President George W. Bush signed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA; P.L. 109-435; 120 Stat. 3198) on December 20, 2006. The PAEA was the first broad revision of the 1970 statute that replaced the U.S. Post Office with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), a self-supporting, independent agency of the executive branch.
This report describes Congress’s pursuit of postal reform and summarizes the major provisions of the new postal reform law. The report also suggests possible PAEA-related oversight issues for Congress.
Legislatively, the pursuit of reform of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) began during the 104th Congress, in 1996. A number of factors encouraged the movement for postal reform. Perhaps foremost were the financial challenges of the USPS.
A decade later, Congress enacted the PAEA, which made over 150 changes to postal law. Some of the more significant alterations are defining the term “postal service”; restricting the USPS’s authority to provide nonpostal services; altering the USPS’s budget submission process; requiring the USPS to prefund its future retiree health benefits by establishing the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund; and replacing the USPS’s regulator, the Postal Rate Commission, with the more powerful Postal Regulatory Commission.
The inherent complexity of lawmaking and the execution thereof invites disagreement and confusion over what a law means and how it should be implemented. In the six years since the enactment of the PAEA, some issues and questions concerning the law’s provisions have arisen. These include, but are not limited to, possible executive branch concerns about the PAEA and the separation of powers; the cost of prefunding USPS future retiree health benefits; the role of the public in the closure of nonretail postal facilities; the USPS’s authority to provide nonpostal products and services, and the viability of the USPS’s business model.
This report will be updated should events warrant.
President George W. Bush signed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA; P.L. 109-435; 120 Stat. 3198) on December 20, 2006. The PAEA was the first broad revision of the 1970 statute that replaced the U.S. Post Office with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), a self-supporting, independent agency of the executive branch.
This report describes Congress's pursuit of postal reform and summarizes the major provisions of the new postal reform law. The report also suggests possible PAEA-related oversight issues for Congress.
Legislatively, the pursuit of reform of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) began during the 104th Congress, in 1996. A number of factors encouraged the movement for postal reform. Perhaps foremost were the financial challenges of the USPS.
A decade later, Congress enacted the PAEA, which made over 150 changes to postal law. Some of the more significant alterations are defining the term "postal service"; restricting the USPS's authority to provide nonpostal services; altering the USPS's budget submission process; requiring the USPS to prefund its future retiree health benefits by establishing the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund; and replacing the USPS's regulator, the Postal Rate Commission, with the more powerful Postal Regulatory Commission.
The inherent complexity of lawmaking and the execution thereof invites disagreement and confusion over what a law means and how it should be implemented. In the six years since the enactment of the PAEA, some issues and questions concerning the law's provisions have arisen. These include, but are not limited to, possible executive branch concerns about the PAEA and the separation of powers; the cost of prefunding USPS future retiree health benefits; the role of the public in the closure of nonretail postal facilities; the USPS's authority to provide nonpostal products and services, and the viability of the USPS's business model.
This report will be updated should events warrant.
Legislatively, the pursuit of reform of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) began during the 104th Congress. On June 25, 1996, Representative John McHugh introduced H.R. 3717, the Postal Reform Act of 1996. The reform movement culminated in the 109th Congress. On December 9, 2006, Congress enacted H.R. 6407, the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA). President George W. Bush signed it into law on December 20, 2006 (PAEA; P.L. 109-435; 120 Stat. 3198).
A number of factors encouraged the movement for postal reform. Perhaps foremost were the financial challenges of the USPS.1 First class mail use was declining as customers substituted electronic alternatives, such as e-mail and online bill paying, for hard-copy letters.2 Yet the USPS's costs—about 76% of which were labor-related—rose with the addition of 2 million new addresses each year and mounting obligations for USPS future retiree health benefits.3
Additionally, the USPS, its board of governors, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), mailers' organizations, postal labor unions, and most recently a presidential commission said that the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 no longer provided a viable business model.4 The rate-setting process was criticized for preventing the USPS from responding quickly to an increasingly competitive marketplace. Critics also argued that long-standing political and statutory restrictions impeded efforts to modernize the mail processing network and close unneeded facilities.
Finally, passage of the Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding Reform Act of 2003 (PCSRSFRA; P.L. 108-18; 117 Stat. 624) helped sow the seeds for reform. The PCSRSFRA was enacted after it was discovered that the USPS was over-funding its retirees' pensions.5 The act reduced the USPS's pension outlays. However, it shifted the costs of postal employees' military service-related pension costs from the U.S. Treasury to the USPS—a $27 billion obligation.6 The PCSRSFRA also required much of the reduction from the previous pension outlay levels to be put toward lowering the USPS's debt and funding an escrow account. The law did not, however, dedicate the escrow fund to any particular use (e.g., postal worker benefits), meaning that the USPS had to make a large annual payment that neither provided operational benefits nor generated revenues.7
According to a CRS analysis using CQ.com's "Law Track" tool, the PAEA makes more than 150 changes to current federal law.8 The law's major changes include the following:
The inherent complexity of lawmaking and the execution thereof invites disagreement and confusion over what a law means. Should agencies interpret a statute based upon the text of the statute alone? Should they consider Congress's intent or try to ascertain the "original understanding" of the statute?18 Newly enacted statutes can be particularly susceptible to differing interpretations as political actors attempt to implement the statute.
As described earlier, the PAEA made numerous significant changes to U.S. postal law. Because of its length—more than 20,000 words—and complexity, it is not surprising that disagreements concerning implementation of the PAEA have arisen. As the words of the PAEA develop into governmental actions, Congress may mitigate some of the possible negative effects through active oversight of the USPS and the PRC.19
To date, it is unclear if the Administration of President Barack Obama has any concerns regarding the implementation of the PAEA.
However, his predecessor, President George W. Bush, did issue a signing statement that addressed a number of sections of PAEA, often in the context of the separation of powers. These include the following:20
Taken as a whole, then, the signing statement's individual contentions amount to a defense of executive branch authorities against perceived or possible legislative encroachments. Congress may wish to consider the merits of these executive branch claims and query the current Administration to see if it shares these views.
PAEA replaced the Postal Rate Commission with the Postal Regulatory Commission. This new regulatory agency has both greater powers and greater duties than its predecessor. To date, the PRC has completed numerous tasks that were integral to executing PAEA's objectives, such as
The PRC also has conducted annual determinations of the USPS's compliance with PAEA, and issued numerous opinions on USPS proposals to alter rates, products, and services.23
Congress has held many hearings on the USPS since enactment of the PAEA during which it has examined the implementation of PAEA and the role of the PRC.24 However, in order to assess the PRC's development as an agency and to further understand the directions in which the PRC is developing, Congress may wish to examine the PRC's actions since the enactment of the PAEA, review its annual expenditures, and confer with its commissioners and employees.
After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, the USPS lost $25.4 billion between FY2007 and FY2011. The USPS's financial difficulties have made it difficult for the USPS to make its RHBF payments as scheduled by the PAEA.
Congress reduced the FY2009 payment amount from $5.4 billion to $1.4 billion (P.L. 111-68), and the USPS made the payment. Congress also delayed the FY2011 payment to August 1, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-331).25 However, the USPS was unable to make the FY2011 payment, and the agency has said it cannot make the FY2012 $5.6 billion payment which is due on September 30, 2012.26
As Table 1 indicates, the USPS must make payments of $5.6 billion to $5.8 billion in PAEA-mandated RHBF payments through FY2016. Both the PRC and the USPS Office of Inspector General have issued reports that suggest that the PAEA payment schedule for future retiree health benefits is too aggressive.27 The PRC estimated that the USPS should pay $3.4 billion per year, while the USPSOIG has said that the USPS should pay $1.6 billion per year through 2016 to fund its obligations.28 In light of this, Congress may wish to reassess the PAEA's payment schedule and the differing calculations of the USPS's obligation.
Table 1. Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund Payments Under PAEA
Fiscal Year |
Payment Due Per PAEA (billions) |
Status of Payment |
2007 |
$5.4 |
Paid in full. |
2008 |
$5.6 |
Paid in full. |
2009 |
$5.4 |
$1.4 billion paid. |
2010 |
$5.5 |
Paid in full. |
2011 |
$5.5 |
No payment. |
2012 |
$5.6 |
Due September 30, 2012. |
2013 |
$5.6 |
Due September 30, 2013. |
2014 |
$5.7 |
Due September 30, 2014. |
2015 |
$5.7 |
Due September 30, 2015. |
2016 |
$5.8 |
Due September 30, 2016. |
Source: Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (P.L. 109-435, 803; 120 Stat. 3251-3252; 5 U.S.C 8909(d)(3)(A).)
Additionally, confusion has arisen as to what might occur should the USPS fail to make its annual payment to the Retiree Health Benefits Fund.29 The PAEA does not address what should occur in such an instance. Congress may wish to address this matter by considering building in consequences or a mechanism for missed or less-than-full payments, such as the automatic rollover of a shortfall into a subsequent fiscal year's scheduled payment.
The PAEA's Section 302 addresses the surfeit of USPS non-retail facilities.30 The law states:
Congress finds that—
(A) the Postal Service has more than 400 logistics facilities, separate from its post office network;
(B) ... the Postal Service has more facilities than it needs and the streamlining of this distribution network can pave the way for the potential consolidation of sorting facilities and the elimination of excess costs;
(C) the Postal Service has always revised its distribution network to meet changing conditions and is best suited to address its operational needs; and
(D) Congress strongly encourages the Postal Service to—
(i) expeditiously move forward in its streamlining efforts; and
(ii) keep unions, management associations, and local elected officials informed as an essential part of this effort and abide by any procedural requirements contained in the national bargaining agreements.
In the move to reduce the number of these facilities, Section 302(c)(1) of the PAEA requires the USPS to produce a facilities plan that includes the
procedures that the Postal Service will use to—
(i) provide adequate public notice to communities potentially affected by a proposed rationalization decision;
(ii) make available information regarding any service changes in the affected communities, any other effects on customers, any effects on postal employees, and any cost savings;
(iii) afford affected persons ample opportunity to provide input on the decision; and
(iv) take such comments into account in making a final decision.
Section 302(c)(5) forbids the USPS from closing or consolidating "any processing or logistics facilities without using procedures for public notice and input consistent with those described [above]."
The USPS published its facilities plan in June 2008.31 The plan neither lists all the types of processing and logistics facilities that exist nor provides public notice and input for closing them.32 The USPS's plan only provides public input processes in its section on area mail processing closures.33 As noted above, the PAEA's Section 302 states that the USPS must devise and employ public notification and input processes prior to the closure of all "processing and logistics facilities." Yet the USPS has been criticized for closing some types of non-retail facilities without following the PAEA-required processes.34
Congress may wish to examine whether there is a discrepancy between Section 302 of PAEA and current USPS practices, and whether the PRC has the jurisdiction and authority to enforce Section 302.
As noted above, Section 101 of the PAEA defined "postal service" to mean "the delivery of letters, printed matter, or mailable packages, including acceptance, collection, sorting, transportation, or other functions ancillary thereto." Section 102(c)(2) of the law did permit the USPS to continue providing the types of nonpostal services (e.g., photocopy and notary services) it had been providing prior to January 1, 2006. However, Section 102(c)(3) required the PRC to
review each nonpostal service offered by the Postal Service ... [to] determine whether that nonpostal service shall continue, taking into account—
(A) the public need for the service; and
(B) the ability of the private sector to meet the public need for the service.
Section 102(c)(4) mandated that "[a]ny nonpostal service not determined to be continued by the Postal Regulatory Commission [under Section 102(c)(3)] shall terminate." Additionally, PAEA's Section 102(c)(5) required that when the PRC authorized the USPS to sell a nonpostal service, the PRC had to designate whether the service would be priced and regulated as a market-dominant product, a competitive product, or an experimental product.
Taken as a whole, then, the PAEA's Section 102 aimed to direct the USPS to provide postal services and to refrain from offering new nonpostal services.
Since the enactment of the PAEA, this latter objective has come into question. As mail volumes and revenues have dropped, the USPS has sought ways to increase its postal product and services revenues.35 In May 2009, the USPS proposed holding a "summer sale" that would give reduced postage prices to mailers who had sent over 1 million mail pieces in a six-month period. (The PRC promptly approved this proposal, and the USPS held the sale.)36 Five months later, the USPS announced it would begin selling Hallmark greeting cards at some of its retail postal facilities.37 (The PRC previously had approved greeting card sales.)
However, the USPS has said that these steps are not sufficient, and that it would like to be given greater authority to sell new nonpostal services. For example, then Postmaster General John Potter testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security that
we are simply unable to generate the revenue necessary to support our retail and delivery network at their current size.... Other national [postal services] complement their traditional offerings with banking, cell phone, logistics, and other services to generate the income necessary to offset the costs of their universal service obligation—costs that cannot be met solely by the price of postage.
[W]e believe the time has come to allow the Postal Service to introduce new lines of business at its retail facilities.... This change is only possible with the concurrence of Congress through new legislation, and we ask for your consideration in this regard.38
Whether the USPS would benefit from additional authority to sell nonpostal products is unclear.39
Additionally, the USPS argument for the need for greater authority to sell nonpostal services rests on a broader argument—that the USPS's business model is "broken." Just four months after the enactment of the PAEA, then Postmaster General Potter testified before Congress that,
[u]nfortunately, significant changes in the communications and delivery markets have made continued success under the original law problematic. That is why our Nation is fortunate that so many have recognized this and acted to preserve affordable, universal Postal services.
I appreciate the efforts of this committee, both houses of Congress, Comptroller General David Walker, the administration, and the President's Commission on the U.S. Postal Service. It is my hope that 30 years from today a future Postmaster General will sit at this table and report on the progress made possible by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006.
Unfortunately, our business model remains broken, even with the positive pricing and product changes in the new law. With the diversion of messages and transactions to the Internet from the mail, we can no longer depend on printed volume growing at a rate sufficient to produce the revenue needed to cover the costs of an ever-expanding delivery network.40
This argument has been reiterated by the USPS's chief financial officer, Joseph Corbett, who said the USPS's "business model, quite frankly, is broken. It doesn't work for a declining-volume scenario."41
The argument that the USPS's business model is "broken" and cannot cover its operating costs without being allowed to enter nonpostal lines of business appears to rest on a fundamental assumption: that over the long run the USPS's operating costs will continue to outstrip its operating revenues in perpetuity;42 and that this lag of revenue growth behind cost growth is the result of declining mail volumes (and the resultant revenues).43 Hence, the need for the USPS to reap additional revenues by offering new nonpostal services.
In its PAEA Section 710 report, GAO states, "USPS's business model is not viable due to USPS's inability to reduce costs sufficiently in response to continuing mail volume and revenue declines."44 As Congress further considers the USPS's request for broader authorities to provide nonpostal services, it may wish to investigate these fundamental assumptions regarding postal economics and the possible ramifications for the USPS's operations.
1. |
On the postal reform movement, see out-of-print CRS Report RL33618, Postal Reform, by [author name scrubbed], available from the author. |
2. |
See CRS Report R40626, The U.S. Postal Service and Six-Day Delivery: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
3. |
Michael Schuyler, "The Postal Wage Premium: No Wonder the Postal Service Loses Money," IRET Congressional Advisory no. 131, Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation (Washington: July 24, 2002). |
4. |
U.S. General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office), U.S. Postal Service: Financial Outlook and Transformation Challenges, GAO Testimony 01-733T, May 15, 2001; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, The Postal Service's Uncertain Financial Outlook, 107th Cong., 1st sess., Part I, April 4, 2001, Part II, May 16, 2001 (Washington: GPO, 2001); Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Financial Outlook of the United States Postal Service, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2001 (Washington: GPO, 2002); and President's Commission on the United States Postal Service, Embracing the Future: Making the Tough Choices to Preserve Universal Mail Service: Report of the President's Commission on the United States Postal Service (Washington: GPO, July 31, 2003). The recommendations of the President's Commission are discussed in out-of-print CRS Report RS21640, The Legislative Recommendations of the President's Commission on the United States Postal Service: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed], available from the author. |
5. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding Reform Act of 2003, S.Rept. 108-35, 108th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 2003, pp. 2-3. |
6. |
Government Accountability Office, Postal Pension Funding Reform: Review of Military Service Funding Proposals, GAO-04-281 (Washington: GAO, November 2003). |
7. |
Government Accountability Office, Postal Pension Funding Reform: Issues Related to the Postal Service's Proposed Use of Pension Savings, GAO-04-238 (Washington: GAO, November 26, 2003). |
8. |
CQ.com's Law Track tool is accessible at http://www.cq.com/lawtrack.do. |
9. |
Government Accountability Office, Postal Service: Development and Inventory of New Products, GAO/GGD99-15 (Washington: GAO, 1998). |
10. |
The Postal Service generates nearly all of its funding by charging users of the mail for the costs of the services it provides. However, Congress does provide an annual appropriation to compensate the USPS for revenue it forgoes in providing free mailing privileges to the blind and overseas voters. For further information on the USPS and appropriations, see CRS Report R42008, Financial Services and General Government: FY2012 Appropriations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
11. |
On the GAO's evolving views of the USPS's use of pay-as-you-go funding, see David M. Walker, Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Postal Service: Accounting for Postretirement Benefits," GAO-02-916-R, September 12, 2002. |
12. |
For further information, see CRS Report R41024, The U.S. Postal Service's Financial Condition: Overview and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
13. |
For example, the USPS possesses a legal monopoly over the delivery of first-class mail (18 U.S.C. 1693-1999 and 39 U.S.C. 601). |
14. |
For example, the USPS must compete with UPS and other private firms in the package delivery business. |
15. |
On the CPI-U, see CRS Report RL30074, The Consumer Price Index: A Brief Overview, by [author name scrubbed]. |
16. |
On Section 4 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see CRS Report RS22482, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Management Assessment of Internal Controls): Current Regulation and Congressional Concerns, by [author name scrubbed]. |
17. |
Government Accountability Office, U.S. Postal Service: Strategies and Options to Facilitate Progress Toward Financial Viability, GAO-10-455, April 12, 2010. |
18. |
For just two of the many different views on statutory interpretation, see Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," 60 Boston University Law Review (1980), pp. 204-238. |
19. |
For example, if the USPS takes an action that Congress believes is outside the scope of its authority and Congress does not take issue with it, this action may later be viewed as a "precedent" that justifies future, similar actions. |
20. |
George W. Bush, "President's Statement on H.R. 6407, the 'Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act,'" December 20, 2006, at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061220-6.html. On presidential signing statements, see CRS Report RL33667, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications, by [author name scrubbed]. |
21. |
During the 110th Congress, S.Res. 22 was introduced in the Senate on January 10, 2007. It resolved that the act did "not grant Federal law enforcement officials any new authority to open domestic mail" and that the Senate reaffirmed "the constitutional and statutory protections accorded sealed domestic mail." S.Res. 22 was placed on the Senate legislative calendar but Congress took no further action on the resolution. |
22. |
These objectives are in Sections 201, 201, 202, and 204. |
23. |
For example, see Postal Regulatory Commission, Postal Regulatory Commission: Annual Compliance Determination (Washington: PRC, March 30, 2009), at http://www.prc.gov/Docs/62/62784/ACD%20Report_2008_FINAL.pdf. The PRC's opinions are available at http://www.prc.gov/prc-pages/library/opinions.aspx?view=opinions. |
24. |
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, The Road Ahead: Implementing Postal Reform, hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 110-340, April 19, 2007, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:35526.pdf. |
25. |
Congress first delayed the due date to October 4, 2011 (P.L. 112-33, 124), then November 18, 2011 (P.L. 112-36, 124), then December 16, 2011 (P.L. 112-55, 101), and then August 1, 2012. |
26. |
U.S. Postal Service, "Form 10-Q," August 9, 2012, p. 8. |
27. |
U.S. Postal Service Inspector General, Final Management Advisory Report—Estimates of Postal Service Liability for Retiree Health Care Benefits, Report No. ESS-MA-09-001(R) (Washington: USPOIG, July 22, 2009), at http://www.uspsoig.gov/foia_files/ESS-MA-09-001R.pdf; and Postal Regulatory Commission, Postal Regulatory Commission Review of Retiree Health Benefit Fund Liability as Calculated by Office of Personnel Management and U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (Washington: PRC, July 30, 2009), at http://www.prc.gov/Docs/63/63987/Retiree%20Health%20Fund%20Study_109.pdf. Recently, the PRC chairman suggested that Congress may wish to recalculate the USPS's long-term obligation and the payment schedule. See Ruth W. Goldway, Chairman, Postal Regulatory Commission, statement, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and District of Columbia, Adapting the Postal Service to a Changing World, pp. 6-7. |
28. |
For an overview of this topic, see CRS Report R41024, The U.S. Postal Service's Financial Condition: Overview and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
29. |
Gregg Carlstrom and Rebecca Neal, "What Happens if USPS Misses Trust Fund Payment? No One Knows," Federal Times, September 28, 2009, p. 5. |
30. |
As used in this report, "non-retail facilities" refer to those USPS facilities that are not do serve the public directly (as compared with retail facilities—post offices, postal stations and branches, etc.). |
31. |
U.S. Postal Service, United States Postal Service § 302 Network Plan (Washington: USPS, June 2008), at http://about.usps.com/postal-act-2006/postal-service-networkplan.pdf. |
32. |
It is unclear how many types of these USPS facilities exist. A 2006 USPS PowerPoint presentation mentioned many types of facilities, such as bulk mail centers, airport mail centers, remote encoding centers, international service centers, logistics and distribution centers, and customer service facilities. Paul Vogel, Vice President, Network Operations Management, U.S Postal Service, "USPS Networks," February 16, 2006, p. 15. |
33. |
U.S. Postal Service, United States Postal Service § 302 Network Plan, pp. 28-29. |
34. |
For example, Rep. Robert E. Andrews, "Decision to Close Swedesboro Mail Facility Requires More Detail," press release, November 6, 2009, at http://www.house.gov/list/hearing/nj01_andrews/11_11_09.html. |
35. |
Congress held a hearing to examine these activities. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, More Than Stamps: Adapting the Postal Service to a Changing World, hearing, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 5, 2009. The GAO provided testimony that included a preliminary review of the USPS's efforts to increase postal product revenue. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Postal Service: Financial Challenges Continue, with Relatively Limited Results from Recent Revenue-Generation Efforts, GAO-10-191T (Washington: GAO, November 5, 2009), pp. 6-7. |
36. |
Postal Regulatory Commission, "PRC approves USPS "Summer Sale" Rates Proposal," press release, PRC approves USPS "Summer Sale" Rates Proposal, June 4, 2009, at http://www.prc.gov/prc-docs/Newsroom/PressReleases/PRC%20approves%20USPS%20Summer%20Sale%20proposal_16.pdf. |
37. |
U.S. Postal Service, "Greetings and Salutations from a Post Office Near You: Postal Service Offering Greeting Cards," press release, October 29, 2009, at http://www.usps.com/communications/newsroom/2009/pr09_090.htm; and Postal Regulatory Commission, Review of Nonpostal Services Under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (Washington: PRC, December 19, 2008), pp. 34-35, at http://www.prc.gov/Docs/61/61647/Order_No_154.pdf. |
38. |
Statement of John Potter, Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, The U.S. Postal Service in Crisis, pp. 9-10. See also Statement of Robert F. Bernstock, President, Shipping and Mailing Services, U.S. Postal Service, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, More Than Stamps: Adapting the Postal Service to a Changing World. |
39. |
Michael Schuyler, Foreign Postal Services Sell Many Nonpostal Products; Would The U.S. Postal Service Be Financially Stronger If It Did The Same? Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation, July 30, 2012, at http://iret.org/pub/ADVS-285.PDF. |
40. |
Statement of John E. Potter, Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, The U.S. Postal Service: 101, hearing, 110th Congress, 1st sess., April 17, 2007, p. 14. |
41. |
Ed O'Keefe, "USPS Loses $3.8 Billion for Year as Volume Falls," Washington Post, November 17, 2009, p. A29. |
42. |
In August 2009, the USPS said that were it not for the PAEA's "oppressive" Retiree Health Benefits Funding payment schedule, it would not have run large deficits during the recent economic slowdown. Statement of John Potter, Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, The U.S. Postal Service in Crisis, hearing, 111th Congress, 1st sess., August 6, 2009, pp. 10-11. |
43. |
The USPS said that it is anticipating "stabilizing mail volume in the next few years." The USPS did not show how it derived this anticipation. U.S. Postal Service, 2010 Annual Report (Washington: USPS, 2010), p. 42, at http://www.usps.com/financials/_pdf/annual_report_2010.pdf. |
44. |
Government Accountability Office, U.S. Postal Service: Strategies and Options to Facilitate Progress Toward Financial Viability, p. 1. See also U.S. Postal Service, Assessment of U.S. Postal Service Business Model (Washington: USPS, November 2009), at http://www.usps.com/postallaw/futurebusinessmodel.htm. |