largest island of the same name. Culebra and Vieques are also inhabited. A fourth major island, Mona, primarily serves
as a nature preserve.
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the same eligibility for some federal programs as those in the states, do not vote in presidential
elections (although they may do so in party primaries), and enjoy a culture and predominant
Spanish language that some argue more closely resembles Latin America than most of the 50
states.
Why Status Might be Relevant for Congress
Some regard status as the fundamental political question that drives everything else about the
Puerto Rico-U.S. relationship. Others see status as a distraction from more compelling everyday
policy and economic challenges. Perhaps because that debate remains unsettled, status is an
undercurrent in virtually every policy matter on the island. Federal policy debates generally are
less affected by status, but here, too, status often arises at least tangentially. As such, even a basic
knowledge of the topic may be helpful in multiple policy areas.
Status has also been a contextual factor in congressional oversight of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)10 enacted during the 114th Congress (a
topic that is generally beyond the scope of this report and addressed in other CRS products)11 in
response to the island’s financial crisis. Legislation introduced in the 118th Congress (see “Status
Developments in the 118th Congress”) could affect the island’s political status. Congress also
could choose to take no action.
Finally, before proceeding, it is noteworthy that much of the status debate in Puerto Rico
concerns attitudes surrounding past or future plebiscites. Whether in the past or future, Puerto
Rico may choose to hold its own plebiscites without congressional authorization. Recently,
however, plebiscite supporters have argued that federal support for a plebiscite could increase the
perceived legitimacy of the results. Plebiscites are not required to revisit status. Whether or not a
plebiscite were held, Congress could admit Puerto Rico as a state, or decline to do so, at its
discretion, through statute.
Brief Political Status and Policy History
Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory subject to congressional authority derived from the Territory
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.12 The Territory Clause grants Congress “Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States.”13 Congress has enacted various statutes to address specific matters concerning
the island’s political status. Puerto Rico’s current political status, as determined by federal statute
(or otherwise, as noted), is summarized briefly below.
• After military governance since the United States acquired Puerto Rico in 1898,
Congress established a civilian government on the island in 1900. Among other
points, the Foraker Act established an “executive council” consisting of a
presidentially appointed civilian governor and various department heads. The
new government also included a popularly elected House of Delegates (which

10 130 Stat. 549; 48 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.
11 See, for example, CRS Report R46788, Puerto Rico’s Public Debts: Accumulation and Restructuring, by D. Andrew
Austin; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10965, SCOTUS Rules That PROMESA Does Not Abrogate Puerto Rico Oversight
Board’s Sovereign Immunity—If It Has Any, by Mainon A. Schwartz
12 U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2. For background discussion of the Territory Clause, see CRS, The Constitution of
the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, available to congressional clients on the CRS website under
the Quick Link “Constitution Annotated.”
13 U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2.
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shared decisionmaking power with the executive council) and a U.S.-style
judiciary system.14
• The Foraker Act also established the Resident Commissioner position to
represent island interests in Washington.15 These duties came to include
nonvoting service in the U.S. House of Representatives (the primary role of the
Resident Commissioner today).16 Through the Jones Act (1917), Congress
authorized appropriations for legislative staff and franking privileges for the
Resident Commissioner.17
• Devoted primarily to strengthening Puerto Rico’s civil government, the Jones Act
also extended U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans and established a bill of rights for
the island.18 Major governmental changes included establishing a three-branch
government similar to the one on the mainland.19
• Congress recognized island authority over matters of internal governance in 1950
through the Federal Relations Act (FRA) and when it approved the island’s
Constitution in 1952.20 No major status changes have occurred since.
After enactment of the FRA and approval of the territorial constitution, Puerto Rico became
known formally as the “Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” Use of the word “commonwealth” and
whether the term carries particular legal or political significance is a topic of substantial historical
and scholarly debate—most of which is not addressed herein. A brief summary of the competing
major perspectives, however, provides important context for understanding the ongoing status
debate.
Some contend that Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status signifies a unique recognition somewhere
between territory and state. This perspective is often called “enhanced commonwealth” or “new
commonwealth.” As longtime territories scholar Arnold H. Leibowitz has summarized, those
holding this view have
argued that more than local self-government was achieved by the 1950-1952 legislation. It
contends that a new legal entity was created with a unique status in American law: the
Commonwealth, a status which is an internationally recognized non-colonial status.... Most
important, in this view, Commonwealth is not a “territory” covered by the ‘Territory
Clause’ of the Constitution, nor quite obviously is it a state; rather, Commonwealth is sui
generis and its judicial bounds are determined by a “compact” which cannot be changed
without the consent of both Puerto Rico and the United States.21
Others, however, contend that, at least in the Puerto Rican context, the term “commonwealth”
does not hold particular legal or political significance. From this viewpoint, “commonwealth” is a
stylistic or historical term of art, as used in the formal names of states such as the Commonwealth

14 31 Stat. 77.
15 31 Stat. 86.
16 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R40170, Parliamentary Rights of the Delegates and Resident
Commissioner from Puerto Rico, by Christopher M. Davis.
17 39 Stat. 951; 39 Stat. 963.
18 39 Stat. 951.
19 The act created a bicameral legislature by transferring the previous executive council legislative functions to a new
Senate and by establishing a House of Representatives. See 39 Stat. 958.
20 See 64 Stat. 319 (popularly known as “P.L. 600” (P.L. 81-600)); and 66 Stat. 327 respectively.
21 Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 163. Internal footnotes omitted.
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of Pennsylvania. Some also suggest that commonwealth refers to a form of government, but does
not designate a unique nonterritorial status. As Leibowitz has observed,
From the outset the non-Commonwealth parties in Puerto Rico, seeking either Statehood
or independence ... questioned the concept of the Commonwealth. They have argued that
although Congress may delegate powers to a territorial government, the broad powers
granted to Congress under the Territorial Clause of the Constitution and the implied powers
of the national government remain and may be exercised should the need arise. Further
they cite the legislative history of Public Law 600 [the FRA] to challenge the compact and
Commonwealth concept.22
Debate over significance of the “commonwealth” term notwithstanding, action by Congress
would be necessary to alter Puerto Rico’s political status. Doing so, of course, would require
passage of legislation by Congress and approval by the President.
Finally, those rejecting the status quo also generally suggest that Puerto Rico’s current status was
not intended to be—or perhaps should not be—permanent, and that statehood or independence
are natural next steps.
Political Parties and Status
The dominant Democratic and Republican party labels found in the mainland United States do
not necessarily translate to Puerto Rican politics. In Puerto Rico, politics tends to revolve around
three status perspectives represented by the three most established political parties:
• The status quo or “procommonwealth” position is generally associated with the
Popular Democratic Party (PDP/PPD).
• The prostatehood position is generally associated with the New Progressive Party
(NPP/PNP).
• The independence position is generally associated with the Independence Party
(PIP or Independentistas). In recent years, the PIP has not consistently received
sufficient electoral support to be certified a major party, but the independence
perspective continues to be a factor in the status debate.
Views within the three major parties, as well as among other parties and interest groups, are not
necessarily uniform. These differences regularly produce active factional groups or officially
recognized minor parties.23 The PDP, NPP, and PIP nonetheless remain the most consistent
partisan forces in Puerto Rican politics.
Other options that call for modified versions of the current commonwealth status or independence
may appeal to members of one or more parties. Typically, the two major perspectives other than
the status quo, statehood, or independence are (1) “enhanced commonwealth” and (2) “free
association.” The former arguably signals a semiautonomous status whereas the latter suggests
independence with closer ties to the United States than a more traditional independence option.
The viability of the “enhanced commonwealth” position is not universally accepted.

22 Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 164.
23 For example, in 2020, the Citizens’ Victory Movement (CVM) and Project Dignity became “registered” political
parties, entitling them to membership on the territorial State Elections Commission (CEE). The CVM and the PIP
reportedly formed an electoral alliance for the 2024 elections. See, for example, Jorell Meléndez-Badillo, “Puerto Rico
is Voting for Its Future,” Time, updated May 6, 2024, https://time.com/6969980/puerto-rico-voting-future/.
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At the federal level, positions on status do not necessarily follow clear partisan patterns. For those
Members of Congress who have firm positions on status, personal preference or constituent issues
appear to be key motivations. Particularly in recent years, Members of both parties in Congress
have generally argued that if the island is to choose a different status, clear consensus is necessary
among the Puerto Rican people, regardless of the selected option.
Recent Policy and Political Developments Most
Relevant for Congress
A series of votes in Puerto Rico, held since 2012, have organized much of the status debate
during the past decade. An overview appears below.
The 2012 Plebiscite in Brief
In 2012, voters were asked to answer two questions: (1) whether they wished to maintain Puerto
Rico’s current political status; and (2) regardless of the choice in the first question, whether they
preferred statehood, independence, or to be a “sovereign free associated state.” Figure 2 shows a
sample ballot.
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Figure 2. Sample 2012 Plebiscite Ballot

Source: Sample November 2012 plebiscite ballot provided to CRS by the Puerto Rico State Elections
Commission, September 2012.
Notes: Size and spacing differed on the actual ballot. Ballot wording and format are as provided in the original
document. To fit the image in the space herein, CRS removed some white space on the ballot and at the margins
of the original file.

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According to results certified by the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission, approximately
54.0% of those who cast ballots answered “no” to the first question. In the second question,
approximately 61.2% of voters chose statehood.24 However, results of the plebiscite were
controversial. Debate focused on whether almost 500,000 blank answers on the second question
should be included in the total, thereby affecting whether any option received a majority. A
concurrent resolution approved by the territorial legislature and supported by PDP Governor
Alejandro García Padilla (who was elected on the same day as the plebiscite) contended that the
results were “inconclusive.” Another CRS report provides additional detail about the 2012
plebiscite.25 After Governor García Padilla assumed office in 2013, momentum toward revisiting
status waned on the island. As explained below, interest in status rebounded in 2016.
In Washington, the House and Senate provided federal funds to support a future plebiscite.
Specifically, in the FY2014 omnibus appropriations law, Congress appropriated $2.5 million for
“objective, nonpartisan voter education about, and a plebiscite on, options that would resolve
Puerto Rico’s future political status.”26 These plebiscite-education funds remain available until
expended, but Congress placed conditions on their release that appear to exclude the “enhanced
commonwealth” status option as a choice on the ballot.27 As discussed below, the Justice
Department determined in 2017 that enhanced commonwealth remained inconsistent with the
U.S. Constitution. As of this writing, the funds remain unexpended.

24 Puerto Rico State Elections Commission, Certification of Official Results for Plebiscite on Puerto Rico Political
Status, First Question, San Juan, PR, December 31, 2012, provided to CRS by the Puerto Rico State Elections
Commission.
25 See CRS Report R42765, Puerto Rico’s Political Status and the 2012 Plebiscite: Background and Key Questions, by
R. Sam Garrett.
26 The $2.5 million was provided in the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014
(Div. B of P.L. 113-76, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014), as part of the appropriations for the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program (see 128 Stat. 61).
27 The $2.5 million was initially included in the House version of the FY2014 Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS)
appropriations bill (H.R. 2787). The House Appropriations Committee report accompanying that bill recommended
conditioning the funding on certification to congressional appropriators, from the U.S. Attorney General, that “the voter
education materials, plebiscite ballot, and related materials are not incompatible with the Constitution and laws and
policies of the United States.” See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Commerce, Justice, Science,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2014, report to accompany H.R. 2787, 113th Cong., 1st sess., July 23, 2013,
Report 113-171 (Washington: GPO, 2013), p. 59. Although the CJS bill was superseded by the omnibus measure,
relevant explanatory-statement language notes that “[r]eport language included in H.Rept. 113-171 ... that is not
changed by this explanatory statement or this Act is approved.” See “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Rogers
of the House Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment on H.R. 3547,
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 160, part 9, Book II (January 15,
2014), p. H475. Furthermore, the relevant budget justification document included similar language, as did previous
Congressional correspondence. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, FY2014 Performance
Budget, p. 29, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2014justification/pdf/ojp-justification.pdf. In addition, in December 2010,
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman and Ranking Member Lisa Murkowski
wrote to President Obama noting that enhanced or “new” commonwealth status “is incompatible with the Constitution
and basic laws of the United States in several respects.” See Letter from Sens. Jeff Bingaman and Lisa Murkowski,
chairman and ranking member (respectively), Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, to President
Obama, December 1, 2010. For additional historical perspective on administration perspectives referenced in the letter,
see Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Sen. Frank Murkowski, chairman, Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, January 18, 2001. For additional views and debate, see also, for example, witness
statements and responses to written questions in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
U.S. Virgin Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Puerto Rico, and Political Status Public Education Programs,
111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 19, 2010, S. Hrg. 111-666 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
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The 2016 Elections in Puerto Rico
In the 2016 general election, Puerto Rico voters selected NPP candidates for both the Governor
and Resident Commissioner posts. The prostatehood NPP also retained majorities in the territorial
House and Senate. Governor-Elect Ricardo Rosselló announced that he “intend[ed] to make
joining the union [as a state] the central focus of his administration.”28 Soon after the November
election, some in the NPP began urging congressional action to admit Puerto Rico as a state.29
In his election night victory speech, according to one media report, Rosselló called his election an
“‘unequivocal mandate to tell the world that the transition to statehood has started,’ which he will
promote through the Tennessee Plan.”30 The “Tennessee Plan” refers to the method by which
Tennessee and six other states joined the union.31 Each territory employed this method somewhat
differently, but the central thrust of the Tennessee Plan involves organizing a political entity that
is essentially a state in all but name. Steps typically include drafting of a state constitution,
election of state officers, and sending an elected congressional delegation to Washington to lobby
for statehood.32 These developments notwithstanding, there is no single path to statehood.
Changing Puerto Rico’s political status by the Tennessee Plan or any other method ultimately
would require a statutory change by Congress with presidential approval.
The 2017 Plebiscite
In January 2017, Rosselló assumed the governorship and the NPP assumed the majority in the
legislature. Puerto Rico was thus now primarily represented by a Governor, legislative majority,
and Resident Commissioner who publicly favored statehood. On February 3, 2017, the legislature
enacted, and the Governor subsequently signed, legislation setting the June 11, 2017, plebiscite
date.33 The new NPP government framed the 2017 plebiscite as the first “sanctioned” by the
federal government (through the FY2014 appropriations language discussed above). The
legislature also characterized the 2017 plebiscite as a way to “reassert the desire for
decolonization and the request for Statehood” from 2012.34 Similar arguments that had

28 Dánica Coto, “Top Candidate Wants Puerto Rico Statehood,” Chicago Tribune, November 6, 2016, p. 27.
29 Jose Aponte-Hernandez, “Puerto Rico Takes Giant Leap Toward Statehood,” The Hill, blog posting, November 15,
2016, https://origin-nyi.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/305990-puerto-rico-takes-giant-leap-towards-
statehood. Aponte-Hernandez is a former Speaker of the territorial House of Representatives and remains a legislator.
30 Cindy Burgos Alvarado, “Rosselló Says He Will Be ‘Last Governor of the Colony,’” Caribbean Business, November
8, 2016, http://caribbeanbusiness.com/rossello-says-he-will-be-last-governor-of-the-colony/; accessed via CRS Factiva
subscription.
31 Tennessee was the first territorial area admitted to the union as a state. For historical background, see, for example,
John Whitfield, The Early History of Tennessee: From Frontier to Statehood (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing
Company, 1999), p. 125. Other former territories that followed statehood paths similar to the Tennessee Plan include,
in chronological order, Michigan, Iowa, California, Oregon, Kansas, and Alaska.
32 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11792, Statehood Process and Political Status of U.S. Territories: Brief Policy
Background, by R. Sam Garrett; and Grupo de Investigadores Puertoriqueños, Breakthrough from Colonialism: An
Interdisciplinary Study of Statehood (Río Piedras, PR: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1984), pp. 1209-
1215. Some of these steps would be relevant for Puerto Rico, while others would not; an analysis of the topic is beyond
the scope of this report.
33 Puerto Rico Act No. 7-2017. This report refers to a certified translation provided to CRS by the Puerto Rico Office of
Legislative Services, May 2017.
34 Puerto Rico Act No. 7-2017, p. 25.
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surrounded the previous plebiscite language resurfaced in 2017.35 Similar criticisms also emerged
from those who opposed the plebiscite.
Initial Plebiscite Ballot and DOJ Reaction
As explained below, the initial ballot was subsequently amended after the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) declined to certify the federal funds appropriated in FY2014 (discussed above) to
administer the plebiscite.
• NPP supporters argued that the 2012 plebiscite established that Puerto Rican
voters preferred a nonterritorial option, and that statehood or a form of
independence were the only constitutionally permissible choices.36
• The plebiscite law thus included two “non-territorial and non-colonial political
status” options on the ballot: (1) “Statehood” and (2) “Free
Association/Independence.” The law further specified that only ballots marking
one of those options would be counted—a reference to controversy over “blank”
ballots believed to be cast in protest in 2012.37
• The law also directed that if the “Free Association/Independence” option
received a majority in the June 11 plebiscite, an October 8, 2017, referendum
would be held for voters to select from these two choices.38 Both free association
and independence would entail Puerto Rico becoming an independent country.
The former suggests an ongoing, mutually negotiated relationship in which the
United States might continue to provide some benefits or services, such as the
United States today has with the Western Pacific nations of the Federated States
of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.39

35 See, for example, Richard Fausset, “In Puerto Rico, Fiscal Crisis Renews Statehood Debate,” New York Times, May
17, 2017, p. 11, late edition.
36 For example, the “statement of motives” section of the law states that “The issue of rejecting the century-old
territorial and colonial status was clearly resolved locally by a majority vote of the citizens of Puerto Rico in the 2012
Plebiscite. Colonialism is not a choice for Puerto Rico under any method or modality of judicial interpretation of the
‘territory clause’ of the U.S. Constitution.” See p. 10 of the English translation. The “statement of motives” is similar to
committee-report language or a “findings” section in federal legislation.
37 This information appears on pp. 43-45 of the certified English translation of Puerto Rico Act No. 7-2017.
38 The law uses the terms “plebiscite” and “referendum” separately. Definitions in the law (p. 30) address both terms
but do not indicate why different terms are used. It is possible that different terms are used simply to avoid confusion
between the June 11 and October 8 events. In general, “plebiscite” was more common historically and in European
contexts than currently and in the U.S. context. In modern U.S. usage, “referendum” typically refers to voter approval
of legislative action. “Plebiscite” in modern U.S. usage (to the extent it is relevant) typically refers to a popular vote as
an expression of nonbinding preference. For additional discussion of these terms, see, for example, Referendums: A
Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, ed. David Butler and Austin Ranney (Washington: American Enterprise
Institute, 1978), pp. 4-5; Francesco Biagi, “Plebiscite: An Old But Still Fashionable Instrument,” University of Illinois
Law Review, 2017, pp. 713-738; and Rafael A. Declet, Jr., “The Mandate Under International Law for a Self-Executing
Plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s Political Status, and the Right of U.S.-Resident Puerto Ricans to Participate,” Syracuse Law
of International Law and Commerce, vol. 28, no. 19 (2001), pp. 19-60.
39 The United States administered these three freely associated states (FASes) on behalf of the United Nations after
World War II. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R44753, The Pacific Islands: Policy Issues, by Thomas Lum
and Bruce Vaughn.
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• PDP supporters objected to the ballot wording and choices. They argued that the
ballot improperly omitted a status-quo option and was biased to favor a statehood
outcome.40
• After the legislature enacted the initial law establishing the plebiscite date and
ballot, attention turned to whether the U.S. Justice Department would approve
releasing the federal funds appropriated in FY2014. Importantly, Puerto Rico
does not require federal approval to conduct a plebiscite or to otherwise
reconsider its political status, but plebiscite supporters argued that federal
approval would enhance the vote’s perceived legitimacy in Washington.
• On April 13, 2017, Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente wrote to
Governor Rosselló that “multiple considerations preclude [DOJ] from notifying
Congress that it approves of the plebiscite ballot and obligating the funds.”41
According to the letter, “the Department does not believe that the results of the
2012 plebiscite justify omitting Puerto Rico’s current status as an option on the
[2017] ballot.” Boente explained that DOJ also had determined that the ballot
language included “several ambiguous and potentially misleading statements,
which may hinder voters’ ability to make a fully informed choice as well as
efforts to ascertain the will of the people from the plebiscite results.” In
particular, DOJ raised concerns about what it regarded as deficiencies in how
U.S. citizenship rights were explained in the “statehood” ballot description; and
the chance that voters could “misperceive” the “free association” option as a
constitutionally impermissible form of “enhanced commonwealth.”42
Amended Plebiscite Ballot
After DOJ issued its determination, attention shifted back to the island. As discussed briefly
below, the prostatehood government amended the plebiscite law to include a commonwealth
option.
• Soon after the DOJ issued its April 13 letter, the Rosselló Administration and the
NPP majority in the legislature announced that they would amend the plebiscite
law.43 The amended “statement of motives” declared that,“[D]ue to the position
stated by the U.S. Department of Justice, [the Legislative Assembly has] acted,
under protest, on [DOJ’s] recommendation to include the current territorial status

40 See, for example, Aníbal Acevdeo-Vilá, “Puerto Rico and the Right to Self-Determination of the USA,” The Hill,
blog posting, February 13, 2017, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/319024-puerto-rico-and-the-right-to-
self-determination-of-the-usa. Acevdeo-Vilá is a former PDP Governor and Resident Commissioner. In addition, a
group of eight U.S. Senators wrote to Attorney General Jeff Sessions to oppose the draft ballot and related materials.
The Senators wrote that the draft ballot language and related materials “[did] not comply with the requirements set
forth in the [FY2014] Consolidated Appropriations Act” because they excluded a status quo (“commonwealth”) option.
See Letter from Roger Wicker, U.S. Senator, et al. to Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney General, April 5, 2017.
41 Letter from Dana J. Boente, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of Puerto
Rico, April 13, 2017, p. 1.
42 Letter from Dana J. Boente, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of Puerto
Rico, April 13, 2017, p. 2-3.
43 Ismael Torres, “Status Referendum Process Affected by Commonwealth Inclusion,” Caribbean Business, April 17,
2017, http://caribbeanbusiness.com/status-referendum-process-affected-by-commonwealth-inclusion/.
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among the options, so that the Plebiscite may be fully supported by the Federal
Government.”44
• As Figure 3 below shows, the revised ballot included three options: (1)
statehood, (2) “free association/independence,” and (3) “current territorial
status.”
• The Justice Department did not formally respond to the ballot changes before
voters went to the polls. However, supporters framed the new ballot options as
tantamount to federal endorsement for the plebiscite. Opponents noted that the
department had not approved the language.45
• Changing the ballot language was intended to address the Justice Department’s
concerns, but it also reignited political controversy among the island’s political
parties. The Independence Party (PIP), which initially announced that it would
encourage its supporters to participate in the plebiscite in hopes of defeating
statehood, changed its position. In light of what it regarded as a colonial
“commonwealth” ballot option now being included, the PIP announced that it
would boycott the plebiscite, as did the PDP, in addition to some other nonparty
groups.46 PDP leadership called for repealing the plebiscite law and beginning
anew.47

44 This text appears on p. 6 of the certified English translation of Puerto Rico Act No. 23-2017, the amendments to
Puerto Rico Act No. 7-2017.
45 See, for example, Colin Wilhelm, “Puerto Rico Governor Pushes Statehood as Vote Looms Despite No U.S.
Support,” Politico online, May 26, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/26/puerto-rico-statehood-is-it-
possible-238867.
46 See, for example, Ismael Torres, “PIP to Defend Independence in Status Referendum,” Caribbean Business,
February 5, 2017, http://caribbeanbusiness.com/pip-to-defend-independence-in-status-referendum/; Ismael Torres,
“Status Referendum Process Affected by Commonwealth Inclusion,” Caribbean Business, April 17, 2017,
http://caribbeanbusiness.com/status-referendum-process-affected-by-commonwealth-inclusion/; and Alex Figueroa
Cancel, “‘El Jute’ Pro Sovereignty Group Joins Plebiscite Boycott,” El Nuevo Dia, April 20, 2017,
http://www.elnuevodia.com/english/english/nota/eljunteprosovereigntygroupjoinsplebisciteboycott-2312855/.
47 See, for example, Robert Slavin, “Puerto Rico Rewriting Statehood Plebiscite Language After U.S. Rejection,” The
Bond Buyer, April 18, 2017, accessed via CRS Factiva subscription.
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Figure 3. Sample Amended 2017 Plebiscite Ballot

Source: CRS figure from April 21, 2017, sample plebiscite ballot posted to the Puerto Rico State Elections
Commission website, http://plebiscito2017.ceepur.org/docs/Papeleta%20Plebiscito.pdf.
Notes: Size and spacing will differ on the actual ballot. Ballot wording and format are as provided in the original
document.
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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

2017 Plebiscite Results
On June 11, 2017, voters in Puerto Rico chose among the three options on the revised plebiscite
ballot.
• 97.2% of voters chose statehood,
• 1.5% of voters chose free association/independence, and
• 1.3% of voters chose the “current territorial status.”
Turnout for the plebiscite was 23% (approximately 518,000 of 2.3 million registered voters).48
In anticipation of a statehood victory in the plebiscite, the territorial legislature enacted, and the
Governor signed, legislation in June 2017 to pursue a “Tennessee Plan” path to statehood,
including appointing a “delegation” to advocate for statehood before the House and Senate in
Washington.49 The PDP opposition criticized the law and vowed to challenge it in court and in
future elections.50
The 2020 Plebiscite and Election Results
Partially as a result of ongoing debate surrounding previous results, the Puerto Rico Legislature
authorized another plebiscite in May 2020, to be held in conjunction with the November general
election. In the November 3, 2020, plebiscite, approximately 52.5% of voters answered
affirmatively, compared with 47.5% who answered negatively, when asked a single ballot
question of whether Puerto Rico should immediately be admitted to the union as a state.
Approximately 52.2% of voters participated in the 2020 plebiscite (approximately 1.2 million of
2.4 million registered voters).51 At the same time that voters selected the statehood option in
2020, they also elected a pro-statehood Governor, Pedro Pierluisi (NPP), and reelected Resident
Commissioner Gonzalez-Colon (NPP), but defeated the previous pro-statehood New Progressive
Party majority in the legislature.52
As with previous status debates, controversy continues over the extent of popular interest in
revisiting status and, if so, how. Discussions within the major parties in Puerto Rico regarding
status also appear to be ongoing.53 Statehood supporters generally argue that statehood has been
victorious in multiple recent plebiscites, while opponents counter that previous plebiscite methods
have predetermined the statehood outcome, that participation was insufficient, or both.

48 These data, posted by the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission, are based on 99.5% of precincts reporting results.
See http://resultados2017.ceepur.org/Noche_del_Evento_78/index.html#es/default/
CONSULTA_DESCOLONIZACION_Resumen.xml.
49 Cindy Burgos Alvarado, “Puerto Rico Governor Approves Tennessee Plan,” Caribbean Business, June 5, 2017,
http://caribbeanbusiness.com/puerto-rico-governor-approves-tennessee-plan/.
50 Ismael Torres, “Puerto Rico’s PDP to Challenge Constitutionality of Tennessee Plan Law,” Caribbean Business,
June 7, 2017, http://caribbeanbusiness.com/puerto-ricos-pdp-to-challenge-constitutionality-of-tennessee-plan-law/.
51 See the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission, Informe Estadístico: Elecciones Generales, 3 de noviembre de
2020, at https://ww2.ceepur.org/sites/ComisionEE/es-pr/Documents/Informe-estadistico-EG2020.pdf, p. 237. CRS
rounded these figures.
52 Some observers have argued that the 2020 election results suggested increasing popular interest in nontraditional
parties. See, for example, Robert Slavin, “Puerto Rico Governance Clashes Likely with Changes in Party Control,” The
Bond Buyer, November 13, 2020, accessed via CRS Factiva subscription.
53 See, for example, Dánica Coto, “Puerto Rico Party to Hold Vote on its Political Future,” Associated Press, June 16,
2022; and Jorell Meléndez-Badillo, “Puerto Rico is Voting for Its Future,” Time, updated May 6, 2024,
https://time.com/6969980/puerto-rico-voting-future/.
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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

Status Developments in the 117th Congress
During the 117th Congress, no changes to Puerto Rico’s political status became law. The House
passed one bill, and several others were introduced in both chambers.
• In April 2021 and June 2021, the House Natural Resources Committee held
hearings on H.R. 1522 and H.R. 2070.54
• In December 2022, the House passed (233-191) H.R. 8393.55
• Status legislation introduced in the Senate (S. 780, S. 865, and S. 4560) did not
substantially advance beyond introduction.
House Passage of Status Legislation During the 117th Congress
Representative Grijalva, then the House Natural Resources Committee chair, introduced H.R.
8393, the Puerto Rico Status Act, on July 15, 2022. On July 20, 2022, the House Natural
Resources Committee held a markup on the bill. His version of the bill would have authorized
another plebiscite among three status options: (1) independence; (2) “sovereignty in free
association with the United States”; and (3) statehood.
At the markup, Chair Grijalva stated that H.R. 8393 represented a compromise measure based on
two other bills, H.R. 1522, the Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act (Soto), and H.R. 2070, the
Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act (Velázquez), both of which had been introduced previously
in the 117th Congress.
During the markup on H.R. 8393, Resident Commissioner González-Colón, Puerto Rico’s
Delegate to the House, voiced support for the compromise bill. Discussion during the markup
addressed issues such as whether maintaining territories is consistent with U.S. democratic
values; how Congress had addressed statehood admission previously; whether the committee had
adequately considered H.R. 8393; whether input from other committees was needed; and whether
or how federal benefits and citizenship should be extended during a transition process to an
independent or freely associated Puerto Rico. The committee considered several amendments
during the markup.56 The committee ordered an amended version of the bill favorably reported on
July 20, 2022.57
House Consideration and Passage
House debate58 on the bill focused on many of the same issues that were addressed in the markup,
and on the timing of the bill’s consideration. After the report accompanying H.R. 8393 was
published on December 14, 2022, the House debated the measure. The House passed (233-191)

54 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, H.R. 1522, “Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act” and
H.R. 2070, “Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2021,” legislative hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 14, 2021,
Serial No. 117-3 (Washington: GPO, 2021); and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, H.R. 1522,
“Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act” and H.R. 2070, “Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2021”—Part 2,
legislative hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2021, Serial No. 117-5 (Washington: GPO, 2021).
55 Roll call vote no. 529.
56 See the amendment in the nature of a substitute (ANS) text and the text of submitted amendments in the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee Repository, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=
115035.
57 See U.S. Congress, House Natural Resources Committee, Puerto Rico Status Act, report to accompany H.R. 8393,
117th Cong., 2nd sess., December 14, 2022, H.Rept. 117-642 (Washington: GPO, 2022).
58 See “Puerto Rico Status Act,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, December 15, 2022, pp.
H9867-H9882.
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the bill on December 15, 2022.59 The Biden Administration issued a Statement of Administration
Policy supporting H.R. 8393 the same day.60 The legislation did not receive additional
consideration in the Senate.
Highlights of the House-passed version of H.R. 8393, which was substantially similar to the
reported version, include the following.
• The bill would have authorized another plebiscite, to be held on November 5,
2023. Under the bill, the ballot options would have included (1) independence;
(2) “sovereignty in free association with the United States”; and (3) statehood. If
one of those options did not receive a majority vote, a runoff would have been
scheduled for March 3, 2024, between the two options that received the largest
number of votes in the first plebiscite. The bill also specified explanatory text to
accompany each ballot option. The bill did not include a ballot option for
maintaining the status quo.
• The bill would have assigned the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission with
conducting a voter education campaign, and would have authorized federal
funding for such purposes.
• If voters chose the independence or sovereignty in free association options, the
bill would have authorized a transition process, such as establishing a convention
in Puerto Rico to draft a constitution; electing governmental officers; reviewing
implications for terminating federal law over the island; and establishing a joint
federal-Puerto Rico transition commission. The bill also specified transition
provisions regarding federal programs and rights, such as those affecting
citizenship, education, and employment. In the case of sovereign free association,
the bill would have established a bilateral commission to negotiate articles of free
association establishing the future relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States. Under the statehood option, the current Puerto Rico constitution
would have been deemed to serve as the state constitution. The bill provided that
the President would make recommendations to Congress about any necessary
changes to federal law, such as those affecting federal benefits. Under statehood,
Puerto Rico would have been entitled to House and Senate representation
consistent with other states.
• The bill called for a presidential proclamation recognizing the chosen status
option. It did not appear to specify an additional approval role for Congress
beyond authorizing the plebiscites. As noted previously, Congress could choose
to admit or otherwise alter Puerto Rico’s political status through a statutory
change, as long as Puerto Rico remained a territory. Congress also could affect
future United States relations with an independent or freely associated Puerto
Rico through federal law governing such relationships (e.g., treaties or free
association agreements). Because the independence and free association options
would entail a new, independent Puerto Rico, the details of future relationships
between the United States and Puerto Rico in those cases would be subject to
future negotiation.

59 Roll call vote no. 529.
60 U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R.
8393—Puerto Rico Status Act, December 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/
HR8393-SAP.pdf.
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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

Senate Legislation Considered During the 117th Congress
Three Senate bills were introduced in the 117th Congress regarding Puerto Rico status. None
advanced substantially beyond introduction.
• S. 780 (Heinrich), the Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act, would have
authorized a “ratification vote” in the form of a single ballot question asking
voters whether Puerto Rico should be admitted as a state.61 If a majority of voters
answered affirmatively, the bill would have directed the President to issue a
proclamation admitting Puerto Rico as a state. The bill also specified transition
provisions.
• S. 865 (Menendez), the Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2021, proposed a
publicly financed campaign fund (matching funds) for those seeking election as
delegates to a proposed “semipermanent” Puerto Rico status convention, which
would have been charged with developing status options.62 The bill also proposed
a bilateral negotiating commission, including Members of Congress, to advise
convention delegates, and specified status transition steps, if applicable. The bill
provided that the island’s status debate may include a referendum, which would
have formed the basis for congressional action to ratify the status choice.
• Senator Wicker introduced S. 4560 on July 20, 2022, the same day as the H.R.
8393 House Natural Resources Committee markup discussed above.63 In a press
release, the Senator’s office characterized the bill as “an alternative” to the
Representative Grijalva bill.64 Also titled the Puerto Rico Status Act, S. 4560
adopted some elements of H.R. 8393. Most notably, S. 4560 also proposed a
November 5, 2023, status plebiscite, to be followed by a March 3, 2024, runoff,
if necessary. Unlike H.R. 8393, S. 4560 would have included a “commonwealth”
option on the ballot, in addition to independence, sovereignty in free association
with the United States, and statehood choices. The bill proposed ballot language
that characterized the commonwealth option, among other provisions, as an
opportunity for “a reaffirmation” of the current status while also preserving an
opportunity for future renegotiation of the Puerto Rico-United States
relationship.65 As with the other status options presented, the bill proposed a
bilateral negotiating commission if voters chose the commonwealth option.
Unlike H.R. 8393, if voters chose statehood under S. 4560, the Senate bill would
have required a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study on Puerto
Rico’s “readiness for statehood,” including, among other factors, whether a
“stable majority” to support statehood existed and how statehood could affect
economic and federal programs in Puerto Rico and on the mainland.66 The bill

61 See S. 780, §7.
62 Campaign finance issues are beyond the scope of this report. For additional general discussion, see CRS Report
R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
63 This report relies on bill text at https://www.wicker.senate.gov/services/files/DA18BCEE-5193-42D6-B867-
5C9CE6849B63, linked from Office of Sen. Wicker, “Wicker Opposes House Puerto Rico Status Proposal, Introduces
Alternative,” press release, July 20, 2022, https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2022/7/wicker-opposes-house-puerto-rico-
status-proposal-introduces-alternative.
64 Office of Sen. Wicker, “Wicker Opposes House Puerto Rico Status Proposal, Introduces Alternative,” press release,
July 20, 2022, https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2022/7/wicker-opposes-house-puerto-rico-status-proposal-introduces-
alternative.
65 See §101, S. 4560.
66 See §402, S. 4560.
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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

proposed that the House and Senate would vote on statehood, followed by a
presidential proclamation (if Congress approved statehood), after receiving the
GAO study.67 S. 4560 also included generally similar language to H.R. 8393
regarding transition provisions (if necessary) and a voter education campaign.
Status Developments in the 118th Congress
As noted below, Members have reintroduced legislation that is substantially similar to bills
introduced in the 117th Congress.
• On April 20, 2023, Representative Grijalva, the ranking member of the House
Committee on Natural Resources in the 118th Congress, reintroduced the Puerto
Rico Status Act as H.R. 2757. The legislation is substantially similar to the
version of Representative Grijalva’s legislation that passed the House during the
117th Congress (H.R. 8393), as discussed above. The bill proposes a November 2,
2025, plebiscite date and a March 8, 2026, runoff date.
• On September 27, 2023, Senator Wicker reintroduced his status bill as S. 2944.
Although the measure is also called the Puerto Rico Status Act, as in the 117th
Congress (S. 4560), Senator Wicker’s bill takes a different approach than other
bills of the same name. Most notably, S. 2944 includes a “commonwealth” option
on the plebiscite ballot.
• On November 6, 2023, Senator Heinrich introduced S. 3231. Unlike the
Senator’s 117th Congress legislation (S. 780), S. 3231 appears to be a companion
measure to Representative Grijalva’s H.R. 2757. S. 3231 and H.R. 2757 are
substantially similar. Both are called the Puerto Rico Status Act.
PROMESA and Status
Much of the status debate emphasizes governance, political participation, and democratic
principles rather than economic issues or other policy matters. Furthermore, the relationship
between status and economics is subject to ongoing debate, with some arguing that the two issues
are inextricably linked and others replying that the status debate distracts from long-standing
economic problems. Most recently, Puerto Rico’s financial situation has, however, shaped some
aspects of attention to status, as discussed briefly below. As noted previously, economic issues are
otherwise beyond the scope of this report.68
In June 2016, Congress enacted legislation responding to an ongoing economic crisis in Puerto
Rico. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L.
114-187)69 establishes a process for restructuring the island government’s public debt. PROMESA
also establishes a federal oversight board, formally known as the Financial Oversight and
Management Board for Puerto Rico, with “broad powers of budgetary and financial control over”
the island.70

67 See §402, S. 4560.
68 This includes a discussion of Puerto Rico’s tax status, which relates to its political status as a territory rather than a
state. For additional discussion of tax policy in U.S. territories, see CRS Report R44651, Tax Policy and U.S.
Territories: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Sean Lowry.
69 48 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.
70 See archived CRS Report R44532, The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
(PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S. 2328), coordinated by D. Andrew Austin, p. 1.
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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

Status was not a central component of the congressional deliberation over PROMESA, although
some Members addressed status in testimony or floor statements.71 Some comments during
hearings also addressed the topic.72 Perhaps most consequentially for the status debate, some of
those who opposed PROMESA, including some Members of Congress, characterized the broad
powers provided to the oversight board as undemocratic. In particular, opponents objected to the
board’s powers to approve fiscal plans submitted by the Governor and to approve territorial
budgets, among others.73 Although not necessarily addressing the oversight board explicitly,
proponents generally argued that, in the absence of bankruptcy protection for territories,
PROMESA was necessary to help the island’s government to restructure its debts in an orderly
fashion. Critics, on the other hand, contended that the oversight board undermines the mutually
agreed status relationship established in 1952.74
One brief section of PROMESA explicitly addresses status. Section 40275 of the law states that
“[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted to restrict Puerto Rico’s right to determine its future
political status, including” through another plebiscite as authorized in the FY2014 omnibus
appropriations law (P.L. 113-76). A December 2016 report released by a congressional task force
established in PROMESA (devoted primarily to economic issues) recommended that if such a
plebiscite is held, Congress “analyze the result ... with care and seriousness of purpose, and take
any appropriate legislative action.”76

71 See, for example, discussion in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Financial and Economic Challenges
in Puerto Rico, 114th Cong., 1st sess., September 29, 2015, S.Hrg. 114-307 (Washington: GPO, 2016); U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, Examining
Procedures Regarding Puerto Rico’s Political Status and Economic Outlook, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2015,
Serial No. 114-13 (Washington: GPO, 2015); U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee
on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, The Need for the Establishment of a Puerto Rico Financial Stability and
Economic Growth Authority, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2, 2016, Serial No. 114-30 (Washington: GPO, 2016).
72 See, in particular, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and
Alaska Native Affairs, Examining Procedures Regarding Puerto Rico’s Political Status and Economic Outlook,
oversight hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2015, Serial No. 114-13 (Washington: GPO, 2015).
73 On the board’s powers, see, in particular, Titles II and III of PROMESA (P.L. 114-187); and archived CRS Report
R44532, The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S. 2328),
coordinated by D. Andrew Austin.
74 For various congressional perspectives on PROMESA, in addition to the hearings cited above, see, for example,
Senate debate throughout the day on June 28, 2016, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 162, part 104 (June 28,
2016). On opposition to the oversight board in particular, see, for example, the colloquy between Sens. Robert
Menendez and Bernie Sanders, “PROMESA,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 162,
part 104 (June 28, 2016), p. S4610.
75 130 Stat. 586; 48 U.S.C. §2192.
76 U.S. Congress, Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico, Report to the House and Senate,
114th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 2016, p. 84.
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Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress

Author Information

R. Sam Garrett

Specialist in American National Government

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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