 
 
 
 Legal Sidebari 
 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and 
Presidential Inability, Part 7: Issues for 
Congress 
March 28, 2024 
This Legal Sidebar post is the last in a seven-part series that discusses t
he Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution. In an effort to ensure that the United States will always possess a functioning President and 
Vice President, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment seeks to promote th
e prompt, orderly, and democratic 
transfer of executive power. In particular, the Amendment establishes procedures for addressing 
presidential inability and vacancies that arise in the presidency or vice presidency. Because Congress may 
play a role in implementing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, understanding the Amendment’s history and 
drafting may assist Congress in its legislative activities.  
This Sidebar post discusses issues for Congress related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Other Sidebars 
in this series discuss the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’
s procedures; the framing of th
e Presidential 
Succession Clause at t
he Constitutional Convention of 1787; t
he history of presidential succession; and 
the Amendment’s drafting i
n Congress a
nd implementation. Additional information on this topic is 
available at t
he Constitution Annotated: Analysis and Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and in 
several CRS reports.  
Issues for Congress 
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has helped to ensure the prompt and orderly transition of 
executive power 
on several occasions, various commentators have
 observed that the Amendment does not 
address all contingencies. In 2012, a Fordham University Law School Clinic on Presidential Succession 
identified several potential challenges: 
•  “Inability of the President when there is a vacancy in the office of Vice President”; 
•  “Dual inability of the President and Vice President”; 
•  “Inability of the Vice President”; and 
•  “Inability of a statutory successor while acting as President.” 
Congressional Research Service 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
LSB11137 
CRS Legal Sidebar 
Prepared for Members and  
 Committees of Congress 
 
  
 
Congressional Research Service 
2 
For instance, if the Vice President were unable to discharge his duties, then a President who anticipates 
becoming incapacitat
ed might refrain from invoking Section 3 to “transfer his powers even briefly to an 
unable Vice President.” Vice-presidential inabilit
y would also prevent executive branch officials from 
invoking Section 4 because any presidential inability determination requires the Vice President’s 
participation. Furthermore, under Section 1, an incapacitated Vice President would
 automatically succeed 
to the presidency in the event of a presidential vacancy, but federal law does not specifically provide for 
an official to serve as Acting President for the duration of the new President’s inability. 
Because Article II’
s Presidential Succession Clause authorizes Congress to enact legislation addressing 
dual inability or vacancy scenarios, some scholars have
 recommended that Congress authorize a disabled 
President (or Acting President) to transfer his powers and duties to a statutorily designated successor, who 
would serve as Acting President in the absence of a healthy Vice President. Some commentators have
 also 
suggested that Congress empower a statutory successor, acting in conjunction with a majority of the 
Cabinet or other congressionally created body, to determine whether the President (or Acting President) is 
unable to fulfill his duties when there is no functioning Vice President. Other commentator
s have argued 
that Article II’s Succession Clause and the Presidential Succession Act implicitly permit the officer 
designated as “next in line” to the presidency to determine presidential and vice-presidential inability in 
the absence of a healthy Vice President. 
Members of Congress and academics have also debated the meaning of “presidential inability” for 
purposes of Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Congressional hearings and debates 
suggest that the Amendment’s framer
s intentionally left the terms “inability” and “unable” ambiguous so 
that future decisionmakers would retain flexibility to address unforeseen contingencies that prevent the 
President from fulfilling his constitutional responsibilities. The Amendment’
s legislative history suggests 
that physical or mental inability, whether temporary or permanent
, could qualify as an “inability” under 
either section. However, as one commentator has
 observed, the Amendment’s framers did not intend for 
the notion of “presidential inability” to encompass “unpopularity, incompetence, impeachable conduct, 
poor judgment, [or] laziness.” As a practical matter, because the Supreme Court
 has been reluctant to 
decide questions textually committed to other branches of government, the ultimate discretion to define 
presidential “inability” might rest with the President, as provided in Section 3, or with the Vice President, 
Cabinet, and Congress, as provided in Section 4. 
Other
 approaches consider how Congress implements the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. For example, some 
policymakers and legal scholars have looked at whether Congress should exercise it
s Section 4 powers to 
create a “disability review body” to evaluate presidential inability in conjunction with the Vice President. 
Such a panel, whi
ch could be of limited durati
on, would displace the Cabinet’s default role in making that 
determination. At least some of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framer
s wanted to give Congress the 
flexibility to provide for another group of officials—which might include Cabinet members—to 
participate with the Vice President in determining presidential inability if experience had shown this to be 
“desirable.” However, although a disability review bod
y might prove useful if the President fired (or 
threatened to fire) Cabinet secretaries who voted to transfer his powers to the Vice President under 
Section 4, some commentators have
 expressed concerns that evaluation of presidential inability by 
officials outside of the executive branch could violate separation-of-powers principles. It also
 appears that 
the President
 could veto legislation establishing another body to evaluate presidential inability, subject to 
potential congressional override. 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers were aware of the Amendment’s potential shortcomings. During 
House floor debates on the draft Twenty-Fifth Amendment, House Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Emanuel Celler echoed many Members’ views when h
e remarked that “[n]o bill can be perfect” but that 
the Amendment was a “well-rounded, sensible, and efficient approach toward a solution of a perplexing 
problem—a problem that has baffled us for over 100 years.” 
  
Congressional Research Service 
3 
Author Information 
 Brandon J. Murrill 
   
Attorney-Adviser (Constitution Annotated)  
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
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to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
 
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