U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma




U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma
Updated January 12, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44570




U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma

Summary
Major changes in Burma’s political situation since 2016 have raised questions among some
Members of Congress concerning the appropriateness of U.S. policy toward Burma (Myanmar) in
general, and the current restrictions on relations with Burma in particular. During the time Burma
was under military rule (1962–2011), restrictions were placed on bilateral relations in an attempt
to encourage the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, to permit the restoration of democracy.
In November 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections from which Aung San Suu
Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) emerged as the party with an absolute majority in
both chambers of Burma’s parliament. The new government subsequently appointed Aung San
Suu Kyi to the newly created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign Minister. Aung San
Suu Kyi and the NLD won parliamentary elections in November 2020 by a similar margin. While
the NLD controls the parliament and the executive branch, the Tatmadaw continues to exercise
significant power under provisions of Burma’s 2008 constitution, impeding potential progress
towards the re-establishment of a democratically-elected civilian government in Burma.
On October 7, 2016, after consultation with Aung San Suu Kyi, former President Obama revoked
several executive orders pertaining to sanctions on Burma, and waived restrictions required by
Section 5(b) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of
2008 (P.L. 110-286), removing most of the economic restrictions on relations with Burma. On
December 2, 2016, he issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, ending some restrictions on
U.S. assistance to Burma. Various noneconomic restrictions remain in effect, including bans on
providing visas to certain Burmese nationals and other restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma.
Some of these restrictions have been authorized as provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). Burma is also subject to some restrictions because of its noncompliance
on certain global issues, such the use of child soldiers and insufficient efforts to combat human
trafficking.
Certain events since 2016 have led some Members of Congress to call for the reinstatement of
some of the waived sanctions and/or the imposition of new restrictions on relations with Burma.
One of the more prominent events was the “clearance operation” in northern Rakhine State in late
2017, during which Burma’s security forces allegedly committed serious human rights abuses
against the Rohingya, a predominately Sunni Muslim minority group. A U.N. fact-finding
mission determined the security force’s actions may have constituted genocide, crimes against
humanity, and/or war crimes. The Gambia filed a case in the International Court of Justice
charging Burma’s Union Government with genocide. In addition, the International Criminal
Court authorized its Prosecutor to investigate the forced deportation of the Rohingya and related
criminal acts allegedly perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. The Trump Administration imposed visa and
financial sanctions against nine Tatmadaw officers and two Burmese military units involved in
the “clearance operation.”
During the 116th Congress, two bills were introduced—the Burma Unified through Rigorous
Military Accountability Act of 2018 (H.R. 3190; the BURMA Act of 2019) and the Burma
Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2018 (S. 1186)—that would have reformulated U.S. policy in
Burma and the restrictions on bilateral relations. The Allowing for the Safe Return of Rohingyas
to Burma Act of 2019 (H.R. 4392) would have withdrawn Burma’s eligibility under the
Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) program. The 117th Congress may consider whether to
reexamine existing sanctions laws on Burma in light of recent developments, to determine
whether to amend, modify, replace, and/or repeal provisions in those laws.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Brief History of Burma and U.S. Sanctions .................................................................................... 2
U.S. Policy Goals in Burma Sanctions Legislation ......................................................................... 5
Restrictions in Place ........................................................................................................................ 6
Visa Restrictions ........................................................................................................................ 6
Restrictions on U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................. 7
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 ....................................................................... 7
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) ................................................... 8
Restrictions on Relations with Burma’s Military ...................................................................... 9
Global Magnitsky and Related Sanctions ............................................................................... 10
Waived or Lapsed Restrictions ...................................................................................................... 12
Economic Restrictions ............................................................................................................ 12
Ban on Import of Products of Burma ................................................................................ 12
“Freezing” the Assets of Certain Burmese Nationals ....................................................... 13
Restrictions on the Provision of Financial Services .......................................................... 13
Ban on Investment in Burma ............................................................................................ 13
Restrictions on Bilateral Assistance .................................................................................. 14
Restrictions on Multilateral Assistance ............................................................................. 14

Congressional Considerations ....................................................................................................... 15
Goals of U.S. Policy ................................................................................................................ 15
Burma’s Current Political Situation ........................................................................................ 16
Escalation of the Civil War ............................................................................................... 17
Crises in Rakhine State ..................................................................................................... 17
Human Rights ................................................................................................................... 19
Addressing U.S. Restrictions .................................................................................................. 19

Tables
Table 1. Burmese Individuals and Entities Sanctioned for Human Rights Violations ................... 11

Appendixes
Appendix. Chronology of Burmese Sanction Legislation and Related Executive Orders ............ 21

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 27

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U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma

Introduction
Between 1989 and 2008, Congress passed several laws placing political and economic sanctions
on Burma’s military junta as part of a policy to identify individuals responsible for repression in
Burma and hold them accountable for their actions, foster the reestablishment of a democratically
elected civilian government, and promote the protection of human rights. Various developments
in Burma between 2010 and 2016 led the Obama Administration and others to perceive positive
developments toward the restoration of a democratically elected civilian government in that
nation after nearly five decades of military rule. Based on that perception, the Obama
Administration waived most of the sanctions on Burma, particularly after Aung San Suu Kyi and
the National League for Democracy won the 2015 parliamentary elections and a new NLD-
controlled Union Parliament took office in April 2016.
The Trump Administration largely continued the Obama Administration’s policies with respect to
Burma, continuing to lend its support to Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, leaving the
restriction waivers in place. It did, however, impose sanctions of some senior military officers and
military units responsible for gross human rights violations.
Certain events since 2016, however, have led some Members of Congress and others to call for
the reinstatement of some of the waived sanctions and/or the imposition of new restrictions on
relations with Burma. The most prominent was the “clearance operation” in northern Rakhine
State in late 2017, during which Burma’s security forces allegedly committed serious human
rights abuses against the Rohingya including murder, torture, and rape. A U.N. fact-finding
mission (and other investigations) have determined that these human rights abuses may constitute
genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes.1 In August 2018, the U.N. Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) has established the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar “to
collect evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law and
prepare files for criminal prosecution.”2 In November 2019, the Gambia accused Burma in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) of violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) during its attack on the Rohingya.3 That same
month, the International Criminal Court authorized its Prosecutor to investigate possible similar
charges.4 Burma’s security forces have also been accused of committing crimes against humanity
and war crimes against civilians in Kachin and Shan State between 2011 and 2020 as part of their
ongoing conflict with various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Other events that have
contributed to congressional reconsideration of U.S. policy in Burma are the lack of progress in
peace talks between Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, the Burmese military, and the EAOs; and

1 The events in Rakhine State are the subject of a case brought by the Gambia against Myanmar in the U.N.
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
For more about these court cases, see CRS Insight IN11215, Burma Ordered to Prevent Genocide Against Rohingya,
by Michael F. Martin and Kirt Smith. For more about the alleged human rights violations in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan
State, see CRS In Focus IF10970, U.N. Report Recommends Burmese Military Leaders Be Investigated and Prosecuted
for Possible Genocide
, by Michael F. Martin, Matthew C. Weed, and Colin Willett, and CRS Report R45388, Burmese
Security Forces and Personnel Implicated in Serious Human Rights Abuses and Accountability Options
, by Michael F.
Martin.
2 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IIMM/Pages/Index.aspx.
3 For more about the pending ICJ case against Burma, see https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178.
4 For more about the ICC’s investigation, see https://www.icc-cpi.int/bangladesh-myanmar.
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the continuing arrest, detention, and conviction of political prisoners, including the conviction of
two Burmese reporters for their coverage of the alleged atrocities in Rakhine State.5
The Trump Administration used the Global Magnitsky Act to impose targeted sanctions on nine
military officers and two military units it determined were responsible for serious human rights
abuses in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan State. In addition, restrictions were placed on security
assistance to Burma pursuant to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA; Title IV of
P.L. 110-457; 22 U.S.C. 2370c et seq.) and the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(IRFA; P.L. 105-292), and some forms of non-humanitarian, nontrade-related assistance pursuant
to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, as amended (TVPA; P.L. 106-386; 22 U.S.C.
7017). On January 31, 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 9983, suspending the entry of
nationals of Burma (and six other nations) as immigrants to the United States until Burma’s
government has adequately addressed shortcomings in its identification documents.6
The 116th Congress continued the practice of past Congresses by including restrictions on U.S.
bilateral, multilateral, and national security assistance in appropriations legislation, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) the Further Consolidated Appropriation Act,
2020 (P.L. 116-94) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). In addition,
three bills were introduced that, if enacted, would have placed additional restrictions on U.S.
relations with Burma. The Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability (BURMA)
Act of 2019 (H.R. 3190) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2019 (S. 1186),
would have redefined U.S. policy in Burma and impose greater restrictions on bilateral relations.
The Allowing for the Safe Return of Rohingyas to Burma Act of 2019 (H.R. 4392) would have
withdrawn Burma’s eligibility under the Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) program
unless the President certified to Congress that certain conditions pertaining to the safe, voluntary,
and dignified return of the Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State have been met, as well as the
provision of their citizenship.
Brief History of Burma and U.S. Sanctions
From 1948 to 1966, the Union of Burma was ruled by a democratically elected civilian
government representing the goals and interests of the nation’s Bamar majority and its various
ethnic minorities. The fragile federated state was based on the provisions of the Panglong
Agreement signed by Burma’s revolutionary leader, General Aung San (father of Aung San Suu
Kyi), and representatives of some of the nation’s larger ethnic minorities—the Chin, the Kachin,
and the Shan. The ethnic-based coalition proved to be unstable, as some of the ethnic minorities
considered withdrawing from the federated state, and the Tatmadaw fought against a Karen
separatist movement militia. On March 2, 1962, Burma’s military, known as the Tatmadaw,
staged a coup d’état, led by General Ne Win. Following the coup, several other ethnic minorities
organized militias to protect themselves from Tatmadaw and Bamar domination.
From 1962 to 2011, much of Burma was ruled by a military junta that denied the people of Burma
the right to select the government of their choice and many of their internationally recognized

5 For more about the stalled peace talks, see CRS In Focus IF11081, Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019, by Michael
F. Martin and Kirt Smith. For more about “political prisoners” in Burma, see CRS Report R44804, Burma’s Political
Prisoners and U.S. Policy
, by Michael F. Martin.
6 For details, see Executive Office of the President, “Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” 85 Federal Register
6699-6707, February 5, 2020.
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human rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association. Throughout this period, a
low-grade civil war raged off and on between the Tatmadaw and over 20 different ethnic armed
organizations; some of the EAOs secured administrative control over portions of the country.7
Despite the military coup, the political repression, and the ongoing civil war, the United States
established and maintained normal diplomatic relations with the military junta, including
relatively close military-to-military relations.8
Between 1989 and 2008, Congress passed a series of laws imposing diplomatic and economic
sanctions on Burma’s military junta, in response to its violent suppression of democratic protests
in 1988, 1990, 2003, and 2007.9 Two of the sanctions laws were the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA, P.L. 108-61) and the JADE Act, which imposed various political
and economic restrictions on U.S. relations with Burma. In addition, during this time period,
Congress passed legislation that potentially could place restrictions on relations with Burma, and
other nations, for violating laws related to human rights, such as the CSPA, the IRFA, and the
TVPA.
In 2008, Burma’s military junta, then known as the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), began a process to transform the nation’s government into what it called a “disciplined
democracy.” On May 8, 2008, the SPDC held a national referendum on a new constitution that
would establish a hybrid civilian/military Union Government. Many observers viewed the results
of the referendum—in which over 90% of the voters supported the new constitution—as
fraudulent.10 On November 7, 2010, the SPDC held parliamentary elections that were boycotted
by many political parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD).
The pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won nearly 80% of the
contested seats (25% of the seats in Burma’s Union Parliament are not contested, but rather under
the 2008 constitution are appointed by the Commander in Chief of Defence Services). The new
Union Parliament appointed SPDC Prime Minister Lieutenant General Thein Sein as President.
He was sworn in on March 30, 2011, after the SPDC officially transferred power to the new
Union Government.
Following the establishment of Burma’s Union Government, the Obama Administration adopted
a new policy of greater engagement while maintaining existing sanctions.11 President Obama used
the waiver provisions in sanctions laws to waive the enforcement of some of the sanctions, in part

7 For example, the United Wa State Army controls and governs much of eastern Shan State under the terms of a 1989
ceasefire agreement with Burma’s military junta. In addition, the Kachin Independence Organization administers
portions of eastern Kachin State, and the Karen National Union governs areas or Kayin State. These EAOs have
established their own official agencies for governing areas under their administrative control that function
independently from the Union Government.
8 Various factors point to continuity of diplomatic relations with Burma following the 1962 coup. The United States
continued to appoint ambassadors to Burma until 1990. In the 1970s, the United States provided aid to Burma’s
military junta as part of its anti-opium efforts. In the 1980s, Burma was the largest beneficiary in Southeast Asia of the
U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
9 See Appendix. For more about the history of the imposition of sanctions, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on
Burma
, by Michael F. Martin.
10 For example, the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) published a report of Burma’s constitutional
referendum on May 26, 2008, sharply criticizing the conduct of the plebiscite, calling the results, “Neither Free nor
Fair.” (The Public International Law & Policy Group, Burmese Constitutional Referendum: Neither Free Nor Fair,
May 2008). For more about the circumstances under which the constitutional referendum was held, see CRS Report
RL34481, Cyclone Nargis and Burma’s Constitutional Referendum, by Michael F. Martin and Rhoda Margesson.
11 For more information, see CRS Report R43035, U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress, by
Michael F. Martin.
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in response to President Thein Sein’s undertaking some political reforms and releasing many
political prisoners.12
On November 8, 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections, in which the NLD won
nearly 80% of the contested seats.13 The Union Parliament chose Htin Kyaw, a long-standing
NLD member and close friend of Aung San Suu Kyi, as President. Aung San Suu Kyi was
subsequently appointed to the newly created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign
Minister. During Aung San Suu Kyi’s September 2016 visit to Washington, DC, President Obama
announced Burma’s reinstatement in the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program
and his intention to revoke several executive orders that enforced many of the sanctions on
Burma.14 President Obama’s pledge to revoke the executive orders was fulfilled by the release of
E.O. 13472 on October 7, 2016. On December 2, 2016, he issued Presidential Determination
2017-04, ending restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma as provided by Section 570(a) of the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997.15
Many observers hoped the success of NLD in the 2015 elections would lead to progress to the
restoration of democracy. Soon after taking office, Aung San Suu Kyi stated that one of her top
priorities would be negotiating an end to the nation’s civil war. She also indicated that she hoped
to obtain the Tatmadaw’s support to amend the 2008 constitution. Neither of these goals were
achieved, and relations between the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities arguably worsened.
In addition, Aung San Suu Kyi used many of the same laws the Tatmadaw used to suppress the
NLD to arrest, detain, prosecute, and imprison its political rivals, continuing Burma’s history of
political prisoners.
During the decade in which the hybrid civilian/military Union Government has been in power,
Burma’s civil war has intensified. Fighting initially escalated in Kachin State, but soon spread to
neighboring Shan State. In October 2016 and again in August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya
Solidarity Army (ARSA), a new EAO, launched attacks on security outposts in Rakhine State,
along the border with Bangladesh. The Tatmadaw responded with a large-scale assault on the
Rohingya, resulting in the flight of an estimated 700,000 people to Bangladesh. While ARSA has
largely receded from Rakhine State, another EAO, the Arakan Army, relocated most of its forces
from Kachin and Shan States into Chin and Rakhine States in late 2017, creating the third and
most active front in Burma’s civil war.
In November 2020, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections in most of the country.16
Voting was cancelled in parts of the States of Chin, Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Mon, Rakhine
(Arakan), and Shan allegedly due to the dangers posed by the civil war. The NLD won more seats
than they did in the 2015 elections. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have reached out to some of
the ethnic minority political parties to discuss terms for forming a “national unity government.”17

12 For more information about political prisoners in Burma, See CRS Report R42363, Burma’s Political Prisoners and
U.S. Sanctions
, by Michael F. Martin.
13 For more information about the election, see CRS Report R44436, Burma’s 2015 Parliamentary Elections: Issues for
Congress
, by Michael F. Martin.
14 White House, “Joint Statement between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the United States of America,”
press release, September 14, 2016. The revoked Executive Orders were E.O. 13047, E.O. 13310, E.O. 13448, E.O.
13464, E.O. 13619, and E.O. 13651.
15 Executive Office of the President, “Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997,” Presidential Determination 2017-04, December 2,
2016.
16 For more about Burma’s 2020 parliamentary elections, see CRS In Focus IF11687, Burma’s 2020 Parliamentary
Elections
, by Michael F. Martin and Kirt Smith.
17 “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s party wins majority in election,” BBC, November 13, 2020.
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Some of the political parties have accepted the offer; others remain skeptical, given their
experiences after the 2015 elections.
While the Obama Administration waived most of the sanctions on Burma, several noneconomic
restrictions as detailed in the sections that follow remain in effect, including
 a prohibition on issuing visas to enter the United States to certain categories of
Burmese officials;
 restrictions limiting the types of U.S. assistance to Burma;
 limitations on U.S. relations with Burma’s military; and
 an embargo on arms sales to Burma.
In addition, Congress has set limits on bilateral relations in appropriations legislation. Section
7043(a) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), for example, places a
number of restrictions on bilateral, international security, and multilateral assistance to Burma.
Similar restrictions were included in Appropriation Acts going back to FY2012, indicating that
Congress may not have fully shared President Obama’s view that circumstances in Burma
warranted the waiving of sanctions.
U.S. Policy Goals in Burma Sanctions Legislation
Each time it passed legislation directly imposing sanctions on Burma, Congress articulated goals
of U.S. policy toward Burma and, by extension, how the sanctions might facilitate the
achievement of those goals. Among the goals stated in those laws were
 the establishment of a constitutional democratic civilian government;
 the protection and/or the improvement of internationally recognized human
rights;
 the release of political prisoners;
 greater cooperation with U.S. counternarcotics efforts;
 the alleviation of the suffering of Burmese refugees and the provision of
humanitarian assistance to the Burmese people; and
 the identification of individuals responsible for repression in Burma and holding
them accountable for their actions.
Progress has been made on some of these goals, but arguably none have been fully achieved.
Circumstances in Burma have raised a number of questions for Congress regarding U.S. policy
and the restrictions on relations, such as the following:
 Should waived restrictions be reinstated, or new restrictions be imposed, in light
of the alleged serious human rights violations against the Rohingya and other
ethnic minorities in Burma?
 To what extent did the formation of the NLD-led government in 2016 advance
the goals of U.S. policy?
 Did the sanctions on Burma contribute to the political changes that occurred
between 2008 and 2015?
 Are the previously stipulated goals of U.S. policy toward Burma still suitable
given the current situation in Burma and in the region? If not, what are the
appropriate new or revised goals?
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 Are the existing restrictions on relations with Burma consistent with U.S. goals in
Burma? If not, how should they be changed or altered to make them consistent?
 Will the continuation or renewal of restrictions on relations with Burma lead to
the achievement of U.S. goals in Burma?
Restrictions in Place
Following President Obama’s release of E.O. 13472 on October 7, 2016, and Presidential
Determination 2017-04 on December 2, 2016, the restrictions on relations with Burma that
remain in place consist of restrictions on the issuance of visas to certain Burmese nationals, limits
on U.S. assistance to Burma contained in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L.
116-94), various restrictions on U.S. relations with Burma’s military, and some restrictions
imposed because of Burma’s violations of the CSPA, IRFA, and the TVPA. In addition, the
Trump Administration has used the Global Magnitsky Act (22 U.S.C. 2656) to apply visa and
economic sanctions to nine Burmese military officers and two military units.18
Visa Restrictions
Section 570(a)(3) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1997 (P.L. 104-208) states, “Except as required by treaty obligations or to
staff the Burmese mission to the United States, the United States should not grant entry visas to
any Burmese government official.” Section 6 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
(BFDA; P.L. 108-61) expanded the discretionary authority to deny entry visas to “the former and
present leadership” of the SPDC and USDA. Neither the President nor the State Department has
used the authority granted by these two laws.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of
2008 (JADE Act; P.L. 110-286) states:
The following persons shall be ineligible for a visa to travel to the United States:
(A) Former and present leaders of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA.19
(B) Officials of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA involved in the
repression of peaceful political activity or in other gross violations of human rights in
Burma or in the commission of other human rights abuses, including any current or
former officials of the security services and judicial institutions of the SPDC.
(C) Any other Burmese persons who provide substantial economic and political
support for the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA.
(D) The immediate family members of any person described in subparagraphs (A)
through (C).
The JADE Act authorizes the President to waive the visa ban if “the President determines and
certifies in writing to Congress that travel by the person seeking such a waiver is in the national

18 Some of these military officers were also publicly designated for visa sanctions pursuant to Section 7031(c) of State
Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPs) appropriations (a recurring annual provision in
SFOPs).
19 The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) was formed in 1992 by Burma’s military junta to
operate as the eyes and ears of the military junta at the local level. In 2010, the USDA was transformed into a political
party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
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interest of the United States.” The Obama Administration and the Trump Administration on many
occasions have issued such presidential waivers.
On January 31, 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 9983, suspending the entry of
nationals of Burma (and six other nations) as immigrants to the United States until Burma’s
government has adequately addressed shortcomings in its identification documents.20 Exercising
authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA; P.L. 89-236), the
proclamation cites Burma for its failure to comply with “the established identity-management and
information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics,” including the issuance of
electronic passports and the sharing of “public-safety and terrorism-related information.” As a
result, the proclamation suspends the entry “into the United States of nationals of Burma as
immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided
assistance to the United States Government.”21
Restrictions on U.S. Assistance
Various restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma are included in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). In addition, because Burma was classified as a Tier 3 country in the
most recent Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, certain restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma
are required by TVPA, unless waived by the President.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) contains several restrictions on U.S.
programs and activities in Burma, or other provisions that may apply to Burma, depending on
how the Administration decides to implement these provisions. Section 7035(c)(4) reads:
CROWD CONTROL ITEMS.—Funds appropriated by this Act should not be used for tear
gas, small arms, light weapons, ammunition, or other items for crowd control purposes for
foreign security forces that use excessive force to repress peaceful expression, association,
or assembly in countries that the Secretary of State determines are undemocratic or are
undergoing democratic transitions.
Burma’s security forces, including the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar Police Force, the Border Guard
Force, and Tatmadaw-affiliated militias, face many allegations consistent with provisions of this
section. The Secretary of State has the authority to determine if Burma’s security forces will be
subject to this restriction.
Section 7043(a) explicitly places restrictions on assistance to Burma, including the following:
 Bilateral economic assistance (Title III):
 Subsection (1)(B)—“That such funds may be available for programs to
support the return of Kachin, Karen, Rohingya, Shan, and other refugees and
internally displaced persons to their locations of origin or preference in
Burma only if such returns are voluntary and consistent with international
law”;

20 For details, see Executive Office of the President, “Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” 85 Federal Register
6699-6707, February 5, 2020.
21 The proclamation defines “Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United
States Government” to mean those aliens described in section 101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K), any alien seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a Special Immigrant Visa
in the SI or SQ classification, and any spouse and children of any such individual.
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 Subsection (1)(C)—“Assistance for the Government of Burma to support the
implementation of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement conferences,
committees, and other procedures may only be made available if the
Secretary of State reports to the Committees on Appropriations that such
conferences, committees, and procedures are directed toward a sustainable
peace and the Government of Burma is implementing its commitments under
such Agreement”; and
 Subsection (3)—“None of the funds appropriated under title III of this Act
for assistance for Burma may be made available to any organization or entity
controlled by the armed forces of Burma, or to any individual or organization
that advocates violence against ethnic or religious groups or individuals in
Burma, as determined by the Secretary of State for programs administered by
the Department of State and USAID or the President of the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) for programs administered by NED.”
 International Security Assistance (Title IV):
 prohibits funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET)
and Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF Program) in Burma; and
 restricts Department of State consultations with the armed forces of Burma
“only on human rights and disaster response in a manner consistent with the
prior fiscal year, and following consultation with the appropriate
congressional committees.”
With regard to Multilateral Assistance (Title VI), Section 7029(b) requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to instruct the U.S. executive director of each international financial institution (IFI) to
vote against any loan or financing for any project unless the project
 provides for accountability and transparency;
 is developed and carried out in accordance with best practices regarding
environmental conservation, cultural protection, and empowerment of local
populations (including indigenous communities);
 does not “provide incentives for, or facilitate, forced displacement”; and
 does not “involve enterprises owned or controlled by the armed forces.”
This restriction would apply to any IFI loan or financing for a project in Burma.
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA)
The TVPA prohibits the provision of nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance
authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and sales and financing authorized by
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to the governments of nations designated as a Tier 3
country in the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.22 The TVPA also
authorizes the President to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors of each multilateral development
bank and the International Monetary Fund to attempt to deny loans or other uses of funds to Tier

22 For more about the TVPA and the annual TIP report, see CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology
, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan, and Liana W.
Rosen.
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3 countries. The law authorizes the President to waive some or all of the restrictions if he
determines it is in the national interest of the United States.
Burma was designated as a Tier 3 country in the 2020 TIP report for the third year in a row.23 On
September 28, 2020, President Trump issued Presidential Determination 2020-12, granting
Burma a partial waiver to allow the provision of assistance otherwise prohibited by the TVPA,
except for Global Health Programs (GHP), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales
(FMS), and Excess Defense Articles.24
Restrictions on Relations with Burma’s Military
The United States has placed specific restrictions on relations with Burma’s military, including:
Prohibition on the Sale of U.S. Military Equipment—On June 9, 1993, the
State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs issued Public Notice
1820 suspending “all export licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise
transfer defense articles or defense services to Burma.”25
Ban on the Provision of Visas to Military Leaders—Section 5(a)(1)(A) of the
Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008
(JADE Act; P.L. 110-286) states that former and present leaders of the Burmese
military “shall be ineligible for a visa to travel to the United States.” Section
5(a)(1)(B) of the same act also makes officials of the Burmese military “involved
in the repression of peaceful political activity or in other gross violations of
human rights in Burma or in the commission of other human rights abuses”
ineligible for a visa.
Prohibition on Military Assistance and Sales under CSPA—From 2010 to
2016, and again in 2018, 2019, and 2020, Burma was designated by the State
Department as a country whose government has armed forces or government-
supported armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers.26 Pursuant to the
Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, P.L. 110-457), certain security
assistance and commercial licensing of military equipment with Burma
(including IMET, FMF, Excess Defense Articles, and Peacekeeping Operations,
as well as the issuance of licenses for direct commercial sales of military
equipment) are prohibited, unless the President issues a waiver. These restrictions
were not waived following Burma’s 2020 designation.27
Prohibition on the Provision of Defense Articles and Defense Services under
IRFA—On December 7, 2020, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a
“country of particular concern” pursuant to the IRFA.28 Utilizing authority

23 Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 25, 2020.
24 Executive Office of the President, “Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments
Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” 85 Federal Register 71209-71211, November 6, 2020.
25 Department of State, “Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Burma,” 58 Federal Register 33293, June 16,
1993.
26 The State Department did not designate Burma in 2017.
27 On September 28, 2016, President Obama issued such a waiver for Burma. For more about the CSPA, see CRS In
Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions, by Michael A. Weber.
28 Department of State, “United States Takes Action against Violators of Religious Freedom,” December 7, 2020. For
more about the IRFA, see CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy, by
Michael A. Weber.
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provided by the IRFA, he imposed a ban on the provision of defense articles and
defense services, in accordance with 22 C.F.R. 126.1.
Prohibition on Sales and Financing Authorized by the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA)—Because Burma was designated as a Tier 3 country in the 2020
TIP report, sales or financing on any terms authorized by the AECA is prohibited,
with the exception of sales or financing provided for narcotics-related purposes.
Global Magnitsky and Related Sanctions
In late 2017, the Tatmadaw conducted a “clearance operation” in northern Rakhine State in
response to alleged ARSA attacks on security outposts along the border with Bangladesh, during
which Burma’s security forces may have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.29 The “clearance operation” resulted in the exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya from Burma
into Bangladesh. Satellite imagery confirms that over 300 Rohingya villages were partially or
totally destroyed during the Tatmadaw’s operation. The United Nations and other organizations
have interviewed Rohingya survivors, who recount stories of mass killings, torture, and rape
perpetrated by Tatmadaw soldiers and other Burmese security officers.30
The Trump Administration has condemned the initial attacks on the Burmese security outposts, as
well as the Tatmadaw’s response to attacks, characterizing the “clearance operations” as “ethnic
cleansing.” On December 21, 2017, the Department of the Treasury placed Major General Maung
Maung Soe, Burma’s Western Commander during the “clearance operations,” on its Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List under the Global Magnitsky Act “for his
command of forces involved in serious human rights abuses in northern Rakhine State.”31 As a
result, General Maung Maung Soe will not be granted a visa to enter the United States, any assets
he may have in U.S. financial institutions have been frozen, and he and any entity in which he is
the majority owner are to be denied financial services by any U.S. entity or person.32
On August 17, 2018, the Department of the Treasury added four more senior Burmese military
officers—Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw, Major General Khin Hlaing, Major General Khin
Maung Soe, and Brigadier General Thura San Lwin—plus two military units—the 33rd Light
Infantry Division and the 99th Light Infantry Division—to its SDN list under the Global
Magnitsky Act.33 The five officers and two units are subject to the same sanctions as General
Maung Maung Soe.


29 For more about events of late 2017, see CRS Report R45016, The Rohingya Crises in Bangladesh and Burma,
coordinated by Michael F. Martin.
30 For more about the alleged human rights abuses, see CRS In Focus IF10970, U.N. Report Recommends Burmese
Military Leaders Be Investigated and Prosecuted for Possible Genocide
, by Michael F. Martin, Matthew C. Weed, and
Colin Willett, and CRS Report R45388, Burmese Security Forces and Personnel Implicated in Serious Human Rights
Abuses and Accountability Options
, by Michael F. Martin.
31 Department of the Treasury, “United States Sanctions Human Rights Abusers and Corrupt Actors Across the Globe,”
press release, December 21, 2017.
32 For more about the sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act, see CRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act
, by Dianne E. Rennack. As of March 11, 2020, there were 45 Burmese persons or
entities on Treasury’s SDN list, of which 31 were designated under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21
U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), 11 under Global Magnitsky, 2 under Executive Order 13687, “Imposing Additional Sanctions
With Respect To,” 80 Federal Register 819-821, January 6, 2015, and 1 under Executive Order 13581, “Blocking
Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations,” 76 Federal Register 44575-44759, July 24, 2011.
33 Department of the Treasury, “Global Magnitsky Designations,” press release, August 17, 2018.
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Table 1. Burmese Individuals and Entities Sanctioned for Human Rights Violations
in chronological order
Date of State Department
Designation Under
Date of Treasury Department
Consolidated Appropriations
Designation Under Global
Person
Act, 2018
Magnitksy
Major General Maung Maung Soe
2018; date not disclosed
December 21, 2017
Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw
2018; date not disclosed
August 17, 2018
Zaw
Major General Khin Hlaing

August 17, 2018
Major General Khin Maung Soe

August 17, 2018
Brigadier General Thura San Lwin

August 17, 2018
The 33rd Light Infantry Division

August 17, 2018
The 99th Light Infantry Division

August 17, 2018
Commander-in-Chief Senior
July 16, 2019
December 10, 2019
General Min Aung Hlaing
Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice
July 16, 2019
December 10, 2019
Senior General Soe Win
Brigadier General Than Oo
July 16, 2019
December 10, 2019
Brigadier General Aung Aung
July 16, 2019
December 10, 2019
On July 16, 2019, the Department of State designated another four senior Burmese military
officers under the authority of section 7031(c) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L.
115-141), which renders “officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members
about whom the Secretary of State has credible information have been involved in corruption
related to the extraction of natural resources, or a gross violation of human rights” ineligible for
entry into the United States.34 The four officers—Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung
Hlaing, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, Brigadier General Than Oo,
and Brigadier General Aung Aung—were designated for their responsibility for gross human
rights violations, “including extrajudicial killings in northern Rakhine State, Burma, during the
ethnic cleansing of Rohingya.” In a press briefing concerning the designation, a State Department
official indicated that Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw and General Maung Maung Soe had
also been previously designated under this provision sometime in 2018.35
On December 10, 2019, the Department of the Treasury designated Commander-in-Chief Senior
General Min Aung Hlaing, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, Brigadier
General Than Oo, and Brigadier General Aung Aung under the authority of the Global Magnitsky
Act for serious human rights abuse under their commands across Burma, including northern
Rakhine State, Kachin State, and Shan States. In announcing the designations of the three
Burmese generals (as well as 12 other individuals from other nations), Secretary of the Treasury

34 Department of State, “Public Designation, Due to Gross Violations of Human Rights, of Burmese Military Officers,”
press release, July 16, 2019. For more information about the recurring Section 7031(c) provision see CRS In Focus
IF10905, FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Targeting Foreign Corruption and Human Rights Violations,
by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber.
35 U.S. State Department, “On Public Designation, Due to Gross Violations of Human Rights, of Burmese Military
Officials,” July 16, 2019.
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Steven T. Mnuchin stated, “The United States will not tolerate torture, kidnapping, sexual
violence, murder, or brutality against innocent civilians.”36
Waived or Lapsed Restrictions
As noted above, some of the laws imposing sanctions on Burma also include provisions whereby
the President could waive, temporarily or permanently, the sanctions under certain conditions. In
addition, some of the laws also contain provisions by which the President can terminate the
sanctions. President Obama waived several restrictions, but also stated that waivers could be
reversed, and the restrictions reimposed, if conditions in Burma so warrant.37 On December 2,
2016, he issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, terminating the restrictions on bilateral
assistance to Burma contained in Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208).38 In addition, Congress has permitted
certain trade restrictions contained in Sections 3 and 3A of the BFDA (as amended) to lapse by
not passing the necessary annual renewal resolution.
Economic Restrictions
In the past, Congress and the executive branch placed several economic restrictions on relations
with Burma that have been subsequently terminated, waived, or suspended, including
 a general ban on the import of goods from Burma;
 a ban on the import of Burmese jadeite and rubies, and products containing
Burmese jadeite and rubies;
 a ban on the import of goods from certain Burmese companies;
 the “freezing” of the assets of certain Burmese nationals;
 a prohibition on providing financial services to certain Burmese nationals;
 restrictions on U.S. investments in Burma;
 restrictions on bilateral assistance to Burma; and
 restrictions on U.S. support for multilateral assistance to Burma.
Ban on Import of Products of Burma
Section 3 and 3A of the BFDA (as amended) banned the importation of “any article that is a
product of Burma,” goods and services from certain Burmese companies, jadeite and rubies from
Burma, and articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies from Burma. This ban, however, was
subject to annual renewal by Congress passing a resolution as stipulated in Section 9(b) of the
same act. From 2004 to 2012, Congress passed the annual renewal resolution, but has not done so
since. As a consequence, these restrictions contained in Section 3 and 3A of the BFDA have
lapsed, but could be reinstated by the passage of the required resolution.

36 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Roles in Atrocities and Other Abuses,” press
release, December 10, 2019.
37 For example, in his statement of May 17, 2012, President Obama said, “We are also maintaining our current
authorities to help ensure further reform and to retain the ability to reinstate selected sanctions if there is backsliding.”
The White House, “Statement by the President on Burma,” press release, May 17, 2012,
https://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/17/statement-president-burma.
38 White House, “Presidential Determination—Pursuant to Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997,” press release, December 2, 2016.
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On August 7, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13651, reinstating the ban on the
import of jadeite and rubies from Burma, and articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies from
Burma. This Executive Order was revoked, however, on October 7, 2016, when President Obama
issued Executive Order 13742, thereby terminating the ban on the import of jadeite and rubies
from Burma.
“Freezing” the Assets of Certain Burmese Nationals
Section 5(b)(1) of the JADE Act blocked the transferal, payment, export, withdrawal, or other
handling of property or interest in property belonging to a person described in Section 5(a)(1) of
the act that is “located in the United States or within the possession or control of a U.S. person”39
(including the overseas branch of a U.S. person); or “comes into the possession or control of a
U.S. person after the date of the enactment of this Act” (July 29, 2008). In Executive Order 13742
on October 7, 2016, President Obama “determined and certified” to Congress that “it is in the
national interest of the United States” to waive the sanctions in Section 5(b) of the JADE Act,
pursuant to Section 5(i) of that act.
Restrictions on the Provision of Financial Services
As described above, Section 5(b) of the JADE Act freezes the assets of persons described by
Section 5(a)(1) of the act, and bars the payment or transfer of any property, or “any transactions
involving the transfer of anything of economic value,” as well as the “export or reexport directly
or indirectly, of any goods, technology, or services” to persons described by Section 5(a)(1) of the
act, or to “any entity, owned, controlled, or operated by the SPDC or by an individual described
in such subsection.” Pursuant to Section 5(i) of the same law, President Obama determined and
certified to Congress on October 7, 2016, in Executive Order 13742 that it was in the national
interest of the United States to waive these sanctions.
Ban on Investment in Burma
Section 570(b) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1997 (P.L. 104-208) states the following:
The President is hereby authorized to prohibit, and shall prohibit United States persons
from new investment in Burma, if the President determines and certifies to Congress that,
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Government of Burma has physically harmed,
rearrested for political acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale
repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition.
Pursuant to Section 570(e) of the same act, the Department of State (having been delegated
authority by President Obama) waived the investment restrictions on Section 570(b) effective
July 11, 2012, having determined that it would be contrary to the national security interests of the
United States to continue the restrictions.40

39 For purposes of this act, a U.S. person is defined, by Section 3(6) as “any United States citizen, permanent resident
alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the
United States.”
40 Department of State, “Allowing New Investment in Burma,” 77 Federal Register 62596, October 15, 2012.
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Restrictions on Bilateral Assistance
Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1997 (P.L. 104-208) restricted bilateral assistance to Burma to the
following:
(A) humanitarian assistance,
(B) subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations,
counter-narcotics assistance under chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
or crop substitution assistance, if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that—
(i) the Government of Burma is fully cooperating with United States counter-narcotics
efforts, and
(ii) the programs are fully consistent with United States human rights concerns in Burma
and serve the United States national interest, and
(C) assistance promoting human rights and democratic values.
The act also provided that these restrictions were to remain in effect “[u]ntil such time as the
President determines and certifies to Congress that Burma has made measurable and substantial
progress in improving human rights practices and implementing democratic government.”
On December 2, 2016, President Obama issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, providing
such a determination and certification to Congress, and thereby terminating the restrictions on
bilateral assistance contained in Section 570(a).
Restrictions on Multilateral Assistance
Section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended) withholds the
“United States proportionate share” of the funding for certain international organizations’
programs in Burma (as well as several other nations). Section 307(c) exempts the Atomic Energy
Agency and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Organizations subject to the
restriction include the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environmental
Program, the World Meteorological Organization, and a number of other U.N. programs. Section
7017 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), however, included the
statement that “the requirement to withhold funds for programs in Burma under section 307(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not apply to funds appropriated by this Act.” This
exemption was extended into FY2020 by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L.
116-94).
Section 5 of the 2003 BFDA required the U.S. executive director of each international financial
institution (IFI) in which the United States participates to vote against the extension of any loan,
financial, or technical assistance to Burma. In September 2012, Congress passed P.L. 112-192,
granting the President the authority to waive U.S. opposition to IFI assistance to Burma required
under Section 5 of the 2003 BFDA if the President determines that doing so is in the national
interest of the United States. President Obama issued a memorandum on October 10, 2012,
delegating the authority granted by P.L. 112-192 to Secretary of State Clinton, who then issued a
determination stating that “it is in the national interest of the United States to support assistance
for Burma.”41

41 Department of State, “Determination Related to United States Support for Assistance Provided by International
Financial Institutions for Burma,” October 12, 2012.
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Congressional Considerations
Congress may examine a number of different factors, should it consider whether to alter U.S.
restrictions on relations with Burma. One question is whether to reassess the goals of U.S. policy
toward Burma, the prospects for achieving them, and whether there are contradictions among
them. Another factor is how to evaluate the current political situation in Burma, and whether
further political and economic reforms are likely. Congress may also examine to what extent
restrictions on relations enhance or harm developments in Burma in order to determine which
restrictions to maintain, impose, or remove.
During the 116th Congress, the Burma Unified Through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of
2018 (H.R. 3190) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2018 (S. 1186) would have
reformulated U.S. policy in Burma and the restrictions on bilateral relations. The Allowing for the
Safe Return of Rohingyas to Burma Act of 2019 (H.R. 4392) would have withdrawn Burma’s
eligibility under the Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) program. was passed by the
House of Representatives on September 24, 2019, by a vote of 394-21, but received no action in
the Senate. H.R. 4392 and S. 1186 were referred to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction, but
received no further action.
Goals of U.S. Policy
For many years, Congress and the executive branch have, in general, shared a common view on
the broader goals of U.S. policy in Burma—the establishment of a democratically elected civilian
government that respects the human rights of its people and promotes the peace and prosperity of
the nation. Former U.S. ambassador to Burma, Scot Marciel, reiterated this policy in a press
interview on May 10, 2016, stating, “But our goal, the United States’ goal, remains the same: We
want to see a peaceful, prosperous, democratic Myanmar. One whose people live in harmony and
enjoy full rights.”42
What Congress chooses to do with respect to U.S. restrictions on relations with Burma will likely
depend on what it determines the objectives of U.S. policy toward Burma should be, and in what
order of priority. Among the specific objectives for U.S. policy in Burma that have been proposed
that Congress may choose to consider are
 supporting the peace process and national reconciliation to end the nation’s civil
war;
 addressing the plight of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, including investigating
alleged genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes perpetrated by the
Tatmadaw and other security forces, providing adequate and reliable
humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rakhine
State, and addressing the citizenship status of the currently stateless Rohingya;
 responding to the allegations that Burmese security forces committed crimes
against humanity and/or war crimes in Kachin and Shan States;
 promoting amendments to Burma’s 2008 constitution to establish a more
democratic, civilian government;
 amending or repealing Burmese laws that are inconsistent with internationally
recognized human rights, and promoting the protection of human rights in
Burma;

42 Andrew D. Kaspar, “New US Ambassador Flags Many Old Problems for Burma,” Irrawaddy, May 10, 2016.
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 supporting the development of governmental institutions that are resilient enough
to function during times of political change and natural disasters; and
 promoting economic growth and development to provide greater prosperity to the
people of Burma.
Moving beyond these general goals, however, may reveal underlying contradictions between the
different goals. Efforts to promote economic prosperity in Burma, for example, may run counter
to establishing a democratically elected civilian government. The Burmese military, via such
entities as the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and the Union of Myanmar Economic
Holdings Limited (UMEHL), controls many sectors of the Burmese economy, including most of
the nation’s natural resources. Efforts to promote economic prosperity by permitting U.S. trade
and investment in portions of the economy controlled by the Burmese military may bolster their
economic and political power, and as such, lead Burma’s military leaders to resist further political
and economic reforms. Further political and economic reform could depend on the Burmese
military’s willingness to relinquish some or all of its seats in the Union Parliament, as well as its
control over the appointment of the Ministers of Border Affairs, Defence, and Home Affairs. At
the same time, however, it is also possible that permitting U.S. economic relations with MEC,
UMEHL, and other companies owned by the Burmese military, its leaders, and/or relatives and
close friends of the military leaders, could prompt Burma’s military leaders to be more willing to
relinquish some of their political power.
Burma’s Current Political Situation
Following the 2015 parliamentary elections, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as the dominant civilian
figure in the Union Government, and used her authority as State Counselor and Foreign Minister
to set priorities and oversee implementation of government policy. Most assume Aung San Suu
Kyi will remain the Union Government’s civilian leader given the NLD success in the 2020
parliamentary elections. Depending on how the dynamics between Aung San Suu Kyi and other
influential figures and forces (such as Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing and the ethnic
armed organizations) proceed, Congress may choose to assess if her views on specific issues are
consistent with U.S. policy, and how best to work with her to advance those efforts in 2021.
Understanding the views of Burma’s military leaders has always been crucial in forming a
framework to understand Burmese political conditions. It was Burma’s military leaders who
effectively wrote the 2008 constitution, held the parliamentary elections in 2010, and formed the
core of the Thein Sein government that ran the country from 2011 to 2015. The political and
economic reforms that have occurred in Burma since 2008 are either the direct results of the
actions of Burma’s military leaders or were undertaken with the support of the military leaders.
Those reforms have been generally consistent with the “seven step roadmap to a disciplined
democracy” announced by General Khin Nyunt, the military junta’s Prime Minister, on August
30, 2003. In the various meetings and conferences held to discuss a path to ending Burma’s civil
war, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and other Tatmadaw representatives have
demonstrated little willingness to negotiate. As a result, it appears unlikely that Burma’s military
leaders will be supportive of or willing to allow the political and economic reforms proposed by
Aung San Suu Kyi or the EAOs; the Tatmadaw would likely resist efforts to fundamentally alter
the current governance system.
Similarly, the opinions of the various ethnic armed organizations may play a vital role in affecting
the achievement of U.S. goals in Burma. Ending the civil war would require the EAOs to either
agree to a cease-fire and the terms for a new governance system, and/or be defeated militarily.
Achieving the former may require major changes in the 2008 constitution (including its possible
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replacement with a new constitution) and Burma’s economy, particularly control over the nation’s
natural resources. Such changes may be unacceptable to Burma’s military or the NLD-led Union
Government. Defeating the EAOs in the battlefield, however, may be beyond the capabilities of
the Burmese military. At this time, Aung San Suu Kyi does not appear to support a military
solution to Burma’s civil war, but prospects for her proposed peace process also are unclear.43
Another potentially important force in Burma’s current political dynamic is the community of
emerging civil society organizations (CSOs). During the decades of military rule, Burma’s
military leaders actively suppressed the establishment of CSOs in order to maintain control over
the Burmese people. The Thein Sein government allowed the emergence of issue-driven CSOs in
Burma, and some of them have undertaken causes generally consistent with U.S. policy.
Relations between some CSOs and the NLD-led government, however, are reportedly strained;
for example, 40 CSOs wrote an open letter to Aung San Suu Kyi in July 2016 asking that they be
allowed to play a more active role in the peace process.44
Besides their potential support for U.S. goals in Burma, CSOs may play a vital role in the
discussion of political reform and the peace process, according to some observers. One such
observer expressed concern that national reconciliation, if left to the NLD-led government, the
Burmese military, and the EAOs, could result in the establishment of a federation of “crony
states,” in which the current military leaders and their supporters in each region of Burma control
both the political and economic systems, and prevent the establishment of a democratic civilian
government based on the rule of law and the will of the Burmese people.45
Escalation of the Civil War
Aung San Suu Kyi has been in power for more than five years, and questions are being raised in
Burma about her commitment and ability to secure an end to the nation’s civil war, promote
political reform, and protect the human rights of the Burmese people. In 2016, she identified the
end of the civil war as a top priority for the new government, but the four “21st Century Panglong
Conferences” have demonstrated that the various groups in attendance have different visions for a
democratic federated state of Burma and the path to achieving that goal.46 Fighting between the
Tatmadaw and at least four of the EAOs (the Arakan Army, the Karen National Liberation Army,
the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army)
intensified in 2019 and 2020, raising doubts about the prospects for peace and the Tatmadaw’s
support for a nationwide cease-fire agreement.
Crises in Rakhine State
More than three years have passed since the Tatmadaw launched their “clearance operations” in
northern Rakhine State, and virtually all of the more than 700,000 Rohingya who fled to
Bangladesh remain in refugee camps. The Rohingya who remain in Burma face harsh conditions,

43 For more about Burma’s peace process, see CRS In Focus IF11081, Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019, by
Michael F. Martin and Kirt Smith.
44 Burma Border-based CSOs, “Burma Border-based Civil Society Organizations Send an Open Letter to State
Counselor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” press release, July 26, 2016.
45 CRS communication with former State Department official.
46 Aung San Suu Kyi has organized three “21st Century Panglong Conferences” at which representatives of her
government, the Tatmadaw, some of the EAOs, and representatives of some CSOs met to discuss terms for a
nationwide ceasefire and to negotiation an end to the nation’s civil war. Those conferences, held in August 2016, May
2017 and July 2018, respectively, made little progress. Efforts to organize a 4th conference have stalled. For more about
Burma’s peace efforts, see CRS In Focus IF11081, Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019, by Michael F. Martin and
Kirt Smith.
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including a curfew, restrictions on movement, lack of employment, limited access to their farms,
and harassment from local police and others. Provision of humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh
appears adequate, but funding is a growing concern. Access to northern Rakhine State remains
strictly controlled by the Tatmadaw, despite an agreement with the United Nations, resulting in a
shortage of food, water, and medical care for the Rohingya community. In 2019, the Arakan Army
moved most of its troops into northern Rakhine State; fighting between the Arakan Army and the
Tatmadaw has spread throughout most of Rakhine State.
Prospects for the dignified, safe, voluntary, and sustainable return of Rohingya displaced into
Bangladesh are presently poor, in part because of the fighting between the Arakan Army and
Tatmadaw. While the governments in Dhaka and Naypyitaw have signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) regarding the return of the Rohingya, no Rohingya have returned in
accordance with the procedures prescribed by the MOU. The United Nations has stated
conditions in northern Rakhine State are neither sufficiently safe nor sustainable for the return of
the Rohingya.47
Two other issues pose major barriers to the voluntary return of the Rohingya. Many of the
Rohingya insist that their Burmese citizenship must be reinstated before they will return to
Rakhine State. In 1982, Burma’s military junta promulgated a new citizenship law, the
implementation of which effectively stripped most of the Rohingya of their citizenship. Aung San
Suu Kyi has chosen to leave that law in place despite the NLD’s supermajority in Burma’s Union
Parliament. The Union Government has offered to consider applications for citizenship from the
Rohingya according to the provisions of the 1982 law. This appears to be unacceptable to many of
the Rohingya.
The other issue that could preclude the return of the Rohingya is their desire for some form of
accountability for the crimes committed against them during the “clearance operations.”48 A
United Nations fact-finding mission has recommended that the U.N. Security Council refer the
case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or an “ad hoc international criminal tribunal.”49
The ICC determined in September 2018 that it has jurisdiction over the displacement of Rohingya
into Bangladesh, and subsequently authorized its Prosecutor to begin an investigation into
possible criminal charges.50 In addition, the Gambia filed a case in the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in November 2019, accusing Burma and its military of genocide.51 On January 23,
2020, the ICJ ordered Burma to undertake four “provisional measures” to prevent genocidal acts
against the Rohingya and “prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related
to allegations of [genocidal] acts.”52 Various organizations have called for the passage of U.N.
sanctions against Burma and the Tatmadaw, as well as the imposition of bilateral restrictions on

47 “Too Soon to Send Rohingya Back to Myanmar—U.N. Rights Envoy,” Reuters, November 6, 2018.
48 For more about the accountability issue, see CRS Report R45388, Burmese Security Forces and Personnel
Implicated in Serious Human Rights Abuses and Accountability Options
, by Michael F. Martin.
49 CRS In Focus IF10970, U.N. Report Recommends Burmese Military Leaders Be Investigated and Prosecuted for
Possible Genocide
.
50 International Criminal Court, “ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rules that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the
alleged deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh,” press release, September 6, 2018;
International Criminal Court, “ICC judges authorise opening of an investigation into the situation in
Bangladesh/Myanmar,” press release, November 49, 2019.
51 Owen Bowcott, “Gambia Files Rohingya Genocide Case Against Myanmar at UN Court,” Guardian, November 11,
2019.
52 CRS Insight IN11215, Burma Ordered to Prevent Genocide Against Rohingya.
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relations with Burma. To date, the international response to calls for accountability in Burma has
been limited, and unlikely to be considered sufficient by the displaced Rohingya.
Human Rights
Progress on other human rights issues has also been relatively slow, according to some observers.
In her first official act as State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi ordered the release of 113 political
detainees on April 7, 2016, and indicated that freeing all political prisoners would be a priority for
the new government.53 Former President Htin Kyaw granted amnesty to 70 political prisoners on
April 17, 2016. By mid-August, the NLD-led government reportedly had released 457 people
facing trial for political activities.54 Since then, the number of political prisoners in Burma has
risen again. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), a nonprofit
human rights organization formed in 2000 by former political prisoners, there were 590
“individuals oppressed due to political activity” as of the end of November 2020, including 35
serving sentences, 199 detained while awaiting trial, and 356 released while awaiting trial.55
The government of Burma’s ability to imprison these individuals is in part facilitated by the
existence of a number of laws, some dating back to British colonial rule, that restrict freedom of
speech, freedom of association, and other internationally recognized human rights. In June 2016,
Human Rights Watch released a report, They Can Arrest You at Any Time, detailing how various
repressive laws criminalize peaceful expression in Burma.56
Addressing U.S. Restrictions
Depending on what goals it sets for U.S. policy in Burma and its perspective on the current
political situation in the country, Congress may decide to address the existing restrictions on U.S.
relations. In the past, this has been done by passing specific legislation to impose or recommend
restrictions on bilateral or multilateral relations, or by including provisions in appropriations
legislation setting limits on bilateral or multilateral assistance to Burma. Congress has also passed
legislation that places conditions on certain forms of bilateral relations contingent on acceptable
behavior with regard to specific issues, such as the recruitment and induction of children into the
military. In addition, Congress may actively or passively permit the President and the executive
branch to determine what restrictions, if any, should be placed on relations with Burma, and
provide the necessary authority and appropriations to implement U.S. policy toward Burma.
Congress may have the opportunity to take action with respect to U.S. policy in Burma on certain
dates or at particular junctures. For example, congressional consideration of appropriations
legislation—or continuing resolutions—provides a legislative juncture when restrictions on
relations with Burma may be considered and altered, if Congress so chooses.
In addition, Congress may consider revisiting the body of legislation imposing restrictions on
relations with Burma to determine if the time has come to repeal or amend those laws in light of
the changes that have occurred in the country, and the extent to which the restrictions imposed in
those laws are no longer in effect due to presidential waivers. To lift the economic restrictions on

53 Sai Wansai, “Burma’s Political Tug of War,” Shan Herald Agency for News, April 18, 2016.
54 “NLD Govt Has Released 457 Political Prisoners,” Democratic Voice of Burma, August 18, 2016.
55 AAPP(B), Monthly Chronology of November 2020 and Current Political Prisoners list, December 9, 2020. For more
about political prisoners in Burma, see CRS Report R44804, Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy, by Michael
F. Martin.
56 Human Rights Watch, They Can Arrest You at Any Time, The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Burma, June
2016.
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Burma, President Obama had to terminate and revoke five separate Executive Orders, and invoke
authority in the JADE Act. The 117th Congress faces consideration of its oversight and legislative
options regarding stating the goals of U.S. policy; accounting for the current situation in Burma;
indicating the restrictions in relations with Burma that are to remain in place; and providing clear
and concise conditions or guidelines for the removal of those restrictions.
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Appendix. Chronology of Burmese Sanction
Legislation and Related Executive Orders
Starting in 1989 and continuing through 2008, Congress and the executive branch imposed a
series of political and economic sanctions on Burma’s ruling military junta. Since 2008, most of
the congressional or executive actions have been to waive or eliminate some of those sanctions.
The following table provides a list of such congressional or presidential actions in chronological
order.
Chronology
Date
Document
Description
April 13, 1989
Presidential Proclamation

Suspended Burma as a beneficiary of the U.S.
5955
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
August 20, 1990
Section 138 of the

Required President to “impose such economic
Customs and Trade Act
sanctions upon Burma as the President determines
of 1990 (P.L. 101-382)
to be appropriate …”
June 9, 1993
Public Notice 1820

Suspended the issuance of export licenses and other
approvals “to export or otherwise transfer defense
articles or defense services to Burma”
April 30, 1994
Section 431 of the

Amended Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act
Foreign Relations
of 1961 to withhold the “United States
Authorization Act, Fiscal
proportionate share for certain programs of
Years 1994 and 1995 (P.L.
international organizations” in Burma (exception
103-236)
provided for International Atomic Energy Agency
and the United Nations Children’s Fund)
September 30, 1996
Section 570(a) of the

Prohibited new investment in Burma; limited
Omnibus Consolidated
bilateral assistance to Burma to humanitarian
Appropriations Act, 1997
assistance, counternarcotics assistance, and
(P.L. 104-208)
“assistance promoting human rights and democratic
values”

Required the Secretary of the Treasury to “instruct
the United States executive director of each
international financial institution to vote against any
loan or other utilization of funds of the respective
bank to or for Burma”

Stipulated that “the United States should not grant
entry visas to any Burmese government official”
except as required by “treaty obligations or to staff
the Burmese mission in the United States”
October 3, 1996
Presidential Proclamation

Suspended “the entry into the United States as
6925
immigrants and nonimmigrants of persons who
formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that
impede Burma’s transition to democracy, and the
immediate family members of such persons”
[Section 1]
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Date
Document
Description
May 20, 1997
Executive Order 13047

Prohibited new investment in Burma by United
States persons as of 12:01 a.m. (EDT) on May 21,
1997 [Section 1]

Prohibited any financial transaction by a United
States person or within the United States that
“would constitute new investment in Burma
prohibited by this order” [Section 2]
July 28, 2003
Burmese Freedom and

Banned the import of “any article that is a product
Democracy Act (BFDA;
of Burma” [Section 3(a)(1)]
P.L. 108-61)

Banned the import of goods from certain Burmese
companies [Section 3(a)(2)]

Authorized the President to “Freeze” the assets
held by any U.S. financial institution belonging to
“those individuals who hold senior positions” in the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) or
the Union Solidarity Development Association
(USDA) [Section 4]

Required the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct
the U.S. executive director “to each appropriate
international financial institution in which the United
States participates to oppose, and vote against the
extension by such institution of any loan or financial
or technical assistance to Burma” [Section 5]

Authorized the President to deny visas to “former
and present leadership” of the SPDC and USDA
[Section 6]
July 28, 2003
Executive Order 13310

Blocked the transfer, payment, export, or
withdrawal of all property or interest in property of
any person determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to be a senior official of the Government
of Burma (GOB), the SPDC, the USDA, or any
successor entity to the forgoing; or “to be owned,
or control ed by, or acting or purported to act for
or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person
whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order” [Section 1]

Prohibited “the exportation or reexportation,
directly or indirectly, to Burma of financial services
either (i) from the United States or (ii) by a United
States person, wherever located”; and “any
approval, financing, facilitating or guarantee by a
United States person, wherever located, of a
transaction by a foreign person where the
transaction by that foreign person would be
prohibited by this order if performed by a United
States person or within the United States” [Section
2]

Prohibited “the importation into the United States
of any article that is a product of Burma” [Section 3]

Revoked Sections 1-7 of Executive Order 13047 “to
the extent they are inconsistent with this order”
[Section 12]
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Date
Document
Description
October 23, 2007
Executive Order 13448

Blocked the transfer, payment, export, or
withdrawal of all property or interest in property of
any person determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to be a senior official of the GOB, the
SPDC, the USDA, or any successor entity to the
forgoing; be “responsible for, or to have participated
in,” human rights abuses related to political
repression in Burma; “engaged, or to have engaged,
in activities facilitating corruption” by senior officials
of the GOB; “have materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, logistical, or technical
support for, or goods and services in support of”
the GOB, SPDC, USDA, any successor entity to any
of the forgoing, any senior official of the forgoing, or
any person whose property and interests in
property is blocked pursuant to Executive Order
13310; or to be a spouse or dependent child of any
person whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order or Executive
Order 13310 [Section 1]
April 30, 2008
Executive Order 13464

Blocked the transfer, payment, export, or
withdrawal of all property or interest in property of
any person determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to be owned or control ed by, directly or
indirectly, the GOB or an official or officials of the
GOB; “have materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, logistical, or technical
support for, or goods and services in support of”
the GOB, SPDC, USDA, any successor entity to any
of the forgoing, any senior official of the forgoing, or
any person whose property and interests in
property is blocked pursuant to Executive Order
13310, Executive Order 13448, or this order; or be
“owned or control ed by, or to have acted or
purported to act for or on the behalf of, directly or
indirectly, any person whose property and interests
in property is blocked pursuant to Executive Order
13310, Executive Order 13448, or this order”
[Section 1]
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Date
Document
Description
July 29, 2008
The Tom Lantos Block

Rendered ineligible for a visa to travel to the United
Burmese JADE (Junta’s
States former and present leaders of the SPDC, the
Anti-Democratic Efforts)
Burmese military, or the USDA; officials of the
Act of 2008 (JADE Act;
SPDC, Burmese military, or the USDA “involved in
P.L. 110-286)
the repression of peaceful political activity in in
other gross violations of human rights in Burma or
in the commission of other human rights abuses”;
any other Burmese persons “who provide
substantial economic or political support” for the
SPDC, Burmese military, or the USDA; or the
immediate family members of any person described
by the preceding text [Section 5(a)(1)]

Blocked the transfer, payment, export, or
withdrawal of property or interest in property
belonging to a person subject to the visa restriction
above if the property is in the United States or
“within the possession or control of a United States
person”57 [Section 5(b)(1)]

Except with respect to financial transactions
authorized under EO 13047 and 13310, prohibited a
United States person from engaging in a financial
transaction with the SPDC or any person subject to
the visa restriction above [Section 5(b)(2)]

Authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
prohibit or impose conditions on the opening or
maintaining of correspondent accounts or payable-
through accounts if the Secretary determines the
account may be used by a foreign banking institution
that holds property or interest in property
belonging to the SPDC or any person subject to the
visa restriction [Section 5(c)]

Amended the BFDA (by the addition of Section 3A)
to prohibit the import of jadeite and rubies from
Burma or articles of jewelry containing jadeite or
rubies from Burma [Section 6]
September 26, 2008
Presidential Proclamation

Determined procedures to implement Sections 3
8294
and 3A of the BFDA, as amended by the JADE Act

Modified Chapter 71 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States to reflect the
prohibition of goods from Burma in headings 7103,
7113, and 7116
January 15, 2009
Presidential

Waived the provisions of Section 5(b) of the JADE
Determination 2009-11
Act with respect to those persons described in
Section 5(a)(1) of the JADE Act who are not
included on the Department of Treasury’s List of
Special y Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
(SDN List)

57 “A United States person” is defined as “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person
organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.”
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Date
Document
Description
July 11, 2012
Executive Order 13619

Blocked the transfer, payment, export, or
withdrawal of all property or interests in property
of any person determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to have engaged in acts that directly or
indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of
Burma; be responsible for or complicit in, or
responsible for ordering, control ing, or otherwise
directing, or to have participated in, the commission
of human rights abuses in Burma; have, directly or
indirectly, imported, exported, reexported, sold, or
supplied arms or related materiel from North Korea
or the Government of North Korea to Burma or
the GOB; be a senior official of an entity that has
engaged in the acts described in the forgoing; have
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods and
services to or in support of, the acts described in
the forgoing or any person whose property or
interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
order; or be owned or control ed by, or to have
acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly
or indirectly, any person whose property or
interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
order [Section 1]

Suspended the entry into the United States of aliens
determined to meet one or more of the forgoing
criteria [Section 5]
September 20, 2012
P.L. 112-192

Provided the President the authority to determine
that “it is in the national interest of the United
States to support assistance to Burma,” and allow
the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United
States executive director of any international
financial institution to vote in favor of the provision
of assistance to Burma
August 6, 2013
Executive Order 13651

Prohibited the import into the United States of “any
jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from Burma or
any articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies
mined or extracted from Burma” [Section 1]

Revoked Sections 3 and 8 of Executive Order 13310
[Section 2]

Waived Section 5(b) of the JADE Act [Section 8]
September 14, 2016
Presidential Proclamation

Restored Burma’s trade benefits under the
9492
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
September 28, 2016
Presidential Memorandum 
Waived the application of prohibitions in Section
404(a) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008
with respect to Burma
October 7, 2016
Executive Order 13742

Terminated national emergency with respect to
Burma

Revoked Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 13448,
13619, and 13651

Waived Section 5(b) of the JADE Act [Section 2]
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U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma

Date
Document
Description
December 2, 2016
Presidential

Determined and certified to Congress that “Burma
Determination 2017-04
has made measureable and substantial progress in
improving human rights practices and implementing
democratic government”

Terminated the restrictions on bilateral assistance in
Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208)
May 8, 2017
Consolidated

Section 7015(f)—requires “the regular notification
Appropriations Act, 2017
procedures of the Committees of Appropriations”
(P.L. 115-31)
be fol owed when obligating or expending assistance
to Burma under Titles III through VI

Section 7043(b)—sets requirements and places
limits on the types of bilateral economic assistance
(Title III), international security assistance (Title IV),
and multilateral assistance (Title V) that can be
provided to Burma
March 23, 2018
Consolidated

Section 7015(f)—requires “the regular notification
Appropriations Act, 2018
procedures of the Committees of Appropriations”
(P.L. 115-141)
be fol owed when obligating or expending assistance
to Burma under Titles III through VI

Section 7043(a)—sets requirements and places
limits on the types of bilateral economic assistance
(Title III), international security assistance (Title IV),
and multilateral assistance (Title V) that can be
provided to Burma
December 31, 2018
Asia Reassurance

Section 201(b) No funds appropriated pursuant to
Initiative Act of 2018
the act’s authorizations for the Department of State,
(P.L. 115-409)
the United States Agency for International
Development, and, as appropriate, the Department
of Defense for fiscal years 2019 to 2023 may be
made available for International Military Education
and Training and Foreign Military Financing
Programs for the armed forces of the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar (historically known as
“Burma”).
February 15, 2019
Consolidated

Section 7015(f)—requires “the regular notification
Appropriations Act, 2019
procedures of the Committees of Appropriations”
(P.L. 116-6)
be fol owed when obligating or expending assistance
to Burma under Titles III through VI

Section 7043(a)—sets requirements and places
limits on the types of bilateral economic assistance
(Title III), international security assistance (Title IV),
and multilateral assistance (Title V) that can be
provided to Burma
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December 20, 2019
Further Consolidated

Section 7015(f)—requires “the regular notification
Appropriations Act, 2020
procedures of the Committees of Appropriations”
(P.L. 116-94)
be fol owed when obligating or expending assistance
to Burma under Titles III through VI

Section 7043(a)—sets requirements and places
limits on the types of bilateral economic assistance
(Title III), international security assistance (Title IV),
and multilateral assistance (Title V) that can be
provided to Burma
December 27, 2020
Consolidated

Section 7015(f)—requires “the regular notification
Appropriations Act, 2021
procedures of the Committees of Appropriations”
(P.L. 116-260)
be fol owed when obligating or expending assistance
to Burma under Titles III through VI

Section 7043(a)—sets requirements and places
limits on the types of bilateral economic assistance
(Title III), and international security assistance (Title
IV) that can be provided to Burma


Author Information

Michael F. Martin

Specialist in Asian Affairs



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Congressional Research Service
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