NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit


NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit
Paul Belkin, Coordinator
Analyst in European Affairs
Carl Ek
Specialist in International Relations
Lisa Mages
Information Research Specialist
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
April 14, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit

Summary
On April 3 and 4, 2009, the heads of state and government of the 26 members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany for a
summit marking the 60th anniversary of the alliance. The summit was one of three stops on
President Obama’s first official visit to Europe as President. Alliance leaders used the anniversary
summit to pay tribute to NATO’s past achievements and to reaffirm their commitment to the
alliance as the preeminent transatlantic security framework. They also completed a new round of
NATO enlargement, sought common positions on the range of challenges currently facing the
alliance, and began to set the parameters for NATO’s future direction.
The key issue facing the alliance is the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, where allied
governments are struggling to reach a strategic consensus on how to stabilize the country. The
deteriorating security situation in the country has caused many to question the ability of NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to achieve its objectives and has exposed rifts
within the alliance as to ISAF’s mission and the appropriate means to accomplish it. NATO’s
strained relations with Russia are a second key issue. The allies announced the resumption of
formal ties with Russia after having suspended relations in the NATO-Russia Council following
Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia. However, alliance members continue to disagree on
how to manage relations with Russia and their other eastern neighbors in the future.
NATO enlargement was a third issue on the summit agenda. Albania and Croatia officially joined
the alliance at the summit and discussions on the stalled membership prospects of Macedonia,
Georgia, and Ukraine continued. In what some observers view as a symbol of renewed European
commitment to NATO, France announced its full reintegration into NATO’s integrated military
command structure. Additional issues facing the alliance include: the future of a proposed U.S.
missile defense system to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic; the direction of NATO-
EU relations; an on-going debate over capabilities, the size of defense budgets, and burdensharing
among the allies; and NATO’s role in addressing a range of emerging challenges including arms
control and weapons proliferation, energy security, and international terrorism. To this end, the
allies agreed to launch the drafting of a new Strategic Concept as a means to clarify NATO’s
purpose and future direction.
The 111th Congress could play a decisive role in shaping NATO’s response to the aforementioned
challenges. Congressional action could include hearings and/or legislation on: NATO’s 60th
anniversary and the future of the alliance; NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and the refinement of
military-led reconstruction efforts; the qualifications of candidate states for allied membership;
establishing an improved NATO-EU relationship; and the military capabilities of NATO member
states. In addition, the Senate could vote on a revision to the North Atlantic Treaty covering
expanded geographic space should the allies agree to invite Macedonia to join the alliance.
This report provides an overview and analysis of the key issues discussed at NATO’s April
summit.

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NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
NATO’s Current Agenda and Key Summit Issues ........................................................................ 2
Afghanistan .......................................................................................................................... 2
NATO-Russia Relations ........................................................................................................ 5
NATO Enlargement............................................................................................................... 8
French Reintegration into NATO’s Integrated Command Structure ........................................ 8
NATO’s Strategic Concept and Emerging Challenges .......................................................... 10
Debate over the Strategic Concept and Different Visions of NATO ................................ 10
Addressing Emerging Challenges .................................................................................. 11
NATO-EU Relations ........................................................................................................... 12
Transformation: Capabilities and the NATO Response Force............................................... 13
NATO Response Force (NRF)....................................................................................... 14

Figures
Figure B-1. NATO Timeline ...................................................................................................... 18
Figure C-1. NATO Map ............................................................................................................ 19

Appendixes
Appendix A. Glossary ............................................................................................................... 16
Appendix B. NATO Timeline .................................................................................................... 18
Appendix C. NATO Map........................................................................................................... 19

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20

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Introduction1
On April 3 and 4, 2009, the heads of state and government of the 26 members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany for a
summit marking the 60th anniversary of the alliance. They were joined by the leaders of Albania
and Croatia, which became the two newest members of the alliance at the summit. The summit
was one of three stops on President Obama’s first official visit to Europe as President. Summit
proceedings focused on three broad areas: a “look-back” and celebration of alliance
achievements; NATO’s latest round of enlargement; and current and future challenges facing the
alliance. First and foremost, alliance leaders paid tribute to the past achievements and evolution
of the alliance and reaffirmed their commitment to NATO as the preeminent transatlantic security
framework. Second, Albania and Croatia were welcomed into NATO and France formally
announced its full reintegration into NATO’s integrated military command structure after a 43
year absence. Third, the summit addressed NATO’s current operations and agenda and began to
set the parameters for its future evolution. Alliance leaders also selected Danish Prime Minister
Anders Fogh Rasmussen to succeed Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as NATO Secretary General,
beginning in August 2009.
Summit co-hosts France and Germany chose the anniversary summit’s location along a
historically much-disputed portion of the French-German border as a testament to NATO’s
pivotal role in forging a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.” At the summit, NATO leaders paid
tribute to alliance achievements over what could be considered four phases of its evolution: its
success in providing for the collective defense of its members and preventing the spread of
communism during the Cold War; its ongoing role in assisting the peaceful transition to
democratic governance in former communist states, including through enlargement to 12 of these
states; its first “out of area” peacekeeping missions beginning in the Balkans in the 1990s; and its
post September 11, 2001 evolution in the face of new asymmetric threats -- marked by the first
ever invocation of NATO’s collective defense clause after the September 11 terrorist attacks
against the United States and the alliance’s ongoing mission in Afghanistan.2
The summit also focused on the formidable challenges currently facing NATO and on a broad
range of uncertainties and divergent opinions about the future of the alliance. The key issue
facing the alliance is the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, where allied governments are
struggling to reach a strategic consensus on how to stabilize the country. NATO has staked its
reputation on success in Afghanistan by deploying a force of over 60,000 troops, extolling the
alliance’s capability for global reach, and expending resources to rebuild the political and
economic infrastructure of the country. NATO’s strained relations with Russia are a second key
issue. The allies announced a resumption of formal ties with Russia after having suspended
relations in the NATO-Russia Council following Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia.
However, alliance members continue to disagree on how to manage relations with Russia and


1 This section was prepared by Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs, with contributions from Vincent Morelli,
Section Research Manager, Europe and the Americas Section.
2 For more background information on NATO see the appendices and the NATO Handbook available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf
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NATO’s other eastern neighbors in the future. The also addressed additional issues such as future
enlargement, including to Georgia and Ukraine; the direction of NATO’s relations with the United
Nations, European Union (EU) and other international organizations; an on-going debate over
capabilities; and NATO’s role in addressing a range of additional challenges including arms
control and weapons proliferation, energy security, and international terrorism.
Finally, alliance leaders launched the drafting of a new Strategic Concept as a means to clarify
NATO’s purpose and future direction. Proponents of a new strategic concept argue that the
existing concept, written in 1999, does not adequately reflect events that have transpired since the
terrorist attacks of 2001 and that it lacks a long-term vision that can be effectively communicated
to the public. While most allies appear to continue to support NATO “transformation,” including,
among other things, “out of area missions,” some argue that NATO should be more selective
when deciding to confront new security challenges. Differences over whether NATO should
continue to evolve into a “global,” “expeditionary” alliance or refocus on territorial defense could
cause considerable friction among the allies.
NATO’s Current Agenda and Key Summit Issues
Afghanistan3
Since taking over responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August
2003, NATO has deployed a sizeable force and devoted significant resources to fighting the
Taliban and other insurgents. However, the deteriorating security situation in the country has
caused many to question NATO’s ability to achieve its objectives and has exposed rifts within the
alliance as to ISAF’s mission and the appropriate means to accomplish it. The Obama
Administration has announced its intention to significantly increase U.S. participation in ISAF in
the coming year and in late March unveiled a strategic review of U.S. policy in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region that will serve as a basis for discussions on the future direction of
ISAF.
NATO allies have generally welcomed the renewed U.S. focus on Afghanistan. They appear
particularly encouraged by the Administration’s regional approach – especially its emphasis on
Pakistan and its apparent willingness to engage Iran in discussions of the mission – and by its
emphasis on improving civilian capacity- and institution-building efforts in Afghanistan. Allied
leaders are also generally supportive of the Administration’s reported decision to engage and
reconcile with local leaders and Taliban supporters who renounce violence.4 On the other hand,


3 This section and subsequent sections on NATO-Russia relations, NATO enlargement, and French reintegration
prepared by Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs. For more information on NATO’s mission in Afghanistan see
CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul
Belkin; CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman; and CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by
Catherine Dale.
4 See, “Summit Declaration on Afghanistan,” from the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52836.htm?mode=pressrelease; Helene Cooper and Thom Shanker, "Obama
Afghan Plan Focuses on Pakistan Aid and Appeal to Militants," March 12, 2009.
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there is concern in some allied nations that significant U.S. troop increases and a continued
reluctance in many allied countries to increase troop contributions to ISAF could lead to an
“Americanization” of the mission that may limit allied influence in decision-making.5
As of March 2009, there were approximately 62,000 troops from 42 countries in ISAF, with
NATO members providing the core of the force. The United States has close to 30,000 troops in
ISAF, and another 14,000 serving under U.S. command as part of Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF).6 The largest ISAF troop deployments come from the United States, the UK (8,300),
Germany (3,640), France (2,780), Canada (2,830), Italy (2,350), the Netherlands (1,770), and
Poland (1,590).7 Forces from the United States, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, and Poland serve in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan where they face
the strongest insurgent challenges and bear the brunt of the fighting. The inequity of burden-
sharing in combat operations remains an important point of contention in the alliance, and could
be a factor in domestic opposition to the mission in states that contribute the most combat forces.
The Netherlands and Canada are expected to withdraw troops from the south in 2010 and 2011,
respectively.
President Obama’s February 2009 announcement that the United States will send an additional
17,000 troops to Afghanistan – primarily under ISAF command – has raised expectations for
increased troop contributions from other allies. NATO’s civilian and military leadership and allied
governments active in the more violent southern and eastern parts of the country have
consistently called for troop increases from other allies, and for an easing of the “caveats” by
which national governments restrict the use of their forces. Caveats, in particular, pose difficult
problems for commanders, who seek maximum flexibility in utilizing troops under their
command. For example, though they make up the third-largest troop contingent in ISAF, German
forces are confined to the northern part of the country and are largely restricted from conducting
offensive armed operations with their Afghan counterparts. In other instances, allied forces lack
the appropriate equipment to fulfill designated tasks and/or function effectively together with
other NATO forces. NATO commanders consistently cite a lack of high-flying helicopters and
other support equipment vital to the mission’s success.
The reluctance of some allies to increase troop levels or ease operational caveats on forces
serving in Afghanistan is rooted largely in strong public opposition to the ISAF mission in many
European countries and what many consider a lack of clarity regarding the way forward in
Afghanistan. Officials in some allied countries also point out that increased deployments to
Afghanistan could come at the expense of contributions to other peacekeeping and stabilization
missions. European allies are currently the main contributors to NATO’s ongoing mission in
Kosovo and to the U.N.’s mission in Lebanon, among others.8


5 Interviews of European officials, December 2008 – March 2009.
6 The missions of those forces serving under U.S. command include suppressing Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents
along the Afghan-Pakistan border.
7 NATO, ISAF "Placemat", March 13, 2009, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf. Note: the
numbers of “boots-on-the-ground” are approximations due to regular unit rotations and the different ways in which the
U.S. Joint Staff and ISAF account for personnel.
8 Some observers believe Spain’s March 2009 decision to withdraw 600 peacekeepers from Kosovo was at least partly
influenced by its desire to boost its deployment in Afghanistan. See Victoria Burnett, "Spain Plans to Withdraw
(continued...)

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U.S. and NATO officials sought to use the NATO summit to reaffirm allied unity behind a clear
and revitalized strategy for the Afghan mission as symbolized by the new U.S. strategic approach
to the region. At the summit, the allies reiterated their commitment to a strategic vision for
Afghanistan based on the four principles laid out at NATO’s 2008 summit in Bucharest: a long-
term commitment; promoting Afghan leadership; a comprehensive approach; and a regional
approach. In particular, the 2009 Summit Declaration on Afghanistan highlights the need for
greater civilian as well as military resources, emphasizing the importance of developing Afghan
capacity to deliver justice, basic services, and employment, especially in the agricultural sector.
The allies also pledged to strengthen NATO efforts to enhance cooperation between the Afghan
and Pakistani governments, to increase Alliance engagement with all countries in the region, and
to support better Afghan and NATO coordination with the United Nations Assistance Mission
Afghanistan (UNAMA).
In an apparent acknowledgement of the constraints facing some allied governments, U.S. officials
refrained from making public requests for specific allies to increase troop contributions at the
April summit. That said, NATO officials and the United States hoped to gain at least short-term
troop commitments of four to five battalions to secure presidential and provincial elections
scheduled for August 2009. This minimum request appears to have been fulfilled with reported
allied commitments of an additional 3,000 additional non-U.S. troops to be deployed through the
election.9 However, commentators point out that these temporary deployments pale in comparison
to the new U.S. force commitments.
Instead of publicly emphasizing the need for additional long-term troop commitments, the Obama
Administration sought to use the summit to urge broader allied engagement in the Afghan
mission. This included calls for substantial increases in financial assistance and supplies for
development and institution-building efforts; police, judicial, and governance assistance and
training; and funding and training for the Afghan National Army (ANA). Administration and
NATO officials specifically highlight army and police training as key areas where European allies
have the ability and expertise to contribute more resources.10
Along these lines, the most significant new initiative announced at the April summit was the
formation of the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). The NTM-A will start with an
initial commitment of 300 mostly French constabulary forces committed to providing senior-level
mentoring and training of the ANA and the Afghan National Police. In an effort to better
coordinate existing training efforts, NTM-A will operate under a dual-hatted command, with a
single commander for both the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A) and the NATO Training Mission.11 The allies also committed an initial $100 million to
an Afghan National Army Trust Fund designed to fund efforts to NATO’s goal to help grow the

(...continued)

Peacekeepers from Kosovo," International Herald Tribune, March 19, 2009.
9 “NATO Pledge to Afghan Mission a ‘Strong Down Payment,’” States News Service, April 4, 2009.
10 In May 2007, the EU accepted a request by NATO to take the lead in training Afghanistan’s police. The European
police (EUPOL) training mission began in June 2007 with an initial mandate of three years. The effort has faltered thus
far for several reasons, including delays in recruiting qualified personnel and strained relations with NATO.
11 For more information see, “NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan,” available on NATO’s website at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52802.htm
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ANA from a force of 82,000 to 134,000 by 2011. U.S. officials have said that they hope to secure
$500 million in contributions to the Trust Fund. Finally, NATO allies have reportedly increased
their commitments to NATO’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), teams of 12-19
personnel embedded with the ANA. U.S. and NATO officials hope 70 additional OMLTs will
begin operating in the coming months.
An ongoing problem is Afghanistan’s narcotics production, which continues to expand, and to
fuel the Taliban insurgency.12 ISAF was not initially authorized to play a direct role in the
counter-narcotics effort by, for example, destroying poppy fields or processing facilities and
apprehending drug traffickers. Nevertheless, NATO commanders were instructed to provide
assistance to local counter-narcotics authorities. The allies have also provided training,
intelligence, and logistics to Afghan army units and police who destroy poppy fields and opium
labs.13 In October 2008, NATO leaders agreed to authorize ISAF forces to act with Afghan forces
against opium labs and other facilities that produce drugs to finance the Taliban when that
connection could be demonstrated. However, some allies have reportedly objected to the order,
arguing that their laws do not permit their soldiers to engage in counter-narcotics operations.14
Some allies have also argued that NATO’s role in a counter-narcotics effort could have a negative
impact on communities that rely on the opium trade for their economic livelihood, especially if
that trade is not directly linked to support for the Taliban insurgents.
NATO-Russia Relations
In 2008, relations between NATO and Russia reached what most observers consider their lowest
point since the end of the Cold War.15 Russia vocally opposed alliance proposals to strengthen
NATO ties with Georgia and Ukraine, and Moscow’s opposition to proposed U.S. missile defense
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic has fueled contentious debate about the merits of
the U.S. plans. Tensions between NATO and Russia escalated in the wake of Russia’s August
2008 invasion of Georgia, after which the sides suspended formal ties in the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC). Low-level cooperation between NATO and Russia resumed in late 2008, and on
March 5, 2009 NATO foreign ministers agreed to a U.S.-German proposal to resume full
diplomatic ties with Russia in the NRC. The allies announced the full resumption of NATO-
Russia ties at the April summit.
Russian leaders tend to characterize NATO’s eastern enlargement as an infringement on
Moscow’s traditional “sphere of influence,” and have long sought international recognition of
Russian-led security initiatives in the former Soviet sphere. Russian concerns appear to have been
a key factor in some European allies’ opposition to U.S. proposals to extend NATO Membership
Action Plans (MAPs) to Georgia and Ukraine at NATO’s April 2008 summit in Bucharest,


12 For more information on the narcotics issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
13 Testimony of Director Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January
11, 2007.
14 “Obstacles arise in Bid to Curb Afghan Trade in Narcotics,” New York Times, December 23, 2008.
15 See, for example, Ellen Barry, “Russia works angles to prod Obama,” International Herald Tribune, February 6,
2009.
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Romania. Supporters of a MAP for Georgia have subsequently argued that closer ties between
NATO and Georgia could have dissuaded Russia from invading last summer. Opponents,
including German and French officials, counter that such an arrangement could have drawn
NATO into a dangerous and unwanted confrontation with Russia. In any case, Russia’s actions,
and particularly its invasion of Georgia, have intensified debate within NATO about how the
alliance should manage relations with its eastern neighbors and with Russia itself. Some allies,
most notably Poland and Lithuania, advocate a firmer NATO stance toward Russia and warn
against granting Russia what could effectively be considered veto power over alliance decisions
on matters such as enlargement. Others, like Germany, tend to advocate increased engagement
with Moscow as the most effective means to influence Russian behavior.
Russia has sent mixed signals to NATO and the United States since President Obama’s election.
Moscow has announced its willingness to open a NATO supply route to Afghanistan through its
territory and has said that it would abandon plans to deploy short-range missiles to the Russian-
Polish border. On the other hand, some observers see Russia’s hand behind the Kyrgyz
government’s February 2009 announcement that it would cancel the U.S. lease on an air base in
Manas that is used by the United States and other NATO allies to supply troops in Afghanistan.
On March 17, Russian President Dimitri Medevedev announced plans for an ambitious overhaul
of Russia’s armed forces, citing among other things, a need to address “attempts to expand the
military infrastructure of NATO near Russia’s borders.”16 Russian officials also continue to
advocate a new European security architecture that some see as an attempt to undermine NATO’s
influence in the region and block U.S. missile defense plans.17
Although it has strongly criticized some aspects of Russian foreign policy, the Obama
Administration has signaled its intention to pursue a path of constructive engagement with
Moscow and has advocated that NATO do the same. Following Vice President Biden’s February
announcement that the United States would “press the reset button [on relations with Russia],”
U.S. officials have emphasized the need to engage Russia in an effort to improve U.S.- and NATO
–Russia cooperation in areas ranging from ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism,
to arms control and non-proliferation and international efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear program.18
NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer reiterated this position after NATO foreign ministers
agreed to resume formal ties with Russia on March 5, saying that “Russia is an important player.
Russia is a global player, and that means that not talking to them is not an option.”19 At the same
time, NATO and U.S. officials stress that they will continue to condemn Russian policies that
they perceive as conflicting with the core values of the alliance. They say, for example, that
NATO will not recognize a Russian sphere of influence outside its borders and will continue to
reject Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


16 See Philip Pan, "Medvedev Pushes Plan to Remake Russian Military," Washington Post, March 18, 2009.
17 Russia reportedly hopes to convene an all-European security conference later this year to discuss its proposals for a
new European security architecture. Some European allies, including Germany and France, have expressed a
willingness to support such a summit and to consider Russian proposals. However, they consistently affirm their
commitment to NATO and the transatlantic relationship as the primary European security mechanism. For more
information see Oxford Analytica, Russia/Europe: Scepticism greets security proposals, January 13, 2009.
18 See Remarks by Vice President Biden at the 45th Munich Security Conference, February 7, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksbyVicePresidentBidenat45thMunichConferenceonSecurityPolicy
/
19 See Andre de Nesnera, "NATO, Russia Revive Dialogue," Voice of America News, March 12, 2009.
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Observers and officials in some allied nations express concern that NATO’s reengagement with
Russia could signal that the alliance is not serious about standing up to Russian behavior it has at
least rhetorically deemed unacceptable. For example, they argue that NATO’s inability or
unwillingness to prevent Russia from moving to establish a permanent military presence in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead some to question the credibility of the alliance’s core
principle of collective defense. Although Georgia is not a member of the alliance, critics contend
that NATO has given the impression that it could concede to Russian demands in its relations
with aspiring alliance members.20 Alliance leaders sought to acknowledge such concerns at the
April summit by reaffirming their commitment to collective defense and reiterating their support
for eventual Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership.
NATO continues its internal debate over U.S. missile defense proposals.21 The Bush
Administration proposed building a site in Poland with 10 interceptors and an associated radar
system in the Czech Republic. The Administration contended that the sites would assist in the
defense of Europe and the United States against a developing Iranian missile threat. Russia
contends that the sites are directed against its ballistic missiles. In November 2008, less than a
day after President Obama’s election, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev announced that Russia
would deploy Iskander cruise missiles in Kaliningrad – near the Polish border – to “neutralize”
the proposed U.S. system. Russia is reported to have since dropped the plans.22
The U.S. missile defense plans, and Russia’s reaction, have been a source of tension within the
alliance. Some critics believe that the system would not adequately cover NATO Europe, and that
it should be “bolted on” to a prospective NATO system. Others argue that the proposed missile
system has not undergone “real world, robust testing.”23 Those opposed to the U.S. proposal
welcomed initial reports that the Obama Administration would move slowly at best in advancing
the missile defense plans. In February, Vice President Biden said that the United States would
continue to pursue the missile defense program – “provided the technology is proven and cost-
effective” -- but that it would also seek to consult more closely with the Europeans and Russians
on the plan. The Administration has denied subsequent reports suggesting that it has offered to
consider dropping the missile defense plans in exchange for Russian cooperation on other issues
such as the Iranian nuclear program.24


20 Ibid.
21 For more information on U.S. missile defense proposals see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile
Defense in Europe
, by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
22 Luke Harding, “Medvedev moves to tighten Russian leadership’s grip on power,” The Guardian, November 6, 2008;
Ellen Barry, “Russia works angles to prod Obama,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009.
23 Interviews with U.S. and Polish officials, 2007-2008; “New team in Poland cool to U.S. shield,” Washington Post,
Jan. 19, 2008, p. A18.; interview of Boeing official, Feb. 1, 2008.
24 Peter Baker, "Obama Offered Deal to Russia in Secret Letter," New York Times, March 2, 2009.Helene Cooper and
Nicholas Kulish, “Biden hints at compromise with Russia on missile defense plan,” International Herald Tribune,
February 8, 2009.
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NATO Enlargement25
Albania and Croatia officially joined NATO at the April summit.26 They are both small countries,
with correspondingly small militaries. In the sense of their military importance and general
resources, neither country represents a “strategic” presence in the alliance, although their
contributions to NATO operations have been commended. However, with some continuing
instability in the Balkan region, further stirred by Serbia’s sharply negative reaction to Kosovo’s
independence, the two countries are a potential factor for stabilization in southeastern Europe.
Little if any progress has been made in advancing Macedonia’s stalled candidacy for NATO
membership. The allies agreed at Bucharest that Macedonia met the qualifications for
membership. However, Greece blocked a membership invitation due to a protracted dispute over
Macedonia’s name. The two sides have since been unable to resolve the issue during talks
sponsored by the U.N. Macedonia asserts its right to use and be recognized by its constitutional
name, the Republic of Macedonia. Greece objects, claiming that the name usurps Greece’s
heritage and conveys irredentist ambitions against Greece’s largest province, also called
“Macedonia,” which borders the former Yugoslav republic. Macedonian officials counter that
they have amended the Macedonian constitution to renounce all territorial claims on Greece or
any neighboring country, and have changed the country’s flag to eliminate possible reference to
Greece’s northern province.
As discussed above, debate over whether to place Georgia and Ukraine in NATO’s MAP process
has caused controversy in the alliance. Although the allies pledged at Bucharest and again at a
December 2008 foreign ministers’ meeting that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become
NATO members, they have not specified when that might happen. The Russia-Georgia conflict
and continued political instability in Ukraine appear to have further diminished the short- and
even medium-term membership prospects for both countries. This was reflected at the December
2008 meeting when NATO foreign ministers agreed to a U.S. proposal to continue talks with the
countries within the framework of the Georgia-NATO and Ukraine-NATO Commissions rather
than the MAP process. Observers viewed the Bush Administration’s decision to back away from
its initially strong support of MAPs for Georgia and Ukraine as a concession to European allied
calls to slow NATO’s enlargement process. While the allies have not ruled out the possibility of
future membership for Georgia and Ukraine, analysts view the shift to what some consider the
more informal commission structure as a tacit agreement to indefinitely postpone the membership
timeline for the countries.27
French Reintegration into NATO’s Integrated Command Structure
At the summit, the allies welcomed France’s full reintegration into NATO’s integrated military
command structure. France is currently the fourth largest contributor of troops to alliance


25 For more information on NATO enlargement see CRS Report RL34701, NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and
Possible Future Candidates
, by Vincent Morelli et al.
26 The U.S. Senate ratified the accession protocols for Albania and Croatia by Division Vote on September 25, 2008
(Treaty Number 110-20).
27 Interviews of U.S., European, and NATO officials, December 2008 – March 2009.
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operations and a significant financial contributor to NATO. However, it has had only very limited
participation in the alliance’s military decision-making structures since then- President Charles de
Gaulle withdrew the country from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966.28 Despite
domestic opposition from critics who fear that the move could limit French military
independence, the French parliament approved Sarkozy’s decision by a vote of 329-238 on March
17, 2009. U.S. officials have welcomed French reintegration as an important step toward
improving alliance cohesion and strengthening the European role within NATO.29
French officials hope that full reintegration into NATO will give France a level of influence in
determining the strategic direction and planning decisions of the alliance that is proportional to its
participation in alliance operations. Practically speaking, French four-star generals are expected to
fill two NATO command posts – Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia
and the Allied Joint Command regional headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal -- and approximately
800 French officers will reportedly be integrated into command structures at NATO
headquarters.30
What role France will play in determining the strategic direction of the alliance remains to be
seen. However, some observers draw attention to France’s past opposition to U.S. and UK calls
for a more “global NATO” defined by enhanced partnerships with countries outside the core
NATO area such as Australia and Japan. French officials have also argued that NATO should
consult more closely with Russia before considering further enlargement and have indicated that
NATO should concentrate on its core mission of defense and leave political and reconstruction
activities to other international institutions (such as the EU and U.N.).31 Other observers point to
Sarkozy’s willingness to break with tradition to argue that past policy positions could be of little
consequence in France’s future approach to the alliance.
Sarkozy has sought alliance and U.S. support for a strong European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP), including development of a full command and planning structure for its forces. France
has argued that a robust and independent European defense capacity could reinforce and
complement NATO. However, some critics in Europe and the United States argue that a separate
European command structure could rival NATO’s large planning cell, elements of which the EU
now uses for its operations, and would be a wasteful duplication of resources. That said, U.S.
officials have welcomed French calls to develop Europe’s security and defense capacity, which
they view as a complement to, not a substitute for, NATO. As one U.S. supporter of French
reintegration notes, “Every step taken by France to improve the cohesiveness and efficiency of


28 President de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966 and ordered U.S. military
personnel to leave the country. However, France remained in NATO’s political wing and maintained a seat on the
North Atlantic Council (NAC), the alliance’s political decision-making body. Since the mid-1990s France has
participated more actively in NATO operations, and Paris has sent an observer to the alliance’s Military Committee,
where key military planning and operational decisions are made.
29 See Vice President Biden’s remarks at the 2009 Munich Security Conference, op. cit.
30 Today, France contributes two one-star flag officers to NATO headquarters and provides approximately one percent
of NATO headquarters staffers. Interviews of European officials, March 2009; Steven Erlanger, "Sarkozy Embraces
NATO, and Bigger Role for France," New York Times, March 8, 2009; Leo Michel, "Sarkozy's Next Big Battle,"
Newsweek, February 23, 2009.
31 See, for example, Jamey Keaten, "U.S. Vision of 'global NATO' runs counter to role sought by France," Associated
Press, March 18, 2009.
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NATO will sooner or later benefit European defense as well – in terms of capabilities,
interoperability and operational performance.”32
NATO’s Strategic Concept and Emerging Challenges33
A new NATO Strategic Concept was a fifth issue on the summit agenda. With the current version
dating to 1999, some officials and observers have long called for the creation of a new Strategic
Concept that provides clarified and updated guidance for NATO’s mission and activities. The
Declaration on Alliance Security issued at the Summit gave a green light to beginning the process
of developing a new Strategic Concept. The Declaration commissions the NATO Secretary
General “to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts” who will consult with all
Allies as they draft the document.34 The process is expected to last one-and-a-half to two years,
with the proposed new Strategic Concept to be submitted for approval at the next NATO Summit,
planned for late 2010 or early 2011 in Portugal.
Debate over the Strategic Concept and Different Visions of NATO
There are three prevalent criticisms of the current Strategic Concept.. First, because it was written
in 1999, many observe that the worldview reflected in the document has become outdated, and
that it therefore does not devote sufficient attention to issues such as terrorism nor incorporate the
nature and reach of NATO missions undertaken over the past ten years, particularly in
Afghanistan. 35 Second, the guidelines set down in the Strategic Concept tend to be very broad,
permitting competing interpretations of NATO’s possible mandates and responsibilities when it
comes to a number of specific questions. Third, the Strategic Concept does not settle the wider
philosophical debates over NATO’s proper vocation.
Such debates center on three interrelated themes: 1) some members of NATO believe that its
future relevance depends on a capacity to conduct “out-of-area” operations, while others believe
NATO should focus on territorial and collective defense; 2) some members of NATO advocate a
continued enlargement and formal partnerships with like-minded countries, while others worry
that further enlargement and a “Global NATO” means strategic drift, overstretch, and undesirable
new security commitments; and 3) some members of NATO support expanding its “soft”
capabilities related to tasks such as crisis management and stabilization and reconstruction, while
others prefer that NATO focus more exclusively on “hard” military power.
Supporters of writing a new Strategic Concept argued that a clear, specific, and up-to-date version
would provide NATO with much-needed vision and a more clear sense of purpose. Critics
observe, however, that strategic concepts, like all NATO policy documents, are consensus


32 Leo Michel, op. cit.
33 Prepared by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
34 See Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of
the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009.
35 For more information see The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
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documents to which all 26 NATO members must agree—full agreement on contentious issues or
detailed policy guidelines is not likely. Thus, while some observers are hopeful that the new
Strategic Concept will definitively settle the three broad differences outlined above one way or
the other, others expect that the new document will continue to allow enough room for balancing
each approach within NATO’s overall mission and operations.
Notwithstanding, some proponents maintain that much of value lies in the process, not
necessarily in the end product. They argue that regardless of the end result, the process could
serve to renew strategic consensus among the member states of the alliance to the greatest
possible extent. On the other hand, critics counter that the process may also open up dangerous
and divisive debates that could distract the alliance from its on-going operations.
Addressing Emerging Challenges
The Declaration on Alliance Security may provide a short blueprint that hints at the contents of a
new Strategic Concept. Observers expect that a new Strategic Concept would likely reiterate
many basic elements from the 1999 version, including the importance of deterrence, military
capabilities, collective defense, and the transatlantic link. The document would also likely an
open but slowed approach to future enlargement and provide an updated assessment of the global
security picture and the multidisciplinary nature of many of today’s threats.
Some observers hope that guidelines laid down in a new strategic concept could provide greater
direction for NATO’s role in addressing emerging security challenges. For example, subject to the
debates outlined above, a new strategic concept might discuss the development of capabilities
related to crisis management, stabilization and reconstruction operations, homeland security,
missile defense, and counterterrorism. The 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration opened the door
for increased NATO engagement in areas such as cyber security and energy security, and NATO
has recently engaged in maritime anti-piracy efforts.36 NATO’s intended development of
capabilities for such tasks could be clarified.
Such discussions could fall under wider clarifications about the criteria for and extent of “out-of-
area” operations; NATO’s approach to global partnerships with non-members; internal alliance
dynamics, funding, force structure, and burden sharing; and proposed linkages between military
and civilian capabilities as expressed in the so-called Comprehensive Approach. Finally, a new
Strategic Concept might place increased emphasis on the NATO-EU relationship and the NATO-
Russia relationship, as well as NATO’s relations with the United Nations, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the African Union.


36 See Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008.
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html
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NATO-EU Relations37
France’s full reintegration into NATO and its parallel support for a strengthened EU defense
capacity has revitalized discussion about the level of cooperation between the European Union
and NATO and the possibility of a strengthened partnership. Both the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit
Declaration and the Declaration on Alliance Security reiterate a general commitment to this
goal.38
Despite overlapping membership and interests, NATO and the EU have struggled to establish a
cooperative and complementary relationship.39 Over the past decade, the United States has
supported the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a means for Europe to develop
security capabilities, under the condition that ESDP avoid the “three Ds” outlined by then-
Secretary of State Albright in 1998: decoupling/delinking (from NATO strategy and decision
making), duplication (of NATO structures and resources), and discrimination (against non-EU
members of NATO).
The 2003 Berlin Plus agreement, allowing EU-led missions access to NATO assets and planning
capabilities, remains the biggest step forward to date and the cornerstone of NATO-EU
relations.40 Berlin Plus reflects a pragmatic conclusion that NATO and the EU need not be
competitors, but are better served as partners sharing a pool of resources and offering each other
an array of complementary capabilities. In the Declaration on Alliance Security, “NATO
recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the
European Union’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common
security challenges.”41 Nevertheless, the old debate remains a source of tension: some believe
fully independent EU capabilities are desirable and necessary, allowing the EU to undertake
missions that NATO does not choose to pursue, and others worry that a robust ESDP could mean
duplication and transatlantic divergence at the expense of NATO and U.S. leadership of the
alliance.42
While NATO-EU cooperation exists at the tactical level, the two institutions are unable to share
sensitive intelligence information, thereby hindering their ability to cooperate on matters of
strategic importance. One intractable problem poses a particular obstacle in this regard. Cyprus
and Malta are members of the EU, but do not have a security agreement with NATO. Citing this
reason, Turkey objects to Cyprus and Malta participating in any NATO-EU discussions that
involve sharing intelligence or other sensitive information. With the EU refusing to allow the
exclusion of any of its members from such meetings, meaningful discussion at the political and


37 Prepared by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
38 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of
the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009 and Declaration on Alliance Security, op. cit.
39 21 countries belong to both NATO and the EU. There are six non-NATO members of the EU (Austria, Cyprus,
Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden) and five non-EU members of NATO (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the
United States).
40 Berlin Plus agreement, NATO Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, updated
21 June 2006. http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm
41 Declaration on Alliance Security, op. cit.
42 See also CRS Report RL32342, NATO and the European Union, by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis.
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strategic level is effectively blocked (beneath the surface of Turkey’s stance are linkages with its
protracted bid for EU membership and the issue of divided Cyprus). Many observers argue that a
broader and deeper NATO-EU relationship would likely require resolution of this impasse.
A stronger NATO-EU relationship might include joint planning in areas such as crisis
management, defense policy, and military procurement. NATO and the EU might also institute
greater coordination of complementary capabilities for expeditionary missions, stabilization and
reconstruction operations, and security sector reform programs. Such tighter relations could help
avoid potentially wasteful duplication in the development of such capabilities. Some experts
assert that, with the EU’s security and defense policy a work in progress, the strengths of the EU
continue to lie in the depth of its civilian capabilities in areas such as civilian crisis management,
humanitarian operations, and police, judicial, and administrative training. They argue that
aligning the EU’s capabilities with NATO’s strengths in a flexible, well-coordinated, and
harmonious NATO-EU relationship would give the Euro-Atlantic community more and better-
rounded resources as well as enhanced effectiveness in pursuing its external goals.
Afghanistan is often cited as an example where improved NATO-EU cooperation could have an
important impact. Given the reluctance of some European governments to contribute additional
forces to ISAF, some experts suggest that Europe might make greater contributions in terms of
vital civilian capabilities that could fall under EU domain: assisting infrastructure projects; police,
judiciary, and civil service training; economic development; and the development of health and
education systems. For example, the EU recently decided to increase the size of its nascent police
training mission (EUPOL) from 180 to 400 personnel. Some analysts have noted, however, that
overall aid efforts to Afghanistan are poorly coordinated. Many believe that an increased EU role
within an enhanced NATO-EU framework could benefit civilian aid programs and improve civil-
military coordination.
Transformation: Capabilities and the NATO Response Force43
NATO’s evolving mission in Afghanistan has revived longstanding discussions on the alliance’s
capacity to operate “out of area” and on whether its capabilities are sufficient to effectively
counter emerging threats. Conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s first highlighted the need for
more mobile forces, for greater technological equality between the United States and its allies,
and for better interoperability. At its 2002 meeting in Prague, dubbed the “transformation
summit,” NATO sought to address these needs primarily by creating a rapid-reaction force and
adopting a new capabilities initiative. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) called for the
allies’ development of modernized equipment such as strategic lift, aerial refuelers, and precision-
guided munitions. Analysts cautioned that the success of PCC would hinge upon increased
spending and changed procurement priorities, particularly by the European allies. At NATO’s
2004 Istanbul summit and its 2006 Riga summit, the alliance reaffirmed the goals of PCC. The
2008 Bucharest summit declaration did not mention PCC, but, in light of NATO missions,
particularly in Afghanistan, stressed the urgency of acquiring specific capabilities such as airlift
and communications.44


43 Prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations.
44 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21659, NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment, by Carl Ek.
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In October 2008, Britain’s Conservative shadow defense secretary Liam Fox and former U.S.
Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Daniel Fata wrote that “the alliance’s report card on
developing and funding key enablers and critical capabilities has been less than glowing. Non-
U.S. annual alliance-wide defense spending continues to decline. This has translated into reduced
operational defense capability, i.e., high-altitude helicopters, deployable joint logistics and UAVs
for an organization ... that has declared Afghanistan to be its top priority”45
Missile defense may increasingly be viewed as an emerging NATO capability priority. The
alliance has already approved a theater missile defense system intended to protect deployed
forces. It also has been discussing the viability of ballistic missile defense, particularly in the
context of the Bush Administration’s proposal to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland and radar
in the Czech Republic in order to guard against a possible threat from Iran. NATO leaders will be
reviewing the conclusions of an earlier-mandated study on the feasibility of a complementary
“bolt-on” anti-missile capability that would protect the southeastern part of Europe.
NATO Response Force (NRF)
In November 2002, the alliance agreed to the concept of a NATO Response Force (NRF.) The
new unit is an expeditionary, stand-alone force capable of being deployed rapidly over long
distances to respond to a wide variety of security challenges globally, ranging from Article 5
(collective defense) missions, to such non-Article 5 operations as counter-terrorism, emergency
evacuation, crisis response, and disaster assistance. The NRF was envisioned as consisting of a
force of up to 25,000 troops, capable of being deployed in five days, and of being sustained in a
remote location for 30 days or more; member countries contribute air, land, or naval forces for
six-month rotations.
Although the NRF reached full capability in November 2006, fulfilling commitments to the NRF
in recent years has become a chronic challenge due to the strong demand for troops for NATO
operations. A British analyst stated that “Afghanistan has to a certain extent usurped, or stolen
the thunder, of the NATO Response Force.”46 According to a U.S. Defense Department official,
the air and maritime components of the NRF have not been severely affected, but member states
have had difficulty fulfilling their land forces commitments. The U.S. government has reportedly
signaled to allies that if they face a choice between contributing assets to NRF or ISAF, the
Pentagon would prefer that troops be deployed to Afghanistan. The alliance remains strongly
committed to the NRF, but, given this strain on resources, there has been a shift toward a
“graduated” concept: NATO will seek to maintain a core force of 12,000 to ensure there is a
framework to rapidly expand to the full complement of 25,000.47
Meanwhile, at the NATO Defense Ministers’ February 19-20, 2009 meeting in Poland, British
Defense Minister John Hutton proposed the establishment of a 3,000-strong rapid deployment
force designated to defend the treaty area. Some observers expressed concern that this plan,
emphasizing territorial defense, would signal the end of the NRF. Others, however, believe that


45 “Don’t Downsize NATO’s Mission – Alliance Must Remain Full-Spectrum Force,” Defense News, October 6, 2008.
46 “As NATO Eyes Cuts to Reaction Force, Doubts Grow About Mission,” Defense News, October 8, 2007.
47 CRS interview of U.S. Department of Defense official, February 5, 2009.
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the plan is intended to reassure NATO’s eastern European member states that their troop
deployments to Afghanistan will not leave their countries with weakened defenses and that they
will continue to be protected against Russia.48



48 “UK Calls For Unit To Defend NATO Territory,” Financial Times, February 19, 2009; “NATO: A Disappointing
Summit,” Stratfor.com, February 20, 2009.
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Appendix A. Glossary
KEY NATO DOCUMENTS AND DECISION-MAKING BODIES49
North Atlantic Treaty
NATO’s founding treaty, signed in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949. In the
treaty, the 12 original signatory nations -- Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
Kingdom, and the United States – and all subsequent NATO members resolve
to unite their efforts for col ective defense and for the preservation of peace and
security.
Article 5 of the North
The basis for the alliance’s core principle of collective defense. States that an
Atlantic Treaty
armed attack against one or more allies shall be considered an attack against all.
Commits each member to taking the actions, including the use of armed force, it
deems necessary to assist the al y attacked.
North Atlantic Council
NATO’s supreme political decision-making body. The Council, composed of
(NAC)
permanent representatives of al NATO countries, oversees al political and
military processes relating to alliance security. It is the only body within the
alliance which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Committee
The highest military authority in NATO, providing NATO’s civilian decision-
making bodies – the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee
and the Nuclear Planning Group -- with advice on military matters.
Defence Planning
The senior decision-making body on matters relating to the integrated military
Committee
structure of the alliance and collective defense matters.
Nuclear Planning Group
The ultimate authority within NATO with regard to nuclear policy issues. France
is not a member and will retain its independence from the Group after its
expected reintegration into the alliance’s military structures.
Supreme Allied Commander
One of NATO’s two strategic commanders and head of Allied Command
Europe (SACEUR)
Operations (ACO). SACEUR, traditionally a United States Flag or General
officer, is dual-hatted as Commander of the US European Command.
Supreme Allied Commander
One of NATO’s two strategic commanders and the commanding officer of
Transformation (SACT)
Allied Command Transformation (ACT). SACT is responsible for promoting
and overseeing the continuing transformation of alliance forces and capabilities.
Secretary General
The alliance’s top international civil servant and chairperson of the NAC. The
Secretary General serves a four-year term and is responsible for steering alliance
consultation and decision-making processes and for ensuring that decisions are
implemented. He or she is NATO’s chief spokesperson and the head of the
organization’s international staff.
Strategic Concept
Authoritative statement of NATO’s objectives and the basis for alliance policy.
First published in 1991, revised in 1999.


49 Prepared by Lisa Mages, Information Research Specialist.
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NATO PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURES
Partner Countries
NATO has developed partnerships with non-NATO countries, promoting
security dialogue and cooperation, since the early 1990s. NATO meets partner
countries from Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the wider
Mediterranean area, as wel as other partners across the globe, on a regular
basis to discuss political and security-related issues.
Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Established in 1997 to provide the overall political framework for cooperation
Council (EAPC)
between NATO and its partner countries.
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Provides a framework for bilateral cooperation with each partner country on an
individual basis.
Membership Action Plan
Assists aspirant partner countries in their preparations for NATO membership
(MAP)
by providing a framework for NATO to channel assistance and practical support
to them.
Founding Act on Mutual
Signed in 1997, provides the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations.
Relations, Cooperation, and
Security
NATO-Russia Council
Established in 2002, brings together the 26 NATO Allies and Russia to identify
and pursue opportunities for joint action.
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Appendix B. NATO Timeline
Figure B-1. NATO Timeline

Source: CRS. Content by Lisa Mages, Information Research Specialist.
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Appendix C. NATO Map
Figure C-1. NATO Map

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
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Author Contact Information

Paul Belkin, Coordinator
Lisa Mages
Analyst in European Affairs
Information Research Specialist
pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
lmages@crs.loc.gov, 7-7452
Carl Ek
Derek E. Mix
Specialist in International Relations
Analyst in European Affairs
cek@crs.loc.gov, 7-7286
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116




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